instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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int64 0
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int64 0
175k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanDeleteFileSystemFile(
int child_id,
const storage::FileSystemURL& filesystem_url) {
return HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(child_id, filesystem_url,
DELETE_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, simple_command)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn, enum php_mysqlnd_server_command command,
const zend_uchar * const arg, size_t arg_len, enum mysqlnd_packet_type ok_packet, zend_bool silent,
zend_bool ignore_upsert_status TSRMLS_DC)
{
enum_func_status ret = PASS;
MYSQLND_PACKET_COMMAND * cmd_packet;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::simple_command");
DBG_INF_FMT("command=%s ok_packet=%u silent=%u", mysqlnd_command_to_text[command], ok_packet, silent);
DBG_INF_FMT("conn->server_status=%u", conn->upsert_status->server_status);
switch (CONN_GET_STATE(conn)) {
case CONN_READY:
break;
case CONN_QUIT_SENT:
SET_CLIENT_ERROR(*conn->error_info, CR_SERVER_GONE_ERROR, UNKNOWN_SQLSTATE, mysqlnd_server_gone);
DBG_ERR("Server is gone");
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
default:
SET_CLIENT_ERROR(*conn->error_info, CR_COMMANDS_OUT_OF_SYNC, UNKNOWN_SQLSTATE, mysqlnd_out_of_sync);
DBG_ERR_FMT("Command out of sync. State=%u", CONN_GET_STATE(conn));
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
SET_ERROR_AFF_ROWS(conn);
SET_EMPTY_ERROR(*conn->error_info);
cmd_packet = conn->protocol->m.get_command_packet(conn->protocol, FALSE TSRMLS_CC);
if (!cmd_packet) {
SET_OOM_ERROR(*conn->error_info);
DBG_RETURN(FAIL);
}
cmd_packet->command = command;
if (arg && arg_len) {
cmd_packet->argument = arg;
cmd_packet->arg_len = arg_len;
}
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC(conn->stats, STAT_COM_QUIT + command - 1 /* because of COM_SLEEP */ );
if (! PACKET_WRITE(cmd_packet, conn)) {
if (!silent) {
DBG_ERR_FMT("Error while sending %s packet", mysqlnd_command_to_text[command]);
php_error(E_WARNING, "Error while sending %s packet. PID=%d", mysqlnd_command_to_text[command], getpid());
}
CONN_SET_STATE(conn, CONN_QUIT_SENT);
DBG_ERR("Server is gone");
ret = FAIL;
} else if (ok_packet != PROT_LAST) {
ret = conn->m->simple_command_handle_response(conn, ok_packet, silent, command, ignore_upsert_status TSRMLS_CC);
}
PACKET_FREE(cmd_packet);
DBG_INF(ret == PASS ? "PASS":"FAIL");
DBG_RETURN(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::DeprecateAsSameValueOverloadedMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_DeprecateAsSameValueOverloadedMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::DeprecateAsSameValueOverloadedMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local void in_init(void)
{
g.in_left = 0;
g.in_eof = 0;
g.in_short = 0;
g.in_tot = 0;
#ifndef NOTHREAD
g.in_which = -1;
#endif
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 44,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLACParser::FLACParser(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource,
const sp<MetaData> &fileMetadata,
const sp<MetaData> &trackMetadata)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mFileMetadata(fileMetadata),
mTrackMetadata(trackMetadata),
mInitCheck(false),
mMaxBufferSize(0),
mGroup(NULL),
mCopy(copyTrespass),
mDecoder(NULL),
mCurrentPos(0LL),
mEOF(false),
mStreamInfoValid(false),
mWriteRequested(false),
mWriteCompleted(false),
mWriteBuffer(NULL),
mErrorStatus((FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus) -1)
{
ALOGV("FLACParser::FLACParser");
memset(&mStreamInfo, 0, sizeof(mStreamInfo));
memset(&mWriteHeader, 0, sizeof(mWriteHeader));
mInitCheck = init();
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestLoadMetadataFromCache() {
file_system_->LoadRootFeedFromCache(
false, // load_from_server
FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("drive")),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystemTest::OnExpectToFindEntry,
FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("drive"))));
BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->FlushForTesting();
message_loop_.RunAllPending();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(char *) cJSON_Print(const cJSON *item)
{
return (char*)print(item, true, &global_hooks);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_lvs_syncd_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) Specifying lvs_sync_daemon_interface against a vrrp is deprecated.", vrrp->iname); /* Deprecated after v1.2.19 */
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, " %*sPlease use global lvs_sync_daemon", (int)strlen(vrrp->iname) - 2, "");
if (global_data->lvs_syncd.ifname) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) lvs_sync_daemon_interface has already been specified as %s - ignoring", vrrp->iname, global_data->lvs_syncd.ifname);
return;
}
global_data->lvs_syncd.ifname = set_value(strvec);
global_data->lvs_syncd.vrrp = vrrp;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<IMediaCodecList> MediaPlayerService::getCodecList() const {
return MediaCodecList::getLocalInstance();
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Set_Charmap( FT_Face face,
FT_CharMap charmap )
{
FT_CharMap* cur;
FT_CharMap* limit;
if ( !face )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Face_Handle;
cur = face->charmaps;
if ( !cur )
return FT_Err_Invalid_CharMap_Handle;
if ( FT_Get_CMap_Format( charmap ) == 14 )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
limit = cur + face->num_charmaps;
for ( ; cur < limit; cur++ )
{
if ( cur[0] == charmap )
{
face->charmap = cur[0];
return 0;
}
}
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pl022_reset(PL022State *s)
{
s->rx_fifo_len = 0;
s->tx_fifo_len = 0;
s->im = 0;
s->is = PL022_INT_TX;
s->sr = PL022_SR_TFE | PL022_SR_TNF;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool parse_notify(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *job_id, *prev_hash, *coinbase1, *coinbase2, *bbversion, *nbit,
*ntime, *header;
size_t cb1_len, cb2_len, alloc_len;
unsigned char *cb1, *cb2;
bool clean, ret = false;
int merkles, i;
json_t *arr;
arr = json_array_get(val, 4);
if (!arr || !json_is_array(arr))
goto out;
merkles = json_array_size(arr);
job_id = json_array_string(val, 0);
prev_hash = json_array_string(val, 1);
coinbase1 = json_array_string(val, 2);
coinbase2 = json_array_string(val, 3);
bbversion = json_array_string(val, 5);
nbit = json_array_string(val, 6);
ntime = json_array_string(val, 7);
clean = json_is_true(json_array_get(val, 8));
if (!job_id || !prev_hash || !coinbase1 || !coinbase2 || !bbversion || !nbit || !ntime) {
/* Annoying but we must not leak memory */
if (job_id)
free(job_id);
if (prev_hash)
free(prev_hash);
if (coinbase1)
free(coinbase1);
if (coinbase2)
free(coinbase2);
if (bbversion)
free(bbversion);
if (nbit)
free(nbit);
if (ntime)
free(ntime);
goto out;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
free(pool->swork.job_id);
free(pool->swork.prev_hash);
free(pool->swork.bbversion);
free(pool->swork.nbit);
free(pool->swork.ntime);
pool->swork.job_id = job_id;
pool->swork.prev_hash = prev_hash;
cb1_len = strlen(coinbase1) / 2;
cb2_len = strlen(coinbase2) / 2;
pool->swork.bbversion = bbversion;
pool->swork.nbit = nbit;
pool->swork.ntime = ntime;
pool->swork.clean = clean;
alloc_len = pool->swork.cb_len = cb1_len + pool->n1_len + pool->n2size + cb2_len;
pool->nonce2_offset = cb1_len + pool->n1_len;
for (i = 0; i < pool->swork.merkles; i++)
free(pool->swork.merkle_bin[i]);
if (merkles) {
pool->swork.merkle_bin = (unsigned char **)realloc(pool->swork.merkle_bin,
sizeof(char *) * merkles + 1);
for (i = 0; i < merkles; i++) {
char *merkle = json_array_string(arr, i);
pool->swork.merkle_bin[i] = (unsigned char *)malloc(32);
if (unlikely(!pool->swork.merkle_bin[i]))
quit(1, "Failed to malloc pool swork merkle_bin");
hex2bin(pool->swork.merkle_bin[i], merkle, 32);
free(merkle);
}
}
pool->swork.merkles = merkles;
if (clean)
pool->nonce2 = 0;
pool->merkle_offset = strlen(pool->swork.bbversion) +
strlen(pool->swork.prev_hash);
pool->swork.header_len = pool->merkle_offset +
/* merkle_hash */ 32 +
strlen(pool->swork.ntime) +
strlen(pool->swork.nbit) +
/* nonce */ 8 +
/* workpadding */ 96;
pool->merkle_offset /= 2;
pool->swork.header_len = pool->swork.header_len * 2 + 1;
align_len(&pool->swork.header_len);
header = (char *)alloca(pool->swork.header_len);
snprintf(header, pool->swork.header_len,
"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
pool->swork.bbversion,
pool->swork.prev_hash,
blank_merkel,
pool->swork.ntime,
pool->swork.nbit,
"00000000", /* nonce */
workpadding);
if (unlikely(!hex2bin(pool->header_bin, header, 128)))
quit(1, "Failed to convert header to header_bin in parse_notify");
cb1 = (unsigned char *)calloc(cb1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!cb1))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc cb1 in parse_notify");
hex2bin(cb1, coinbase1, cb1_len);
cb2 = (unsigned char *)calloc(cb2_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!cb2))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc cb2 in parse_notify");
hex2bin(cb2, coinbase2, cb2_len);
free(pool->coinbase);
align_len(&alloc_len);
pool->coinbase = (unsigned char *)calloc(alloc_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->coinbase))
quit(1, "Failed to calloc pool coinbase in parse_notify");
memcpy(pool->coinbase, cb1, cb1_len);
memcpy(pool->coinbase + cb1_len, pool->nonce1bin, pool->n1_len);
memcpy(pool->coinbase + cb1_len + pool->n1_len + pool->n2size, cb2, cb2_len);
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
if (opt_protocol) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "job_id: %s", job_id);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "prev_hash: %s", prev_hash);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "coinbase1: %s", coinbase1);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "coinbase2: %s", coinbase2);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "bbversion: %s", bbversion);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "nbit: %s", nbit);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "ntime: %s", ntime);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "clean: %s", clean ? "yes" : "no");
}
free(coinbase1);
free(coinbase2);
free(cb1);
free(cb2);
/* A notify message is the closest stratum gets to a getwork */
pool->getwork_requested++;
total_getworks++;
ret = true;
if (pool == current_pool())
opt_work_update = true;
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 166,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserPluginGuest::~BrowserPluginGuest() {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nodeNameAttributeSetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Value = info[0];
TestInterfaceNodeV8Internal::nodeNameAttributeSetter(v8Value, info);
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 119,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void destroy_raw_packet_qp(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev,
struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp)
{
struct mlx5_ib_raw_packet_qp *raw_packet_qp = &qp->raw_packet_qp;
struct mlx5_ib_sq *sq = &raw_packet_qp->sq;
struct mlx5_ib_rq *rq = &raw_packet_qp->rq;
if (qp->rq.wqe_cnt) {
destroy_raw_packet_qp_tir(dev, rq);
destroy_raw_packet_qp_rq(dev, rq);
}
if (qp->sq.wqe_cnt) {
destroy_raw_packet_qp_sq(dev, sq);
destroy_raw_packet_qp_tis(dev, sq);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_port_set_lldp(struct ofproto *ofproto,
ofp_port_t ofp_port,
const struct smap *cfg)
{
struct ofport *ofport;
int error;
ofport = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (!ofport) {
VLOG_WARN("%s: cannot configure LLDP on nonexistent port %"PRIu32,
ofproto->name, ofp_port);
return;
}
error = (ofproto->ofproto_class->set_lldp
? ofproto->ofproto_class->set_lldp(ofport, cfg)
: EOPNOTSUPP);
if (error) {
VLOG_WARN("%s: lldp configuration on port %"PRIu32" (%s) failed (%s)",
ofproto->name, ofp_port, netdev_get_name(ofport->netdev),
ovs_strerror(error));
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RunLoop::IsRunningOnCurrentThread() {
Delegate* delegate = tls_delegate.Get().Get();
return delegate && !delegate->active_run_loops_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::DefaultBlur() {
TextControlElement::blur();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_rx_descr_threshold_hit(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *rxi)
{
return e1000e_ring_free_descr_num(core, rxi) ==
e1000e_ring_len(core, rxi) >> core->rxbuf_min_shift;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold int init_studio_vlcs(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx)
{
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
ret = init_vlc(&ctx->studio_intra_tab[i], STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 22,
&ff_mpeg4_studio_intra[i][0][1], 4, 2,
&ff_mpeg4_studio_intra[i][0][0], 4, 2,
0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
ret = init_vlc(&ctx->studio_luma_dc, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 19,
&ff_mpeg4_studio_dc_luma[0][1], 4, 2,
&ff_mpeg4_studio_dc_luma[0][0], 4, 2,
0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = init_vlc(&ctx->studio_chroma_dc, STUDIO_INTRA_BITS, 19,
&ff_mpeg4_studio_dc_chroma[0][1], 4, 2,
&ff_mpeg4_studio_dc_chroma[0][0], 4, 2,
0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 74,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: wiki_get_pages(int *n_pages, char *expr)
{
WikiPageList **pages;
struct dirent **namelist;
int n, i = 0;
struct stat st;
n = scandir(".", &namelist, 0, (void *)changes_compar);
pages = malloc(sizeof(WikiPageList*)*n);
while(n--)
{
if ((namelist[n]->d_name)[0] == '.'
|| !strcmp(namelist[n]->d_name, "styles.css"))
goto cleanup;
if (expr != NULL)
{ /* Super Simple Search */
char *data = NULL;
if ((data = file_read(namelist[n]->d_name)) != NULL)
if (strstr(data, expr) == NULL)
if (strcmp(namelist[n]->d_name, expr) != 0)
goto cleanup;
}
stat(namelist[n]->d_name, &st);
/* ignore anything but regular readable files */
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && access(namelist[n]->d_name, R_OK) == 0)
{
pages[i] = malloc(sizeof(WikiPageList));
pages[i]->name = strdup (namelist[n]->d_name);
pages[i]->mtime = st.st_mtime;
i++;
}
cleanup:
free(namelist[n]);
}
*n_pages = i;
free(namelist);
if (i==0) return NULL;
return pages;
}
Commit Message: page_name_is_good function
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 58,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_node(struct xkb_compose_table *table, xkb_keysym_t keysym)
{
struct compose_node new = {
.keysym = keysym,
.next = 0,
.is_leaf = true,
};
darray_append(table->nodes, new);
return darray_size(table->nodes) - 1;
}
Commit Message: compose: fix infinite loop in parser on some inputs
The parser would enter an infinite loop if an unterminated keysym
literal occurs at EOF.
Found with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <ran234@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 79,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::StartFileUploadOnUIThread(
const StartFileUploadParams& params,
GDataFileError* error,
int64* file_size,
std::string* content_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(error);
DCHECK(file_size);
DCHECK(content_type);
if (*error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!params.callback.is_null())
params.callback.Run(*error);
return;
}
directory_service_->GetEntryInfoByPath(
params.remote_file_path.DirName(),
base::Bind(
&GDataFileSystem::StartFileUploadOnUIThreadAfterGetEntryInfo,
ui_weak_ptr_,
params,
*file_size,
*content_type));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindowHostWin::UnConfineCursor() {
ClipCursor(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_ODD( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = ( ( exc->func_round( exc, args[0], 0 ) & 127 ) == 64 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetTrieParamsForTesting(
const HuffmanTrieParams& trie_params) {
g_trie_params = trie_params;
}
Commit Message: Block modifier-letter-voicing character from domain names
This character (ˬ) is easy to miss between other characters. It's one of the three characters from Spacing-Modifier-Letters block that ICU lists in its recommended set in uspoof.cpp. Two of these characters (modifier-letter-turned-comma and modifier-letter-apostrophe) are already blocked in crbug/678812.
Bug: 896717
Change-Id: I24b2b591de8cc7822cd55aa005b15676be91175e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303037
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604128}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttr", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttr(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wheelEventHandlerCountChanged(Document* document)
{
Page* page = document->page();
if (!page)
return;
ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = page->scrollingCoordinator();
if (!scrollingCoordinator)
return;
FrameView* frameView = document->view();
if (!frameView)
return;
scrollingCoordinator->frameViewWheelEventHandlerCountChanged(frameView);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_read_guest_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
void *data, unsigned long len)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
int r;
if (slots->generation != ghc->generation)
kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(kvm, ghc, ghc->gpa);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva))
return -EFAULT;
r = __copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)ghc->hva, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void Splash::drawSpan(SplashPipe *pipe, int x0, int x1, int y,
GBool noClip) {
int x;
pipeSetXY(pipe, x0, y);
if (noClip) {
for (x = x0; x <= x1; ++x) {
pipeRun(pipe);
}
updateModX(x0);
updateModX(x1);
updateModY(y);
} else {
for (x = x0; x <= x1; ++x) {
if (state->clip->test(x, y)) {
pipeRun(pipe);
updateModX(x);
updateModY(y);
} else {
pipeIncX(pipe);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tsize_t t2p_readwrite_pdf_image(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
unsigned char* buffer=NULL;
unsigned char* samplebuffer=NULL;
tsize_t bufferoffset=0;
tsize_t samplebufferoffset=0;
tsize_t read=0;
tstrip_t i=0;
tstrip_t j=0;
tstrip_t stripcount=0;
tsize_t stripsize=0;
tsize_t sepstripcount=0;
tsize_t sepstripsize=0;
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
toff_t inputoffset=0;
uint16 h_samp=1;
uint16 v_samp=1;
uint16 ri=1;
uint32 rows=0;
#endif /* ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
unsigned char* jpt;
float* xfloatp;
uint64* sbc;
unsigned char* stripbuffer;
tsize_t striplength=0;
uint32 max_striplength=0;
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
/* Fail if prior error (in particular, can't trust tiff_datasize) */
if (t2p->t2p_error != T2P_ERR_OK)
return(0);
if(t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4){
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (buffer == NULL) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for "
"t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFReadRawStrip(input, 0, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
/*
* make sure is lsb-to-msb
* bit-endianness fill order
*/
TIFFReverseBits(buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif /* ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT */
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if (t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP) {
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer == NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
TIFFReadRawStrip(input, 0, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB) {
TIFFReverseBits(buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT */
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG) {
if(t2p->tiff_dataoffset != 0) {
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer == NULL) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength==0){
inputoffset=t2pSeekFile(input, 0,
SEEK_CUR);
t2pSeekFile(input,
t2p->tiff_dataoffset,
SEEK_SET);
t2pReadFile(input, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
t2pSeekFile(input, inputoffset,
SEEK_SET);
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
} else {
inputoffset=t2pSeekFile(input, 0,
SEEK_CUR);
t2pSeekFile(input,
t2p->tiff_dataoffset,
SEEK_SET);
bufferoffset = t2pReadFile(input,
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength);
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength = 0;
t2pSeekFile(input, inputoffset,
SEEK_SET);
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&h_samp, &v_samp);
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0xdd;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0x00;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0x04;
h_samp*=8;
v_samp*=8;
ri=(t2p->tiff_width+h_samp-1) / h_samp;
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
&rows);
ri*=(rows+v_samp-1)/v_samp;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= (ri>>8) & 0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= ri & 0xff;
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(i != 0 ){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=(0xd0 | ((i-1)%8));
}
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
} else {
if(! t2p->pdf_ojpegdata){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with bad tables",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, t2p->pdf_ojpegdata, t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength);
bufferoffset=t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength;
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(i != 0){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=(0xd0 | ((i-1)%8));
}
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
}
if( ! ( (buffer[bufferoffset-1]==0xd9) && (buffer[bufferoffset-2]==0xff) ) ){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
#if 0
/*
This hunk of code removed code is clearly
mis-placed and we are not sure where it
should be (if anywhere)
*/
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with no JPEG File Interchange offset",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
#endif
}
}
#endif /* ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
uint32 count = 0;
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) {
if(count > 4) {
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count);
bufferoffset += count - 2;
}
}
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(sbc[i]>max_striplength) max_striplength=sbc[i];
}
stripbuffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(max_striplength);
if(stripbuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %u bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
max_striplength,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
striplength=TIFFReadRawStrip(input, i, (tdata_t) stripbuffer, -1);
if(!t2p_process_jpeg_strip(
stripbuffer,
&striplength,
buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize,
&bufferoffset,
i,
t2p->tiff_length)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't process JPEG data in input file %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
}
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(stripbuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample==T2P_SAMPLE_NOTHING){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
stripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
TIFFmin(stripsize, t2p->tiff_datasize - bufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset+=read;
}
} else {
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_PLANAR_SEPARATE_TO_CONTIG){
sepstripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
sepstripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
stripsize=sepstripsize*t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
stripcount=sepstripcount/t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
samplebuffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
}
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
samplebufferoffset=0;
for(j=0;j<t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;j++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i + j*stripcount,
(tdata_t) &(samplebuffer[samplebufferoffset]),
TIFFmin(sepstripsize, stripsize - samplebufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i + j*stripcount,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset+=read;
}
t2p_sample_planar_separate_to_contig(
t2p,
&(buffer[bufferoffset]),
samplebuffer,
samplebufferoffset);
bufferoffset+=samplebufferoffset;
}
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
goto dataready;
}
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
stripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
TIFFmin(stripsize, t2p->tiff_datasize - bufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset+=read;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_REALIZE_PALETTE){
samplebuffer=(unsigned char*)_TIFFrealloc(
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize * t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
} else {
buffer=samplebuffer;
t2p->tiff_datasize *= t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
}
t2p_sample_realize_palette(t2p, buffer);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgba_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBAA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgbaa_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_YCBCR_TO_RGB){
samplebuffer=(unsigned char*)_TIFFrealloc(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length*4);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
} else {
buffer=samplebuffer;
}
if(!TIFFReadRGBAImageOriented(
input,
t2p->tiff_width,
t2p->tiff_length,
(uint32*)buffer,
ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT,
0)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't use TIFFReadRGBAImageOriented to extract RGB image from %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_abgr_to_rgb(
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_LAB_SIGNED_TO_UNSIGNED){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_lab_signed_to_unsigned(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
}
dataready:
t2p_disable(output);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, t2p->tiff_photometric);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, t2p->tiff_bitspersample);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, t2p->tiff_width);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, t2p->tiff_length);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, t2p->tiff_length);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, FILLORDER_MSB2LSB);
switch(t2p->pdf_compression){
case T2P_COMPRESS_NONE:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_NONE);
break;
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_G4:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4);
break;
#endif /* ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG:
if(t2p->tiff_photometric==PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
uint16 hor = 0, ver = 0;
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, &hor, &ver) !=0 ) {
if(hor != 0 && ver != 0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, hor, ver);
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, &xfloatp)!=0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, xfloatp);
}
}
if(TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_JPEG)==0){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Unable to use JPEG compression for input %s and output %s",
TIFFFileName(input),
TIFFFileName(output));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE, 0);
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & (T2P_CS_RGB | T2P_CS_LAB)){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
if(t2p->tiff_photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_GRAY){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_CMYK){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality);
}
break;
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_DEFLATE);
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality%100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality % 100);
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality/100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,
(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality / 100));
}
break;
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT */
default:
break;
}
t2p_enable(output);
t2p->outputwritten = 0;
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG
&& t2p->tiff_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t)0,
buffer,
stripsize * stripcount);
} else
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
{
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t)0,
buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
if (buffer != NULL) {
_TIFFfree(buffer);
buffer=NULL;
}
if (bufferoffset == (tsize_t)-1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error writing encoded strip to output PDF %s",
TIFFFileName(output));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
written = t2p->outputwritten;
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 71,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static tsize_t tiff_readproc(thandle_t clientdata, tdata_t data, tsize_t size)
{
tiff_handle *th = (tiff_handle *)clientdata;
gdIOCtx *ctx = th->ctx;
size = (ctx->getBuf)(ctx, data, size);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int svc_can_find(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "find";
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GetOrientationType() {
std::string type;
ExecuteScriptAndGetValue(shell()->web_contents()->GetMainFrame(),
"screen.orientation.type")->GetAsString(&type);
return type;
}
Commit Message: Tests for CL 647933003.
BUG=424453
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653283007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#302374}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaStreamImpl::MediaStreamImpl(
MediaStreamDispatcher* media_stream_dispatcher,
content::P2PSocketDispatcher* p2p_socket_dispatcher,
VideoCaptureImplManager* vc_manager,
MediaStreamDependencyFactory* dependency_factory)
: dependency_factory_(dependency_factory),
media_stream_dispatcher_(media_stream_dispatcher),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(p2p_socket_dispatcher),
network_manager_(NULL),
vc_manager_(vc_manager),
peer_connection_handler_(NULL),
message_loop_proxy_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()),
signaling_thread_(NULL),
worker_thread_(NULL),
chrome_worker_thread_("Chrome_libJingle_WorkerThread") {
}
Commit Message: Explicitly stopping thread in MediaStreamImpl dtor to avoid any racing issues.
This may solve the below bugs.
BUG=112408,111202
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9307058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: extract_tag_der_recursive(asn1_node node, const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, int *inner_len, unsigned flags)
{
asn1_node p;
int ris = ASN1_DER_ERROR;
if (type_field (node->type) == ASN1_ETYPE_CHOICE)
{
p = node->down;
while (p)
{
ris = _asn1_extract_tag_der (p, der, der_len, ret_len, inner_len, flags);
if (ris == ASN1_SUCCESS)
break;
p = p->right;
}
*ret_len = 0;
return ris;
}
else
return _asn1_extract_tag_der (node, der, der_len, ret_len, inner_len, flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexSubImage2DImmediate(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::TexSubImage2DImmediate& c) {
GLboolean internal = static_cast<GLboolean>(c.internal);
if (internal == GL_TRUE && tex_image_2d_failed_)
return error::kNoError;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint xoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.xoffset);
GLint yoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.yoffset);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32 data_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSize(
width, height, format, type, unpack_alignment_, &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const void* pixels = GetImmediateDataAs<const void*>(
c, data_size, immediate_data_size);
if (!validators_->texture_target.IsValid(target)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexSubImage2D: target GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexSubImage2D: width < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (height < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexSubImage2D: height < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->texture_format.IsValid(format)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexSubImage2D: format GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->pixel_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glTexSubImage2D: type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (pixels == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoTexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type, pixels);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationController::CreateNavigationEntriesFromTabNavigations(
const std::vector<TabNavigation>& navigations,
std::vector<linked_ptr<NavigationEntry> >* entries) {
int page_id = 0;
for (std::vector<TabNavigation>::const_iterator i =
navigations.begin(); i != navigations.end(); ++i, ++page_id) {
linked_ptr<NavigationEntry> entry(i->ToNavigationEntry(page_id, profile_));
entries->push_back(entry);
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 99,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned filter(unsigned char* out, const unsigned char* in, unsigned w, unsigned h,
const LodePNGColorMode* info, const LodePNGEncoderSettings* settings)
{
/*
For PNG filter method 0
out must be a buffer with as size: h + (w * h * bpp + 7) / 8, because there are
the scanlines with 1 extra byte per scanline
*/
unsigned bpp = lodepng_get_bpp(info);
/*the width of a scanline in bytes, not including the filter type*/
size_t linebytes = (w * bpp + 7) / 8;
/*bytewidth is used for filtering, is 1 when bpp < 8, number of bytes per pixel otherwise*/
size_t bytewidth = (bpp + 7) / 8;
const unsigned char* prevline = 0;
unsigned x, y;
unsigned error = 0;
LodePNGFilterStrategy strategy = settings->filter_strategy;
/*
There is a heuristic called the minimum sum of absolute differences heuristic, suggested by the PNG standard:
* If the image type is Palette, or the bit depth is smaller than 8, then do not filter the image (i.e.
use fixed filtering, with the filter None).
* (The other case) If the image type is Grayscale or RGB (with or without Alpha), and the bit depth is
not smaller than 8, then use adaptive filtering heuristic as follows: independently for each row, apply
all five filters and select the filter that produces the smallest sum of absolute values per row.
This heuristic is used if filter strategy is LFS_MINSUM and filter_palette_zero is true.
If filter_palette_zero is true and filter_strategy is not LFS_MINSUM, the above heuristic is followed,
but for "the other case", whatever strategy filter_strategy is set to instead of the minimum sum
heuristic is used.
*/
if(settings->filter_palette_zero &&
(info->colortype == LCT_PALETTE || info->bitdepth < 8)) strategy = LFS_ZERO;
if(bpp == 0) return 31; /*error: invalid color type*/
if(strategy == LFS_ZERO)
{
for(y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
size_t outindex = (1 + linebytes) * y; /*the extra filterbyte added to each row*/
size_t inindex = linebytes * y;
out[outindex] = 0; /*filter type byte*/
filterScanline(&out[outindex + 1], &in[inindex], prevline, linebytes, bytewidth, 0);
prevline = &in[inindex];
}
}
else if(strategy == LFS_MINSUM)
{
/*adaptive filtering*/
size_t sum[5];
ucvector attempt[5]; /*five filtering attempts, one for each filter type*/
size_t smallest = 0;
unsigned char type, i, bestType = 0;
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++)
{
ucvector_init(&attempt[type]);
if(!ucvector_resize(&attempt[type], linebytes))
{
for(i=0; i<type; i++) ucvector_cleanup(&attempt[i]);
return 83; /*alloc fail*/
}
}
if(!error)
{
for(y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
/*try the 5 filter types*/
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++)
{
filterScanline(attempt[type].data, &in[y * linebytes], prevline, linebytes, bytewidth, type);
/*calculate the sum of the result*/
sum[type] = 0;
if(type == 0)
{
for(x = 0; x < linebytes; x++) sum[type] += (unsigned char)(attempt[type].data[x]);
}
else
{
for(x = 0; x < linebytes; x++)
{
/*For differences, each byte should be treated as signed, values above 127 are negative
(converted to signed char). Filtertype 0 isn't a difference though, so use unsigned there.
This means filtertype 0 is almost never chosen, but that is justified.*/
unsigned char s = attempt[type].data[x];
sum[type] += s < 128 ? s : (255U - s);
}
}
/*check if this is smallest sum (or if type == 0 it's the first case so always store the values)*/
if(type == 0 || sum[type] < smallest)
{
bestType = type;
smallest = sum[type];
}
}
prevline = &in[y * linebytes];
/*now fill the out values*/
out[y * (linebytes + 1)] = bestType; /*the first byte of a scanline will be the filter type*/
for(x = 0; x < linebytes; x++) out[y * (linebytes + 1) + 1 + x] = attempt[bestType].data[x];
}
}
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++) ucvector_cleanup(&attempt[type]);
}
else if(strategy == LFS_ENTROPY)
{
float sum[5];
ucvector attempt[5]; /*five filtering attempts, one for each filter type*/
float smallest = 0;
unsigned type, i, bestType = 0;
unsigned count[256];
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++)
{
ucvector_init(&attempt[type]);
if(!ucvector_resize(&attempt[type], linebytes))
{
for(i=0; i<type; i++) ucvector_cleanup(&attempt[i]);
return 83; /*alloc fail*/
}
}
for(y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
/*try the 5 filter types*/
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++)
{
filterScanline(attempt[type].data, &in[y * linebytes], prevline, linebytes, bytewidth, type);
for(x = 0; x < 256; x++) count[x] = 0;
for(x = 0; x < linebytes; x++) count[attempt[type].data[x]]++;
count[type]++; /*the filter type itself is part of the scanline*/
sum[type] = 0;
for(x = 0; x < 256; x++)
{
float p = count[x] / (float)(linebytes + 1);
sum[type] += count[x] == 0 ? 0 : flog2(1 / p) * p;
}
/*check if this is smallest sum (or if type == 0 it's the first case so always store the values)*/
if(type == 0 || sum[type] < smallest)
{
bestType = type;
smallest = sum[type];
}
}
prevline = &in[y * linebytes];
/*now fill the out values*/
out[y * (linebytes + 1)] = bestType; /*the first byte of a scanline will be the filter type*/
for(x = 0; x < linebytes; x++) out[y * (linebytes + 1) + 1 + x] = attempt[bestType].data[x];
}
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++) ucvector_cleanup(&attempt[type]);
}
else if(strategy == LFS_PREDEFINED)
{
for(y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
size_t outindex = (1 + linebytes) * y; /*the extra filterbyte added to each row*/
size_t inindex = linebytes * y;
unsigned char type = settings->predefined_filters[y];
out[outindex] = type; /*filter type byte*/
filterScanline(&out[outindex + 1], &in[inindex], prevline, linebytes, bytewidth, type);
prevline = &in[inindex];
}
}
else if(strategy == LFS_BRUTE_FORCE)
{
/*brute force filter chooser.
deflate the scanline after every filter attempt to see which one deflates best.
This is very slow and gives only slightly smaller, sometimes even larger, result*/
size_t size[5];
ucvector attempt[5]; /*five filtering attempts, one for each filter type*/
size_t smallest = 0;
unsigned type = 0, bestType = 0;
unsigned char* dummy;
LodePNGCompressSettings zlibsettings = settings->zlibsettings;
/*use fixed tree on the attempts so that the tree is not adapted to the filtertype on purpose,
to simulate the true case where the tree is the same for the whole image. Sometimes it gives
better result with dynamic tree anyway. Using the fixed tree sometimes gives worse, but in rare
cases better compression. It does make this a bit less slow, so it's worth doing this.*/
zlibsettings.btype = 1;
/*a custom encoder likely doesn't read the btype setting and is optimized for complete PNG
images only, so disable it*/
zlibsettings.custom_zlib = 0;
zlibsettings.custom_deflate = 0;
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++)
{
ucvector_init(&attempt[type]);
ucvector_resize(&attempt[type], linebytes); /*todo: give error if resize failed*/
}
for(y = 0; y < h; y++) /*try the 5 filter types*/
{
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++)
{
unsigned testsize = attempt[type].size;
/*if(testsize > 8) testsize /= 8;*/ /*it already works good enough by testing a part of the row*/
filterScanline(attempt[type].data, &in[y * linebytes], prevline, linebytes, bytewidth, type);
size[type] = 0;
dummy = 0;
zlib_compress(&dummy, &size[type], attempt[type].data, testsize, &zlibsettings);
free(dummy);
/*check if this is smallest size (or if type == 0 it's the first case so always store the values)*/
if(type == 0 || size[type] < smallest)
{
bestType = type;
smallest = size[type];
}
}
prevline = &in[y * linebytes];
out[y * (linebytes + 1)] = bestType; /*the first byte of a scanline will be the filter type*/
for(x = 0; x < linebytes; x++) out[y * (linebytes + 1) + 1 + x] = attempt[bestType].data[x];
}
for(type = 0; type < 5; type++) ucvector_cleanup(&attempt[type]);
}
else return 88; /* unknown filter strategy */
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads(VirtIONet *n)
{
qemu_set_offload(qemu_get_queue(n->nic)->peer,
!!(n->curr_guest_offloads & (1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM)),
!!(n->curr_guest_offloads & (1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4)),
!!(n->curr_guest_offloads & (1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6)),
!!(n->curr_guest_offloads & (1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN)),
!!(n->curr_guest_offloads & (1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO)));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(struct hstate *h, struct mm_struct *mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct address_space *mapping,
pgoff_t idx, unsigned long address)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xt_client_simulate_focus(Widget w, int type)
{
XEvent xevent;
memset(&xevent, 0, sizeof(xevent));
xevent.xfocus.type = type;
xevent.xfocus.window = XtWindow(w);
xevent.xfocus.display = XtDisplay(w);
xevent.xfocus.mode = NotifyNormal;
xevent.xfocus.detail = NotifyAncestor;
trap_errors();
XSendEvent(XtDisplay(w), xevent.xfocus.window, False, NoEventMask, &xevent);
XSync(XtDisplay(w), False);
untrap_errors();
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(ResourceMessageFilter* filter,
IPC::Message* sync_result,
int route_id,
int request_id) {
net::URLRequestStatus status(net::URLRequestStatus::FAILED,
net::ERR_ABORTED);
if (sync_result) {
SyncLoadResult result;
result.status = status;
ResourceHostMsg_SyncLoad::WriteReplyParams(sync_result, result);
filter->Send(sync_result);
} else {
filter->Send(new ResourceMsg_RequestComplete(
route_id,
request_id,
status,
std::string(), // No security info needed, connection not established.
base::TimeTicks()));
}
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct wireless_dev *brcmf_ap_add_vif(struct wiphy *wiphy, const char *name,
u32 *flags, struct vif_params *params)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(cfg_to_ndev(cfg));
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
int err;
if (brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event_armed(cfg))
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "Adding vif \"%s\"\n", name);
vif = brcmf_alloc_vif(cfg, NL80211_IFTYPE_AP);
if (IS_ERR(vif))
return (struct wireless_dev *)vif;
brcmf_cfg80211_arm_vif_event(cfg, vif);
err = brcmf_cfg80211_request_ap_if(ifp);
if (err) {
brcmf_cfg80211_arm_vif_event(cfg, NULL);
goto fail;
}
/* wait for firmware event */
err = brcmf_cfg80211_wait_vif_event(cfg, BRCMF_E_IF_ADD,
BRCMF_VIF_EVENT_TIMEOUT);
brcmf_cfg80211_arm_vif_event(cfg, NULL);
if (!err) {
brcmf_err("timeout occurred\n");
err = -EIO;
goto fail;
}
/* interface created in firmware */
ifp = vif->ifp;
if (!ifp) {
brcmf_err("no if pointer provided\n");
err = -ENOENT;
goto fail;
}
strncpy(ifp->ndev->name, name, sizeof(ifp->ndev->name) - 1);
err = brcmf_net_attach(ifp, true);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Registering netdevice failed\n");
goto fail;
}
return &ifp->vif->wdev;
fail:
brcmf_free_vif(vif);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 48,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand, mark as required later */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
*dst_reg = *src_reg;
dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
*dst_reg = *src_reg;
dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs,
insn->dst_reg);
}
coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
/* clear any state __mark_reg_known doesn't set */
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
insn->imm);
} else {
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg,
(u32)insn->imm);
}
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 91,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_do_dither(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row,
png_bytep palette_lookup, png_bytep dither_lookup)
{
png_bytep sp, dp;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width=row_info->width;
png_debug(1, "in png_do_dither");
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
if (row != NULL && row_info != NULL)
#endif
{
if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB &&
palette_lookup && row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
int r, g, b, p;
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
r = *sp++;
g = *sp++;
b = *sp++;
/* This looks real messy, but the compiler will reduce
* it down to a reasonable formula. For example, with
* 5 bits per color, we get:
* p = (((r >> 3) & 0x1f) << 10) |
* (((g >> 3) & 0x1f) << 5) |
* ((b >> 3) & 0x1f);
*/
p = (((r >> (8 - PNG_DITHER_RED_BITS)) &
((1 << PNG_DITHER_RED_BITS) - 1)) <<
(PNG_DITHER_GREEN_BITS + PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS)) |
(((g >> (8 - PNG_DITHER_GREEN_BITS)) &
((1 << PNG_DITHER_GREEN_BITS) - 1)) <<
(PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS)) |
((b >> (8 - PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS)) &
((1 << PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS) - 1));
*dp++ = palette_lookup[p];
}
row_info->color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
row_info->channels = 1;
row_info->pixel_depth = row_info->bit_depth;
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
else if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA &&
palette_lookup != NULL && row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
int r, g, b, p;
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
r = *sp++;
g = *sp++;
b = *sp++;
sp++;
p = (((r >> (8 - PNG_DITHER_RED_BITS)) &
((1 << PNG_DITHER_RED_BITS) - 1)) <<
(PNG_DITHER_GREEN_BITS + PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS)) |
(((g >> (8 - PNG_DITHER_GREEN_BITS)) &
((1 << PNG_DITHER_GREEN_BITS) - 1)) <<
(PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS)) |
((b >> (8 - PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS)) &
((1 << PNG_DITHER_BLUE_BITS) - 1));
*dp++ = palette_lookup[p];
}
row_info->color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
row_info->channels = 1;
row_info->pixel_depth = row_info->bit_depth;
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
else if (row_info->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE &&
dither_lookup && row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp++)
{
*sp = dither_lookup[*sp];
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE;
if (cr4 & CR4_RESERVED_BITS)
return 1;
if (!guest_cpuid_has_xsave(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
return 1;
if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE))
return 1;
} else if (is_paging(vcpu) && (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)
&& ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & pdptr_bits)
&& !load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, vcpu->arch.cr3))
return 1;
if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE)
return 1;
kvm_x86_ops->set_cr4(vcpu, cr4);
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & pdptr_bits)
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
update_cpuid(vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_apprentice(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn, int action)
{
char *p, *mfn;
int file_err, errs = -1;
size_t i;
if (ms->mlist[0] != NULL)
file_reset(ms);
if ((fn = magic_getpath(fn, action)) == NULL)
return -1;
init_file_tables();
if ((mfn = strdup(fn)) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, strlen(fn));
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
if ((ms->mlist[i] = mlist_alloc()) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*ms->mlist[i]));
if (i != 0) {
--i;
do
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
while (i != 0);
}
free(mfn);
return -1;
}
}
fn = mfn;
while (fn) {
p = strchr(fn, PATHSEP);
if (p)
*p++ = '\0';
if (*fn == '\0')
break;
file_err = apprentice_1(ms, fn, action);
errs = MAX(errs, file_err);
fn = p;
}
free(mfn);
if (errs == -1) {
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
}
file_error(ms, 0, "could not find any valid magic files!");
return -1;
}
#if 0
/*
* Always leave the database loaded
*/
if (action == FILE_LOAD)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
}
#endif
switch (action) {
case FILE_LOAD:
case FILE_COMPILE:
case FILE_CHECK:
case FILE_LIST:
return 0;
default:
file_error(ms, 0, "Invalid action %d", action);
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Huff_getBloc(void)
{
return bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_config_ap_mgmt_ie(struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif,
struct cfg80211_beacon_data *beacon)
{
s32 err;
/* Set Beacon IEs to FW */
err = brcmf_vif_set_mgmt_ie(vif, BRCMF_VNDR_IE_BEACON_FLAG,
beacon->tail, beacon->tail_len);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Set Beacon IE Failed\n");
return err;
}
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Applied Vndr IEs for Beacon\n");
/* Set Probe Response IEs to FW */
err = brcmf_vif_set_mgmt_ie(vif, BRCMF_VNDR_IE_PRBRSP_FLAG,
beacon->proberesp_ies,
beacon->proberesp_ies_len);
if (err)
brcmf_err("Set Probe Resp IE Failed\n");
else
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Applied Vndr IEs for Probe Resp\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpTest10 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p == NULL));
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t payload[4];
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
stream_config.async_oneside = TRUE;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = htonl(11);
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(6);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
FAIL_IF(StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1);
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED);
FAIL_IF(! (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC));
FAIL_IF(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->client.last_ack != 6 &&
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq != 11);
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
PASS;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __jbd2_journal_temp_unlink_buffer(struct journal_head *jh)
{
struct journal_head **list = NULL;
transaction_t *transaction;
struct buffer_head *bh = jh2bh(jh);
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, jbd_is_locked_bh_state(bh));
transaction = jh->b_transaction;
if (transaction)
assert_spin_locked(&transaction->t_journal->j_list_lock);
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, jh->b_jlist < BJ_Types);
if (jh->b_jlist != BJ_None)
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, transaction != NULL);
switch (jh->b_jlist) {
case BJ_None:
return;
case BJ_Metadata:
transaction->t_nr_buffers--;
J_ASSERT_JH(jh, transaction->t_nr_buffers >= 0);
list = &transaction->t_buffers;
break;
case BJ_Forget:
list = &transaction->t_forget;
break;
case BJ_IO:
list = &transaction->t_iobuf_list;
break;
case BJ_Shadow:
list = &transaction->t_shadow_list;
break;
case BJ_LogCtl:
list = &transaction->t_log_list;
break;
case BJ_Reserved:
list = &transaction->t_reserved_list;
break;
}
__blist_del_buffer(list, jh);
jh->b_jlist = BJ_None;
if (test_clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh))
mark_buffer_dirty(bh); /* Expose it to the VM */
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t getParameter(
node_id node, OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
void *params, size_t size) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(index);
data.writeInt64(size);
data.write(params, size);
remote()->transact(GET_PARAMETER, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
reply.read(params, size);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::overrideWidth() const
{
return hasOverrideSize() ? overrideSize().width() : width();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserPolicyConnector::CreateManagedPlatformProvider() {
const ConfigurationPolicyProvider::PolicyDefinitionList* policy_list =
ConfigurationPolicyPrefStore::GetChromePolicyDefinitionList();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return new ConfigurationPolicyProviderWin(policy_list);
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return new ConfigurationPolicyProviderMac(policy_list);
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
FilePath config_dir_path;
if (PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_POLICY_FILES, &config_dir_path)) {
return new ConfigDirPolicyProvider(
policy_list,
config_dir_path.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("managed")));
} else {
return new DummyConfigurationPolicyProvider(policy_list);
}
#else
return new DummyConfigurationPolicyProvider(policy_list);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_value(const char *s, const char *delimiters)
{
size_t n = 0;
/* Iterate until we reach a delimiter.
*
* strchr(s, '\0') returns s+strlen(s), so this test handles the null
* terminator at the end of 's'. */
while (!strchr(delimiters, s[n])) {
if (s[n] == '(') {
int level = 0;
do {
switch (s[n]) {
case '\0':
return n;
case '(':
level++;
break;
case ')':
level--;
break;
}
n++;
} while (level > 0);
} else {
n++;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnEnablePreferredSizeChangedMode() {
if (send_preferred_size_changes_)
return;
send_preferred_size_changes_ = true;
DidUpdateLayout();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: path_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *str = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
PATH *path;
int isopen;
char *s;
int npts;
int size;
int depth = 0;
if ((npts = pair_count(str, ',')) <= 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type path: \"%s\"", str)));
s = str;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *s))
s++;
/* skip single leading paren */
if ((*s == LDELIM) && (strrchr(s, LDELIM) == s))
{
s++;
depth++;
}
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +sizeof(path->p[0]) * npts;
path = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(path, size);
path->npts = npts;
if ((!path_decode(TRUE, npts, s, &isopen, &s, &(path->p[0])))
&& (!((depth == 0) && (*s == '\0'))) && !((depth >= 1) && (*s == RDELIM)))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type path: \"%s\"", str)));
path->closed = (!isopen);
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
path->dummy = 0;
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 166,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXNodeObject::AXNodeObject(Node* node, AXObjectCacheImpl& axObjectCache)
: AXObject(axObjectCache),
m_ariaRole(UnknownRole),
m_childrenDirty(false),
m_node(node) {
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int config__read_file_core(struct mosquitto__config *config, bool reload, struct config_recurse *cr, int level, int *lineno, FILE *fptr, char **buf, int *buflen)
{
int rc;
char *token;
int tmp_int;
char *saveptr = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
char *tmp_char;
struct mosquitto__bridge *cur_bridge = NULL;
struct mosquitto__bridge_topic *cur_topic;
#endif
struct mosquitto__auth_plugin_config *cur_auth_plugin_config = NULL;
time_t expiration_mult;
char *key;
char *conf_file;
#ifdef WIN32
HANDLE fh;
char dirpath[MAX_PATH];
WIN32_FIND_DATA find_data;
#else
DIR *dh;
struct dirent *de;
#endif
int len;
struct mosquitto__listener *cur_listener = &config->default_listener;
int i;
int lineno_ext;
struct mosquitto__security_options *cur_security_options = NULL;
*lineno = 0;
while(fgets_extending(buf, buflen, fptr)){
(*lineno)++;
if((*buf)[0] != '#' && (*buf)[0] != 10 && (*buf)[0] != 13){
while((*buf)[strlen((*buf))-1] == 10 || (*buf)[strlen((*buf))-1] == 13){
(*buf)[strlen((*buf))-1] = 0;
}
token = strtok_r((*buf), " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcmp(token, "acl_file")){
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
if(reload){
mosquitto__free(cur_security_options->acl_file);
cur_security_options->acl_file = NULL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "acl_file", &cur_security_options->acl_file, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "address") || !strcmp(token, "addresses")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge || cur_bridge->addresses){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
while((token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr))){
cur_bridge->address_count++;
cur_bridge->addresses = mosquitto__realloc(cur_bridge->addresses, sizeof(struct bridge_address)*cur_bridge->address_count);
if(!cur_bridge->addresses){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_bridge->addresses[cur_bridge->address_count-1].address = token;
}
for(i=0; i<cur_bridge->address_count; i++){
/* cur_bridge->addresses[i].address is now
* "address[:port]". If address is an IPv6 address,
* then port is required. We must check for the :
* backwards. */
tmp_char = strrchr(cur_bridge->addresses[i].address, ':');
if(tmp_char){
/* Remove ':', so cur_bridge->addresses[i].address
* now just looks like the address. */
tmp_char[0] = '\0';
/* The remainder of the string */
tmp_int = atoi(&tmp_char[1]);
if(tmp_int < 1 || tmp_int > 65535){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid port value (%d).", tmp_int);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
cur_bridge->addresses[i].port = tmp_int;
}else{
cur_bridge->addresses[i].port = 1883;
}
/* This looks a bit weird, but isn't. Before this
* call, cur_bridge->addresses[i].address points
* to the tokenised part of the line, it will be
* reused in a future parse of a config line so we
* must duplicate it. */
cur_bridge->addresses[i].address = mosquitto__strdup(cur_bridge->addresses[i].address);
conf__attempt_resolve(cur_bridge->addresses[i].address, "bridge address", MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning");
}
if(cur_bridge->address_count == 0){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty address value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "allow_anonymous")){
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "allow_anonymous", (bool *)&cur_security_options->allow_anonymous, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "allow_duplicate_messages")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "allow_duplicate_messages", &config->allow_duplicate_messages, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "allow_zero_length_clientid")){
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "allow_zero_length_clientid", &cur_security_options->allow_zero_length_clientid, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strncmp(token, "auth_opt_", 9)){
if(reload) continue; // Auth plugin not currently valid for reloading.
if(!cur_auth_plugin_config){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: An auth_opt_ option exists in the config file without an auth_plugin.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(strlen(token) < 12){
/* auth_opt_ == 9, + one digit key == 10, + one space == 11, + one value == 12 */
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid auth_opt_ config option.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
key = mosquitto__strdup(&token[9]);
if(!key){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}else if(STREMPTY(key)){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid auth_opt_ config option.");
mosquitto__free(key);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token += 9+strlen(key)+1;
while(token[0] == ' ' || token[0] == '\t'){
token++;
}
if(token[0]){
cur_auth_plugin_config->option_count++;
cur_auth_plugin_config->options = mosquitto__realloc(cur_auth_plugin_config->options, cur_auth_plugin_config->option_count*sizeof(struct mosquitto_auth_opt));
if(!cur_auth_plugin_config->options){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
mosquitto__free(key);
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_auth_plugin_config->options[cur_auth_plugin_config->option_count-1].key = key;
cur_auth_plugin_config->options[cur_auth_plugin_config->option_count-1].value = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!cur_auth_plugin_config->options[cur_auth_plugin_config->option_count-1].value){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty %s value in configuration.", key);
mosquitto__free(key);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "auth_plugin")){
if(reload) continue; // Auth plugin not currently valid for reloading.
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
cur_security_options->auth_plugin_configs = mosquitto__realloc(cur_security_options->auth_plugin_configs, (cur_security_options->auth_plugin_config_count+1)*sizeof(struct mosquitto__auth_plugin_config));
if(!cur_security_options->auth_plugin_configs){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_auth_plugin_config = &cur_security_options->auth_plugin_configs[cur_security_options->auth_plugin_config_count];
memset(cur_auth_plugin_config, 0, sizeof(struct mosquitto__auth_plugin_config));
cur_auth_plugin_config->path = NULL;
cur_auth_plugin_config->options = NULL;
cur_auth_plugin_config->option_count = 0;
cur_auth_plugin_config->deny_special_chars = true;
cur_security_options->auth_plugin_config_count++;
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "auth_plugin", &cur_auth_plugin_config->path, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "auth_plugin_deny_special_chars")){
if(reload) continue; // Auth plugin not currently valid for reloading.
if(!cur_auth_plugin_config){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: An auth_plugin_deny_special_chars option exists in the config file without an auth_plugin.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "auth_plugin_deny_special_chars", &cur_auth_plugin_config->deny_special_chars, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "auto_id_prefix")){
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "auto_id_prefix", &cur_security_options->auto_id_prefix, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_security_options->auto_id_prefix){
cur_security_options->auto_id_prefix_len = strlen(cur_security_options->auto_id_prefix);
}else{
cur_security_options->auto_id_prefix_len = 0;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "autosave_interval")){
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "autosave_interval", &config->autosave_interval, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(config->autosave_interval < 0) config->autosave_interval = 0;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "autosave_on_changes")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "autosave_on_changes", &config->autosave_on_changes, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bind_address")){
if(reload) continue; // Listener not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "default listener bind_address", &config->default_listener.host, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(conf__attempt_resolve(config->default_listener.host, "bind_address", MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error")){
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_attempt_unsubscribe")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "bridge_attempt_unsubscribe", &cur_bridge->attempt_unsubscribe, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_cafile")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#ifdef WITH_TLS_PSK
if(cur_bridge->tls_psk_identity || cur_bridge->tls_psk){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single bridge.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#endif
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_cafile", &cur_bridge->tls_cafile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_capath")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#ifdef WITH_TLS_PSK
if(cur_bridge->tls_psk_identity || cur_bridge->tls_psk){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single bridge.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#endif
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_capath", &cur_bridge->tls_capath, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_certfile")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#ifdef WITH_TLS_PSK
if(cur_bridge->tls_psk_identity || cur_bridge->tls_psk){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single bridge.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#endif
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_certfile", &cur_bridge->tls_certfile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_identity")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS_PSK)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(cur_bridge->tls_cafile || cur_bridge->tls_capath || cur_bridge->tls_certfile || cur_bridge->tls_keyfile){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and identity encryption in a single bridge.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_identity", &cur_bridge->tls_psk_identity, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS-PSK support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_insecure")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "bridge_insecure", &cur_bridge->tls_insecure, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_bridge->tls_insecure){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge %s using insecure mode.", cur_bridge->name);
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS-PSK support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_keyfile")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#ifdef WITH_TLS_PSK
if(cur_bridge->tls_psk_identity || cur_bridge->tls_psk){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single bridge.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#endif
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_keyfile", &cur_bridge->tls_keyfile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_protocol_version")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, "", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcmp(token, "mqttv31")){
cur_bridge->protocol_version = mosq_p_mqtt31;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "mqttv311")){
cur_bridge->protocol_version = mosq_p_mqtt311;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge_protocol_version value (%s).", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty bridge_protocol_version value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_psk")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS_PSK)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(cur_bridge->tls_cafile || cur_bridge->tls_capath || cur_bridge->tls_certfile || cur_bridge->tls_keyfile){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single bridge.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_psk", &cur_bridge->tls_psk, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS-PSK support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "bridge_tls_version")){
#if defined(WITH_BRIDGE) && defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge_tls_version", &cur_bridge->tls_version, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge and/or TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "cafile")){
#if defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(cur_listener->psk_hint){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single listener.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "cafile", &cur_listener->cafile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "capath")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "capath", &cur_listener->capath, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "certfile")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(cur_listener->psk_hint){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot use both certificate and psk encryption in a single listener.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "certfile", &cur_listener->certfile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "ciphers")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "ciphers", &cur_listener->ciphers, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "clientid") || !strcmp(token, "remote_clientid")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge remote clientid", &cur_bridge->remote_clientid, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "cleansession")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "cleansession", &cur_bridge->clean_session, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "clientid_prefixes")){
if(reload){
mosquitto__free(config->clientid_prefixes);
config->clientid_prefixes = NULL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "clientid_prefixes", &config->clientid_prefixes, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "connection")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
/* Check for existing bridge name. */
for(i=0; i<config->bridge_count; i++){
if(!strcmp(config->bridges[i].name, token)){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Duplicate bridge name \"%s\".", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}
config->bridge_count++;
config->bridges = mosquitto__realloc(config->bridges, config->bridge_count*sizeof(struct mosquitto__bridge));
if(!config->bridges){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_bridge = &(config->bridges[config->bridge_count-1]);
memset(cur_bridge, 0, sizeof(struct mosquitto__bridge));
cur_bridge->name = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!cur_bridge->name){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_bridge->keepalive = 60;
cur_bridge->notifications = true;
cur_bridge->notifications_local_only = false;
cur_bridge->start_type = bst_automatic;
cur_bridge->idle_timeout = 60;
cur_bridge->restart_timeout = 30;
cur_bridge->threshold = 10;
cur_bridge->try_private = true;
cur_bridge->attempt_unsubscribe = true;
cur_bridge->protocol_version = mosq_p_mqtt311;
cur_bridge->primary_retry_sock = INVALID_SOCKET;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty connection value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "connection_messages")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, token, &config->connection_messages, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "crlfile")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "crlfile", &cur_listener->crlfile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "http_dir")){
#ifdef WITH_WEBSOCKETS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "http_dir", &cur_listener->http_dir, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Websockets support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "idle_timeout")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "idle_timeout", &cur_bridge->idle_timeout, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_bridge->idle_timeout < 1){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_NOTICE, "idle_timeout interval too low, using 1 second.");
cur_bridge->idle_timeout = 1;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "include_dir")){
if(level == 0){
/* Only process include_dir from the main config file. */
token = strtok_r(NULL, "", &saveptr);
if(!token){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty include_dir value in configuration.");
return 1;
}
#ifdef WIN32
snprintf(dirpath, MAX_PATH, "%s\\*.conf", token);
fh = FindFirstFile(dirpath, &find_data);
if(fh == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){
/* No files found */
continue;
}
do{
len = strlen(token)+1+strlen(find_data.cFileName)+1;
conf_file = mosquitto__malloc(len+1);
if(!conf_file){
FindClose(fh);
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
snprintf(conf_file, len, "%s\\%s", token, find_data.cFileName);
conf_file[len] = '\0';
rc = config__read_file(config, reload, conf_file, cr, level+1, &lineno_ext);
if(rc){
FindClose(fh);
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error found at %s:%d.", conf_file, lineno_ext);
mosquitto__free(conf_file);
return rc;
}
mosquitto__free(conf_file);
}while(FindNextFile(fh, &find_data));
FindClose(fh);
#else
dh = opendir(token);
if(!dh){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Unable to open include_dir '%s'.", token);
return 1;
}
while((de = readdir(dh)) != NULL){
if(strlen(de->d_name) > 5){
if(!strcmp(&de->d_name[strlen(de->d_name)-5], ".conf")){
len = strlen(token)+1+strlen(de->d_name)+1;
conf_file = mosquitto__malloc(len+1);
if(!conf_file){
closedir(dh);
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
snprintf(conf_file, len, "%s/%s", token, de->d_name);
conf_file[len] = '\0';
rc = config__read_file(config, reload, conf_file, cr, level+1, &lineno_ext);
if(rc){
closedir(dh);
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error found at %s:%d.", conf_file, lineno_ext);
mosquitto__free(conf_file);
return rc;
}
mosquitto__free(conf_file);
}
}
}
closedir(dh);
#endif
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "keepalive_interval")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "keepalive_interval", &cur_bridge->keepalive, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_bridge->keepalive < 5){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_NOTICE, "keepalive interval too low, using 5 seconds.");
cur_bridge->keepalive = 5;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "keyfile")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "keyfile", &cur_listener->keyfile, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "listener")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
tmp_int = atoi(token);
if(tmp_int < 1 || tmp_int > 65535){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid port value (%d).", tmp_int);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(reload){
/* We reload listeners settings based on port number.
* If the port number doesn't already exist, exit with a complaint. */
cur_listener = NULL;
for(i=0; i<config->listener_count; i++){
if(config->listeners[i].port == tmp_int){
cur_listener = &config->listeners[i];
}
}
if(!cur_listener){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: It is not currently possible to add/remove listeners when reloading the config file.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
config->listener_count++;
config->listeners = mosquitto__realloc(config->listeners, sizeof(struct mosquitto__listener)*config->listener_count);
if(!config->listeners){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_listener = &config->listeners[config->listener_count-1];
memset(cur_listener, 0, sizeof(struct mosquitto__listener));
}
cur_listener->security_options.allow_anonymous = -1;
cur_listener->protocol = mp_mqtt;
cur_listener->port = tmp_int;
token = strtok_r(NULL, "", &saveptr);
mosquitto__free(cur_listener->host);
if(token){
cur_listener->host = mosquitto__strdup(token);
}else{
cur_listener->host = NULL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty listener value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "local_clientid")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge local clientd", &cur_bridge->local_clientid, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "local_password")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge local_password", &cur_bridge->local_password, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "local_username")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge local_username", &cur_bridge->local_username, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "log_dest")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cr->log_dest_set = 1;
if(!strcmp(token, "none")){
cr->log_dest = MQTT3_LOG_NONE;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "syslog")){
cr->log_dest |= MQTT3_LOG_SYSLOG;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "stdout")){
cr->log_dest |= MQTT3_LOG_STDOUT;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "stderr")){
cr->log_dest |= MQTT3_LOG_STDERR;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "topic")){
cr->log_dest |= MQTT3_LOG_TOPIC;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "file")){
cr->log_dest |= MQTT3_LOG_FILE;
if(config->log_fptr || config->log_file){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Duplicate \"log_dest file\" value.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
/* Get remaining string. */
token = &token[strlen(token)+1];
while(token[0] == ' ' || token[0] == '\t'){
token++;
}
if(token[0]){
config->log_file = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!config->log_file){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty \"log_dest file\" value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid log_dest value (%s).", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#if defined(WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
if(service_handle){
if(cr->log_dest == MQTT3_LOG_STDOUT || cr->log_dest == MQTT3_LOG_STDERR){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Cannot log to stdout/stderr when running as a Windows service.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}
#endif
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty log_dest value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "log_facility")){
#if defined(WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: log_facility not supported on Windows.");
#else
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "log_facility", &tmp_int, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
switch(tmp_int){
case 0:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
break;
case 1:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
break;
case 2:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
break;
case 3:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
break;
case 4:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
break;
case 5:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
break;
case 6:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
break;
case 7:
config->log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
break;
default:
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid log_facility value (%d).", tmp_int);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "log_timestamp")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, token, &config->log_timestamp, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "log_type")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cr->log_type_set = 1;
if(!strcmp(token, "none")){
cr->log_type = MOSQ_LOG_NONE;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "information")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_INFO;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "notice")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_NOTICE;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "warning")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_WARNING;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "error")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_ERR;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "debug")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_DEBUG;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "subscribe")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_SUBSCRIBE;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "unsubscribe")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_UNSUBSCRIBE;
#ifdef WITH_WEBSOCKETS
}else if(!strcmp(token, "websockets")){
cr->log_type |= MOSQ_LOG_WEBSOCKETS;
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "all")){
cr->log_type = INT_MAX;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid log_type value (%s).", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty log_type value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "max_connections")){
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cur_listener->max_connections = atoi(token);
if(cur_listener->max_connections < 0) cur_listener->max_connections = -1;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty max_connections value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "max_inflight_bytes")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cr->max_inflight_bytes = atol(token);
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty max_inflight_bytes value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "max_inflight_messages")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cr->max_inflight_messages = atoi(token);
if(cr->max_inflight_messages < 0) cr->max_inflight_messages = 0;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty max_inflight_messages value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "max_queued_bytes")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cr->max_queued_bytes = atol(token); /* 63 bits is ok right? */
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty max_queued_bytes value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "max_queued_messages")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cr->max_queued_messages = atoi(token);
if(cr->max_queued_messages < 0) cr->max_queued_messages = 0;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty max_queued_messages value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "memory_limit")){
ssize_t lim;
if(conf__parse_ssize_t(&token, "memory_limit", &lim, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(lim < 0){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid memory_limit value (%ld).", lim);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
memory__set_limit(lim);
}else if(!strcmp(token, "message_size_limit")){
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "message_size_limit", (int *)&config->message_size_limit, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(config->message_size_limit > MQTT_MAX_PAYLOAD){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid message_size_limit value (%u).", config->message_size_limit);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "mount_point")){
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(config->listener_count == 0){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: You must use create a listener before using the mount_point option in the configuration file.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "mount_point", &cur_listener->mount_point, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(mosquitto_pub_topic_check(cur_listener->mount_point) != MOSQ_ERR_SUCCESS){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR,
"Error: Invalid mount_point '%s'. Does it contain a wildcard character?",
cur_listener->mount_point);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "notifications")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "notifications", &cur_bridge->notifications, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "notifications_local_only")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "notifications_local_only", &cur_bridge->notifications_local_only, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "notification_topic")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "notification_topic", &cur_bridge->notification_topic, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "password") || !strcmp(token, "remote_password")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "bridge remote_password", &cur_bridge->remote_password, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "password_file")){
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
if(reload){
mosquitto__free(cur_security_options->password_file);
cur_security_options->password_file = NULL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "password_file", &cur_security_options->password_file, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "per_listener_settings")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "per_listener_settings", &config->per_listener_settings, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_security_options && config->per_listener_settings){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: per_listener_settings must be set before any other security settings.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "persistence") || !strcmp(token, "retained_persistence")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, token, &config->persistence, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "persistence_file")){
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "persistence_file", &config->persistence_file, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "persistence_location")){
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "persistence_location", &config->persistence_location, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "persistent_client_expiration")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
switch(token[strlen(token)-1]){
case 'h':
expiration_mult = 3600;
break;
case 'd':
expiration_mult = 86400;
break;
case 'w':
expiration_mult = 86400*7;
break;
case 'm':
expiration_mult = 86400*30;
break;
case 'y':
expiration_mult = 86400*365;
break;
default:
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid persistent_client_expiration duration in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token[strlen(token)-1] = '\0';
config->persistent_client_expiration = atoi(token)*expiration_mult;
if(config->persistent_client_expiration <= 0){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid persistent_client_expiration duration in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty persistent_client_expiration value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "pid_file")){
if(reload) continue; // pid file not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "pid_file", &config->pid_file, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "port")){
if(reload) continue; // Listener not valid for reloading.
if(config->default_listener.port){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Default listener port specified multiple times. Only the latest will be used.");
}
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "port", &tmp_int, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(tmp_int < 1 || tmp_int > 65535){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid port value (%d).", tmp_int);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
config->default_listener.port = tmp_int;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "protocol")){
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcmp(token, "mqtt")){
cur_listener->protocol = mp_mqtt;
/*
}else if(!strcmp(token, "mqttsn")){
cur_listener->protocol = mp_mqttsn;
*/
}else if(!strcmp(token, "websockets")){
#ifdef WITH_WEBSOCKETS
cur_listener->protocol = mp_websockets;
config->have_websockets_listener = true;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Websockets support not available.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#endif
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid protocol value (%s).", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty protocol value in configuration.");
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "psk_file")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS_PSK
conf__set_cur_security_options(config, cur_listener, &cur_security_options);
if(reload){
mosquitto__free(cur_security_options->psk_file);
cur_security_options->psk_file = NULL;
}
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "psk_file", &cur_security_options->psk_file, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS/TLS-PSK support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "psk_hint")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS_PSK
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "psk_hint", &cur_listener->psk_hint, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS/TLS-PSK support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "queue_qos0_messages")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, token, &config->queue_qos0_messages, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "require_certificate")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "require_certificate", &cur_listener->require_certificate, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "restart_timeout")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "restart_timeout", &cur_bridge->restart_timeout, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_bridge->restart_timeout < 1){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_NOTICE, "restart_timeout interval too low, using 1 second.");
cur_bridge->restart_timeout = 1;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "retry_interval")){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: The retry_interval option is no longer available.");
}else if(!strcmp(token, "round_robin")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "round_robin", &cur_bridge->round_robin, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "set_tcp_nodelay")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "set_tcp_nodelay", &config->set_tcp_nodelay, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "start_type")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcmp(token, "automatic")){
cur_bridge->start_type = bst_automatic;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "lazy")){
cur_bridge->start_type = bst_lazy;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "manual")){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Manual start_type not supported.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "once")){
cur_bridge->start_type = bst_once;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid start_type value in configuration (%s).", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty start_type value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "socket_domain")){
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcmp(token, "ipv4")){
cur_listener->socket_domain = AF_INET;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "ipv6")){
cur_listener->socket_domain = AF_INET6;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid socket_domain value \"%s\" in configuration.", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty socket_domain value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "store_clean_interval")){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: store_clean_interval is no longer needed.");
}else if(!strcmp(token, "sys_interval")){
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "sys_interval", &config->sys_interval, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(config->sys_interval < 0 || config->sys_interval > 65535){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid sys_interval value (%d).", config->sys_interval);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}else if(!strcmp(token, "threshold")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "threshold", &cur_bridge->threshold, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
if(cur_bridge->threshold < 1){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_NOTICE, "threshold too low, using 1 message.");
cur_bridge->threshold = 1;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "tls_version")){
#if defined(WITH_TLS)
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "tls_version", &cur_listener->tls_version, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "topic")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cur_bridge->topic_count++;
cur_bridge->topics = mosquitto__realloc(cur_bridge->topics,
sizeof(struct mosquitto__bridge_topic)*cur_bridge->topic_count);
if(!cur_bridge->topics){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
cur_topic = &cur_bridge->topics[cur_bridge->topic_count-1];
if(!strcmp(token, "\"\"")){
cur_topic->topic = NULL;
}else{
cur_topic->topic = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!cur_topic->topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
cur_topic->direction = bd_out;
cur_topic->qos = 0;
cur_topic->local_prefix = NULL;
cur_topic->remote_prefix = NULL;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty topic value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcasecmp(token, "out")){
cur_topic->direction = bd_out;
}else if(!strcasecmp(token, "in")){
cur_topic->direction = bd_in;
}else if(!strcasecmp(token, "both")){
cur_topic->direction = bd_both;
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge topic direction '%s'.", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cur_topic->qos = atoi(token);
if(cur_topic->qos < 0 || cur_topic->qos > 2){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge QoS level '%s'.", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
cur_bridge->topic_remapping = true;
if(!strcmp(token, "\"\"")){
cur_topic->local_prefix = NULL;
}else{
if(mosquitto_pub_topic_check(token) != MOSQ_ERR_SUCCESS){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge topic local prefix '%s'.", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
cur_topic->local_prefix = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!cur_topic->local_prefix){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(!strcmp(token, "\"\"")){
cur_topic->remote_prefix = NULL;
}else{
if(mosquitto_pub_topic_check(token) != MOSQ_ERR_SUCCESS){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge topic remote prefix '%s'.", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
cur_topic->remote_prefix = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!cur_topic->remote_prefix){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
}
}
}
}
if(cur_topic->topic == NULL &&
(cur_topic->local_prefix == NULL || cur_topic->remote_prefix == NULL)){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge remapping.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(cur_topic->local_prefix){
if(cur_topic->topic){
len = strlen(cur_topic->topic) + strlen(cur_topic->local_prefix)+1;
cur_topic->local_topic = mosquitto__malloc(len+1);
if(!cur_topic->local_topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
snprintf(cur_topic->local_topic, len+1, "%s%s", cur_topic->local_prefix, cur_topic->topic);
cur_topic->local_topic[len] = '\0';
}else{
cur_topic->local_topic = mosquitto__strdup(cur_topic->local_prefix);
if(!cur_topic->local_topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
}else{
cur_topic->local_topic = mosquitto__strdup(cur_topic->topic);
if(!cur_topic->local_topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
if(cur_topic->remote_prefix){
if(cur_topic->topic){
len = strlen(cur_topic->topic) + strlen(cur_topic->remote_prefix)+1;
cur_topic->remote_topic = mosquitto__malloc(len+1);
if(!cur_topic->remote_topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
snprintf(cur_topic->remote_topic, len, "%s%s", cur_topic->remote_prefix, cur_topic->topic);
cur_topic->remote_topic[len] = '\0';
}else{
cur_topic->remote_topic = mosquitto__strdup(cur_topic->remote_prefix);
if(!cur_topic->remote_topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
}else{
cur_topic->remote_topic = mosquitto__strdup(cur_topic->topic);
if(!cur_topic->remote_topic){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "try_private")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "try_private", &cur_bridge->try_private, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "upgrade_outgoing_qos")){
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, token, &config->upgrade_outgoing_qos, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "use_identity_as_username")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "use_identity_as_username", &cur_listener->use_identity_as_username, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "use_subject_as_username")){
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "use_subject_as_username", &cur_listener->use_subject_as_username, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: TLS support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "user")){
if(reload) continue; // Drop privileges user not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_string(&token, "user", &config->user, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "use_username_as_clientid")){
if(reload) continue; // Listeners not valid for reloading.
if(conf__parse_bool(&token, "use_username_as_clientid", &cur_listener->use_username_as_clientid, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}else if(!strcmp(token, "username") || !strcmp(token, "remote_username")){
#ifdef WITH_BRIDGE
if(reload) continue; // FIXME
if(!cur_bridge){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Invalid bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(token){
if(cur_bridge->remote_username){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Duplicate username value in bridge configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
cur_bridge->remote_username = mosquitto__strdup(token);
if(!cur_bridge->remote_username){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Out of memory.");
return MOSQ_ERR_NOMEM;
}
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty username value in configuration.");
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Bridge support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "websockets_log_level")){
#ifdef WITH_WEBSOCKETS
if(conf__parse_int(&token, "websockets_log_level", &config->websockets_log_level, saveptr)) return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
#else
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Websockets support not available.");
#endif
}else if(!strcmp(token, "trace_level")
|| !strcmp(token, "ffdc_output")
|| !strcmp(token, "max_log_entries")
|| !strcmp(token, "trace_output")){
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: Unsupported rsmb configuration option \"%s\".", token);
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Unknown configuration variable \"%s\".", token);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
}
}
}
return MOSQ_ERR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix acl_file being ignore for default listener if with per_listener_settings
Close #1073. Thanks to Jef Driesen.
Bug: https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/issues/1073
CWE ID:
| 0
| 75,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_sched_groups_power(int cpu, struct sched_domain *sd)
{
struct sched_domain *child;
struct sched_group *group;
long power;
int weight;
WARN_ON(!sd || !sd->groups);
if (cpu != group_first_cpu(sd->groups))
return;
sd->groups->group_weight = cpumask_weight(sched_group_cpus(sd->groups));
child = sd->child;
sd->groups->cpu_power = 0;
if (!child) {
power = SCHED_LOAD_SCALE;
weight = cpumask_weight(sched_domain_span(sd));
/*
* SMT siblings share the power of a single core.
* Usually multiple threads get a better yield out of
* that one core than a single thread would have,
* reflect that in sd->smt_gain.
*/
if ((sd->flags & SD_SHARE_CPUPOWER) && weight > 1) {
power *= sd->smt_gain;
power /= weight;
power >>= SCHED_LOAD_SHIFT;
}
sd->groups->cpu_power += power;
return;
}
/*
* Add cpu_power of each child group to this groups cpu_power.
*/
group = child->groups;
do {
sd->groups->cpu_power += group->cpu_power;
group = group->next;
} while (group != child->groups);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewFullscreenWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t widget_route_id,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget) {
CreateNewWidget(render_process_id, widget_route_id, /*is_fullscreen=*/true,
std::move(widget));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trigger_activate(int trigger_index)
{
int last_trigger;
struct map_trigger* trigger;
trigger = vector_get(s_map->triggers, trigger_index);
last_trigger = s_current_trigger;
s_current_trigger = trigger_index;
script_run(trigger->script, true);
s_current_trigger = last_trigger;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::webkitWillExitFullScreenForElement(Element*)
{
if (!m_fullScreenElement)
return;
if (!attached() || inPageCache())
return;
m_fullScreenElement->willStopBeingFullscreenElement();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __tipc_nl_compat_doit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
int err;
struct sk_buff *doit_buf;
struct sk_buff *trans_buf;
struct nlattr **attrbuf;
struct genl_info info;
trans_buf = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!trans_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
err = (*cmd->transcode)(cmd, trans_buf, msg);
if (err)
goto trans_out;
attrbuf = kmalloc((tipc_genl_family.maxattr + 1) *
sizeof(struct nlattr *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attrbuf) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto trans_out;
}
err = nla_parse(attrbuf, tipc_genl_family.maxattr,
(const struct nlattr *)trans_buf->data,
trans_buf->len, NULL);
if (err)
goto parse_out;
doit_buf = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!doit_buf) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto parse_out;
}
doit_buf->sk = msg->dst_sk;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.attrs = attrbuf;
err = (*cmd->doit)(doit_buf, &info);
kfree_skb(doit_buf);
parse_out:
kfree(attrbuf);
trans_out:
kfree_skb(trans_buf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggedAttrSetter2AttributeGetterForMainWorld(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggedAttrSetter2());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromePluginServiceFilter::GetProcess(
int render_process_id) const {
std::map<int, ProcessDetails>::const_iterator it =
plugin_details_.find(render_process_id);
if (it == plugin_details_.end())
return NULL;
return &it->second;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_hl_proc_send_data_cfm(tBTA_HL_MDL_HANDLE mdl_handle,
tBTA_HL_STATUS status){
UINT8 app_idx,mcl_idx, mdl_idx;
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
UNUSED(status);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
if (btif_hl_find_mdl_idx_using_handle(mdl_handle,
&app_idx, &mcl_idx, &mdl_idx ))
{
p_dcb =BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
btif_hl_free_buf((void **) &p_dcb->p_tx_pkt);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("send success free p_tx_pkt tx_size=%d", p_dcb->tx_size);
p_dcb->tx_size = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static STACK_OF(X509) * load_all_certs_from_file(char *certfile)
{
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *stack=NULL, *ret=NULL;
BIO *in=NULL;
X509_INFO *xi;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if(!(stack = sk_X509_new_null())) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_ERROR, "memory allocation failure");
goto end;
}
if (php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(certfile TSRMLS_CC)) {
sk_X509_free(stack);
goto end;
}
if(!(in=BIO_new_file(certfile, "r"))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error opening the file, %s", certfile);
sk_X509_free(stack);
goto end;
}
/* This loads from a file, a stack of x509/crl/pkey sets */
if(!(sk=PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(in, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error reading the file, %s", certfile);
sk_X509_free(stack);
goto end;
}
/* scan over it and pull out the certs */
while (sk_X509_INFO_num(sk)) {
xi=sk_X509_INFO_shift(sk);
if (xi->x509 != NULL) {
sk_X509_push(stack,xi->x509);
xi->x509=NULL;
}
X509_INFO_free(xi);
}
if(!sk_X509_num(stack)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "no certificates in file, %s", certfile);
sk_X509_free(stack);
goto end;
}
ret=stack;
end:
BIO_free(in);
sk_X509_INFO_free(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int red_channel_client_pre_create_validate(RedChannel *channel, RedClient *client)
{
if (red_client_get_channel(client, channel->type, channel->id)) {
spice_printerr("Error client %p: duplicate channel type %d id %d",
client, channel->type, channel->id);
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::ColorChooserInfo::ColorChooserInfo(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
ColorChooser* chooser,
int identifier)
: render_process_id(render_process_id),
render_frame_id(render_frame_id),
chooser(chooser),
identifier(identifier) {
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_home_var ()
{
SHELL_VAR *temp_var;
temp_var = find_variable ("HOME");
if (temp_var == 0)
temp_var = bind_variable ("HOME", sh_get_home_dir (), 0);
#if 0
VSETATTR (temp_var, att_exported);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterXCFImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("XCF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXCFImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXCF;
entry->description=ConstantString("GIMP image");
entry->module=ConstantString("XCF");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: Check for image list before we destroy the last image in XCF coder (patch sent privately by Андрей Черный)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 68,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HostCache::HostCache(size_t max_entries)
: max_entries_(max_entries), network_changes_(0) {}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int backref_match_at_nested_level(regex_t* reg
, OnigStackType* top, OnigStackType* stk_base
, int ignore_case, int case_fold_flag
, int nest, int mem_num, UChar* memp, UChar** s, const UChar* send)
{
UChar *ss, *p, *pstart, *pend = NULL_UCHARP;
int level;
OnigStackType* k;
level = 0;
k = top;
k--;
while (k >= stk_base) {
if (k->type == STK_CALL_FRAME) {
level--;
}
else if (k->type == STK_RETURN) {
level++;
}
else if (level == nest) {
if (k->type == STK_MEM_START) {
if (mem_is_in_memp(k->u.mem.num, mem_num, memp)) {
pstart = k->u.mem.pstr;
if (pend != NULL_UCHARP) {
if (pend - pstart > send - *s) return 0; /* or goto next_mem; */
p = pstart;
ss = *s;
if (ignore_case != 0) {
if (string_cmp_ic(reg->enc, case_fold_flag,
pstart, &ss, (int )(pend - pstart)) == 0)
return 0; /* or goto next_mem; */
}
else {
while (p < pend) {
if (*p++ != *ss++) return 0; /* or goto next_mem; */
}
}
*s = ss;
return 1;
}
}
}
else if (k->type == STK_MEM_END) {
if (mem_is_in_memp(k->u.mem.num, mem_num, memp)) {
pend = k->u.mem.pstr;
}
}
}
k--;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wc_ecc_import_raw_ex(ecc_key* key, const char* qx, const char* qy,
const char* d, int curve_id)
{
return wc_ecc_import_raw_private(key, qx, qy, d, curve_id,
ECC_TYPE_HEX_STR);
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 81,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegateWin::LaunchApp(
Profile* profile, const extensions::Extension* extension, int event_flags) {
AppListServiceImpl::RecordAppListAppLaunch();
chrome::OpenApplication(chrome::AppLaunchParams(
profile, extension, NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB));
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 113,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceFetcher::didChangeLoadingPriority(const Resource* resource, ResourceLoadPriority loadPriority, int intraPriorityValue)
{
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO1("net", "Resource", resource, "ChangePriority", "priority", loadPriority);
context().dispatchDidChangeResourcePriority(resource->identifier(), loadPriority, intraPriorityValue);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AuthenticatorSheetModelBase::OnAccept() {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecp_normalize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi;
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Z, 0 ) == 0 )
return( 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT)
if ( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
{
return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac( grp, pt );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */
mbedtls_mpi_init( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ZZi );
/*
* X = X / Z^2 mod p
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( ZZi );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->X );
/*
* Y = Y / Z^3 mod p
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi ) ); MOD_MUL( pt->Y );
/*
* Z = 1
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &pt->Z, 1 ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &Zi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ZZi );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::BindAssociatedInterfaceRequestFromFrame(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedInterfaceEndpointHandle* handle) {
if (interface_name == autofill::mojom::AutofillDriver::Name_) {
autofill::ContentAutofillDriverFactory::BindAutofillDriver(
autofill::mojom::AutofillDriverAssociatedRequest(std::move(*handle)),
render_frame_host);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::canReplaceChild(Node* newChild, Node* oldChild)
{
if (!oldChild)
return true;
if (oldChild->nodeType() == newChild->nodeType())
return true;
int numDoctypes = 0;
int numElements = 0;
for (Node* c = firstChild(); c; c = c->nextSibling()) {
if (c == oldChild)
continue;
switch (c->nodeType()) {
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
numDoctypes++;
break;
case ELEMENT_NODE:
numElements++;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (newChild->nodeType() == DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE) {
for (Node* c = newChild->firstChild(); c; c = c->nextSibling()) {
switch (c->nodeType()) {
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
case ENTITY_NODE:
case NOTATION_NODE:
case TEXT_NODE:
case XPATH_NAMESPACE_NODE:
return false;
case COMMENT_NODE:
case PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
break;
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
numDoctypes++;
break;
case ELEMENT_NODE:
numElements++;
break;
}
}
} else {
switch (newChild->nodeType()) {
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
case ENTITY_NODE:
case NOTATION_NODE:
case TEXT_NODE:
case XPATH_NAMESPACE_NODE:
return false;
case COMMENT_NODE:
case PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
return true;
case DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
numDoctypes++;
break;
case ELEMENT_NODE:
numElements++;
break;
}
}
if (numElements > 1 || numDoctypes > 1)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::GetCursorEnabled() const {
return GetRenderText()->cursor_enabled();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SerializedScriptValue::transferImageBitmaps(v8::Isolate* isolate, const ImageBitmapArray& imageBitmaps, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!imageBitmaps.size())
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < imageBitmaps.size(); ++i) {
if (imageBitmaps[i]->isNeutered()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ImageBitmap at index " + String::number(i) + " is already neutered.");
return;
}
}
OwnPtr<ImageBitmapContentsArray> contents = adoptPtr(new ImageBitmapContentsArray);
HeapHashSet<Member<ImageBitmap>> visited;
for (size_t i = 0; i < imageBitmaps.size(); ++i) {
if (visited.contains(imageBitmaps[i]))
continue;
visited.add(imageBitmaps[i]);
contents->append(imageBitmaps[i]->transfer());
}
m_imageBitmapContentsArray = contents.release();
}
Commit Message: When we can't neuter ArrayBuffers, we can't transfer them
Instead, we need to copy
BUG=603987
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1904913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388719}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __dwc3_gadget_wakeup(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
int retries;
int ret;
u32 reg;
u8 link_state;
u8 speed;
/*
* According to the Databook Remote wakeup request should
* be issued only when the device is in early suspend state.
*
* We can check that via USB Link State bits in DSTS register.
*/
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DSTS);
speed = reg & DWC3_DSTS_CONNECTSPD;
if ((speed == DWC3_DSTS_SUPERSPEED) ||
(speed == DWC3_DSTS_SUPERSPEED_PLUS))
return 0;
link_state = DWC3_DSTS_USBLNKST(reg);
switch (link_state) {
case DWC3_LINK_STATE_RX_DET: /* in HS, means Early Suspend */
case DWC3_LINK_STATE_U3: /* in HS, means SUSPEND */
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = dwc3_gadget_set_link_state(dwc, DWC3_LINK_STATE_RECOV);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(dwc->dev, "failed to put link in Recovery\n");
return ret;
}
/* Recent versions do this automatically */
if (dwc->revision < DWC3_REVISION_194A) {
/* write zeroes to Link Change Request */
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL);
reg &= ~DWC3_DCTL_ULSTCHNGREQ_MASK;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL, reg);
}
/* poll until Link State changes to ON */
retries = 20000;
while (retries--) {
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DSTS);
/* in HS, means ON */
if (DWC3_DSTS_USBLNKST(reg) == DWC3_LINK_STATE_U0)
break;
}
if (DWC3_DSTS_USBLNKST(reg) != DWC3_LINK_STATE_U0) {
dev_err(dwc->dev, "failed to send remote wakeup\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipa_rop_draw(wmfAPI * API, wmfROP_Draw_t * rop_draw)
{
/* wmfBrush */
/* *brush = WMF_DC_BRUSH(rop_draw->dc); */
/* wmfBMP */
/* *brush_bmp = WMF_BRUSH_BITMAP(brush); */
if (TO_FILL(rop_draw) == 0)
return;
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
/* FIXME: finish implementing (once we know what it is supposed to do!) */
/*
struct _wmfROP_Draw_t
{ wmfDC* dc;
wmfD_Coord TL;
wmfD_Coord BR;
U32 ROP;
double pixel_width;
double pixel_height;
};
*/
/* if (brush_bmp && brush_bmp->data != 0) */
/* printf("Have an image!\n"); */
switch (rop_draw->ROP) /* Ternary raster operations */
{
case SRCCOPY: /* dest = source */
printf("ipa_rop_draw SRCCOPY ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case SRCPAINT: /* dest = source OR dest */
printf("ipa_rop_draw SRCPAINT ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case SRCAND: /* dest = source AND dest */
printf("ipa_rop_draw SRCAND ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case SRCINVERT: /* dest = source XOR dest */
printf("ipa_rop_draw SRCINVERT ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case SRCERASE: /* dest = source AND (NOT dest) */
printf("ipa_rop_draw SRCERASE ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case NOTSRCCOPY: /* dest = (NOT source) */
printf("ipa_rop_draw NOTSRCCOPY ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case NOTSRCERASE: /* dest = (NOT src) AND (NOT dest) */
printf("ipa_rop_draw NOTSRCERASE ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case MERGECOPY: /* dest = (source AND pattern) */
printf("ipa_rop_draw MERGECOPY ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case MERGEPAINT: /* dest = (NOT source) OR dest */
printf("ipa_rop_draw MERGEPAINT ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case PATCOPY: /* dest = pattern */
util_set_brush(API, rop_draw->dc, BrushApplyFill);
break;
case PATPAINT: /* dest = DPSnoo */
printf("ipa_rop_draw PATPAINT ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case PATINVERT: /* dest = pattern XOR dest */
printf("ipa_rop_draw PATINVERT ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case DSTINVERT: /* dest = (NOT dest) */
printf("ipa_rop_draw DSTINVERT ROP mode not implemented\n");
break;
case BLACKNESS: /* dest = BLACK */
draw_fill_color_string(WmfDrawingWand,"black");
break;
case WHITENESS: /* dest = WHITE */
draw_fill_color_string(WmfDrawingWand,"white");
break;
default:
printf("ipa_rop_draw 0x%x ROP mode not implemented\n", rop_draw->ROP);
break;
}
DrawRectangle(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(rop_draw->TL.x), YC(rop_draw->TL.y),
XC(rop_draw->BR.x), YC(rop_draw->BR.y));
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect ShelfLayoutManager::GetIdealBounds() {
gfx::Rect bounds(
gfx::Screen::GetDisplayNearestWindow(status_->GetNativeView()).bounds());
int width = 0, height = 0;
GetShelfSize(&width, &height);
switch (alignment_) {
case SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM:
return gfx::Rect(bounds.x(), bounds.bottom() - height,
bounds.width(), height);
case SHELF_ALIGNMENT_LEFT:
return gfx::Rect(bounds.x(), bounds.y(), width, bounds.height());
case SHELF_ALIGNMENT_RIGHT:
return gfx::Rect(bounds.right() - width, bounds.y(), width,
bounds.height());
}
NOTREACHED();
return gfx::Rect();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_GROUP(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
return str_to_u32(arg, &ofpact_put_GROUP(ofpacts)->group_id);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int reason, seqnr;
int r;
u_char *msg;
for (;;) {
msg = NULL;
if (compat20) {
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (*typep) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
}
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
if (msg)
free(msg);
return r;
}
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), reason, msg);
free(msg);
return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
seqnr);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
} else {
r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep);
switch (*typep) {
case SSH_MSG_NONE:
return SSH_MSG_NONE;
case SSH_MSG_IGNORE:
break;
case SSH_MSG_DEBUG:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
error("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), msg);
free(msg);
return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
default:
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
return 0;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __serpent_decrypt(struct serpent_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
const u32 *k = ctx->expkey;
const __le32 *s = (const __le32 *)src;
__le32 *d = (__le32 *)dst;
u32 r0, r1, r2, r3, r4;
r0 = le32_to_cpu(s[0]);
r1 = le32_to_cpu(s[1]);
r2 = le32_to_cpu(s[2]);
r3 = le32_to_cpu(s[3]);
K(r0, r1, r2, r3, 32);
SI7(r0, r1, r2, r3, r4); KL(r1, r3, r0, r4, r2, 31);
SI6(r1, r3, r0, r4, r2); KL(r0, r2, r4, r1, r3, 30);
SI5(r0, r2, r4, r1, r3); KL(r2, r3, r0, r4, r1, 29);
SI4(r2, r3, r0, r4, r1); KL(r2, r0, r1, r4, r3, 28);
SI3(r2, r0, r1, r4, r3); KL(r1, r2, r3, r4, r0, 27);
SI2(r1, r2, r3, r4, r0); KL(r2, r0, r4, r3, r1, 26);
SI1(r2, r0, r4, r3, r1); KL(r1, r0, r4, r3, r2, 25);
SI0(r1, r0, r4, r3, r2); KL(r4, r2, r0, r1, r3, 24);
SI7(r4, r2, r0, r1, r3); KL(r2, r1, r4, r3, r0, 23);
SI6(r2, r1, r4, r3, r0); KL(r4, r0, r3, r2, r1, 22);
SI5(r4, r0, r3, r2, r1); KL(r0, r1, r4, r3, r2, 21);
SI4(r0, r1, r4, r3, r2); KL(r0, r4, r2, r3, r1, 20);
SI3(r0, r4, r2, r3, r1); KL(r2, r0, r1, r3, r4, 19);
SI2(r2, r0, r1, r3, r4); KL(r0, r4, r3, r1, r2, 18);
SI1(r0, r4, r3, r1, r2); KL(r2, r4, r3, r1, r0, 17);
SI0(r2, r4, r3, r1, r0); KL(r3, r0, r4, r2, r1, 16);
SI7(r3, r0, r4, r2, r1); KL(r0, r2, r3, r1, r4, 15);
SI6(r0, r2, r3, r1, r4); KL(r3, r4, r1, r0, r2, 14);
SI5(r3, r4, r1, r0, r2); KL(r4, r2, r3, r1, r0, 13);
SI4(r4, r2, r3, r1, r0); KL(r4, r3, r0, r1, r2, 12);
SI3(r4, r3, r0, r1, r2); KL(r0, r4, r2, r1, r3, 11);
SI2(r0, r4, r2, r1, r3); KL(r4, r3, r1, r2, r0, 10);
SI1(r4, r3, r1, r2, r0); KL(r0, r3, r1, r2, r4, 9);
SI0(r0, r3, r1, r2, r4); KL(r1, r4, r3, r0, r2, 8);
SI7(r1, r4, r3, r0, r2); KL(r4, r0, r1, r2, r3, 7);
SI6(r4, r0, r1, r2, r3); KL(r1, r3, r2, r4, r0, 6);
SI5(r1, r3, r2, r4, r0); KL(r3, r0, r1, r2, r4, 5);
SI4(r3, r0, r1, r2, r4); KL(r3, r1, r4, r2, r0, 4);
SI3(r3, r1, r4, r2, r0); KL(r4, r3, r0, r2, r1, 3);
SI2(r4, r3, r0, r2, r1); KL(r3, r1, r2, r0, r4, 2);
SI1(r3, r1, r2, r0, r4); KL(r4, r1, r2, r0, r3, 1);
SI0(r4, r1, r2, r0, r3); K(r2, r3, r1, r4, 0);
d[0] = cpu_to_le32(r2);
d[1] = cpu_to_le32(r3);
d[2] = cpu_to_le32(r1);
d[3] = cpu_to_le32(r4);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_SZPS( INS_ARG )
{
switch ( args[0] )
{
case 0:
CUR.zp0 = CUR.twilight;
break;
case 1:
CUR.zp0 = CUR.pts;
break;
default:
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
CUR.zp1 = CUR.zp0;
CUR.zp2 = CUR.zp0;
CUR.GS.gep0 = (Int)(args[0]);
CUR.GS.gep1 = (Int)(args[0]);
CUR.GS.gep2 = (Int)(args[0]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char * fstostr(
time_t ntp_stamp
)
{
char * buf;
struct tm * tm;
time_t unix_stamp;
LIB_GETBUF(buf);
unix_stamp = ntp_stamp - JAN_1970;
tm = gmtime(&unix_stamp);
if (NULL == tm)
#ifdef WAIT_FOR_NTP_CRYPTO_C_CALLERS_ABLE_TO_HANDLE_MORE_THAN_20_CHARS
msnprintf(buf, LIB_BUFLENGTH, "gmtime: %m");
#else
strncpy(buf, "gmtime() error", LIB_BUFLENGTH);
#endif
else
snprintf(buf, LIB_BUFLENGTH, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
tm->tm_year + 1900, tm->tm_mon + 1,
tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_hour, tm->tm_min);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 169,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WasUserInteractionReceived() { return user_interaction_received_; }
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBaseCreate(WebContext* context, WebPageGroup* pageGroup)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(g_object_new(WEBKIT_TYPE_WEB_VIEW_BASE, NULL));
webkitWebViewBaseCreateWebPage(webkitWebViewBase, toAPI(context), toAPI(pageGroup));
return webkitWebViewBase;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackRenderbuffer::~BackRenderbuffer() {
DCHECK_EQ(id_, 0u);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct appctx *stream_int_register_handler(struct stream_interface *si, struct si_applet *app)
{
struct appctx *appctx;
DPRINTF(stderr, "registering handler %p for si %p (was %p)\n", app, si, si->owner);
appctx = si_alloc_appctx(si);
if (!si)
return NULL;
appctx_set_applet(appctx, app);
si->flags |= SI_FL_WAIT_DATA;
return si_appctx(si);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UsbChooserContext::DestroyDeviceManagerForTesting() {
device_manager_instance_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void Run() {}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_write_client_write(struct archive_write_filter *f,
const void *_buff, size_t length)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)f->archive;
struct archive_none *state = (struct archive_none *)f->data;
const char *buff = (const char *)_buff;
ssize_t remaining, to_copy;
ssize_t bytes_written;
remaining = length;
/*
* If there is no buffer for blocking, just pass the data
* straight through to the client write callback. In
* particular, this supports "no write delay" operation for
* special applications. Just set the block size to zero.
*/
if (state->buffer_size == 0) {
while (remaining > 0) {
bytes_written = (a->client_writer)(&a->archive,
a->client_data, buff, remaining);
if (bytes_written <= 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
remaining -= bytes_written;
buff += bytes_written;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/* If the copy buffer isn't empty, try to fill it. */
if (state->avail < state->buffer_size) {
/* If buffer is not empty... */
/* ... copy data into buffer ... */
to_copy = ((size_t)remaining > state->avail) ?
state->avail : (size_t)remaining;
memcpy(state->next, buff, to_copy);
state->next += to_copy;
state->avail -= to_copy;
buff += to_copy;
remaining -= to_copy;
/* ... if it's full, write it out. */
if (state->avail == 0) {
char *p = state->buffer;
size_t to_write = state->buffer_size;
while (to_write > 0) {
bytes_written = (a->client_writer)(&a->archive,
a->client_data, p, to_write);
if (bytes_written <= 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if ((size_t)bytes_written > to_write) {
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
-1, "write overrun");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
p += bytes_written;
to_write -= bytes_written;
}
state->next = state->buffer;
state->avail = state->buffer_size;
}
}
while ((size_t)remaining >= state->buffer_size) {
/* Write out full blocks directly to client. */
bytes_written = (a->client_writer)(&a->archive,
a->client_data, buff, state->buffer_size);
if (bytes_written <= 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
buff += bytes_written;
remaining -= bytes_written;
}
if (remaining > 0) {
/* Copy last bit into copy buffer. */
memcpy(state->next, buff, remaining);
state->next += remaining;
state->avail -= remaining;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 34,061
|
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