instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 ilen)
{
int padding = 32;
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
if (ci)
padding = 4 << (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
ilen = max(ilen, (u32)FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
return round_up(ilen, padding);
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 67,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_eregi_replace)
{
_php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, ONIG_OPTION_IGNORECASE, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 51,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const ExtensionList* ExtensionService::disabled_extensions() const {
return &disabled_extensions_;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WillSendRequest(blink::WebURLRequest& request) {
WebDocumentLoader* document_loader = frame_->GetDocumentLoader();
WillSendRequestInternal(
request, WebURLRequestToResourceType(request),
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader),
GetTransitionType(document_loader, IsMainFrame(), false /* loading */));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Run(scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> relay_proxy,
const base::Callback<void(T1, T2, scoped_ptr<T3>)>& callback,
T1 arg1,
T2 arg2,
scoped_ptr<T3> arg3) {
if (callback.is_null())
return;
RunTaskOnThread(relay_proxy,
base::Bind(callback, arg1, arg2, base::Passed(&arg3)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int kvmppc_get_vsr_word_offset(int index)
{
int offset;
if ((index > 3) || (index < 0))
return -1;
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
offset = index;
#else
offset = 3 - index;
#endif
return offset;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_supported_format(audio_format_t format)
{
if (format == AUDIO_FORMAT_MP3 ||
((format & AUDIO_FORMAT_MAIN_MASK) == AUDIO_FORMAT_AAC))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guard_failed(circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_p)
{
if (BUG(*guard_state_p == NULL))
return;
entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guard_handle_get((*guard_state_p)->guard);
if (! guard || BUG(guard->in_selection == NULL))
return;
entry_guards_note_guard_failure(guard->in_selection, guard);
(*guard_state_p)->state = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_DEAD;
(*guard_state_p)->state_set_at = approx_time();
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int check_disk_change(struct block_device *bdev)
{
struct gendisk *disk = bdev->bd_disk;
const struct block_device_operations *bdops = disk->fops;
unsigned int events;
events = disk_clear_events(disk, DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE |
DISK_EVENT_EJECT_REQUEST);
if (!(events & DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE))
return 0;
flush_disk(bdev, true);
if (bdops->revalidate_disk)
bdops->revalidate_disk(bdev->bd_disk);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __wait_discard_cmd(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool wait_cond)
{
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
struct list_head *wait_list = &(dcc->wait_list);
struct discard_cmd *dc, *tmp;
bool need_wait;
next:
need_wait = false;
mutex_lock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dc, tmp, wait_list, list) {
if (!wait_cond || (dc->state == D_DONE && !dc->ref)) {
wait_for_completion_io(&dc->wait);
__remove_discard_cmd(sbi, dc);
} else {
dc->ref++;
need_wait = true;
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
if (need_wait) {
__wait_one_discard_bio(sbi, dc);
goto next;
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 86,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DrawingBuffer::SetupRGBEmulationForBlitFramebuffer() {
if (want_alpha_channel_ || anti_aliasing_mode_ != kNone)
return false;
if (!(ShouldUseChromiumImage() &&
ContextProvider()->GetCapabilities().chromium_image_rgb_emulation))
return false;
if (!back_color_buffer_)
return false;
if (!back_color_buffer_->image_id)
return false;
GLuint rgb_texture = back_color_buffer_->rgb_workaround_texture_id;
GLenum target = GC3D_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB;
if (!rgb_texture) {
gl_->GenTextures(1, &rgb_texture);
gl_->BindTexture(target, rgb_texture);
gl_->TexParameteri(target, GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, GL_LINEAR);
gl_->TexParameteri(target, GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, GL_LINEAR);
gl_->TexParameteri(target, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
gl_->TexParameteri(target, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
gl_->BindTexImage2DWithInternalformatCHROMIUM(target, GL_RGB,
back_color_buffer_->image_id);
back_color_buffer_->rgb_workaround_texture_id = rgb_texture;
}
gl_->FramebufferTexture2D(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_ANGLE, GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
target, rgb_texture, 0);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void convert_32s_P1C1(OPJ_INT32 const* const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32* pDst,
OPJ_SIZE_T length, OPJ_INT32 adjust)
{
OPJ_SIZE_T i;
const OPJ_INT32* pSrc0 = pSrc[0];
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
pDst[i] = pSrc0[i] + adjust;
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_trigger_check(GSource * source)
{
crm_trigger_t *trig = (crm_trigger_t *) source;
return trig->trigger;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ipmr_mfc_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
int n;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
"Group "
"Origin "
"Iif Pkts Bytes Wrong Oifs\n");
} else {
const struct mfc6_cache *mfc = v;
const struct ipmr_mfc_iter *it = seq->private;
struct mr6_table *mrt = it->mrt;
seq_printf(seq, "%pI6 %pI6 %-3hd",
&mfc->mf6c_mcastgrp, &mfc->mf6c_origin,
mfc->mf6c_parent);
if (it->cache != &mrt->mfc6_unres_queue) {
seq_printf(seq, " %8lu %8lu %8lu",
mfc->mfc_un.res.pkt,
mfc->mfc_un.res.bytes,
mfc->mfc_un.res.wrong_if);
for (n = mfc->mfc_un.res.minvif;
n < mfc->mfc_un.res.maxvif; n++) {
if (MIF_EXISTS(mrt, n) &&
mfc->mfc_un.res.ttls[n] < 255)
seq_printf(seq,
" %2d:%-3d",
n, mfc->mfc_un.res.ttls[n]);
}
} else {
/* unresolved mfc_caches don't contain
* pkt, bytes and wrong_if values
*/
seq_printf(seq, " %8lu %8lu %8lu", 0ul, 0ul, 0ul);
}
seq_putc(seq, '\n');
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 93,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw()
: m_numCommits(0)
, m_numDraws(0)
{
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exit_with_signal (int sig)
{
sigset_t s;
signal (sig, SIG_DFL);
sigemptyset (&s);
sigaddset (&s, sig);
sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &s, (sigset_t *) 0);
raise (sig);
exit (2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 5,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ipmi_thread_busy_wait(enum si_sm_result smi_result,
const struct smi_info *smi_info,
struct timespec64 *busy_until)
{
unsigned int max_busy_us = 0;
if (smi_info->si_num < num_max_busy_us)
max_busy_us = kipmid_max_busy_us[smi_info->si_num];
if (max_busy_us == 0 || smi_result != SI_SM_CALL_WITH_DELAY)
ipmi_si_set_not_busy(busy_until);
else if (!ipmi_si_is_busy(busy_until)) {
ktime_get_ts64(busy_until);
timespec64_add_ns(busy_until, max_busy_us*NSEC_PER_USEC);
} else {
struct timespec64 now;
ktime_get_ts64(&now);
if (unlikely(timespec64_compare(&now, busy_until) > 0)) {
ipmi_si_set_not_busy(busy_until);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 90,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_delete(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table, zval *ids_array, ulong opt, char **sql TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *ids_converted = NULL;
smart_str querystr = {0};
int ret = FAILURE;
assert(pg_link != NULL);
assert(table != NULL);
assert(Z_TYPE_P(ids_array) == IS_ARRAY);
assert(!(opt & ~(PGSQL_CONV_FORCE_NULL|PGSQL_DML_EXEC|PGSQL_DML_STRING)));
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(ids_array)) == 0) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (!(opt & PGSQL_DML_NO_CONV)) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ids_converted);
array_init(ids_converted);
if (php_pgsql_convert(pg_link, table, ids_array, ids_converted, (opt & PGSQL_CONV_OPTS) TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
goto cleanup;
}
ids_array = ids_converted;
}
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "DELETE FROM ");
build_tablename(&querystr, pg_link, table);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, " WHERE ");
if (build_assignment_string(&querystr, Z_ARRVAL_P(ids_array), 1, " AND ", sizeof(" AND ")-1 TSRMLS_CC))
goto cleanup;
smart_str_appendc(&querystr, ';');
smart_str_0(&querystr);
if ((opt & PGSQL_DML_EXEC) && do_exec(&querystr, PGRES_COMMAND_OK, pg_link, opt TSRMLS_CC) == 0) {
ret = SUCCESS;
} else if (opt & PGSQL_DML_STRING) {
ret = SUCCESS;
}
cleanup:
if (!(opt & PGSQL_DML_NO_CONV)) {
zval_dtor(ids_converted);
FREE_ZVAL(ids_converted);
}
if (ret == SUCCESS && (opt & PGSQL_DML_STRING)) {
*sql = querystr.c;
}
else {
smart_str_free(&querystr);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lldp_private_8023_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8023_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MACPHY:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t autonegotiation [%s] (0x%02x)",
bittok2str(lldp_8023_autonegotiation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PMD autoneg capability [%s] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(lldp_pmd_capability_values,"unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 5)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAU type %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(lldp_mau_types_values, "unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+7)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 7)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MDIPOWER:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MDI power support [%s], power pair %s, power class %s",
bittok2str(lldp_mdi_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_pairs_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_class_values, "unknown", *(tptr + 6))));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_LINKAGGR:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t aggregation status [%s], aggregation port ID %u",
bittok2str(lldp_aggregation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 5)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU size %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13027/LLDP: Fix a bounds check.
The total length of the OID is the OID length plus the length of the OID
length itself.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.have_fixed = 1;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
if (r == 0)
r = kvm_mmu_setup(vcpu);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t recovery_start_show(struct md_rdev *rdev, char *page)
{
unsigned long long recovery_start = rdev->recovery_offset;
if (test_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags) ||
recovery_start == MaxSector)
return sprintf(page, "none\n");
return sprintf(page, "%llu\n", recovery_start);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Camera2Client::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
if ( checkPid(__FUNCTION__) != OK) return;
mStreamingProcessor->releaseRecordingFrame(mem);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ipv6_exthdrs_len(struct ipv6hdr *iph,
const struct net_offload **opps)
{
struct ipv6_opt_hdr *opth = (void *)iph;
int len = 0, proto, optlen = sizeof(*iph);
proto = iph->nexthdr;
for (;;) {
if (proto != NEXTHDR_HOP) {
*opps = rcu_dereference(inet6_offloads[proto]);
if (unlikely(!(*opps)))
break;
if (!((*opps)->flags & INET6_PROTO_GSO_EXTHDR))
break;
}
opth = (void *)opth + optlen;
optlen = ipv6_optlen(opth);
len += optlen;
proto = opth->nexthdr;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestURLFetcher::SetResponseString(const std::string& response) {
SetResponseDestinationForTesting(STRING);
fake_response_string_ = response;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedNameAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::nameAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataDirectoryService::InitializeRootEntry(const std::string& root_id) {
root_.reset(new GDataDirectory(NULL, this));
root_->set_title(kGDataRootDirectory);
root_->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
root_->set_resource_id(root_id);
AddEntryToResourceMap(root_.get());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool _Remove1Op(cmsPipeline* Lut, cmsStageSignature UnaryOp)
{
cmsStage** pt = &Lut ->Elements;
cmsBool AnyOpt = FALSE;
while (*pt != NULL) {
if ((*pt) ->Implements == UnaryOp) {
_RemoveElement(pt);
AnyOpt = TRUE;
}
else
pt = &((*pt) -> Next);
}
return AnyOpt;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
int al;
size_t i;
/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
/* If sigalgs received process it. */
if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
} else
ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
return 1;
err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 164,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STREAM* rdp_data_pdu_init(rdpRdp* rdp)
{
STREAM* s;
s = transport_send_stream_init(rdp->transport, 2048);
stream_seek(s, RDP_PACKET_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH);
rdp_security_stream_init(rdp, s);
stream_seek(s, RDP_SHARE_CONTROL_HEADER_LENGTH);
stream_seek(s, RDP_SHARE_DATA_HEADER_LENGTH);
return s;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait1(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateRst(ssn, p))
return -1;
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSED);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: Reset received state changed to TCP_CLOSED",
ssn);
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == 0)
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p)));
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->client, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
} else {
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == 0)
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p)));
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server,
StreamTcpResetGetMaxAck(&ssn->server, TCP_GET_SEQ(p)));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
}
} else if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_FIN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_FIN|TH_ACK)) {
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateTimestamp(ssn, p))
return -1;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to server: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->client, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
} else if (SEQ_LT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq) ||
SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), (ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_FIN_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_TIME_WAIT);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_TIME_WAIT", ssn);
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->server.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (SEQ_EQ(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_SEQ(p))) {
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->client, (ssn->client.next_seq + p->payload_len));
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
} else { /* implied to client */
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to client: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->server, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
} else if (SEQ_LT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq) ||
SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), (ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_FIN_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_TIME_WAIT);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_TIME_WAIT", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (SEQ_EQ(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_SEQ(p))) {
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->server, (ssn->server.next_seq + p->payload_len));
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->server.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack);
}
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_FIN) {
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateTimestamp(ssn, p))
return -1;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to server: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->client, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
} else if (SEQ_LT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq) ||
SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), (ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_FIN_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSING);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_CLOSING", ssn);
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->server.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (SEQ_EQ(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_SEQ(p))) {
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->client, (ssn->client.next_seq + p->payload_len));
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
} else { /* implied to client */
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to client: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->server, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
} else if (SEQ_LT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq) ||
SEQ_GT(TCP_GET_SEQ(p), (ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_FIN_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_CLOSING);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_CLOSING", ssn);
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (SEQ_EQ(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_SEQ(p))) {
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->server, (ssn->server.next_seq + p->payload_len));
}
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->server.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack);
}
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) {
SCLogDebug("ssn (%p): SYN pkt on FinWait1", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_SHUTDOWN_SYN_RESEND);
return -1;
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) {
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
if (!StreamTcpValidateTimestamp(ssn, p))
return -1;
}
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to server: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->client, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->server, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
if (SEQ_LEQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p) + p->payload_len, ssn->client.next_win) ||
(ssn->flags & (STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM|STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: seq %"PRIu32" in window, ssn->client.next_win "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_win);
if (TCP_GET_SEQ(p) == ssn->client.next_seq) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_FIN_WAIT2);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_FIN_WAIT2", ssn);
}
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->client.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_ACK_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
ssn->server.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->server.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->server, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->server.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (SEQ_EQ(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_SEQ(p))) {
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->client, (ssn->client.next_seq + p->payload_len));
}
StreamTcpSackUpdatePacket(&ssn->server, p);
/* update next_win */
StreamTcpUpdateNextWin(ssn, &ssn->server, (ssn->server.last_ack + ssn->server.window));
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->client.next_seq,
ssn->server.last_ack);
} else { /* implied to client */
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: pkt (%" PRIu32 ") is to client: SEQ "
"%" PRIu32 ", ACK %" PRIu32 "", ssn, p->payload_len,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), TCP_GET_ACK(p));
int retransmission = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacketIsRetransmission(&ssn->server, p)) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: packet is retransmission", ssn);
retransmission = 1;
}
if (StreamTcpValidateAck(ssn, &ssn->client, p) == -1) {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: rejecting because of invalid ack value", ssn);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_INVALID_ACK);
return -1;
}
if (!retransmission) {
if (SEQ_LEQ(TCP_GET_SEQ(p) + p->payload_len, ssn->server.next_win) ||
(ssn->flags & (STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM|STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC)))
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: seq %"PRIu32" in window, ssn->server.next_win "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_win);
if (TCP_GET_SEQ(p) == ssn->server.next_seq) {
StreamTcpPacketSetState(p, ssn, TCP_FIN_WAIT2);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: state changed to TCP_FIN_WAIT2", ssn);
}
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: -> SEQ mismatch, packet SEQ %" PRIu32 ""
" != %" PRIu32 " from stream", ssn,
TCP_GET_SEQ(p), ssn->server.next_seq);
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_FIN1_ACK_WRONG_SEQ);
return -1;
}
ssn->client.window = TCP_GET_WINDOW(p) << ssn->client.wscale;
}
StreamTcpUpdateLastAck(ssn, &ssn->client, TCP_GET_ACK(p));
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_TIMESTAMP) {
StreamTcpHandleTimestamp(ssn, p);
}
/* Update the next_seq, in case if we have missed the client
packet and server has already received and acked it */
if (SEQ_LT(ssn->client.next_seq, TCP_GET_ACK(p)))
ssn->client.next_seq = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
if (SEQ_EQ(ssn->server.next_seq, TCP_GET_SEQ(p))) {
StreamTcpUpdateNextSeq(ssn, &ssn->server, (ssn->server.next_seq + p->payload_len));
}
StreamTcpSackUpdatePacket(&ssn->client, p);
/* update next_win */
StreamTcpUpdateNextWin(ssn, &ssn->client, (ssn->client.last_ack + ssn->client.window));
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: =+ next SEQ %" PRIu32 ", last ACK "
"%" PRIu32 "", ssn, ssn->server.next_seq,
ssn->client.last_ack);
}
} else {
SCLogDebug("ssn (%p): default case", ssn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void brcmf_clear_assoc_ies(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_connect_info *conn_info = cfg_to_conn(cfg);
kfree(conn_info->req_ie);
conn_info->req_ie = NULL;
conn_info->req_ie_len = 0;
kfree(conn_info->resp_ie);
conn_info->resp_ie = NULL;
conn_info->resp_ie_len = 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltStrAlignFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
xmlChar *str, *padding, *alignment, *ret;
int str_l, padding_l;
if ((nargs < 2) || (nargs > 3)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 3)
alignment = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
else
alignment = NULL;
padding = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_l = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
padding_l = xmlUTF8Strlen (padding);
if (str_l == padding_l) {
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, str);
xmlFree(padding);
xmlFree(alignment);
return;
}
if (str_l > padding_l) {
ret = xmlUTF8Strndup (str, padding_l);
} else {
if (xmlStrEqual(alignment, (const xmlChar *) "right")) {
ret = xmlUTF8Strndup (padding, padding_l - str_l);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, str);
} else if (xmlStrEqual(alignment, (const xmlChar *) "center")) {
int left = (padding_l - str_l) / 2;
int right_start;
ret = xmlUTF8Strndup (padding, left);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, str);
right_start = xmlUTF8Strsize (padding, left + str_l);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, padding + right_start);
} else {
int str_s;
str_s = xmlStrlen (str);
ret = xmlStrdup (str);
ret = xmlStrcat (ret, padding + str_s);
}
}
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
xmlFree(str);
xmlFree(padding);
xmlFree(alignment);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be32 nfsd4_decode_reclaim_complete(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_reclaim_complete *rc)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(4);
rc->rca_one_fs = be32_to_cpup(p++);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void perf_read_regs(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_compressRleLiteralsBlock (void* dst, size_t dstCapacity, const void* src, size_t srcSize)
{
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE* const)dst;
U32 const flSize = 1 + (srcSize>31) + (srcSize>4095);
(void)dstCapacity; /* dstCapacity already guaranteed to be >=4, hence large enough */
switch(flSize)
{
case 1: /* 2 - 1 - 5 */
ostart[0] = (BYTE)((U32)set_rle + (srcSize<<3));
break;
case 2: /* 2 - 2 - 12 */
MEM_writeLE16(ostart, (U16)((U32)set_rle + (1<<2) + (srcSize<<4)));
break;
case 3: /* 2 - 2 - 20 */
MEM_writeLE32(ostart, (U32)((U32)set_rle + (3<<2) + (srcSize<<4)));
break;
default: /* not necessary : flSize is {1,2,3} */
assert(0);
}
ostart[flSize] = *(const BYTE*)src;
return flSize+1;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void addString(std::vector<std::string>* list, std::string str) {
if (str.compare(0, 6, "DIRECT") == 0) {
list->push_back("DIRECT");
} else if (str.compare(0, 6, "PROXY ") == 0) {
list->push_back(str.substr(6));
} else {
ALOGE("Unrecognized proxy string");
}
}
Commit Message: Test for error in handling getters changing element kind.
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Merged-In: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
Change-Id: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
(cherry picked from commit 59b9b11a462fe3aad313b8538fb98468f22d9095)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 164,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void webkit_web_view_delete_selection(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
frame->editor()->performDelete();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::BindFragDataLocationEXT(GLuint program,
GLuint colorName,
const char* name) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glBindFragDataLocationEXT("
<< program << ", " << colorName << ", " << name << ")");
SetBucketAsString(kResultBucketId, name);
helper_->BindFragDataLocationEXTBucket(program, colorName, kResultBucketId);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_MSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(xmlwriter)
{
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0 || (size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PresentationConnection::dispatchEventAsync(EventTarget* target,
Event* event) {
DCHECK(target);
DCHECK(event);
target->dispatchEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageFilledEllipse (gdImagePtr im, int mx, int my, int w, int h, int c)
{
int x=0,mx1=0,mx2=0,my1=0,my2=0;
long aq,bq,dx,dy,r,rx,ry,a,b;
int i;
int old_y2;
a=w>>1;
b=h>>1;
for (x = mx-a; x <= mx+a; x++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, my, c);
}
mx1 = mx-a;
my1 = my;
mx2 = mx+a;
my2 = my;
aq = a * a;
bq = b * b;
dx = aq << 1;
dy = bq << 1;
r = a * bq;
rx = r << 1;
ry = 0;
x = a;
old_y2=-2;
while (x > 0) {
if (r > 0) {
my1++;
my2--;
ry +=dx;
r -=ry;
}
if (r <= 0) {
x--;
mx1++;
mx2--;
rx -=dy;
r +=rx;
}
if(old_y2!=my2) {
for(i=mx1; i<=mx2; i++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im,i,my1,c);
}
}
if(old_y2!=my2) {
for(i=mx1; i<=mx2; i++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im,i,my2,c);
}
}
old_y2 = my2;
}
}
Commit Message: fix #215 gdImageFillToBorder stack-overflow when invalid color is used
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 96,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bgp_attr_undup(struct attr *new, struct attr *old)
{
if (new->aspath != old->aspath)
aspath_free(new->aspath);
if (new->community != old->community)
community_free(&new->community);
if (new->ecommunity != old->ecommunity)
ecommunity_free(&new->ecommunity);
if (new->lcommunity != old->lcommunity)
lcommunity_free(&new->lcommunity);
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 91,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_setwap(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct sockaddr *ap_addr,
char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
int err = -EINPROGRESS; /* Call commit handler */
unsigned long flags;
static const u8 off_addr[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
static const u8 any_addr[] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff };
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
/* Enable automatic roaming - no sanity checks are needed */
if (memcmp(&ap_addr->sa_data, off_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0 ||
memcmp(&ap_addr->sa_data, any_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
priv->bssid_fixed = 0;
memset(priv->desired_bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
/* "off" means keep existing connection */
if (ap_addr->sa_data[0] == 0) {
__orinoco_hw_set_wap(priv);
err = 0;
}
goto out;
}
if (priv->firmware_type == FIRMWARE_TYPE_AGERE) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Lucent/Agere firmware doesn't "
"support manual roaming\n",
dev->name);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
if (priv->iw_mode != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Manual roaming supported only in "
"managed mode\n", dev->name);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
/* Intersil firmware hangs without Desired ESSID */
if (priv->firmware_type == FIRMWARE_TYPE_INTERSIL &&
strlen(priv->desired_essid) == 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Desired ESSID must be set for "
"manual roaming\n", dev->name);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
/* Finally, enable manual roaming */
priv->bssid_fixed = 1;
memcpy(priv->desired_bssid, &ap_addr->sa_data, ETH_ALEN);
out:
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
return err;
}
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <comes@naic.edu>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <kilroyd@googlemail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::drawArrays(GLenum mode,
GLint first,
GLsizei count) {
if (!ValidateDrawArrays("drawArrays"))
return;
if (!bound_vertex_array_object_->IsAllEnabledAttribBufferBound()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "drawArrays",
"no buffer is bound to enabled attribute");
return;
}
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.Get());
ClearIfComposited();
ContextGL()->DrawArrays(mode, first, count);
MarkContextChanged(kCanvasChanged);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err co64_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *) s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->nb_entries);
for (i = 0; i < ptr->nb_entries; i++ ) {
gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->offsets[i]);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nested_vmx_store_msr_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmx_msr_entry *e)
{
if (e->index == MSR_IA32_SMBASE || /* SMM is not supported */
nested_vmx_msr_check_common(vcpu, e))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
if (current == task)
return 0;
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
(cred->uid == tcred->euid &&
cred->uid == tcred->suid &&
cred->uid == tcred->uid &&
cred->gid == tcred->egid &&
cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
cred->gid == tcred->gid))
return 0;
if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameView::removeFromAXObjectCache()
{
if (AXObjectCache* cache = axObjectCache())
cache->remove(this);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 119,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_setnamedprofileicc(const gs_gstate * pgs, gs_param_string * pval)
{
int code;
char* pname;
int namelen = (pval->size)+1;
gs_memory_t *mem = pgs->memory;
/* Check if it was "NULL" */
if (pval->size != 0) {
pname = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem, namelen,
"set_named_profile_icc");
if (pname == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(pname,pval->data,namelen-1);
pname[namelen-1] = 0;
code = gsicc_set_profile(pgs->icc_manager,
(const char*) pname, namelen, NAMED_TYPE);
gs_free_object(mem, pname,
"set_named_profile_icc");
if (code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot find named color icc profile");
return code;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Eina_Bool ewk_frame_uri_set(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const char* uri)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
WebCore::KURL kurl(WebCore::KURL(), WTF::String::fromUTF8(uri));
WebCore::ResourceRequest req(kurl);
WebCore::FrameLoader* loader = smartData->frame->loader();
loader->load(req, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InProgressDownloadObserver::OnDownloadRemoved(DownloadItem* download) {
if (!in_progress_cache_)
return;
in_progress_cache_->RemoveEntry(download->GetGuid());
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::ToggleDevToolsWindow(
content::WebContents* inspected_web_contents,
bool force_open,
const DevToolsToggleAction& action,
const std::string& settings) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(inspected_web_contents));
DevToolsWindow* window = FindDevToolsWindow(agent.get());
bool do_open = force_open;
if (!window) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(
inspected_web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
content::RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("DevTools_InspectRenderer"));
std::string panel = "";
switch (action.type()) {
case DevToolsToggleAction::kInspect:
case DevToolsToggleAction::kShowElementsPanel:
panel = "elements";
break;
case DevToolsToggleAction::kShowConsolePanel:
panel = "console";
break;
case DevToolsToggleAction::kShow:
case DevToolsToggleAction::kToggle:
case DevToolsToggleAction::kReveal:
case DevToolsToggleAction::kNoOp:
break;
}
window = Create(profile, GURL(), inspected_web_contents, false, false,
std::string(), true, settings, panel);
if (!window)
return;
window->bindings_->AttachTo(agent.get());
do_open = true;
}
window->UpdateBrowserToolbar();
if (!window->is_docked_ || do_open)
window->ScheduleShow(action);
else
window->CloseWindow();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: php_mysqlnd_auth_response_read(void * _packet, MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_uchar local_buf[AUTH_RESP_BUFFER_SIZE];
size_t buf_len = conn->net->cmd_buffer.buffer? conn->net->cmd_buffer.length: AUTH_RESP_BUFFER_SIZE;
zend_uchar *buf = conn->net->cmd_buffer.buffer? (zend_uchar *) conn->net->cmd_buffer.buffer : local_buf;
zend_uchar *p = buf;
zend_uchar *begin = buf;
unsigned long i;
register MYSQLND_PACKET_AUTH_RESPONSE * packet= (MYSQLND_PACKET_AUTH_RESPONSE *) _packet;
DBG_ENTER("php_mysqlnd_auth_response_read");
/* leave space for terminating safety \0 */
buf_len--;
PACKET_READ_HEADER_AND_BODY(packet, conn, buf, buf_len, "OK", PROT_OK_PACKET);
BAIL_IF_NO_MORE_DATA;
/*
zero-terminate the buffer for safety. We are sure there is place for the \0
because buf_len is -1 the size of the buffer pointed
*/
buf[packet->header.size] = '\0';
/* Should be always 0x0 or ERROR_MARKER for error */
packet->response_code = uint1korr(p);
p++;
BAIL_IF_NO_MORE_DATA;
if (ERROR_MARKER == packet->response_code) {
php_mysqlnd_read_error_from_line(p, packet->header.size - 1,
packet->error, sizeof(packet->error),
&packet->error_no, packet->sqlstate
TSRMLS_CC);
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
if (0xFE == packet->response_code) {
/* Authentication Switch Response */
if (packet->header.size > (size_t) (p - buf)) {
packet->new_auth_protocol = mnd_pestrdup((char *)p, FALSE);
packet->new_auth_protocol_len = strlen(packet->new_auth_protocol);
p+= packet->new_auth_protocol_len + 1; /* +1 for the \0 */
packet->new_auth_protocol_data_len = packet->header.size - (size_t) (p - buf);
if (packet->new_auth_protocol_data_len) {
packet->new_auth_protocol_data = mnd_emalloc(packet->new_auth_protocol_data_len);
memcpy(packet->new_auth_protocol_data, p, packet->new_auth_protocol_data_len);
}
DBG_INF_FMT("The server requested switching auth plugin to : %s", packet->new_auth_protocol);
DBG_INF_FMT("Server salt : [%d][%.*s]", packet->new_auth_protocol_data_len, packet->new_auth_protocol_data_len, packet->new_auth_protocol_data);
}
} else {
/* Everything was fine! */
packet->affected_rows = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length_ll(&p);
BAIL_IF_NO_MORE_DATA;
packet->last_insert_id = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length_ll(&p);
BAIL_IF_NO_MORE_DATA;
packet->server_status = uint2korr(p);
p+= 2;
BAIL_IF_NO_MORE_DATA;
packet->warning_count = uint2korr(p);
p+= 2;
BAIL_IF_NO_MORE_DATA;
/* There is a message */
if (packet->header.size > (size_t) (p - buf) && (i = php_mysqlnd_net_field_length(&p))) {
packet->message_len = MIN(i, buf_len - (p - begin));
packet->message = mnd_pestrndup((char *)p, packet->message_len, FALSE);
} else {
packet->message = NULL;
packet->message_len = 0;
}
DBG_INF_FMT("OK packet: aff_rows=%lld last_ins_id=%ld server_status=%u warnings=%u",
packet->affected_rows, packet->last_insert_id, packet->server_status,
packet->warning_count);
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
premature_end:
DBG_ERR_FMT("OK packet %d bytes shorter than expected", p - begin - packet->header.size);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "AUTH_RESPONSE packet "MYSQLND_SZ_T_SPEC" bytes shorter than expected",
p - begin - packet->header.size);
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bus_owner_unref (BusOwner *owner)
{
_dbus_assert (owner->refcount > 0);
owner->refcount -= 1;
if (owner->refcount == 0)
{
bus_connection_remove_owned_service (owner->conn, owner->service);
_dbus_mem_pool_dealloc (owner->service->registry->owner_pool, owner);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_inode_nonrcu(struct inode *inode)
{
kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, inode);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldStayInParentProcessForNTP(
const GURL& url,
SiteInstance* parent_site_instance) {
return url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeSearchScheme) &&
IsNTPSiteInstance(parent_site_instance);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTServer::getPrimaryServices(
ScriptState* scriptState,
const StringOrUnsignedLong& service,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
String serviceUUID = BluetoothUUID::getService(service, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return exceptionState.reject(scriptState);
return getPrimaryServicesImpl(
scriptState, mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::MULTIPLE,
serviceUUID);
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ESDS::getCodecSpecificInfo(const void **data, size_t *size) const {
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
return mInitCheck;
}
*data = &mData[mDecoderSpecificOffset];
*size = mDecoderSpecificLength;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow in ESDS processing
Several arithmetic operations within parseESDescriptor could underflow, leading
to an out-of-bounds read operation. Ensure that subtractions from 'size' do not
cause it to wrap around.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit 07c0f59d6c48874982d2b5c713487612e5af465a)
Change-Id: I377d21051e07ca654ea1f7037120429d3f71924a
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofpact_init(struct ofpact *ofpact, enum ofpact_type type, size_t len)
{
memset(ofpact, 0, len);
ofpact->type = type;
ofpact->raw = -1;
ofpact->len = len;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RBinJavaAttrInfo *r_bin_java_annotation_default_attr_new(ut8 *buffer, ut64 sz, ut64 buf_offset) {
ut64 offset = 0;
RBinJavaAttrInfo *attr = NULL;
attr = r_bin_java_default_attr_new (buffer, sz, buf_offset);
offset += 6;
if (attr) {
attr->type = R_BIN_JAVA_ATTR_TYPE_ANNOTATION_DEFAULT_ATTR;
attr->info.annotation_default_attr.default_value = r_bin_java_element_value_new (buffer + offset, sz - offset, buf_offset + offset);
if (attr->info.annotation_default_attr.default_value) {
offset += attr->info.annotation_default_attr.default_value->size;
}
}
r_bin_java_print_annotation_default_attr_summary (attr);
return attr;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_lease(struct dhcp_lease *lease, const struct dhcp_message *dhcp)
{
struct timeval now;
lease->cookie = dhcp->cookie;
/* BOOTP does not set yiaddr for replies when ciaddr is set. */
if (dhcp->yiaddr)
lease->addr.s_addr = dhcp->yiaddr;
else
lease->addr.s_addr = dhcp->ciaddr;
if (get_option_addr(&lease->net, dhcp, DHO_SUBNETMASK) == -1)
lease->net.s_addr = get_netmask(lease->addr.s_addr);
if (get_option_addr(&lease->brd, dhcp, DHO_BROADCAST) == -1)
lease->brd.s_addr = lease->addr.s_addr | ~lease->net.s_addr;
if (get_option_uint32(&lease->leasetime, dhcp, DHO_LEASETIME) == 0) {
/* Ensure that we can use the lease */
get_monotonic(&now);
if (now.tv_sec + (time_t)lease->leasetime < now.tv_sec)
lease->leasetime = ~0U; /* Infinite lease */
} else
lease->leasetime = ~0U; /* Default to infinite lease */
if (get_option_uint32(&lease->renewaltime, dhcp, DHO_RENEWALTIME) != 0)
lease->renewaltime = 0;
if (get_option_uint32(&lease->rebindtime, dhcp, DHO_REBINDTIME) != 0)
lease->rebindtime = 0;
if (get_option_addr(&lease->server, dhcp, DHO_SERVERID) != 0)
lease->server.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_preempt_delay_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
double preempt_delay;
if (!read_double_strvec(strvec, 1, &preempt_delay, 0, TIMER_MAX_SEC, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) Preempt_delay not valid! must be between 0-%d", vrrp->iname, TIMER_MAX_SEC);
vrrp->preempt_delay = 0;
}
else
vrrp->preempt_delay = (unsigned long)(preempt_delay * TIMER_HZ);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::DestroyFakePluginWindowHandle(gfx::PluginWindowHandle window) {
if (window && fake_plugin_window_handles_.find(window) !=
fake_plugin_window_handles_.end()) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DestroyFakePluginWindowHandle(routing_id(), window));
fake_plugin_window_handles_.erase(window);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int su3000_streaming_ctrl(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap, int onoff)
{
static u8 command_start[] = {0x00};
static u8 command_stop[] = {0x01};
struct i2c_msg msg = {
.addr = SU3000_STREAM_CTRL,
.flags = 0,
.buf = onoff ? command_start : command_stop,
.len = 1
};
i2c_transfer(&adap->dev->i2c_adap, &msg, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void opl3_close(int dev)
{
devc->busy = 0;
devc->v_alloc->max_voice = devc->nr_voice = (devc->model == 2) ? 18 : 9;
devc->fm_info.nr_drums = 0;
devc->fm_info.perc_mode = 0;
opl3_reset(dev);
}
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: wv_csp10_opaque_binary_tag(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset,
guint8 token, guint8 codepage, guint32 *length)
{
guint32 data_len = tvb_get_guintvar(tvb, offset, length);
char *str = NULL;
switch (codepage) {
case 0: /* Common code page */
switch (token) {
case 0x0B: /* <Code> */
case 0x0F: /* <ContentSize> */
case 0x1A: /* <MessageCount> */
case 0x3C: /* <Validity> */
str = wv_integer_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
case 0x11: /* <DateTime> */
str = wv_datetime_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
case 1: /* Access code page */
switch (token) {
case 0x1C: /* <KeepAliveTime> */
case 0x32: /* <TimeToLive> */
str = wv_integer_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
case 3: /* Client capability code page */
switch (token) {
case 0x06: /* <AcceptedContentLength> */
case 0x0C: /* <MultiTrans> */
case 0x0D: /* <ParserSize> */
case 0x0E: /* <ServerPollMin> */
case 0x11: /* <TCPAddress> */
case 0x12: /* <TCPPort> */
case 0x13: /* <UDPPort> */
str = wv_integer_from_opaque(tvb,
offset + *length, data_len);
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (str == NULL) { /* Error, or not parsed */
str = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "(%d bytes of unparsed opaque data)", data_len);
}
*length += data_len;
return str;
}
Commit Message: WBXML: add a basic sanity check for offset overflow
This is a naive approach allowing to detact that something went wrong,
without the need to replace all proto_tree_add_text() calls as what was
done in master-2.0 branch.
Bug: 12408
Change-Id: Ia14905005e17ae322c2fc639ad5e491fa08b0108
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15310
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Pascal Quantin <pascal.quantin@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::clearPreloads()
{
#if PRELOAD_DEBUG
printPreloadStats();
#endif
if (!m_preloads)
return;
ListHashSet<Resource*>::iterator end = m_preloads->end();
for (ListHashSet<Resource*>::iterator it = m_preloads->begin(); it != end; ++it) {
Resource* res = *it;
res->decreasePreloadCount();
bool deleted = res->deleteIfPossible();
if (!deleted && res->preloadResult() == Resource::PreloadNotReferenced)
memoryCache()->remove(res);
}
m_preloads.clear();
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaBuffer *FLACParser::readBuffer(bool doSeek, FLAC__uint64 sample)
{
mWriteRequested = true;
mWriteCompleted = false;
if (doSeek) {
if (!FLAC__stream_decoder_seek_absolute(mDecoder, sample)) {
ALOGE("FLACParser::readBuffer seek to sample %lld failed", (long long)sample);
return NULL;
}
ALOGV("FLACParser::readBuffer seek to sample %lld succeeded", (long long)sample);
} else {
if (!FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single(mDecoder)) {
ALOGE("FLACParser::readBuffer process_single failed");
return NULL;
}
}
if (!mWriteCompleted) {
ALOGV("FLACParser::readBuffer write did not complete");
return NULL;
}
unsigned blocksize = mWriteHeader.blocksize;
if (blocksize == 0 || blocksize > getMaxBlockSize()) {
ALOGE("FLACParser::readBuffer write invalid blocksize %u", blocksize);
return NULL;
}
if (mWriteHeader.sample_rate != getSampleRate() ||
mWriteHeader.channels != getChannels() ||
mWriteHeader.bits_per_sample != getBitsPerSample()) {
ALOGE("FLACParser::readBuffer write changed parameters mid-stream: %d/%d/%d -> %d/%d/%d",
getSampleRate(), getChannels(), getBitsPerSample(),
mWriteHeader.sample_rate, mWriteHeader.channels, mWriteHeader.bits_per_sample);
return NULL;
}
CHECK(mGroup != NULL);
MediaBuffer *buffer;
status_t err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&buffer);
if (err != OK) {
return NULL;
}
size_t bufferSize = blocksize * getChannels() * sizeof(short);
CHECK(bufferSize <= mMaxBufferSize);
short *data = (short *) buffer->data();
buffer->set_range(0, bufferSize);
(*mCopy)(data, mWriteBuffer, blocksize, getChannels());
CHECK(mWriteHeader.number_type == FLAC__FRAME_NUMBER_TYPE_SAMPLE_NUMBER);
FLAC__uint64 sampleNumber = mWriteHeader.number.sample_number;
int64_t timeUs = (1000000LL * sampleNumber) / getSampleRate();
buffer->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, timeUs);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
int ret = 0;
u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_EFER:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
break;
case MSR_GS_BASE:
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
vmx_load_host_state(vmx);
vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
break;
#endif
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
(!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
return 1;
if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
(data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
return 1;
/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
return 1;
vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
if (!data)
break;
/*
* For non-nested:
* When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
* it through.
*
* For nested:
* The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
* nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
* vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
* in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
* since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
*/
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
MSR_TYPE_RW);
break;
case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
return 1;
if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
return 1;
if (!data)
break;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
/*
* For non-nested:
* When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
* it through.
*
* For nested:
* The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
* nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
* vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
* in the merging.
*/
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
MSR_TYPE_W);
break;
case MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
return 1;
vmx->arch_capabilities = data;
break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
vcpu->arch.pat = data;
break;
}
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
if ((!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE)) ||
(data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data;
break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
if (!vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vcpu, data) ||
(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated))
return 1;
vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
return 1; /* they are read-only */
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
return 1;
return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_XSS:
if (!vmx_xsaves_supported())
return 1;
/*
* The only supported bit as of Skylake is bit 8, but
* it is not supported on KVM.
*/
if (data != 0)
return 1;
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = data;
if (vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_XSS,
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, host_xss);
else
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_XSS);
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
return 1;
/* Check reserved bit, higher 32 bits should be zero */
if ((data >> 32) != 0)
return 1;
/* Otherwise falls through */
default:
msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_index);
if (msr) {
u64 old_msr_data = msr->data;
msr->data = data;
if (msr - vmx->guest_msrs < vmx->save_nmsrs) {
preempt_disable();
ret = kvm_set_shared_msr(msr->index, msr->data,
msr->mask);
preempt_enable();
if (ret)
msr->data = old_msr_data;
}
break;
}
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit ipgre_fini(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_tap_ops);
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (gre_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, GREPROTO_CISCO) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre close: can't remove protocol\n");
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
int extdatalen = 0;
unsigned char *orig = buf;
unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
int using_ecc = 0;
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
int i;
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
using_ecc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
#endif
ret += 2;
if (ret >= limit)
return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate) {
int el;
if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
s2n(el, ret);
if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
goto done;
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
unsigned long size_str;
long lenmax;
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 for the servername type and extension length
* 2 for servernamelist length
* 1 for the hostname type
* 2 for hostname length
* + hostname length
*/
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
|| (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
return NULL;
/* extension type and length */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
/* length of servername list */
s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
/* hostname type, length and hostname */
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
s2n(size_str, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
ret += size_str;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
* Client Hello message */
int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
/*-
* check for enough space.
* 4 for the srp type type and extension length
* 1 for the srp user identity
* + srp user identity length
*/
if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
return NULL;
/* fill in the extension */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
(*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
ret += login_len;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (using_ecc) {
/*
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
*/
long lenmax;
const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char *etmp;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
return NULL;
if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
return NULL;
if (num_formats > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
/* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
ret += num_formats;
/*
* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
*/
pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
return NULL;
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
return NULL;
if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
return NULL;
if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
etmp = ret + 4;
/* Copy curve ID if supported */
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
*etmp++ = pcurves[0];
*etmp++ = pcurves[1];
}
}
curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
ret += curves_list_len;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
int ticklen;
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
return NULL;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
} else
ticklen = 0;
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
goto skip_ext;
/*
* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
* ticket
*/
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
s2n(ticklen, ret);
if (ticklen) {
memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
ret += ticklen;
}
}
skip_ext:
if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
size_t salglen;
const unsigned char *salg;
unsigned char *etmp;
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
etmp = ret;
/* Skip over lengths for now */
ret += 4;
salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
/* Fill in lengths */
s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
s2n(salglen, etmp);
ret += salglen;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
int i;
long extlen, idlen, itmp;
OCSP_RESPID *id;
idlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
if (itmp <= 0)
return NULL;
idlen += itmp + 2;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
if (extlen < 0)
return NULL;
} else
extlen = 0;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
return NULL;
s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
s2n(idlen, ret);
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
/* save position of id len */
unsigned char *q = ret;
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
/* skip over id len */
ret += 2;
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
/* write id len */
s2n(itmp, q);
}
s2n(extlen, ret);
if (extlen > 0)
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Add Heartbeat extension */
if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
s2n(1, ret);
/*-
* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
/*
* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#endif
/*
* finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
* this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
* (see longer comment below)
*/
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
int el;
/* Returns 0 on success!! */
if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
s2n(el, ret);
if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#endif
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
#endif
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
/*
* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
* code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
* appear last.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
if (hlen >= 4)
hlen -= 4;
else
hlen = 0;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
s2n(hlen, ret);
memset(ret, 0, hlen);
ret += hlen;
}
}
done:
if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
return orig;
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetNeedsBeginFrames(bool needs_begin_frames) {
needs_begin_frames_ = needs_begin_frames;
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssh_connshare_log(Ssh ssh, int event, const char *logtext,
const char *ds_err, const char *us_err)
{
if (event == SHARE_NONE) {
/* In this case, 'logtext' is an error message indicating a
* reason why connection sharing couldn't be set up _at all_.
* Failing that, ds_err and us_err indicate why we couldn't be
* a downstream and an upstream respectively. */
if (logtext) {
logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing: %s", logtext);
} else {
if (ds_err)
logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing"
" as downstream: %s", ds_err);
if (us_err)
logeventf(ssh, "Could not set up connection sharing"
" as upstream: %s", us_err);
}
} else if (event == SHARE_DOWNSTREAM) {
/* In this case, 'logtext' is a local endpoint address */
logeventf(ssh, "Using existing shared connection at %s", logtext);
/* Also we should mention this in the console window to avoid
* confusing users as to why this window doesn't behave the
* usual way. */
if ((flags & FLAG_VERBOSE) || (flags & FLAG_INTERACTIVE)) {
c_write_str(ssh,"Reusing a shared connection to this server.\r\n");
}
} else if (event == SHARE_UPSTREAM) {
/* In this case, 'logtext' is a local endpoint address too */
logeventf(ssh, "Sharing this connection at %s", logtext);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebURLRequest::PreviewsState RenderFrameImpl::GetPreviewsStateForFrame()
const {
PreviewsState disabled_state = previews_state_ & kDisabledPreviewsBits;
if (disabled_state) {
DCHECK(!(previews_state_ & ~kDisabledPreviewsBits)) << previews_state_;
return disabled_state;
}
return static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(previews_state_);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len)))
return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->dec, sctx->key, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long super_cache_count(struct shrinker *shrink,
struct shrink_control *sc)
{
struct super_block *sb;
long total_objects = 0;
sb = container_of(shrink, struct super_block, s_shrink);
if (!grab_super_passive(sb))
return 0;
if (sb->s_op && sb->s_op->nr_cached_objects)
total_objects = sb->s_op->nr_cached_objects(sb,
sc->nid);
total_objects += list_lru_count_node(&sb->s_dentry_lru,
sc->nid);
total_objects += list_lru_count_node(&sb->s_inode_lru,
sc->nid);
total_objects = vfs_pressure_ratio(total_objects);
drop_super(sb);
return total_objects;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMWindow::DOMWindow(Frame& frame)
: frame_(frame),
window_proxy_manager_(frame.GetWindowProxyManager()),
window_is_closing_(false) {}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::WebContents* web_contents() { return web_contents_; }
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 154,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCommand(
unsigned int command,
unsigned int arg_count,
const void* cmd_data) {
error::Error result = error::kNoError;
base::TimeTicks begin_time(base::TimeTicks::HighResNow());
if (log_commands()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "[" << GetLogPrefix() << "]" << "cmd: "
<< GetCommandName(command);
}
unsigned int command_index = command - kStartPoint - 1;
if (command_index < arraysize(g_command_info)) {
const CommandInfo& info = g_command_info[command_index];
unsigned int info_arg_count = static_cast<unsigned int>(info.arg_count);
if ((info.arg_flags == cmd::kFixed && arg_count == info_arg_count) ||
(info.arg_flags == cmd::kAtLeastN && arg_count >= info_arg_count)) {
uint32 immediate_data_size =
(arg_count - info_arg_count) * sizeof(CommandBufferEntry); // NOLINT
switch (command) {
#define GLES2_CMD_OP(name) \
case name::kCmdId: \
result = Handle ## name( \
immediate_data_size, \
*static_cast<const name*>(cmd_data)); \
break; \
GLES2_COMMAND_LIST(GLES2_CMD_OP)
#undef GLES2_CMD_OP
}
if (debug()) {
GLenum error;
while ((error = glGetError()) != GL_NO_ERROR) {
LOG(ERROR) << "[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] "
<< "GL ERROR: " << GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(error) << " : "
<< GetCommandName(command);
SetGLError(error, "DoCommand", "GL error from driver");
}
}
} else {
result = error::kInvalidArguments;
}
} else {
result = DoCommonCommand(command, arg_count, cmd_data);
}
if (result == error::kNoError && current_decoder_error_ != error::kNoError) {
result = current_decoder_error_;
current_decoder_error_ = error::kNoError;
}
total_processing_commands_time_ +=
base::TimeTicks::HighResNow() - begin_time;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight()
{
if (isTableCell() || (isInline() && !isReplaced()))
return;
Length h;
if (isPositioned()) {
computePositionedLogicalHeight();
} else {
RenderBlock* cb = containingBlock();
bool hasPerpendicularContainingBlock = cb->isHorizontalWritingMode() != isHorizontalWritingMode();
if (!hasPerpendicularContainingBlock)
computeBlockDirectionMargins(cb);
if (isTable()) {
if (hasPerpendicularContainingBlock)
computeInlineDirectionMargins(cb, containingBlockLogicalWidthForContent(), logicalHeight());
return;
}
bool inHorizontalBox = parent()->isDeprecatedFlexibleBox() && parent()->style()->boxOrient() == HORIZONTAL;
bool stretching = parent()->style()->boxAlign() == BSTRETCH;
bool treatAsReplaced = shouldComputeSizeAsReplaced() && (!inHorizontalBox || !stretching);
bool checkMinMaxHeight = false;
if (hasOverrideSize() && parent()->isDeprecatedFlexibleBox() && parent()->style()->boxOrient() == VERTICAL
&& parent()->isFlexingChildren())
h = Length(overrideHeight() - borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight(), Fixed);
else if (treatAsReplaced)
h = Length(computeReplacedLogicalHeight(), Fixed);
else {
h = style()->logicalHeight();
checkMinMaxHeight = true;
}
if (h.isAuto() && parent()->isDeprecatedFlexibleBox() && parent()->style()->boxOrient() == HORIZONTAL
&& parent()->isStretchingChildren()) {
h = Length(parentBox()->contentLogicalHeight() - marginBefore() - marginAfter() - borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight(), Fixed);
checkMinMaxHeight = false;
}
LayoutUnit heightResult;
if (checkMinMaxHeight) {
heightResult = computeLogicalHeightUsing(style()->logicalHeight());
if (heightResult == -1)
heightResult = logicalHeight();
LayoutUnit minH = computeLogicalHeightUsing(style()->logicalMinHeight()); // Leave as -1 if unset.
LayoutUnit maxH = style()->logicalMaxHeight().isUndefined() ? heightResult : computeLogicalHeightUsing(style()->logicalMaxHeight());
if (maxH == -1)
maxH = heightResult;
heightResult = min(maxH, heightResult);
heightResult = max(minH, heightResult);
} else {
heightResult = h.value() + borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
}
setLogicalHeight(heightResult);
if (hasPerpendicularContainingBlock)
computeInlineDirectionMargins(cb, containingBlockLogicalWidthForContent(), heightResult);
}
bool paginatedContentNeedsBaseHeight = document()->printing() && h.isPercent()
&& (isRoot() || (isBody() && document()->documentElement()->renderer()->style()->logicalHeight().isPercent()));
if (stretchesToViewport() || paginatedContentNeedsBaseHeight) {
LayoutUnit margins = collapsedMarginBefore() + collapsedMarginAfter();
LayoutUnit visHeight;
if (document()->printing())
visHeight = static_cast<LayoutUnit>(view()->pageLogicalHeight());
else {
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
visHeight = view()->viewHeight();
else
visHeight = view()->viewWidth();
}
if (isRoot())
setLogicalHeight(max(logicalHeight(), visHeight - margins));
else {
LayoutUnit marginsBordersPadding = margins + parentBox()->marginBefore() + parentBox()->marginAfter() + parentBox()->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
setLogicalHeight(max(logicalHeight(), visHeight - marginsBordersPadding));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_ring_free_descr_num(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
{
trace_e1000e_ring_free_space(r->idx, core->mac[r->dlen],
core->mac[r->dh], core->mac[r->dt]);
if (core->mac[r->dh] <= core->mac[r->dt]) {
return core->mac[r->dt] - core->mac[r->dh];
}
if (core->mac[r->dh] > core->mac[r->dt]) {
return core->mac[r->dlen] / E1000_RING_DESC_LEN +
core->mac[r->dt] - core->mac[r->dh];
}
g_assert_not_reached();
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Stream_ReleaseFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Byte** pbytes )
{
if ( stream && stream->read )
{
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
ft_mem_free( memory, *pbytes );
*pbytes = NULL;
#else
FT_FREE( *pbytes );
#endif
}
*pbytes = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenQueriesEXTHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (query_manager_->IsValidQuery(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
query_manager_->GenQueries(n, client_ids);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECL_PIOCTL(PGetWSCell)
{
struct cell *tcell = NULL;
AFS_STATCNT(PGetWSCell);
if (!afs_resourceinit_flag) /* afs daemons haven't started yet */
return EIO; /* Inappropriate ioctl for device */
tcell = afs_GetPrimaryCell(READ_LOCK);
if (!tcell) /* no primary cell? */
return ESRCH;
if (afs_pd_putString(aout, tcell->cellName) != 0)
return EINVAL;
afs_PutCell(tcell, READ_LOCK);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
int error;
if (ops->id) {
error = ida_alloc_min(&net_generic_ids, MIN_PERNET_OPS_ID,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (error < 0)
return error;
*ops->id = error;
max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1);
}
error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops);
if (error) {
rcu_barrier();
if (ops->id)
ida_free(&net_generic_ids, *ops->id);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 91,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
{
memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct blkcg_gq *blkg_lookup_slowpath(struct blkcg *blkcg,
struct request_queue *q, bool update_hint)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg;
/*
* Hint didn't match. Look up from the radix tree. Note that the
* hint can only be updated under queue_lock as otherwise @blkg
* could have already been removed from blkg_tree. The caller is
* responsible for grabbing queue_lock if @update_hint.
*/
blkg = radix_tree_lookup(&blkcg->blkg_tree, q->id);
if (blkg && blkg->q == q) {
if (update_hint) {
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
rcu_assign_pointer(blkcg->blkg_hint, blkg);
}
return blkg;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void encode_commit(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_writeargs *args, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 16);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_COMMIT);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, args->offset);
*p = cpu_to_be32(args->count);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_commit_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionService::IsBeingUpgraded(const Extension* extension) {
return extension_runtime_data_[extension->id()].being_upgraded;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vhost_net_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *f)
{
struct vhost_net *n = f->private_data;
struct socket *tx_sock;
struct socket *rx_sock;
vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock);
vhost_net_flush(n);
vhost_dev_stop(&n->dev);
vhost_dev_cleanup(&n->dev, false);
vhost_net_vq_reset(n);
if (tx_sock)
fput(tx_sock->file);
if (rx_sock)
fput(rx_sock->file);
/* Make sure no callbacks are outstanding */
synchronize_rcu_bh();
/* We do an extra flush before freeing memory,
* since jobs can re-queue themselves. */
vhost_net_flush(n);
kfree(n->dev.vqs);
kfree(n);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ablk_cbc_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
return ablk_init_common(tfm, "__driver-cbc-aes-aesni");
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::CancelPendingJavaScriptUrl() {
if (javascript_url_task_handle_.IsActive())
javascript_url_task_handle_.Cancel();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct rpc_task *_nfs41_proc_sequence(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_sequence_data *calldata;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SEQUENCE],
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = clp->cl_rpcclient,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs41_sequence_ops,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC | RPC_TASK_SOFT,
};
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&clp->cl_count))
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
calldata = kzalloc(sizeof(*calldata), GFP_NOFS);
if (calldata == NULL) {
nfs_put_client(clp);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
nfs41_init_sequence(&calldata->args, &calldata->res, 0);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->args;
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res;
calldata->clp = clp;
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
return rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compute_keygrip (gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_sexp_t keyparam)
{
gcry_sexp_t l1;
const char *data;
size_t datalen;
l1 = sexp_find_token (keyparam, "n", 1);
if (!l1)
return GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ;
data = sexp_nth_data (l1, 1, &datalen);
if (!data)
{
sexp_release (l1);
return GPG_ERR_NO_OBJ;
}
_gcry_md_write (md, data, datalen);
sexp_release (l1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 17,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void oprintf(struct out *op, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char buf[256];
int d, l;
va_start(ap, fmt);
l = vsprintf(buf, fmt, ap);
while((d = op->ptr - op->buf) + l >= op->len-1)
{
op->buf = (char *) realloc(op->buf, op->len += 100);
op->ptr = op->buf + d;
}
for(d = 0 ; d < l ; d++)
*op->ptr++ = buf[d];
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlThrDefSetStructuredErrorFunc(void *ctx, xmlStructuredErrorFunc handler) {
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
xmlStructuredErrorContextThrDef = ctx;
xmlStructuredErrorThrDef = handler;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 107,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hmac_sha256_init(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
ctx->config.data_format = HASH_DATA_8_BITS;
ctx->config.algorithm = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
ctx->config.oper_mode = HASH_OPER_MODE_HMAC;
ctx->digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
return hash_init(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum test_return test_binary_pipeline_hickup(void)
{
size_t buffersize = 65 * 1024;
void *buffer = malloc(buffersize);
int ii;
pthread_t tid;
int ret;
allow_closed_read = true;
hickup_thread_running = true;
if ((ret = pthread_create(&tid, NULL,
binary_hickup_recv_verification_thread, NULL)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Can't create thread: %s\n", strerror(ret));
return TEST_FAIL;
}
/* Allow the thread to start */
usleep(250);
srand((int)time(NULL));
for (ii = 0; ii < 2; ++ii) {
test_binary_pipeline_hickup_chunk(buffer, buffersize);
}
/* send quitq to shut down the read thread ;-) */
size_t len = raw_command(buffer, buffersize, PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_QUITQ,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
safe_send(buffer, len, false);
pthread_join(tid, NULL);
free(buffer);
return TEST_PASS;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 94,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PassRefPtr<SharedBuffer> serializePageToMHTML(Page* page, MHTMLArchive::EncodingPolicy encodingPolicy)
{
Vector<SerializedResource> resources;
PageSerializer serializer(&resources);
serializer.serialize(page);
Document* document = page->mainFrame()->document();
return MHTMLArchive::generateMHTMLData(resources, encodingPolicy, document->title(), document->suggestedMIMEType());
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,867
|
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