instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_exec(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *cmd)
{
if (ftp == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "SITE EXEC", cmd)) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 200) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_mspel8_mc32_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, ptrdiff_t stride)
{
uint8_t halfH[88];
uint8_t halfV[64];
uint8_t halfHV[64];
wmv2_mspel8_h_lowpass(halfH, src-stride, 8, stride, 11);
wmv2_mspel8_v_lowpass(halfV, src+1, 8, stride, 8);
wmv2_mspel8_v_lowpass(halfHV, halfH+8, 8, 8, 8);
put_pixels8_l2_8(dst, halfV, halfHV, stride, 8, 8, 8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ComponentControllerImpl::Detach() {
controller_binding_.set_error_handler(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_compute_index_tables(MXFContext *mxf)
{
int i, j, k, ret, nb_sorted_segments;
MXFIndexTableSegment **sorted_segments = NULL;
if ((ret = mxf_get_sorted_table_segments(mxf, &nb_sorted_segments, &sorted_segments)) ||
nb_sorted_segments <= 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "broken or empty index\n");
return 0;
}
/* sanity check and count unique BodySIDs/IndexSIDs */
for (i = 0; i < nb_sorted_segments; i++) {
if (i == 0 || sorted_segments[i-1]->index_sid != sorted_segments[i]->index_sid)
mxf->nb_index_tables++;
else if (sorted_segments[i-1]->body_sid != sorted_segments[i]->body_sid) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "found inconsistent BodySID\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto finish_decoding_index;
}
}
mxf->index_tables = av_mallocz_array(mxf->nb_index_tables,
sizeof(*mxf->index_tables));
if (!mxf->index_tables) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "failed to allocate index tables\n");
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto finish_decoding_index;
}
/* distribute sorted segments to index tables */
for (i = j = 0; i < nb_sorted_segments; i++) {
if (i != 0 && sorted_segments[i-1]->index_sid != sorted_segments[i]->index_sid) {
/* next IndexSID */
j++;
}
mxf->index_tables[j].nb_segments++;
}
for (i = j = 0; j < mxf->nb_index_tables; i += mxf->index_tables[j++].nb_segments) {
MXFIndexTable *t = &mxf->index_tables[j];
MXFTrack *mxf_track = NULL;
t->segments = av_mallocz_array(t->nb_segments,
sizeof(*t->segments));
if (!t->segments) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "failed to allocate IndexTableSegment"
" pointer array\n");
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto finish_decoding_index;
}
if (sorted_segments[i]->index_start_position)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "IndexSID %i starts at EditUnit %"PRId64" - seeking may not work as expected\n",
sorted_segments[i]->index_sid, sorted_segments[i]->index_start_position);
memcpy(t->segments, &sorted_segments[i], t->nb_segments * sizeof(MXFIndexTableSegment*));
t->index_sid = sorted_segments[i]->index_sid;
t->body_sid = sorted_segments[i]->body_sid;
if ((ret = mxf_compute_ptses_fake_index(mxf, t)) < 0)
goto finish_decoding_index;
for (k = 0; k < mxf->fc->nb_streams; k++) {
MXFTrack *track = mxf->fc->streams[k]->priv_data;
if (track && track->index_sid == t->index_sid) {
mxf_track = track;
break;
}
}
/* fix zero IndexDurations */
for (k = 0; k < t->nb_segments; k++) {
if (!t->segments[k]->index_edit_rate.num || !t->segments[k]->index_edit_rate.den) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "IndexSID %i segment %i has invalid IndexEditRate\n",
t->index_sid, k);
if (mxf_track)
t->segments[k]->index_edit_rate = mxf_track->edit_rate;
}
if (t->segments[k]->index_duration)
continue;
if (t->nb_segments > 1)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "IndexSID %i segment %i has zero IndexDuration and there's more than one segment\n",
t->index_sid, k);
if (!mxf_track) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "no streams?\n");
break;
}
/* assume the first stream's duration is reasonable
* leave index_duration = 0 on further segments in case we have any (unlikely)
*/
t->segments[k]->index_duration = mxf_track->original_duration;
break;
}
}
ret = 0;
finish_decoding_index:
av_free(sorted_segments);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err ctts_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_CompositionOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_CompositionOffsetBox *) s;
ptr->size += 4 + (8 * ptr->nb_entries);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainGetEmulatorPinInfo(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned char *cpumap,
int maplen, unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "cpumap=%p, maplen=%d, flags=%x",
cpumap, maplen, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(cpumap, error);
virCheckPositiveArgGoto(maplen, error);
VIR_EXCLUSIVE_FLAGS_GOTO(VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_LIVE,
VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CONFIG,
error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetEmulatorPinInfo) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetEmulatorPinInfo(domain, cpumap,
maplen, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_set_cookie_params)
{
zval **lifetime = NULL;
char *path = NULL, *domain = NULL;
int path_len, domain_len, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zend_bool secure = 0, httponly = 0;
if (!PS(use_cookies) ||
zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "Z|ssbb", &lifetime, &path, &path_len, &domain, &domain_len, &secure, &httponly) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
convert_to_string_ex(lifetime);
zend_alter_ini_entry("session.cookie_lifetime", sizeof("session.cookie_lifetime"), Z_STRVAL_PP(lifetime), Z_STRLEN_PP(lifetime), PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
if (path) {
zend_alter_ini_entry("session.cookie_path", sizeof("session.cookie_path"), path, path_len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
}
if (domain) {
zend_alter_ini_entry("session.cookie_domain", sizeof("session.cookie_domain"), domain, domain_len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
}
if (argc > 3) {
zend_alter_ini_entry("session.cookie_secure", sizeof("session.cookie_secure"), secure ? "1" : "0", 1, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
}
if (argc > 4) {
zend_alter_ini_entry("session.cookie_httponly", sizeof("session.cookie_httponly"), httponly ? "1" : "0", 1, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PredictorVGetField(TIFF* tif, uint32 tag, va_list ap)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->vgetparent != NULL);
switch (tag) {
case TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR:
*va_arg(ap, uint16*) = (uint16)sp->predictor;
break;
default:
return (*sp->vgetparent)(tif, tag, ap);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 48,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static authz_status ssl_authz_verify_client_check(request_rec *r,
const char *require_line,
const void *parsed)
{
SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
if (!ssl)
return AUTHZ_DENIED;
if (sslconn->verify_error == NULL &&
sslconn->verify_info == NULL &&
SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
{
X509 *xs = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (xs) {
X509_free(xs);
return AUTHZ_GRANTED;
}
else {
X509_free(xs);
}
}
return AUTHZ_DENIED;
}
Commit Message: modssl: reset client-verify state when renegotiation is aborted
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1750779 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 52,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int netlbl_cipsov4_genl_init(void)
{
int ret_val;
ret_val = genl_register_family(&netlbl_cipsov4_gnl_family);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_cipsov4_gnl_family,
&netlbl_cipsov4_genl_c_add);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_cipsov4_gnl_family,
&netlbl_cipsov4_genl_c_remove);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_cipsov4_gnl_family,
&netlbl_cipsov4_genl_c_list);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
ret_val = genl_register_ops(&netlbl_cipsov4_gnl_family,
&netlbl_cipsov4_genl_c_listall);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array was not always fully initialized, which caused sporadic
failures.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_push_have_end(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr->end_fn != NULL)
(*(png_ptr->end_fn))(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *js_utfidxtoptr(const char *s, int i)
{
Rune rune;
while (i-- > 0) {
rune = *(unsigned char*)s;
if (rune < Runeself) {
if (rune == 0)
return NULL;
++s;
} else
s += chartorune(&rune, s);
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 90,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PresentationConnection::matches(const String& id, const KURL& url) const {
return m_url == url && m_id == id;
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init pegasus_init(void)
{
pr_info("%s: %s, " DRIVER_DESC "\n", driver_name, DRIVER_VERSION);
if (devid)
parse_id(devid);
return usb_register(&pegasus_driver);
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, n_valid, do_write, do_scrub;
char *c, *dname, *name;
DIR *dir;
FILE *fp;
pdf_t *pdf;
pdf_flag_t flags;
if (argc < 2)
usage();
/* Args */
do_write = do_scrub = flags = 0;
name = NULL;
for (i=1; i<argc; i++)
{
if (strncmp(argv[i], "-w", 2) == 0)
do_write = 1;
else if (strncmp(argv[i], "-i", 2) == 0)
flags |= PDF_FLAG_DISP_CREATOR;
else if (strncmp(argv[i], "-q", 2) == 0)
flags |= PDF_FLAG_QUIET;
else if (strncmp(argv[i], "-s", 2) == 0)
do_scrub = 1;
else if (argv[i][0] != '-')
name = argv[i];
else if (argv[i][0] == '-')
usage();
}
if (!name)
usage();
if (!(fp = fopen(name, "r")))
{
ERR("Could not open file '%s'\n", argv[1]);
return -1;
}
else if (!pdf_is_pdf(fp))
{
ERR("'%s' specified is not a valid PDF\n", name);
fclose(fp);
return -1;
}
/* Load PDF */
if (!(pdf = init_pdf(fp, name)))
{
fclose(fp);
return -1;
}
/* Count valid xrefs */
for (i=0, n_valid=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version)
++n_valid;
/* Bail if we only have 1 valid */
if (n_valid < 2)
{
if (!(flags & (PDF_FLAG_QUIET | PDF_FLAG_DISP_CREATOR)))
printf("%s: There is only one version of this PDF\n", pdf->name);
if (do_write)
{
fclose(fp);
pdf_delete(pdf);
return 0;
}
}
dname = NULL;
if (do_write)
{
/* Create directory to place the various versions in */
if ((c = strrchr(name, '/')))
name = c + 1;
if ((c = strrchr(name, '.')))
*c = '\0';
dname = malloc(strlen(name) + 16);
sprintf(dname, "%s-versions", name);
if (!(dir = opendir(dname)))
mkdir(dname, S_IRWXU);
else
{
ERR("This directory already exists, PDF version extraction will "
"not occur.\n");
fclose(fp);
closedir(dir);
free(dname);
pdf_delete(pdf);
return -1;
}
/* Write the pdf as a pervious version */
for (i=0; i<pdf->n_xrefs; i++)
if (pdf->xrefs[i].version)
write_version(fp, name, dname, &pdf->xrefs[i]);
}
/* Generate a per-object summary */
pdf_summarize(fp, pdf, dname, flags);
/* Have we been summoned to scrub history from this PDF */
if (do_scrub)
scrub_document(fp, pdf);
/* Display extra information */
if (flags & PDF_FLAG_DISP_CREATOR)
display_creator(fp, pdf);
fclose(fp);
free(dname);
pdf_delete(pdf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __declspec(dllexport)
#endif
SQLITE_API int sqlite3_fts5_init(
sqlite3 *db,
char **pzErrMsg,
const sqlite3_api_routines *pApi
){
SQLITE_EXTENSION_INIT2(pApi);
(void)pzErrMsg; /* Unused parameter */
return fts5Init(db);
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int copy_files(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct files_struct *oldf, *newf;
int error = 0;
/*
* A background process may not have any files ...
*/
oldf = current->files;
if (!oldf)
goto out;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FILES) {
atomic_inc(&oldf->count);
goto out;
}
newf = dup_fd(oldf, &error);
if (!newf)
goto out;
tsk->files = newf;
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostManager::DidUpdateFrameTree(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
if (render_view_host != current_host())
return;
RenderViewHostImpl* render_view_host_impl = static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(
render_view_host);
for (RenderViewHostMap::iterator iter = swapped_out_hosts_.begin();
iter != swapped_out_hosts_.end();
++iter) {
DCHECK_NE(iter->second->GetSiteInstance(),
current_host()->GetSiteInstance());
if (iter->second != pending_render_view_host_) {
iter->second->UpdateFrameTree(
render_view_host_impl->GetProcess()->GetID(),
render_view_host_impl->GetRoutingID(),
render_view_host_impl->frame_tree());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_write_access(struct inode * inode)
{
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) < 0) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return -ETXTBSY;
}
atomic_inc(&inode->i_writecount);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(xps_document *doc, xps_part *part)
{
unsigned char buf[33];
unsigned char key[16];
char *p;
int i;
p = strrchr(part->name, '/');
if (!p)
p = part->name;
for (i = 0; i < 32 && *p; p++)
{
if (ishex(*p))
buf[i++] = *p;
}
buf[i] = 0;
if (i != 32)
{
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot extract GUID from obfuscated font part name");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
key[i] = unhex(buf[i*2+0]) * 16 + unhex(buf[i*2+1]);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
part->data[i] ^= key[15-i];
part->data[i+16] ^= key[15-i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_pre_login(Session *s)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
pid_t pid = getpid();
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name,
get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PerformanceEntryVector Performance::getEntriesByName(const String& name,
const String& entry_type) {
PerformanceEntryVector entries;
PerformanceEntry::EntryType type =
PerformanceEntry::ToEntryTypeEnum(entry_type);
if (!entry_type.IsNull() && type == PerformanceEntry::kInvalid)
return entries;
if (entry_type.IsNull() || type == PerformanceEntry::kResource) {
for (const auto& resource : resource_timing_buffer_) {
if (resource->name() == name)
entries.push_back(resource);
}
}
if (entry_type.IsNull() || type == PerformanceEntry::kNavigation) {
if (!navigation_timing_)
navigation_timing_ = CreateNavigationTimingInstance();
if (navigation_timing_ && navigation_timing_->name() == name)
entries.push_back(navigation_timing_);
}
if (entry_type.IsNull() || type == PerformanceEntry::kComposite ||
type == PerformanceEntry::kRender) {
for (const auto& frame : frame_timing_buffer_) {
if (frame->name() == name &&
(entry_type.IsNull() || entry_type == frame->entryType()))
entries.push_back(frame);
}
}
if (user_timing_) {
if (entry_type.IsNull() || type == PerformanceEntry::kMark)
entries.AppendVector(user_timing_->GetMarks(name));
if (entry_type.IsNull() || type == PerformanceEntry::kMeasure)
entries.AppendVector(user_timing_->GetMeasures(name));
}
if (entry_type.IsNull() || type == PerformanceEntry::kPaint) {
if (first_paint_timing_ && first_paint_timing_->name() == name)
entries.push_back(first_paint_timing_);
if (first_contentful_paint_timing_ &&
first_contentful_paint_timing_->name() == name)
entries.push_back(first_contentful_paint_timing_);
}
std::sort(entries.begin(), entries.end(),
PerformanceEntry::StartTimeCompareLessThan);
return entries;
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8 *obuf,
uint32 imagelength, uint32 imagewidth,
uint32 tw, uint32 tl,
uint16 spp, uint16 bps)
{
int i, status = 1, sample;
int shift_width, bytes_per_pixel;
uint16 bytes_per_sample;
uint32 row, col; /* Current row and col of image */
uint32 nrow, ncol; /* Number of rows and cols in current tile */
uint32 row_offset, col_offset; /* Output buffer offsets */
tsize_t tbytes = 0, tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
tsample_t s;
uint8* bufp = (uint8*)obuf;
unsigned char *srcbuffs[MAX_SAMPLES];
unsigned char *tbuff = NULL;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
for (sample = 0; (sample < spp) && (sample < MAX_SAMPLES); sample++)
{
srcbuffs[sample] = NULL;
tbuff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(tilesize + 8);
if (!tbuff)
{
TIFFError ("readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to allocate tile read buffer for sample %d", sample);
for (i = 0; i < sample; i++)
_TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]);
return 0;
}
srcbuffs[sample] = tbuff;
}
/* Each tile contains only the data for a single plane
* arranged in scanlines of tw * bytes_per_sample bytes.
*/
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
for (s = 0; s < spp && s < MAX_SAMPLES; s++)
{ /* Read each plane of a tile set into srcbuffs[s] */
tbytes = TIFFReadTile(in, srcbuffs[s], col, row, 0, s);
if (tbytes < 0 && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile for row %lu col %lu, "
"sample %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row,
(unsigned long) s);
status = 0;
for (sample = 0; (sample < spp) && (sample < MAX_SAMPLES); sample++)
{
tbuff = srcbuffs[sample];
if (tbuff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(tbuff);
}
return status;
}
}
/* Tiles on the right edge may be padded out to tw
* which must be a multiple of 16.
* Ncol represents the visible (non padding) portion.
*/
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
row_offset = row * (((imagewidth * spp * bps) + 7) / 8);
col_offset = ((col * spp * bps) + 7) / 8;
bufp = obuf + row_offset + col_offset;
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
{
if (combineSeparateTileSamplesBytes(srcbuffs, bufp, ncol, nrow, imagewidth,
tw, spp, bps, NULL, 0, 0))
{
status = 0;
break;
}
}
else
{
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
switch (shift_width)
{
case 1: if (combineSeparateTileSamples8bits (srcbuffs, bufp, ncol, nrow,
imagewidth, tw, spp, bps,
NULL, 0, 0))
{
status = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 2: if (combineSeparateTileSamples16bits (srcbuffs, bufp, ncol, nrow,
imagewidth, tw, spp, bps,
NULL, 0, 0))
{
status = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 3: if (combineSeparateTileSamples24bits (srcbuffs, bufp, ncol, nrow,
imagewidth, tw, spp, bps,
NULL, 0, 0))
{
status = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: if (combineSeparateTileSamples32bits (srcbuffs, bufp, ncol, nrow,
imagewidth, tw, spp, bps,
NULL, 0, 0))
{
status = 0;
break;
}
break;
default: TIFFError ("readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth: %d", bps);
status = 0;
break;
}
}
}
}
for (sample = 0; (sample < spp) && (sample < MAX_SAMPLES); sample++)
{
tbuff = srcbuffs[sample];
if (tbuff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(tbuff);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RFlagItem *r_flag_get_at(RFlag *f, ut64 off, bool closest) {
RFlagItem *item, *nice = NULL;
RListIter *iter;
const RFlagsAtOffset *flags_at = r_flag_get_nearest_list (f, off, -1);
if (!flags_at) {
return NULL;
}
if (flags_at->off == off) {
r_list_foreach (flags_at->flags, iter, item) {
if (f->space_idx != -1 && item->space != f->space_idx) {
continue;
}
if (nice) {
if (isFunctionFlag (nice->name)) {
nice = item;
}
} else {
nice = item;
}
}
return nice;
}
if (!closest) {
return NULL;
}
while (!nice && flags_at) {
r_list_foreach (flags_at->flags, iter, item) {
if (f->space_strict && IS_IN_SPACE (f, item)) {
continue;
}
if (item->offset == off) {
eprintf ("XXX Should never happend\n");
return evalFlag (f, item);
}
nice = item;
break;
}
if (flags_at->off) {
flags_at = r_flag_get_nearest_list (f, flags_at->off - 1, -1);
} else {
flags_at = NULL;
}
}
return evalFlag (f, nice);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tcp_collapse(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff_head *list,
struct sk_buff *head, struct sk_buff *tail,
u32 start, u32 end)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *n;
bool end_of_skbs;
/* First, check that queue is collapsible and find
* the point where collapsing can be useful. */
skb = head;
restart:
end_of_skbs = true;
skb_queue_walk_from_safe(list, skb, n) {
if (skb == tail)
break;
/* No new bits? It is possible on ofo queue. */
if (!before(start, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq)) {
skb = tcp_collapse_one(sk, skb, list);
if (!skb)
break;
goto restart;
}
/* The first skb to collapse is:
* - not SYN/FIN and
* - bloated or contains data before "start" or
* overlaps to the next one.
*/
if (!(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & (TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_FIN)) &&
(tcp_win_from_space(skb->truesize) > skb->len ||
before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, start))) {
end_of_skbs = false;
break;
}
if (!skb_queue_is_last(list, skb)) {
struct sk_buff *next = skb_queue_next(list, skb);
if (next != tail &&
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != TCP_SKB_CB(next)->seq) {
end_of_skbs = false;
break;
}
}
/* Decided to skip this, advance start seq. */
start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
}
if (end_of_skbs ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & (TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_FIN)))
return;
while (before(start, end)) {
int copy = min_t(int, SKB_MAX_ORDER(0, 0), end - start);
struct sk_buff *nskb;
nskb = alloc_skb(copy, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
return;
memcpy(nskb->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(skb->cb));
TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->seq = TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->end_seq = start;
__skb_queue_before(list, skb, nskb);
skb_set_owner_r(nskb, sk);
/* Copy data, releasing collapsed skbs. */
while (copy > 0) {
int offset = start - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
int size = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq - start;
BUG_ON(offset < 0);
if (size > 0) {
size = min(copy, size);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, skb_put(nskb, size), size))
BUG();
TCP_SKB_CB(nskb)->end_seq += size;
copy -= size;
start += size;
}
if (!before(start, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq)) {
skb = tcp_collapse_one(sk, skb, list);
if (!skb ||
skb == tail ||
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & (TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_FIN)))
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compute_moov_size(AVFormatContext *s)
{
int i, moov_size, moov_size2;
MOVMuxContext *mov = s->priv_data;
moov_size = get_moov_size(s);
if (moov_size < 0)
return moov_size;
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
mov->tracks[i].data_offset += moov_size;
moov_size2 = get_moov_size(s);
if (moov_size2 < 0)
return moov_size2;
/* if the size changed, we just switched from stco to co64 and need to
* update the offsets */
if (moov_size2 != moov_size)
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
mov->tracks[i].data_offset += moov_size2 - moov_size;
return moov_size2;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_cert_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_,
uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_cert *p;
struct ikev1_pl_cert cert;
static const char *certstr[] = {
"none", "pkcs7", "pgp", "dns",
"x509sign", "x509ke", "kerberos", "crl",
"arl", "spki", "x509attr",
};
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CERT)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_cert *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&cert, ext, sizeof(cert));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", item_len - 4));
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", STR_OR_ID((cert.encode), certstr)));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < item_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), item_len - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_CERT)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnShowSystemDialog() {
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("onSystemDialogLinkClicked");
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_directory_remove_file_monitors (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file)
{
GList *result, **list, *node, *next;
Monitor *monitor;
g_assert (NAUTILUS_IS_DIRECTORY (directory));
g_assert (NAUTILUS_IS_FILE (file));
g_assert (file->details->directory == directory);
result = NULL;
list = &directory->details->monitor_list;
for (node = directory->details->monitor_list; node != NULL; node = next)
{
next = node->next;
monitor = node->data;
if (monitor->file == file)
{
*list = g_list_remove_link (*list, node);
result = g_list_concat (node, result);
request_counter_remove_request (directory->details->monitor_counters,
monitor->request);
}
}
/* XXX - do we need to remove anything from the work queue? */
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
return (FileMonitors *) result;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void des_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypt_s390_km(KM_DEA_ENCRYPT, ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkCanvas* SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::BeginPaintRenderPass(
const RenderPassId& id,
const gfx::Size& surface_size,
ResourceFormat format,
bool mipmap,
sk_sp<SkColorSpace> color_space) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(!current_paint_);
DCHECK(resource_sync_tokens_.empty());
SkSurfaceCharacterization c = CreateSkSurfaceCharacterization(
surface_size, format, mipmap, std::move(color_space));
current_paint_.emplace(c, id);
return current_paint_->recorder()->getCanvas();
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_card_module_info_read(struct snd_info_entry *entry,
struct snd_info_buffer *buffer)
{
int idx;
struct snd_card *card;
for (idx = 0; idx < SNDRV_CARDS; idx++) {
mutex_lock(&snd_card_mutex);
if ((card = snd_cards[idx]) != NULL)
snd_iprintf(buffer, "%2i %s\n",
idx, card->module->name);
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 36,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent)
: Chunk(parent, kChunk_VP8X)
{
this->needsRewrite = true;
this->size = 10;
this->data.resize(this->size);
this->data.assign(this->size, 0);
XMP_Uns8* bitstream =
(XMP_Uns8*)parent->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_IMAGE][0]->data.data();
XMP_Uns32 width = ((bitstream[7] << 8) | bitstream[6]) & 0x3fff;
XMP_Uns32 height = ((bitstream[9] << 8) | bitstream[8]) & 0x3fff;
this->width(width);
this->height(height);
parent->vp8x = this;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit DeferredTaskSetColorInput(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate, BlackBerry::Platform::String value)
: DeferredTaskType(webPagePrivate)
{
webPagePrivate->m_cachedColorInput = value;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string_expand_home (const char *path)
{
char *ptr_home, *str;
int length;
if (!path)
return NULL;
if (!path[0] || (path[0] != '~')
|| ((path[1] && path[1] != DIR_SEPARATOR_CHAR)))
{
return strdup (path);
}
ptr_home = getenv ("HOME");
length = strlen (ptr_home) + strlen (path + 1) + 1;
str = malloc (length);
if (!str)
return strdup (path);
snprintf (str, length, "%s%s", ptr_home, path + 1);
return str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void accumulate_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 delta;
if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
return;
delta = current->sched_info.run_delay - vcpu->arch.st.last_steal;
vcpu->arch.st.last_steal = current->sched_info.run_delay;
vcpu->arch.st.accum_steal = delta;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_compr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f)
{
struct snd_compr *compr;
struct snd_compr_file *data;
struct snd_compr_runtime *runtime;
enum snd_compr_direction dirn;
int maj = imajor(inode);
int ret;
if ((f->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
dirn = SND_COMPRESS_PLAYBACK;
else if ((f->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
dirn = SND_COMPRESS_CAPTURE;
else
return -EINVAL;
if (maj == snd_major)
compr = snd_lookup_minor_data(iminor(inode),
SNDRV_DEVICE_TYPE_COMPRESS);
else
return -EBADFD;
if (compr == NULL) {
pr_err("no device data!!!\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (dirn != compr->direction) {
pr_err("this device doesn't support this direction\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
data->stream.ops = compr->ops;
data->stream.direction = dirn;
data->stream.private_data = compr->private_data;
data->stream.device = compr;
runtime = kzalloc(sizeof(*runtime), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!runtime) {
kfree(data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
runtime->state = SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN;
init_waitqueue_head(&runtime->sleep);
data->stream.runtime = runtime;
f->private_data = (void *)data;
mutex_lock(&compr->lock);
ret = compr->ops->open(&data->stream);
mutex_unlock(&compr->lock);
if (ret) {
kfree(runtime);
kfree(data);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipip6_tunnel_update(struct ip_tunnel *t, struct ip_tunnel_parm *p,
__u32 fwmark)
{
struct net *net = t->net;
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
ipip6_tunnel_unlink(sitn, t);
synchronize_net();
t->parms.iph.saddr = p->iph.saddr;
t->parms.iph.daddr = p->iph.daddr;
memcpy(t->dev->dev_addr, &p->iph.saddr, 4);
memcpy(t->dev->broadcast, &p->iph.daddr, 4);
ipip6_tunnel_link(sitn, t);
t->parms.iph.ttl = p->iph.ttl;
t->parms.iph.tos = p->iph.tos;
t->parms.iph.frag_off = p->iph.frag_off;
if (t->parms.link != p->link || t->fwmark != fwmark) {
t->parms.link = p->link;
t->fwmark = fwmark;
ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev(t->dev);
}
dst_cache_reset(&t->dst_cache);
netdev_state_change(t->dev);
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::cssCompositingEnabled() const
{
return RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssCompositingEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ShowCreatedWidget(int route_id,
bool is_fullscreen,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect) {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* widget_host_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(GetCreatedWidget(route_id));
if (!widget_host_view)
return;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = NULL;
BrowserPluginGuest* guest = GetBrowserPluginGuest();
if (guest && guest->embedder_web_contents()) {
view = guest->embedder_web_contents()->GetRenderWidgetHostView();
} else {
view = GetRenderWidgetHostView();
}
if (is_fullscreen) {
DCHECK_EQ(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, fullscreen_widget_routing_id_);
view_->StoreFocus();
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_ = route_id;
if (delegate_ && delegate_->EmbedsFullscreenWidget()) {
widget_host_view->InitAsChild(GetRenderWidgetHostView()->GetNativeView());
delegate_->EnterFullscreenModeForTab(this, GURL());
} else {
widget_host_view->InitAsFullscreen(view);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidShowFullscreenWidget(route_id));
if (!widget_host_view->HasFocus())
widget_host_view->Focus();
} else {
widget_host_view->InitAsPopup(view, initial_rect);
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host_impl =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget_host_view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
render_widget_host_impl->Init();
render_widget_host_impl->set_allow_privileged_mouse_lock(is_fullscreen);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::NSObjectRelease(widget_host_view->GetNativeView());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnChannelError() {
ProcessDied(true /* already_dead */);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t ctrl_get_render_size(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
va_list args) {
int *const render_size = va_arg(args, int *);
if (ctx->frame_parallel_decode) {
set_error_detail(ctx, "Not supported in frame parallel decode");
return VPX_CODEC_INCAPABLE;
}
if (render_size) {
if (ctx->frame_workers) {
VPxWorker *const worker = ctx->frame_workers;
FrameWorkerData *const frame_worker_data =
(FrameWorkerData *)worker->data1;
const VP9_COMMON *const cm = &frame_worker_data->pbi->common;
render_size[0] = cm->render_width;
render_size[1] = cm->render_height;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
} else {
return VPX_CODEC_ERROR;
}
}
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool hal_open() {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
int fd_array[CH_MAX];
int number_of_ports = vendor->send_command(VENDOR_OPEN_USERIAL, &fd_array);
if (number_of_ports != 1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s opened the wrong number of ports: got %d, expected 1.", __func__, number_of_ports);
goto error;
}
uart_fd = fd_array[0];
if (uart_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to open the uart serial port.", __func__);
goto error;
}
uart_stream = eager_reader_new(uart_fd, &allocator_malloc, HCI_HAL_SERIAL_BUFFER_SIZE, SIZE_MAX, "hci_single_channel");
if (!uart_stream) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create eager reader for the uart serial port.", __func__);
goto error;
}
stream_has_interpretation = false;
stream_corruption_detected = false;
stream_corruption_bytes_to_ignore = 0;
eager_reader_register(uart_stream, thread_get_reactor(thread), event_uart_has_bytes, NULL);
thread_set_priority(thread, HCI_THREAD_PRIORITY);
thread_set_priority(eager_reader_get_read_thread(uart_stream), HCI_THREAD_PRIORITY);
return true;
error:
interface.close();
return false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int auth_session_timeout_cb(CALLBACK_FRAME) {
pr_event_generate("core.timeout-session", NULL);
pr_response_send_async(R_421,
_("Session Timeout (%d seconds): closing control connection"),
TimeoutSession);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_INFO, "%s", "FTP session timed out, disconnected");
pr_session_disconnect(&auth_module, PR_SESS_DISCONNECT_TIMEOUT,
"TimeoutSession");
/* no need to restart the timer -- session's over */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OnInstallApplication(TabContents* source,
const WebApplicationInfo& web_app) {
ExtensionService* extensions_service = profile()->GetExtensionService();
if (!extensions_service)
return;
scoped_refptr<CrxInstaller> installer(
new CrxInstaller(extensions_service,
extensions_service->show_extensions_prompts() ?
new ExtensionInstallUI(profile()) : NULL));
installer->InstallWebApp(web_app);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __tcp_put_md5sig_pool(void)
{
tcp_free_md5sig_pool();
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodDefaultNullableStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<kTreatNullAndUndefinedAsNullString> default_string_arg;
if (!info[0]->IsUndefined()) {
default_string_arg = info[0];
if (!default_string_arg.Prepare())
return;
} else {
default_string_arg = nullptr;
}
impl->voidMethodDefaultNullableStringArg(default_string_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt, int noignore)
{
int len;
if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC) &&
ssh->deferred_len == 0 && !noignore &&
!(ssh->remote_bugs & BUG_CHOKES_ON_SSH2_IGNORE)) {
/*
* Interpose an SSH_MSG_IGNORE to ensure that user data don't
* get encrypted with a known IV.
*/
struct Packet *ipkt = ssh2_pkt_init(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
ssh2_pkt_addstring_start(ipkt);
ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, ipkt, TRUE);
}
len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
if (ssh->deferred_len + len > ssh->deferred_size) {
ssh->deferred_size = ssh->deferred_len + len + 128;
ssh->deferred_send_data = sresize(ssh->deferred_send_data,
ssh->deferred_size,
unsigned char);
}
memcpy(ssh->deferred_send_data + ssh->deferred_len, pkt->body, len);
ssh->deferred_len += len;
ssh->deferred_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
ssh_free_packet(pkt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntries() {
bool transient = transient_entry_index_ != -1;
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
if (transient) {
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(kInvalidateAll);
}
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usb_sg_wait(struct usb_sg_request *io)
{
int i;
int entries = io->entries;
/* queue the urbs. */
spin_lock_irq(&io->lock);
i = 0;
while (i < entries && !io->status) {
int retval;
io->urbs[i]->dev = io->dev;
spin_unlock_irq(&io->lock);
retval = usb_submit_urb(io->urbs[i], GFP_NOIO);
switch (retval) {
/* maybe we retrying will recover */
case -ENXIO: /* hc didn't queue this one */
case -EAGAIN:
case -ENOMEM:
retval = 0;
yield();
break;
/* no error? continue immediately.
*
* NOTE: to work better with UHCI (4K I/O buffer may
* need 3K of TDs) it may be good to limit how many
* URBs are queued at once; N milliseconds?
*/
case 0:
++i;
cpu_relax();
break;
/* fail any uncompleted urbs */
default:
io->urbs[i]->status = retval;
dev_dbg(&io->dev->dev, "%s, submit --> %d\n",
__func__, retval);
usb_sg_cancel(io);
}
spin_lock_irq(&io->lock);
if (retval && (io->status == 0 || io->status == -ECONNRESET))
io->status = retval;
}
io->count -= entries - i;
if (io->count == 0)
complete(&io->complete);
spin_unlock_irq(&io->lock);
/* OK, yes, this could be packaged as non-blocking.
* So could the submit loop above ... but it's easier to
* solve neither problem than to solve both!
*/
wait_for_completion(&io->complete);
sg_clean(io);
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::frameDetached(WebFrame* frame) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, FrameDetached(frame));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t cr2, u32 error_code,
void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int r, emulation_type = EMULTYPE_RETRY;
enum emulation_result er;
r = vcpu->arch.mmu.page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, false);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
if (!r) {
r = 1;
goto out;
}
if (is_mmio_page_fault(vcpu, cr2))
emulation_type = 0;
er = x86_emulate_instruction(vcpu, cr2, emulation_type, insn, insn_len);
switch (er) {
case EMULATE_DONE:
return 1;
case EMULATE_USER_EXIT:
++vcpu->stat.mmio_exits;
/* fall through */
case EMULATE_FAIL:
return 0;
default:
BUG();
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib3f(
GLuint index, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1, GLfloat v2) {
GLfloat v[4] = { v0, v1, v2, 1.0f, };
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttrib3f", index, v)) {
state_.SetGenericVertexAttribBaseType(
index, SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT);
api()->glVertexAttrib3fFn(index, v0, v1, v2);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginServiceImpl::GetAllowedPluginForOpenChannelToPlugin(
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& page_url,
const std::string& mime_type,
PluginProcessHost::Client* client,
ResourceContext* resource_context) {
webkit::WebPluginInfo info;
bool allow_wildcard = true;
bool found = GetPluginInfo(
render_process_id, render_view_id, resource_context,
url, page_url, mime_type, allow_wildcard,
NULL, &info, NULL);
FilePath plugin_path;
if (found)
plugin_path = info.path;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PluginServiceImpl::FinishOpenChannelToPlugin,
base::Unretained(this),
render_process_id,
plugin_path,
client));
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Tags::SimpleTag::ShallowCopy(SimpleTag& rhs) const {
rhs.m_tag_name = m_tag_name;
rhs.m_tag_string = m_tag_string;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *loadfile(FILE *file)
{
long fsize, ret;
char *buf;
fseek(file, 0, SEEK_END);
fsize = ftell(file);
fseek(file, 0, SEEK_SET);
buf = malloc(fsize+1);
ret = fread(buf, 1, fsize, file);
if (ret != fsize)
exit(1);
buf[fsize] = '\0';
return buf;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_is_output_fmt_supported(int fmt)
{
switch(fmt) {
#if IW_SUPPORT_PNG == 1
case IW_FORMAT_PNG:
#endif
#if IW_SUPPORT_JPEG == 1
case IW_FORMAT_JPEG:
#endif
#if IW_SUPPORT_WEBP == 1
case IW_FORMAT_WEBP:
#endif
case IW_FORMAT_BMP:
case IW_FORMAT_TIFF:
case IW_FORMAT_MIFF:
case IW_FORMAT_PNM:
case IW_FORMAT_PPM:
case IW_FORMAT_PGM:
case IW_FORMAT_PBM:
case IW_FORMAT_PAM:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 0 | 66,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageHandler::ScreencastFrameCaptured(
std::unique_ptr<Page::ScreencastFrameMetadata> page_metadata,
const SkBitmap& bitmap) {
if (bitmap.drawsNothing()) {
if (capture_retry_count_) {
--capture_retry_count_;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&PageHandler::InnerSwapCompositorFrame,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kFrameRetryDelayMs));
}
--frames_in_flight_;
return;
}
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE, {base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(&EncodeSkBitmap, bitmap, screencast_format_,
screencast_quality_),
base::BindOnce(&PageHandler::ScreencastFrameEncoded,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(page_metadata)));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long madvise_remove(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
loff_t offset;
int error;
struct file *f;
*prev = NULL; /* tell sys_madvise we drop mmap_sem */
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
return -EINVAL;
f = vma->vm_file;
if (!f || !f->f_mapping || !f->f_mapping->host) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED|VM_WRITE)) != (VM_SHARED|VM_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
offset = (loff_t)(start - vma->vm_start)
+ ((loff_t)vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
/*
* Filesystem's fallocate may need to take i_mutex. We need to
* explicitly grab a reference because the vma (and hence the
* vma's reference to the file) can go away as soon as we drop
* mmap_sem.
*/
get_file(f);
if (userfaultfd_remove(vma, start, end)) {
/* mmap_sem was not released by userfaultfd_remove() */
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
}
error = vfs_fallocate(f,
FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE,
offset, end - start);
fput(f);
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[mhocko@suse.com: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127115318.911-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 85,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_prefix(smart_str* loc_name, char* key_name)
{
if( strncmp(key_name , LOC_PRIVATE_TAG , 7) == 0 ){
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, SEPARATOR , sizeof(SEPARATOR)-1);
smart_str_appendl(loc_name, PRIVATE_PREFIX , sizeof(PRIVATE_PREFIX)-1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 52,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: internal_ipc_send_recv(crm_ipc_t * client, const void *iov)
{
int rc = 0;
do {
rc = qb_ipcc_sendv_recv(client->ipc, iov, 2, client->buffer, client->buf_size, -1);
} while (rc == -EAGAIN && crm_ipc_connected(client));
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 86,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
IncludePrivacySensitiveFields include_privacy_sensitive_fields) {
if (!tab_strip)
ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index);
DictionaryValue* result = new DictionaryValue();
bool is_loading = contents->IsLoading();
result->SetInteger(keys::kIdKey, GetTabId(contents));
result->SetInteger(keys::kIndexKey, tab_index);
result->SetInteger(keys::kWindowIdKey, GetWindowIdOfTab(contents));
result->SetString(keys::kStatusKey, GetTabStatusText(is_loading));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kActiveKey,
tab_strip && tab_index == tab_strip->active_index());
result->SetBoolean(keys::kSelectedKey,
tab_strip && tab_index == tab_strip->active_index());
result->SetBoolean(keys::kHighlightedKey,
tab_strip && tab_strip->IsTabSelected(tab_index));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip && tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
result->SetBoolean(keys::kIncognitoKey,
contents->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord());
if (include_privacy_sensitive_fields == INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS) {
result->SetString(keys::kUrlKey, contents->GetURL().spec());
result->SetString(keys::kTitleKey, contents->GetTitle());
if (!is_loading) {
NavigationEntry* entry = contents->GetController().GetActiveEntry();
if (entry && entry->GetFavicon().valid)
result->SetString(keys::kFaviconUrlKey, entry->GetFavicon().url.spec());
}
}
if (tab_strip) {
WebContents* opener = tab_strip->GetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (opener)
result->SetInteger(keys::kOpenerTabIdKey, GetTabId(opener));
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioFlinger::EffectHandle::~EffectHandle()
{
ALOGV("Destructor %p", this);
if (mEffect == 0) {
mDestroyed = true;
return;
}
mEffect->lock();
mDestroyed = true;
mEffect->unlock();
disconnect(false);
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InRegionScrollableArea::InRegionScrollableArea()
: m_webPage(0)
, m_layer(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Remove minimum and maximum scroll position as they are no
longer required due to changes in ScrollViewBase.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87298
Patch by Genevieve Mak <gmak@rim.com> on 2012-05-23
Reviewed by Antonio Gomes.
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InRegionScrollableArea::InRegionScrollableArea):
* WebKitSupport/InRegionScrollableArea.h:
(InRegionScrollableArea):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118233 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XcursorImagesDestroy (XcursorImages *images)
{
int n;
if (!images)
return;
for (n = 0; n < images->nimage; n++)
XcursorImageDestroy (images->images[n]);
if (images->name)
free (images->name);
free (images);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::DispatchKeyEvent(
const std::string& type,
Maybe<int> modifiers,
Maybe<double> timestamp,
Maybe<std::string> text,
Maybe<std::string> unmodified_text,
Maybe<std::string> key_identifier,
Maybe<std::string> code,
Maybe<std::string> key,
Maybe<int> windows_virtual_key_code,
Maybe<int> native_virtual_key_code,
Maybe<bool> auto_repeat,
Maybe<bool> is_keypad,
Maybe<bool> is_system_key,
Maybe<int> location,
std::unique_ptr<DispatchKeyEventCallback> callback) {
blink::WebInputEvent::Type web_event_type;
if (type == Input::DispatchKeyEvent::TypeEnum::KeyDown) {
web_event_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kKeyDown;
} else if (type == Input::DispatchKeyEvent::TypeEnum::KeyUp) {
web_event_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kKeyUp;
} else if (type == Input::DispatchKeyEvent::TypeEnum::Char) {
web_event_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kChar;
} else if (type == Input::DispatchKeyEvent::TypeEnum::RawKeyDown) {
web_event_type = blink::WebInputEvent::kRawKeyDown;
} else {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
base::StringPrintf("Unexpected event type '%s'", type.c_str())));
return;
}
NativeWebKeyboardEvent event(
web_event_type,
GetEventModifiers(modifiers.fromMaybe(blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers),
auto_repeat.fromMaybe(false),
is_keypad.fromMaybe(false), location.fromMaybe(0)),
GetEventTimeTicks(std::move(timestamp)));
if (!SetKeyboardEventText(event.text, std::move(text))) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Invalid 'text' parameter"));
return;
}
if (!SetKeyboardEventText(event.unmodified_text,
std::move(unmodified_text))) {
callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("Invalid 'unmodifiedText' parameter"));
return;
}
if (windows_virtual_key_code.isJust())
event.windows_key_code = windows_virtual_key_code.fromJust();
if (native_virtual_key_code.isJust())
event.native_key_code = native_virtual_key_code.fromJust();
if (is_system_key.isJust())
event.is_system_key = is_system_key.fromJust();
if (code.isJust()) {
event.dom_code = static_cast<int>(
ui::KeycodeConverter::CodeStringToDomCode(code.fromJust()));
}
if (key.isJust()) {
event.dom_key = static_cast<int>(
ui::KeycodeConverter::KeyStringToDomKey(key.fromJust()));
}
if (!host_ || !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (event.native_key_code)
event.os_event = NativeInputEventBuilder::CreateEvent(event);
else
event.skip_in_browser = true;
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->Focus();
input_queued_ = false;
pending_key_callbacks_.push_back(std::move(callback));
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->ForwardKeyboardEvent(event);
if (!input_queued_) {
pending_key_callbacks_.back()->sendSuccess();
pending_key_callbacks_.pop_back();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool stratum_send(struct pool *pool, char *s, ssize_t len)
{
enum send_ret ret = SEND_INACTIVE;
if (opt_protocol)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "SEND: %s", s);
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
if (pool->stratum_active)
ret = __stratum_send(pool, s, len);
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
/* This is to avoid doing applog under stratum_lock */
switch (ret) {
default:
case SEND_OK:
break;
case SEND_SELECTFAIL:
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Write select failed on %s sock", get_pool_name(pool));
suspend_stratum(pool);
break;
case SEND_SENDFAIL:
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to send in stratum_send");
suspend_stratum(pool);
break;
case SEND_INACTIVE:
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Stratum send failed due to no pool stratum_active");
break;
}
return (ret == SEND_OK);
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmw_legacy_srf_destroy(struct vmw_resource *res)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = res->dev_priv;
uint32_t submit_size;
uint8_t *cmd;
BUG_ON(res->id == -1);
/*
* Encode the dma- and surface destroy commands.
*/
submit_size = vmw_surface_destroy_size();
cmd = vmw_fifo_reserve(dev_priv, submit_size);
if (unlikely(!cmd)) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed reserving FIFO space for surface "
"eviction.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
vmw_surface_destroy_encode(res->id, cmd);
vmw_fifo_commit(dev_priv, submit_size);
/*
* Surface memory usage accounting.
*/
dev_priv->used_memory_size -= res->backup_size;
/*
* Release the surface ID.
*/
vmw_resource_release_id(res);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 64,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_print_exec (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, struct t_gui_line *line)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
char *prefix_no_color, *message_no_color;
int tags_match, tag_found, i, j;
if (!line->data->message || !line->data->message[0])
return;
prefix_no_color = (line->data->prefix) ?
gui_color_decode (line->data->prefix, NULL) : NULL;
message_no_color = gui_color_decode (line->data->message, NULL);
if (!message_no_color)
{
if (prefix_no_color)
free (prefix_no_color);
return;
}
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_PRINT];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (!HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, buffer)
|| (buffer == HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, buffer)))
&& (!HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message)
|| !HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message)[0]
|| string_strcasestr (prefix_no_color, HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message))
|| string_strcasestr (message_no_color, HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, message))))
{
/* check if tags match */
if (HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, tags_array))
{
/* if there are tags in message printed */
if (line->data->tags_array)
{
tags_match = 1;
for (i = 0; i < HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, tags_count); i++)
{
/* search for tag in message */
tag_found = 0;
for (j = 0; j < line->data->tags_count; j++)
{
if (string_strcasecmp (HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, tags_array)[i],
line->data->tags_array[j]) == 0)
{
tag_found = 1;
break;
}
}
/* tag was asked by hook but not found in message? */
if (!tag_found)
{
tags_match = 0;
break;
}
}
}
else
tags_match = 0;
}
else
tags_match = 1;
/* run callback */
if (tags_match)
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, buffer, line->data->date,
line->data->tags_count,
(const char **)line->data->tags_array,
(int)line->data->displayed, (int)line->data->highlight,
(HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, strip_colors)) ? prefix_no_color : line->data->prefix,
(HOOK_PRINT(ptr_hook, strip_colors)) ? message_no_color : line->data->message);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
if (prefix_no_color)
free (prefix_no_color);
if (message_no_color)
free (message_no_color);
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sc_format_asn1_entry(struct sc_asn1_entry *entry, void *parm, void *arg,
int set_present)
{
entry->parm = parm;
entry->arg = arg;
if (set_present)
entry->flags |= SC_ASN1_PRESENT;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ValidMpegAudioFrameHeader(const uint8_t* header,
int header_size,
int* framesize) {
DCHECK_GE(header_size, 4);
*framesize = 0;
BitReader reader(header, 4); // Header can only be 4 bytes long.
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 11) == 0x7ff);
int version = ReadBits(&reader, 2);
RCHECK(version != 1); // Reserved.
int layer = ReadBits(&reader, 2);
RCHECK(layer != 0);
reader.SkipBits(1);
int bitrate_index = ReadBits(&reader, 4);
RCHECK(bitrate_index != 0xf);
int sampling_index = ReadBits(&reader, 2);
RCHECK(sampling_index != 3);
int padding = ReadBits(&reader, 1);
int sampling_rate = kSampleRateTable[version][sampling_index];
int bitrate;
if (version == VERSION_1) {
if (layer == LAYER_1)
bitrate = kBitRateTableV1L1[bitrate_index];
else if (layer == LAYER_2)
bitrate = kBitRateTableV1L2[bitrate_index];
else
bitrate = kBitRateTableV1L3[bitrate_index];
} else {
if (layer == LAYER_1)
bitrate = kBitRateTableV2L1[bitrate_index];
else
bitrate = kBitRateTableV2L23[bitrate_index];
}
if (layer == LAYER_1)
*framesize = ((12000 * bitrate) / sampling_rate + padding) * 4;
else
*framesize = (144000 * bitrate) / sampling_rate + padding;
return (bitrate > 0 && sampling_rate > 0);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void h264bsdFreeDpb(dpbStorage_t *dpb)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i;
/* Code */
ASSERT(dpb);
if (dpb->buffer)
{
for (i = 0; i < dpb->dpbSize+1; i++)
{
FREE(dpb->buffer[i].pAllocatedData);
}
}
FREE(dpb->buffer);
FREE(dpb->list);
FREE(dpb->outBuf);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API int r_bin_has_dbg_relocs(RBin *bin) {
RBinObject *o = r_bin_cur_object (bin);
return o? (R_BIN_DBG_RELOCS & o->info->dbg_info): false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parsefh(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const uint32_t *dp, int v3)
{
u_int len;
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp) / 4;
dp++;
} else
len = NFSX_V2FH / 4;
if (ND_TTEST2(*dp, len * sizeof(*dp))) {
nfs_printfh(ndo, dp, len);
return (dp + len);
}
trunc:
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link,
struct key *dest)
{
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
uid, gid, cred, perm, flags, restrict_link);
if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(keyring);
keyring = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
}
return keyring;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_OFPAT_RAW10_SET_VLAN_PCP(uint8_t pcp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
return decode_set_vlan_pcp(pcp, true, out);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecryptfs_calculate_md5(char *dst,
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
char *src, int len)
{
struct scatterlist sg;
struct hash_desc desc = {
.tfm = crypt_stat->hash_tfm,
.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
};
int rc = 0;
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_hash_tfm_mutex);
sg_init_one(&sg, (u8 *)src, len);
if (!desc.tfm) {
desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_HASH, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(desc.tfm);
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to "
"allocate crypto context; rc = [%d]\n",
rc);
goto out;
}
crypt_stat->hash_tfm = desc.tfm;
}
rc = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error initializing crypto hash; rc = [%d]\n",
__func__, rc);
goto out;
}
rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error updating crypto hash; rc = [%d]\n",
__func__, rc);
goto out;
}
rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, dst);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error finalizing crypto hash; rc = [%d]\n",
__func__, rc);
goto out;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_hash_tfm_mutex);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int __get_next_segno(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type)
{
/* if segs_per_sec is large than 1, we need to keep original policy. */
if (sbi->segs_per_sec != 1)
return CURSEG_I(sbi, type)->segno;
if (type == CURSEG_HOT_DATA || IS_NODESEG(type))
return 0;
if (SIT_I(sbi)->last_victim[ALLOC_NEXT])
return SIT_I(sbi)->last_victim[ALLOC_NEXT];
return CURSEG_I(sbi, type)->segno;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void memcg_wakeup_oom(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
{
/* for filtering, pass "memcg" as argument. */
__wake_up(&memcg_oom_waitq, TASK_NORMAL, 0, memcg);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageResourceFactory(const FetchParameters& fetch_params)
: NonTextResourceFactory(Resource::kImage),
fetch_params_(&fetch_params) {}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hidp_recv_intr_frame(struct hidp_session *session,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned char hdr;
BT_DBG("session %p skb %p len %d", session, skb, skb->len);
hdr = skb->data[0];
skb_pull(skb, 1);
if (hdr == (HIDP_TRANS_DATA | HIDP_DATA_RTYPE_INPUT)) {
hidp_set_timer(session);
if (session->input)
hidp_input_report(session, skb);
if (session->hid) {
hid_input_report(session->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, skb->data, skb->len, 1);
BT_DBG("report len %d", skb->len);
}
} else {
BT_DBG("Unsupported protocol header 0x%02x", hdr);
}
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 33,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void compute_bandwidth(void)
{
unsigned bandwidth;
int i;
FFServerStream *stream;
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
bandwidth = 0;
for(i=0;i<stream->nb_streams;i++) {
LayeredAVStream *st = stream->streams[i];
switch(st->codec->codec_type) {
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO:
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO:
bandwidth += st->codec->bit_rate;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
stream->bandwidth = (bandwidth + 999) / 1000;
}
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteHeader(cmsIT8* it8, SAVESTREAM* fp)
{
KEYVALUE* p;
TABLE* t = GetTable(it8);
WriteStr(fp, t->SheetType);
WriteStr(fp, "\n");
for (p = t->HeaderList; (p != NULL); p = p->Next)
{
if (*p ->Keyword == '#') {
char* Pt;
WriteStr(fp, "#\n# ");
for (Pt = p ->Value; *Pt; Pt++) {
Writef(fp, "%c", *Pt);
if (*Pt == '\n') {
WriteStr(fp, "# ");
}
}
WriteStr(fp, "\n#\n");
continue;
}
if (!IsAvailableOnList(it8-> ValidKeywords, p->Keyword, NULL, NULL)) {
#ifdef CMS_STRICT_CGATS
WriteStr(fp, "KEYWORD\t\"");
WriteStr(fp, p->Keyword);
WriteStr(fp, "\"\n");
#endif
AddAvailableProperty(it8, p->Keyword, WRITE_UNCOOKED);
}
WriteStr(fp, p->Keyword);
if (p->Value) {
switch (p ->WriteAs) {
case WRITE_UNCOOKED:
Writef(fp, "\t%s", p ->Value);
break;
case WRITE_STRINGIFY:
Writef(fp, "\t\"%s\"", p->Value );
break;
case WRITE_HEXADECIMAL:
Writef(fp, "\t0x%X", atoi(p ->Value));
break;
case WRITE_BINARY:
Writef(fp, "\t0x%B", atoi(p ->Value));
break;
case WRITE_PAIR:
Writef(fp, "\t\"%s,%s\"", p->Subkey, p->Value);
break;
default: SynError(it8, "Unknown write mode %d", p ->WriteAs);
return;
}
}
WriteStr (fp, "\n");
}
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_dellink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct net_device *dev;
struct ifinfomsg *ifm;
char ifname[IFNAMSIZ];
struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_MAX+1];
int err;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ifm), tb, IFLA_MAX, ifla_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[IFLA_IFNAME])
nla_strlcpy(ifname, tb[IFLA_IFNAME], IFNAMSIZ);
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (ifm->ifi_index > 0)
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, ifm->ifi_index);
else if (tb[IFLA_IFNAME])
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname);
else if (tb[IFLA_GROUP])
return rtnl_group_dellink(net, nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_GROUP]));
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
return rtnl_delete_link(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRouteMessageEvent(
const ViewMsg_PostMessage_Params& params) {
delegate_->RouteMessageEvent(this, params);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::vector<ui::EventType>& events() const { return events_; };
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::PointerLockElement() const {
if (!GetPage() || GetPage()->GetPointerLockController().LockPending())
return nullptr;
if (Element* element = GetPage()->GetPointerLockController().GetElement()) {
if (element->GetDocument() == this)
return element;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base();
mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
} else {
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
}
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::DispatchMessageEventWithOriginCheck(
const WebSecurityOrigin& intended_target_origin,
const WebDOMEvent& event,
bool has_user_gesture) {
DCHECK(!event.IsNull());
std::unique_ptr<UserGestureIndicator> gesture_indicator;
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::UserActivationV2Enabled() && has_user_gesture) {
gesture_indicator = Frame::NotifyUserActivation(GetFrame());
UserGestureIndicator::SetWasForwardedCrossProcess();
}
GetFrame()->DomWindow()->DispatchMessageEventWithOriginCheck(
intended_target_origin.Get(), event,
SourceLocation::Create(String(), 0, 0, nullptr));
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_cram_md5(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char ibuf[LONG_STRING * 2], obuf[LONG_STRING];
unsigned char hmac_response[MD5_DIGEST_LEN];
int len;
int rc;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, ACRAM_MD5))
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
mutt_message(_("Authenticating (CRAM-MD5)..."));
/* get auth info */
if (mutt_account_getlogin(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
imap_cmd_start(idata, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
/* From RFC2195:
* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a presumptively
* arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the fully-qualified
* primary host name of the server. The syntax of the unencoded form must
* correspond to that of an RFC822 'msg-id' [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_RESPOND)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Invalid response from server: %s\n", ibuf);
goto bail;
}
len = mutt_b64_decode(obuf, idata->buf + 2);
if (len == -1)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error decoding base64 response.\n");
goto bail;
}
obuf[len] = '\0';
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM challenge: %s\n", obuf);
/* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
* consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
* computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where the
* key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp (including
* angle-brackets).
*
* Note: The user name shouldn't be quoted. Since the digest can't contain
* spaces, there is no ambiguity. Some servers get this wrong, we'll work
* around them when the bug report comes in. Until then, we'll remain
* blissfully RFC-compliant.
*/
hmac_md5(idata->conn->account.pass, obuf, hmac_response);
/* dubious optimisation I saw elsewhere: make the whole string in one call */
int off = snprintf(obuf, sizeof(obuf), "%s ", idata->conn->account.user);
mutt_md5_toascii(hmac_response, obuf + off);
mutt_debug(2, "CRAM response: %s\n", obuf);
/* ibuf must be long enough to store the base64 encoding of obuf,
* plus the additional debris */
mutt_b64_encode(ibuf, obuf, strlen(obuf), sizeof(ibuf) - 2);
mutt_str_strcat(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), "\r\n");
mutt_socket_send(idata->conn, ibuf);
do
rc = imap_cmd_step(idata);
while (rc == IMAP_CMD_CONTINUE);
if (rc != IMAP_CMD_OK)
{
mutt_debug(1, "Error receiving server response.\n");
goto bail;
}
if (imap_code(idata->buf))
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
bail:
mutt_error(_("CRAM-MD5 authentication failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtecp_construct_fci(sc_card_t *card, const sc_file_t *file,
u8 *out, size_t *outlen)
{
u8 buf[64], *p = out;
assert(card && card->ctx && file && out && outlen);
assert(*outlen >= (size_t)(p - out) + 2);
*p++ = 0x6F; /* FCI template */
p++; /* for length */
/* 0x80 - Number of data bytes in the file, excluding structural information */
buf[0] = (file->size >> 8) & 0xFF;
buf[1] = file->size & 0xFF;
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x80, buf, 2, p, *outlen - (p - out), &p);
/* 0x82 - File descriptor byte */
if (file->type_attr_len)
{
assert(sizeof(buf) >= file->type_attr_len);
memcpy(buf, file->type_attr, file->type_attr_len);
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x82, buf, file->type_attr_len,
p, *outlen - (p - out), &p);
}
else
{
switch (file->type)
{
case SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF:
buf[0] = 0x01;
break;
case SC_FILE_TYPE_DF:
buf[0] = 0x38;
break;
case SC_FILE_TYPE_INTERNAL_EF:
default:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
buf[1] = 0;
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x82, buf, 2, p, *outlen - (p - out), &p);
}
/* 0x83 - File identifier */
buf[0] = (file->id >> 8) & 0xFF;
buf[1] = file->id & 0xFF;
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x83, buf, 2, p, *outlen - (p - out), &p);
if (file->prop_attr_len)
{
assert(sizeof(buf) >= file->prop_attr_len);
memcpy(buf, file->prop_attr, file->prop_attr_len);
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x85, buf, file->prop_attr_len,
p, *outlen - (p - out), &p);
}
if (file->sec_attr_len)
{
assert(sizeof(buf) >= file->sec_attr_len);
memcpy(buf, file->sec_attr, file->sec_attr_len);
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x86, buf, file->sec_attr_len,
p, *outlen - (p - out), &p);
}
out[1] = p - out - 2; /* length */
*outlen = p - out;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, 0);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int md_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct mddev *mddev = v;
sector_t sectors;
struct md_rdev *rdev;
if (v == (void*)1) {
struct md_personality *pers;
seq_printf(seq, "Personalities : ");
spin_lock(&pers_lock);
list_for_each_entry(pers, &pers_list, list)
seq_printf(seq, "[%s] ", pers->name);
spin_unlock(&pers_lock);
seq_printf(seq, "\n");
seq->poll_event = atomic_read(&md_event_count);
return 0;
}
if (v == (void*)2) {
status_unused(seq);
return 0;
}
spin_lock(&mddev->lock);
if (mddev->pers || mddev->raid_disks || !list_empty(&mddev->disks)) {
seq_printf(seq, "%s : %sactive", mdname(mddev),
mddev->pers ? "" : "in");
if (mddev->pers) {
if (mddev->ro==1)
seq_printf(seq, " (read-only)");
if (mddev->ro==2)
seq_printf(seq, " (auto-read-only)");
seq_printf(seq, " %s", mddev->pers->name);
}
sectors = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev) {
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
seq_printf(seq, " %s[%d]",
bdevname(rdev->bdev,b), rdev->desc_nr);
if (test_bit(WriteMostly, &rdev->flags))
seq_printf(seq, "(W)");
if (test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags)) {
seq_printf(seq, "(F)");
continue;
}
if (rdev->raid_disk < 0)
seq_printf(seq, "(S)"); /* spare */
if (test_bit(Replacement, &rdev->flags))
seq_printf(seq, "(R)");
sectors += rdev->sectors;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!list_empty(&mddev->disks)) {
if (mddev->pers)
seq_printf(seq, "\n %llu blocks",
(unsigned long long)
mddev->array_sectors / 2);
else
seq_printf(seq, "\n %llu blocks",
(unsigned long long)sectors / 2);
}
if (mddev->persistent) {
if (mddev->major_version != 0 ||
mddev->minor_version != 90) {
seq_printf(seq," super %d.%d",
mddev->major_version,
mddev->minor_version);
}
} else if (mddev->external)
seq_printf(seq, " super external:%s",
mddev->metadata_type);
else
seq_printf(seq, " super non-persistent");
if (mddev->pers) {
mddev->pers->status(seq, mddev);
seq_printf(seq, "\n ");
if (mddev->pers->sync_request) {
if (mddev->curr_resync > 2) {
status_resync(seq, mddev);
seq_printf(seq, "\n ");
} else if (mddev->curr_resync >= 1)
seq_printf(seq, "\tresync=DELAYED\n ");
else if (mddev->recovery_cp < MaxSector)
seq_printf(seq, "\tresync=PENDING\n ");
}
} else
seq_printf(seq, "\n ");
bitmap_status(seq, mddev->bitmap);
seq_printf(seq, "\n");
}
spin_unlock(&mddev->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_libxml_streams_IO_write(void *context, const char *buffer, int len)
{
TSRMLS_FETCH();
return php_stream_write((php_stream*)context, buffer, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void complete_nread_ascii(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
item *it = c->item;
int comm = c->cmd;
enum store_item_type ret;
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[it->slabs_clsid].set_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (strncmp(ITEM_data(it) + it->nbytes - 2, "\r\n", 2) != 0) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad data chunk");
} else {
ret = store_item(it, comm, c);
#ifdef ENABLE_DTRACE
uint64_t cas = ITEM_get_cas(it);
switch (c->cmd) {
case NREAD_ADD:
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_ADD(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
(ret == 1) ? it->nbytes : -1, cas);
break;
case NREAD_REPLACE:
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_REPLACE(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
(ret == 1) ? it->nbytes : -1, cas);
break;
case NREAD_APPEND:
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_APPEND(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
(ret == 1) ? it->nbytes : -1, cas);
break;
case NREAD_PREPEND:
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_PREPEND(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
(ret == 1) ? it->nbytes : -1, cas);
break;
case NREAD_SET:
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_SET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
(ret == 1) ? it->nbytes : -1, cas);
break;
case NREAD_CAS:
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_CAS(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey, it->nbytes,
cas);
break;
}
#endif
switch (ret) {
case STORED:
out_string(c, "STORED");
break;
case EXISTS:
out_string(c, "EXISTS");
break;
case NOT_FOUND:
out_string(c, "NOT_FOUND");
break;
case NOT_STORED:
out_string(c, "NOT_STORED");
break;
default:
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR Unhandled storage type.");
}
}
item_remove(c->item); /* release the c->item reference */
c->item = 0;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cluster_hash_alloc (void *p)
{
struct cluster_list * val = (struct cluster_list *) p;
struct cluster_list *cluster;
cluster = XMALLOC (MTYPE_CLUSTER, sizeof (struct cluster_list));
cluster->length = val->length;
if (cluster->length)
{
cluster->list = XMALLOC (MTYPE_CLUSTER_VAL, val->length);
memcpy (cluster->list, val->list, val->length);
}
else
cluster->list = NULL;
cluster->refcnt = 0;
return cluster;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VirtIONet *n = opaque;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
int ret, i, link_down;
if (version_id < 2 || version_id > VIRTIO_NET_VM_VERSION)
return -EINVAL;
ret = virtio_load(vdev, f);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac, ETH_ALEN);
n->vqs[0].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
virtio_net_set_mrg_rx_bufs(n, qemu_get_be32(f));
if (version_id >= 3)
n->status = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (version_id >= 4) {
if (version_id < 8) {
n->promisc = qemu_get_be32(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_be32(f);
} else {
n->promisc = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->allmulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
}
if (version_id >= 5) {
n->mac_table.in_use = qemu_get_be32(f);
/* MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES may be different from the saved image */
if (n->mac_table.in_use <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
qemu_get_buffer(f, n->mac_table.macs,
n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
} else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
g_free(buf);
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = n->mac_table.uni_overflow = 1;
n->mac_table.in_use = 0;
}
}
if (version_id >= 6)
qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)n->vlans, MAX_VLAN >> 3);
if (version_id >= 7) {
if (qemu_get_be32(f) && !peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires vnet_hdr=on");
return -1;
}
}
if (version_id >= 9) {
n->mac_table.multi_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->mac_table.uni_overflow = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 10) {
n->alluni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nomulti = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nouni = qemu_get_byte(f);
n->nobcast = qemu_get_byte(f);
}
if (version_id >= 11) {
if (qemu_get_byte(f) && !peer_has_ufo(n)) {
error_report("virtio-net: saved image requires TUN_F_UFO support");
return -1;
}
}
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
n->curr_guest_offloads = virtio_net_supported_guest_offloads(n);
}
if (peer_has_vnet_hdr(n)) {
virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads(n);
}
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
/* Find the first multicast entry in the saved MAC filter */
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN] & 1) {
break;
}
}
n->mac_table.first_multi = i;
/* nc.link_down can't be migrated, so infer link_down according
* to link status bit in n->status */
link_down = (n->status & VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP) == 0;
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i)->link_down = link_down;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64)
{
#if BITS_PER_LONG < 64
return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX;
#else
return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY;
#endif
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AtomicString makeVisibleEmptyValue(const Vector<String>& symbols)
{
unsigned maximumLength = 0;
for (unsigned index = 0; index < symbols.size(); ++index)
maximumLength = std::max(maximumLength, numGraphemeClusters(symbols[index]));
StringBuilder builder;
builder.reserveCapacity(maximumLength);
for (unsigned length = 0; length < maximumLength; ++length)
builder.append('-');
return builder.toAtomicString();
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,246 |
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