instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int pkey = 0;
*populate = 0;
if (!len)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC?
*
* (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec
* mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
*/
if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
if (!(file && path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
/* force arch specific MAP_FIXED handling in get_unmapped_area */
if (flags & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE)
flags |= MAP_FIXED;
if (!(flags & MAP_FIXED))
addr = round_hint_to_min(addr);
/* Careful about overflows.. */
len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
if (!len)
return -ENOMEM;
/* offset overflow? */
if ((pgoff + (len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) < pgoff)
return -EOVERFLOW;
/* Too many mappings? */
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
* that it represents a valid section of the address space.
*/
addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
if (offset_in_page(addr))
return addr;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len)
return -EEXIST;
}
if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
pkey = execute_only_pkey(mm);
if (pkey < 0)
pkey = 0;
}
/* Do simple checking here so the lower-level routines won't have
* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
* of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
*/
vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
if (!can_do_mlock())
return -EPERM;
if (mlock_future_check(mm, vm_flags, len))
return -EAGAIN;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
unsigned long flags_mask;
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len))
return -EOVERFLOW;
flags_mask = LEGACY_MAP_MASK | file->f_op->mmap_supported_flags;
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
/*
* Force use of MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE with non-legacy
* flags. E.g. MAP_SYNC is dangerous to use with
* MAP_SHARED as you don't know which consistency model
* you will get. We silently ignore unsupported flags
* with MAP_SHARED to preserve backward compatibility.
*/
flags &= LEGACY_MAP_MASK;
/* fall through */
case MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE:
if (flags & ~flags_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((prot&PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode&FMODE_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
* file..
*/
if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
*/
if (locks_verify_locked(file))
return -EAGAIN;
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE | VM_SHARED);
/* fall through */
case MAP_PRIVATE:
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
if (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
return -EPERM;
vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
}
if (!file->f_op->mmap)
return -ENODEV;
if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Ignore pgoff.
*/
pgoff = 0;
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
break;
case MAP_PRIVATE:
/*
* Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma.
*/
pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Set 'VM_NORESERVE' if we should not account for the
* memory use of this mapping.
*/
if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
/* We honor MAP_NORESERVE if allowed to overcommit */
if (sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
/* hugetlb applies strict overcommit unless MAP_NORESERVE */
if (file && is_file_hugepages(file))
vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
}
addr = mmap_region(file, addr, len, vm_flags, pgoff, uf);
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(addr) &&
((vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ||
(flags & (MAP_POPULATE | MAP_NONBLOCK)) == MAP_POPULATE))
*populate = len;
return addr;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nautilus_mime_types_group_get_name (gint group_index)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (group_index < G_N_ELEMENTS (mimetype_groups), NULL);
return gettext (mimetype_groups[group_index].name);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lxcfs_mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
if (strncmp(path, "/cgroup", 7) == 0)
return cg_mkdir(path, mode);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_ape_send_event(struct tg3 *tp, u32 event)
{
int err;
u32 apedata;
apedata = tg3_ape_read32(tp, TG3_APE_SEG_SIG);
if (apedata != APE_SEG_SIG_MAGIC)
return -EAGAIN;
apedata = tg3_ape_read32(tp, TG3_APE_FW_STATUS);
if (!(apedata & APE_FW_STATUS_READY))
return -EAGAIN;
/* Wait for up to 1 millisecond for APE to service previous event. */
err = tg3_ape_event_lock(tp, 1000);
if (err)
return err;
tg3_ape_write32(tp, TG3_APE_EVENT_STATUS,
event | APE_EVENT_STATUS_EVENT_PENDING);
tg3_ape_unlock(tp, TG3_APE_LOCK_MEM);
tg3_ape_write32(tp, TG3_APE_EVENT, APE_EVENT_1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rsp_increment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int inc)
{
masked_increment(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP), stack_mask(ctxt), inc);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 perf_swevent_set_period(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
u64 period = hwc->last_period;
u64 nr, offset;
s64 old, val;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
again:
old = val = local64_read(&hwc->period_left);
if (val < 0)
return 0;
nr = div64_u64(period + val, period);
offset = nr * period;
val -= offset;
if (local64_cmpxchg(&hwc->period_left, old, val) != old)
goto again;
return nr;
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_dict_geta(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *abbrev)
{
pdf_obj *v;
v = pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, key);
if (v)
return v;
return pdf_dict_get(ctx, obj, abbrev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mcs_recv(uint16 * channel, RD_BOOL * is_fastpath, uint8 * fastpath_hdr)
{
uint8 opcode, appid, length;
STREAM s;
s = iso_recv(is_fastpath, fastpath_hdr);
if (s == NULL)
return NULL;
if (*is_fastpath == True)
return s;
in_uint8(s, opcode);
appid = opcode >> 2;
if (appid != MCS_SDIN)
{
if (appid != MCS_DPUM)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "mcs_recv(), expected data, got %d", opcode);
}
return NULL;
}
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* userid */
in_uint16_be(s, *channel);
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* flags */
in_uint8(s, length);
if (length & 0x80)
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* second byte of length */
return s;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_flag_unset_all(RFlag *f) {
f->space_idx = -1;
r_list_free (f->flags);
f->flags = r_list_newf ((RListFree)r_flag_item_free);
if (!f->flags) {
return;
}
ht_free (f->ht_name);
f->ht_name = ht_new (NULL, flag_free_kv, NULL);
r_skiplist_purge (f->by_off);
r_flag_space_unset (f, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct rpc_cred *nfs4_get_machine_cred_locked(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = NULL;
if (clp->cl_machine_cred != NULL)
cred = get_rpccred(clp->cl_machine_cred);
return cred;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void out_resolve(s2s_t s2s, char *domain, xht results, time_t expiry) {
dnscache_t dns;
/* no results, resolve failed */
if(xhash_count(results) == 0) {
dns = xhash_get(s2s->dnscache, domain);
if (dns != NULL) {
/* store negative DNS cache */
xhash_free(dns->results);
dns->query = NULL;
dns->results = NULL;
dns->expiry = expiry;
dns->pending = 0;
}
log_write(s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "dns lookup for %s failed", domain);
/* bounce queue */
out_bounce_domain_queues(s2s, domain, stanza_err_REMOTE_SERVER_NOT_FOUND);
xhash_free(results);
return;
}
log_write(s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "dns lookup for %s returned %d result%s (ttl %d)",
domain, xhash_count(results), xhash_count(results)!=1?"s":"", expiry - time(NULL));
/* get the cache entry */
dns = xhash_get(s2s->dnscache, domain);
if(dns == NULL) {
/* retry using punycode */
char *punydomain;
if (idna_to_ascii_8z(domain, &punydomain, 0) == IDNA_SUCCESS) {
dns = xhash_get(s2s->dnscache, punydomain);
free(punydomain);
}
}
if(dns == NULL) {
log_write(s2s->log, LOG_ERR, "weird, never requested %s resolution", domain);
return;
}
/* fill it out */
xhash_free(dns->results);
dns->query = NULL;
dns->results = results;
dns->expiry = expiry;
dns->pending = 0;
out_flush_domain_queues(s2s, domain);
/* delete the cache entry if caching is disabled */
if (!s2s->dns_cache_enabled && !dns->pending) {
xhash_free(dns->results);
xhash_zap(s2s->dnscache, domain);
free(dns);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ceph_aes_encrypt2(const void *key, int key_len, void *dst,
size_t *dst_len,
const void *src1, size_t src1_len,
const void *src2, size_t src2_len)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[3], prealloc_sg;
struct sg_table sg_out;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ceph_crypto_alloc_cipher();
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
int ret;
char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
size_t zero_padding = (0x10 - ((src1_len + src2_len) & 0x0f));
char pad[16];
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
memset(pad, zero_padding, zero_padding);
*dst_len = src1_len + src2_len + zero_padding;
sg_init_table(sg_in, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], src1, src1_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], src2, src2_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[2], pad, zero_padding);
ret = setup_sgtable(&sg_out, &prealloc_sg, dst, *dst_len);
if (ret)
goto out_tfm;
crypto_skcipher_setkey((void *)tfm, key, key_len);
memcpy(iv, aes_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out.sgl,
src1_len + src2_len + zero_padding, iv);
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
key, key_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc src1: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
src1, src1_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc src2: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
src2, src2_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc pad: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
pad, zero_padding, 1);
*/
ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("ceph_aes_crypt2 failed %d\n", ret);
goto out_sg;
}
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc out: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
dst, *dst_len, 1);
*/
out_sg:
teardown_sgtable(&sg_out);
out_tfm:
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libceph: introduce ceph_crypt() for in-place en/decryption
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.
There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:
"... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 71,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::NativeWindow ShellWindowViews::GetNativeWindow() {
return window_->GetNativeWindow();
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cvt_float(union VALUETYPE *p, const struct magic *m)
{
DO_CVT2(f, (float));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: opj_image_t* rawltoimage(const char *filename, opj_cparameters_t *parameters,
raw_cparameters_t *raw_cp)
{
return rawtoimage_common(filename, parameters, raw_cp, OPJ_FALSE);
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ip6_frags_ns_sysctl_register(struct net *net)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
unsigned long derrno;
int ret;
int datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0;
const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt;
kenter("'%*.*s',%u", datalen, datalen, data, datalen);
if (datalen <= 1 || !data || data[datalen - 1] != '\0')
return -EINVAL;
datalen--;
/* deal with any options embedded in the data */
end = data + datalen;
opt = memchr(data, '#', datalen);
if (!opt) {
/* no options: the entire data is the result */
kdebug("no options");
result_len = datalen;
} else {
const char *next_opt;
result_len = opt - data;
opt++;
kdebug("options: '%s'", opt);
do {
const char *eq;
int opt_len, opt_nlen, opt_vlen, tmp;
next_opt = memchr(opt, '#', end - opt) ?: end;
opt_len = next_opt - opt;
if (!opt_len) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Empty option to dns_resolver key\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
eq = memchr(opt, '=', opt_len) ?: end;
opt_nlen = eq - opt;
eq++;
opt_vlen = next_opt - eq; /* will be -1 if no value */
tmp = opt_vlen >= 0 ? opt_vlen : 0;
kdebug("option '%*.*s' val '%*.*s'",
opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt, tmp, tmp, eq);
/* see if it's an error number representing a DNS error
* that's to be recorded as the result in this key */
if (opt_nlen == sizeof(DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION) - 1 &&
memcmp(opt, DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION, opt_nlen) == 0) {
kdebug("dns error number option");
if (opt_vlen <= 0)
goto bad_option_value;
ret = kstrtoul(eq, 10, &derrno);
if (ret < 0)
goto bad_option_value;
if (derrno < 1 || derrno > 511)
goto bad_option_value;
kdebug("dns error no. = %lu", derrno);
prep->payload.data[dns_key_error] = ERR_PTR(-derrno);
continue;
}
bad_option_value:
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key:"
" bad/missing value\n",
opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt);
return -EINVAL;
} while (opt = next_opt + 1, opt < end);
}
/* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no
* result */
if (prep->payload.data[dns_key_error]) {
kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->payload.data[dns_key_error]));
return 0;
}
kdebug("store result");
prep->quotalen = result_len;
upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + result_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!upayload) {
kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
return -ENOMEM;
}
upayload->datalen = result_len;
memcpy(upayload->data, data, result_len);
upayload->data[result_len] = '\0';
prep->payload.data[dns_key_data] = upayload;
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void lsi_memcpy(LSIState *s, uint32_t dest, uint32_t src, int count)
{
int n;
uint8_t buf[LSI_BUF_SIZE];
trace_lsi_memcpy(dest, src, count);
while (count) {
n = (count > LSI_BUF_SIZE) ? LSI_BUF_SIZE : count;
lsi_mem_read(s, src, buf, n);
lsi_mem_write(s, dest, buf, n);
src += n;
dest += n;
count -= n;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 3,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_packet_out(struct ofputil_packet_out *po,
const struct ofp_header *oh,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
enum ofpraw raw = ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
ofpbuf_clear(ofpacts);
if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT11_PACKET_OUT) {
enum ofperr error;
const struct ofp11_packet_out *opo = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *opo);
po->buffer_id = ntohl(opo->buffer_id);
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(opo->in_port, &po->in_port);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(&b, ntohs(opo->actions_len),
oh->version, NULL, NULL,
ofpacts);
if (error) {
return error;
}
} else if (raw == OFPRAW_OFPT10_PACKET_OUT) {
enum ofperr error;
const struct ofp10_packet_out *opo = ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *opo);
po->buffer_id = ntohl(opo->buffer_id);
po->in_port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(opo->in_port));
error = ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(&b, ntohs(opo->actions_len),
oh->version, NULL, NULL,
ofpacts);
if (error) {
return error;
}
} else {
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
if (ofp_to_u16(po->in_port) >= ofp_to_u16(OFPP_MAX)
&& po->in_port != OFPP_LOCAL
&& po->in_port != OFPP_NONE && po->in_port != OFPP_CONTROLLER) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "packet-out has bad input port %#"PRIx32,
po->in_port);
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_PORT;
}
po->ofpacts = ofpacts->data;
po->ofpacts_len = ofpacts->size;
if (po->buffer_id == UINT32_MAX) {
po->packet = b.data;
po->packet_len = b.size;
} else {
po->packet = NULL;
po->packet_len = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerRestarted(int worker_process_id,
int worker_route_id) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
state_ = WORKER_NOT_READY;
worker_process_id_ = worker_process_id;
worker_route_id_ = worker_route_id;
RenderProcessHost* host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_process_id_);
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(host, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rvcc_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free(s);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int shash_compat_init(struct hash_desc *hdesc)
{
struct shash_desc **descp = crypto_hash_ctx(hdesc->tfm);
struct shash_desc *desc = *descp;
desc->flags = hdesc->flags;
return crypto_shash_init(desc);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableClientPlaceholdersForServerLoFi(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetClientPlaceholdersForServerLoFiEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShellSurface::OnPostWindowStateTypeChange(
ash::wm::WindowState* window_state,
ash::wm::WindowStateType old_type) {
ash::wm::WindowStateType new_type = window_state->GetStateType();
if (ash::wm::IsMaximizedOrFullscreenOrPinnedWindowStateType(old_type) ||
ash::wm::IsMaximizedOrFullscreenOrPinnedWindowStateType(new_type)) {
Configure();
}
if (widget_)
UpdateWidgetBounds();
if (!state_changed_callback_.is_null())
state_changed_callback_.Run(old_type, new_type);
scoped_animations_disabled_.reset();
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _gnutls_send_finished (gnutls_session_t session, int again)
{
uint8_t data[36];
int ret;
int data_size = 0;
if (again == 0)
{
/* This is needed in order to hash all the required
* messages.
*/
if ((ret = _gnutls_handshake_hash_pending (session)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (gnutls_protocol_get_version (session) == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{
ret =
_gnutls_ssl3_finished (session,
session->security_parameters.entity, data);
data_size = 36;
}
else
{ /* TLS 1.0 */
ret =
_gnutls_finished (session,
session->security_parameters.entity, data);
data_size = 12;
}
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
}
ret =
_gnutls_send_handshake (session, data, data_size,
GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 GoogleChromeDistribution::GetPublisherName() {
const base::string16& publisher_name =
installer::GetLocalizedString(IDS_ABOUT_VERSION_COMPANY_NAME_BASE);
return publisher_name;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of SEE_MASK_FLAG_NO_UI from Chrome Windows installer.
This flag was originally added to ui::base::win to suppress a specific
error message when attempting to open a file via the shell using the
"open" verb. The flag has additional side-effects and shouldn't be used
when invoking ShellExecute().
R=grt@chromium.org
Bug: 819809
Change-Id: I7db2344982dd206c85a73928e906c21e06a47a9e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/966964
Commit-Queue: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544012}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_info_stop (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
NautilusFile *file;
if (directory->details->get_info_in_progress != NULL)
{
file = directory->details->get_info_file;
if (file != NULL)
{
g_assert (NAUTILUS_IS_FILE (file));
g_assert (file->details->directory == directory);
if (is_needy (file, lacks_info, REQUEST_FILE_INFO))
{
return;
}
}
/* The info is not wanted, so stop it. */
file_info_cancel (directory);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
const AuthorizationData *ad,
krb5_data *data)
{
AuthorizationData child;
krb5_error_code ret;
int pos;
if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
pos = ad->len - 1;
if (ad->val[pos].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[pos].ad_data.data,
ad->val[pos].ad_data.length,
&child,
NULL);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
"IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
return ret;
}
if (child.len != 1) {
free_AuthorizationData(&child);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
}
if (child.val[0].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET) {
free_AuthorizationData(&child);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
}
if (data)
ret = der_copy_octet_string(&child.val[0].ad_data, data);
free_AuthorizationData(&child);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 67,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __ap_flush_queue(struct ap_device *ap_dev)
{
struct ap_message *ap_msg, *next;
list_for_each_entry_safe(ap_msg, next, &ap_dev->pendingq, list) {
list_del_init(&ap_msg->list);
ap_dev->pendingq_count--;
ap_msg->receive(ap_dev, ap_msg, ERR_PTR(-ENODEV));
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(ap_msg, next, &ap_dev->requestq, list) {
list_del_init(&ap_msg->list);
ap_dev->requestq_count--;
ap_msg->receive(ap_dev, ap_msg, ERR_PTR(-ENODEV));
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit TestResourceMultiBuffer(UrlData* url_data, int shift)
: ResourceMultiBuffer(url_data, shift) {}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser* Browser::CreateForType(Type type, Profile* profile) {
CreateParams params(type, profile);
return CreateWithParams(params);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct filename *filename_parentat(int dfd, struct filename *name,
unsigned int flags, struct path *parent,
struct qstr *last, int *type)
{
int retval;
struct nameidata nd;
if (IS_ERR(name))
return name;
set_nameidata(&nd, dfd, name);
retval = path_parentat(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_RCU, parent);
if (unlikely(retval == -ECHILD))
retval = path_parentat(&nd, flags, parent);
if (unlikely(retval == -ESTALE))
retval = path_parentat(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, parent);
if (likely(!retval)) {
*last = nd.last;
*type = nd.last_type;
audit_inode(name, parent->dentry, LOOKUP_PARENT);
} else {
putname(name);
name = ERR_PTR(retval);
}
restore_nameidata();
return name;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 43,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Decimal InputType::ParseToNumber(const String&,
const Decimal& default_value) const {
NOTREACHED();
return default_value;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int checksum_setup(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
unsigned char *th;
int err = -EPROTO;
int recalculate_partial_csum = 0;
/*
* A GSO SKB must be CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. However some buggy
* peers can fail to set NETRXF_csum_blank when sending a GSO
* frame. In this case force the SKB to CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
* recalculate the partial checksum.
*/
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_is_gso(skb)) {
vif->rx_gso_checksum_fixup++;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
recalculate_partial_csum = 1;
}
/* A non-CHECKSUM_PARTIAL SKB does not require setup. */
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
return 0;
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
goto out;
iph = (void *)skb->data;
th = skb->data + 4 * iph->ihl;
if (th >= skb_tail_pointer(skb))
goto out;
skb->csum_start = th - skb->head;
switch (iph->protocol) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct tcphdr, check);
if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
struct tcphdr *tcph = (struct tcphdr *)th;
tcph->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
skb->len - iph->ihl*4,
IPPROTO_TCP, 0);
}
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
if (recalculate_partial_csum) {
struct udphdr *udph = (struct udphdr *)th;
udph->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
skb->len - iph->ihl*4,
IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
}
break;
default:
if (net_ratelimit())
netdev_err(vif->dev,
"Attempting to checksum a non-TCP/UDP packet, dropping a protocol %d packet\n",
iph->protocol);
goto out;
}
if ((th + skb->csum_offset + 2) > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
goto out;
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorResourceAgent::didFinishLoading(unsigned long identifier, DocumentLoader* loader, double monotonicFinishTime, int64_t encodedDataLength)
{
double finishTime = 0.0;
if (monotonicFinishTime)
finishTime = loader->timing()->monotonicTimeToPseudoWallTime(monotonicFinishTime);
String requestId = IdentifiersFactory::requestId(identifier);
m_resourcesData->maybeDecodeDataToContent(requestId);
if (!finishTime)
finishTime = currentTime();
m_frontend->loadingFinished(requestId, finishTime, encodedDataLength);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *netlink_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct sock *s;
struct nl_seq_iter *iter;
struct net *net;
int i, j;
++*pos;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
return netlink_seq_socket_idx(seq, 0);
net = seq_file_net(seq);
iter = seq->private;
s = v;
do {
s = sk_next(s);
} while (s && !nl_table[s->sk_protocol].compare(net, s));
if (s)
return s;
i = iter->link;
j = iter->hash_idx + 1;
do {
struct nl_portid_hash *hash = &nl_table[i].hash;
for (; j <= hash->mask; j++) {
s = sk_head(&hash->table[j]);
while (s && !nl_table[s->sk_protocol].compare(net, s))
s = sk_next(s);
if (s) {
iter->link = i;
iter->hash_idx = j;
return s;
}
}
j = 0;
} while (++i < MAX_LINKS);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int shash_setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
unsigned long absize;
u8 *buffer, *alignbuffer;
int err;
absize = keylen + (alignmask & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1));
buffer = kmalloc(absize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
err = shash->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
kzfree(buffer);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int filemap_flush(struct address_space *mapping)
{
return __filemap_fdatawrite(mapping, WB_SYNC_NONE);
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_2ndtkt_enctype(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_enctype *useenctype, const char **status)
{
krb5_enctype etype;
krb5_ticket *stkt = req->second_ticket[0];
int i;
etype = stkt->enc_part2->session->enctype;
if (!krb5_c_valid_enctype(etype)) {
*status = "BAD_ETYPE_IN_2ND_TKT";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
for (i = 0; i < req->nktypes; i++) {
if (req->ktype[i] == etype) {
*useenctype = etype;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417]
An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a
valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name.
The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an
unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success.
While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based
service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a
TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the
hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with
it).
Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to
construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along
with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because
krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts
to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the
empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs()
to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a
null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because
there is no error condition.
Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when
krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error
condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from
krb5_walk_realm_tree().
The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice.
(Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test
realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable.
Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
(cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0)
ticket: 7668
version_fixed: 1.11.4
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void printstr(struct printparam* pp, char* str){
stdpr(pp, str, str?(int)strlen(str):0);
}
Commit Message: Fix: out-of-bounds write and few more bugs in 'admin' configuration upload
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PPB_URLLoader_Impl::RecordUploadProgress() const {
return request_info_ && request_info_->record_upload_progress();
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~AutofocusTask() { }
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static off_t raw_command(char* buf,
size_t bufsz,
uint8_t cmd,
const void* key,
size_t keylen,
const void* dta,
size_t dtalen) {
/* all of the storage commands use the same command layout */
protocol_binary_request_no_extras *request = (void*)buf;
assert(bufsz > sizeof(*request) + keylen + dtalen);
memset(request, 0, sizeof(*request));
request->message.header.request.magic = PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ;
request->message.header.request.opcode = cmd;
request->message.header.request.keylen = htons(keylen);
request->message.header.request.bodylen = htonl(keylen + dtalen);
request->message.header.request.opaque = 0xdeadbeef;
off_t key_offset = sizeof(protocol_binary_request_no_extras);
if (key != NULL) {
memcpy(buf + key_offset, key, keylen);
}
if (dta != NULL) {
memcpy(buf + key_offset + keylen, dta, dtalen);
}
return sizeof(*request) + keylen + dtalen;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_put_line)
{
char *query;
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
size_t query_len;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
int result = 0, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (argc == 1) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "s", &query, &query_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "rs", &pgsql_link, &query, &query_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
result = PQputline(pgsql, query);
if (result==EOF) {
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Query failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void show_snapshot_main_help(struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, "# echo 0 > snapshot : Clears and frees snapshot buffer\n"
"# echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated.\n"
"# Takes a snapshot of the main buffer.\n"
"# echo 2 > snapshot : Clears snapshot buffer (but does not allocate or free)\n"
"# (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that\n"
"# is not a '0' or '1')\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_cmd_hb_timers_start(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_transport *t;
/* Start a heartbeat timer for each transport on the association.
* hold a reference on the transport to make sure none of
* the needed data structures go away.
*/
list_for_each_entry(t, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list, transports) {
if (!mod_timer(&t->hb_timer, sctp_transport_timeout(t)))
sctp_transport_hold(t);
}
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v)
{
return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compare_thresholds(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct mem_cgroup_threshold *_a = a;
const struct mem_cgroup_threshold *_b = b;
return _a->threshold - _b->threshold;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::UpdateCompositedSelection(
LocalFrame* frame,
const CompositedSelection& selection) {
LocalFrame& local_root = frame->LocalFrameRoot();
WebFrameWidgetBase* widget =
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(&local_root)->FrameWidget();
WebWidgetClient* client = widget->Client();
if (!client)
return;
if (WebLayerTreeView* layer_tree_view = widget->GetLayerTreeView())
layer_tree_view->RegisterSelection(WebSelection(selection));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa);
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
"Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
return 1;
}
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check segment count
F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 63,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardEmulatedTouchEvent(
const blink::WebTouchEvent& touch_event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardEmulatedTouchEvent");
TouchEventWithLatencyInfo touch_with_latency(touch_event);
latency_tracker_.OnInputEvent(touch_event, &touch_with_latency.latency);
input_router_->SendTouchEvent(touch_with_latency);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfilingProcessHost::Register() {
DCHECK(!is_registered_);
Add(this);
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CREATED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_TERMINATED,
content::NotificationService::AllBrowserContextsAndSources());
is_registered_ = true;
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 150,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: run_err(const char *fmt,...)
{
static FILE *fp;
va_list ap;
++errs;
if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
(void) fflush(fp);
}
if (!iamremote) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
Commit Message: upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
CWE ID: CWE-706
| 0
| 92,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGImage::drawPatternForContainer(GraphicsContext* context, const FloatSize containerSize, float zoom, const FloatRect& srcRect,
const FloatSize& scale, const FloatPoint& phase, CompositeOperator compositeOp, const FloatRect& dstRect, blink::WebBlendMode blendMode, const IntSize& repeatSpacing)
{
FloatRect zoomedContainerRect = FloatRect(FloatPoint(), containerSize);
zoomedContainerRect.scale(zoom);
AffineTransform transform = context->getCTM();
FloatSize imageBufferScale = FloatSize(transform.xScale(), transform.yScale());
ASSERT(imageBufferScale.width());
ASSERT(imageBufferScale.height());
FloatSize scaleWithoutCTM(scale.width() / imageBufferScale.width(), scale.height() / imageBufferScale.height());
FloatRect imageBufferSize = zoomedContainerRect;
imageBufferSize.scale(imageBufferScale.width(), imageBufferScale.height());
OwnPtr<ImageBuffer> buffer = ImageBuffer::create(expandedIntSize(imageBufferSize.size()));
if (!buffer) // Failed to allocate buffer.
return;
drawForContainer(buffer->context(), containerSize, zoom, imageBufferSize, zoomedContainerRect, CompositeSourceOver, blink::WebBlendModeNormal);
RefPtr<Image> image = buffer->copyImage(DontCopyBackingStore, Unscaled);
FloatRect scaledSrcRect = srcRect;
scaledSrcRect.scale(imageBufferScale.width(), imageBufferScale.height());
image->drawPattern(context, scaledSrcRect, scaleWithoutCTM, phase, compositeOp, dstRect, blendMode, repeatSpacing);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL Browser::GetHomePage() const {
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kHomePage)) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
FilePath browser_directory;
PathService::Get(base::DIR_CURRENT, &browser_directory);
GURL home_page(URLFixerUpper::FixupRelativeFile(browser_directory,
command_line.GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kHomePage)));
if (home_page.is_valid())
return home_page;
}
if (profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kHomePageIsNewTabPage))
return GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL);
GURL home_page(URLFixerUpper::FixupURL(
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kHomePage),
std::string()));
if (!home_page.is_valid())
return GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL);
return home_page;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *qeth_get_cardname_short(struct qeth_card *card)
{
if (card->info.guestlan) {
switch (card->info.type) {
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD:
return "Virt.NIC QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD:
return "Virt.NIC Hiper";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSM:
return "Virt.NIC OSM";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX:
return "Virt.NIC OSX";
default:
return "unknown";
}
} else {
switch (card->info.type) {
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD:
switch (card->info.link_type) {
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_FAST_ETH:
return "OSD_100";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_HSTR:
return "HSTR";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_GBIT_ETH:
return "OSD_1000";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_10GBIT_ETH:
return "OSD_10GIG";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_ETH100:
return "OSD_FE_LANE";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_TR:
return "OSD_TR_LANE";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE_ETH1000:
return "OSD_GbE_LANE";
case QETH_LINK_TYPE_LANE:
return "OSD_ATM_LANE";
default:
return "OSD_Express";
}
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD:
return "HiperSockets";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSN:
return "OSN";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSM:
return "OSM_1000";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX:
return "OSX_10GIG";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
return "n/a";
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppLayerRequestProtocolChange(Flow *f, uint16_t dp, AppProto expect_proto)
{
FlowSetChangeProtoFlag(f);
f->protodetect_dp = dp;
f->alproto_expect = expect_proto;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_usb_get_cur_mix_value(struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval,
int channel, int index, int *value)
{
int err;
if (cval->cached & (1 << channel)) {
*value = cval->cache_val[index];
return 0;
}
err = get_cur_mix_raw(cval, channel, value);
if (err < 0) {
if (!cval->head.mixer->ignore_ctl_error)
usb_audio_dbg(cval->head.mixer->chip,
"cannot get current value for control %d ch %d: err = %d\n",
cval->control, channel, err);
return err;
}
cval->cached |= 1 << channel;
cval->cache_val[index] = *value;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameLoader::ShouldTreatURLAsSameAsCurrent(const KURL& url) const {
return document_loader_->GetHistoryItem() &&
url == document_loader_->GetHistoryItem()->Url();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UpdatePinhole(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
#if 0
static const char resp[] =
"<u:UpdatePinholeResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1\">"
"</u:UpdatePinholeResponse>";
#endif
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
const char * uid_str, * leaseTime;
char iaddr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
unsigned short iport;
int ltime;
int uid;
int n;
if(CheckStatus(h)==0)
return;
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
uid_str = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "UniqueID");
leaseTime = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "NewLeaseTime");
uid = uid_str ? atoi(uid_str) : -1;
ltime = leaseTime ? atoi(leaseTime) : -1;
ClearNameValueList(&data);
if(uid < 0 || uid > 65535 || ltime <= 0 || ltime > 86400)
{
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
return;
}
/* Check that client is not updating an pinhole
* it doesn't have access to, because of its public access */
n = upnp_get_pinhole_info(uid, NULL, 0, NULL,
iaddr, sizeof(iaddr), &iport,
NULL, /* proto */
NULL, 0, /* desc, desclen */
NULL, NULL);
if (n >= 0)
{
if(PinholeVerification(h, iaddr, iport) <= 0)
return;
}
else if(n == -2)
{
SoapError(h, 704, "NoSuchEntry");
return;
}
else
{
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
return;
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: (inbound) updating lease duration to %d for pinhole with ID: %d",
action, ltime, uid);
n = upnp_update_inboundpinhole(uid, ltime);
if(n == -1)
SoapError(h, 704, "NoSuchEntry");
else if(n < 0)
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
else {
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
}
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, contains)
{
zval *obj;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "o", &obj) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(spl_object_storage_contains(intern, getThis(), obj TSRMLS_CC));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int SplObjectStorage::count()
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport const char *GetXMLTreeTag(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
return(xml_info->tag);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 71,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseStartTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *attname;
xmlChar *attvalue;
const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
int nbatts = 0;
int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
int i;
if (RAW != '<') return(NULL);
NEXT1;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseStartTag: invalid element name\n");
return(NULL);
}
/*
* Now parse the attributes, it ends up with the ending
*
* (S Attribute)* S?
*/
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
while (((RAW != '>') &&
((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
(IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW))) && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
const xmlChar *q = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
attname = xmlParseAttribute(ctxt, &attvalue);
if ((attname != NULL) && (attvalue != NULL)) {
/*
* [ WFC: Unique Att Spec ]
* No attribute name may appear more than once in the same
* start-tag or empty-element tag.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nbatts;i += 2) {
if (xmlStrEqual(atts[i], attname)) {
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, NULL, attname);
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
}
/*
* Add the pair to atts
*/
if (atts == NULL) {
maxatts = 22; /* allow for 10 attrs by default */
atts = (const xmlChar **)
xmlMalloc(maxatts * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (atts == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
ctxt->atts = atts;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
} else if (nbatts + 4 > maxatts) {
const xmlChar **n;
maxatts *= 2;
n = (const xmlChar **) xmlRealloc((void *) atts,
maxatts * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (n == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
goto failed;
}
atts = n;
ctxt->atts = atts;
ctxt->maxatts = maxatts;
}
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
atts[nbatts] = NULL;
atts[nbatts + 1] = NULL;
} else {
if (attvalue != NULL)
xmlFree(attvalue);
}
failed:
GROW
if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
break;
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(RAW)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"attributes construct error\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (q == CUR_PTR) &&
(attname == NULL) && (attvalue == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseStartTag: problem parsing attributes\n");
break;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
}
/*
* SAX: Start of Element !
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->startElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (nbatts > 0)
ctxt->sax->startElement(ctxt->userData, name, atts);
else
ctxt->sax->startElement(ctxt->userData, name, NULL);
}
if (atts != NULL) {
/* Free only the content strings */
for (i = 1;i < nbatts;i+=2)
if (atts[i] != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
return(name);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: run_error (CommonJob *job,
char *primary_text,
char *secondary_text,
const char *details_text,
gboolean show_all,
...)
{
va_list varargs;
int res;
va_start (varargs, show_all);
res = run_simple_dialog_va (job,
FALSE,
GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
primary_text,
secondary_text,
details_text,
show_all,
varargs);
va_end (varargs);
return res;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xc2028_get_afc(struct dvb_frontend *fe, s32 *afc)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
int i, rc;
u16 frq_lock = 0;
s16 afc_reg = 0;
rc = check_device_status(priv);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
/* If the device is sleeping, no channel is tuned */
if (!rc) {
*afc = 0;
return 0;
}
mutex_lock(&priv->lock);
/* Sync Lock Indicator */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
rc = xc2028_get_reg(priv, XREG_LOCK, &frq_lock);
if (rc < 0)
goto ret;
if (frq_lock)
break;
msleep(6);
}
/* Frequency didn't lock */
if (frq_lock == 2)
goto ret;
/* Get AFC */
rc = xc2028_get_reg(priv, XREG_FREQ_ERROR, &afc_reg);
if (rc < 0)
goto ret;
*afc = afc_reg * 15625; /* Hz */
tuner_dbg("AFC is %d Hz\n", *afc);
ret:
mutex_unlock(&priv->lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_clearhalt(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
unsigned int ep;
int pipe;
int ret;
if (get_user(ep, (unsigned int __user *)arg))
return -EFAULT;
ret = findintfep(ps->dev, ep);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = checkintf(ps, ret);
if (ret)
return ret;
check_reset_of_active_ep(ps->dev, ep, "CLEAR_HALT");
if (ep & USB_DIR_IN)
pipe = usb_rcvbulkpipe(ps->dev, ep & 0x7f);
else
pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(ps->dev, ep & 0x7f);
return usb_clear_halt(ps->dev, pipe);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteGIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
int
c;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
RectangleInfo
page;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
delay,
imageListLength,
length,
one;
ssize_t
j,
opacity;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*global_colormap;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(768UL,
sizeof(*global_colormap));
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(768UL,sizeof(*colormap));
if ((global_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
if (global_colormap != (unsigned char *) NULL)
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
if (colormap != (unsigned char *) NULL)
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < 768; i++)
colormap[i]=(unsigned char) 0;
/*
Write GIF header.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if (LocaleCompare(write_info->magick,"GIF87") != 0)
(void) WriteBlob(image,6,(unsigned char *) "GIF89a");
else
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,6,(unsigned char *) "GIF87a");
write_info->adjoin=MagickFalse;
}
/*
Determine image bounding box.
*/
page.width=image->columns;
if (image->page.width > page.width)
page.width=image->page.width;
page.height=image->rows;
if (image->page.height > page.height)
page.height=image->page.height;
page.x=image->page.x;
page.y=image->page.y;
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) page.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) page.height);
/*
Write images to file.
*/
if ((write_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) &&
(GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
write_info->interlace=NoInterlace;
scene=0;
one=1;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
opacity=(-1);
if (IsOpaqueImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
}
else
{
double
alpha,
beta;
/*
Identify transparent colormap index.
*/
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteBilevelMatteType);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
{
if (opacity < 0)
{
opacity=i;
continue;
}
alpha=fabs((double) image->colormap[i].opacity-
TransparentOpacity);
beta=fabs((double) image->colormap[opacity].opacity-
TransparentOpacity);
if (alpha < beta)
opacity=i;
}
if (opacity == -1)
{
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteBilevelMatteType);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if (image->colormap[i].opacity != OpaqueOpacity)
{
if (opacity < 0)
{
opacity=i;
continue;
}
alpha=fabs((double) image->colormap[i].opacity-
TransparentOpacity);
beta=fabs((double) image->colormap[opacity].opacity-
TransparentOpacity);
if (alpha < beta)
opacity=i;
}
}
if (opacity >= 0)
{
image->colormap[opacity].red=image->transparent_color.red;
image->colormap[opacity].green=image->transparent_color.green;
image->colormap[opacity].blue=image->transparent_color.blue;
}
}
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (bits_per_pixel=1; bits_per_pixel < 8; bits_per_pixel++)
if ((one << bits_per_pixel) >= image->colors)
break;
q=colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (one << bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
}
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(write_info->adjoin == MagickFalse))
{
/*
Write global colormap.
*/
c=0x80;
c|=(8-1) << 4; /* color resolution */
c|=(bits_per_pixel-1); /* size of global colormap */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->colors; j++)
if (IsColorEqual(&image->background_color,image->colormap+j))
break;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char)
(j == (ssize_t) image->colors ? 0 : j)); /* background color */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00); /* reserved */
length=(size_t) (3*(one << bits_per_pixel));
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,colormap);
for (j=0; j < 768; j++)
global_colormap[j]=colormap[j];
}
if (LocaleCompare(write_info->magick,"GIF87") != 0)
{
const char
*value;
/*
Write graphics control extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xf9);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x04);
c=image->dispose << 2;
if (opacity >= 0)
c|=0x01;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
delay=(size_t) (100*image->delay/MagickMax((size_t)
image->ticks_per_second,1));
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) delay);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) (opacity >= 0 ? opacity :
0));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
size_t
count;
/*
Write comment extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xfe);
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; )
{
count=MagickMin(strlen(p),255);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) count);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p++);
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL) &&
(GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(image->iterations != 1))
{
/*
Write Netscape Loop extension.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","NETSCAPE2.0");
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x0b);
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "NETSCAPE2.0");
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x03);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x01);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->iterations ?
image->iterations-1 : 0));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
if ((image->gamma != 1.0f/2.2f))
{
char
attributes[MaxTextExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Write ImageMagick extension.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","ImageMagick");
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x0b);
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "ImageMagick");
count=FormatLocaleString(attributes,MaxTextExtent,"gamma=%g",
image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) count);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) count,(unsigned char *) attributes);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for ( ; ; )
{
char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
if (name == (const char *) NULL)
break;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"ICM") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"IPTC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"8BIM") == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(name,"gif:",4) == 0))
{
size_t
length;
ssize_t
offset;
unsigned char
*datum;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x21);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x0b);
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"ICC") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(name,"ICM") == 0))
{
/*
Write ICC extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "ICCRGBG1012");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","ICCRGBG1012");
}
else
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"IPTC") == 0))
{
/*
Write IPTC extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) "MGKIPTC0000");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","MGKIPTC0000");
}
else
if ((LocaleCompare(name,"8BIM") == 0))
{
/*
Write 8BIM extension.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *)
"MGK8BIM0000");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s","MGK8BIM0000");
}
else
{
char
extension[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Write generic extension.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(extension,name+4,
sizeof(extension));
(void) WriteBlob(image,11,(unsigned char *) extension);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing GIF Extension %s",name);
}
offset=0;
while ((ssize_t) length > offset)
{
size_t
block_length;
if ((length-offset) < 255)
block_length=length-offset;
else
block_length=255;
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) block_length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) block_length,datum+offset);
offset+=(ssize_t) block_length;
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
}
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,','); /* image separator */
/*
Write the image header.
*/
page.x=image->page.x;
page.y=image->page.y;
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
page=image->page;
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (page.x < 0 ? 0 : page.x));
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (page.y < 0 ? 0 : page.y));
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) image->rows);
c=0x00;
if (write_info->interlace != NoInterlace)
c|=0x40; /* pixel data is interlaced */
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors); j++)
if (colormap[j] != global_colormap[j])
break;
if (j == (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
else
{
c|=0x80;
c|=(bits_per_pixel-1); /* size of local colormap */
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
length=(size_t) (3*(one << bits_per_pixel));
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,colormap);
}
/*
Write the image data.
*/
c=(int) MagickMax(bits_per_pixel,2);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) c);
status=EncodeImage(write_info,image,(size_t) MagickMax(bits_per_pixel,2)+1);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0x00);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
scene++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (write_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,';'); /* terminator */
global_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(global_colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit MinimalInputEventFilter(aura::RootWindow* root)
: root_(root),
input_method_(ui::CreateInputMethod(this,
gfx::kNullAcceleratedWidget)) {
input_method_->Init(true);
root_->window()->AddPreTargetHandler(this);
root_->window()->SetProperty(aura::client::kRootWindowInputMethodKey,
input_method_.get());
}
Commit Message: shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 113,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::Rect PDFiumEngine::GetPageContentsRect(int index) {
return GetScreenRect(pages_[index]->rect());
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,341
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PropertyDetails GetDetailsImpl(JSObject* holder, uint32_t entry) {
FixedArray* parameter_map = FixedArray::cast(holder->elements());
uint32_t length = parameter_map->length() - 2;
if (entry < length) {
return PropertyDetails(kData, NONE, 0, PropertyCellType::kNoCell);
}
FixedArray* arguments = FixedArray::cast(parameter_map->get(1));
return ArgumentsAccessor::GetDetailsImpl(arguments, entry - length);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rmd320_transform(u32 *state, const __le32 *in)
{
u32 aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, tmp;
/* Initialize left lane */
aa = state[0];
bb = state[1];
cc = state[2];
dd = state[3];
ee = state[4];
/* Initialize right lane */
aaa = state[5];
bbb = state[6];
ccc = state[7];
ddd = state[8];
eee = state[9];
/* round 1: left lane */
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F1, K1, in[0], 11);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[1], 14);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[2], 15);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[3], 12);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F1, K1, in[4], 5);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F1, K1, in[5], 8);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[6], 7);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[7], 9);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[8], 11);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F1, K1, in[9], 13);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F1, K1, in[10], 14);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F1, K1, in[11], 15);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F1, K1, in[12], 6);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F1, K1, in[13], 7);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F1, K1, in[14], 9);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F1, K1, in[15], 8);
/* round 1: right lane */
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F5, KK1, in[5], 8);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F5, KK1, in[14], 9);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F5, KK1, in[7], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F5, KK1, in[0], 11);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F5, KK1, in[9], 13);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F5, KK1, in[2], 15);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F5, KK1, in[11], 15);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F5, KK1, in[4], 5);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F5, KK1, in[13], 7);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F5, KK1, in[6], 7);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F5, KK1, in[15], 8);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F5, KK1, in[8], 11);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F5, KK1, in[1], 14);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F5, KK1, in[10], 14);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F5, KK1, in[3], 12);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F5, KK1, in[12], 6);
/* Swap contents of "a" registers */
tmp = aa; aa = aaa; aaa = tmp;
/* round 2: left lane" */
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[7], 7);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[4], 6);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[13], 8);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F2, K2, in[1], 13);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F2, K2, in[10], 11);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[6], 9);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[15], 7);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[3], 15);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F2, K2, in[12], 7);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F2, K2, in[0], 12);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[9], 15);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F2, K2, in[5], 9);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F2, K2, in[2], 11);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F2, K2, in[14], 7);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F2, K2, in[11], 13);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F2, K2, in[8], 12);
/* round 2: right lane */
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK2, in[6], 9);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK2, in[11], 13);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F4, KK2, in[3], 15);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F4, KK2, in[7], 7);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F4, KK2, in[0], 12);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK2, in[13], 8);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK2, in[5], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F4, KK2, in[10], 11);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F4, KK2, in[14], 7);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F4, KK2, in[15], 7);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK2, in[8], 12);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F4, KK2, in[12], 7);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F4, KK2, in[4], 6);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F4, KK2, in[9], 15);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F4, KK2, in[1], 13);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F4, KK2, in[2], 11);
/* Swap contents of "b" registers */
tmp = bb; bb = bbb; bbb = tmp;
/* round 3: left lane" */
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[3], 11);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[10], 13);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F3, K3, in[14], 6);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F3, K3, in[4], 7);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[9], 14);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[15], 9);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[8], 13);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F3, K3, in[1], 15);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F3, K3, in[2], 14);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[7], 8);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[0], 13);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F3, K3, in[6], 6);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F3, K3, in[13], 5);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F3, K3, in[11], 12);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F3, K3, in[5], 7);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F3, K3, in[12], 5);
/* round 3: right lane */
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK3, in[15], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F3, KK3, in[5], 7);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F3, KK3, in[1], 15);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F3, KK3, in[3], 11);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK3, in[7], 8);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK3, in[14], 6);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F3, KK3, in[6], 6);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F3, KK3, in[9], 14);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F3, KK3, in[11], 12);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK3, in[8], 13);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK3, in[12], 5);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F3, KK3, in[2], 14);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F3, KK3, in[10], 13);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F3, KK3, in[0], 13);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F3, KK3, in[4], 7);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F3, KK3, in[13], 5);
/* Swap contents of "c" registers */
tmp = cc; cc = ccc; ccc = tmp;
/* round 4: left lane" */
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[1], 11);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F4, K4, in[9], 12);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F4, K4, in[11], 14);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[10], 15);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[0], 14);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[8], 15);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F4, K4, in[12], 9);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F4, K4, in[4], 8);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[13], 9);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[3], 14);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[7], 5);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F4, K4, in[15], 6);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F4, K4, in[14], 8);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F4, K4, in[5], 6);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F4, K4, in[6], 5);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F4, K4, in[2], 12);
/* round 4: right lane */
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F2, KK4, in[8], 15);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F2, KK4, in[6], 5);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F2, KK4, in[4], 8);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK4, in[1], 11);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK4, in[3], 14);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F2, KK4, in[11], 14);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F2, KK4, in[15], 6);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F2, KK4, in[0], 14);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK4, in[5], 6);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK4, in[12], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F2, KK4, in[2], 12);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F2, KK4, in[13], 9);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F2, KK4, in[9], 12);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F2, KK4, in[7], 5);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F2, KK4, in[10], 15);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F2, KK4, in[14], 8);
/* Swap contents of "d" registers */
tmp = dd; dd = ddd; ddd = tmp;
/* round 5: left lane" */
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F5, K5, in[4], 9);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F5, K5, in[0], 15);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F5, K5, in[5], 5);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F5, K5, in[9], 11);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F5, K5, in[7], 6);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F5, K5, in[12], 8);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F5, K5, in[2], 13);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F5, K5, in[10], 12);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F5, K5, in[14], 5);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F5, K5, in[1], 12);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F5, K5, in[3], 13);
ROUND(aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, F5, K5, in[8], 14);
ROUND(ee, aa, bb, cc, dd, F5, K5, in[11], 11);
ROUND(dd, ee, aa, bb, cc, F5, K5, in[6], 8);
ROUND(cc, dd, ee, aa, bb, F5, K5, in[15], 5);
ROUND(bb, cc, dd, ee, aa, F5, K5, in[13], 6);
/* round 5: right lane */
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F1, KK5, in[12], 8);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F1, KK5, in[15], 5);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK5, in[10], 12);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK5, in[4], 9);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F1, KK5, in[1], 12);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F1, KK5, in[5], 5);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F1, KK5, in[8], 14);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK5, in[7], 6);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK5, in[6], 8);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F1, KK5, in[2], 13);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F1, KK5, in[13], 6);
ROUND(aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, F1, KK5, in[14], 5);
ROUND(eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, ddd, F1, KK5, in[0], 15);
ROUND(ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, ccc, F1, KK5, in[3], 13);
ROUND(ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, bbb, F1, KK5, in[9], 11);
ROUND(bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, aaa, F1, KK5, in[11], 11);
/* Swap contents of "e" registers */
tmp = ee; ee = eee; eee = tmp;
/* combine results */
state[0] += aa;
state[1] += bb;
state[2] += cc;
state[3] += dd;
state[4] += ee;
state[5] += aaa;
state[6] += bbb;
state[7] += ccc;
state[8] += ddd;
state[9] += eee;
return;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabContents* Browser::OpenApplication(
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
extension_misc::LaunchContainer container,
TabContents* existing_tab) {
TabContents* tab = NULL;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.AppLaunchContainer", container, 100);
switch (container) {
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_WINDOW:
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_PANEL:
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationWindow(profile, extension, container,
GURL(), NULL);
break;
case extension_misc::LAUNCH_TAB: {
tab = Browser::OpenApplicationTab(profile, extension, existing_tab);
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return tab;
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnFirstResult() {
EXPECT_FALSE(first_result_received_);
first_result_received_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionWarningService* ExtensionSystemImpl::Shared::warning_service() {
return extension_warning_service_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum nl_mmap_status netlink_get_status(const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr)
{
smp_rmb();
flush_dcache_page(pgvec_to_page(hdr));
return hdr->nm_status;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
union futex_key *key,
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct *task, int set_waiters)
{
int lock_taken, ret, ownerdied = 0;
u32 uval, newval, curval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(task);
retry:
ret = lock_taken = 0;
/*
* To avoid races, we attempt to take the lock here again
* (by doing a 0 -> TID atomic cmpxchg), while holding all
* the locks. It will most likely not succeed.
*/
newval = vpid;
if (set_waiters)
newval |= FUTEX_WAITERS;
if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, 0, newval)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Detect deadlocks.
*/
if ((unlikely((curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == vpid)))
return -EDEADLK;
/*
* Surprise - we got the lock. Just return to userspace:
*/
if (unlikely(!curval))
return 1;
uval = curval;
/*
* Set the FUTEX_WAITERS flag, so the owner will know it has someone
* to wake at the next unlock.
*/
newval = curval | FUTEX_WAITERS;
/*
* There are two cases, where a futex might have no owner (the
* owner TID is 0): OWNER_DIED. We take over the futex in this
* case. We also do an unconditional take over, when the owner
* of the futex died.
*
* This is safe as we are protected by the hash bucket lock !
*/
if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
/* Keep the OWNER_DIED bit */
newval = (curval & ~FUTEX_TID_MASK) | vpid;
ownerdied = 0;
lock_taken = 1;
}
if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(curval != uval))
goto retry;
/*
* We took the lock due to owner died take over.
*/
if (unlikely(lock_taken))
return 1;
/*
* We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if
* we are the first waiter):
*/
ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
switch (ret) {
case -ESRCH:
/*
* No owner found for this futex. Check if the
* OWNER_DIED bit is set to figure out whether
* this is a robust futex or not.
*/
if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We simply start over in case of a robust
* futex. The code above will take the futex
* and return happy.
*/
if (curval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
ownerdied = 1;
goto retry;
}
default:
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err trak_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_TrackBox *ptr = (GF_TrackBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, trak_AddBox);
if (e) return e;
gf_isom_check_sample_desc(ptr);
if (!ptr->Header) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing TrackHeaderBox\n"));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (!ptr->Media) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing MediaBox\n"));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
if (!ptr->Media->information || !ptr->Media->information->sampleTable) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid MediaBox\n"));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
for (i=0; i<gf_list_count(ptr->Media->information->sampleTable->other_boxes); i++) {
GF_Box *a = gf_list_get(ptr->Media->information->sampleTable->other_boxes, i);
if ((a->type ==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_UUID) && (((GF_UUIDBox *)a)->internal_4cc == GF_ISOM_BOX_UUID_PSEC)) {
ptr->sample_encryption = (struct __sample_encryption_box *) a;
break;
}
else if (a->type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SENC) {
ptr->sample_encryption = (struct __sample_encryption_box *)a;
break;
}
}
return e;
}
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 91,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xen_netbk_kthread(void *data)
{
struct xen_netbk *netbk = data;
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
wait_event_interruptible(netbk->wq,
rx_work_todo(netbk) ||
tx_work_todo(netbk) ||
kthread_should_stop());
cond_resched();
if (kthread_should_stop())
break;
if (rx_work_todo(netbk))
xen_netbk_rx_action(netbk);
if (tx_work_todo(netbk))
xen_netbk_tx_action(netbk);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetVertexAttribiv(
GLuint index, GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetVertexAttribiv: index out of range");
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_BUFFER_BINDING: {
BufferManager::BufferInfo* buffer = info->buffer();
if (buffer && !buffer->IsDeleted()) {
GLuint client_id;
buffer_manager()->GetClientId(buffer->service_id(), &client_id);
*params = client_id;
}
break;
}
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_ENABLED:
*params = info->enabled();
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_SIZE:
*params = info->size();
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_STRIDE:
*params = info->gl_stride();
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_TYPE:
*params = info->type();
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_NORMALIZED:
*params = static_cast<GLint>(info->normalized());
break;
case GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_DIVISOR_ANGLE:
*params = info->divisor();
break;
case GL_CURRENT_VERTEX_ATTRIB:
params[0] = static_cast<GLint>(info->value().v[0]);
params[1] = static_cast<GLint>(info->value().v[1]);
params[2] = static_cast<GLint>(info->value().v[2]);
params[3] = static_cast<GLint>(info->value().v[3]);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetPostCountAndReset() {
int r = post_count_;
post_count_ = 0;
return r;
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TestNavigationManager::WaitForRequestStart() {
DCHECK(desired_state_ == NavigationState::STARTED);
return WaitForDesiredState();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeDupImmutableBlobFileDescriptor(int fd)
{
if (!mAllowFds) return FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
status_t status = writeInt32(BLOB_ASHMEM_IMMUTABLE);
if (status) return status;
return writeDupFileDescriptor(fd);
}
Commit Message: Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nicklist_deinit(void)
{
signal_remove("channel created", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_channel_created);
signal_remove("channel destroyed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_channel_destroyed);
module_uniq_destroy("NICK");
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::addMountedShare( Smb4KShare *share )
{
Q_ASSERT( share );
bool added = false;
mutex.lock();
if ( !findShareByPath( share->path() ) )
{
p->mountedSharesList.append( share );
added = true;
p->onlyForeignShares = true;
for ( int i = 0; i < p->mountedSharesList.size(); ++i )
{
if ( !p->mountedSharesList.at( i )->isForeign() )
{
p->onlyForeignShares = false;
break;
}
else
{
continue;
}
}
}
else
{
}
mutex.unlock();
return added;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xenvif_notify_tx_completion(struct xenvif *vif)
{
if (netif_queue_stopped(vif->dev) && xenvif_rx_schedulable(vif))
netif_wake_queue(vif->dev);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 34,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setValueInternal(const String& sanitizedValue, TextFieldEventBehavior eventBehavior)
{
m_valueIfDirty = sanitizedValue;
setNeedsValidityCheck();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
int *max_version)
{
int version;
int hole;
const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
const version_info *table;
const version_info *vent;
switch (s->method->version) {
default:
/*
* If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
* (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
* that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
* versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
* ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
*/
*min_version = *max_version = s->version;
return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
break;
case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = dtls_version_table;
break;
}
/*
* SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
* below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
* capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
* (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
*
* Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
* the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
* the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
*
* Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
* the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
* method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
*
* If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
* as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
* a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
* changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
* If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
* selected, as we start from scratch.
*/
*min_version = version = 0;
hole = 1;
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
/*
* A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
* "version capability" vector.
*/
if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
hole = 1;
continue;
}
method = vent->cmeth();
if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
hole = 1;
} else if (!hole) {
single = NULL;
*min_version = method->version;
} else {
version = (single = method)->version;
*min_version = version;
hole = 0;
}
}
*max_version = version;
/* Fail if everything is disabled */
if (version == 0)
return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int usb_get_langid(struct usb_device *dev, unsigned char *tbuf)
{
int err;
if (dev->have_langid)
return 0;
if (dev->string_langid < 0)
return -EPIPE;
err = usb_string_sub(dev, 0, 0, tbuf);
/* If the string was reported but is malformed, default to english
* (0x0409) */
if (err == -ENODATA || (err > 0 && err < 4)) {
dev->string_langid = 0x0409;
dev->have_langid = 1;
dev_err(&dev->dev,
"language id specifier not provided by device, defaulting to English\n");
return 0;
}
/* In case of all other errors, we assume the device is not able to
* deal with strings at all. Set string_langid to -1 in order to
* prevent any string to be retrieved from the device */
if (err < 0) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "string descriptor 0 read error: %d\n",
err);
dev->string_langid = -1;
return -EPIPE;
}
/* always use the first langid listed */
dev->string_langid = tbuf[2] | (tbuf[3] << 8);
dev->have_langid = 1;
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "default language 0x%04x\n",
dev->string_langid);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::dispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(ChromeClient& chromeClient, bool& didAllowNavigation)
{
if (!m_domWindow)
return true;
if (!body())
return true;
if (processingBeforeUnload())
return false;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> protect(this);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<BeforeUnloadEvent> beforeUnloadEvent = BeforeUnloadEvent::create();
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventInProgress;
m_domWindow->dispatchEvent(beforeUnloadEvent.get(), this);
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventCompleted;
if (!beforeUnloadEvent->defaultPrevented())
defaultEventHandler(beforeUnloadEvent.get());
if (!frame() || beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue().isNull())
return true;
if (didAllowNavigation) {
addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(JSMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Blocked attempt to show multiple 'beforeunload' confirmation panels for a single navigation."));
return true;
}
String text = beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue();
if (chromeClient.openBeforeUnloadConfirmPanel(text, m_frame)) {
didAllowNavigation = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, treatNullAsNullStringStringArg, info[0]);
imp->voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArg(treatNullAsNullStringStringArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getDocPtr(xmlNode * node)
{
xmlDoc *doc = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(node != NULL, return NULL);
doc = node->doc;
if (doc == NULL) {
doc = xmlNewDoc((const xmlChar *)"1.0");
xmlDocSetRootElement(doc, node);
xmlSetTreeDoc(node, doc);
}
return doc;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddInternalName(const Experiment& e, std::set<std::string>* names) {
if (e.type == Experiment::SINGLE_VALUE) {
names->insert(e.internal_name);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(Experiment::MULTI_VALUE, e.type);
for (int i = 0; i < e.num_choices; ++i)
names->insert(NameForChoice(e, i));
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ipgre_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return
/* IFLA_GRE_LINK */
nla_total_size(4) +
/* IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS */
nla_total_size(2) +
/* IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS */
nla_total_size(2) +
/* IFLA_GRE_IKEY */
nla_total_size(4) +
/* IFLA_GRE_OKEY */
nla_total_size(4) +
/* IFLA_GRE_LOCAL */
nla_total_size(4) +
/* IFLA_GRE_REMOTE */
nla_total_size(4) +
/* IFLA_GRE_TTL */
nla_total_size(1) +
/* IFLA_GRE_TOS */
nla_total_size(1) +
/* IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC */
nla_total_size(1) +
0;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateShaderSource(const String& string) {
for (wtf_size_t i = 0; i < string.length(); ++i) {
if (IsWebGL2OrHigher() && string[i] == '\\') {
continue;
}
if (!ValidateCharacter(string[i])) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "shaderSource", "string not ASCII");
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockDownloadController::~MockDownloadController() {}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool tcp_check_sack_reneging(struct sock *sk, int flag)
{
if (flag & FLAG_SACK_RENEGING) {
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
unsigned long delay = max(usecs_to_jiffies(tp->srtt_us >> 4),
msecs_to_jiffies(10));
inet_csk_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_RETRANS,
delay, TCP_RTO_MAX);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 51,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void on_btn_add_file(GtkButton *button)
{
GtkWidget *dialog = gtk_file_chooser_dialog_new(
"Attach File",
GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant),
GTK_FILE_CHOOSER_ACTION_OPEN,
_("_Cancel"), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL,
_("_Open"), GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT,
NULL
);
char *filename = NULL;
if (gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)) == GTK_RESPONSE_ACCEPT)
filename = gtk_file_chooser_get_filename(GTK_FILE_CHOOSER(dialog));
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
if (filename)
{
char *basename = strrchr(filename, '/');
if (!basename) /* wtf? (never happens) */
goto free_and_ret;
basename++;
/* TODO: ask for the name to save it as? For now, just use basename */
char *message = NULL;
struct stat statbuf;
if (stat(filename, &statbuf) != 0 || !S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
{
message = xasprintf(_("'%s' is not an ordinary file"), filename);
goto show_msgbox;
}
struct problem_item *item = problem_data_get_item_or_NULL(g_cd, basename);
if (!item || (item->flags & CD_FLAG_ISEDITABLE))
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
{
dd_close(dd);
char *new_name = concat_path_file(g_dump_dir_name, basename);
if (strcmp(filename, new_name) == 0)
{
message = xstrdup(_("You are trying to copy a file onto itself"));
}
else
{
off_t r = copy_file(filename, new_name, 0666);
if (r < 0)
{
message = xasprintf(_("Can't copy '%s': %s"), filename, strerror(errno));
unlink(new_name);
}
if (!message)
{
problem_data_reload_from_dump_dir();
update_gui_state_from_problem_data(/* don't update selected event */ 0);
/* Set flags for the new item */
update_ls_details_checkboxes(g_event_selected);
}
}
free(new_name);
}
}
else
message = xasprintf(_("Item '%s' already exists and is not modifiable"), basename);
if (message)
{
show_msgbox: ;
GtkWidget *dlg = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant),
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL | GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
message);
free(message);
gtk_window_set_transient_for(GTK_WINDOW(dlg), GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant));
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dlg));
gtk_widget_destroy(dlg);
}
free_and_ret:
g_free(filename);
}
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jbd2_journal_get_undo_access(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
int err;
struct journal_head *jh = jbd2_journal_add_journal_head(bh);
char *committed_data = NULL;
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "entry");
/*
* Do this first --- it can drop the journal lock, so we want to
* make sure that obtaining the committed_data is done
* atomically wrt. completion of any outstanding commits.
*/
err = do_get_write_access(handle, jh, 1);
if (err)
goto out;
repeat:
if (!jh->b_committed_data) {
committed_data = jbd2_alloc(jh2bh(jh)->b_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!committed_data) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "%s: No memory for committed data\n",
__func__);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
if (!jh->b_committed_data) {
/* Copy out the current buffer contents into the
* preserved, committed copy. */
JBUFFER_TRACE(jh, "generate b_committed data");
if (!committed_data) {
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
goto repeat;
}
jh->b_committed_data = committed_data;
committed_data = NULL;
memcpy(jh->b_committed_data, bh->b_data, bh->b_size);
}
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
out:
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
if (unlikely(committed_data))
jbd2_free(committed_data, bh->b_size);
return err;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::SetIndexKeys(
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> primary_key,
const std::vector<IndexedDBIndexKeys>& index_keys) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::SetIndexKeys", "txn.id", transaction->id());
DCHECK_EQ(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
IndexedDBBackingStore::RecordIdentifier record_identifier;
bool found = false;
Status s = backing_store_->KeyExistsInObjectStore(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), metadata_.id, object_store_id,
*primary_key, &record_identifier, &found);
if (!s.ok()) {
ReportErrorWithDetails(s, "Internal error setting index keys.");
return;
}
if (!found) {
transaction->Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionUnknownError,
"Internal error setting index keys for object store."));
return;
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<IndexWriter>> index_writers;
base::string16 error_message;
bool obeys_constraints = false;
DCHECK(metadata_.object_stores.find(object_store_id) !=
metadata_.object_stores.end());
const IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata& object_store_metadata =
metadata_.object_stores[object_store_id];
bool backing_store_success = MakeIndexWriters(transaction,
backing_store_.get(),
id(),
object_store_metadata,
*primary_key,
false,
index_keys,
&index_writers,
&error_message,
&obeys_constraints);
if (!backing_store_success) {
transaction->Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionUnknownError,
"Internal error: backing store error updating index keys."));
return;
}
if (!obeys_constraints) {
transaction->Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionConstraintError, error_message));
return;
}
for (const auto& writer : index_writers) {
writer->WriteIndexKeys(record_identifier, backing_store_.get(),
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(),
object_store_id);
}
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ReverbSetDiffusion(ReverbContext *pContext, int16_t level){
LVREV_ControlParams_st ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_GetControlParameters", "ReverbSetDiffusion")
ActiveParams.Density = (LVM_INT16)(level/10);
/* Activate the initial settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_SetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_SetControlParameters", "ReverbSetDiffusion")
pContext->SavedDiffusion = level;
return;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,442
|
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