instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vhost_scsi_ioctl(struct file *f,
unsigned int ioctl,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct vhost_scsi *vs = f->private_data;
struct vhost_scsi_target backend;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
u64 __user *featurep = argp;
u32 __user *eventsp = argp;
u32 events_missed;
u64 features;
int r, abi_version = VHOST_SCSI_ABI_VERSION;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &vs->vqs[VHOST_SCSI_VQ_EVT].vq;
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT:
if (copy_from_user(&backend, argp, sizeof backend))
return -EFAULT;
if (backend.reserved != 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(vs, &backend);
case VHOST_SCSI_CLEAR_ENDPOINT:
if (copy_from_user(&backend, argp, sizeof backend))
return -EFAULT;
if (backend.reserved != 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint(vs, &backend);
case VHOST_SCSI_GET_ABI_VERSION:
if (copy_to_user(argp, &abi_version, sizeof abi_version))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_SCSI_SET_EVENTS_MISSED:
if (get_user(events_missed, eventsp))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vs->vs_events_missed = events_missed;
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
return 0;
case VHOST_SCSI_GET_EVENTS_MISSED:
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
events_missed = vs->vs_events_missed;
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (put_user(events_missed, eventsp))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_GET_FEATURES:
features = VHOST_SCSI_FEATURES;
if (copy_to_user(featurep, &features, sizeof features))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_SET_FEATURES:
if (copy_from_user(&features, featurep, sizeof features))
return -EFAULT;
return vhost_scsi_set_features(vs, features);
default:
mutex_lock(&vs->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_ioctl(&vs->dev, ioctl, argp);
/* TODO: flush backend after dev ioctl. */
if (r == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
r = vhost_vring_ioctl(&vs->dev, ioctl, argp);
mutex_unlock(&vs->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnGetNetworkList(const IPC::Message& msg) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod(
this, &P2PSocketDispatcherHost::DoGetNetworkList, msg.routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, running)
{
char *fname, *arch, *entry;
int fname_len, arch_len, entry_len;
zend_bool retphar = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|b", &retphar) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fname = (char*)zend_get_executed_filename();
fname_len = strlen(fname);
if (fname_len > 7 && !memcmp(fname, "phar://", 7) && SUCCESS == phar_split_fname(fname, fname_len, &arch, &arch_len, &entry, &entry_len, 2, 0)) {
efree(entry);
if (retphar) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(fname, arch_len + 7);
efree(arch);
return;
} else {
RETVAL_STRINGL(arch, arch_len);
efree(arch);
return;
}
}
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int load_elf_library(struct file *file)
{
struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata;
struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
unsigned long elf_bss, bss, len;
int retval, error, i, j;
struct elfhdr elf_ex;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, 0, (char *)&elf_ex, sizeof(elf_ex));
if (retval != sizeof(elf_ex))
goto out;
if (memcmp(elf_ex.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0)
goto out;
/* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
if (elf_ex.e_type != ET_EXEC || elf_ex.e_phnum > 2 ||
!elf_check_arch(&elf_ex) || !file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap)
goto out;
/* Now read in all of the header information */
j = sizeof(struct elf_phdr) * elf_ex.e_phnum;
/* j < ELF_MIN_ALIGN because elf_ex.e_phnum <= 2 */
error = -ENOMEM;
elf_phdata = kmalloc(j, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!elf_phdata)
goto out;
eppnt = elf_phdata;
error = -ENOEXEC;
retval = kernel_read(file, elf_ex.e_phoff, (char *)eppnt, j);
if (retval != j)
goto out_free_ph;
for (j = 0, i = 0; i<elf_ex.e_phnum; i++)
if ((eppnt + i)->p_type == PT_LOAD)
j++;
if (j != 1)
goto out_free_ph;
while (eppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
eppnt++;
/* Now use mmap to map the library into memory. */
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
error = do_mmap(file,
ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr),
(eppnt->p_filesz +
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE,
(eppnt->p_offset -
ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr)));
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (error != ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr))
goto out_free_ph;
elf_bss = eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
if (padzero(elf_bss)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out_free_ph;
}
len = ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_filesz + eppnt->p_vaddr +
ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1);
bss = eppnt->p_memsz + eppnt->p_vaddr;
if (bss > len) {
down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
do_brk(len, bss - len);
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
}
error = 0;
out_free_ph:
kfree(elf_phdata);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int delegation_blocked(struct knfsd_fh *fh)
{
u32 hash;
struct bloom_pair *bd = &blocked_delegations;
if (bd->entries == 0)
return 0;
if (seconds_since_boot() - bd->swap_time > 30) {
spin_lock(&blocked_delegations_lock);
if (seconds_since_boot() - bd->swap_time > 30) {
bd->entries -= bd->old_entries;
bd->old_entries = bd->entries;
memset(bd->set[bd->new], 0,
sizeof(bd->set[0]));
bd->new = 1-bd->new;
bd->swap_time = seconds_since_boot();
}
spin_unlock(&blocked_delegations_lock);
}
hash = jhash(&fh->fh_base, fh->fh_size, 0);
if (test_bit(hash&255, bd->set[0]) &&
test_bit((hash>>8)&255, bd->set[0]) &&
test_bit((hash>>16)&255, bd->set[0]))
return 1;
if (test_bit(hash&255, bd->set[1]) &&
test_bit((hash>>8)&255, bd->set[1]) &&
test_bit((hash>>16)&255, bd->set[1]))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PostProfileInit() {
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginPassword)) {
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->SetUserPolicyTokenService(
profile()->GetTokenService());
}
if (!parameters().ui_task)
OptionallyRunChromeOSLoginManager(parsed_command_line(), profile());
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PostProfileInit();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *in;
const xmlChar *ret;
int count = 0;
GROW;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseName++;
#endif
/*
* Accelerator for simple ASCII names
*/
in = ctxt->input->cur;
if (((*in >= 0x61) && (*in <= 0x7A)) ||
((*in >= 0x41) && (*in <= 0x5A)) ||
(*in == '_') || (*in == ':')) {
in++;
while (((*in >= 0x61) && (*in <= 0x7A)) ||
((*in >= 0x41) && (*in <= 0x5A)) ||
((*in >= 0x30) && (*in <= 0x39)) ||
(*in == '_') || (*in == '-') ||
(*in == ':') || (*in == '.'))
in++;
if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) {
count = in - ctxt->input->cur;
if ((count > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
return(NULL);
}
ret = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur, count);
ctxt->input->cur = in;
ctxt->nbChars += count;
ctxt->input->col += count;
if (ret == NULL)
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(ret);
}
}
/* accelerator for special cases */
return(xmlParseNameComplex(ctxt));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_format_emu_quirk(struct snd_usb_substream *subs,
struct audioformat *fmt)
{
unsigned char emu_samplerate_id = 0;
/* When capture is active
* sample rate shouldn't be changed
* by playback substream
*/
if (subs->direction == SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK) {
if (subs->stream->substream[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE].interface != -1)
return;
}
switch (fmt->rate_min) {
case 48000:
emu_samplerate_id = EMU_QUIRK_SR_48000HZ;
break;
case 88200:
emu_samplerate_id = EMU_QUIRK_SR_88200HZ;
break;
case 96000:
emu_samplerate_id = EMU_QUIRK_SR_96000HZ;
break;
case 176400:
emu_samplerate_id = EMU_QUIRK_SR_176400HZ;
break;
case 192000:
emu_samplerate_id = EMU_QUIRK_SR_192000HZ;
break;
default:
emu_samplerate_id = EMU_QUIRK_SR_44100HZ;
break;
}
snd_emuusb_set_samplerate(subs->stream->chip, emu_samplerate_id);
subs->pkt_offset_adj = (emu_samplerate_id >= EMU_QUIRK_SR_176400HZ) ? 4 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mipspmu_enable(struct pmu *pmu)
{
if (mipspmu)
mipspmu->start();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltNewExtModule(xsltExtInitFunction initFunc,
xsltExtShutdownFunction shutdownFunc,
xsltStyleExtInitFunction styleInitFunc,
xsltStyleExtShutdownFunction styleShutdownFunc)
{
xsltExtModulePtr cur;
cur = (xsltExtModulePtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltExtModule));
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltNewExtModule : malloc failed\n");
return (NULL);
}
cur->initFunc = initFunc;
cur->shutdownFunc = shutdownFunc;
cur->styleInitFunc = styleInitFunc;
cur->styleShutdownFunc = styleShutdownFunc;
return (cur);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SkIcoCodec::onSkipScanlines(int count) {
SkASSERT(fCurrScanlineCodec);
return fCurrScanlineCodec->skipScanlines(count);
}
Commit Message: RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <reed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <robertphillips@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <stephana@google.com>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 162,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int powermate_alloc_buffers(struct usb_device *udev, struct powermate_device *pm)
{
pm->data = usb_alloc_coherent(udev, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX,
GFP_ATOMIC, &pm->data_dma);
if (!pm->data)
return -1;
pm->configcr = kmalloc(sizeof(*(pm->configcr)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pm->configcr)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void charstring_end(void)
{
byte *bp;
sprintf(line, "%d ", (int) (charstring_bp - charstring_buf));
eexec_string(line);
sprintf(line, "%s ", cs_start);
eexec_string(line);
for (bp = charstring_buf; bp < charstring_bp; bp++)
eexec_byte(*bp);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltCompilerUtilsCreateMergedList(xsltPointerListPtr first,
xsltPointerListPtr second)
{
xsltPointerListPtr ret;
size_t num;
if (first)
num = first->number;
else
num = 0;
if (second)
num += second->number;
if (num == 0)
return(NULL);
ret = xsltPointerListCreate(num);
if (ret == NULL)
return(NULL);
/*
* Copy contents.
*/
if ((first != NULL) && (first->number != 0)) {
memcpy(ret->items, first->items,
first->number * sizeof(void *));
if ((second != NULL) && (second->number != 0))
memcpy(ret->items + first->number, second->items,
second->number * sizeof(void *));
} else if ((second != NULL) && (second->number != 0))
memcpy(ret->items, (void *) second->items,
second->number * sizeof(void *));
ret->number = num;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __iommu_alloc_remap(struct page **pages, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, pgprot_t prot,
const void *caller)
{
unsigned int i, nr_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct vm_struct *area;
unsigned long p;
area = get_vm_area_caller(size, VM_ARM_DMA_CONSISTENT | VM_USERMAP,
caller);
if (!area)
return NULL;
area->pages = pages;
area->nr_pages = nr_pages;
p = (unsigned long)area->addr;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
phys_addr_t phys = __pfn_to_phys(page_to_pfn(pages[i]));
if (ioremap_page_range(p, p + PAGE_SIZE, phys, prot))
goto err;
p += PAGE_SIZE;
}
return area->addr;
err:
unmap_kernel_range((unsigned long)area->addr, size);
vunmap(area->addr);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
{
int error;
if (!name)
return -EFAULT;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname)))
return -EFAULT;
down_read(&uts_sem);
error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname,
__OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename,
__OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release,
__OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version,
__OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine,
__OLD_UTS_LEN);
error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN);
up_read(&uts_sem);
if (!error && override_architecture(name))
error = -EFAULT;
if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
error = -EFAULT;
return error ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_backlog_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = SCTP_INPUT_CB(skb)->chunk;
struct sctp_inq *inqueue = &chunk->rcvr->inqueue;
struct sctp_ep_common *rcvr = NULL;
int backloged = 0;
rcvr = chunk->rcvr;
/* If the rcvr is dead then the association or endpoint
* has been deleted and we can safely drop the chunk
* and refs that we are holding.
*/
if (rcvr->dead) {
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
goto done;
}
if (unlikely(rcvr->sk != sk)) {
/* In this case, the association moved from one socket to
* another. We are currently sitting on the backlog of the
* old socket, so we need to move.
* However, since we are here in the process context we
* need to take make sure that the user doesn't own
* the new socket when we process the packet.
* If the new socket is user-owned, queue the chunk to the
* backlog of the new socket without dropping any refs.
* Otherwise, we can safely push the chunk on the inqueue.
*/
sk = rcvr->sk;
sctp_bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
sk_add_backlog(sk, skb);
backloged = 1;
} else
sctp_inq_push(inqueue, chunk);
sctp_bh_unlock_sock(sk);
/* If the chunk was backloged again, don't drop refs */
if (backloged)
return 0;
} else {
sctp_inq_push(inqueue, chunk);
}
done:
/* Release the refs we took in sctp_add_backlog */
if (SCTP_EP_TYPE_ASSOCIATION == rcvr->type)
sctp_association_put(sctp_assoc(rcvr));
else if (SCTP_EP_TYPE_SOCKET == rcvr->type)
sctp_endpoint_put(sctp_ep(rcvr));
else
BUG();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Fix another socket race during accept/peeloff
There is a race between sctp_rcv() and sctp_accept() where we
have moved the association from the listening socket to the
accepted socket, but sctp_rcv() processing cached the old
socket and continues to use it.
The easy solution is to check for the socket mismatch once we've
grabed the socket lock. If we hit a mis-match, that means
that were are currently holding the lock on the listening socket,
but the association is refrencing a newly accepted socket. We need
to drop the lock on the old socket and grab the lock on the new one.
A more proper solution might be to create accepted sockets when
the new association is established, similar to TCP. That would
eliminate the race for 1-to-1 style sockets, but it would still
existing for 1-to-many sockets where a user wished to peeloff an
association. For now, we'll live with this easy solution as
it addresses the problem.
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 34,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dummy_print(netdissect_options *ndo _U_,
const u_char *opt _U_, u_int opt_len _U_, u_char flags _U_)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::mapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(
WGC3Denum target,
WGC3Dintptr offset,
WGC3Dsizeiptr size,
WGC3Denum access) {
return gl_->MapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(target, offset, size, access);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FixSignedValues(const Image *image,Quantum *q, int y)
{
while(y-->0)
{
/* Please note that negative values will overflow
Q=8; QuantumRange=255: <0;127> + 127+1 = <128; 255>
<-1;-128> + 127+1 = <0; 127> */
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,q)+QuantumRange/2+1,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(image,q)+QuantumRange/2+1,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,q)+QuantumRange/2+1,q);
q++;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/362
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 62,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void enqueue_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
update_rq_clock(rq);
if (!(flags & ENQUEUE_RESTORE))
sched_info_queued(rq, p);
p->sched_class->enqueue_task(rq, p, flags);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip_vs_copy_usvc_compat(struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *usvc,
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat)
{
memset(usvc, 0, sizeof(*usvc));
usvc->af = AF_INET;
usvc->protocol = usvc_compat->protocol;
usvc->addr.ip = usvc_compat->addr;
usvc->port = usvc_compat->port;
usvc->fwmark = usvc_compat->fwmark;
/* Deep copy of sched_name is not needed here */
usvc->sched_name = usvc_compat->sched_name;
usvc->flags = usvc_compat->flags;
usvc->timeout = usvc_compat->timeout;
usvc->netmask = usvc_compat->netmask;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext2_xattr_cmp(struct ext2_xattr_header *header1,
struct ext2_xattr_header *header2)
{
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry1, *entry2;
entry1 = ENTRY(header1+1);
entry2 = ENTRY(header2+1);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry1)) {
if (IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry2))
return 1;
if (entry1->e_hash != entry2->e_hash ||
entry1->e_name_index != entry2->e_name_index ||
entry1->e_name_len != entry2->e_name_len ||
entry1->e_value_size != entry2->e_value_size ||
memcmp(entry1->e_name, entry2->e_name, entry1->e_name_len))
return 1;
if (entry1->e_value_block != 0 || entry2->e_value_block != 0)
return -EIO;
if (memcmp((char *)header1 + le16_to_cpu(entry1->e_value_offs),
(char *)header2 + le16_to_cpu(entry2->e_value_offs),
le32_to_cpu(entry1->e_value_size)))
return 1;
entry1 = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry1);
entry2 = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(entry2);
}
if (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(entry2))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 94,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::OnExternalExtensionUpdateUrlFound(
const std::string& id,
const GURL& update_url,
Extension::Location location) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
CHECK(Extension::IdIsValid(id));
const Extension* extension = GetExtensionById(id, true);
if (extension) {
Extension::Location current = extension->location();
if (current == Extension::GetHigherPriorityLocation(current, location))
return;
}
pending_extension_manager()->AddFromExternalUpdateUrl(
id, update_url, location);
external_extension_url_added_ |= true;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool GfxResources::lookupGStateNF(char *name, Object *obj) {
GfxResources *resPtr;
for (resPtr = this; resPtr; resPtr = resPtr->next) {
if (resPtr->gStateDict.isDict()) {
if (!resPtr->gStateDict.dictLookupNF(name, obj)->isNull()) {
return gTrue;
}
obj->free();
}
}
error(-1, "ExtGState '%s' is unknown", name);
return gFalse;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioFlinger::EffectModule::EffectModule(ThreadBase *thread,
const wp<AudioFlinger::EffectChain>& chain,
effect_descriptor_t *desc,
int id,
audio_session_t sessionId)
: mPinned(sessionId > AUDIO_SESSION_OUTPUT_MIX),
mThread(thread), mChain(chain), mId(id), mSessionId(sessionId),
mDescriptor(*desc),
mEffectInterface(NULL),
mStatus(NO_INIT), mState(IDLE),
mSuspended(false),
mAudioFlinger(thread->mAudioFlinger)
{
ALOGV("Constructor %p", this);
int lStatus;
mStatus = EffectCreate(&desc->uuid, sessionId, thread->id(), &mEffectInterface);
if (mStatus != NO_ERROR) {
return;
}
lStatus = init();
if (lStatus < 0) {
mStatus = lStatus;
goto Error;
}
ALOGV("Constructor success name %s, Interface %p", mDescriptor.name, mEffectInterface);
return;
Error:
EffectRelease(mEffectInterface);
mEffectInterface = NULL;
ALOGV("Constructor Error %d", mStatus);
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_pull_phy_port(enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *b,
struct ofputil_phy_port *pp)
{
memset(pp, 0, sizeof *pp);
switch (ofp_version) {
case OFP10_VERSION: {
const struct ofp10_phy_port *opp = ofpbuf_try_pull(b, sizeof *opp);
return opp ? ofputil_decode_ofp10_phy_port(pp, opp) : EOF;
}
case OFP11_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION: {
const struct ofp11_port *op = ofpbuf_try_pull(b, sizeof *op);
return op ? ofputil_decode_ofp11_port(pp, op) : EOF;
}
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION:
return b->size ? ofputil_pull_ofp14_port(pp, b) : EOF;
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int getFocusRingOutset(int offset)
{
#if PLATFORM(CHROMIUM) && OS(DARWIN)
return offset + 2;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 107,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_bridge_dellink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
void *arg)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct ifinfomsg *ifm;
struct net_device *dev;
struct nlattr *br_spec, *attr = NULL;
int rem, err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
u16 oflags, flags = 0;
bool have_flags = false;
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*ifm))
return -EINVAL;
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (ifm->ifi_family != AF_BRIDGE)
return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, ifm->ifi_index);
if (!dev) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: RTM_SETLINK with unknown ifindex\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
br_spec = nlmsg_find_attr(nlh, sizeof(struct ifinfomsg), IFLA_AF_SPEC);
if (br_spec) {
nla_for_each_nested(attr, br_spec, rem) {
if (nla_type(attr) == IFLA_BRIDGE_FLAGS) {
have_flags = true;
flags = nla_get_u16(attr);
break;
}
}
}
oflags = flags;
if (!flags || (flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_MASTER)) {
struct net_device *br_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
if (!br_dev || !br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_dellink) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
err = br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_dellink(dev, nlh);
if (err)
goto out;
flags &= ~BRIDGE_FLAGS_MASTER;
}
if ((flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_SELF)) {
if (!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_dellink)
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
else
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_dellink(dev, nlh);
if (!err)
flags &= ~BRIDGE_FLAGS_SELF;
}
if (have_flags)
memcpy(nla_data(attr), &flags, sizeof(flags));
/* Generate event to notify upper layer of bridge change */
if (!err)
err = rtnl_bridge_notify(dev, oflags);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void remove_trailing_rmap_items(struct mm_slot *mm_slot,
struct rmap_item **rmap_list)
{
while (*rmap_list) {
struct rmap_item *rmap_item = *rmap_list;
*rmap_list = rmap_item->rmap_list;
remove_rmap_item_from_tree(rmap_item);
free_rmap_item(rmap_item);
}
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::QueueToolbarRedraw() {
gtk_widget_queue_draw(toolbar_->widget());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::CommitPendingTransaction(
SwapCompletionCallback completion_callback,
PresentationCallback present_callback) {
DCHECK(pending_transaction_);
ResourceRefs resources_to_release;
resources_to_release.swap(current_frame_resources_);
current_frame_resources_.clear();
current_frame_resources_.swap(pending_frame_resources_);
pending_frame_resources_.clear();
SurfaceControl::Transaction::OnCompleteCb callback = base::BindOnce(
&GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl::OnTransactionAckOnGpuThread,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(completion_callback),
std::move(present_callback), std::move(resources_to_release));
pending_transaction_->SetOnCompleteCb(std::move(callback), gpu_task_runner_);
pending_transaction_->Apply();
pending_transaction_.reset();
DCHECK_GE(surface_list_.size(), pending_surfaces_count_);
surface_list_.resize(pending_surfaces_count_);
pending_surfaces_count_ = 0u;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *follow_pud_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, p4d_t *p4dp,
unsigned int flags,
struct follow_page_context *ctx)
{
pud_t *pud;
spinlock_t *ptl;
struct page *page;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pud = pud_offset(p4dp, address);
if (pud_none(*pud))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
if (pud_huge(*pud) && vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB) {
page = follow_huge_pud(mm, address, pud, flags);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (is_hugepd(__hugepd(pud_val(*pud)))) {
page = follow_huge_pd(vma, address,
__hugepd(pud_val(*pud)), flags,
PUD_SHIFT);
if (page)
return page;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
if (pud_devmap(*pud)) {
ptl = pud_lock(mm, pud);
page = follow_devmap_pud(vma, address, pud, flags, &ctx->pgmap);
spin_unlock(ptl);
if (page)
return page;
}
if (unlikely(pud_bad(*pud)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
return follow_pmd_mask(vma, address, pud, flags, ctx);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::MainThreadOnly::MainThreadOnly(
RendererSchedulerImpl* renderer_scheduler_impl,
const scoped_refptr<MainThreadTaskQueue>& compositor_task_runner,
base::TickClock* time_source,
base::TimeTicks now)
: loading_task_cost_estimator(time_source,
kLoadingTaskEstimationSampleCount,
kLoadingTaskEstimationPercentile),
timer_task_cost_estimator(time_source,
kTimerTaskEstimationSampleCount,
kTimerTaskEstimationPercentile),
idle_time_estimator(compositor_task_runner,
time_source,
kShortIdlePeriodDurationSampleCount,
kShortIdlePeriodDurationPercentile),
current_use_case(UseCase::kNone,
"RendererScheduler.UseCase",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
UseCaseToString),
longest_jank_free_task_duration(
base::TimeDelta(),
"RendererScheduler.LongestJankFreeTaskDuration",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
TimeDeltaToMilliseconds),
renderer_pause_count(0,
"RendererScheduler.PauseCount",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_),
navigation_task_expected_count(
0,
"RendererScheduler.NavigationTaskExpectedCount",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_),
expensive_task_policy(ExpensiveTaskPolicy::kRun,
"RendererScheduler.ExpensiveTaskPolicy",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
ExpensiveTaskPolicyToString),
rail_mode_for_tracing(current_policy.rail_mode(),
"RendererScheduler.RAILMode",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
RAILModeToString),
renderer_hidden(false,
"RendererScheduler.Hidden",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
HiddenStateToString),
renderer_backgrounded(kLaunchingProcessIsBackgrounded,
"RendererScheduler.Backgrounded",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
BackgroundStateToString),
stopping_when_backgrounded_enabled(
false,
"RendererScheduler.StoppingWhenBackgroundedEnabled",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
stopped_when_backgrounded(false,
"RendererScheduler.StoppedWhenBackgrounded",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
was_shutdown(false,
"RendererScheduler.WasShutdown",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
loading_task_estimated_cost(
base::TimeDelta(),
"RendererScheduler.LoadingTaskEstimatedCostMs",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
TimeDeltaToMilliseconds),
timer_task_estimated_cost(base::TimeDelta(),
"RendererScheduler.TimerTaskEstimatedCostMs",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
TimeDeltaToMilliseconds),
loading_tasks_seem_expensive(
false,
"RendererScheduler.LoadingTasksSeemExpensive",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
timer_tasks_seem_expensive(false,
"RendererScheduler.TimerTasksSeemExpensive",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
touchstart_expected_soon(false,
"RendererScheduler.TouchstartExpectedSoon",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
have_seen_a_begin_main_frame(
false,
"RendererScheduler.HasSeenBeginMainFrame",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
have_reported_blocking_intervention_in_current_policy(
false,
"RendererScheduler.HasReportedBlockingInterventionInCurrentPolicy",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
have_reported_blocking_intervention_since_navigation(
false,
"RendererScheduler.HasReportedBlockingInterventionSinceNavigation",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
has_visible_render_widget_with_touch_handler(
false,
"RendererScheduler.HasVisibleRenderWidgetWithTouchHandler",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
begin_frame_not_expected_soon(
false,
"RendererScheduler.BeginFrameNotExpectedSoon",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
in_idle_period_for_testing(false,
"RendererScheduler.InIdlePeriod",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
use_virtual_time(false,
"RendererScheduler.UseVirtualTime",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
is_audio_playing(false,
"RendererScheduler.AudioPlaying",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
AudioPlayingStateToString),
compositor_will_send_main_frame_not_expected(
false,
"RendererScheduler.CompositorWillSendMainFrameNotExpected",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
has_navigated(false,
"RendererScheduler.HasNavigated",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
pause_timers_for_webview(false,
"RendererScheduler.PauseTimersForWebview",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
background_status_changed_at(now),
rail_mode_observer(nullptr),
wake_up_budget_pool(nullptr),
metrics_helper(renderer_scheduler_impl, now, renderer_backgrounded),
process_type(RendererProcessType::kRenderer,
"RendererScheduler.ProcessType",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
RendererProcessTypeToString),
task_description_for_tracing(
base::nullopt,
"RendererScheduler.MainThreadTask",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
OptionalTaskDescriptionToString),
virtual_time_policy(VirtualTimePolicy::kAdvance),
virtual_time_pause_count(0),
max_virtual_time_task_starvation_count(0),
virtual_time_stopped(false),
nested_runloop(false) {}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tipc_write_space(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket_wq *wq;
rcu_read_lock();
wq = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_wq);
if (skwq_has_sleeper(wq))
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&wq->wait, POLLOUT |
POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int num_med_bfreg(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_bfreg_info *bfregi)
{
int n;
n = max_bfregs(dev, bfregi) - bfregi->num_low_latency_bfregs -
NUM_NON_BLUE_FLAME_BFREGS;
return n >= 0 ? n : 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputType::HasLegalLinkAttribute(const QualifiedName&) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsFrameDisplayNone() {
return frame_tree_node()->frame_owner_properties().is_display_none;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_mmx_thresholds (png_structp png_ptr,
png_byte mmx_bitdepth_threshold,
png_uint_32 mmx_rowbytes_threshold)
{
/* Obsolete as of libpng-1.2.20 and will be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
/* Quiet the compiler */
PNG_UNUSED(mmx_bitdepth_threshold)
PNG_UNUSED(mmx_rowbytes_threshold)
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6ip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return ip6_tnl_rcv(skb, ETH_P_IPV6, IPPROTO_IPV6,
ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::send(Blob* body, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!initSend(es))
return;
if (areMethodAndURLValidForSend()) {
const String& contentType = getRequestHeader("Content-Type");
if (contentType.isEmpty()) {
const String& blobType = body->type();
if (!blobType.isEmpty() && isValidContentType(blobType))
setRequestHeaderInternal("Content-Type", blobType);
else {
setRequestHeaderInternal("Content-Type", "");
}
}
m_requestEntityBody = FormData::create();
if (body->isFile())
m_requestEntityBody->appendFile(toFile(body)->path());
else
m_requestEntityBody->appendBlob(body->url());
}
createRequest(es);
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* Browser::OpenAppShortcutWindow(Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
bool update_shortcut) {
Browser* app_browser;
TabContents* tab = OpenApplicationWindow(
profile,
NULL, // this is a URL app. No extension.
extension_misc::LAUNCH_WINDOW,
url,
&app_browser);
if (!tab)
return NULL;
if (update_shortcut) {
app_browser->pending_web_app_action_ = UPDATE_SHORTCUT;
}
return tab;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClearNetworkingHistorySinceOnIOThread(
ProfileImplIOData* io_data, base::Time time) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
io_data->transport_security_state()->DeleteSince(time);
io_data->http_server_properties()->Clear();
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = (struct f2fs_inode_info *) foo;
inode_init_once(&fi->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | 0 | 63,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg)
{
_php_mb_regex_ereg_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 51,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (ExtensionWebContentsObserver::OnMessageReceived(message,
render_frame_host)) {
return true;
}
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver, message,
render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ExtensionHostMsg_DetailedConsoleMessageAdded,
OnDetailedConsoleMessageAdded)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 125,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void migrate_page_add(struct page *page, struct list_head *pagelist,
unsigned long flags)
{
/*
* Avoid migrating a page that is shared with others.
*/
if ((flags & MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL) || page_mapcount(page) == 1) {
if (!isolate_lru_page(page)) {
list_add_tail(&page->lru, pagelist);
inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_ISOLATED_ANON +
page_is_file_cache(page));
}
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cipso_v4_cache_init(void)
{
u32 iter;
cipso_v4_cache = kcalloc(CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETS,
sizeof(struct cipso_v4_map_cache_bkt),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (cipso_v4_cache == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
for (iter = 0; iter < CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETS; iter++) {
spin_lock_init(&cipso_v4_cache[iter].lock);
cipso_v4_cache[iter].size = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cipso_v4_cache[iter].list);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QDeclarativeListProperty<QObject> QQuickWebViewExperimental::flickableData()
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
ASSERT(d->flickProvider);
return d->flickProvider->flickableData();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalDOMWindow::SchedulePostMessage(
MessageEvent* event,
scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin> target,
Document* source) {
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> location = SourceLocation::Capture(source);
PostMessageTimer* timer =
new PostMessageTimer(*this, event, std::move(target), std::move(location),
UserGestureIndicator::CurrentToken());
timer->StartOneShot(TimeDelta(), FROM_HERE);
timer->PauseIfNeeded();
probe::AsyncTaskScheduled(document(), "postMessage", timer);
post_message_timers_.insert(timer);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCtxtResetPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *chunk,
int size, const char *filename, const char *encoding)
{
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr buf;
xmlCharEncoding enc = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(1);
if ((encoding == NULL) && (chunk != NULL) && (size >= 4))
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding((const xmlChar *) chunk, size);
buf = xmlAllocParserInputBuffer(enc);
if (buf == NULL)
return(1);
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(1);
}
xmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
if (ctxt->pushTab == NULL) {
ctxt->pushTab = (void **) xmlMalloc(ctxt->nameMax * 3 *
sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->pushTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(1);
}
}
if (filename == NULL) {
ctxt->directory = NULL;
} else {
ctxt->directory = xmlParserGetDirectory(filename);
}
inputStream = xmlNewInputStream(ctxt);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(1);
}
if (filename == NULL)
inputStream->filename = NULL;
else
inputStream->filename = (char *)
xmlCanonicPath((const xmlChar *) filename);
inputStream->buf = buf;
xmlBufResetInput(buf->buffer, inputStream);
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
if ((size > 0) && (chunk != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL)) {
size_t base = xmlBufGetInputBase(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input);
size_t cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, size, chunk);
xmlBufSetInputBaseCur(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input, base, cur);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: pushed %d\n", size);
#endif
}
if (encoding != NULL) {
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr hdlr;
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) encoding);
hdlr = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler(encoding);
if (hdlr != NULL) {
xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, hdlr);
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
"Unsupported encoding %s\n", BAD_CAST encoding);
}
} else if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void oom_reap_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int attempts = 0;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->signal->oom_mm;
/* Retry the down_read_trylock(mmap_sem) a few times */
while (attempts++ < MAX_OOM_REAP_RETRIES && !__oom_reap_task_mm(tsk, mm))
schedule_timeout_idle(HZ/10);
if (attempts <= MAX_OOM_REAP_RETRIES)
goto done;
pr_info("oom_reaper: unable to reap pid:%d (%s)\n",
task_pid_nr(tsk), tsk->comm);
debug_show_all_locks();
done:
tsk->oom_reaper_list = NULL;
/*
* Hide this mm from OOM killer because it has been either reaped or
* somebody can't call up_write(mmap_sem).
*/
set_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags);
/* Drop a reference taken by wake_oom_reaper */
put_task_struct(tsk);
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_addr_filters_apply(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_addr_filters_head *ifh = perf_event_addr_filters(event);
struct task_struct *task = READ_ONCE(event->ctx->task);
struct perf_addr_filter *filter;
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
unsigned int count = 0;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* We may observe TASK_TOMBSTONE, which means that the event tear-down
* will stop on the parent's child_mutex that our caller is also holding
*/
if (task == TASK_TOMBSTONE)
return;
mm = get_task_mm(event->ctx->task);
if (!mm)
goto restart;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ifh->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(filter, &ifh->list, entry) {
event->addr_filters_offs[count] = 0;
/*
* Adjust base offset if the filter is associated to a binary
* that needs to be mapped:
*/
if (filter->inode)
event->addr_filters_offs[count] =
perf_addr_filter_apply(filter, mm);
count++;
}
event->addr_filters_gen++;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ifh->lock, flags);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
restart:
perf_event_stop(event, 1);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _regulator_do_set_voltage(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
int min_uV, int max_uV)
{
int ret;
int delay = 0;
int best_val = 0;
unsigned int selector;
int old_selector = -1;
trace_regulator_set_voltage(rdev_get_name(rdev), min_uV, max_uV);
min_uV += rdev->constraints->uV_offset;
max_uV += rdev->constraints->uV_offset;
/*
* If we can't obtain the old selector there is not enough
* info to call set_voltage_time_sel().
*/
if (_regulator_is_enabled(rdev) &&
rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage_time_sel &&
rdev->desc->ops->get_voltage_sel) {
old_selector = rdev->desc->ops->get_voltage_sel(rdev);
if (old_selector < 0)
return old_selector;
}
if (rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage) {
ret = _regulator_call_set_voltage(rdev, min_uV, max_uV,
&selector);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (rdev->desc->ops->list_voltage)
best_val = rdev->desc->ops->list_voltage(rdev,
selector);
else
best_val = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev);
}
} else if (rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage_sel) {
if (rdev->desc->ops->map_voltage) {
ret = rdev->desc->ops->map_voltage(rdev, min_uV,
max_uV);
} else {
if (rdev->desc->ops->list_voltage ==
regulator_list_voltage_linear)
ret = regulator_map_voltage_linear(rdev,
min_uV, max_uV);
else if (rdev->desc->ops->list_voltage ==
regulator_list_voltage_linear_range)
ret = regulator_map_voltage_linear_range(rdev,
min_uV, max_uV);
else
ret = regulator_map_voltage_iterate(rdev,
min_uV, max_uV);
}
if (ret >= 0) {
best_val = rdev->desc->ops->list_voltage(rdev, ret);
if (min_uV <= best_val && max_uV >= best_val) {
selector = ret;
if (old_selector == selector)
ret = 0;
else
ret = _regulator_call_set_voltage_sel(
rdev, best_val, selector);
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
}
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
/* Call set_voltage_time_sel if successfully obtained old_selector */
if (ret == 0 && !rdev->constraints->ramp_disable && old_selector >= 0
&& old_selector != selector) {
delay = rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage_time_sel(rdev,
old_selector, selector);
if (delay < 0) {
rdev_warn(rdev, "set_voltage_time_sel() failed: %d\n",
delay);
delay = 0;
}
/* Insert any necessary delays */
if (delay >= 1000) {
mdelay(delay / 1000);
udelay(delay % 1000);
} else if (delay) {
udelay(delay);
}
}
if (ret == 0 && best_val >= 0) {
unsigned long data = best_val;
_notifier_call_chain(rdev, REGULATOR_EVENT_VOLTAGE_CHANGE,
(void *)data);
}
trace_regulator_set_voltage_complete(rdev_get_name(rdev), best_val);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDEVICE_OBJECT GetVirtualVolumeDeviceObject (int driveNumber)
{
if (driveNumber < MIN_MOUNTED_VOLUME_DRIVE_NUMBER || driveNumber > MAX_MOUNTED_VOLUME_DRIVE_NUMBER)
return NULL;
return VirtualVolumeDeviceObjects[driveNumber];
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pcd_block_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct pcd_unit *cd = disk->private_data;
mutex_lock(&pcd_mutex);
cdrom_release(&cd->info, mode);
mutex_unlock(&pcd_mutex);
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 1 | 168,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRG16F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing,
float,
uint16_t>(const float* source,
uint16_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[0]);
destination[1] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[1]);
source += 4;
destination += 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_setclientid_confirm(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_setclientid_confirm *scd_c)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
if (argp->minorversion >= 1)
return nfserr_notsupp;
READ_BUF(8 + NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
COPYMEM(&scd_c->sc_clientid, 8);
COPYMEM(&scd_c->sc_confirm, NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::DidCompleteWrite() {
int result =
InternalSendTo(write_buf_.get(), write_buf_len_, send_to_address_.get());
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
write_buf_ = NULL;
write_buf_len_ = 0;
send_to_address_.reset();
write_socket_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
DoWriteCallback(result);
}
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_add_pt(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
Point *point = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
CIRCLE *result;
result = circle_copy(circle);
result->center.x += point->x;
result->center.y += point->y;
PG_RETURN_CIRCLE_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mkdirat, int, dfd, const char __user *, pathname, umode_t, mode)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct path path;
int error;
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
retry:
dentry = user_path_create(dfd, pathname, &path, lookup_flags);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (!IS_POSIXACL(path.dentry->d_inode))
mode &= ~current_umask();
error = security_path_mkdir(&path, dentry, mode);
if (!error)
error = vfs_mkdir(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
done_path_create(&path, dentry);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldStartDownload(int32 download_id) {
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetActiveDownloadItem(download_id);
if (!download)
return false;
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
DownloadProtectionService* service = GetDownloadProtectionService();
if (service) {
VLOG(2) << __FUNCTION__ << "() Start SB URL check for download = "
<< download->DebugString(false);
service->CheckDownloadUrl(
DownloadProtectionService::DownloadInfo::FromDownloadItem(*download),
base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadUrlDone,
this,
download->GetId()));
return false;
}
#endif
CheckDownloadUrlDone(download_id, DownloadProtectionService::SAFE);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cma_release_dev(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
mutex_lock(&lock);
list_del(&id_priv->list);
cma_deref_dev(id_priv->cma_dev);
id_priv->cma_dev = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&lock);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncTest::DisableNetwork(Profile* profile) {
DisableNotificationsImpl();
net::ProxyConfig config;
config.proxy_rules().ParseFromString("http=127.0.0.1:0");
SetProxyConfig(profile->GetRequestContext(), config);
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::NotifyObserversOfIPAddressChangeForTests();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char intf_mem_inb(const struct si_sm_io *io,
unsigned int offset)
{
return readb((io->addr)+(offset * io->regspacing));
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_usb_vid_control_info(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
{
static const int *capability_bits[] = {
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[0],
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[1],
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[2],
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[3],
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[4],
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[5],
&hf_usb_vid_control_info_D[6],
NULL
};
DISSECTOR_ASSERT(array_length(capability_bits) == (1+array_length(hf_usb_vid_control_info_D)));
proto_tree_add_bitmask(tree, tvb, offset, hf_usb_vid_control_info,
ett_control_capabilities, capability_bits, ENC_NA);
return offset+1;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 51,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionRestoreImpl(Profile* profile,
Browser* browser,
bool synchronous,
bool clobber_existing_tab,
bool always_create_tabbed_browser,
const std::vector<GURL>& urls_to_open)
: profile_(profile),
browser_(browser),
synchronous_(synchronous),
clobber_existing_tab_(clobber_existing_tab),
always_create_tabbed_browser_(always_create_tabbed_browser),
urls_to_open_(urls_to_open),
restore_started_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
browser_shown_(false) {
if (profiles_getting_restored == NULL)
profiles_getting_restored = new std::set<const Profile*>();
CHECK(profiles_getting_restored->find(profile) ==
profiles_getting_restored->end());
profiles_getting_restored->insert(profile);
g_browser_process->AddRefModule();
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
TBR=sky@chromium.org
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
ext4_fsblk_t last_block;
ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap;
ext4_fsblk_t inode_table;
int flexbg_flag = 0;
ext4_group_t i;
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FLEX_BG))
flexbg_flag = 1;
ext4_debug("Checking group descriptors");
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
if (i == sbi->s_groups_count - 1 || flexbg_flag)
last_block = ext4_blocks_count(sbi->s_es) - 1;
else
last_block = first_block +
(EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) - 1);
block_bitmap = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Block bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, block_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_bitmap = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode bitmap for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_bitmap);
return 0;
}
inode_table = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
if (inode_table < first_block ||
inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Inode table for group %u not in group "
"(block %llu)!", i, inode_table);
return 0;
}
ext4_lock_group(sb, i);
if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sbi, i, gdp)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
"Checksum for group %u failed (%u!=%u)",
i, le16_to_cpu(ext4_group_desc_csum(sbi, i,
gdp)), le16_to_cpu(gdp->bg_checksum));
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
return 0;
}
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, i);
if (!flexbg_flag)
first_block += EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb);
}
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(sbi->s_es, ext4_count_free_blocks(sb));
sbi->s_es->s_free_inodes_count =cpu_to_le32(ext4_count_free_inodes(sb));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendIO::ExecuteEntryOperation() {
switch (operation_) {
case OP_READ:
result_ =
entry_->ReadDataImpl(index_, offset_, buf_.get(), buf_len_,
base::Bind(&BackendIO::OnIOComplete, this));
break;
case OP_WRITE:
result_ =
entry_->WriteDataImpl(index_, offset_, buf_.get(), buf_len_,
base::Bind(&BackendIO::OnIOComplete, this),
truncate_);
break;
case OP_READ_SPARSE:
result_ = entry_->ReadSparseDataImpl(
offset64_, buf_.get(), buf_len_,
base::Bind(&BackendIO::OnIOComplete, this));
break;
case OP_WRITE_SPARSE:
result_ = entry_->WriteSparseDataImpl(
offset64_, buf_.get(), buf_len_,
base::Bind(&BackendIO::OnIOComplete, this));
break;
case OP_GET_RANGE:
result_ = entry_->GetAvailableRangeImpl(offset64_, buf_len_, start_);
break;
case OP_CANCEL_IO:
entry_->CancelSparseIOImpl();
result_ = net::OK;
break;
case OP_IS_READY:
result_ = entry_->ReadyForSparseIOImpl(
base::Bind(&BackendIO::OnIOComplete, this));
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid Operation";
result_ = net::ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
buf_ = NULL;
if (result_ != net::ERR_IO_PENDING)
NotifyController();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xmlrpc_append_char_encode(mowgli_string_t *s, const char *s1)
{
long unsigned int i;
unsigned char c;
char buf2[15];
if ((!(s1) || (*(s1) == '\0')))
{
return;
}
for (i = 0; s1[i] != '\0'; i++)
{
c = s1[i];
if (c > 127)
{
snprintf(buf2, sizeof buf2, "&#%d;", c);
s->append(s, buf2, strlen(buf2));
}
else if (c == '&')
{
s->append(s, "&", 5);
}
else if (c == '<')
{
s->append(s, "<", 4);
}
else if (c == '>')
{
s->append(s, ">", 4);
}
else if (c == '"')
{
s->append(s, """, 6);
}
else
{
s->append_char(s, c);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Do not copy more bytes than were allocated
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXLayoutObject::elementAccessibilityHitTest(
const IntPoint& point) const {
if (isSVGImage())
return remoteSVGElementHitTest(point);
return AXObject::elementAccessibilityHitTest(point);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::AdjustFloatRectForScrollAndAbsoluteZoom(
FloatRect& rect,
const LayoutObject& layout_object) const {
if (!View())
return;
LayoutRect visible_content_rect(View()->VisibleContentRect());
rect.Move(-FloatSize(visible_content_rect.X().ToFloat(),
visible_content_rect.Y().ToFloat()));
AdjustFloatRectForAbsoluteZoom(rect, layout_object);
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dns_packet_read_type_window(DnsPacket *p, Bitmap **types, size_t *start) {
uint8_t window;
uint8_t length;
const uint8_t *bitmap;
uint8_t bit = 0;
unsigned i;
bool found = false;
_cleanup_(rewind_dns_packet) DnsPacketRewinder rewinder;
int r;
assert(p);
assert(types);
INIT_REWINDER(rewinder, p);
r = bitmap_ensure_allocated(types);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dns_packet_read_uint8(p, &window, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dns_packet_read_uint8(p, &length, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (length == 0 || length > 32)
return -EBADMSG;
r = dns_packet_read(p, length, (const void **)&bitmap, NULL);
if (r < 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
uint8_t bitmask = 1 << 7;
if (!bitmap[i]) {
found = false;
bit += 8;
continue;
}
found = true;
while (bitmask) {
if (bitmap[i] & bitmask) {
uint16_t n;
n = (uint16_t) window << 8 | (uint16_t) bit;
/* Ignore pseudo-types. see RFC4034 section 4.1.2 */
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(n))
continue;
r = bitmap_set(*types, n);
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
bit++;
bitmask >>= 1;
}
}
if (!found)
return -EBADMSG;
if (start)
*start = rewinder.saved_rindex;
CANCEL_REWINDER(rewinder);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXFixesSetWindowShapeRegion(ClientPtr client)
{
int result = Success, j;
PanoramiXRes *win;
RegionPtr reg = NULL;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetWindowShapeRegionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesSetWindowShapeRegionReq);
if ((result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &win, stuff->dest,
XRT_WINDOW, client,
DixWriteAccess))) {
client->errorValue = stuff->dest;
return result;
}
if (win->u.win.root)
VERIFY_REGION_OR_NONE(reg, stuff->region, client, DixReadAccess);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
ScreenPtr screen = screenInfo.screens[j];
stuff->dest = win->info[j].id;
if (reg)
RegionTranslate(reg, -screen->x, -screen->y);
result =
(*PanoramiXSaveXFixesVector[X_XFixesSetWindowShapeRegion]) (client);
if (reg)
RegionTranslate(reg, screen->x, screen->y);
if (result != Success)
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameView* Document::view() const
{
return m_frame ? m_frame->view() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcs_connect_finalize(STREAM mcs_data)
{
unsigned int i;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
mcs_send_connect_initial(mcs_data);
if (!mcs_recv_connect_response(mcs_data))
goto error;
mcs_send_edrq();
mcs_send_aurq();
if (!mcs_recv_aucf(&g_mcs_userid))
goto error;
mcs_send_cjrq(g_mcs_userid + MCS_USERCHANNEL_BASE);
if (!mcs_recv_cjcf())
goto error;
mcs_send_cjrq(MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL);
if (!mcs_recv_cjcf())
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < g_num_channels; i++)
{
mcs_send_cjrq(g_channels[i].mcs_id);
if (!mcs_recv_cjcf())
goto error;
}
return True;
error:
iso_disconnect();
return False;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int flashsv_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
FlashSVContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int zret; // Zlib return code
s->avctx = avctx;
s->zstream.zalloc = Z_NULL;
s->zstream.zfree = Z_NULL;
s->zstream.opaque = Z_NULL;
zret = inflateInit(&s->zstream);
if (zret != Z_OK) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Inflate init error: %d\n", zret);
return 1;
}
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
avcodec_get_frame_defaults(&s->frame);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/flashsv: check diff_start/height
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2844
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dbus_g_proxy_manager_unmonitor_name_owner (DBusGProxyManager *manager,
const char *name)
{
DBusGProxyNameOwnerInfo *info;
const char *owner;
gboolean ret;
ret = dbus_g_proxy_manager_lookup_name_owner (manager, name, &info, &owner);
g_assert (ret);
g_assert (info != NULL);
g_assert (owner != NULL);
info->refcount--;
if (info->refcount == 0)
{
GSList *names;
GSList *link;
names = g_hash_table_lookup (manager->owner_names, owner);
link = g_slist_find_custom (names, name, find_name_in_info);
names = g_slist_delete_link (names, link);
if (names != NULL)
g_hash_table_insert (manager->owner_names, g_strdup (owner), names);
else
g_hash_table_remove (manager->owner_names, owner);
g_free (info->name);
g_free (info);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InitCompatInfo(CompatInfo *info, struct xkb_context *ctx,
ActionsInfo *actions, const struct xkb_mod_set *mods)
{
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->ctx = ctx;
info->actions = actions;
info->mods = *mods;
info->default_interp.merge = MERGE_OVERRIDE;
info->default_interp.interp.virtual_mod = XKB_MOD_INVALID;
info->default_led.merge = MERGE_OVERRIDE;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 78,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CameraSource::CameraSource(
const sp<ICamera>& camera,
const sp<ICameraRecordingProxy>& proxy,
int32_t cameraId,
const String16& clientName,
uid_t clientUid,
Size videoSize,
int32_t frameRate,
const sp<IGraphicBufferProducer>& surface,
bool storeMetaDataInVideoBuffers)
: mCameraFlags(0),
mNumInputBuffers(0),
mVideoFrameRate(-1),
mCamera(0),
mSurface(surface),
mNumFramesReceived(0),
mLastFrameTimestampUs(0),
mStarted(false),
mNumFramesEncoded(0),
mTimeBetweenFrameCaptureUs(0),
mFirstFrameTimeUs(0),
mNumFramesDropped(0),
mNumGlitches(0),
mGlitchDurationThresholdUs(200000),
mCollectStats(false) {
mVideoSize.width = -1;
mVideoSize.height = -1;
mInitCheck = init(camera, proxy, cameraId,
clientName, clientUid,
videoSize, frameRate,
storeMetaDataInVideoBuffers);
if (mInitCheck != OK) releaseCamera();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bind_socket(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int rc = 0;
if (server->srcaddr.ss_family != AF_UNSPEC) {
/* Bind to the specified local IP address */
struct socket *socket = server->ssocket;
rc = socket->ops->bind(socket,
(struct sockaddr *) &server->srcaddr,
sizeof(server->srcaddr));
if (rc < 0) {
struct sockaddr_in *saddr4;
struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr6;
saddr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->srcaddr;
saddr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&server->srcaddr;
if (saddr6->sin6_family == AF_INET6)
cERROR(1, "cifs: "
"Failed to bind to: %pI6c, error: %d\n",
&saddr6->sin6_addr, rc);
else
cERROR(1, "cifs: "
"Failed to bind to: %pI4, error: %d\n",
&saddr4->sin_addr.s_addr, rc);
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int gdTransformAffineGetImage(gdImagePtr *dst,
const gdImagePtr src,
gdRectPtr src_area,
const double affine[6])
{
int res;
double m[6];
gdRect bbox;
gdRect area_full;
if (src_area == NULL) {
area_full.x = 0;
area_full.y = 0;
area_full.width = gdImageSX(src);
area_full.height = gdImageSY(src);
src_area = &area_full;
}
gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(src_area, affine, &bbox);
*dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(bbox.width, bbox.height);
if (*dst == NULL) {
return GD_FALSE;
}
(*dst)->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
if (!src->trueColor) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
/* Translate to dst origin (0,0) */
gdAffineTranslate(m, -bbox.x, -bbox.y);
gdAffineConcat(m, affine, m);
gdImageAlphaBlending(*dst, 0);
res = gdTransformAffineCopy(*dst,
0,0,
src,
src_area,
m);
if (res != GD_TRUE) {
gdImageDestroy(*dst);
dst = NULL;
return GD_FALSE;
} else {
return GD_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 170,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~GpuProcessTransportFactory() {
DCHECK(per_compositor_data_.empty());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ShortMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_shortMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::ShortMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nodeNameAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestInterfaceNode* impl = V8TestInterfaceNode::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->nodeName(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_irda saddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
memset(&saddr, 0, sizeof(saddr));
if (peer) {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
saddr.sir_family = AF_IRDA;
saddr.sir_lsap_sel = self->dtsap_sel;
saddr.sir_addr = self->daddr;
} else {
saddr.sir_family = AF_IRDA;
saddr.sir_lsap_sel = self->stsap_sel;
saddr.sir_addr = self->saddr;
}
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), tsap_sel = %#x\n", __func__, saddr.sir_lsap_sel);
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), addr = %08x\n", __func__, saddr.sir_addr);
/* uaddr_len come to us uninitialised */
*uaddr_len = sizeof (struct sockaddr_irda);
memcpy(uaddr, &saddr, *uaddr_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::StopAndDeleteDevice(int session_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
media_stream_manager_->audio_input_device_manager()->Stop(session_id);
session_entries_.erase(session_id);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcGrabKeyboard(ClientPtr client)
{
xGrabKeyboardReply rep;
BYTE status;
REQUEST(xGrabKeyboardReq);
int result;
DeviceIntPtr keyboard = PickKeyboard(client);
GrabMask mask;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGrabKeyboardReq);
UpdateCurrentTime();
mask.core = KeyPressMask | KeyReleaseMask;
result = GrabDevice(client, keyboard, stuff->pointerMode,
stuff->keyboardMode, stuff->grabWindow,
stuff->ownerEvents, stuff->time, &mask, CORE, None,
None, &status);
if (result != Success)
return result;
rep = (xGrabKeyboardReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.status = status,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0
};
WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xGrabKeyboardReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType EqualizeImage(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define EqualizeImageTag "Equalize/Image"
CacheView
*image_view;
double
black[CompositePixelChannel+1],
*equalize_map,
*histogram,
*map,
white[CompositePixelChannel+1];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize histogram arrays.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
if (AccelerateEqualizeImage(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
#endif
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
equalize_map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,
GetPixelChannels(image)*sizeof(*equalize_map));
histogram=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
map=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1UL,GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*map));
if ((equalize_map == (double *) NULL) || (histogram == (double *) NULL) ||
(map == (double *) NULL))
{
if (map != (double *) NULL)
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (histogram != (double *) NULL)
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
if (equalize_map != (double *) NULL)
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
/*
Form histogram.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(histogram,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*histogram));
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
intensity=p[i];
if ((image->channel_mask & SyncChannels) != 0)
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(image,p);
histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*ScaleQuantumToMap(intensity)+i]++;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
/*
Integrate the histogram to get the equalization map.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
double
intensity;
register ssize_t
j;
intensity=0.0;
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
{
intensity+=histogram[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i];
map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=intensity;
}
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(equalize_map,0,(MaxMap+1)*GetPixelChannels(image)*
sizeof(*equalize_map));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(black,0,sizeof(*black));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(white,0,sizeof(*white));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
black[i]=map[i];
white[i]=map[GetPixelChannels(image)*MaxMap+i];
if (black[i] != white[i])
for (j=0; j <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; j++)
equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]=(double)
ScaleMapToQuantum((double) ((MaxMap*(map[
GetPixelChannels(image)*j+i]-black[i]))/(white[i]-black[i])));
}
histogram=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
j;
/*
Equalize colormap.
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->colors; j++)
{
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,RedPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].red=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].red))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
GreenPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].green=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].green))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,BluePixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].blue=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].blue))+
channel];
}
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,
AlphaPixelChannel);
if (black[channel] != white[channel])
image->colormap[j].alpha=equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[j].alpha))+
channel];
}
}
}
/*
Equalize image.
*/
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) == 0)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if (((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0) || (black[j] == white[j]))
continue;
q[j]=ClampToQuantum(equalize_map[GetPixelChannels(image)*
ScaleQuantumToMap(q[j])+j]);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_EqualizeImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,EqualizeImageTag,progress++,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
equalize_map=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(equalize_map);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 166,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DOMPatchSupport::insertBeforeAndMarkAsUsed(ContainerNode* parentNode, Digest* digest, Node* anchor, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
bool result = m_domEditor->insertBefore(parentNode, digest->m_node, anchor, ec);
markNodeAsUsed(digest);
return result;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::SetBlendMode(SkXfermode::Mode blend_mode) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (blend_mode_ == blend_mode)
return;
switch (blend_mode) {
case SkXfermode::kSrcOver_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kScreen_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kOverlay_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDarken_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kLighten_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kColorDodge_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kColorBurn_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kHardLight_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kSoftLight_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDifference_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kExclusion_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kMultiply_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kHue_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kSaturation_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kColor_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kLuminosity_Mode:
break;
case SkXfermode::kClear_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kSrc_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDst_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDstOver_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kSrcIn_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDstIn_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kSrcOut_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDstOut_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kSrcATop_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kDstATop_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kXor_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kPlus_Mode:
case SkXfermode::kModulate_Mode:
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
blend_mode_ = blend_mode;
SetNeedsCommit();
SetNeedsFilterContextIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void iscsi_co_init_iscsitask(IscsiLun *iscsilun, struct IscsiTask *iTask)
{
*iTask = (struct IscsiTask) {
.co = qemu_coroutine_self(),
.iscsilun = iscsilun,
};
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_rodc_critical_attribute(struct ldb_message *msg)
{
uint32_t schemaFlagsEx, searchFlags, rodc_filtered_flags;
schemaFlagsEx = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "schemaFlagsEx", 0);
searchFlags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "searchFlags", 0);
rodc_filtered_flags = (SEARCH_FLAG_RODC_ATTRIBUTE
| SEARCH_FLAG_CONFIDENTIAL);
if ((schemaFlagsEx & SCHEMA_FLAG_ATTR_IS_CRITICAL) &&
((searchFlags & rodc_filtered_flags) == rodc_filtered_flags)) {
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 0 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::flowAwareBorderAfter() const
{
switch (transformedWritingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
return borderBottom();
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
return borderTop();
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
return borderRight();
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
return borderLeft();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return borderTop();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrame* WebDevToolsAgentImpl::mainFrame()
{
if (Page* page = m_webViewImpl->page())
return page->mainFrame();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_KillTimer(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param, int timer_id) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
engine->timers_.erase(timer_id);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint16_t AVRC_PassRsp(uint8_t handle, uint8_t label, tAVRC_MSG_PASS* p_msg) {
BT_HDR* p_buf;
if (!p_msg) return AVRC_BAD_PARAM;
p_buf = avrc_pass_msg(p_msg);
if (p_buf) return AVCT_MsgReq(handle, label, AVCT_RSP, p_buf);
return AVRC_NO_RESOURCES;
}
Commit Message: Add missing AVRCP message length checks inside avrc_msg_cback
Explicitly check the length of the received message before
accessing the data.
Bug: 111803925
Bug: 79883824
Test: POC scripts
Change-Id: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
Merged-In: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
(cherry picked from commit 282deb3e27407aaa88b8ddbdbd7bb7d56ddc635f)
(cherry picked from commit 007868d05f4b761842c7345161aeda6fd40dd245)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean startDiscoveryNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jboolean result = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return result;
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->start_discovery();
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,705 |
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