instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_envp( httpd_conn* hc )
{
static char* envp[50];
int envn;
char* cp;
char buf[256];
envn = 0;
envp[envn++] = build_env( "PATH=%s", CGI_PATH );
#ifdef CGI_LD_LIBRARY_PATH
envp[envn++] = build_env( "LD_LIBRARY_PATH=%s", CGI_LD_LIBRARY_PATH );
#endif /* CGI_LD_LIBRARY_PATH */
envp[envn++] = build_env( "SERVER_SOFTWARE=%s", SERVER_SOFTWARE );
/* If vhosting, use that server-name here. */
if ( hc->hs->vhost && hc->hostname != (char*) 0 )
cp = hc->hostname;
else
cp = hc->hs->server_hostname;
if ( cp != (char*) 0 )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "SERVER_NAME=%s", cp );
envp[envn++] = "GATEWAY_INTERFACE=CGI/1.1";
envp[envn++] = build_env("SERVER_PROTOCOL=%s", hc->protocol);
(void) my_snprintf( buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", (int) hc->hs->port );
envp[envn++] = build_env( "SERVER_PORT=%s", buf );
envp[envn++] = build_env(
"REQUEST_METHOD=%s", httpd_method_str( hc->method ) );
if ( hc->pathinfo[0] != '\0' )
{
char* cp2;
size_t l;
envp[envn++] = build_env( "PATH_INFO=/%s", hc->pathinfo );
l = strlen( hc->hs->cwd ) + strlen( hc->pathinfo ) + 1;
cp2 = NEW( char, l );
if ( cp2 != (char*) 0 )
{
(void) my_snprintf( cp2, l, "%s%s", hc->hs->cwd, hc->pathinfo );
envp[envn++] = build_env( "PATH_TRANSLATED=%s", cp2 );
}
}
envp[envn++] = build_env(
"SCRIPT_NAME=/%s", strcmp( hc->origfilename, "." ) == 0 ?
"" : hc->origfilename );
if ( hc->query[0] != '\0')
envp[envn++] = build_env( "QUERY_STRING=%s", hc->query );
envp[envn++] = build_env(
"REMOTE_ADDR=%s", httpd_ntoa( &hc->client_addr ) );
if ( hc->referer[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_REFERER=%s", hc->referer );
if ( hc->useragent[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_USER_AGENT=%s", hc->useragent );
if ( hc->accept[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_ACCEPT=%s", hc->accept );
if ( hc->accepte[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING=%s", hc->accepte );
if ( hc->acceptl[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE=%s", hc->acceptl );
if ( hc->cookie[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_COOKIE=%s", hc->cookie );
if ( hc->contenttype[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "CONTENT_TYPE=%s", hc->contenttype );
if ( hc->hdrhost[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "HTTP_HOST=%s", hc->hdrhost );
if ( hc->contentlength != -1 )
{
(void) my_snprintf(
buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu", (unsigned long) hc->contentlength );
envp[envn++] = build_env( "CONTENT_LENGTH=%s", buf );
}
if ( hc->remoteuser[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "REMOTE_USER=%s", hc->remoteuser );
if ( hc->authorization[0] != '\0' )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "AUTH_TYPE=%s", "Basic" );
/* We only support Basic auth at the moment. */
if ( getenv( "TZ" ) != (char*) 0 )
envp[envn++] = build_env( "TZ=%s", getenv( "TZ" ) );
envp[envn++] = build_env( "CGI_PATTERN=%s", hc->hs->cgi_pattern );
envp[envn] = (char*) 0;
return envp;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
{
int i;
i = __find_msr_index(vmx, msr);
if (i >= 0)
return &vmx->guest_msrs[i];
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NotificationView(const DialogNotification& data,
AutofillDialogViewDelegate* delegate)
: data_(data),
delegate_(delegate),
checkbox_(NULL) {
scoped_ptr<views::View> label_view;
if (data.HasCheckbox()) {
scoped_ptr<views::Checkbox> checkbox(
new views::Checkbox(base::string16()));
checkbox->SetText(data.display_text());
checkbox->SetTextMultiLine(true);
checkbox->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
checkbox->SetTextColor(views::Button::STATE_NORMAL,
data.GetTextColor());
checkbox->SetTextColor(views::Button::STATE_HOVERED,
data.GetTextColor());
checkbox->SetChecked(data.checked());
checkbox->set_listener(this);
checkbox_ = checkbox.get();
label_view.reset(checkbox.release());
} else {
scoped_ptr<views::StyledLabel> label(new views::StyledLabel(
data.display_text(), this));
label->set_auto_color_readability_enabled(false);
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo text_style;
text_style.color = data.GetTextColor();
if (data.link_range().is_empty()) {
label->AddStyleRange(gfx::Range(0, data.display_text().size()),
text_style);
} else {
gfx::Range prefix_range(0, data.link_range().start());
if (!prefix_range.is_empty())
label->AddStyleRange(prefix_range, text_style);
label->AddStyleRange(
data.link_range(),
views::StyledLabel::RangeStyleInfo::CreateForLink());
gfx::Range suffix_range(data.link_range().end(),
data.display_text().size());
if (!suffix_range.is_empty())
label->AddStyleRange(suffix_range, text_style);
}
label_view.reset(label.release());
}
AddChildView(label_view.release());
if (!data.tooltip_text().empty())
AddChildView(new TooltipIcon(data.tooltip_text()));
set_background(
views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(data.GetBackgroundColor()));
SetBorder(views::Border::CreateSolidSidedBorder(
1, 0, 1, 0, data.GetBorderColor()));
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_lidt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct desc_ptr desc_ptr;
int rc;
rc = read_descriptor(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,
&desc_ptr.size, &desc_ptr.address,
ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->set_idt(ctxt, &desc_ptr);
/* Disable writeback. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ShowSingletonTabRespectRef(const GURL& url) {
browser::NavigateParams params(GetSingletonTabNavigateParams(url));
params.ref_behavior = browser::NavigateParams::RESPECT_REF;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcListFontsWithInfo(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xListFontsWithInfoReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xListFontsWithInfoReq, stuff->nbytes);
return StartListFontsWithInfo(client, stuff->nbytes,
(unsigned char *) &stuff[1], stuff->maxNames);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::triggerAutofocus(uint32_t id) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
ALOGV("%s: Triggering autofocus, id %d", __FUNCTION__, id);
RequestTrigger trigger[] = {
{
ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_TRIGGER,
ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_TRIGGER_START
},
{
ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_TRIGGER_ID,
static_cast<int32_t>(id)
}
};
return mRequestThread->queueTrigger(trigger,
sizeof(trigger)/sizeof(trigger[0]));
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_version(void __user *arg)
{
mdu_version_t ver;
ver.major = MD_MAJOR_VERSION;
ver.minor = MD_MINOR_VERSION;
ver.patchlevel = MD_PATCHLEVEL_VERSION;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &ver, sizeof(ver)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabletModeWindowManager::OnWindowDestroying(aura::Window* window) {
if (IsContainerWindow(window)) {
window->RemoveObserver(this);
observed_container_windows_.erase(window);
} else if (base::Contains(added_windows_, window)) {
added_windows_.erase(window);
window->RemoveObserver(this);
} else {
ForgetWindow(window, /*destroyed=*/true);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WriteRiffHeader (FILE *outfile, WavpackContext *wpc, int64_t total_samples, int qmode)
{
int do_rf64 = 0, write_junk = 1;
ChunkHeader ds64hdr, datahdr, fmthdr;
RiffChunkHeader riffhdr;
DS64Chunk ds64_chunk;
JunkChunk junkchunk;
WaveHeader wavhdr;
uint32_t bcount;
int64_t total_data_bytes, total_riff_bytes;
int num_channels = WavpackGetNumChannels (wpc);
int32_t channel_mask = WavpackGetChannelMask (wpc);
int32_t sample_rate = WavpackGetSampleRate (wpc);
int bytes_per_sample = WavpackGetBytesPerSample (wpc);
int bits_per_sample = WavpackGetBitsPerSample (wpc);
int format = WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) ? 3 : 1;
int wavhdrsize = 16;
if (format == 3 && WavpackGetFloatNormExp (wpc) != 127) {
error_line ("can't create valid RIFF wav header for non-normalized floating data!");
return FALSE;
}
if (total_samples == -1)
total_samples = 0x7ffff000 / (bytes_per_sample * num_channels);
total_data_bytes = total_samples * bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
if (total_data_bytes > 0xff000000) {
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so rf64", total_data_bytes);
write_junk = 0;
do_rf64 = 1;
}
else if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("total_data_bytes = %lld, so riff", total_data_bytes);
CLEAR (wavhdr);
wavhdr.FormatTag = format;
wavhdr.NumChannels = num_channels;
wavhdr.SampleRate = sample_rate;
wavhdr.BytesPerSecond = sample_rate * num_channels * bytes_per_sample;
wavhdr.BlockAlign = bytes_per_sample * num_channels;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
if (num_channels > 2 || channel_mask != 0x5 - num_channels) {
wavhdrsize = sizeof (wavhdr);
wavhdr.cbSize = 22;
wavhdr.ValidBitsPerSample = bits_per_sample;
wavhdr.SubFormat = format;
wavhdr.ChannelMask = channel_mask;
wavhdr.FormatTag = 0xfffe;
wavhdr.BitsPerSample = bytes_per_sample * 8;
wavhdr.GUID [4] = 0x10;
wavhdr.GUID [6] = 0x80;
wavhdr.GUID [9] = 0xaa;
wavhdr.GUID [11] = 0x38;
wavhdr.GUID [12] = 0x9b;
wavhdr.GUID [13] = 0x71;
}
strncpy (riffhdr.ckID, do_rf64 ? "RF64" : "RIFF", sizeof (riffhdr.ckID));
strncpy (riffhdr.formType, "WAVE", sizeof (riffhdr.formType));
total_riff_bytes = sizeof (riffhdr) + wavhdrsize + sizeof (datahdr) + ((total_data_bytes + 1) & ~(int64_t)1);
if (do_rf64) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (ds64hdr) + sizeof (ds64_chunk);
if (write_junk) total_riff_bytes += sizeof (junkchunk);
strncpy (fmthdr.ckID, "fmt ", sizeof (fmthdr.ckID));
strncpy (datahdr.ckID, "data", sizeof (datahdr.ckID));
fmthdr.ckSize = wavhdrsize;
if (write_junk) {
CLEAR (junkchunk);
strncpy (junkchunk.ckID, "junk", sizeof (junkchunk.ckID));
junkchunk.ckSize = sizeof (junkchunk) - 8;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&junkchunk, ChunkHeaderFormat);
}
if (do_rf64) {
strncpy (ds64hdr.ckID, "ds64", sizeof (ds64hdr.ckID));
ds64hdr.ckSize = sizeof (ds64_chunk);
CLEAR (ds64_chunk);
ds64_chunk.riffSize64 = total_riff_bytes;
ds64_chunk.dataSize64 = total_data_bytes;
ds64_chunk.sampleCount64 = total_samples;
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) -1;
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64hdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&ds64_chunk, DS64ChunkFormat);
}
else {
riffhdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_riff_bytes;
datahdr.ckSize = (uint32_t) total_data_bytes;
}
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&riffhdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&fmthdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&wavhdr, WaveHeaderFormat);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (&datahdr, ChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &riffhdr, sizeof (riffhdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (riffhdr) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64hdr, sizeof (ds64hdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64hdr))) ||
(do_rf64 && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &ds64_chunk, sizeof (ds64_chunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (ds64_chunk))) ||
(write_junk && (!DoWriteFile (outfile, &junkchunk, sizeof (junkchunk), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (junkchunk))) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &fmthdr, sizeof (fmthdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (fmthdr) ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &wavhdr, wavhdrsize, &bcount) || bcount != wavhdrsize ||
!DoWriteFile (outfile, &datahdr, sizeof (datahdr), &bcount) || bcount != sizeof (datahdr)) {
error_line ("can't write .WAV data, disk probably full!");
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: issue #27, do not overwrite stack on corrupt RF64 file
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExprResolveButton(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr, int *btn_rtrn)
{
return ExprResolveIntegerLookup(ctx, expr, btn_rtrn, SimpleLookup,
buttonNames);
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 78,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t resp_hdr_cb(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *user_data)
{
struct header_info *hi = user_data;
size_t remlen, slen, ptrlen = size * nmemb;
char *rem, *val = NULL, *key = NULL;
void *tmp;
val = calloc(1, ptrlen);
key = calloc(1, ptrlen);
if (!key || !val)
goto out;
tmp = memchr(ptr, ':', ptrlen);
if (!tmp || (tmp == ptr)) /* skip empty keys / blanks */
goto out;
slen = tmp - ptr;
if ((slen + 1) == ptrlen) /* skip key w/ no value */
goto out;
memcpy(key, ptr, slen); /* store & nul term key */
key[slen] = 0;
rem = ptr + slen + 1; /* trim value's leading whitespace */
remlen = ptrlen - slen - 1;
while ((remlen > 0) && (isspace(*rem))) {
remlen--;
rem++;
}
memcpy(val, rem, remlen); /* store value, trim trailing ws */
val[remlen] = 0;
while ((*val) && (isspace(val[strlen(val) - 1])))
val[strlen(val) - 1] = 0;
if (!*val) /* skip blank value */
goto out;
if (opt_protocol)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "HTTP hdr(%s): %s", key, val);
if (!strcasecmp("X-Roll-Ntime", key)) {
hi->hadrolltime = true;
if (!strncasecmp("N", val, 1))
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "X-Roll-Ntime: N found");
else {
hi->canroll = true;
/* Check to see if expire= is supported and if not, set
* the rolltime to the default scantime */
if (strlen(val) > 7 && !strncasecmp("expire=", val, 7)) {
sscanf(val + 7, "%d", &hi->rolltime);
hi->hadexpire = true;
} else
hi->rolltime = opt_scantime;
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "X-Roll-Ntime expiry set to %d", hi->rolltime);
}
}
if (!strcasecmp("X-Long-Polling", key)) {
hi->lp_path = val; /* steal memory reference */
val = NULL;
}
if (!strcasecmp("X-Reject-Reason", key)) {
hi->reason = val; /* steal memory reference */
val = NULL;
}
if (!strcasecmp("X-Stratum", key)) {
hi->stratum_url = val;
val = NULL;
}
out:
free(key);
free(val);
return ptrlen;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 36,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const GURL& WebContentsImpl::GetURL() const {
NavigationEntry* entry = controller_.GetVisibleEntry();
return entry ? entry->GetVirtualURL() : GURL::EmptyGURL();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
/*
* There's a time window between 'ctx->is_active' check
* in perf_event_enable function and this place having:
* - IRQs on
* - ctx->lock unlocked
*
* where the task could be killed and 'ctx' deactivated
* by perf_event_exit_task.
*/
if (!ctx->is_active)
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event) {
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
perf_cpu_hrtimer_restart(cpuctx);
}
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipgre_tunnel_bind_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_device *tdev = NULL;
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel;
struct iphdr *iph;
int hlen = LL_MAX_HEADER;
int mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN;
int addend = sizeof(struct iphdr) + 4;
tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
iph = &tunnel->parms.iph;
/* Guess output device to choose reasonable mtu and needed_headroom */
if (iph->daddr) {
struct flowi fl = {
.oif = tunnel->parms.link,
.fl4_dst = iph->daddr,
.fl4_src = iph->saddr,
.fl4_tos = RT_TOS(iph->tos),
.proto = IPPROTO_GRE,
.fl_gre_key = tunnel->parms.o_key
};
struct rtable *rt;
if (!ip_route_output_key(dev_net(dev), &rt, &fl)) {
tdev = rt->dst.dev;
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER)
dev->flags |= IFF_POINTOPOINT;
}
if (!tdev && tunnel->parms.link)
tdev = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(dev), tunnel->parms.link);
if (tdev) {
hlen = tdev->hard_header_len + tdev->needed_headroom;
mtu = tdev->mtu;
}
dev->iflink = tunnel->parms.link;
/* Precalculate GRE options length */
if (tunnel->parms.o_flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ)) {
if (tunnel->parms.o_flags&GRE_CSUM)
addend += 4;
if (tunnel->parms.o_flags&GRE_KEY)
addend += 4;
if (tunnel->parms.o_flags&GRE_SEQ)
addend += 4;
}
dev->needed_headroom = addend + hlen;
mtu -= dev->hard_header_len + addend;
if (mtu < 68)
mtu = 68;
tunnel->hlen = addend;
return mtu;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_backlog_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int rc;
/* Charge it to the socket, dropping if the queue is full. */
rc = sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
if (rc < 0)
goto drop;
return 0;
drop:
IP_INC_STATS(&init_net, IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::FrameScheduledNavigation(
LocalFrame* frame,
ScheduledNavigation* scheduled_navigation) {
GetFrontend()->frameScheduledNavigation(
IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame), scheduled_navigation->Delay(),
ScheduledNavigationReasonToProtocol(scheduled_navigation->GetReason()),
scheduled_navigation->Url().GetString());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ehci_cancel_queue(EHCIQueue *q)
{
EHCIPacket *p;
int packets = 0;
p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets);
if (p == NULL) {
goto leave;
}
trace_usb_ehci_queue_action(q, "cancel");
do {
ehci_free_packet(p);
packets++;
} while ((p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets)) != NULL);
leave:
ehci_queue_stopped(q);
return packets;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GaiaCookieManagerService::ListAccounts(
std::vector<gaia::ListedAccount>* accounts,
std::vector<gaia::ListedAccount>* signed_out_accounts,
const std::string& source) {
if (!list_accounts_stale_) {
if (accounts)
accounts->assign(listed_accounts_.begin(), listed_accounts_.end());
if (signed_out_accounts) {
signed_out_accounts->assign(signed_out_accounts_.begin(),
signed_out_accounts_.end());
}
return true;
}
TriggerListAccounts(source);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 128,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ScrollbarTest::IsScrollbarVisible(
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt> prompt) {
ExtensionInstallDialogView* dialog = new ExtensionInstallDialogView(
profile(), web_contents(), ExtensionInstallPrompt::DoneCallback(),
std::move(prompt));
views::Widget* modal = constrained_window::CreateBrowserModalDialogViews(
dialog, web_contents()->GetTopLevelNativeWindow());
modal->Show();
content::RunAllBlockingPoolTasksUntilIdle();
return dialog->scroll_view()->vertical_scroll_bar()->visible();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
struct robust_list __user * __user *head,
int *pi)
{
unsigned long uentry;
if (get_user(uentry, (unsigned long __user *)head))
return -EFAULT;
*entry = (void __user *)(uentry & ~1UL);
*pi = uentry & 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual webkit_glue::ResourceLoaderBridge::Peer* OnReceivedResponse(
webkit_glue::ResourceLoaderBridge::Peer* current_peer,
const std::string& mime_type,
const GURL& url) {
return ExtensionLocalizationPeer::CreateExtensionLocalizationPeer(
current_peer, RenderThread::Get(), mime_type, url);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvp_key_add_or_modify(int pool, __u8 *key, int key_size, __u8 *value,
int value_size)
{
int i;
int j, k;
int num_records;
struct kvp_record *record;
int num_blocks;
if ((key_size > HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE) ||
(value_size > HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE))
return 1;
/*
* First update the in-memory state.
*/
kvp_update_mem_state(pool);
num_records = kvp_file_info[pool].num_records;
record = kvp_file_info[pool].records;
num_blocks = kvp_file_info[pool].num_blocks;
for (i = 0; i < num_records; i++) {
if (memcmp(key, record[i].key, key_size))
continue;
/*
* Found a match; just update the value -
* this is the modify case.
*/
memcpy(record[i].value, value, value_size);
kvp_update_file(pool);
return 0;
}
/*
* Need to add a new entry;
*/
if (num_records == (ENTRIES_PER_BLOCK * num_blocks)) {
/* Need to allocate a larger array for reg entries. */
record = realloc(record, sizeof(struct kvp_record) *
ENTRIES_PER_BLOCK * (num_blocks + 1));
if (record == NULL)
return 1;
kvp_file_info[pool].num_blocks++;
}
memcpy(record[i].value, value, value_size);
memcpy(record[i].key, key, key_size);
kvp_file_info[pool].records = record;
kvp_file_info[pool].num_records++;
kvp_update_file(pool);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Tools: hv: verify origin of netlink connector message
The SuSE security team suggested to use recvfrom instead of recv to be
certain that the connector message is originated from kernel.
CVE-2012-2669
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tsize_t t2p_sample_realize_palette(T2P* t2p, unsigned char* buffer){
uint32 sample_count=0;
uint16 component_count=0;
uint32 palette_offset=0;
uint32 sample_offset=0;
uint32 i=0;
uint32 j=0;
sample_count=t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length;
component_count=t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
if( sample_count * component_count > t2p->tiff_datasize )
{
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Error: sample_count * component_count > t2p->tiff_datasize");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
for(i=sample_count;i>0;i--){
palette_offset=buffer[i-1] * component_count;
sample_offset= (i-1) * component_count;
for(j=0;j<component_count;j++){
buffer[sample_offset+j]=t2p->pdf_palette[palette_offset+j];
}
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 71,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int detect_netkey(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_path_t p;
sc_file_t *f;
int keylen;
char dir[10];
const char *c_auth;
/* NKS-Applikation ? */
memset(&p, 0, sizeof(sc_path_t));
p.type=SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
memcpy(p.value, "\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x03\x01\x02", p.len=7);
if (sc_select_file(card,&p,&f)!=SC_SUCCESS) return 1;
sprintf(dir,"%04X", f->id);
sc_file_free(f);
p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id = strdup("TeleSec GmbH");
p15card->tokeninfo->label = strdup(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3 ? "NetKey V3 Card" : "NetKey Card");
keylen= card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3 ? 2048 : 1024;
c_auth= card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3 ? "C500" : "C100";
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"4331"), 0x45, 1, "Signatur Zertifikat 1");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"4332"), 0x45, 1, "Signatur Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"C000"), 0x45, 0, "Telesec Signatur Zertifikat");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"43B1"), 0x46, 1, "Verschluesselungs Zertifikat 1");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"43B2"), 0x46, 1, "Verschluesselungs Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"C200"), 0x46, 0, "Telesec Verschluesselungs Zertifikat");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"4371"), 0x47, 1, "Authentifizierungs Zertifikat 1");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"4372"), 0x47, 1, "Authentifizierungs Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,c_auth), 0x47, 0, "Telesec Authentifizierungs Zertifikat");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"C201"), 0x48, 0, "Telesec 1024bit Zertifikat");
insert_key(p15card, dirpath(dir,"5331"), 0x45, 0x80, keylen, 4, "Signatur Schluessel");
insert_key(p15card, dirpath(dir,"53B1"), 0x46, 0x81, keylen, 3, "Verschluesselungs Schluessel");
insert_key(p15card, dirpath(dir,"5371"), 0x47, 0x82, keylen, 3, "Authentifizierungs Schluessel");
insert_key(p15card, dirpath(dir,"0000"), 0x48, 0x83, 1024, 3, "1024bit Schluessel");
insert_pin(p15card, "5000", 1, 2, 0x00, 6, "PIN",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
insert_pin(p15card, "5001", 2, 0, 0x01, 8, "PUK",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_UNBLOCKING_PIN | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_SO_PIN
);
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
insert_pin(p15card, dirpath(dir,"0000"), 3, 1, 0x83, 6, "NetKey PIN2",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_LOCAL |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
} else {
insert_pin(p15card, dirpath(dir,"5080"), 3, 1, 0x80, 6, "NetKey PIN0",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_LOCAL |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
}
insert_pin(p15card, dirpath(dir,"5081"), 4, 1, 0x81, 6, "NetKey PIN1",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_LOCAL |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
/* SigG-Applikation */
p.len=7; p.type=SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
memcpy(p.value, "\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x66\x01", p.len=6);
if (sc_select_file(card,&p,&f)==SC_SUCCESS){
sprintf(dir,"%04X", f->id);
sc_file_free(f);
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"C000"), 0x49, 1, "SigG Zertifikat 1");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"4331"), 0x49, 1, "SigG Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card, dirpath(dir,"4332"), 0x49, 1, "SigG Zertifikat 3");
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
insert_key(p15card, dirpath(dir,"0000"), 0x49, 0x84, 2048, 5, "SigG Schluessel");
} else {
insert_key(p15card, dirpath(dir,"5331"), 0x49, 0x80, 1024, 5, "SigG Schluessel");
}
insert_pin(p15card, dirpath(dir,"5081"), 5, 0, 0x81, 6, "SigG PIN",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_LOCAL |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
insert_pin(p15card, dirpath(dir,"0000"), 6, 0, 0x83, 8, "SigG PIN2",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_LOCAL |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadDCMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
explicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
implicit_vr[MagickPathExtent],
magick[MagickPathExtent],
photometric[MagickPathExtent];
DCMStreamInfo
*stream_info;
Image
*image;
int
*bluemap,
datum,
*greenmap,
*graymap,
index,
*redmap;
MagickBooleanType
explicit_file,
explicit_retry,
polarity,
sequence,
use_explicit;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
Quantum
*scale;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_allocated,
bytes_per_pixel,
colors,
depth,
height,
length,
mask,
max_value,
number_scenes,
quantum,
samples_per_pixel,
signed_data,
significant_bits,
status,
width,
window_width;
ssize_t
count,
rescale_intercept,
rescale_slope,
scene,
window_center,
y;
unsigned char
*data;
unsigned short
group,
element;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image->depth=8UL;
image->endian=LSBEndian;
/*
Read DCM preamble.
*/
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*stream_info));
if (stream_info == (DCMStreamInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(stream_info,0,sizeof(*stream_info));
count=ReadBlob(image,128,(unsigned char *) magick);
if (count != 128)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
if ((count != 4) || (LocaleNCompare(magick,"DICM",4) != 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Read DCM Medical image.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ",MagickPathExtent);
bits_allocated=8;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
polarity=MagickFalse;
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
depth=8;
element=0;
explicit_vr[2]='\0';
explicit_file=MagickFalse;
colors=0;
redmap=(int *) NULL;
greenmap=(int *) NULL;
bluemap=(int *) NULL;
graymap=(int *) NULL;
height=0;
max_value=255UL;
mask=0xffff;
number_scenes=1;
rescale_intercept=0;
rescale_slope=1;
samples_per_pixel=1;
scale=(Quantum *) NULL;
sequence=MagickFalse;
signed_data=(~0UL);
significant_bits=0;
use_explicit=MagickFalse;
explicit_retry = MagickFalse;
width=0;
window_center=0;
window_width=0;
for (group=0; (group != 0x7FE0) || (element != 0x0010) ||
(sequence != MagickFalse); )
{
/*
Read a group.
*/
image->offset=(ssize_t) TellBlob(image);
group=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
element=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((group != 0x0002) && (image->endian == MSBEndian))
{
group=(unsigned short) ((group << 8) | ((group >> 8) & 0xFF));
element=(unsigned short) ((element << 8) | ((element >> 8) & 0xFF));
}
quantum=0;
/*
Find corresponding VR for this group and element.
*/
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].group < 0xffff; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) && (element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,dicom_info[i].vr,MagickPathExtent);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) explicit_vr);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Check for "explicitness", but meta-file headers always explicit.
*/
if ((explicit_file == MagickFalse) && (group != 0x0002))
explicit_file=(isupper((unsigned char) *explicit_vr) != MagickFalse) &&
(isupper((unsigned char) *(explicit_vr+1)) != MagickFalse) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
use_explicit=((group == 0x0002) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse)) ||
(explicit_file != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if ((use_explicit != MagickFalse) && (strncmp(implicit_vr,"xs",2) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(implicit_vr,explicit_vr,MagickPathExtent);
if ((use_explicit == MagickFalse) || (strncmp(implicit_vr,"!!",2) == 0))
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) -2,SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
quantum=4;
}
else
{
/*
Assume explicit type.
*/
quantum=2;
if ((strncmp(explicit_vr,"OB",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"UN",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"OW",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(explicit_vr,"SQ",2) == 0))
{
(void) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
quantum=4;
}
}
datum=0;
if (quantum == 4)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if (quantum == 2)
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
quantum=0;
length=1;
if (datum != 0)
{
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"SS",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"US",2) == 0))
quantum=2;
else
if ((strncmp(implicit_vr,"UL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"SL",2) == 0) ||
(strncmp(implicit_vr,"FL",2) == 0))
quantum=4;
else
if (strncmp(implicit_vr,"FD",2) != 0)
quantum=1;
else
quantum=8;
if (datum != ~0)
length=(size_t) datum/quantum;
else
{
/*
Sequence and item of undefined length.
*/
quantum=0;
length=0;
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Display Dicom info.
*/
if (use_explicit == MagickFalse)
explicit_vr[0]='\0';
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"0x%04lX %4ld %s-%s (0x%04lx,0x%04lx)",
(unsigned long) image->offset,(long) length,implicit_vr,explicit_vr,
(unsigned long) group,(unsigned long) element);
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout," %s",dicom_info[i].description);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,": ");
}
if ((sequence == MagickFalse) && (group == 0x7FE0) && (element == 0x0010))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
break;
}
/*
Allocate space and read an array.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 1))
datum=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 2))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedShort(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedShort(image);
}
else
if ((length == 1) && (quantum == 4))
{
if (group == 0x0002)
datum=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
else
datum=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
}
else
if ((quantum != 0) && (length != 0))
{
if (~length >= 1)
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,quantum*
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) quantum*length,data);
if (count != (ssize_t) (quantum*length))
{
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"count=%d quantum=%d "
"length=%d group=%d\n",(int) count,(int) quantum,(int)
length,(int) group);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
data[length*quantum]='\0';
}
else
if ((unsigned int) datum == 0xFFFFFFFFU)
{
sequence=MagickTrue;
continue;
}
if ((unsigned int) ((group << 16) | element) == 0xFFFEE0DD)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
sequence=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
if (sequence != MagickFalse)
{
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
continue;
}
switch (group)
{
case 0x0002:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0010:
{
char
transfer_syntax[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Transfer Syntax.
*/
if ((datum == 0) && (explicit_retry == MagickFalse))
{
explicit_retry=MagickTrue;
(void) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType) 0,SEEK_SET);
group=0;
element=0;
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,
"Corrupted image - trying explicit format\n");
break;
}
*transfer_syntax='\0';
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(transfer_syntax,(char *) data,
MagickPathExtent);
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"transfer_syntax=%s\n",
(const char *) transfer_syntax);
if (strncmp(transfer_syntax,"1.2.840.10008.1.2",17) == 0)
{
int
count,
subtype,
type;
type=1;
subtype=0;
if (strlen(transfer_syntax) > 17)
{
count=sscanf(transfer_syntax+17,".%d.%d",&type,&subtype);
if (count < 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (type)
{
case 1:
{
image->endian=LSBEndian;
break;
}
case 2:
{
image->endian=MSBEndian;
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((subtype >= 80) && (subtype <= 81))
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
else
if ((subtype >= 90) && (subtype <= 93))
image->compression=JPEG2000Compression;
else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
break;
}
case 5:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
}
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x0028:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0002:
{
/*
Samples per pixel.
*/
samples_per_pixel=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0004:
{
/*
Photometric interpretation.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin(length,MagickPathExtent-1); i++)
photometric[i]=(char) data[i];
photometric[i]='\0';
polarity=LocaleCompare(photometric,"MONOCHROME1 ") == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
break;
}
case 0x0006:
{
/*
Planar configuration.
*/
if (datum == 1)
image->interlace=PlaneInterlace;
break;
}
case 0x0008:
{
/*
Number of frames.
*/
number_scenes=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x0010:
{
/*
Image rows.
*/
height=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0011:
{
/*
Image columns.
*/
width=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x0100:
{
/*
Bits allocated.
*/
bits_allocated=(size_t) datum;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (datum > 8)
bytes_per_pixel=2;
depth=bits_allocated;
if (depth > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=(1UL << bits_allocated)-1;
break;
}
case 0x0101:
{
/*
Bits stored.
*/
significant_bits=(size_t) datum;
bytes_per_pixel=1;
if (significant_bits > 8)
bytes_per_pixel=2;
depth=significant_bits;
if (depth > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
max_value=(1UL << significant_bits)-1;
mask=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(significant_bits);
break;
}
case 0x0102:
{
/*
High bit.
*/
break;
}
case 0x0103:
{
/*
Pixel representation.
*/
signed_data=(size_t) datum;
break;
}
case 0x1050:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: center.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
window_center=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1051:
{
/*
Visible pixel range: width.
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
window_width=StringToUnsignedLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1052:
{
/*
Rescale intercept
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
rescale_intercept=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1053:
{
/*
Rescale slope
*/
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
rescale_slope=(ssize_t) StringToLong((char *) data);
break;
}
case 0x1200:
case 0x3006:
{
/*
Populate graymap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/bytes_per_pixel);
datum=(int) colors;
graymap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*graymap));
if (graymap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
graymap[i]=(int) data[i];
else
graymap[i]=(int) ((short *) data)[i];
break;
}
case 0x1201:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate redmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
redmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*redmap));
if (redmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
redmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1202:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate greenmap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
greenmap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*greenmap));
if (greenmap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
greenmap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
case 0x1203:
{
unsigned short
index;
/*
Populate bluemap.
*/
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
colors=(size_t) (length/2);
datum=(int) colors;
bluemap=(int *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) colors,
sizeof(*bluemap));
if (bluemap == (int *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
p=data;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
if (image->endian == MSBEndian)
index=(unsigned short) ((*p << 8) | *(p+1));
else
index=(unsigned short) (*p | (*(p+1) << 8));
bluemap[i]=(int) index;
p+=2;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x2050:
{
switch (element)
{
case 0x0020:
{
if ((data != (unsigned char *) NULL) &&
(strncmp((char *) data,"INVERSE",7) == 0))
polarity=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
char
*attribute;
for (i=0; dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL; i++)
if ((group == dicom_info[i].group) &&
(element == dicom_info[i].element))
break;
if (dicom_info[i].description != (char *) NULL)
{
attribute=AcquireString("dcm:");
(void) ConcatenateString(&attribute,dicom_info[i].description);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) || (length > 4))
{
(void) SubstituteString(&attribute," ","");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,attribute,(char *) data,exception);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
}
}
if (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
{
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d\n",datum);
else
{
/*
Display group data.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMax(length,4); i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((i != (ssize_t) length) && (length <= 4))
{
ssize_t
j;
datum=0;
for (j=(ssize_t) length-1; j >= 0; j--)
datum=(256*datum+data[j]);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%d",datum);
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isprint((int) data[i]) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",data[i]);
else
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%c",'.');
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"\n");
}
}
if (data != (unsigned char *) NULL)
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
if ((width == 0) || (height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
if (signed_data == 0xffff)
signed_data=(size_t) (significant_bits == 16 ? 1 : 0);
if ((image->compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(image->compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
Image
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c;
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
/*
Handle non-native image formats.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
images=NewImageList();
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property;
FILE
*file;
Image
*jpeg_image;
int
unique_file;
unsigned int
tag;
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (tag == 0xFFFEE0DD)
break; /* sequence delimiter tag */
if (tag != 0xFFFEE000)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,
"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",filename);
break;
}
for ( ; length != 0; length--)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"jpeg:%s",filename);
if (image->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"j2k:%s",filename);
jpeg_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (jpeg_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(jpeg_image,property,
GetImageProperty(image,property,exception),exception);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
AppendImageToList(&images,jpeg_image);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(images));
}
if (depth != (1UL*MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH))
{
QuantumAny
range;
size_t
length;
/*
Compute pixel scaling table.
*/
length=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1);
scale=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*scale));
if (scale == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1); i++)
scale[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum((size_t) i,range);
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
size_t
length;
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE offset table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
(void) tag;
length=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
stream_info->offset_count=length >> 2;
if (stream_info->offset_count != 0)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
stream_info->offset_count,sizeof(*stream_info->offsets));
if (stream_info->offsets == (ssize_t *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
offset=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->offset_count; i++)
stream_info->offsets[i]+=offset;
}
}
for (scene=0; scene < (ssize_t) number_scenes; scene++)
{
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
break;
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
image->colorspace=RGBColorspace;
if ((image->colormap == (PixelInfo *) NULL) && (samples_per_pixel == 1))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
if (colors == 0)
colors=one << depth;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,one << depth,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=redmap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=greenmap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=bluemap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) colors; i++)
{
index=graymap[i];
if ((scale != (Quantum *) NULL) && (index <= (int) max_value))
index=(int) scale[index];
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) index;
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) index;
}
}
if (image->compression == RLECompression)
{
unsigned int
tag;
/*
Read RLE segment table.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) stream_info->remaining; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
tag=(ReadBlobLSBShort(image) << 16) | ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
stream_info->remaining=(size_t) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((tag != 0xFFFEE000) || (stream_info->remaining <= 64) ||
(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
stream_info->count=0;
stream_info->segment_count=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
{
bytes_per_pixel=1;
depth=8;
}
for (i=0; i < 15; i++)
stream_info->segments[i]=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
stream_info->remaining-=64;
}
if ((samples_per_pixel > 1) && (image->interlace == PlaneInterlace))
{
/*
Convert Planar RGB DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)),q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
}
else
{
const char
*option;
int
byte;
PixelPacket
pixel;
/*
Convert DCM Medical image to pixel packets.
*/
byte=0;
i=0;
if ((window_center != 0) && (window_width == 0))
window_width=(size_t) window_center;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dcm:display-range");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"reset") == 0)
window_width=0;
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=polarity != MagickFalse ?
((int) max_value-ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((bits_allocated != 12) || (significant_bits != 12))
{
if (signed_data)
pixel_value=ReadDCMSignedShort(stream_info,image);
else
pixel_value=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
if (polarity != MagickFalse)
pixel_value=(int)max_value-pixel_value;
}
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=ReadDCMSignedShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
index=(pixel_value*rescale_slope)+rescale_intercept;
if (window_width == 0)
{
if (signed_data == 1)
index-=32767;
}
else
{
ssize_t
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=(ssize_t) ceil((double) window_center-
(window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=(ssize_t) floor((double) window_center+
(window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if ((ssize_t)index <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if ((ssize_t)index > window_max)
index=(int) max_value;
else
index=(int) (max_value*(((index-window_center-
0.5)/(window_width-1))+0.5));
}
index&=mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
pixel.red=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=mask;
pixel.green&=mask;
pixel.blue&=mask;
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
pixel.red=scale[pixel.red];
pixel.green=scale[pixel.green];
pixel.blue=scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) pixel.red,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) pixel.green,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) pixel.blue,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (stream_info->segment_count > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (samples_per_pixel == 1)
{
int
pixel_value;
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
pixel_value=polarity != MagickFalse ?
((int) max_value-ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
else
if ((bits_allocated != 12) || (significant_bits != 12))
{
pixel_value=(int) (polarity != MagickFalse ?
(max_value-ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image)) :
ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image));
if (signed_data == 1)
pixel_value=((signed short) pixel_value);
}
else
{
if ((i & 0x01) != 0)
pixel_value=(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << 8) |
byte;
else
{
pixel_value=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
byte=(int) (pixel_value & 0x0f);
pixel_value>>=4;
}
i++;
}
index=(pixel_value*rescale_slope)+rescale_intercept;
if (window_width == 0)
{
if (signed_data == 1)
index-=32767;
}
else
{
ssize_t
window_max,
window_min;
window_min=(ssize_t) ceil((double) window_center-
(window_width-1.0)/2.0-0.5);
window_max=(ssize_t) floor((double) window_center+
(window_width-1.0)/2.0+0.5);
if ((ssize_t)index <= window_min)
index=0;
else
if ((ssize_t)index > window_max)
index=(int) max_value;
else
index=(int) (max_value*(((index-window_center-
0.5)/(window_width-1))+0.5));
}
index&=mask;
index=(int) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) (((size_t)
GetPixelIndex(image,q)) | (((size_t) index) << 8)),q);
pixel.red=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].red;
pixel.green=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].green;
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) image->colormap[index].blue;
}
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 1)
{
pixel.red=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=(unsigned int) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
}
else
{
pixel.red=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.green=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
pixel.blue=ReadDCMShort(stream_info,image);
}
pixel.red&=mask;
pixel.green&=mask;
pixel.blue&=mask;
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
pixel.red=scale[pixel.red];
pixel.green=scale[pixel.green];
pixel.blue=scale[pixel.blue];
}
}
SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) GetPixelRed(image,q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.red) << 8)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.green) << 8)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) (((size_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q)) |
(((size_t) pixel.blue) << 8)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (scene < (ssize_t) (number_scenes-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
/*
Free resources.
*/
if (stream_info->offsets != (ssize_t *) NULL)
stream_info->offsets=(ssize_t *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info->offsets);
stream_info=(DCMStreamInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(stream_info);
if (scale != (Quantum *) NULL)
scale=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scale);
if (graymap != (int *) NULL)
graymap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(graymap);
if (bluemap != (int *) NULL)
bluemap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bluemap);
if (greenmap != (int *) NULL)
greenmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(greenmap);
if (redmap != (int *) NULL)
redmap=(int *) RelinquishMagickMemory(redmap);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Add additional checks to DCM reader to prevent data-driven faults (bug report from Hanno Böck
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int blk_update_nr_requests(struct request_queue *q, unsigned int nr)
{
struct request_list *rl;
int on_thresh, off_thresh;
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
q->nr_requests = nr;
blk_queue_congestion_threshold(q);
on_thresh = queue_congestion_on_threshold(q);
off_thresh = queue_congestion_off_threshold(q);
blk_queue_for_each_rl(rl, q) {
if (rl->count[BLK_RW_SYNC] >= on_thresh)
blk_set_congested(rl, BLK_RW_SYNC);
else if (rl->count[BLK_RW_SYNC] < off_thresh)
blk_clear_congested(rl, BLK_RW_SYNC);
if (rl->count[BLK_RW_ASYNC] >= on_thresh)
blk_set_congested(rl, BLK_RW_ASYNC);
else if (rl->count[BLK_RW_ASYNC] < off_thresh)
blk_clear_congested(rl, BLK_RW_ASYNC);
if (rl->count[BLK_RW_SYNC] >= q->nr_requests) {
blk_set_rl_full(rl, BLK_RW_SYNC);
} else {
blk_clear_rl_full(rl, BLK_RW_SYNC);
wake_up(&rl->wait[BLK_RW_SYNC]);
}
if (rl->count[BLK_RW_ASYNC] >= q->nr_requests) {
blk_set_rl_full(rl, BLK_RW_ASYNC);
} else {
blk_clear_rl_full(rl, BLK_RW_ASYNC);
wake_up(&rl->wait[BLK_RW_ASYNC]);
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RFlagsAtOffset* r_flag_get_nearest_list(RFlag *f, ut64 off, int dir) {
RFlagsAtOffset *flags = NULL;
RFlagsAtOffset key;
key.off = off;
if (dir >= 0) {
flags = r_skiplist_get_geq (f->by_off, &key);
} else {
flags = r_skiplist_get_leq (f->by_off, &key);
}
if (dir == 0 && flags && flags->off != off) {
return NULL;
}
return flags;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_short_term_ref_pic_set(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
stref_picset_t *ps_stref_picset_base,
WORD32 num_short_term_ref_pic_sets,
WORD32 idx,
stref_picset_t *ps_stref_picset)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
stref_picset_t *ps_stref_picset_ref;
WORD32 delta_idx, delta_rps;
WORD32 r_idx;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 j, k, temp;
if(idx > 0)
{
BITS_PARSE("inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_stref_picset->i1_inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag = value;
}
else
ps_stref_picset->i1_inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag = 0;
if(ps_stref_picset->i1_inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag)
{
WORD32 delta_rps_sign;
WORD32 abs_delta_rps;
WORD32 num_neg_pics = 0;
WORD32 num_pos_pics = 0;
WORD32 num_pics = 0;
if(idx == num_short_term_ref_pic_sets)
{
UEV_PARSE("delta_idx_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
delta_idx = value + 1;
}
else
{
delta_idx = 1;
}
r_idx = idx - delta_idx;
r_idx = CLIP3(r_idx, 0, idx - 1);
ps_stref_picset_ref = ps_stref_picset_base + r_idx;
BITS_PARSE("delta_rps_sign", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
delta_rps_sign = value;
UEV_PARSE("abs_delta_rps_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
abs_delta_rps = value + 1;
delta_rps = (1 - 2 * delta_rps_sign) * (abs_delta_rps);
for(i = 0; i <= ps_stref_picset_ref->i1_num_delta_pocs; i++)
{
WORD32 ref_idc;
/*****************************************************************/
/* ref_idc is parsed as below */
/* bits "1" ref_idc 1 */
/* bits "01" ref_idc 2 */
/* bits "00" ref_idc 0 */
/*****************************************************************/
BITS_PARSE("used_by_curr_pic_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ref_idc = value;
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[num_pics] = value;
/* If ref_idc is zero check for next bit */
if(0 == ref_idc)
{
BITS_PARSE("use_delta_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ref_idc = value << 1;
}
if((ref_idc == 1) || (ref_idc == 2))
{
WORD32 delta_poc;
delta_poc = delta_rps;
delta_poc +=
((i < ps_stref_picset_ref->i1_num_delta_pocs) ?
ps_stref_picset_ref->ai2_delta_poc[i] :
0);
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[num_pics] = delta_poc;
if(delta_poc < 0)
{
num_neg_pics++;
}
else
{
num_pos_pics++;
}
num_pics++;
}
ps_stref_picset->ai1_ref_idc[i] = ref_idc;
}
num_neg_pics = CLIP3(num_neg_pics, 0, MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
num_pos_pics = CLIP3(num_pos_pics, 0, (MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1 - num_neg_pics));
num_pics = num_neg_pics + num_pos_pics;
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_ref_idc =
ps_stref_picset_ref->i1_num_delta_pocs + 1;
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_delta_pocs = num_pics;
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_pos_pics = num_pos_pics;
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics = num_neg_pics;
for(j = 1; j < num_pics; j++)
{
WORD32 delta_poc = ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[j];
WORD8 i1_used = ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[j];
for(k = j - 1; k >= 0; k--)
{
temp = ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[k];
if(delta_poc < temp)
{
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[k + 1] = temp;
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[k + 1] = ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[k];
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[k] = delta_poc;
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[k] = i1_used;
}
}
}
for(j = 0, k = num_neg_pics - 1; j < num_neg_pics >> 1; j++, k--)
{
WORD32 delta_poc = ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[j];
WORD8 i1_used = ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[j];
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[j] = ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[k];
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[j] = ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[k];
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[k] = delta_poc;
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[k] = i1_used;
}
}
else
{
WORD32 prev_poc = 0;
WORD32 poc;
UEV_PARSE("num_negative_pics", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics = value;
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics = CLIP3(ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics,
0,
MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1);
UEV_PARSE("num_positive_pics", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_pos_pics = value;
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_pos_pics = CLIP3(ps_stref_picset->i1_num_pos_pics,
0,
(MAX_DPB_SIZE - 1 - ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics));
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_delta_pocs =
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics +
ps_stref_picset->i1_num_pos_pics;
for(i = 0; i < ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics; i++)
{
UEV_PARSE("delta_poc_s0_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
poc = prev_poc - (value + 1);
prev_poc = poc;
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[i] = poc;
BITS_PARSE("used_by_curr_pic_s0_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[i] = value;
}
prev_poc = 0;
for(i = ps_stref_picset->i1_num_neg_pics;
i < ps_stref_picset->i1_num_delta_pocs;
i++)
{
UEV_PARSE("delta_poc_s1_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
poc = prev_poc + (value + 1);
prev_poc = poc;
ps_stref_picset->ai2_delta_poc[i] = poc;
BITS_PARSE("used_by_curr_pic_s1_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_stref_picset->ai1_used[i] = value;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_close(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_close *close)
{
__be32 status;
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp;
struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
dprintk("NFSD: nfsd4_close on file %pd\n",
cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry);
status = nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op(cstate, close->cl_seqid,
&close->cl_stateid,
NFS4_OPEN_STID|NFS4_CLOSED_STID,
&stp, nn);
nfsd4_bump_seqid(cstate, status);
if (status)
goto out;
nfs4_inc_and_copy_stateid(&close->cl_stateid, &stp->st_stid);
mutex_unlock(&stp->st_mutex);
nfsd4_close_open_stateid(stp);
/* put reference from nfs4_preprocess_seqid_op */
nfs4_put_stid(&stp->st_stid);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AbstractObjectState(v8::Handle<v8::Object> object, StateBase* next)
: State<v8::Object>(object, next)
, m_index(0)
, m_numSerializedProperties(0)
, m_nameDone(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned short PerformanceNavigationTiming::redirectCount() const {
bool allow_redirect_details = GetAllowRedirectDetails();
DocumentLoadTiming* timing = GetDocumentLoadTiming();
if (!allow_redirect_details || !timing)
return 0;
return timing->RedirectCount();
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reiserfs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
int error, error2;
struct reiserfs_transaction_handle th;
size_t jcreate_blocks;
int size = acl ? posix_acl_xattr_size(acl->a_count) : 0;
/*
* Pessimism: We can't assume that anything from the xattr root up
* has been created.
*/
jcreate_blocks = reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(inode) +
reiserfs_xattr_nblocks(inode, size) * 2;
reiserfs_write_lock(inode->i_sb);
error = journal_begin(&th, inode->i_sb, jcreate_blocks);
reiserfs_write_unlock(inode->i_sb);
if (error == 0) {
error = __reiserfs_set_acl(&th, inode, type, acl);
reiserfs_write_lock(inode->i_sb);
error2 = journal_end(&th);
reiserfs_write_unlock(inode->i_sb);
if (error2)
error = error2;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void strictTypeCheckingFloatAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->strictTypeCheckingFloatAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xPathNSResolverMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::xPathNSResolverMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum print_line_t print_trace_line(struct trace_iterator *iter)
{
struct trace_array *tr = iter->tr;
unsigned long trace_flags = tr->trace_flags;
enum print_line_t ret;
if (iter->lost_events) {
trace_seq_printf(&iter->seq, "CPU:%d [LOST %lu EVENTS]\n",
iter->cpu, iter->lost_events);
if (trace_seq_has_overflowed(&iter->seq))
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
}
if (iter->trace && iter->trace->print_line) {
ret = iter->trace->print_line(iter);
if (ret != TRACE_TYPE_UNHANDLED)
return ret;
}
if (iter->ent->type == TRACE_BPUTS &&
trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK &&
trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK_MSGONLY)
return trace_print_bputs_msg_only(iter);
if (iter->ent->type == TRACE_BPRINT &&
trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK &&
trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK_MSGONLY)
return trace_print_bprintk_msg_only(iter);
if (iter->ent->type == TRACE_PRINT &&
trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK &&
trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_PRINTK_MSGONLY)
return trace_print_printk_msg_only(iter);
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_BIN)
return print_bin_fmt(iter);
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_HEX)
return print_hex_fmt(iter);
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_RAW)
return print_raw_fmt(iter);
return print_trace_fmt(iter);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udpv6_offload_exit(void)
{
return inet6_del_offload(&udpv6_offload, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 65,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __setparam_dl(struct task_struct *p, const struct sched_attr *attr)
{
struct sched_dl_entity *dl_se = &p->dl;
dl_se->dl_runtime = attr->sched_runtime;
dl_se->dl_deadline = attr->sched_deadline;
dl_se->dl_period = attr->sched_period ?: dl_se->dl_deadline;
dl_se->flags = attr->sched_flags;
dl_se->dl_bw = to_ratio(dl_se->dl_period, dl_se->dl_runtime);
/*
* Changing the parameters of a task is 'tricky' and we're not doing
* the correct thing -- also see task_dead_dl() and switched_from_dl().
*
* What we SHOULD do is delay the bandwidth release until the 0-lag
* point. This would include retaining the task_struct until that time
* and change dl_overflow() to not immediately decrement the current
* amount.
*
* Instead we retain the current runtime/deadline and let the new
* parameters take effect after the current reservation period lapses.
* This is safe (albeit pessimistic) because the 0-lag point is always
* before the current scheduling deadline.
*
* We can still have temporary overloads because we do not delay the
* change in bandwidth until that time; so admission control is
* not on the safe side. It does however guarantee tasks will never
* consume more than promised.
*/
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_vm86_irq_handling(int subfunction, int irqnumber)
{
int ret;
switch (subfunction) {
case VM86_GET_AND_RESET_IRQ: {
return get_and_reset_irq(irqnumber);
}
case VM86_GET_IRQ_BITS: {
return irqbits;
}
case VM86_REQUEST_IRQ: {
int sig = irqnumber >> 8;
int irq = irqnumber & 255;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM;
if (!((1 << sig) & ALLOWED_SIGS)) return -EPERM;
if (invalid_vm86_irq(irq)) return -EPERM;
if (vm86_irqs[irq].tsk) return -EPERM;
ret = request_irq(irq, &irq_handler, 0, VM86_IRQNAME, NULL);
if (ret) return ret;
vm86_irqs[irq].sig = sig;
vm86_irqs[irq].tsk = current;
return irq;
}
case VM86_FREE_IRQ: {
if (invalid_vm86_irq(irqnumber)) return -EPERM;
if (!vm86_irqs[irqnumber].tsk) return 0;
if (vm86_irqs[irqnumber].tsk != current) return -EPERM;
free_vm86_irq(irqnumber);
return 0;
}
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readSsidRid(struct airo_info*ai, SsidRid *ssidr)
{
return PC4500_readrid(ai, RID_SSID, ssidr, sizeof(*ssidr), 1);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sched_autogroup_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct task_struct *p;
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
int nice;
int err;
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if (count > sizeof(buffer) - 1)
count = sizeof(buffer) - 1;
if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
err = kstrtoint(strstrip(buffer), 0, &nice);
if (err < 0)
return err;
p = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!p)
return -ESRCH;
err = proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice(p, nice);
if (err)
count = err;
put_task_struct(p);
return count;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_vmnc_dec_handle_frame (GstVideoDecoder * decoder,
GstVideoCodecFrame * frame)
{
GstVMncDec *dec = GST_VMNC_DEC (decoder);
int res;
GstFlowReturn ret = GST_FLOW_OK;
GstMapInfo map;
if (!gst_buffer_map (frame->input_buffer, &map, GST_MAP_READ))
return GST_FLOW_ERROR;
res = vmnc_handle_packet (dec, map.data, map.size, TRUE);
gst_buffer_unmap (frame->input_buffer, &map);
if (!dec->have_format) {
GST_VIDEO_DECODER_ERROR (decoder, 2, STREAM, DECODE, (NULL),
("Data found before header"), ret);
gst_video_decoder_drop_frame (decoder, frame);
} else if (res < 0) {
ret = GST_FLOW_ERROR;
gst_video_decoder_drop_frame (decoder, frame);
GST_VIDEO_DECODER_ERROR (decoder, 1, STREAM, DECODE, (NULL),
("Couldn't decode packet"), ret);
} else {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (dec, "read %d bytes of %" G_GSIZE_FORMAT, res,
gst_buffer_get_size (frame->input_buffer));
/* inbuf may be NULL; that's ok */
ret = vmnc_fill_buffer (dec, frame);
if (ret == GST_FLOW_OK)
gst_video_decoder_finish_frame (decoder, frame);
else
gst_video_decoder_drop_frame (decoder, frame);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isNativeImage() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!node)
return false;
if (isHTMLImageElement(*node))
return true;
if (isHTMLPlugInElement(*node))
return true;
if (isHTMLInputElement(*node))
return toHTMLInputElement(*node).type() == InputTypeNames::image;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_get_monotonic_time (long *tv_sec,
long *tv_usec)
{
#ifdef HAVE_MONOTONIC_CLOCK
struct timespec ts;
clock_gettime (CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
if (tv_sec)
*tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
if (tv_usec)
*tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
#else
struct timeval t;
gettimeofday (&t, NULL);
if (tv_sec)
*tv_sec = t.tv_sec;
if (tv_usec)
*tv_usec = t.tv_usec;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_pmu_register(struct pmu *pmu, const char *name, int type)
{
int cpu, ret;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_disable_count = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!pmu->pmu_disable_count)
goto unlock;
pmu->type = -1;
if (!name)
goto skip_type;
pmu->name = name;
if (type < 0) {
type = idr_alloc(&pmu_idr, pmu, PERF_TYPE_MAX, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (type < 0) {
ret = type;
goto free_pdc;
}
}
pmu->type = type;
if (pmu_bus_running) {
ret = pmu_dev_alloc(pmu);
if (ret)
goto free_idr;
}
skip_type:
if (pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_hw_context) {
static int hw_context_taken = 0;
/*
* Other than systems with heterogeneous CPUs, it never makes
* sense for two PMUs to share perf_hw_context. PMUs which are
* uncore must use perf_invalid_context.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_context_taken &&
!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_HETEROGENEOUS_CPUS)))
pmu->task_ctx_nr = perf_invalid_context;
hw_context_taken = 1;
}
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = find_pmu_context(pmu->task_ctx_nr);
if (pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto got_cpu_context;
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = alloc_percpu(struct perf_cpu_context);
if (!pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto free_dev;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
__perf_event_init_context(&cpuctx->ctx);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.mutex, &cpuctx_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.lock, &cpuctx_lock);
cpuctx->ctx.pmu = pmu;
__perf_mux_hrtimer_init(cpuctx, cpu);
}
got_cpu_context:
if (!pmu->start_txn) {
if (pmu->pmu_enable) {
/*
* If we have pmu_enable/pmu_disable calls, install
* transaction stubs that use that to try and batch
* hardware accesses.
*/
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_start_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_commit_txn;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_cancel_txn;
} else {
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_nop_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_nop_int;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
}
if (!pmu->pmu_enable) {
pmu->pmu_enable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->pmu_disable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
if (!pmu->event_idx)
pmu->event_idx = perf_event_idx_default;
list_add_rcu(&pmu->entry, &pmus);
atomic_set(&pmu->exclusive_cnt, 0);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
return ret;
free_dev:
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
free_idr:
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
free_pdc:
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
goto unlock;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testEmptyPicture()
{
m_testSurface->initializeCurrentFrame();
RefPtr<SkPicture> picture = m_testSurface->getPicture();
EXPECT_TRUE((bool)picture.get());
EXPECT_EQ(1, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
expectDisplayListEnabled(true);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static status_t GetMimeTypeForVideoCoding(
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType, AString *mime) {
for (size_t i = 0;
i < sizeof(kVideoCodingMapEntry) / sizeof(kVideoCodingMapEntry[0]);
++i) {
if (codingType == kVideoCodingMapEntry[i].mVideoCodingType) {
*mime = kVideoCodingMapEntry[i].mMime;
return OK;
}
}
mime->clear();
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NormalPageArena::TakeFreelistSnapshot(const String& dump_name) {
if (free_list_.TakeSnapshot(dump_name)) {
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* buckets_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(dump_name + "/buckets");
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* pages_dump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CreateMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(dump_name + "/pages");
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::Instance()
->CurrentProcessMemoryDump()
->AddOwnershipEdge(pages_dump->guid(), buckets_dump->guid());
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_attr_atomic (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
/* Length check. */
if (length != 0)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_ERR, "ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute length isn't 0 [%u]",
length);
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
args->total);
}
/* Set atomic aggregate flag. */
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->perWorldBindingsVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(
const url::Origin& origin,
url::Origin* result) {
return GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(
origin, SiteInstanceImpl::GetSiteForOrigin(origin), result);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_sa_defrag_extent(struct new_sa_defrag_extent *new)
{
struct old_sa_defrag_extent *old, *tmp;
if (!new)
return;
list_for_each_entry_safe(old, tmp, &new->head, list) {
list_del(&old->list);
kfree(old);
}
kfree(new);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_special_stateids(struct net *net, svc_fh *current_fh, stateid_t *stateid, int flags)
{
if (ONE_STATEID(stateid) && (flags & RD_STATE))
return nfs_ok;
else if (opens_in_grace(net)) {
/* Answer in remaining cases depends on existence of
* conflicting state; so we must wait out the grace period. */
return nfserr_grace;
} else if (flags & WR_STATE)
return nfs4_share_conflict(current_fh,
NFS4_SHARE_DENY_WRITE);
else /* (flags & RD_STATE) && ZERO_STATEID(stateid) */
return nfs4_share_conflict(current_fh,
NFS4_SHARE_DENY_READ);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FLTApplySimpleSQLFilter(FilterEncodingNode *psNode, mapObj *map, int iLayerIndex)
{
layerObj *lp = NULL;
char *szExpression = NULL;
rectObj sQueryRect = map->extent;
const char *szEPSG = NULL;
projectionObj sProjTmp;
char *pszBuffer = NULL;
int bConcatWhere = 0;
int bHasAWhere =0;
char *pszTmp = NULL, *pszTmp2 = NULL;
char *tmpfilename = NULL;
const char* pszTimeField = NULL;
const char* pszTimeValue = NULL;
lp = (GET_LAYER(map, iLayerIndex));
/* if there is a bbox use it */
szEPSG = FLTGetBBOX(psNode, &sQueryRect);
if(szEPSG && map->projection.numargs > 0) {
msInitProjection(&sProjTmp);
/* Use the non EPSG variant since axis swapping is done in FLTDoAxisSwappingIfNecessary */
if (msLoadProjectionString(&sProjTmp, szEPSG) == 0) {
msProjectRect(&sProjTmp, &map->projection, &sQueryRect);
}
msFreeProjection(&sProjTmp);
}
if( lp->connectiontype == MS_OGR ) {
pszTimeValue = FLTGetDuring(psNode, &pszTimeField);
}
/* make sure that the layer can be queried*/
if (!lp->template) lp->template = msStrdup("ttt.html");
/* if there is no class, create at least one, so that query by rect would work */
if (lp->numclasses == 0) {
if (msGrowLayerClasses(lp) == NULL)
return MS_FAILURE;
initClass(lp->class[0]);
}
bConcatWhere = 0;
bHasAWhere = 0;
if (lp->connectiontype == MS_POSTGIS || lp->connectiontype == MS_ORACLESPATIAL ||
lp->connectiontype == MS_PLUGIN) {
szExpression = FLTGetSQLExpression(psNode, lp);
if (szExpression) {
pszTmp = msStrdup("(");
pszTmp = msStringConcatenate(pszTmp, szExpression);
pszTmp = msStringConcatenate(pszTmp, ")");
msFree(szExpression);
szExpression = pszTmp;
}
}
/* concatenates the WHERE clause for OGR layers. This only applies if
the expression was empty or not of an expression string. If there
is an sql type expression, it is assumed to have the WHERE clause.
If it is an expression and does not have a WHERE it is assumed to be a mapserver
type expression*/
else if (lp->connectiontype == MS_OGR) {
if (lp->filter.type != MS_EXPRESSION) {
szExpression = FLTGetSQLExpression(psNode, lp);
bConcatWhere = 1;
} else {
if (lp->filter.string && EQUALN(lp->filter.string,"WHERE ",6)) {
szExpression = FLTGetSQLExpression(psNode, lp);
bHasAWhere = 1;
bConcatWhere =1;
} else {
szExpression = FLTGetCommonExpression(psNode, lp);
}
}
} else {
szExpression = FLTGetCommonExpression(psNode, lp);
}
if (szExpression) {
if (bConcatWhere)
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, "WHERE ");
/* if the filter is set and it's an expression type, concatenate it with
this filter. If not just free it */
if (lp->filter.string && lp->filter.type == MS_EXPRESSION) {
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, "((");
if (bHasAWhere)
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, lp->filter.string+6);
else
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, lp->filter.string);
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, ") and ");
} else if (lp->filter.string)
msFreeExpression(&lp->filter);
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, szExpression);
if(lp->filter.string && lp->filter.type == MS_EXPRESSION)
pszBuffer = msStringConcatenate(pszBuffer, ")");
msLoadExpressionString(&lp->filter, pszBuffer);
free(szExpression);
}
if (pszTimeField && pszTimeValue)
msLayerSetTimeFilter(lp, pszTimeValue, pszTimeField);
if (pszBuffer)
free(pszBuffer);
map->query.type = MS_QUERY_BY_RECT;
map->query.mode = MS_QUERY_MULTIPLE;
map->query.layer = lp->index;
map->query.rect = sQueryRect;
if(map->debug == MS_DEBUGLEVEL_VVV) {
tmpfilename = msTmpFile(map, map->mappath, NULL, "_filter.map");
if (tmpfilename == NULL) {
tmpfilename = msTmpFile(map, NULL, NULL, "_filter.map" );
}
if (tmpfilename) {
msSaveMap(map,tmpfilename);
msDebug("FLTApplySimpleSQLFilter(): Map file after Filter was applied %s\n", tmpfilename);
msFree(tmpfilename);
}
}
/*for oracle connection, if we have a simple filter with no spatial constraints
we should set the connection function to NONE to have a better performance
(#2725)*/
if (lp->connectiontype == MS_ORACLESPATIAL && FLTIsSimpleFilterNoSpatial(psNode)) {
if (strcasestr(lp->data, "USING") == 0)
lp->data = msStringConcatenate(lp->data, " USING NONE");
else if (strcasestr(lp->data, "NONE") == 0) {
/*if one of the functions is used, just replace it with NONE*/
if (strcasestr(lp->data, "FILTER"))
lp->data = msCaseReplaceSubstring(lp->data, "FILTER", "NONE");
else if (strcasestr(lp->data, "GEOMRELATE"))
lp->data = msCaseReplaceSubstring(lp->data, "GEOMRELATE", "NONE");
else if (strcasestr(lp->data, "RELATE"))
lp->data = msCaseReplaceSubstring(lp->data, "RELATE", "NONE");
else if (strcasestr(lp->data, "VERSION")) {
/*should add NONE just before the VERSION. Cases are:
DATA "ORA_GEOMETRY FROM data USING VERSION 10g
DATA "ORA_GEOMETRY FROM data USING UNIQUE FID VERSION 10g"
*/
pszTmp = (char *)strcasestr(lp->data, "VERSION");
pszTmp2 = msStringConcatenate(pszTmp2, " NONE ");
pszTmp2 = msStringConcatenate(pszTmp2, pszTmp);
lp->data = msCaseReplaceSubstring(lp->data, pszTmp, pszTmp2);
msFree(pszTmp2);
} else if (strcasestr(lp->data, "SRID")) {
lp->data = msStringConcatenate(lp->data, " NONE");
}
}
}
return msQueryByRect(map);
/* return MS_SUCCESS; */
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long media_device_enum_entities(struct media_device *mdev,
struct media_entity_desc __user *uent)
{
struct media_entity *ent;
struct media_entity_desc u_ent;
if (copy_from_user(&u_ent.id, &uent->id, sizeof(u_ent.id)))
return -EFAULT;
ent = find_entity(mdev, u_ent.id);
if (ent == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
u_ent.id = ent->id;
if (ent->name) {
strncpy(u_ent.name, ent->name, sizeof(u_ent.name));
u_ent.name[sizeof(u_ent.name) - 1] = '\0';
} else {
memset(u_ent.name, 0, sizeof(u_ent.name));
}
u_ent.type = ent->type;
u_ent.revision = ent->revision;
u_ent.flags = ent->flags;
u_ent.group_id = ent->group_id;
u_ent.pads = ent->num_pads;
u_ent.links = ent->num_links - ent->num_backlinks;
memcpy(&u_ent.raw, &ent->info, sizeof(ent->info));
if (copy_to_user(uent, &u_ent, sizeof(u_ent)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media: info leak in __media_device_enum_links()
These structs have holes and reserved struct members which aren't
cleared. I've added a memset() so we don't leak stack information.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hns_ppe_get_stats(struct hns_ppe_cb *ppe_cb, u64 *data)
{
u64 *regs_buff = data;
struct hns_ppe_hw_stats *hw_stats = &ppe_cb->hw_stats;
regs_buff[0] = hw_stats->rx_pkts_from_sw;
regs_buff[1] = hw_stats->rx_pkts;
regs_buff[2] = hw_stats->rx_drop_no_bd;
regs_buff[3] = hw_stats->rx_alloc_buf_fail;
regs_buff[4] = hw_stats->rx_alloc_buf_wait;
regs_buff[5] = hw_stats->rx_drop_no_buf;
regs_buff[6] = hw_stats->rx_err_fifo_full;
regs_buff[7] = hw_stats->tx_bd_form_rcb;
regs_buff[8] = hw_stats->tx_pkts_from_rcb;
regs_buff[9] = hw_stats->tx_pkts;
regs_buff[10] = hw_stats->tx_err_fifo_empty;
regs_buff[11] = hw_stats->tx_err_checksum;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAVC::initEncParams() {
mCodecCtx = NULL;
mMemRecords = NULL;
mNumMemRecords = DEFAULT_MEM_REC_CNT;
mHeaderGenerated = 0;
mNumCores = GetCPUCoreCount();
mArch = DEFAULT_ARCH;
mSliceMode = DEFAULT_SLICE_MODE;
mSliceParam = DEFAULT_SLICE_PARAM;
mHalfPelEnable = DEFAULT_HPEL;
mIInterval = DEFAULT_I_INTERVAL;
mIDRInterval = DEFAULT_IDR_INTERVAL;
mDisableDeblkLevel = DEFAULT_DISABLE_DEBLK_LEVEL;
mEnableFastSad = DEFAULT_ENABLE_FAST_SAD;
mEnableAltRef = DEFAULT_ENABLE_ALT_REF;
mEncSpeed = DEFAULT_ENC_SPEED;
mIntra4x4 = DEFAULT_INTRA4x4;
mAIRMode = DEFAULT_AIR;
mAIRRefreshPeriod = DEFAULT_AIR_REFRESH_PERIOD;
mPSNREnable = DEFAULT_PSNR_ENABLE;
mReconEnable = DEFAULT_RECON_ENABLE;
mEntropyMode = DEFAULT_ENTROPY_MODE;
mBframes = DEFAULT_B_FRAMES;
gettimeofday(&mTimeStart, NULL);
gettimeofday(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsWindow* DevToolsWindow::AsDevToolsWindow(
content::RenderViewHost* window_rvh) {
if (g_instances == NULL)
return NULL;
DevToolsWindows* instances = &g_instances.Get();
for (DevToolsWindows::iterator it(instances->begin()); it != instances->end();
++it) {
if ((*it)->web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost() == window_rvh)
return *it;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_route_input_mc(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev, int our)
{
struct rtable *rth;
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
unsigned int flags = RTCF_MULTICAST;
u32 itag = 0;
int err;
/* Primary sanity checks. */
if (!in_dev)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(saddr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(saddr) ||
skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
goto e_inval;
if (ipv4_is_loopback(saddr) && !IN_DEV_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev))
goto e_inval;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr)) {
if (!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr))
goto e_inval;
} else {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, 0, tos, 0, dev,
in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0)
goto e_err;
}
if (our)
flags |= RTCF_LOCAL;
rth = rt_dst_alloc(dev_net(dev)->loopback_dev, flags, RTN_MULTICAST,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY), false, false);
if (!rth)
goto e_nobufs;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
rth->dst.tclassid = itag;
#endif
rth->dst.output = ip_rt_bug;
rth->rt_is_input= 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE
if (!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) && IN_DEV_MFORWARD(in_dev))
rth->dst.input = ip_mr_input;
#endif
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_mc);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
return 0;
e_nobufs:
return -ENOBUFS;
e_inval:
return -EINVAL;
e_err:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 62,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_Snd_Shutdown(void)
{
S_Shutdown();
cls.soundStarted = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JBIG2Bitmap::combine(JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap, int x, int y,
Guint combOp) {
int x0, x1, y0, y1, xx, yy;
Guchar *srcPtr, *destPtr;
Guint src0, src1, src, dest, s1, s2, m1, m2, m3;
GBool oneByte;
if (y < 0) {
y0 = -y;
} else {
y0 = 0;
}
if (y + bitmap->h > h) {
y1 = h - y;
} else {
y1 = bitmap->h;
}
if (y0 >= y1) {
return;
}
if (x >= 0) {
x0 = x & ~7;
} else {
x0 = 0;
}
x1 = x + bitmap->w;
if (x1 > w) {
x1 = w;
}
if (x0 >= x1) {
return;
}
s1 = x & 7;
s2 = 8 - s1;
m1 = 0xff >> (x1 & 7);
m2 = 0xff << (((x1 & 7) == 0) ? 0 : 8 - (x1 & 7));
m3 = (0xff >> s1) & m2;
oneByte = x0 == ((x1 - 1) & ~7);
for (yy = y0; yy < y1; ++yy) {
if (oneByte) {
if (x >= 0) {
destPtr = data + (y + yy) * line + (x >> 3);
srcPtr = bitmap->data + yy * bitmap->line;
dest = *destPtr;
src1 = *srcPtr;
switch (combOp) {
case 0: // or
dest |= (src1 >> s1) & m2;
break;
case 1: // and
dest &= ((0xff00 | src1) >> s1) | m1;
break;
case 2: // xor
dest ^= (src1 >> s1) & m2;
break;
case 3: // xnor
dest ^= ((src1 ^ 0xff) >> s1) & m2;
break;
case 4: // replace
dest = (dest & ~m3) | ((src1 >> s1) & m3);
break;
}
*destPtr = dest;
} else {
destPtr = data + (y + yy) * line;
srcPtr = bitmap->data + yy * bitmap->line + (-x >> 3);
dest = *destPtr;
src1 = *srcPtr;
switch (combOp) {
case 0: // or
dest |= src1 & m2;
break;
case 1: // and
dest &= src1 | m1;
break;
case 2: // xor
dest ^= src1 & m2;
break;
case 3: // xnor
dest ^= (src1 ^ 0xff) & m2;
break;
case 4: // replace
dest = (src1 & m2) | (dest & m1);
break;
}
*destPtr = dest;
}
} else {
if (x >= 0) {
destPtr = data + (y + yy) * line + (x >> 3);
srcPtr = bitmap->data + yy * bitmap->line;
src1 = *srcPtr++;
dest = *destPtr;
switch (combOp) {
case 0: // or
dest |= src1 >> s1;
break;
case 1: // and
dest &= (0xff00 | src1) >> s1;
break;
case 2: // xor
dest ^= src1 >> s1;
break;
case 3: // xnor
dest ^= (src1 ^ 0xff) >> s1;
break;
case 4: // replace
dest = (dest & (0xff << s2)) | (src1 >> s1);
break;
}
*destPtr++ = dest;
xx = x0 + 8;
} else {
destPtr = data + (y + yy) * line;
srcPtr = bitmap->data + yy * bitmap->line + (-x >> 3);
src1 = *srcPtr++;
xx = x0;
}
for (; xx < x1 - 8; xx += 8) {
dest = *destPtr;
src0 = src1;
src1 = *srcPtr++;
src = (((src0 << 8) | src1) >> s1) & 0xff;
switch (combOp) {
case 0: // or
dest |= src;
break;
case 1: // and
dest &= src;
break;
case 2: // xor
dest ^= src;
break;
case 3: // xnor
dest ^= src ^ 0xff;
break;
case 4: // replace
dest = src;
break;
}
*destPtr++ = dest;
}
dest = *destPtr;
src0 = src1;
src1 = *srcPtr++;
src = (((src0 << 8) | src1) >> s1) & 0xff;
switch (combOp) {
case 0: // or
dest |= src & m2;
break;
case 1: // and
dest &= src | m1;
break;
case 2: // xor
dest ^= src & m2;
break;
case 3: // xnor
dest ^= (src ^ 0xff) & m2;
break;
case 4: // replace
dest = (src & m2) | (dest & m1);
break;
}
*destPtr = dest;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: attach_entity_load_avg(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int flags) {}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ewk_frame_scroll_size_get(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame, int* width, int* height)
{
if (width)
*width = 0;
if (height)
*height = 0;
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame->view(), false);
WebCore::IntPoint point = smartData->frame->view()->maximumScrollPosition();
if (width)
*width = point.x();
if (height)
*height = point.y();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_add_object_to_list(list_t *list, const cac_object_t *object)
{
if (list_append(list, object) < 0)
return SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: c14nWithCommentTest(const char *filename,
const char *resul ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *err ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
int options ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
return(c14nCommonTest(filename, 1, XML_C14N_1_0, "with-comments"));
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::RefreshNigori(const std::string& chrome_version,
const base::Closure& done_callback) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
data_->UpdateCryptographerAndNigori(
chrome_version,
done_callback);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::ExtensionSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_STR(id);
SET_STR(version);
SET_STR(update_url);
SET_BOOL(enabled);
SET_BOOL(incognito_enabled);
SET_STR(name);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
GetRenderManager()->set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool GetVal(cmsIT8* it8, char* Buffer, cmsUInt32Number max, const char* ErrorTitle)
{
switch (it8->sy) {
case SEOLN: // Empty value
Buffer[0]=0;
break;
case SIDENT: strncpy(Buffer, it8->id, max);
Buffer[max-1]=0;
break;
case SINUM: snprintf(Buffer, max, "%d", it8 -> inum); break;
case SDNUM: snprintf(Buffer, max, it8->DoubleFormatter, it8 -> dnum); break;
case SSTRING: strncpy(Buffer, it8->str, max);
Buffer[max-1] = 0;
break;
default:
return SynError(it8, "%s", ErrorTitle);
}
Buffer[max] = 0;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int migrate_misplaced_transhuge_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pmd_t *pmd, pmd_t entry,
unsigned long address,
struct page *page, int node)
{
spinlock_t *ptl;
pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(node);
int isolated = 0;
struct page *new_page = NULL;
int page_lru = page_is_file_cache(page);
unsigned long mmun_start = address & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
unsigned long mmun_end = mmun_start + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE;
/*
* Rate-limit the amount of data that is being migrated to a node.
* Optimal placement is no good if the memory bus is saturated and
* all the time is being spent migrating!
*/
if (numamigrate_update_ratelimit(pgdat, HPAGE_PMD_NR))
goto out_dropref;
new_page = alloc_pages_node(node,
(GFP_TRANSHUGE_LIGHT | __GFP_THISNODE),
HPAGE_PMD_ORDER);
if (!new_page)
goto out_fail;
prep_transhuge_page(new_page);
isolated = numamigrate_isolate_page(pgdat, page);
if (!isolated) {
put_page(new_page);
goto out_fail;
}
/* Prepare a page as a migration target */
__SetPageLocked(new_page);
if (PageSwapBacked(page))
__SetPageSwapBacked(new_page);
/* anon mapping, we can simply copy page->mapping to the new page: */
new_page->mapping = page->mapping;
new_page->index = page->index;
migrate_page_copy(new_page, page);
WARN_ON(PageLRU(new_page));
/* Recheck the target PMD */
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (unlikely(!pmd_same(*pmd, entry) || !page_ref_freeze(page, 2))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/* Reverse changes made by migrate_page_copy() */
if (TestClearPageActive(new_page))
SetPageActive(page);
if (TestClearPageUnevictable(new_page))
SetPageUnevictable(page);
unlock_page(new_page);
put_page(new_page); /* Free it */
/* Retake the callers reference and putback on LRU */
get_page(page);
putback_lru_page(page);
mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page),
NR_ISOLATED_ANON + page_lru, -HPAGE_PMD_NR);
goto out_unlock;
}
entry = mk_huge_pmd(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot);
entry = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_mkdirty(entry), vma);
/*
* Clear the old entry under pagetable lock and establish the new PTE.
* Any parallel GUP will either observe the old page blocking on the
* page lock, block on the page table lock or observe the new page.
* The SetPageUptodate on the new page and page_add_new_anon_rmap
* guarantee the copy is visible before the pagetable update.
*/
flush_cache_range(vma, mmun_start, mmun_end);
page_add_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, mmun_start, true);
pmdp_huge_clear_flush_notify(vma, mmun_start, pmd);
set_pmd_at(mm, mmun_start, pmd, entry);
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, address, &entry);
page_ref_unfreeze(page, 2);
mlock_migrate_page(new_page, page);
page_remove_rmap(page, true);
set_page_owner_migrate_reason(new_page, MR_NUMA_MISPLACED);
spin_unlock(ptl);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
/* Take an "isolate" reference and put new page on the LRU. */
get_page(new_page);
putback_lru_page(new_page);
unlock_page(new_page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page); /* Drop the rmap reference */
put_page(page); /* Drop the LRU isolation reference */
count_vm_events(PGMIGRATE_SUCCESS, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
count_vm_numa_events(NUMA_PAGE_MIGRATE, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page),
NR_ISOLATED_ANON + page_lru,
-HPAGE_PMD_NR);
return isolated;
out_fail:
count_vm_events(PGMIGRATE_FAIL, HPAGE_PMD_NR);
out_dropref:
ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmd);
if (pmd_same(*pmd, entry)) {
entry = pmd_modify(entry, vma->vm_page_prot);
set_pmd_at(mm, mmun_start, pmd, entry);
update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, address, &entry);
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
out_unlock:
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize 'move_pages()' permission checks
The 'move_paghes()' system call was introduced long long ago with the
same permission checks as for sending a signal (except using
CAP_SYS_NICE instead of CAP_SYS_KILL for the overriding capability).
That turns out to not be a great choice - while the system call really
only moves physical page allocations around (and you need other
capabilities to do a lot of it), you can check the return value to map
out some the virtual address choices and defeat ASLR of a binary that
still shares your uid.
So change the access checks to the more common 'ptrace_may_access()'
model instead.
This tightens the access checks for the uid, and also effectively
changes the CAP_SYS_NICE check to CAP_SYS_PTRACE, but it's unlikely that
anybody really _uses_ this legacy system call any more (we hav ebetter
NUMA placement models these days), so I expect nobody to notice.
Famous last words.
Reported-by: Otto Ebeling <otto.ebeling@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 61,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int task_scan_max(struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long smin = task_scan_min(p);
unsigned long smax;
/* Watch for min being lower than max due to floor calculations */
smax = sysctl_numa_balancing_scan_period_max / task_nr_scan_windows(p);
/* Scale the maximum scan period with the amount of shared memory. */
if (p->numa_group) {
struct numa_group *ng = p->numa_group;
unsigned long shared = group_faults_shared(ng);
unsigned long private = group_faults_priv(ng);
unsigned long period = smax;
period *= atomic_read(&ng->refcount);
period *= shared + 1;
period /= private + shared + 1;
smax = max(smax, period);
}
return max(smin, smax);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *path_make_absolute(const char *p, const char *prefix) {
assert(p);
/* Makes every item in the list an absolute path by prepending
* the prefix, if specified and necessary */
if (path_is_absolute(p) || !prefix)
return strdup(p);
return join(prefix, "/", p, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HeapAllocator::expandInlineVectorBacking(void* address, size_t newSize) {
return backingExpand(address, newSize);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetPresentationCallback(
const PresentationCallback& callback) {
CheckLock();
presentation_callback_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlDoRead(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *URL, const char *encoding,
int options, int reuse)
{
xmlDocPtr ret;
xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal(ctxt, options, encoding);
if (encoding != NULL) {
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr hdlr;
hdlr = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler(encoding);
if (hdlr != NULL)
xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, hdlr);
}
if ((URL != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->filename == NULL))
ctxt->input->filename = (char *) xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) URL);
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed) || ctxt->recovery)
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
else {
ret = NULL;
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL) {
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
}
}
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
if (!reuse) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
task_lock(task);
mm = task->mm;
if (mm) {
if (task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
mm = NULL;
else
mmget(mm);
}
task_unlock(task);
return mm;
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static socklen_t get_peername(h2o_conn_t *_conn, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = (void *)_conn;
return h2o_socket_getpeername(conn->sock, sa);
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xts_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
switch (key_len) {
case 32:
xts_ctx->enc = KM_XTS_128_ENCRYPT;
xts_ctx->dec = KM_XTS_128_DECRYPT;
memcpy(xts_ctx->key + 16, in_key, 16);
memcpy(xts_ctx->pcc_key + 16, in_key + 16, 16);
break;
case 48:
xts_ctx->enc = 0;
xts_ctx->dec = 0;
xts_fallback_setkey(tfm, in_key, key_len);
break;
case 64:
xts_ctx->enc = KM_XTS_256_ENCRYPT;
xts_ctx->dec = KM_XTS_256_DECRYPT;
memcpy(xts_ctx->key, in_key, 32);
memcpy(xts_ctx->pcc_key, in_key + 32, 32);
break;
default:
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
xts_ctx->key_len = key_len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC__StreamDecoderLengthStatus FLACParser::length_callback(
const FLAC__StreamDecoder * /* decoder */,
FLAC__uint64 *stream_length, void *client_data)
{
return ((FLACParser *) client_data)->lengthCallback(stream_length);
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_user_dscr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long dscr)
{
task->thread.dscr = dscr;
task->thread.dscr_inherit = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool decode_asq_control(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB source_attribute;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_asq_control *lac;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lac = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_asq_control);
if (!lac) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &source_attribute)) {
return false;
}
lac->src_attr_len = source_attribute.length;
if (lac->src_attr_len) {
lac->source_attribute = talloc_strndup(lac, (const char *)source_attribute.data, source_attribute.length);
if (!(lac->source_attribute)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lac->source_attribute = NULL;
}
lac->request = 1;
} else if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_ENUMERATED)) {
if (!asn1_read_enumerated(data, &(lac->result))) {
return false;
}
lac->request = 0;
} else {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lac;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jsvIsNewChild(const JsVar *v) { return jsvIsName(v) && jsvGetNextSibling(v) && jsvGetNextSibling(v)==jsvGetPrevSibling(v); }
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel::AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model,
base::string16 title,
base::string16 description)
: AuthenticatorSheetModelBase(dialog_model),
title_(std::move(title)),
description_(std::move(description)) {}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map> privateMap(const char* name)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> console = ensureConsole();
v8::Local<v8::Private> privateKey = v8::Private::ForApi(m_isolate, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, name));
v8::Local<v8::Value> mapValue;
if (!console->GetPrivate(m_context, privateKey).ToLocal(&mapValue))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map>();
if (mapValue->IsUndefined()) {
v8::Local<v8::Map> map = v8::Map::New(m_isolate);
if (!console->SetPrivate(m_context, privateKey, map).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map>();
return map;
}
return mapValue->IsMap() ? mapValue.As<v8::Map>() : v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map>();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendImpl::SyncEndEnumeration(
std::unique_ptr<Rankings::Iterator> iterator) {
iterator->Reset();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int acm_tty_write_room(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct acm *acm = tty->driver_data;
/*
* Do not let the line discipline to know that we have a reserve,
* or it might get too enthusiastic.
*/
return acm_wb_is_avail(acm) ? acm->writesize : 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_er_add_slice(ERContext *s, int startx, int starty,
int endx, int endy, int status)
{
const int start_i = av_clip(startx + starty * s->mb_width, 0, s->mb_num - 1);
const int end_i = av_clip(endx + endy * s->mb_width, 0, s->mb_num);
const int start_xy = s->mb_index2xy[start_i];
const int end_xy = s->mb_index2xy[end_i];
int mask = -1;
if (s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_slice)
return;
if (start_i > end_i || start_xy > end_xy) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"internal error, slice end before start\n");
return;
}
if (!s->avctx->error_concealment)
return;
mask &= ~VP_START;
if (status & (ER_AC_ERROR | ER_AC_END)) {
mask &= ~(ER_AC_ERROR | ER_AC_END);
atomic_fetch_add(&s->error_count, start_i - end_i - 1);
}
if (status & (ER_DC_ERROR | ER_DC_END)) {
mask &= ~(ER_DC_ERROR | ER_DC_END);
atomic_fetch_add(&s->error_count, start_i - end_i - 1);
}
if (status & (ER_MV_ERROR | ER_MV_END)) {
mask &= ~(ER_MV_ERROR | ER_MV_END);
atomic_fetch_add(&s->error_count, start_i - end_i - 1);
}
if (status & ER_MB_ERROR) {
s->error_occurred = 1;
atomic_store(&s->error_count, INT_MAX);
}
if (mask == ~0x7F) {
memset(&s->error_status_table[start_xy], 0,
(end_xy - start_xy) * sizeof(uint8_t));
} else {
int i;
for (i = start_xy; i < end_xy; i++)
s->error_status_table[i] &= mask;
}
if (end_i == s->mb_num)
atomic_store(&s->error_count, INT_MAX);
else {
s->error_status_table[end_xy] &= mask;
s->error_status_table[end_xy] |= status;
}
s->error_status_table[start_xy] |= VP_START;
if (start_xy > 0 && !(s->avctx->active_thread_type & FF_THREAD_SLICE) &&
er_supported(s) && s->avctx->skip_top * s->mb_width < start_i) {
int prev_status = s->error_status_table[s->mb_index2xy[start_i - 1]];
prev_status &= ~ VP_START;
if (prev_status != (ER_MV_END | ER_DC_END | ER_AC_END)) {
s->error_occurred = 1;
atomic_store(&s->error_count, INT_MAX);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 79,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickPrivate void CacheComponentTerminus(void)
{
if (cache_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&cache_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_semaphore);
instantiate_cache=MagickFalse;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_semaphore);
RelinquishSemaphoreInfo(&cache_semaphore);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxDeviceCMYKColorSpace::~GfxDeviceCMYKColorSpace() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pbkdf2)
{
zend_long key_length = 0, iterations = 0;
char *password;
size_t password_len;
char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
char *method;
size_t method_len = 0;
zend_string *out_buffer;
const EVP_MD *digest;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ssll|s",
&password, &password_len,
&salt, &salt_len,
&key_length, &iterations,
&method, &method_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (key_length <= 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method_len) {
digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(method);
} else {
digest = EVP_sha1();
}
if (!digest) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_LONG_TO_INT(key_length, key);
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_LONG_TO_INT(iterations, iterations);
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_SIZE_T_TO_INT(password_len, password);
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_SIZE_T_TO_INT(salt_len, salt);
out_buffer = zend_string_alloc(key_length, 0);
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, (int)password_len, (unsigned char *)salt, (int)salt_len, (int)iterations, digest, (int)key_length, (unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(out_buffer)) == 1) {
ZSTR_VAL(out_buffer)[key_length] = 0;
RETURN_NEW_STR(out_buffer);
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
zend_string_release(out_buffer);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
{
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2:
ctxt->_eip = (u16)dst;
break;
case 4:
ctxt->_eip = (u32)dst;
break;
case 8:
ctxt->_eip = dst;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "unsupported eip assignment size\n");
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 169,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update_thread_context(AVCodecContext *dst, const AVCodecContext *src)
{
PNGDecContext *psrc = src->priv_data;
PNGDecContext *pdst = dst->priv_data;
int ret;
if (dst == src)
return 0;
ff_thread_release_buffer(dst, &pdst->picture);
if (psrc->picture.f->data[0] &&
(ret = ff_thread_ref_frame(&pdst->picture, &psrc->picture)) < 0)
return ret;
if (CONFIG_APNG_DECODER && dst->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_APNG) {
pdst->width = psrc->width;
pdst->height = psrc->height;
pdst->bit_depth = psrc->bit_depth;
pdst->color_type = psrc->color_type;
pdst->compression_type = psrc->compression_type;
pdst->interlace_type = psrc->interlace_type;
pdst->filter_type = psrc->filter_type;
pdst->cur_w = psrc->cur_w;
pdst->cur_h = psrc->cur_h;
pdst->x_offset = psrc->x_offset;
pdst->y_offset = psrc->y_offset;
pdst->has_trns = psrc->has_trns;
memcpy(pdst->transparent_color_be, psrc->transparent_color_be, sizeof(pdst->transparent_color_be));
pdst->dispose_op = psrc->dispose_op;
memcpy(pdst->palette, psrc->palette, sizeof(pdst->palette));
pdst->state |= psrc->state & (PNG_IHDR | PNG_PLTE);
ff_thread_release_buffer(dst, &pdst->last_picture);
if (psrc->last_picture.f->data[0] &&
(ret = ff_thread_ref_frame(&pdst->last_picture, &psrc->last_picture)) < 0)
return ret;
ff_thread_release_buffer(dst, &pdst->previous_picture);
if (psrc->previous_picture.f->data[0] &&
(ret = ff_thread_ref_frame(&pdst->previous_picture, &psrc->previous_picture)) < 0)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit DataUrlCommitObserver(WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::GetAddress() const {
if (!IsPresent())
return std::string();
BluetoothAdapterClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
DCHECK(properties);
return properties->address.value();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::DidReadFile(int result) {
if (result <= 0) {
NotifyFailure(net::ERR_FAILED);
return;
}
SetStatus(net::URLRequestStatus()); // Clear the IO_PENDING status
AdvanceBytesRead(result);
if (!read_buf_->BytesRemaining()) {
int bytes_read = BytesReadCompleted();
NotifyReadComplete(bytes_read);
return;
}
int bytes_read = 0;
if (ReadLoop(&bytes_read))
NotifyReadComplete(bytes_read);
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 115,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DGADestroyColormap(ColormapPtr pmap)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen = pmap->pScreen;
DGAScreenPtr pScreenPriv = DGA_GET_SCREEN_PRIV(pScreen);
VisualPtr pVisual = pmap->pVisual;
if (pScreenPriv->fakedVisuals) {
FakedVisualList *curr = pScreenPriv->fakedVisuals;
while (curr) {
if (curr->pVisual == pVisual) {
/* We can't get rid of them yet since FreeColormap
still needs the pVisual during the cleanup */
curr->free = TRUE;
break;
}
curr = curr->next;
}
}
if (pScreenPriv->DestroyColormap) {
pScreen->DestroyColormap = pScreenPriv->DestroyColormap;
(*pScreen->DestroyColormap) (pmap);
pScreen->DestroyColormap = DGADestroyColormap;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeStackElem(xsltStackElemPtr elem) {
if (elem == NULL)
return;
if (elem->value != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(elem->value);
/*
* Release the list of temporary Result Tree Fragments.
*/
if (elem->fragment) {
xmlDocPtr cur;
while (elem->fragment != NULL) {
cur = elem->fragment;
elem->fragment = (xmlDocPtr) cur->next;
if (elem->context &&
(cur->psvi == (void *) ((long) 1)))
{
/*
* This fragment is a result of an extension instruction
* (e.g. XSLT's function) and needs to be preserved until
* the instruction exits.
* Example: The fragment of the variable must not be freed
* since it is returned by the EXSLT function:
* <f:function name="foo">
* <xsl:variable name="bar">
* <bar/>
* </xsl:variable>
* <f:result select="$bar"/>
* </f:function>
*
*/
xsltRegisterLocalRVT(elem->context, cur);
} else {
xsltReleaseRVT((xsltTransformContextPtr) elem->context,
cur);
}
}
}
/*
* Cache or free the variable structure.
*/
if (elem->context && (elem->context->cache->nbStackItems < 50)) {
/*
* Store the item in the cache.
*/
xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt = elem->context;
memset(elem, 0, sizeof(xsltStackElem));
elem->context = ctxt;
elem->next = ctxt->cache->stackItems;
ctxt->cache->stackItems = elem;
ctxt->cache->nbStackItems++;
#ifdef XSLT_DEBUG_PROFILE_CACHE
ctxt->cache->dbgCachedVars++;
#endif
return;
}
xmlFree(elem);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int afiucv_hs_callback_rx(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if (!iucv) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
/* write stuff from iucv_msg to skb cb */
if (skb->len < sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
spin_lock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
if (skb_queue_empty(&iucv->backlog_skb_q)) {
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb)) {
/* handle rcv queue full */
skb_queue_tail(&iucv->backlog_skb_q, skb);
}
} else
skb_queue_tail(&iucv_sk(sk)->backlog_skb_q, skb);
spin_unlock(&iucv->message_q.lock);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcListInstalledColormaps(ClientPtr client)
{
xListInstalledColormapsReply *preply;
int nummaps, rc;
WindowPtr pWin;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->id, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_SCREEN_ACCESS, client, pWin->drawable.pScreen,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
preply = malloc(sizeof(xListInstalledColormapsReply) +
pWin->drawable.pScreen->maxInstalledCmaps *
sizeof(Colormap));
if (!preply)
return BadAlloc;
preply->type = X_Reply;
preply->sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
nummaps = (*pWin->drawable.pScreen->ListInstalledColormaps)
(pWin->drawable.pScreen, (Colormap *) &preply[1]);
preply->nColormaps = nummaps;
preply->length = nummaps;
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xListInstalledColormapsReply), preply);
client->pSwapReplyFunc = (ReplySwapPtr) Swap32Write;
WriteSwappedDataToClient(client, nummaps * sizeof(Colormap), &preply[1]);
free(preply);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_async_mask(ovs_be32 src,
const struct ofp14_async_prop *ap, enum ofp_version version,
bool loose, struct ofputil_async_cfg *dst)
{
uint32_t mask = ntohl(src);
uint32_t allowed = ofp14_async_prop_allowed(ap, version);
if (mask & ~allowed) {
OFPPROP_LOG(&bad_ofmsg_rl, loose,
"bad value %#x for %s (allowed mask %#x)",
mask, ofputil_async_msg_type_to_string(ap->oam),
allowed);
mask &= allowed;
if (!loose) {
return OFPERR_OFPACFC_INVALID;
}
}
if (ap->oam == OAM_PACKET_IN) {
if (mask & (1u << OFPR_NO_MATCH)) {
mask |= 1u << OFPR_EXPLICIT_MISS;
if (version < OFP13_VERSION) {
mask |= 1u << OFPR_IMPLICIT_MISS;
}
}
}
uint32_t *array = ap->master ? dst->master : dst->slave;
array[ap->oam] = mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,439 |
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