instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int subcmd_main(int argc, char **argv, const struct subcommand *cb)
{
const char *cmd = basename(*argv);
mainfunc_t f = subcmd_get(cmd, cb);
if (f == NULL && argc > 1) {
/*
* Unable to find a main method for our command name?
* Let's try again with the first argument!
*/
++argv;
--argc;
f = subcmd_get(*argv, cb);
}
/* now we should have a valid function pointer */
if (f != NULL)
return f(argc, argv);
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: No valid subcommand given.\nValid subcommands:\n");
for (; cb->name != NULL; ++cb)
fprintf(stderr, " * %s\n", cb->name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long ppc_set_hwdebug(struct task_struct *child,
struct ppc_hw_breakpoint *bp_info)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
int len = 0;
struct thread_struct *thread = &(child->thread);
struct perf_event *bp;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT */
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
struct arch_hw_breakpoint brk;
#endif
if (bp_info->version != 1)
return -ENOTSUPP;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
/*
* Check for invalid flags and combinations
*/
if ((bp_info->trigger_type == 0) ||
(bp_info->trigger_type & ~(PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_EXECUTE |
PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_RW)) ||
(bp_info->addr_mode & ~PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_MASK) ||
(bp_info->condition_mode &
~(PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_MODE |
PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_BE_ALL)))
return -EINVAL;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS == 0
if (bp_info->condition_mode != PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE)
return -EINVAL;
#endif
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_EXECUTE) {
if ((bp_info->trigger_type != PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_EXECUTE) ||
(bp_info->condition_mode != PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE))
return -EINVAL;
return set_instruction_bp(child, bp_info);
}
if (bp_info->addr_mode == PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT)
return set_dac(child, bp_info);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
return set_dac_range(child, bp_info);
#else
return -EINVAL;
#endif
#else /* !CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS */
/*
* We only support one data breakpoint
*/
if ((bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_RW) == 0 ||
(bp_info->trigger_type & ~PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_RW) != 0 ||
bp_info->condition_mode != PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_NONE)
return -EINVAL;
if ((unsigned long)bp_info->addr >= TASK_SIZE)
return -EIO;
brk.address = bp_info->addr & ~7UL;
brk.type = HW_BRK_TYPE_TRANSLATE;
brk.len = 8;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ)
brk.type |= HW_BRK_TYPE_READ;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_WRITE)
brk.type |= HW_BRK_TYPE_WRITE;
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
/*
* Check if the request is for 'range' breakpoints. We can
* support it if range < 8 bytes.
*/
if (bp_info->addr_mode == PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_RANGE_INCLUSIVE)
len = bp_info->addr2 - bp_info->addr;
else if (bp_info->addr_mode == PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT)
len = 1;
else
return -EINVAL;
bp = thread->ptrace_bps[0];
if (bp)
return -ENOSPC;
/* Create a new breakpoint request if one doesn't exist already */
hw_breakpoint_init(&attr);
attr.bp_addr = (unsigned long)bp_info->addr & ~HW_BREAKPOINT_ALIGN;
attr.bp_len = len;
arch_bp_generic_fields(brk.type, &attr.bp_type);
thread->ptrace_bps[0] = bp = register_user_hw_breakpoint(&attr,
ptrace_triggered, NULL, child);
if (IS_ERR(bp)) {
thread->ptrace_bps[0] = NULL;
return PTR_ERR(bp);
}
return 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT */
if (bp_info->addr_mode != PPC_BREAKPOINT_MODE_EXACT)
return -EINVAL;
if (child->thread.hw_brk.address)
return -ENOSPC;
child->thread.hw_brk = brk;
return 1;
#endif /* !CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS */
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcRenderCompositeGlyphs (ClientPtr client)
{
GlyphSetPtr glyphSet;
GlyphSet gs;
PicturePtr pSrc, pDst;
PictFormatPtr pFormat;
GlyphListRec listsLocal[NLOCALDELTA];
GlyphListPtr lists, listsBase;
GlyphPtr glyphsLocal[NLOCALGLYPH];
Glyph glyph;
GlyphPtr *glyphs, *glyphsBase;
xGlyphElt *elt;
CARD8 *buffer, *end;
int nglyph;
int nlist;
int space;
int size;
int rc, n;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
switch (stuff->renderReqType) {
default: size = 1; break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs16: size = 2; break;
case X_RenderCompositeGlyphs32: size = 4; break;
}
if (!PictOpValid (stuff->op))
{
client->errorValue = stuff->op;
return BadValue;
}
VERIFY_PICTURE (pSrc, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pDst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pDst->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
if (pSrc->pDrawable && pSrc->pDrawable->pScreen != pDst->pDrawable->pScreen)
return BadMatch;
if (stuff->maskFormat)
{
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&pFormat, stuff->maskFormat,
PictFormatType, client, DixReadAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
}
else
pFormat = 0;
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&glyphSet, stuff->glyphset,
GlyphSetType, client, DixUseAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
buffer = (CARD8 *) (stuff + 1);
end = (CARD8 *) stuff + (client->req_len << 2);
nglyph = 0;
nlist = 0;
while (buffer + sizeof (xGlyphElt) < end)
{
elt = (xGlyphElt *) buffer;
buffer += sizeof (xGlyphElt);
if (elt->len == 0xff)
{
buffer += 4;
}
else
{
nlist++;
nglyph += elt->len;
space = size * elt->len;
if (space & 3)
space += 4 - (space & 3);
buffer += space;
}
}
if (nglyph <= NLOCALGLYPH)
glyphsBase = glyphsLocal;
else
{
glyphsBase = (GlyphPtr *) malloc(nglyph * sizeof (GlyphPtr));
if (!glyphsBase)
return BadAlloc;
}
if (nlist <= NLOCALDELTA)
listsBase = listsLocal;
else
{
listsBase = (GlyphListPtr) malloc(nlist * sizeof (GlyphListRec));
if (!listsBase)
return BadAlloc;
}
buffer = (CARD8 *) (stuff + 1);
glyphs = glyphsBase;
lists = listsBase;
while (buffer + sizeof (xGlyphElt) < end)
{
elt = (xGlyphElt *) buffer;
buffer += sizeof (xGlyphElt);
if (elt->len == 0xff)
{
if (buffer + sizeof (GlyphSet) < end)
{
memcpy(&gs, buffer, sizeof(GlyphSet));
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&glyphSet, gs,
GlyphSetType, client,
DixUseAccess);
if (rc != Success)
{
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
free(glyphsBase);
if (listsBase != listsLocal)
free(listsBase);
return rc;
}
}
buffer += 4;
}
else
{
lists->xOff = elt->deltax;
lists->yOff = elt->deltay;
lists->format = glyphSet->format;
lists->len = 0;
n = elt->len;
while (n--)
{
if (buffer + size <= end)
{
switch (size) {
case 1:
glyph = *((CARD8 *)buffer); break;
case 2:
glyph = *((CARD16 *)buffer); break;
case 4:
default:
glyph = *((CARD32 *)buffer); break;
}
if ((*glyphs = FindGlyph (glyphSet, glyph)))
{
lists->len++;
glyphs++;
}
}
buffer += size;
}
space = size * elt->len;
if (space & 3)
buffer += 4 - (space & 3);
lists++;
}
}
if (buffer > end)
return BadLength;
CompositeGlyphs (stuff->op,
pSrc,
pDst,
pFormat,
stuff->xSrc,
stuff->ySrc,
nlist,
listsBase,
glyphsBase);
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
free(glyphsBase);
if (listsBase != listsLocal)
free(listsBase);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SharedMemoryHandleProvider::GetHandleForInProcessAccess() {
{
base::AutoLock lock(mapping_lock_);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK_GE(map_ref_count_, 0);
++map_ref_count_;
#endif
if (!shared_memory_->memory()) {
CHECK(shared_memory_->Map(mapped_size_));
DVLOG(3) << __func__ << ": Mapped memory for in-process access @"
<< shared_memory_->memory() << '.';
}
}
return std::make_unique<Handle>(this);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void get_token(FILE *pnm_file, char *token)
{
int i = 0;
int ret;
/* remove white-space and comment lines */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
if (ret == '#') {
/* the rest of this line is a comment */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
}
while ((ret != '\n') && (ret != '\r') && (ret != EOF));
}
if (ret == EOF) break;
token[i] = (unsigned char) ret;
}
while ((token[i] == '\n') || (token[i] == '\r') || (token[i] == ' '));
/* read string */
do
{
ret = fgetc(pnm_file);
if (ret == EOF) break;
i++;
token[i] = (unsigned char) ret;
}
while ((token[i] != '\n') && (token[i] != '\r') && (token[i] != ' '));
token[i] = '\0';
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserViewRenderer::RequestDrawGL(bool wait_for_completion) {
return client_->RequestDrawGL(wait_for_completion);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_mnt_ns_file(struct dentry *dentry)
{
/* Is this a proxy for a mount namespace? */
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct proc_ns *ei;
if (!proc_ns_inode(inode))
return false;
ei = get_proc_ns(inode);
if (ei->ns_ops != &mntns_operations)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_getfh(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct svc_fh **getfh)
{
if (!cstate->current_fh.fh_dentry)
return nfserr_nofilehandle;
*getfh = &cstate->current_fh;
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Handle<JSArray> SliceImpl(Handle<JSObject> receiver,
uint32_t start, uint32_t end) {
Isolate* isolate = receiver->GetIsolate();
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store(receiver->elements(), isolate);
int result_len = end < start ? 0u : end - start;
Handle<JSArray> result_array = isolate->factory()->NewJSArray(
KindTraits::Kind, result_len, result_len);
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
Subclass::CopyElementsImpl(*backing_store, start, result_array->elements(),
KindTraits::Kind, 0, kPackedSizeNotKnown,
result_len);
Subclass::TryTransitionResultArrayToPacked(result_array);
return result_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN BTM_GetSecurityFlags (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 * p_sec_flags)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr)) != NULL)
{
*p_sec_flags = (UINT8) p_dev_rec->sec_flags;
return(TRUE);
}
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_GetSecurityFlags false");
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hostap_setup_dev(struct net_device *dev, local_info_t *local,
int type)
{
struct hostap_interface *iface;
iface = netdev_priv(dev);
ether_setup(dev);
/* kernel callbacks */
if (iface) {
/* Currently, we point to the proper spy_data only on
* the main_dev. This could be fixed. Jean II */
iface->wireless_data.spy_data = &iface->spy_data;
dev->wireless_data = &iface->wireless_data;
}
dev->wireless_handlers = &hostap_iw_handler_def;
dev->watchdog_timeo = TX_TIMEOUT;
switch(type) {
case HOSTAP_INTERFACE_AP:
dev->tx_queue_len = 0; /* use main radio device queue */
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_mgmt_netdev_ops;
dev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211;
dev->header_ops = &hostap_80211_ops;
break;
case HOSTAP_INTERFACE_MASTER:
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_master_ops;
break;
default:
dev->tx_queue_len = 0; /* use main radio device queue */
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_netdev_ops;
}
dev->mtu = local->mtu;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &prism2_ethtool_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pfkey_delete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct km_event c;
int err;
if (!ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_SA-1] ||
!present_and_same_family(ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC-1],
ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST-1]))
return -EINVAL;
x = pfkey_xfrm_state_lookup(net, hdr, ext_hdrs);
if (x == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
if ((err = security_xfrm_state_delete(x)))
goto out;
if (xfrm_state_kern(x)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
err = xfrm_state_delete(x);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
c.seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq;
c.portid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid;
c.event = XFRM_MSG_DELSA;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
out:
xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, err ? 0 : 1,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current), 0);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfsd_print_count(struct nfs4_client *clp, unsigned int count,
const char *type)
{
char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
rpc_ntop((struct sockaddr *)&clp->cl_addr, buf, sizeof(buf));
printk(KERN_INFO "NFS Client: %s has %u %s\n", buf, count, type);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hns_rcb_get_common_regs_count(void)
{
return HNS_RCB_COMMON_DUMP_REG_NUM;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::paintTransparencyGroup(GfxState * /*state*/, double * /*bbox*/) {
cairo_set_source (cairo, group);
if (!mask) {
if (shape) {
cairo_save (cairo);
/* OPERATOR_SOURCE w/ a mask is defined as (src IN mask) ADD (dest OUT mask)
* however our source has already been clipped to mask so we only need to
* do ADD and OUT */
/* clear the shape mask */
cairo_set_source (cairo, shape);
cairo_set_operator (cairo, CAIRO_OPERATOR_DEST_OUT);
cairo_paint (cairo);
cairo_set_operator (cairo, CAIRO_OPERATOR_ADD);
cairo_set_source (cairo, group);
cairo_paint (cairo);
cairo_restore (cairo);
cairo_pattern_destroy (shape);
shape = NULL;
} else {
cairo_paint_with_alpha (cairo, fill_opacity);
}
cairo_status_t status = cairo_status(cairo);
if (status)
printf("BAD status: %s\n", cairo_status_to_string(status));
} else {
cairo_mask(cairo, mask);
cairo_pattern_destroy(mask);
mask = NULL;
}
popTransparencyGroup();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tm_recheckpoint_new_task(struct task_struct *new)
{
unsigned long msr;
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return;
/* Recheckpoint the registers of the thread we're about to switch to.
*
* If the task was using FP, we non-lazily reload both the original and
* the speculative FP register states. This is because the kernel
* doesn't see if/when a TM rollback occurs, so if we take an FP
* unavoidable later, we are unable to determine which set of FP regs
* need to be restored.
*/
if (!new->thread.regs)
return;
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(new->thread.regs->msr)){
tm_restore_sprs(&new->thread);
return;
}
msr = new->thread.ckpt_regs.msr;
/* Recheckpoint to restore original checkpointed register state. */
TM_DEBUG("*** tm_recheckpoint of pid %d "
"(new->msr 0x%lx, new->origmsr 0x%lx)\n",
new->pid, new->thread.regs->msr, msr);
/* This loads the checkpointed FP/VEC state, if used */
tm_recheckpoint(&new->thread, msr);
/* This loads the speculative FP/VEC state, if used */
if (msr & MSR_FP) {
do_load_up_transact_fpu(&new->thread);
new->thread.regs->msr |=
(MSR_FP | new->thread.fpexc_mode);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
do_load_up_transact_altivec(&new->thread);
new->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_VEC;
}
#endif
/* We may as well turn on VSX too since all the state is restored now */
if (msr & MSR_VSX)
new->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_VSX;
TM_DEBUG("*** tm_recheckpoint of pid %d complete "
"(kernel msr 0x%lx)\n",
new->pid, mfmsr());
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks
Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This
results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs
when not in suspend mode.
The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to
deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack
pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we
must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack
pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return
directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through
__switch_to().
Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad
userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will
result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the
process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This
tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has
already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode.
Whee!
This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended
before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state
away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the
additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing
exception.
Found using syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 56,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int eaten = -1;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq)
goto drop;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
__skb_pull(skb, th->doff * 4);
TCP_ECN_accept_cwr(tp, skb);
tp->rx_opt.dsack = 0;
/* Queue data for delivery to the user.
* Packets in sequence go to the receive queue.
* Out of sequence packets to the out_of_order_queue.
*/
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt) {
if (tcp_receive_window(tp) == 0)
goto out_of_window;
/* Ok. In sequence. In window. */
if (tp->ucopy.task == current &&
tp->copied_seq == tp->rcv_nxt && tp->ucopy.len &&
sock_owned_by_user(sk) && !tp->urg_data) {
int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len,
tp->ucopy.len);
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
local_bh_enable();
if (!skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, tp->ucopy.iov, chunk)) {
tp->ucopy.len -= chunk;
tp->copied_seq += chunk;
eaten = (chunk == skb->len);
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
}
local_bh_disable();
}
if (eaten <= 0) {
queue_and_out:
if (eaten < 0 &&
tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize))
goto drop;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
if (skb->len)
tcp_event_data_recv(sk, skb);
if (th->fin)
tcp_fin(sk);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) {
tcp_ofo_queue(sk);
/* RFC2581. 4.2. SHOULD send immediate ACK, when
* gap in queue is filled.
*/
if (skb_queue_empty(&tp->out_of_order_queue))
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.pingpong = 0;
}
if (tp->rx_opt.num_sacks)
tcp_sack_remove(tp);
tcp_fast_path_check(sk);
if (eaten > 0)
__kfree_skb(skb);
else if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
return;
}
if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
/* A retransmit, 2nd most common case. Force an immediate ack. */
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_DELAYEDACKLOST);
tcp_dsack_set(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
out_of_window:
tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk);
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
drop:
__kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
/* Out of window. F.e. zero window probe. */
if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt + tcp_receive_window(tp)))
goto out_of_window;
tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk);
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
/* Partial packet, seq < rcv_next < end_seq */
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "partial packet: rcv_next %X seq %X - %X\n",
tp->rcv_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
tcp_dsack_set(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt);
/* If window is closed, drop tail of packet. But after
* remembering D-SACK for its head made in previous line.
*/
if (!tcp_receive_window(tp))
goto out_of_window;
goto queue_and_out;
}
TCP_ECN_check_ce(tp, skb);
if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize))
goto drop;
/* Disable header prediction. */
tp->pred_flags = 0;
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "out of order segment: rcv_next %X seq %X - %X\n",
tp->rcv_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
if (!skb_peek(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) {
/* Initial out of order segment, build 1 SACK. */
if (tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
tp->rx_opt.num_sacks = 1;
tp->selective_acks[0].start_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
tp->selective_acks[0].end_seq =
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
}
__skb_queue_head(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
} else {
struct sk_buff *skb1 = skb_peek_tail(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
u32 seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
u32 end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
if (seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq) {
__skb_queue_after(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1, skb);
if (!tp->rx_opt.num_sacks ||
tp->selective_acks[0].end_seq != seq)
goto add_sack;
/* Common case: data arrive in order after hole. */
tp->selective_acks[0].end_seq = end_seq;
return;
}
/* Find place to insert this segment. */
while (1) {
if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq, seq))
break;
if (skb_queue_is_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1)) {
skb1 = NULL;
break;
}
skb1 = skb_queue_prev(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1);
}
/* Do skb overlap to previous one? */
if (skb1 && before(seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq)) {
if (!after(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq)) {
/* All the bits are present. Drop. */
__kfree_skb(skb);
tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq, end_seq);
goto add_sack;
}
if (after(seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq)) {
/* Partial overlap. */
tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq);
} else {
if (skb_queue_is_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue,
skb1))
skb1 = NULL;
else
skb1 = skb_queue_prev(
&tp->out_of_order_queue,
skb1);
}
}
if (!skb1)
__skb_queue_head(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
else
__skb_queue_after(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1, skb);
/* And clean segments covered by new one as whole. */
while (!skb_queue_is_last(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb)) {
skb1 = skb_queue_next(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
if (!after(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq))
break;
if (before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq)) {
tcp_dsack_extend(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq,
end_seq);
break;
}
__skb_unlink(skb1, &tp->out_of_order_queue);
tcp_dsack_extend(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq);
__kfree_skb(skb1);
}
add_sack:
if (tcp_is_sack(tp))
tcp_sack_new_ofo_skb(sk, seq, end_seq);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExportTIFF_Date ( const SXMPMeta & xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp, TIFF_Manager * tiff, XMP_Uns16 mainID )
{
XMP_Uns8 mainIFD = kTIFF_ExifIFD;
XMP_Uns16 fracID=0;
switch ( mainID ) {
case kTIFF_DateTime : mainIFD = kTIFF_PrimaryIFD; fracID = kTIFF_SubSecTime; break;
case kTIFF_DateTimeOriginal : fracID = kTIFF_SubSecTimeOriginal; break;
case kTIFF_DateTimeDigitized : fracID = kTIFF_SubSecTimeDigitized; break;
}
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
std::string xmpStr;
bool foundXMP = xmp.GetProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp, &xmpStr, 0 );
if ( ! foundXMP ) {
tiff->DeleteTag ( mainIFD, mainID );
tiff->DeleteTag ( kTIFF_ExifIFD, fracID ); // ! The subseconds are always in the Exif IFD.
return;
}
XMP_DateTime xmpBin;
SXMPUtils::ConvertToDate ( xmpStr.c_str(), &xmpBin );
char buffer[24];
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%04d:%02d:%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", // AUDIT: Use of sizeof(buffer) is safe.
xmpBin.year, xmpBin.month, xmpBin.day, xmpBin.hour, xmpBin.minute, xmpBin.second );
size_t xmpLen = xmpStr.size();
if ( xmpLen < 18 ) {
buffer[17] = buffer[18] = ' ';
if ( xmpLen < 15 ) {
buffer[14] = buffer[15] = ' ';
if ( xmpLen < 12 ) {
buffer[11] = buffer[12] = ' ';
if ( xmpLen < 9 ) {
buffer[8] = buffer[9] = ' ';
if ( xmpLen < 6 ) {
buffer[5] = buffer[6] = ' ';
if ( xmpLen < 1 ) {
buffer[0] = buffer[1] = buffer[2] = buffer[3] = ' ';
}
}
}
}
}
}
tiff->SetTag_ASCII ( mainIFD, mainID, buffer );
if ( xmpBin.nanoSecond == 0 ) {
tiff->DeleteTag ( kTIFF_ExifIFD, fracID );
} else {
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%09d", xmpBin.nanoSecond ); // AUDIT: Use of sizeof(buffer) is safe.
for ( size_t i = strlen(buffer)-1; i > 0; --i ) {
if ( buffer[i] != '0' ) break;
buffer[i] = 0; // Strip trailing zero digits.
}
tiff->SetTag_ASCII ( kTIFF_ExifIFD, fracID, buffer ); // ! The subseconds are always in the Exif IFD.
}
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ExportTIFF_Date
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct vfsmount *new,
int *new_mnt_flags)
{
int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags;
struct mount *mnt;
bool visible = false;
down_read(&namespace_sem);
list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) {
struct mount *child;
int mnt_flags;
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != new->mnt_sb->s_type)
continue;
/* This mount is not fully visible if it's root directory
* is not the root directory of the filesystem.
*/
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_root != mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_root)
continue;
/* A local view of the mount flags */
mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags;
/* Don't miss readonly hidden in the superblock flags */
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
/* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive
* than the proposed new mount.
*/
if ((mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
!(new_flags & MNT_READONLY))
continue;
if ((mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
((mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (new_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK)))
continue;
/* This mount is not fully visible if there are any
* locked child mounts that cover anything except for
* empty directories.
*/
list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode;
/* Only worry about locked mounts */
if (!(child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED))
continue;
/* Is the directory permanetly empty? */
if (!is_empty_dir_inode(inode))
goto next;
}
/* Preserve the locked attributes */
*new_mnt_flags |= mnt_flags & (MNT_LOCK_READONLY | \
MNT_LOCK_ATIME);
visible = true;
goto found;
next: ;
}
found:
up_read(&namespace_sem);
return visible;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmat, int, shmid, char __user *, shmaddr, int, shmflg)
{
unsigned long ret;
long err;
err = do_shmat(shmid, shmaddr, shmflg, &ret, SHMLBA);
if (err)
return err;
force_successful_syscall_return();
return (long)ret;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmp_extents_forward(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct uid_gid_extent *e1 = a;
const struct uid_gid_extent *e2 = b;
if (e1->first < e2->first)
return -1;
if (e1->first > e2->first)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 76,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_pmu_rotate_stop(struct pmu *pmu)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = this_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context);
WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
list_del_init(&cpuctx->rotation_list);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void GetDrawInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info,DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
char
*next_token;
const char
*option;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
/*
Initialize draw attributes.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
(void) memset(draw_info,0,sizeof(*draw_info));
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
GetAffineMatrix(&draw_info->affine);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#000F",AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#FFF0",AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
draw_info->stroke_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
draw_info->stroke_width=1.0;
draw_info->fill_rule=EvenOddRule;
draw_info->alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
draw_info->fill_alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
draw_info->stroke_alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
draw_info->linecap=ButtCap;
draw_info->linejoin=MiterJoin;
draw_info->miterlimit=10;
draw_info->decorate=NoDecoration;
draw_info->pointsize=12.0;
draw_info->undercolor.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
draw_info->compose=OverCompositeOp;
draw_info->render=MagickTrue;
draw_info->clip_path=MagickFalse;
draw_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
if (clone_info->font != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->font=AcquireString(clone_info->font);
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->density=AcquireString(clone_info->density);
draw_info->text_antialias=clone_info->antialias;
if (fabs(clone_info->pointsize) >= MagickEpsilon)
draw_info->pointsize=clone_info->pointsize;
draw_info->border_color=clone_info->border_color;
if (clone_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->server_name=AcquireString(clone_info->server_name);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"direction");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->direction=(DirectionType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDirectionOptions,MagickFalse,option);
else
draw_info->direction=UndefinedDirection;
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"encoding");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->encoding,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"family");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->family,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"fill");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"gravity");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->gravity=(GravityType) ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interline-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interline_spacing=StringToDouble(option,&next_token);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"interword-spacing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->interword_spacing=StringToDouble(option,&next_token);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"kerning");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->kerning=StringToDouble(option,&next_token);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"stroke");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"strokewidth");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->stroke_width=StringToDouble(option,&next_token);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"style");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
draw_info->style=(StyleType) ParseCommandOption(MagickStyleOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"undercolor");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
(void) QueryColorCompliance(option,AllCompliance,&draw_info->undercolor,
exception);
option=GetImageOption(clone_info,"weight");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
ssize_t
weight;
weight=ParseCommandOption(MagickWeightOptions,MagickFalse,option);
if (weight == -1)
weight=(ssize_t) StringToUnsignedLong(option);
draw_info->weight=(size_t) weight;
}
exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
draw_info->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ClipPixelCacheNexus(Image *image,
NexusInfo *nexus_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
NexusInfo
**restrict clip_nexus,
**restrict image_nexus;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict r;
register IndexPacket
*restrict nexus_indexes,
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict p,
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Apply clip mask.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->clip_mask == (Image *) NULL) ||
(image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
return(MagickTrue);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
if (cache_info == (Cache) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
image_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(1);
clip_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(1);
if ((image_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL) ||
(clip_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL))
ThrowBinaryException(CacheError,"UnableToGetCacheNexus",image->filename);
p=GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,nexus_info->region.x,nexus_info->region.y,
nexus_info->region.width,nexus_info->region.height,image_nexus[0],
exception);
indexes=image_nexus[0]->indexes;
q=nexus_info->pixels;
nexus_indexes=nexus_info->indexes;
r=GetVirtualPixelsFromNexus(image->clip_mask,MaskVirtualPixelMethod,
nexus_info->region.x,nexus_info->region.y,nexus_info->region.width,
nexus_info->region.height,clip_nexus[0],exception);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) nexus_info->region.width*
nexus_info->region.height;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if ((p == (PixelPacket *) NULL) || (r == (const PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
if (GetPixelIntensity(image,r) > (QuantumRange/2))
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
if (cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse)
SetPixelIndex(nexus_indexes+i,GetPixelIndex(indexes+i));
}
p++;
q++;
r++;
}
clip_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(clip_nexus,1);
image_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(image_nexus,1);
if (i < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 73,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool netlink_compare(struct net *net, struct sock *sk)
{
return net_eq(sock_net(sk), net);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CompleteRead(net::URLRequest* request,
int* bytes_read) {
if (!request || !request->status().is_success()) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
bool defer = false;
if (!info->resource_handler()->OnReadCompleted(info->GetRequestID(),
bytes_read, &defer)) {
CancelRequestInternal(request, false);
return false;
}
if (defer)
PauseRequest(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID(), true);
return *bytes_read != 0;
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size,
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name )
{
size_t i;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;
const char *sep = "";
size_t sep_len = 0;
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( cur->buf.len + sep_len >= n )
{
*p = '\0';
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
n -= cur->buf.len + sep_len;
for( i = 0; i < sep_len; i++ )
*p++ = sep[i];
for( i = 0; i < cur->buf.len; i++ )
*p++ = cur->buf.p[i];
sep = ", ";
sep_len = 2;
cur = cur->next;
}
*p = '\0';
*size = n;
*buf = p;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 61,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int _array_init(zval *arg, uint size ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC) /* {{{ */
{
ALLOC_HASHTABLE_REL(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg));
_zend_hash_init(Z_ARRVAL_P(arg), size, ZVAL_PTR_DTOR, 0 ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(arg) = IS_ARRAY;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cbprintf(vcbprintf_callback user_callback, void *user_data, const char *fmt, ...) {
va_list argp;
va_start(argp, fmt);
vcbprintf(user_callback,user_data, fmt, argp);
va_end(argp);
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 82,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ReloadInternal(WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
bool ignore_cache) {
TabContents* current_tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (current_tab && current_tab->showing_interstitial_page()) {
NavigationEntry* entry = current_tab->controller().GetActiveEntry();
DCHECK(entry); // Should exist if interstitial is showing.
OpenURL(entry->url(), GURL(), disposition, PageTransition::RELOAD);
return;
}
TabContents* tab = GetOrCloneTabForDisposition(disposition);
if (!tab->FocusLocationBarByDefault())
tab->Focus();
if (ignore_cache)
tab->controller().ReloadIgnoringCache(true);
else
tab->controller().Reload(true);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: aura::Window* CreateWindowInWatchedContainer(const InitParams& params) {
aura::test::TestWindowDelegate* delegate = NULL;
if (!params.can_maximize) {
delegate = aura::test::TestWindowDelegate::CreateSelfDestroyingDelegate();
delegate->set_window_component(HTCAPTION);
if (!params.max_size.IsEmpty())
delegate->set_maximum_size(params.max_size);
}
aura::Window* window = aura::test::CreateTestWindowWithDelegateAndType(
delegate, params.type, 0, params.bounds, NULL, params.show_on_creation);
int32_t behavior = aura::client::kResizeBehaviorNone;
behavior |= params.can_resize ? aura::client::kResizeBehaviorCanResize : 0;
behavior |=
params.can_maximize ? aura::client::kResizeBehaviorCanMaximize : 0;
window->SetProperty(aura::client::kResizeBehaviorKey, behavior);
aura::Window* container =
wm::GetSwitchableContainersForRoot(Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(),
/*active_desk_only=*/true)[0];
container->AddChild(window);
return window;
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutocompleteInput::PageClassification OmniboxEditModel::ClassifyPage() const {
if (!delegate_->CurrentPageExists())
return AutocompleteInput::OTHER;
if (delegate_->IsInstantNTP()) {
return (focus_source_ == FAKEBOX) ?
AutocompleteInput::INSTANT_NTP_WITH_FAKEBOX_AS_STARTING_FOCUS :
AutocompleteInput::INSTANT_NTP_WITH_OMNIBOX_AS_STARTING_FOCUS;
}
const GURL& gurl = delegate_->GetURL();
if (!gurl.is_valid())
return AutocompleteInput::INVALID_SPEC;
const std::string& url = gurl.spec();
if (url == chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL)
return AutocompleteInput::NTP;
if (url == content::kAboutBlankURL)
return AutocompleteInput::BLANK;
if (url == profile()->GetPrefs()->GetString(prefs::kHomePage))
return AutocompleteInput::HOME_PAGE;
if (controller_->GetToolbarModel()->WouldPerformSearchTermReplacement(true))
return AutocompleteInput::SEARCH_RESULT_PAGE_DOING_SEARCH_TERM_REPLACEMENT;
if (delegate_->IsSearchResultsPage())
return AutocompleteInput::SEARCH_RESULT_PAGE_NO_SEARCH_TERM_REPLACEMENT;
return AutocompleteInput::OTHER;
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_job_status(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 status;
static const int * hf_status[] = {
&hf_job_status_user_intervention,
&hf_job_status_blocked,
&hf_job_status_deleted,
&hf_job_status_printed,
&hf_job_status_paperout,
&hf_job_status_offline,
&hf_job_status_printing,
&hf_job_status_spooling,
&hf_job_status_deleting,
&hf_job_status_error,
&hf_job_status_paused,
NULL
};
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, NULL, di, drep, -1, &status);
proto_tree_add_bitmask_value_with_flags(tree, tvb, offset - 4, hf_job_status,
ett_job_status, hf_status, status, BMT_NO_APPEND);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 52,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask(
const TaskParamsForDidGetQuota& params,
quota::QuotaStatusCode status,
int64 usage, int64 quota) {
if (status != quota::kQuotaStatusOk) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Got unexpected quota error : " << status;
params.error_callback.Run();
return;
}
operation_context_.set_allowed_bytes_growth(quota - usage);
scoped_quota_notifier_.reset(new ScopedQuotaNotifier(
file_system_context(), params.origin, params.type));
params.task.Run();
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void scheduleBeginFrameAndCommit()
{
CCMainThread::postTask(m_proxy->createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread());
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_SDPVTL( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_Long A, B, C;
FT_UShort p1, p2; /* was FT_Int in pas type ERROR */
FT_Byte opcode = exc->opcode;
p1 = (FT_UShort)args[1];
p2 = (FT_UShort)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( p2, exc->zp1.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( p1, exc->zp2.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
{
FT_Vector* v1 = exc->zp1.org + p2;
FT_Vector* v2 = exc->zp2.org + p1;
A = SUB_LONG( v1->x, v2->x );
B = SUB_LONG( v1->y, v2->y );
/* If v1 == v2, SDPvTL behaves the same as */
/* SVTCA[X], respectively. */
/* */
/* Confirmed by Greg Hitchcock. */
if ( A == 0 && B == 0 )
{
A = 0x4000;
opcode = 0;
}
}
if ( ( opcode & 1 ) != 0 )
{
C = B; /* counter clockwise rotation */
B = A;
A = NEG_LONG( C );
}
Normalize( A, B, &exc->GS.dualVector );
{
FT_Vector* v1 = exc->zp1.cur + p2;
FT_Vector* v2 = exc->zp2.cur + p1;
A = SUB_LONG( v1->x, v2->x );
B = SUB_LONG( v1->y, v2->y );
if ( A == 0 && B == 0 )
{
A = 0x4000;
opcode = 0;
}
}
if ( ( opcode & 1 ) != 0 )
{
C = B; /* counter clockwise rotation */
B = A;
A = NEG_LONG( C );
}
Normalize( A, B, &exc->GS.projVector );
Compute_Funcs( exc );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ahci_start_transfer(IDEDMA *dma)
{
AHCIDevice *ad = DO_UPCAST(AHCIDevice, dma, dma);
IDEState *s = &ad->port.ifs[0];
uint32_t size = (uint32_t)(s->data_end - s->data_ptr);
/* write == ram -> device */
uint32_t opts = le32_to_cpu(ad->cur_cmd->opts);
int is_write = opts & AHCI_CMD_WRITE;
int is_atapi = opts & AHCI_CMD_ATAPI;
int has_sglist = 0;
if (is_atapi && !ad->done_atapi_packet) {
/* already prepopulated iobuffer */
ad->done_atapi_packet = true;
goto out;
}
if (!ahci_populate_sglist(ad, &s->sg, 0)) {
has_sglist = 1;
}
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%sing %d bytes on %s w/%s sglist\n",
is_write ? "writ" : "read", size, is_atapi ? "atapi" : "ata",
has_sglist ? "" : "o");
if (has_sglist && size) {
if (is_write) {
dma_buf_write(s->data_ptr, size, &s->sg);
} else {
dma_buf_read(s->data_ptr, size, &s->sg);
}
}
/* update number of transferred bytes */
ad->cur_cmd->status = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(ad->cur_cmd->status) + size);
out:
/* declare that we processed everything */
s->data_ptr = s->data_end;
if (has_sglist) {
qemu_sglist_destroy(&s->sg);
}
s->end_transfer_func(s);
if (!(s->status & DRQ_STAT)) {
/* done with DMA */
ahci_trigger_irq(ad->hba, ad, PORT_IRQ_STAT_DSS);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetMediaPlayerManager(
RendererMediaPlayerManagerInterface* media_player_manager) {
cast_impl_.SetMediaPlayerManager(media_player_manager);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_snmp_parse_oid(zval *object, int st, struct objid_query *objid_query, zval **oid, zval **type, zval **value TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *pptr;
HashPosition pos_oid, pos_type, pos_value;
zval **tmp_oid, **tmp_type, **tmp_value;
if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) != IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_ISREF_PP(oid)) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(oid);
}
convert_to_string_ex(oid);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), &pos_oid);
}
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) != IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_ISREF_PP(type)) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(type);
}
convert_to_string_ex(type);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(type), &pos_type);
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) != IS_ARRAY) {
if (Z_ISREF_PP(value)) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(value);
}
convert_to_string_ex(value);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(value), &pos_value);
}
}
objid_query->count = 0;
objid_query->array_output = ((st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) ? TRUE : FALSE);
if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) == IS_STRING) {
objid_query->vars = (snmpobjarg *)emalloc(sizeof(snmpobjarg));
if (objid_query->vars == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while parsing oid: %s", strerror(errno));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].oid = Z_STRVAL_PP(oid);
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_STRING && Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(type) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Bogus type '%s', should be single char, got %u", Z_STRVAL_PP(type), Z_STRLEN_PP(type));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
pptr = Z_STRVAL_PP(type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_PP(value);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Single objid and multiple type or values are not supported");
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
objid_query->count++;
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(oid) == IS_ARRAY) { /* we got objid array */
if (zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Got empty OID array");
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars = (snmpobjarg *)emalloc(sizeof(snmpobjarg) * zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid)));
if (objid_query->vars == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "emalloc() failed while parsing oid array: %s", strerror(errno));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->array_output = ( (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) ? FALSE : TRUE );
for ( zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), &pos_oid);
zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), (void **) &tmp_oid, &pos_oid) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(oid), &pos_oid) ) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_oid);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].oid = Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid);
if (st & SNMP_CMD_SET) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_STRING) {
pptr = Z_STRVAL_PP(type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(type) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(type), (void **) &tmp_type, &pos_type)) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_type);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp_type) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s': bogus type '%s', should be single char, got %u", Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid), Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_type), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp_type));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
pptr = Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_type);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].type = *pptr;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(type), &pos_type);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s': no type set", Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_STRING) {
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_PP(value);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_ARRAY) {
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(value), (void **) &tmp_value, &pos_value)) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp_value);
objid_query->vars[objid_query->count].value = Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_value);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_PP(value), &pos_value);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "'%s': no value set", Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp_oid));
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
objid_query->count++;
}
}
/* now parse all OIDs */
if (st & SNMP_CMD_WALK) {
if (objid_query->count > 1) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Multi OID walks are not supported!");
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = MAX_NAME_LEN;
if (strlen(objid_query->vars[0].oid)) { /* on a walk, an empty string means top of tree - no error */
if (!snmp_parse_oid(objid_query->vars[0].oid, objid_query->vars[0].name, &(objid_query->vars[0].name_length))) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Invalid object identifier: %s", objid_query->vars[0].oid);
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
} else {
memmove((char *)objid_query->vars[0].name, (char *)objid_mib, sizeof(objid_mib));
objid_query->vars[0].name_length = sizeof(objid_mib) / sizeof(oid);
}
} else {
for (objid_query->offset = 0; objid_query->offset < objid_query->count; objid_query->offset++) {
objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length = MAX_OID_LEN;
if (!snmp_parse_oid(objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].oid, objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name, &(objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].name_length))) {
php_snmp_error(object, NULL TSRMLS_CC, PHP_SNMP_ERRNO_OID_PARSING_ERROR, "Invalid object identifier: %s", objid_query->vars[objid_query->offset].oid);
efree(objid_query->vars);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
objid_query->offset = 0;
objid_query->step = objid_query->count;
return (objid_query->count > 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 164,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GfxCalRGBColorSpace::getGray(GfxColor *color, GfxGray *gray) {
GfxRGB rgb;
#ifdef USE_CMS
if (XYZ2DisplayTransform != NULL && displayPixelType == PT_GRAY) {
Guchar out[gfxColorMaxComps];
double in[gfxColorMaxComps];
double X, Y, Z;
getXYZ(color,&X,&Y,&Z);
in[0] = clip01(X);
in[1] = clip01(Y);
in[2] = clip01(Z);
XYZ2DisplayTransform->doTransform(in,out,1);
*gray = byteToCol(out[0]);
return;
}
#endif
getRGB(color, &rgb);
*gray = clip01((GfxColorComp)(0.299 * rgb.r +
0.587 * rgb.g +
0.114 * rgb.b + 0.5));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int logi_dj_ll_parse(struct hid_device *hid)
{
struct dj_device *djdev = hid->driver_data;
unsigned int rsize = 0;
char *rdesc;
int retval;
dbg_hid("%s\n", __func__);
djdev->hdev->version = 0x0111;
djdev->hdev->country = 0x00;
rdesc = kmalloc(MAX_RDESC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdesc)
return -ENOMEM;
if (djdev->reports_supported & STD_KEYBOARD) {
dbg_hid("%s: sending a kbd descriptor, reports_supported: %x\n",
__func__, djdev->reports_supported);
rdcat(rdesc, &rsize, kbd_descriptor, sizeof(kbd_descriptor));
}
if (djdev->reports_supported & STD_MOUSE) {
dbg_hid("%s: sending a mouse descriptor, reports_supported: "
"%x\n", __func__, djdev->reports_supported);
rdcat(rdesc, &rsize, mse_descriptor, sizeof(mse_descriptor));
}
if (djdev->reports_supported & MULTIMEDIA) {
dbg_hid("%s: sending a multimedia report descriptor: %x\n",
__func__, djdev->reports_supported);
rdcat(rdesc, &rsize, consumer_descriptor, sizeof(consumer_descriptor));
}
if (djdev->reports_supported & POWER_KEYS) {
dbg_hid("%s: sending a power keys report descriptor: %x\n",
__func__, djdev->reports_supported);
rdcat(rdesc, &rsize, syscontrol_descriptor, sizeof(syscontrol_descriptor));
}
if (djdev->reports_supported & MEDIA_CENTER) {
dbg_hid("%s: sending a media center report descriptor: %x\n",
__func__, djdev->reports_supported);
rdcat(rdesc, &rsize, media_descriptor, sizeof(media_descriptor));
}
if (djdev->reports_supported & KBD_LEDS) {
dbg_hid("%s: need to send kbd leds report descriptor: %x\n",
__func__, djdev->reports_supported);
}
retval = hid_parse_report(hid, rdesc, rsize);
kfree(rdesc);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::DocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame() {
if (!pending_request_.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "DidStopLoading called even though no pending request.";
return;
}
AddLoadingSignal("DocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame");
snapshot_controller_->DocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 139,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dispatchCdmaSubscriptionSource(Parcel& p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
RIL_RadioState state = CALL_ONSTATEREQUEST((RIL_SOCKET_ID)pRI->socket_id);
if ((RADIO_STATE_UNAVAILABLE == state) || (RADIO_STATE_OFF == state)) {
RIL_onRequestComplete(pRI, RIL_E_RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE, NULL, 0);
}
if (RADIO_STATE_ON == state) {
dispatchVoid(p, pRI);
return;
}
cdmaSubscriptionSource = decodeCdmaSubscriptionSource(state);
if (cdmaSubscriptionSource < 0)
RIL_onRequestComplete(pRI, RIL_E_GENERIC_FAILURE, NULL, 0);
else
RIL_onRequestComplete(pRI, RIL_E_SUCCESS, &cdmaSubscriptionSource, sizeof(int));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 162,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: local unsigned long crc32_comb(unsigned long crc1, unsigned long crc2,
size_t len2)
{
int n;
unsigned long row;
unsigned long even[32]; /* even-power-of-two zeros operator */
unsigned long odd[32]; /* odd-power-of-two zeros operator */
/* degenerate case */
if (len2 == 0)
return crc1;
/* put operator for one zero bit in odd */
odd[0] = 0xedb88320UL; /* CRC-32 polynomial */
row = 1;
for (n = 1; n < 32; n++) {
odd[n] = row;
row <<= 1;
}
/* put operator for two zero bits in even */
gf2_matrix_square(even, odd);
/* put operator for four zero bits in odd */
gf2_matrix_square(odd, even);
/* apply len2 zeros to crc1 (first square will put the operator for one
zero byte, eight zero bits, in even) */
do {
/* apply zeros operator for this bit of len2 */
gf2_matrix_square(even, odd);
if (len2 & 1)
crc1 = gf2_matrix_times(even, crc1);
len2 >>= 1;
/* if no more bits set, then done */
if (len2 == 0)
break;
/* another iteration of the loop with odd and even swapped */
gf2_matrix_square(odd, even);
if (len2 & 1)
crc1 = gf2_matrix_times(odd, crc1);
len2 >>= 1;
/* if no more bits set, then done */
} while (len2 != 0);
/* return combined crc */
crc1 ^= crc2;
return crc1;
}
Commit Message: When decompressing with -N or -NT, strip any path from header name.
This uses the path of the compressed file combined with the name
from the header as the name of the decompressed output file. Any
path information in the header name is stripped. This avoids a
possible vulnerability where absolute or descending paths are put
in the gzip header.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 44,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int me;
int cpu = vcpu->cpu;
kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
me = get_cpu();
if (cpu != me && (unsigned)cpu < nr_cpu_ids && cpu_online(cpu))
if (kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(vcpu))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
put_cpu();
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::CallOnIO(
GpuProcessKind kind,
bool force_create,
const base::Callback<void(GpuProcessHost*)>& callback) {
#if !defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK_NE(kind, GpuProcessHost::GPU_PROCESS_KIND_UNSANDBOXED);
#endif
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&RunCallbackOnIO, kind, force_create, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void callback_thread_event(bt_cb_thread_evt event) {
JavaVM* vm = AndroidRuntime::getJavaVM();
if (event == ASSOCIATE_JVM) {
JavaVMAttachArgs args;
char name[] = "BT Service Callback Thread";
args.version = JNI_VERSION_1_6;
args.name = name;
args.group = NULL;
vm->AttachCurrentThread(&callbackEnv, &args);
ALOGV("Callback thread attached: %p", callbackEnv);
} else if (event == DISASSOCIATE_JVM) {
if (!checkCallbackThread()) {
ALOGE("Callback: '%s' is not called on the correct thread", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
vm->DetachCurrentThread();
}
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CustomButton::SetAnimationDuration(int duration) {
hover_animation_->SetSlideDuration(duration);
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_agg_finalfn(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
JsonAggState *state;
/* cannot be called directly because of internal-type argument */
Assert(AggCheckCallContext(fcinfo, NULL));
state = PG_ARGISNULL(0) ?
NULL :
(JsonAggState *) PG_GETARG_POINTER(0);
/* NULL result for no rows in, as is standard with aggregates */
if (state == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
/* Else return state with appropriate array terminator added */
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(catenate_stringinfo_string(state->str, "]"));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_resetCStream_internal(ZSTD_CStream* cctx,
const void* const dict, size_t const dictSize, ZSTD_dictContentType_e const dictContentType,
const ZSTD_CDict* const cdict,
ZSTD_CCtx_params params, unsigned long long const pledgedSrcSize)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_resetCStream_internal");
/* Finalize the compression parameters */
params.cParams = ZSTD_getCParamsFromCCtxParams(¶ms, pledgedSrcSize, dictSize);
/* params are supposed to be fully validated at this point */
assert(!ZSTD_isError(ZSTD_checkCParams(params.cParams)));
assert(!((dict) && (cdict))); /* either dict or cdict, not both */
CHECK_F( ZSTD_compressBegin_internal(cctx,
dict, dictSize, dictContentType, ZSTD_dtlm_fast,
cdict,
params, pledgedSrcSize,
ZSTDb_buffered) );
cctx->inToCompress = 0;
cctx->inBuffPos = 0;
cctx->inBuffTarget = cctx->blockSize
+ (cctx->blockSize == pledgedSrcSize); /* for small input: avoid automatic flush on reaching end of block, since it would require to add a 3-bytes null block to end frame */
cctx->outBuffContentSize = cctx->outBuffFlushedSize = 0;
cctx->streamStage = zcss_load;
cctx->frameEnded = 0;
return 0; /* ready to go */
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qsize_t *ext4_get_reserved_space(struct inode *inode)
{
return &EXT4_I(inode)->i_reserved_quota;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int sock_no_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *pt)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
{
u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
u32 min, opt, min2, opt2;
u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0;
u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0;
u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0;
u32 _vmexit_control = 0;
u32 _vmentry_control = 0;
min = CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING |
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
#endif
CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS |
CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING |
CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING;
opt = CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS |
CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
&_cpu_based_exec_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if ((_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING &
~CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING;
#endif
if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
min2 = 0;
opt2 = SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING |
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |
SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
#endif
if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~(
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
if (_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) {
/* CR3 accesses and invlpg don't need to cause VM Exits when EPT
enabled */
_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
vmx_capability.ept, vmx_capability.vpid);
}
min = VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
min |= VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE;
#endif
opt = VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT |
VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
&_vmexit_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
min = PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING;
opt = PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS | PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR |
PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
&_pin_based_exec_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer())
_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY))
_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
min = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
&_vmentry_control) < 0)
return -EIO;
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */
if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE)
return -EIO;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16))
return -EIO;
#endif
/* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6)
return -EIO;
vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
vmcs_conf->order = get_order(vmcs_conf->size);
vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control;
vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control;
vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control;
vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control;
vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control;
cpu_has_load_ia32_efer =
allow_1_setting(MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
&& allow_1_setting(MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl =
allow_1_setting(MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
&& allow_1_setting(MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
/*
* Some cpus support VM_ENTRY_(LOAD|SAVE)_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL
* but due to errata below it can't be used. Workaround is to use
* msr load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
*
* VM Exit May Incorrectly Clear IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL [34:32]
*
* AAK155 (model 26)
* AAP115 (model 30)
* AAT100 (model 37)
* BC86,AAY89,BD102 (model 44)
* BA97 (model 46)
*
*/
if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) {
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
case 26:
case 30:
case 37:
case 44:
case 46:
cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl = false;
printk_once(KERN_WARNING"kvm: VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL "
"does not work properly. Using workaround\n");
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_get_nick_index (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
int i;
if (!server->nick)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < server->nicks_count; i++)
{
if (strcmp (server->nick, server->nicks_array[i]) == 0)
{
return i;
}
}
/* nick not found */
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::BindInterfaceRequest(
const service_manager::BindSourceInfo& source_info,
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle* interface_pipe) {
if (source_info.identity.name() == content::mojom::kGpuServiceName)
gpu_binder_registry_.TryBindInterface(interface_name, interface_pipe);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unsignedShortSequenceAttrAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.unsignedShortSequenceAttr._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
Vector<unsigned short> v = toNativeArray<unsigned short>(value);
imp->setUnsignedShortSequenceAttr(v);
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mxf_compute_essence_containers(MXFContext *mxf)
{
int x;
/* everything is already correct */
if (mxf->op == OPAtom)
return;
for (x = 0; x < mxf->partitions_count; x++) {
MXFPartition *p = &mxf->partitions[x];
if (!p->body_sid)
continue; /* BodySID == 0 -> no essence */
if (x >= mxf->partitions_count - 1)
break; /* FooterPartition - can't compute length (and we don't need to) */
/* essence container spans to the next partition */
p->essence_length = mxf->partitions[x+1].this_partition - p->essence_offset;
if (p->essence_length < 0) {
/* next ThisPartition < essence_offset */
p->essence_length = 0;
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"partition %i: bad ThisPartition = %"PRIX64"\n",
x+1, mxf->partitions[x+1].this_partition);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clock_gettime, const clockid_t, which_clock,
struct __kernel_timespec __user *, tp)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = clockid_to_kclock(which_clock);
struct timespec64 kernel_tp;
int error;
if (!kc)
return -EINVAL;
error = kc->clock_get(which_clock, &kernel_tp);
if (!error && put_timespec64(&kernel_tp, tp))
error = -EFAULT;
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
{
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
int tot;
unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
#endif
SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
int i;
if (len < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
/*
* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
* than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
* this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
* report the error in a way the user will notice
*/
if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
i = s->handshake_func(s);
if (i < 0)
return (i);
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
/*
* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
* will happen with non blocking IO
*/
if (wb->left != 0) {
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
if (i <= 0) {
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
/*
* Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
* better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
* jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
* compromise is considered worthy.
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
unsigned char aad[13];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
int packlen;
/* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
max_send_fragment -= 512;
if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
max_send_fragment, NULL);
if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
packlen *= 8;
else
packlen *= 4;
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
} else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot;
}
n = (len - tot);
for (;;) {
if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
break;
}
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
}
if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
else
nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
aad[8] = type;
aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
aad[11] = 0;
aad[12] = 0;
mb_param.out = NULL;
mb_param.inp = aad;
mb_param.len = nw;
packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
break;
}
mb_param.out = wb->buf;
mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
mb_param.len = nw;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
return -1;
s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
int j = 6;
while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
}
wb->offset = 0;
wb->left = packlen;
s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
if (i <= 0) {
if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
}
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
if (i == (int)n) {
/* free jumbo buffer */
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot + i;
}
n -= i;
tot += i;
}
} else
#endif
if (tot == len) { /* done? */
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot;
}
n = (len - tot);
split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
/*
* If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
* 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
* processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
* explicit IVs
*/
maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
/*
* We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
* shouldn't get here
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (maxpipes == 0
|| s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
|| !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
|| !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
maxpipes = 1;
if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
|| split_send_fragment == 0) {
/*
* We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
* fragments so we shouldn't get here
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
for (;;) {
unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
unsigned int numpipes, j;
if (n == 0)
numpipes = 1;
else
numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
if (numpipes > maxpipes)
numpipes = maxpipes;
if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
/*
* We have enough data to completely fill all available
* pipelines
*/
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
}
} else {
/* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
remain = n % numpipes;
for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
if (j < remain)
pipelens[j]++;
}
}
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
/* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
if ((i == (int)n) ||
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
/*
* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
* in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
*/
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
return tot + i;
}
n -= i;
tot += i;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 168,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbFetchPixel_a4 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
CARD32 pixel = Fetch4(bits, offset);
pixel |= pixel << 4;
return pixel << 24;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sspi_GlobalInit()
{
if (!sspi_initialized)
{
SSL_load_error_strings();
SSL_library_init();
sspi_ContextBufferAllocTableNew();
sspi_initialized = TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::height() {
return cached_height_;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a_, const int p[],
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0, count = 0, j;
BIGNUM *a, *z, *rho, *w, *w2, *tmp;
bn_check_top(a_);
if (!p[0]) {
/* reduction mod 1 => return 0 */
BN_zero(r);
return 1;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
w = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (w == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(a, a_, p))
goto err;
if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
BN_zero(r);
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
if (p[0] & 0x1) { /* m is odd */
/* compute half-trace of a */
if (!BN_copy(z, a))
goto err;
for (j = 1; j <= (p[0] - 1) / 2; j++) {
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, a))
goto err;
}
} else { /* m is even */
rho = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
w2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rand(rho, p[0], 0, 0))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(rho, rho, p))
goto err;
BN_zero(z);
if (!BN_copy(w, rho))
goto err;
for (j = 1; j <= p[0] - 1; j++) {
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(z, z, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w2, w, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(tmp, w2, a, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(z, z, tmp))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, w2, rho))
goto err;
}
count++;
} while (BN_is_zero(w) && (count < MAX_ITERATIONS));
if (BN_is_zero(w)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(w, z, p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(w, z, w))
goto err;
if (BN_GF2m_cmp(w, a)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR, BN_R_NO_SOLUTION);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_copy(r, z))
goto err;
bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 44,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_end_io_direct_write(
struct kiocb *iocb,
loff_t offset,
ssize_t size,
void *private)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
uintptr_t flags = (uintptr_t)private;
int error = 0;
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write(ip, offset, size);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount))
return -EIO;
if (size <= 0)
return size;
/*
* The flags tell us whether we are doing unwritten extent conversions
* or an append transaction that updates the on-disk file size. These
* cases are the only cases where we should *potentially* be needing
* to update the VFS inode size.
*/
if (flags == 0) {
ASSERT(offset + size <= i_size_read(inode));
return 0;
}
/*
* We need to update the in-core inode size here so that we don't end up
* with the on-disk inode size being outside the in-core inode size. We
* have no other method of updating EOF for AIO, so always do it here
* if necessary.
*
* We need to lock the test/set EOF update as we can be racing with
* other IO completions here to update the EOF. Failing to serialise
* here can result in EOF moving backwards and Bad Things Happen when
* that occurs.
*/
spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (offset + size > i_size_read(inode))
i_size_write(inode, offset + size);
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_COW)
error = xfs_reflink_end_cow(ip, offset, size);
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_UNWRITTEN) {
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write_unwritten(ip, offset, size);
error = xfs_iomap_write_unwritten(ip, offset, size);
}
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_APPEND) {
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write_append(ip, offset, size);
error = xfs_setfilesize(ip, offset, size);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 93,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int uio_fasync(int fd, struct file *filep, int on)
{
struct uio_listener *listener = filep->private_data;
struct uio_device *idev = listener->dev;
return fasync_helper(fd, filep, on, &idev->async_queue);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AccessibilityUIElement::isVisible() const
{
return checkElementState(m_element, ATK_STATE_VISIBLE);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int piv_check_sw(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int sw1, unsigned int sw2)
{
struct sc_card_driver *iso_drv = sc_get_iso7816_driver();
int r;
piv_private_data_t * priv = PIV_DATA(card);
/* may be called before piv_init has allocated priv */
if (priv) {
/* need to save sw1 and sw2 if trying to determine card_state from pin_cmd */
if (priv->pin_cmd_verify) {
priv->pin_cmd_verify_sw1 = sw1;
priv->pin_cmd_verify_sw2 = sw2;
} else {
/* a command has completed and it is not verify */
/* If we are in a context_specific sequence, unlock */
if (priv->context_specific) {
sc_log(card->ctx,"Clearing CONTEXT_SPECIFIC lock");
priv->context_specific = 0;
sc_unlock(card);
}
}
if (priv->card_issues & CI_VERIFY_630X) {
/* Handle the Yubikey NEO or any other PIV card which returns in response to a verify
* 63 0X rather than 63 CX indicate the number of remaining PIN retries.
* Perhaps they misread the spec and thought 0xCX meant "clear" or "don't care", not a literal 0xC!
*/
if (priv->pin_cmd_verify && sw1 == 0x63U) {
priv->pin_cmd_verify_sw2 |= 0xC0U; /* make it easier to test in other code */
if ((sw2 & ~0x0fU) == 0x00U) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Verification failed (remaining tries: %d)", (sw2 & 0x0f));
return SC_ERROR_PIN_CODE_INCORRECT;
/* this is what the iso_check_sw returns for 63 C0 */
}
}
}
}
r = iso_drv->ops->check_sw(card, sw1, sw2);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PepperMediaDeviceManager::OnDeviceOpenFailed(int request_id) {
NotifyDeviceOpened(request_id, false, std::string());
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_measuredLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
UseCounter::Count(CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()), WebFeature::kV8TestObject_MeasuredLongAttribute_AttributeSetter);
test_object_v8_internal::MeasuredLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaManager::DidSetTemporaryGlobalOverrideQuota(
const QuotaCallback& callback,
const int64* new_quota,
bool success) {
QuotaStatusCode status = kQuotaErrorInvalidAccess;
DidDatabaseWork(success);
if (success) {
temporary_quota_override_ = *new_quota;
status = kQuotaStatusOk;
}
if (callback.is_null())
return;
callback.Run(status, kStorageTypeTemporary, *new_quota);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned short netdev_lock_pos(unsigned short dev_type)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netdev_lock_type); i++)
if (netdev_lock_type[i] == dev_type)
return i;
/* the last key is used by default */
return ARRAY_SIZE(netdev_lock_type) - 1;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool top_edge_hover_timer_running() const {
return controller_->top_edge_hover_timer_.IsRunning();
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_apr_date_parse_rfc(lua_State *L)
{
const char *input;
apr_time_t result;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TSTRING);
input = lua_tostring(L, 1);
result = apr_date_parse_rfc(input);
if (result == 0)
return 0;
lua_pushnumber(L, (lua_Number)(result / APR_USEC_PER_SEC));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool roleAllowsChecked(AccessibilityRole role) {
return role == MenuItemCheckBoxRole || role == MenuItemRadioRole ||
role == RadioButtonRole || role == CheckBoxRole ||
role == TreeItemRole || role == ListBoxOptionRole ||
role == SwitchRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool XSSAuditor::FilterFormToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request) {
DCHECK_EQ(request.token.GetType(), HTMLToken::kStartTag);
DCHECK(HasName(request.token, formTag));
return EraseAttributeIfInjected(request, actionAttr, kURLWithUniqueOrigin,
kSrcLikeAttributeTruncation);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 146,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GlobalHistogramAllocator::DeletePersistentLocation() {
memory_allocator()->SetMemoryState(PersistentMemoryAllocator::MEMORY_DELETED);
#if defined(OS_NACL)
NOTREACHED();
#else
if (persistent_location_.empty())
return;
File file(persistent_location_,
File::FLAG_OPEN | File::FLAG_READ | File::FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedTextureBinder::ScopedTextureBinder(ContextState* state,
GLuint id,
GLenum target)
: state_(state),
target_(target) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"ScopedTextureBinder::ctor", state_->GetErrorState());
auto* api = state->api();
api->glActiveTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE0);
api->glBindTextureFn(target, id);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void longAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->longAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int grayrange(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
ptr[0] = 0;
ptr[1] = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedUnsupportedFeature::~ScopedUnsupportedFeature() {
g_engine_for_unsupported = old_engine_;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pango_glyph_string_x_to_index (PangoGlyphString *glyphs,
char *text,
int length,
PangoAnalysis *analysis,
int x_pos,
int *index,
gboolean *trailing)
{
int i;
int start_xpos = 0;
int end_xpos = 0;
int width = 0;
int start_index = -1;
int end_index = -1;
int cluster_chars = 0;
char *p;
gboolean found = FALSE;
/* Find the cluster containing the position */
width = 0;
if (analysis->level % 2) /* Right to left */
{
for (i = glyphs->num_glyphs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
width += glyphs->glyphs[i].geometry.width;
for (i = glyphs->num_glyphs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
if (glyphs->log_clusters[i] != start_index)
{
if (found)
{
end_index = glyphs->log_clusters[i];
end_xpos = width;
break;
}
else
{
start_index = glyphs->log_clusters[i];
start_xpos = width;
}
}
width -= glyphs->glyphs[i].geometry.width;
if (width <= x_pos && x_pos < width + glyphs->glyphs[i].geometry.width)
found = TRUE;
}
}
else /* Left to right */
{
for (i = 0; i < glyphs->num_glyphs; i++)
{
if (glyphs->log_clusters[i] != start_index)
{
if (found)
{
end_index = glyphs->log_clusters[i];
end_xpos = width;
break;
}
else
{
start_index = glyphs->log_clusters[i];
start_xpos = width;
}
}
if (width <= x_pos && x_pos < width + glyphs->glyphs[i].geometry.width)
found = TRUE;
width += glyphs->glyphs[i].geometry.width;
}
}
if (end_index == -1)
{
end_index = length;
end_xpos = (analysis->level % 2) ? 0 : width;
}
/* Calculate number of chars within cluster */
p = text + start_index;
while (p < text + end_index)
{
p = g_utf8_next_char (p);
cluster_chars++;
}
if (start_xpos == end_xpos)
{
if (index)
*index = start_index;
if (trailing)
*trailing = FALSE;
}
else
{
double cp = ((double)(x_pos - start_xpos) * cluster_chars) / (end_xpos - start_xpos);
/* LTR and right-to-left have to be handled separately
* here because of the edge condition when we are exactly
* at a pixel boundary; end_xpos goes with the next
* character for LTR, with the previous character for RTL.
*/
if (start_xpos < end_xpos) /* Left-to-right */
{
if (index)
{
char *p = text + start_index;
int i = 0;
while (i + 1 <= cp)
{
p = g_utf8_next_char (p);
i++;
}
*index = (p - text);
}
if (trailing)
*trailing = (cp - (int)cp >= 0.5) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
else /* Right-to-left */
{
if (index)
{
char *p = text + start_index;
int i = 0;
while (i + 1 < cp)
{
p = g_utf8_next_char (p);
i++;
}
*index = (p - text);
}
if (trailing)
{
double cp_flip = cluster_chars - cp;
*trailing = (cp_flip - (int)cp_flip >= 0.5) ? FALSE : TRUE;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: [glyphstring] Handle overflow with very long glyphstrings
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 18,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::LockKeyboard() {
if (!keyboard_lock_allowed_ || !is_focused_ || !view_)
return false;
base::Optional<base::flat_set<ui::DomCode>> copy = keyboard_keys_to_lock_;
return view_->LockKeyboard(std::move(copy));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netlink_broadcast_filtered(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid,
u32 group, gfp_t allocation,
int (*filter)(struct sock *dsk, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data),
void *filter_data)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(ssk);
struct netlink_broadcast_data info;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct sock *sk;
skb = netlink_trim(skb, allocation);
info.exclude_sk = ssk;
info.net = net;
info.pid = pid;
info.group = group;
info.failure = 0;
info.delivery_failure = 0;
info.congested = 0;
info.delivered = 0;
info.allocation = allocation;
info.skb = skb;
info.skb2 = NULL;
info.tx_filter = filter;
info.tx_data = filter_data;
/* While we sleep in clone, do not allow to change socket list */
netlink_lock_table();
sk_for_each_bound(sk, node, &nl_table[ssk->sk_protocol].mc_list)
do_one_broadcast(sk, &info);
consume_skb(skb);
netlink_unlock_table();
if (info.delivery_failure) {
kfree_skb(info.skb2);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
consume_skb(info.skb2);
if (info.delivered) {
if (info.congested && (allocation & __GFP_WAIT))
yield();
return 0;
}
return -ESRCH;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_compare(struct mm_share *a, struct mm_share *b)
{
ptrdiff_t diff = (char *)a->address - (char *)b->address;
if (diff == 0)
return (0);
else if (diff < 0)
return (-1);
else
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inode_tree_del(struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int empty = 0;
spin_lock(&root->inode_lock);
if (!RB_EMPTY_NODE(&BTRFS_I(inode)->rb_node)) {
rb_erase(&BTRFS_I(inode)->rb_node, &root->inode_tree);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&BTRFS_I(inode)->rb_node);
empty = RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&root->inode_tree);
}
spin_unlock(&root->inode_lock);
if (empty && btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) == 0) {
synchronize_srcu(&root->fs_info->subvol_srcu);
spin_lock(&root->inode_lock);
empty = RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&root->inode_tree);
spin_unlock(&root->inode_lock);
if (empty)
btrfs_add_dead_root(root);
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaControlPanelEnclosureElement* MediaControlPanelEnclosureElement::create(
MediaControls& mediaControls) {
MediaControlPanelEnclosureElement* enclosure =
new MediaControlPanelEnclosureElement(mediaControls);
enclosure->setShadowPseudoId(
AtomicString("-webkit-media-controls-enclosure"));
return enclosure;
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 126,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int coolkey_read_binary(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int idx,
u8 *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
coolkey_private_data_t * priv = COOLKEY_DATA(card);
int r = 0, len;
u8 *data = NULL;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
if (idx > priv->obj->length) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_FILE_END_REACHED);
}
/* if we've already read the data, just return it */
if (priv->obj->data) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"returning cached value idx=%u count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
len = MIN(count, priv->obj->length-idx);
memcpy(buf, &priv->obj->data[idx], len);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, len);
}
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"clearing cache idx=%u count=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
idx, count);
data = malloc(priv->obj->length);
if (data == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto done;
}
r = coolkey_read_object(card, priv->obj->id, 0, data, priv->obj->length,
priv->nonce, sizeof(priv->nonce));
if (r < 0)
goto done;
if ((size_t) r != priv->obj->length) {
priv->obj->length = r;
}
/* OK we've read the data, now copy the required portion out to the callers buffer */
len = MIN(count, priv->obj->length-idx);
memcpy(buf, &data[idx], len);
r = len;
/* cache the data in the object */
priv->obj->data=data;
data = NULL;
done:
if (data)
free(data);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LRESULT OmniboxViewWin::OnGetObject(UINT message,
WPARAM wparam,
LPARAM lparam) {
if (lparam == OBJID_CLIENT) {
return LresultFromObject(IID_IAccessible, wparam,
native_view_host_->GetNativeViewAccessible());
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int iucv_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_LISTEN)
return iucv_accept_poll(sk);
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR |
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN)
mask |= POLLIN;
if (sock_writeable(sk) && iucv_below_msglim(sk))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete(
HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrame* pending_frame,
const SkBitmap& bitmap,
content::ReadbackResponse response) {
TRACE_EVENT2(
"headless", "HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete",
"sequence_number", pending_frame->sequence_number, "response", response);
if (response == content::READBACK_SUCCESS) {
pending_frame->bitmap = base::MakeUnique<SkBitmap>(bitmap);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Readback from surface failed with response " << response;
}
pending_frame->wait_for_copy_result = false;
if (pending_frame->MaybeRunCallback()) {
base::EraseIf(pending_frames_,
[pending_frame](const std::unique_ptr<PendingFrame>& frame) {
return frame.get() == pending_frame;
});
}
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnUpdateViewportIntersectionPostOnIO(
const gfx::Rect& viewport_intersection,
const gfx::Rect& compositing_rect,
bool occluded_or_obscured) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {content::BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&UpdateViewportIntersectionMessageFilter::
OnUpdateViewportIntersectionOnUI,
this, viewport_intersection, compositing_rect,
occluded_or_obscured));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void eat_until_eol( const char **pcur )
{
while (**pcur != '\0' && **pcur != '\n')
(*pcur)++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::NeedsInputGrab() {
return popup_type_ == WebKit::WebPopupTypeSelect;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: templPop(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt)
{
xsltTemplatePtr ret;
if (ctxt->templNr <= 0)
return (0);
ctxt->templNr--;
if (ctxt->templNr > 0)
ctxt->templ = ctxt->templTab[ctxt->templNr - 1];
else
ctxt->templ = (xsltTemplatePtr) 0;
ret = ctxt->templTab[ctxt->templNr];
ctxt->templTab[ctxt->templNr] = 0;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sepbasecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int base, int *stage, int *cont, int *stack_depth)
{
os_ptr op = osp; /* required by "push" macro */
int use, code;
code = septransform(i_ctx_p, space, &use, stage, stack_depth);
if (code != 0)
return code;
if (!use) {
*stage = 0;
*cont = 0;
pop(1);
op = osp;
switch(base) {
case 0:
push(1);
make_real(op, 0.0);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
push(3);
make_real(&op[-2], 0.0);
make_real(&op[-1], 0.0);
make_real(op, 0.0);
break;
case 3:
push(4);
make_real(&op[-3], 0.0);
make_real(&op[-2], 0.0);
make_real(&op[-1], 0.0);
make_real(op, 0.0);
break;
}
} else {
*stage = 0;
*cont = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcRenderCreatePicture (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderCreatePictureReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->pid, n);
swapl(&stuff->drawable, n);
swapl(&stuff->format, n);
swapl(&stuff->mask, n);
SwapRestL(stuff);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_boot_catalog(struct archive_write *a)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
unsigned char *block;
unsigned char *p;
uint16_t sum, *wp;
block = wb_buffptr(a);
memset(block, 0, LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE);
p = block;
/*
* Validation Entry
*/
/* Header ID */
p[0] = 1;
/* Platform ID */
p[1] = iso9660->el_torito.platform_id;
/* Reserved */
p[2] = p[3] = 0;
/* ID */
if (archive_strlen(&(iso9660->el_torito.id)) > 0)
strncpy((char *)p+4, iso9660->el_torito.id.s, 23);
p[27] = 0;
/* Checksum */
p[28] = p[29] = 0;
/* Key */
p[30] = 0x55;
p[31] = 0xAA;
sum = 0;
wp = (uint16_t *)block;
while (wp < (uint16_t *)&block[32])
sum += archive_le16dec(wp++);
set_num_721(&block[28], (~sum) + 1);
/*
* Initial/Default Entry
*/
p = &block[32];
/* Boot Indicator */
p[0] = 0x88;
/* Boot media type */
p[1] = iso9660->el_torito.media_type;
/* Load Segment */
if (iso9660->el_torito.media_type == BOOT_MEDIA_NO_EMULATION)
set_num_721(&p[2], iso9660->el_torito.boot_load_seg);
else
set_num_721(&p[2], 0);
/* System Type */
p[4] = iso9660->el_torito.system_type;
/* Unused */
p[5] = 0;
/* Sector Count */
if (iso9660->el_torito.media_type == BOOT_MEDIA_NO_EMULATION)
set_num_721(&p[6], iso9660->el_torito.boot_load_size);
else
set_num_721(&p[6], 1);
/* Load RBA */
set_num_731(&p[8],
iso9660->el_torito.boot->file->content.location);
/* Unused */
memset(&p[12], 0, 20);
return (wb_consume(a, LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE));
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_rsa_sign( void *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
int mode, int hash_id, unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig )
{
return rsa_pkcs1_sign( (rsa_context *) ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, hash_id,
hashlen, hash, sig );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OutdatedPluginInfoBarDelegate::Cancel() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("OutdatedPluginInfobar.AllowThisTime"));
return PluginInfoBarDelegate::Cancel();
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 97,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::IsPluginHandledExternally(
const blink::WebElement& plugin_element,
const blink::WebURL& url,
const blink::WebString& suggested_mime_type) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
if (!BrowserPluginManager::Get()) {
return false;
}
int32_t tentative_element_instance_id =
BrowserPluginManager::Get()->GetNextInstanceID();
return GetContentClient()->renderer()->MaybeCreateMimeHandlerView(
this, plugin_element, GURL(url), suggested_mime_type.Utf8(),
tentative_element_instance_id);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,883
|
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