instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pcrypt_cpumask_change_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long val, void *data)
{
struct padata_pcrypt *pcrypt;
struct pcrypt_cpumask *new_mask, *old_mask;
struct padata_cpumask *cpumask = (struct padata_cpumask *)data;
if (!(val & PADATA_CPU_SERIAL))
return 0;
pcrypt = container_of(self, struct padata_pcrypt, nblock);
new_mask = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_mask), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_mask)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask->mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
kfree(new_mask);
return -ENOMEM;
}
old_mask = pcrypt->cb_cpumask;
cpumask_copy(new_mask->mask, cpumask->cbcpu);
rcu_assign_pointer(pcrypt->cb_cpumask, new_mask);
synchronize_rcu_bh();
free_cpumask_var(old_mask->mask);
kfree(old_mask);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_new_from_fd(RBin *bin, int fd, RBinFileOptions *options) {
int file_sz = 0;
RBinPlugin *plugin = NULL;
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_file_create_append (bin, "-", NULL, 0, file_sz,
0, fd, NULL, false);
if (!bf) {
return NULL;
}
int loadaddr = options? options->laddr: 0;
int baseaddr = options? options->baddr: 0;
bool binfile_created = true;
r_buf_free (bf->buf);
bf->buf = r_buf_new_with_io (&bin->iob, fd);
if (bin->force) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_name (bin, bin->force);
}
if (!plugin) {
if (options && options->plugname) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_name (bin, options->plugname);
}
if (!plugin) {
ut8 bytes[1024];
int sz = 1024;
r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, 0, bytes, sz);
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_by_bytes (bin, bytes, sz);
if (!plugin) {
plugin = r_bin_get_binplugin_any (bin);
}
}
}
RBinObject *o = r_bin_object_new (bf, plugin, baseaddr, loadaddr, 0, r_buf_size (bf->buf));
if (o && !o->size) {
o->size = file_sz;
}
if (!o) {
if (bf && binfile_created) {
r_list_delete_data (bin->binfiles, bf);
}
return NULL;
}
#if 0
/* WTF */
if (strcmp (plugin->name, "any")) {
bf->narch = 1;
}
#endif
/* free unnecessary rbuffer (???) */
return bf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static wchar_t *ConvertUTF8ToUTF16(const unsigned char *source)
{
size_t
length;
wchar_t
*utf16;
length=UTF8ToUTF16(source,(wchar_t *) NULL);
if (length == 0)
{
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Not UTF-8, just copy.
*/
length=strlen((char *) source);
utf16=(wchar_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*utf16));
if (utf16 == (wchar_t *) NULL)
return((wchar_t *) NULL);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) length; i++)
utf16[i]=source[i];
return(utf16);
}
utf16=(wchar_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*utf16));
if (utf16 == (wchar_t *) NULL)
return((wchar_t *) NULL);
length=UTF8ToUTF16(source,utf16);
return(utf16);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ipcget(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_ids *ids,
const struct ipc_ops *ops, struct ipc_params *params)
{
if (params->key == IPC_PRIVATE)
return ipcget_new(ns, ids, ops, params);
else
return ipcget_public(ns, ids, ops, params);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 42,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* Tab::GetClassName() const {
return kViewClassName;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_print_results(struct iperf_test *test)
{
cJSON *json_summary_streams = NULL;
cJSON *json_summary_stream = NULL;
int total_retransmits = 0;
int total_packets = 0, lost_packets = 0;
char ubuf[UNIT_LEN];
char nbuf[UNIT_LEN];
struct stat sb;
char sbuf[UNIT_LEN];
struct iperf_stream *sp = NULL;
iperf_size_t bytes_sent, total_sent = 0;
iperf_size_t bytes_received, total_received = 0;
double start_time, end_time, avg_jitter = 0.0, lost_percent;
double bandwidth;
/* print final summary for all intervals */
if (test->json_output) {
json_summary_streams = cJSON_CreateArray();
if (json_summary_streams == NULL)
return;
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_end, "streams", json_summary_streams);
} else {
iprintf(test, "%s", report_bw_separator);
if (test->verbose)
iprintf(test, "%s", report_summary);
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp) {
if (test->sender_has_retransmits)
iprintf(test, "%s", report_bw_retrans_header);
else
iprintf(test, "%s", report_bw_header);
} else
iprintf(test, "%s", report_bw_udp_header);
}
start_time = 0.;
sp = SLIST_FIRST(&test->streams);
/*
* If there is at least one stream, then figure out the length of time
* we were running the tests and print out some statistics about
* the streams. It's possible to not have any streams at all
* if the client got interrupted before it got to do anything.
*/
if (sp) {
end_time = timeval_diff(&sp->result->start_time, &sp->result->end_time);
SLIST_FOREACH(sp, &test->streams, streams) {
if (test->json_output) {
json_summary_stream = cJSON_CreateObject();
if (json_summary_stream == NULL)
return;
cJSON_AddItemToArray(json_summary_streams, json_summary_stream);
}
bytes_sent = sp->result->bytes_sent;
bytes_received = sp->result->bytes_received;
total_sent += bytes_sent;
total_received += bytes_received;
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp) {
if (test->sender_has_retransmits) {
total_retransmits += sp->result->stream_retrans;
}
} else {
total_packets += (sp->packet_count - sp->omitted_packet_count);
lost_packets += sp->cnt_error;
avg_jitter += sp->jitter;
}
unit_snprintf(ubuf, UNIT_LEN, (double) bytes_sent, 'A');
bandwidth = (double) bytes_sent / (double) end_time;
unit_snprintf(nbuf, UNIT_LEN, bandwidth, test->settings->unit_format);
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp) {
if (test->sender_has_retransmits) {
/* Summary, TCP with retransmits. */
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(json_summary_stream, "sender", iperf_json_printf("socket: %d start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f retransmits: %d", (int64_t) sp->socket, (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) bytes_sent, bandwidth * 8, (int64_t) sp->result->stream_retrans));
else
iprintf(test, report_bw_retrans_format, sp->socket, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, sp->result->stream_retrans, report_sender);
} else {
/* Summary, TCP without retransmits. */
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(json_summary_stream, "sender", iperf_json_printf("socket: %d start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f", (int64_t) sp->socket, (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) bytes_sent, bandwidth * 8));
else
iprintf(test, report_bw_format, sp->socket, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, report_sender);
}
} else {
/* Summary, UDP. */
lost_percent = 100.0 * sp->cnt_error / (sp->packet_count - sp->omitted_packet_count);
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(json_summary_stream, "udp", iperf_json_printf("socket: %d start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f jitter_ms: %f lost_packets: %d packets: %d lost_percent: %f out_of_order: %d", (int64_t) sp->socket, (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) bytes_sent, bandwidth * 8, (double) sp->jitter * 1000.0, (int64_t) sp->cnt_error, (int64_t) (sp->packet_count - sp->omitted_packet_count), (double) lost_percent, (int64_t) sp->outoforder_packets));
else {
iprintf(test, report_bw_udp_format, sp->socket, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, sp->jitter * 1000.0, sp->cnt_error, (sp->packet_count - sp->omitted_packet_count), lost_percent, "");
if (test->role == 'c')
iprintf(test, report_datagrams, sp->socket, (sp->packet_count - sp->omitted_packet_count));
if (sp->outoforder_packets > 0)
iprintf(test, report_sum_outoforder, start_time, end_time, sp->outoforder_packets);
}
}
if (sp->diskfile_fd >= 0) {
if (fstat(sp->diskfile_fd, &sb) == 0) {
int percent = (int) ( ( (double) bytes_sent / (double) sb.st_size ) * 100.0 );
unit_snprintf(sbuf, UNIT_LEN, (double) sb.st_size, 'A');
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(json_summary_stream, "diskfile", iperf_json_printf("sent: %d size: %d percent: %d filename: %s", (int64_t) bytes_sent, (int64_t) sb.st_size, (int64_t) percent, test->diskfile_name));
else
iprintf(test, report_diskfile, ubuf, sbuf, percent, test->diskfile_name);
}
}
unit_snprintf(ubuf, UNIT_LEN, (double) bytes_received, 'A');
bandwidth = (double) bytes_received / (double) end_time;
unit_snprintf(nbuf, UNIT_LEN, bandwidth, test->settings->unit_format);
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp) {
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(json_summary_stream, "receiver", iperf_json_printf("socket: %d start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f", (int64_t) sp->socket, (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) bytes_received, bandwidth * 8));
else
iprintf(test, report_bw_format, sp->socket, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, report_receiver);
}
}
}
if (test->num_streams > 1 || test->json_output) {
unit_snprintf(ubuf, UNIT_LEN, (double) total_sent, 'A');
/* If no tests were run, arbitrariliy set bandwidth to 0. */
if (end_time > 0.0) {
bandwidth = (double) total_sent / (double) end_time;
}
else {
bandwidth = 0.0;
}
unit_snprintf(nbuf, UNIT_LEN, bandwidth, test->settings->unit_format);
if (test->protocol->id == Ptcp) {
if (test->sender_has_retransmits) {
/* Summary sum, TCP with retransmits. */
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_end, "sum_sent", iperf_json_printf("start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f retransmits: %d", (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) total_sent, bandwidth * 8, (int64_t) total_retransmits));
else
iprintf(test, report_sum_bw_retrans_format, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, total_retransmits, report_sender);
} else {
/* Summary sum, TCP without retransmits. */
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_end, "sum_sent", iperf_json_printf("start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f", (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) total_sent, bandwidth * 8));
else
iprintf(test, report_sum_bw_format, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, report_sender);
}
unit_snprintf(ubuf, UNIT_LEN, (double) total_received, 'A');
/* If no tests were run, set received bandwidth to 0 */
if (end_time > 0.0) {
bandwidth = (double) total_received / (double) end_time;
}
else {
bandwidth = 0.0;
}
unit_snprintf(nbuf, UNIT_LEN, bandwidth, test->settings->unit_format);
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_end, "sum_received", iperf_json_printf("start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f", (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) total_received, bandwidth * 8));
else
iprintf(test, report_sum_bw_format, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, report_receiver);
} else {
/* Summary sum, UDP. */
avg_jitter /= test->num_streams;
/* If no packets were sent, arbitrarily set loss percentage to 100. */
if (total_packets > 0) {
lost_percent = 100.0 * lost_packets / total_packets;
}
else {
lost_percent = 100.0;
}
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_end, "sum", iperf_json_printf("start: %f end: %f seconds: %f bytes: %d bits_per_second: %f jitter_ms: %f lost_packets: %d packets: %d lost_percent: %f", (double) start_time, (double) end_time, (double) end_time, (int64_t) total_sent, bandwidth * 8, (double) avg_jitter * 1000.0, (int64_t) lost_packets, (int64_t) total_packets, (double) lost_percent));
else
iprintf(test, report_sum_bw_udp_format, start_time, end_time, ubuf, nbuf, avg_jitter * 1000.0, lost_packets, total_packets, lost_percent, "");
}
}
if (test->json_output)
cJSON_AddItemToObject(test->json_end, "cpu_utilization_percent", iperf_json_printf("host_total: %f host_user: %f host_system: %f remote_total: %f remote_user: %f remote_system: %f", (double) test->cpu_util[0], (double) test->cpu_util[1], (double) test->cpu_util[2], (double) test->remote_cpu_util[0], (double) test->remote_cpu_util[1], (double) test->remote_cpu_util[2]));
else {
if (test->verbose) {
iprintf(test, report_cpu, report_local, test->sender?report_sender:report_receiver, test->cpu_util[0], test->cpu_util[1], test->cpu_util[2], report_remote, test->sender?report_receiver:report_sender, test->remote_cpu_util[0], test->remote_cpu_util[1], test->remote_cpu_util[2]);
}
/* Print server output if we're on the client and it was requested/provided */
if (test->role == 'c' && iperf_get_test_get_server_output(test)) {
if (test->json_server_output) {
iprintf(test, "\nServer JSON output:\n%s\n", cJSON_Print(test->json_server_output));
cJSON_Delete(test->json_server_output);
test->json_server_output = NULL;
}
if (test->server_output_text) {
iprintf(test, "\nServer output:\n%s\n", test->server_output_text);
test->server_output_text = NULL;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
{
Buffer m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid, sid;
int devnull;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (stdin_null_flag) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD);
buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */
buffer_put_cstring(&m, stdio_forward_host);
buffer_put_int(&m, stdio_forward_port);
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__);
/* Read their reply */
buffer_clear(&m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
buffer_free(&m);
return -1;
}
type = buffer_get_int(&m);
if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
sid = buffer_get_int(&m);
debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
default:
buffer_free(&m);
error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
*/
buffer_clear(&m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE ||
(errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
return 0;
fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u8 *pl_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 60 && rdesc[39] == 0x2a && rdesc[40] == 0xf5 &&
rdesc[41] == 0x00 && rdesc[59] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[60] == 0xf9 && rdesc[61] == 0x00) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Petalynx Maxter Remote report descriptor\n");
rdesc[60] = 0xfa;
rdesc[40] = 0xfa;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_sh(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, fz_shade *shade)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_show_shade(ctx, pr, shade);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageLoader::shouldLoadImmediately(const KURL& url) const {
if (!url.isNull()) {
Resource* resource = memoryCache()->resourceForURL(
url, m_element->document().fetcher()->getCacheIdentifier());
if (resource && !resource->errorOccurred())
return true;
}
return (isHTMLObjectElement(m_element) || isHTMLEmbedElement(m_element));
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: group_sched_in(struct perf_event *group_event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event *event, *partial_group = NULL;
struct pmu *pmu = group_event->pmu;
u64 now = ctx->time;
bool simulate = false;
if (group_event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 0;
pmu->start_txn(pmu);
if (event_sched_in(group_event, cpuctx, ctx)) {
pmu->cancel_txn(pmu);
return -EAGAIN;
}
/*
* Schedule in siblings as one group (if any):
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &group_event->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx)) {
partial_group = event;
goto group_error;
}
}
if (!pmu->commit_txn(pmu))
return 0;
group_error:
/*
* Groups can be scheduled in as one unit only, so undo any
* partial group before returning:
* The events up to the failed event are scheduled out normally,
* tstamp_stopped will be updated.
*
* The failed events and the remaining siblings need to have
* their timings updated as if they had gone thru event_sched_in()
* and event_sched_out(). This is required to get consistent timings
* across the group. This also takes care of the case where the group
* could never be scheduled by ensuring tstamp_stopped is set to mark
* the time the event was actually stopped, such that time delta
* calculation in update_event_times() is correct.
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &group_event->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (event == partial_group)
simulate = true;
if (simulate) {
event->tstamp_running += now - event->tstamp_stopped;
event->tstamp_stopped = now;
} else {
event_sched_out(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
}
event_sched_out(group_event, cpuctx, ctx);
pmu->cancel_txn(pmu);
return -EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KConfigSkeleton *Part::config() const
{
return ArkSettings::self();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 9,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rock_ridge_symlink_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct iso_inode_info *ei = ISOFS_I(inode);
struct isofs_sb_info *sbi = ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb);
char *link = kmap(page);
unsigned long bufsize = ISOFS_BUFFER_SIZE(inode);
struct buffer_head *bh;
char *rpnt = link;
unsigned char *pnt;
struct iso_directory_record *raw_de;
unsigned long block, offset;
int sig;
struct rock_ridge *rr;
struct rock_state rs;
int ret;
if (!sbi->s_rock)
goto error;
init_rock_state(&rs, inode);
block = ei->i_iget5_block;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, block);
if (!bh)
goto out_noread;
offset = ei->i_iget5_offset;
pnt = (unsigned char *)bh->b_data + offset;
raw_de = (struct iso_directory_record *)pnt;
/*
* If we go past the end of the buffer, there is some sort of error.
*/
if (offset + *pnt > bufsize)
goto out_bad_span;
/*
* Now test for possible Rock Ridge extensions which will override
* some of these numbers in the inode structure.
*/
setup_rock_ridge(raw_de, inode, &rs);
repeat:
while (rs.len > 2) { /* There may be one byte for padding somewhere */
rr = (struct rock_ridge *)rs.chr;
if (rr->len < 3)
goto out; /* Something got screwed up here */
sig = isonum_721(rs.chr);
if (rock_check_overflow(&rs, sig))
goto out;
rs.chr += rr->len;
rs.len -= rr->len;
if (rs.len < 0)
goto out; /* corrupted isofs */
switch (sig) {
case SIG('R', 'R'):
if ((rr->u.RR.flags[0] & RR_SL) == 0)
goto out;
break;
case SIG('S', 'P'):
if (check_sp(rr, inode))
goto out;
break;
case SIG('S', 'L'):
rpnt = get_symlink_chunk(rpnt, rr,
link + (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
if (rpnt == NULL)
goto out;
break;
case SIG('C', 'E'):
/* This tells is if there is a continuation record */
rs.cont_extent = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.extent);
rs.cont_offset = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.offset);
rs.cont_size = isonum_733(rr->u.CE.size);
default:
break;
}
}
ret = rock_continue(&rs);
if (ret == 0)
goto repeat;
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
if (rpnt == link)
goto fail;
brelse(bh);
*rpnt = '\0';
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
/* error exit from macro */
out:
kfree(rs.buffer);
goto fail;
out_noread:
printk("unable to read i-node block");
goto fail;
out_bad_span:
printk("symlink spans iso9660 blocks\n");
fail:
brelse(bh);
error:
SetPageError(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries
Rock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which
define where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs
image can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one
containing loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when
traversing these entries.
Limit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space
to store all the Rock Ridge data.
Reported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int _yr_emit_split(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
int16_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
int16_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
assert(opcode == RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_A || opcode == RE_OPCODE_SPLIT_B);
if (emit_context->next_split_id == RE_MAX_SPLIT_ID)
return ERROR_REGULAR_EXPRESSION_TOO_COMPLEX;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&emit_context->next_split_id,
sizeof(RE_SPLIT_ID_TYPE),
NULL));
emit_context->next_split_id++;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(int16_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = sizeof(uint8_t) + sizeof(RE_SPLIT_ID_TYPE) + sizeof(int16_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 66,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: T1_Get_MM_Var( T1_Face face,
FT_MM_Var* *master )
{
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_MM_Var *mmvar = NULL;
FT_Multi_Master mmaster;
FT_Error error;
FT_UInt i;
FT_Fixed axiscoords[T1_MAX_MM_AXIS];
PS_Blend blend = face->blend;
error = T1_Get_Multi_Master( face, &mmaster );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_ALLOC( mmvar,
sizeof ( FT_MM_Var ) +
mmaster.num_axis * sizeof ( FT_Var_Axis ) ) )
goto Exit;
mmvar->num_axis = mmaster.num_axis;
mmvar->num_designs = mmaster.num_designs;
mmvar->num_namedstyles = ~0U; /* Does not apply */
mmvar->axis = (FT_Var_Axis*)&mmvar[1];
/* Point to axes after MM_Var struct */
mmvar->namedstyle = NULL;
for ( i = 0 ; i < mmaster.num_axis; ++i )
{
mmvar->axis[i].name = mmaster.axis[i].name;
mmvar->axis[i].minimum = INT_TO_FIXED( mmaster.axis[i].minimum);
mmvar->axis[i].maximum = INT_TO_FIXED( mmaster.axis[i].maximum);
mmvar->axis[i].def = ( mmvar->axis[i].minimum +
mmvar->axis[i].maximum ) / 2;
/* Does not apply. But this value is in range */
mmvar->axis[i].strid = ~0U; /* Does not apply */
mmvar->axis[i].tag = ~0U; /* Does not apply */
if ( ft_strcmp( mmvar->axis[i].name, "Weight" ) == 0 )
mmvar->axis[i].tag = FT_MAKE_TAG( 'w', 'g', 'h', 't' );
else if ( ft_strcmp( mmvar->axis[i].name, "Width" ) == 0 )
mmvar->axis[i].tag = FT_MAKE_TAG( 'w', 'd', 't', 'h' );
else if ( ft_strcmp( mmvar->axis[i].name, "OpticalSize" ) == 0 )
mmvar->axis[i].tag = FT_MAKE_TAG( 'o', 'p', 's', 'z' );
}
if ( blend->num_designs == ( 1U << blend->num_axis ) )
{
mm_weights_unmap( blend->default_weight_vector,
axiscoords,
blend->num_axis );
for ( i = 0; i < mmaster.num_axis; ++i )
mmvar->axis[i].def = mm_axis_unmap( &blend->design_map[i],
axiscoords[i] );
}
*master = mmvar;
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebRTCMockRenderProcess() {}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InitialLoadObserver::~InitialLoadObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sp_node_init(struct sp_node *node, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end, struct mempolicy *pol)
{
node->start = start;
node->end = end;
node->policy = pol;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 67,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::setUserViewportArguments(const WebViewportArguments& viewportArguments)
{
d->m_userViewportArguments = *(viewportArguments.d);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_scsi_port_unlink(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
struct se_lun *lun)
{
struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg = container_of(se_tpg,
struct vhost_scsi_tpg, se_tpg);
mutex_lock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
mutex_lock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
tpg->tv_tpg_port_count--;
mutex_unlock(&tpg->tv_tpg_mutex);
vhost_scsi_hotunplug(tpg, lun);
mutex_unlock(&vhost_scsi_mutex);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntPoint PaintLayerScrollableArea::ConvertFromRootFrame(
const IntPoint& point_in_root_frame) const {
LayoutView* view = GetLayoutBox()->View();
if (!view)
return point_in_root_frame;
return view->GetFrameView()->ConvertFromRootFrame(point_in_root_frame);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CURLcode Curl_protocol_connecting(struct connectdata *conn,
bool *done)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
if(conn && conn->handler->connecting) {
*done = FALSE;
result = conn->handler->connecting(conn, done);
}
else
*done = TRUE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 77,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheBackendImpl::TransferHostIn(
int new_host_id, scoped_ptr<AppCacheHost> host) {
HostMap::iterator found = hosts_.find(new_host_id);
if (found == hosts_.end()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
delete found->second;
host->CompleteTransfer(new_host_id, frontend_);
found->second = host.release();
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long madvise_dontneed_free(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
int behavior)
{
*prev = vma;
if (!can_madv_dontneed_vma(vma))
return -EINVAL;
if (!userfaultfd_remove(vma, start, end)) {
*prev = NULL; /* mmap_sem has been dropped, prev is stale */
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
if (!vma)
return -ENOMEM;
if (start < vma->vm_start) {
/*
* This "vma" under revalidation is the one
* with the lowest vma->vm_start where start
* is also < vma->vm_end. If start <
* vma->vm_start it means an hole materialized
* in the user address space within the
* virtual range passed to MADV_DONTNEED
* or MADV_FREE.
*/
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!can_madv_dontneed_vma(vma))
return -EINVAL;
if (end > vma->vm_end) {
/*
* Don't fail if end > vma->vm_end. If the old
* vma was splitted while the mmap_sem was
* released the effect of the concurrent
* operation may not cause madvise() to
* have an undefined result. There may be an
* adjacent next vma that we'll walk
* next. userfaultfd_remove() will generate an
* UFFD_EVENT_REMOVE repetition on the
* end-vma->vm_end range, but the manager can
* handle a repetition fine.
*/
end = vma->vm_end;
}
VM_WARN_ON(start >= end);
}
if (behavior == MADV_DONTNEED)
return madvise_dontneed_single_vma(vma, start, end);
else if (behavior == MADV_FREE)
return madvise_free_single_vma(vma, start, end);
else
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[mhocko@suse.com: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127115318.911-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 85,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnMoveEntryToDirectoryWithFileMoveCallback(
const FileMoveCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const FilePath& moved_file_path) {
if (error == GDATA_FILE_OK)
OnDirectoryChanged(moved_file_path.DirName());
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error, moved_file_path);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::CopyFeatureAndFieldTrialFlags(
base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
base::FieldTrialList::CopyFieldTrialStateToFlags(
switches::kFieldTrialHandle, switches::kEnableFeatures,
switches::kDisableFeatures, cmd_line);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EnsureCustomWallpaperDirectories(
const wallpaper::WallpaperFilesId& wallpaper_files_id) {
base::FilePath dir;
dir = WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperDir(kSmallWallpaperSubDir);
dir = dir.Append(wallpaper_files_id.id());
if (!base::PathExists(dir))
base::CreateDirectory(dir);
dir = WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperDir(kLargeWallpaperSubDir);
dir = dir.Append(wallpaper_files_id.id());
if (!base::PathExists(dir))
base::CreateDirectory(dir);
dir = WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperDir(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir);
dir = dir.Append(wallpaper_files_id.id());
if (!base::PathExists(dir))
base::CreateDirectory(dir);
dir = WallpaperManagerBase::GetCustomWallpaperDir(kThumbnailWallpaperSubDir);
dir = dir.Append(wallpaper_files_id.id());
if (!base::PathExists(dir))
base::CreateDirectory(dir);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vhost_net_set_ubuf_info(struct vhost_net *n)
{
bool zcopy;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX; ++i) {
zcopy = vhost_net_zcopy_mask & (0x1 << i);
if (!zcopy)
continue;
n->vqs[i].ubuf_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*n->vqs[i].ubuf_info) *
UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!n->vqs[i].ubuf_info)
goto err;
}
return 0;
err:
vhost_net_clear_ubuf_info(n);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct vfsmount *lookup_mnt(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *child_mnt;
br_read_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
child_mnt = __lookup_mnt(path->mnt, path->dentry, 1);
if (child_mnt) {
mnt_add_count(child_mnt, 1);
br_read_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
return &child_mnt->mnt;
} else {
br_read_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void doWriteNumber(double number)
{
append(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&number), sizeof(number));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::GetTitle() {
return instance_->name();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFUN(svSrc, DOWNLOAD SAVE, "Save document source")
{
char *file;
if (Currentbuf->sourcefile == NULL)
return;
CurrentKeyData = NULL; /* not allowed in w3m-control: */
PermitSaveToPipe = TRUE;
if (Currentbuf->real_scheme == SCM_LOCAL)
file = conv_from_system(guess_save_name(NULL,
Currentbuf->currentURL.
real_file));
else
file = guess_save_name(Currentbuf, Currentbuf->currentURL.file);
doFileCopy(Currentbuf->sourcefile, file);
PermitSaveToPipe = FALSE;
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rmap_walk(struct page *page, struct rmap_walk_control *rwc)
{
if (unlikely(PageKsm(page)))
return rmap_walk_ksm(page, rwc);
else if (PageAnon(page))
return rmap_walk_anon(page, rwc);
else
return rmap_walk_file(page, rwc);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t fuse_send_read(struct fuse_req *req, struct file *file,
loff_t pos, size_t count, fl_owner_t owner)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
fuse_read_fill(req, file, pos, count, FUSE_READ);
if (owner != NULL) {
struct fuse_read_in *inarg = &req->misc.read.in;
inarg->read_flags |= FUSE_READ_LOCKOWNER;
inarg->lock_owner = fuse_lock_owner_id(fc, owner);
}
fuse_request_send(fc, req);
return req->out.args[0].size;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::SendOutstandingReplies(
EstablishChannelStatus failure_status) {
DCHECK_NE(failure_status, EstablishChannelStatus::SUCCESS);
valid_ = false;
while (!channel_requests_.empty()) {
auto callback = channel_requests_.front();
channel_requests_.pop();
std::move(callback).Run(mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle(), gpu::GPUInfo(),
gpu::GpuFeatureInfo(), failure_status);
}
while (!create_gpu_memory_buffer_requests_.empty()) {
auto callback = std::move(create_gpu_memory_buffer_requests_.front());
create_gpu_memory_buffer_requests_.pop();
std::move(callback).Run(gfx::GpuMemoryBufferHandle(),
BufferCreationStatus::GPU_HOST_INVALID);
}
if (!send_destroying_video_surface_done_cb_.is_null())
base::ResetAndReturn(&send_destroying_video_surface_done_cb_).Run();
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
{
if (bprm->page[i]) {
__free_page(bprm->page[i]);
bprm->page[i] = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __insert_nid_to_list(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct free_nid *i, enum nid_list list, bool new)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
if (new) {
int err = radix_tree_insert(&nm_i->free_nid_root, i->nid, i);
if (err)
return err;
}
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, list == FREE_NID_LIST ? i->state != NID_NEW :
i->state != NID_ALLOC);
nm_i->nid_cnt[list]++;
list_add_tail(&i->list, &nm_i->nid_list[list]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,243
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaEmpty(PTA *pta)
{
PROCNAME("ptaEmpty");
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("ptad not defined", procName, 1);
pta->n = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> unsignedShortAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.unsignedShortAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->unsignedShortAttr());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hfs_file_read_compressed_attr(TSK_FS_FILE* fs_file,
uint8_t cmpType,
char* buffer,
uint32_t attributeLength,
uint64_t uncSize,
int (*decompress_attr)(char* rawBuf,
uint32_t rawSize,
uint64_t uncSize,
char** dstBuf,
uint64_t* dstSize,
int* dstBufFree))
{
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"%s: Compressed data is inline in the attribute, will load this as the default DATA attribute.\n", __func__);
if (attributeLength <= 16) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"%s: WARNING, Compression Record of type %u is not followed by"
" compressed data. No data will be loaded into the DATA"
" attribute.\n", __func__, cmpType);
return 1;
}
TSK_FS_ATTR *fs_attr_unc;
if ((fs_attr_unc = tsk_fs_attrlist_getnew(
fs_file->meta->attr, TSK_FS_ATTR_RES)) == NULL)
{
error_returned(" - %s, FS_ATTR for uncompressed data", __func__);
return 0;
}
char* dstBuf;
uint64_t dstSize;
int dstBufFree = FALSE;
if (!decompress_attr(buffer + 16, attributeLength - 16, uncSize,
&dstBuf, &dstSize, &dstBufFree)) {
return 0;
}
if (dstSize != uncSize) {
error_detected(TSK_ERR_FS_READ,
" %s, actual uncompressed size not equal to the size in the compression record", __func__);
goto on_error;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"%s: Loading decompressed data as default DATA attribute.",
__func__);
if (tsk_fs_attr_set_str(fs_file,
fs_attr_unc, "DATA",
TSK_FS_ATTR_TYPE_HFS_DATA,
HFS_FS_ATTR_ID_DATA, dstBuf,
dstSize))
{
error_returned(" - %s", __func__);
goto on_error;
}
if (dstBufFree) {
free(dstBuf);
}
return 1;
on_error:
if (dstBufFree) {
free(dstBuf);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *url_decode(char *str) {
size_t size = strlen(str) + 1;
char *buf = mallocz(size);
return url_decode_r(buf, str, size);
}
Commit Message: fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 93,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* PE_(r_bin_pe_new_buf)(RBuffer * buf, bool verbose) {
struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin = R_NEW0 (struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t));
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
bin->kv = sdb_new0 ();
bin->b = r_buf_new ();
bin->verbose = verbose;
bin->size = buf->length;
if (!r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf->buf, bin->size)) {
return PE_(r_bin_pe_free)(bin);
}
if (!bin_pe_init (bin)) {
return PE_(r_bin_pe_free)(bin);
}
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RegisterSomeUser() {
RegisterUser(kTestUser1);
StartupUtils::MarkOobeCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_enable_nvram_access(struct tg3 *tp)
{
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5750_PLUS) && !tg3_flag(tp, PROTECTED_NVRAM)) {
u32 nvaccess = tr32(NVRAM_ACCESS);
tw32(NVRAM_ACCESS, nvaccess | ACCESS_ENABLE);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ut64 Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_offset)(ELFOBJ *bin, const char *section_name) {
RBinElfSection *section = get_section_by_name (bin, section_name);
if (!section) return UT64_MAX;
return section->offset;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CastDuplexView::ActivateCastView() {
select_view_->SetVisible(false);
cast_view_->SetVisible(true);
InvalidateLayout();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 119,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnLogCleanShutdown() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::FilePath user_data_dir;
if (base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &user_data_dir))
browser_watcher::MarkOwnStabilityFileDeleted(user_data_dir);
#endif // OS_WIN
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XIQueryDevice(Display *dpy, int deviceid, int *ndevices_return)
{
XIDeviceInfo *info = NULL;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReply reply;
char *ptr;
int i;
char *buf;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_2_0, extinfo) == -1)
goto error_unlocked;
GetReq(XIQueryDevice, req);
req->reqType = extinfo->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_XIQueryDevice;
req->deviceid = deviceid;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
*ndevices_return = reply.num_devices;
info = Xmalloc((reply.num_devices + 1) * sizeof(XIDeviceInfo));
if (!info)
goto error;
buf = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
_XRead(dpy, buf, reply.length * 4);
ptr = buf;
/* info is a null-terminated array */
info[reply.num_devices].name = NULL;
nclasses = wire->num_classes;
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
XIDeviceInfo *lib = &info[i];
xXIDeviceInfo *wire = (xXIDeviceInfo*)ptr;
lib->deviceid = wire->deviceid;
lib->use = wire->use;
lib->attachment = wire->attachment;
Xfree(buf);
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
strncpy(lib->name, ptr, wire->name_len);
ptr += ((wire->name_len + 3)/4) * 4;
sz = size_classes((xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, nclasses);
lib->classes = Xmalloc(sz);
ptr += copy_classes(lib, (xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, &nclasses);
/* We skip over unused classes */
lib->num_classes = nclasses;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 164,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: too_many_lines (char const *filename)
{
fatal ("File %s has too many lines", quotearg (filename));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 2,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<TagCollection> ContainerNode::getElementsByTagName(const AtomicString& localName)
{
if (localName.isNull())
return nullptr;
if (document().isHTMLDocument())
return ensureCachedCollection<HTMLTagCollection>(HTMLTagCollectionType, localName);
return ensureCachedCollection<TagCollection>(TagCollectionType, localName);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,078
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileChooserView::ShowView(profiles::BubbleViewMode view_to_display,
AvatarMenu* avatar_menu) {
if (view_to_display == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_MANAGEMENT) {
DCHECK(AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsMirrorEnabledForProfile(
browser_->profile()));
const AvatarMenu::Item& active_item = avatar_menu->GetItemAt(
avatar_menu->GetActiveProfileIndex());
if (!active_item.signed_in) {
view_to_display = profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_PROFILE_CHOOSER;
}
}
if (browser_->profile()->IsSupervised() &&
(view_to_display == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_GAIA_ADD_ACCOUNT ||
view_to_display == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_REMOVAL)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Supervised user attempted to add/remove account";
return;
}
ResetView();
RemoveAllChildViews(true);
view_mode_ = view_to_display;
views::GridLayout* layout = nullptr;
views::View* sub_view = nullptr;
views::View* view_to_focus = nullptr;
switch (view_mode_) {
case profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_GAIA_SIGNIN:
case profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_GAIA_ADD_ACCOUNT:
case profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_GAIA_REAUTH:
NOTREACHED();
break;
case profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_REMOVAL:
layout = CreateSingleColumnLayout(this, kFixedAccountRemovalViewWidth);
sub_view = CreateAccountRemovalView();
break;
case profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_ACCOUNT_MANAGEMENT:
case profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_PROFILE_CHOOSER:
layout = CreateSingleColumnLayout(this, menu_width_);
sub_view = CreateProfileChooserView(avatar_menu);
break;
}
views::ScrollView* scroll_view = new views::ScrollView;
scroll_view->set_hide_horizontal_scrollbar(true);
scroll_view->set_draw_overflow_indicator(false);
scroll_view->ClipHeightTo(0, GetMaxHeight());
scroll_view->SetContents(sub_view);
layout->StartRow(1.0, 0);
layout->AddView(scroll_view);
if (GetBubbleFrameView()) {
SizeToContents();
Layout();
}
if (view_to_focus)
view_to_focus->RequestFocus();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<IMediaSource> MPEG4Extractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
status_t err;
if ((err = readMetaData()) != OK) {
return NULL;
}
Track *track = mFirstTrack;
while (index > 0) {
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
track = track->next;
--index;
}
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trex *trex = NULL;
int32_t trackId;
if (track->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTrex.size(); i++) {
Trex *t = &mTrex.editItemAt(i);
if (t->track_ID == (uint32_t) trackId) {
trex = t;
break;
}
}
} else {
ALOGE("b/21657957");
return NULL;
}
ALOGV("getTrack called, pssh: %zu", mPssh.size());
const char *mime;
if (!track->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime)) {
return NULL;
}
if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size;
if (!track->meta->findData(kKeyAVCC, &type, &data, &size)) {
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *ptr = (const uint8_t *)data;
if (size < 7 || ptr[0] != 1) { // configurationVersion == 1
return NULL;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_HEVC)) {
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size;
if (!track->meta->findData(kKeyHVCC, &type, &data, &size)) {
return NULL;
}
const uint8_t *ptr = (const uint8_t *)data;
if (size < 22 || ptr[0] != 1) { // configurationVersion == 1
return NULL;
}
}
sp<MPEG4Source> source = new MPEG4Source(this,
track->meta, mDataSource, track->timescale, track->sampleTable,
mSidxEntries, trex, mMoofOffset);
if (source->init() != OK) {
return NULL;
}
return source;
}
Commit Message: Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void emmh32_init(emmh32_context *context)
{
/* prepare for new mic calculation */
context->accum = 0;
context->position = 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mem_cgroup_sockets_init(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
{
struct proto *proto;
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(proto, &proto_list, node) {
if (proto->init_cgroup) {
ret = proto->init_cgroup(cgrp, ss);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
return ret;
out:
list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(proto, &proto_list, node)
if (proto->destroy_cgroup)
proto->destroy_cgroup(cgrp);
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()
Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXListBoxOption::isEnabled() const {
if (!getNode())
return false;
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_disabledAttr), "true"))
return false;
if (toElement(getNode())->hasAttribute(disabledAttr))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 171,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sr_read_sector(Scsi_CD *cd, int lba, int blksize, unsigned char *dest)
{
struct packet_command cgc;
int rc;
/* we try the READ CD command first... */
if (cd->readcd_known) {
rc = sr_read_cd(cd, dest, lba, 0, blksize);
if (-EDRIVE_CANT_DO_THIS != rc)
return rc;
cd->readcd_known = 0;
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM does'nt support READ CD (0xbe) command\n");
/* fall & retry the other way */
}
/* ... if this fails, we switch the blocksize using MODE SELECT */
if (blksize != cd->device->sector_size) {
if (0 != (rc = sr_set_blocklength(cd, blksize)))
return rc;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd, "sr_read_sector lba=%d blksize=%d\n",
lba, blksize);
#endif
memset(&cgc, 0, sizeof(struct packet_command));
cgc.cmd[0] = GPCMD_READ_10;
cgc.cmd[2] = (unsigned char) (lba >> 24) & 0xff;
cgc.cmd[3] = (unsigned char) (lba >> 16) & 0xff;
cgc.cmd[4] = (unsigned char) (lba >> 8) & 0xff;
cgc.cmd[5] = (unsigned char) lba & 0xff;
cgc.cmd[8] = 1;
cgc.buffer = dest;
cgc.buflen = blksize;
cgc.data_direction = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
cgc.timeout = IOCTL_TIMEOUT;
rc = sr_do_ioctl(cd, &cgc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer
We're casting the CDROM layer request_sense to the SCSI sense
buffer, but the former is 64 bytes and the latter is 96 bytes.
As we generally allocate these on the stack, we end up blowing
up the stack.
Fix this by wrapping the scsi_execute() call with a properly
sized sense buffer, and copying back the bits for the CDROM
layer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Piotr Gabriel Kosinski <pg.kosinski@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <daniel@twistlock.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 82ed4db499b8 ("block: split scsi_request out of struct request")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_class_superclass(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value klass)
{
struct RClass *c;
c = mrb_class_ptr(klass);
c = find_origin(c)->super;
while (c && c->tt == MRB_TT_ICLASS) {
c = find_origin(c)->super;
}
if (!c) return mrb_nil_value();
return mrb_obj_value(c);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TriState StateJustifyFull(LocalFrame& frame, Event*) {
return StateStyle(frame, CSSPropertyTextAlign, "justify");
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int r_flush(apr_vformatter_buff_t *buff)
{
/* callback function passed to ap_vformatter to be called when
* vformatter needs to write into buff and buff.curpos > buff.endpos */
/* ap_vrprintf_data passed as a apr_vformatter_buff_t, which is then
* "downcast" to an ap_vrprintf_data */
struct ap_vrprintf_data *vd = (struct ap_vrprintf_data*)buff;
if (vd->r->connection->aborted)
return -1;
/* r_flush is called when vbuff is completely full */
if (buffer_output(vd->r, vd->buff, AP_IOBUFSIZE)) {
return -1;
}
/* reset the buffer position */
vd->vbuff.curpos = vd->buff;
vd->vbuff.endpos = vd->buff + AP_IOBUFSIZE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 45,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nsse16_c(void *v, uint8_t *s1, uint8_t *s2, int stride, int h){
MpegEncContext *c = v;
int score1=0;
int score2=0;
int x,y;
for(y=0; y<h; y++){
for(x=0; x<16; x++){
score1+= (s1[x ] - s2[x ])*(s1[x ] - s2[x ]);
}
if(y+1<h){
for(x=0; x<15; x++){
score2+= FFABS( s1[x ] - s1[x +stride]
- s1[x+1] + s1[x+1+stride])
-FFABS( s2[x ] - s2[x +stride]
- s2[x+1] + s2[x+1+stride]);
}
}
s1+= stride;
s2+= stride;
}
if(c) return score1 + FFABS(score2)*c->avctx->nsse_weight;
else return score1 + FFABS(score2)*8;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_assoc_image_info(zval *value, int sub_array, image_info_type *image_info, int section_index TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[64], *val, *name, uname[64];
int i, ap, l, b, idx=0, unknown=0;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
int info_tag;
#endif
image_info_value *info_value;
image_info_data *info_data;
zval *tmpi, *array = NULL;
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
/* php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Adding %d infos from section %s", image_info->info_list[section_index].count, exif_get_sectionname(section_index));*/
#endif
if (image_info->info_list[section_index].count) {
if (sub_array) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmpi);
array_init(tmpi);
} else {
tmpi = value;
}
for(i=0; i<image_info->info_list[section_index].count; i++) {
info_data = &image_info->info_list[section_index].list[i];
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
info_tag = info_data->tag; /* conversion */
#endif
info_value = &info_data->value;
if (!(name = info_data->name)) {
snprintf(uname, sizeof(uname), "%d", unknown++);
name = uname;
}
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
/* php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Adding infos: tag(0x%04X,%12s,L=0x%04X): %s", info_tag, exif_get_tagname(info_tag, buffer, -12, exif_get_tag_table(section_index) TSRMLS_CC), info_data->length, info_data->format==TAG_FMT_STRING?(info_value&&info_value->s?info_value->s:"<no data>"):exif_get_tagformat(info_data->format));*/
#endif
if (info_data->length==0) {
add_assoc_null(tmpi, name);
} else {
switch (info_data->format) {
default:
/* Standard says more types possible but skip them...
* but allow users to handle data if they know how to
* So not return but use type UNDEFINED
* return;
*/
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
case TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED:
if (!info_value->s) {
add_assoc_stringl(tmpi, name, "", 0, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_stringl(tmpi, name, info_value->s, info_data->length, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_STRING:
if (!(val = info_value->s)) {
val = "";
}
if (section_index==SECTION_COMMENT) {
add_index_string(tmpi, idx++, val, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_string(tmpi, name, val, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
/*case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:*/
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
/* now the rest, first see if it becomes an array */
if ((l = info_data->length) > 1) {
array = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(array);
array_init(array);
}
for(ap=0; ap<l; ap++) {
if (l>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value.list[ap];
}
switch (info_data->format) {
case TAG_FMT_BYTE:
if (l>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value;
for (b=0;b<l;b++) {
add_index_long(array, b, (int)(info_value->s[b]));
}
break;
}
case TAG_FMT_USHORT:
case TAG_FMT_ULONG:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_long(tmpi, name, (int)info_value->u);
} else {
add_index_long(array, ap, (int)info_value->u);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%i/%i", info_value->ur.num, info_value->ur.den);
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_string(tmpi, name, buffer, 1);
} else {
add_index_string(array, ap, buffer, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE:
if (l>1) {
info_value = &info_data->value;
for (b=0;b<l;b++) {
add_index_long(array, ap, (int)info_value->s[b]);
}
break;
}
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT:
case TAG_FMT_SLONG:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_long(tmpi, name, info_value->i);
} else {
add_index_long(array, ap, info_value->i);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%i/%i", info_value->sr.num, info_value->sr.den);
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_string(tmpi, name, buffer, 1);
} else {
add_index_string(array, ap, buffer, 1);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_double(tmpi, name, info_value->f);
} else {
add_index_double(array, ap, info_value->f);
}
break;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
if (l==1) {
add_assoc_double(tmpi, name, info_value->d);
} else {
add_index_double(array, ap, info_value->d);
}
break;
}
info_value = &info_data->value.list[ap];
}
if (l>1) {
add_assoc_zval(tmpi, name, array);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (sub_array) {
add_assoc_zval(value, exif_get_sectionname(section_index), tmpi);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FT_Request_Size( FT_Face face,
FT_Size_Request req )
{
FT_Driver_Class clazz;
FT_ULong strike_index;
if ( !face )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Face_Handle;
if ( !req || req->width < 0 || req->height < 0 ||
req->type >= FT_SIZE_REQUEST_TYPE_MAX )
return FT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
clazz = face->driver->clazz;
if ( clazz->request_size )
return clazz->request_size( face->size, req );
/*
* The reason that a driver doesn't have `request_size' defined is
* either that the scaling here suffices or that the supported formats
* are bitmap-only and size matching is not implemented.
*
* In the latter case, a simple size matching is done.
*/
if ( !FT_IS_SCALABLE( face ) && FT_HAS_FIXED_SIZES( face ) )
{
FT_Error error;
error = FT_Match_Size( face, req, 0, &strike_index );
if ( error )
return error;
FT_TRACE3(( "FT_Request_Size: bitmap strike %lu matched\n",
strike_index ));
return FT_Select_Size( face, (FT_Int)strike_index );
}
FT_Request_Metrics( face, req );
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithActiveFile(const FilePath& base_path,
const FilePath& active_path,
const FilePath& spare_path,
size_t size,
uint64_t id,
StringPiece name) {
if (!base::ReplaceFile(active_path, base_path, nullptr))
base::DeleteFile(base_path, /*recursive=*/false);
DCHECK(!base::PathExists(active_path));
if (!spare_path.empty()) {
base::ReplaceFile(spare_path, active_path, nullptr);
DCHECK(!base::PathExists(spare_path));
}
return base::GlobalHistogramAllocator::CreateWithFile(active_path, size, id,
name);
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::SetMouseLeftButtonDown(bool is_mouse_left_button_down) {
mouse_left_button_down_ = is_mouse_left_button_down;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: armpmu_reserve_hardware(struct arm_pmu *armpmu)
{
int err, irq;
unsigned int i, irqs;
struct platform_device *pmu_device = armpmu->plat_device;
if (!pmu_device) {
pr_err("no PMU device registered\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
irqs = min(pmu_device->num_resources, num_possible_cpus());
if (!irqs) {
pr_err("no irqs for PMUs defined\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
irq = platform_get_irq(pmu_device, 0);
if (irq <= 0) {
pr_err("failed to get valid irq for PMU device\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (irq_is_percpu(irq)) {
err = request_percpu_irq(irq, armpmu->handle_irq,
"arm-pmu", &cpu_hw_events);
if (err) {
pr_err("unable to request percpu IRQ%d for ARM PMU counters\n",
irq);
armpmu_release_hardware(armpmu);
return err;
}
on_each_cpu(armpmu_enable_percpu_irq, &irq, 1);
} else {
for (i = 0; i < irqs; ++i) {
err = 0;
irq = platform_get_irq(pmu_device, i);
if (irq <= 0)
continue;
/*
* If we have a single PMU interrupt that we can't shift,
* assume that we're running on a uniprocessor machine and
* continue. Otherwise, continue without this interrupt.
*/
if (irq_set_affinity(irq, cpumask_of(i)) && irqs > 1) {
pr_warning("unable to set irq affinity (irq=%d, cpu=%u)\n",
irq, i);
continue;
}
err = request_irq(irq, armpmu->handle_irq,
IRQF_NOBALANCING,
"arm-pmu", armpmu);
if (err) {
pr_err("unable to request IRQ%d for ARM PMU counters\n",
irq);
armpmu_release_hardware(armpmu);
return err;
}
cpumask_set_cpu(i, &armpmu->active_irqs);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ping_hashfn(struct net *net, unsigned int num, unsigned int mask)
{
int res = (num + net_hash_mix(net)) & mask;
pr_debug("hash(%d) = %d\n", num, res);
return res;
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void S_AL_SrcUnlock(srcHandle_t src)
{
srcList[src].isLocked = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TCStopVolumeThread (PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, PEXTENSION Extension)
{
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (DeviceObject); /* Remove compiler warning */
Dump ("Signalling thread to quit...\n");
Extension->bThreadShouldQuit = TRUE;
KeReleaseSemaphore (&Extension->RequestSemaphore,
0,
1,
TRUE);
ntStatus = KeWaitForSingleObject (Extension->peThread,
Executive,
KernelMode,
FALSE,
NULL);
ASSERT (NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus));
ObDereferenceObject (Extension->peThread);
Extension->peThread = NULL;
Dump ("Thread exited\n");
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SetIntProperty(XID window,
const std::string& name,
const std::string& type,
int value) {
std::vector<int> values(1, value);
return SetIntArrayProperty(window, name, type, values);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_venc::dev_set_buf_req(OMX_U32 *min_buff_count,
OMX_U32 *actual_buff_count,
OMX_U32 *buff_size,
OMX_U32 port)
{
return handle->venc_set_buf_req(min_buff_count,
actual_buff_count,
buff_size,
port);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const BlockEntry* Track::GetEOS() const
{
return &m_eos;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_disconnect_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int on)
{
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 36,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OmniboxViewViews::OmniboxViewViews(OmniboxEditController* controller,
std::unique_ptr<OmniboxClient> client,
bool popup_window_mode,
LocationBarView* location_bar,
const gfx::FontList& font_list)
: OmniboxView(controller, std::move(client)),
popup_window_mode_(popup_window_mode),
saved_selection_for_focus_change_(gfx::Range::InvalidRange()),
location_bar_view_(location_bar),
latency_histogram_state_(NOT_ACTIVE),
friendly_suggestion_text_prefix_length_(0),
scoped_compositor_observer_(this),
scoped_template_url_service_observer_(this) {
set_id(VIEW_ID_OMNIBOX);
SetFontList(font_list);
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
omnibox::kHideSteadyStateUrlPathQueryAndRef)) {
SkColor starting_color =
location_bar_view_->GetColor(OmniboxPart::LOCATION_BAR_TEXT_DIMMED);
path_fade_animation_ =
std::make_unique<PathFadeAnimation>(this, starting_color);
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void opj_pi_update_encoding_parameters(const opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no)
{
/* encoding parameters to set */
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min, l_dy_min;
/* pointers */
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
l_tcp = &(p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no]);
/* get encoding parameters */
opj_get_encoding_parameters(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no, &l_tx0, &l_tx1, &l_ty0,
&l_ty1, &l_dx_min, &l_dy_min, &l_max_prec, &l_max_res);
if (l_tcp->POC) {
opj_pi_update_encode_poc_and_final(p_cp, p_tile_no, l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1,
l_max_prec, l_max_res, l_dx_min, l_dy_min);
} else {
opj_pi_update_encode_not_poc(p_cp, p_image->numcomps, p_tile_no, l_tx0, l_tx1,
l_ty0, l_ty1, l_max_prec, l_max_res, l_dx_min, l_dy_min);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 70,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int shm_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
{
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
put_ipc_ns(sfd->ns);
shm_file_data(file) = NULL;
kfree(sfd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bio_free_pages(struct bio *bio)
{
struct bio_vec *bvec;
int i;
bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, i)
__free_page(bvec->bv_page);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::Navigate(std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> request,
ReloadType reload_type,
RestoreType restore_type) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser,navigation", "NavigatorImpl::Navigate");
const GURL& dest_url = request->common_params().url;
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node = request->frame_tree_node();
navigation_data_.reset(new NavigationMetricsData(
request->common_params().navigation_start, dest_url, restore_type));
bool should_dispatch_beforeunload =
!FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(
request->common_params().navigation_type) &&
!request->request_params().is_history_navigation_in_new_child &&
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->ShouldDispatchBeforeUnload(
false /* check_subframes_only */);
int nav_entry_id = request->nav_entry_id();
bool is_pending_entry =
controller_->GetPendingEntry() &&
(nav_entry_id == controller_->GetPendingEntry()->GetUniqueID());
frame_tree_node->CreatedNavigationRequest(std::move(request));
DCHECK(frame_tree_node->navigation_request());
if (should_dispatch_beforeunload) {
frame_tree_node->navigation_request()->SetWaitingForRendererResponse();
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->DispatchBeforeUnload(
RenderFrameHostImpl::BeforeUnloadType::BROWSER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION,
reload_type != ReloadType::NONE);
} else {
frame_tree_node->navigation_request()->BeginNavigation();
}
if (is_pending_entry)
CHECK_EQ(nav_entry_id, controller_->GetPendingEntry()->GetUniqueID());
if (delegate_ && is_pending_entry)
delegate_->DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(dest_url, reload_type);
}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_spoolss_doc_info_ctr(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
proto_tree *subtree;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(
tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_DOC_INFO_CTR, NULL, "Document info container");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep, hf_level, NULL);
offset = dissect_spoolss_doc_info(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 52,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBindRenderbuffer(
GLenum target,
GLuint renderbuffer) {
api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(
target, GetRenderbufferServiceID(api(), renderbuffer, resources_,
bind_generates_resource_));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RegisterMojoInterfaces() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&InstalledAppProviderImplDefault::Create));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PermissionControllerImpl* permission_controller =
PermissionControllerImpl::FromBrowserContext(
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
if (delegate_) {
auto* geolocation_context = delegate_->GetGeolocationContext();
if (geolocation_context) {
geolocation_service_.reset(new GeolocationServiceImpl(
geolocation_context, permission_controller, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&GeolocationServiceImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(geolocation_service_.get())));
}
}
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::WakeLock>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindWakeLockRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc)) {
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::NFC>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindNFCRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#endif
if (!permission_service_context_)
permission_service_context_.reset(new PermissionServiceContext(this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PermissionServiceContext::CreateService,
base::Unretained(permission_service_context_.get())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindPresentationServiceRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaSessionServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(
base::IgnoreResult(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService),
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebUsbService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface<media::mojom::InterfaceFactory>(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindMediaInterfaceFactoryRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebSocket, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateDedicatedWorkerHostFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&SharedWorkerConnectorImpl::Create,
process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&device::GamepadMonitor::Create));
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::VRService>(base::Bind(
&WebvrServiceProvider::BindWebvrService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioInputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioOutputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CreateFrameResourceCoordinator, base::Unretained(this)));
if (BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()) {
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager();
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaDevicesDispatcherHost::Create, GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(), base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateMediaStreamDispatcherHost,
base::Unretained(this), base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&RemoterFactoryImpl::Bind,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID()));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&KeyboardLockServiceImpl::CreateMojoService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&ImageCaptureImpl::Create));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuth)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindAuthenticatorRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableWebAuthTestingAPI)) {
auto* environment_singleton =
ScopedVirtualAuthenticatorEnvironment::GetInstance();
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&ScopedVirtualAuthenticatorEnvironment::AddBinding,
base::Unretained(environment_singleton)));
}
}
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
sensor_provider_proxy_.reset(
new SensorProviderProxyImpl(permission_controller, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&SensorProviderProxyImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(sensor_provider_proxy_.get())));
media::VideoDecodePerfHistory::SaveCallback save_stats_cb;
if (GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()) {
save_stats_cb = GetSiteInstance()
->GetBrowserContext()
->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()
->GetSaveCallback();
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&media::MediaMetricsProvider::Create, frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(),
base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostDelegate::GetUkmSourceIdForLastCommittedSource,
base::Unretained(delegate_)),
std::move(save_stats_cb)));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&InputInjectorImpl::Create, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&QuotaDispatcherHost::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(SpeechRecognitionDispatcherHost::Create,
GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
file_system_manager_.reset(new FileSystemManagerImpl(
GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id_,
GetProcess()->GetStoragePartition()->GetFileSystemContext(),
ChromeBlobStorageContext::GetFor(GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&FileSystemManagerImpl::BindRequest,
base::Unretained(file_system_manager_.get())),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
if (Portal::IsEnabled()) {
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(IgnoreResult(&Portal::Create),
base::Unretained(this)));
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&BackgroundFetchServiceImpl::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&ContactsManagerImpl::Create));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&FileChooserImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&AudioContextManagerImpl::Create,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(&WakeLockServiceImpl::Create,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 173,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_handle_save(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fdctrl->fifo[0] = 0;
fdctrl->fifo[1] = 0;
/* Drives position */
fdctrl->fifo[2] = drv0(fdctrl)->track;
fdctrl->fifo[3] = drv1(fdctrl)->track;
#if MAX_FD == 4
fdctrl->fifo[4] = drv2(fdctrl)->track;
fdctrl->fifo[5] = drv3(fdctrl)->track;
#else
fdctrl->fifo[4] = 0;
fdctrl->fifo[5] = 0;
#endif
/* timers */
fdctrl->fifo[6] = fdctrl->timer0;
fdctrl->fifo[7] = fdctrl->timer1;
fdctrl->fifo[8] = cur_drv->last_sect;
fdctrl->fifo[9] = (fdctrl->lock << 7) |
(cur_drv->perpendicular << 2);
fdctrl->fifo[10] = fdctrl->config;
fdctrl->fifo[11] = fdctrl->precomp_trk;
fdctrl->fifo[12] = fdctrl->pwrd;
fdctrl->fifo[13] = 0;
fdctrl->fifo[14] = 0;
fdctrl_set_fifo(fdctrl, 15);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScriptProfiler::stopTrackingHeapObjects()
{
v8::Isolate::GetCurrent()->GetHeapProfiler()->StopTrackingHeapObjects();
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __ext4_error_file(struct file *file, const char *function,
unsigned int line, ext4_fsblk_t block,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
struct va_format vaf;
struct ext4_super_block *es;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
char pathname[80], *path;
es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
es->s_last_error_ino = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
if (ext4_error_ratelimit(inode->i_sb)) {
path = file_path(file, pathname, sizeof(pathname));
if (IS_ERR(path))
path = "(unknown)";
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
if (block)
printk(KERN_CRIT
"EXT4-fs error (device %s): %s:%d: inode #%lu: "
"block %llu: comm %s: path %s: %pV\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id, function, line, inode->i_ino,
block, current->comm, path, &vaf);
else
printk(KERN_CRIT
"EXT4-fs error (device %s): %s:%d: inode #%lu: "
"comm %s: path %s: %pV\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id, function, line, inode->i_ino,
current->comm, path, &vaf);
va_end(args);
}
save_error_info(inode->i_sb, function, line);
ext4_handle_error(inode->i_sb);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect BrowserView::GetRestoredBounds() const {
return frame_->GetRestoredBounds();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void megasas_free_ctrl_dma_buffers(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = instance->pdev;
struct fusion_context *fusion = instance->ctrl_context;
if (instance->evt_detail)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct megasas_evt_detail),
instance->evt_detail,
instance->evt_detail_h);
if (fusion && fusion->ioc_init_request)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MPI2_IOC_INIT_REQUEST),
fusion->ioc_init_request,
fusion->ioc_init_request_phys);
if (instance->pd_list_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
MEGASAS_MAX_PD * sizeof(struct MR_PD_LIST),
instance->pd_list_buf,
instance->pd_list_buf_h);
if (instance->ld_list_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct MR_LD_LIST),
instance->ld_list_buf,
instance->ld_list_buf_h);
if (instance->ld_targetid_list_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct MR_LD_TARGETID_LIST),
instance->ld_targetid_list_buf,
instance->ld_targetid_list_buf_h);
if (instance->ctrl_info_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct megasas_ctrl_info),
instance->ctrl_info_buf,
instance->ctrl_info_buf_h);
if (instance->system_info_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct MR_DRV_SYSTEM_INFO),
instance->system_info_buf,
instance->system_info_h);
if (instance->pd_info)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct MR_PD_INFO),
instance->pd_info, instance->pd_info_h);
if (instance->tgt_prop)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct MR_TARGET_PROPERTIES),
instance->tgt_prop, instance->tgt_prop_h);
if (instance->crash_dump_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev, CRASH_DMA_BUF_SIZE,
instance->crash_dump_buf,
instance->crash_dump_h);
if (instance->snapdump_prop)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(struct MR_SNAPDUMP_PROPERTIES),
instance->snapdump_prop,
instance->snapdump_prop_h);
if (instance->host_device_list_buf)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
HOST_DEVICE_LIST_SZ,
instance->host_device_list_buf,
instance->host_device_list_buf_h);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::SetSourceLocation(
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> source_location) {
source_location_ = std::move(source_location);
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int piv_process_discovery(sc_card_t *card)
{
int r;
u8 * rbuf = NULL;
size_t rbuflen = 0;
r = piv_get_cached_data(card, PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
/* Note rbuf and rbuflen are now pointers into cache */
if (r < 0)
goto err;
sc_log(card->ctx, "Discovery = %p:%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", rbuf,
rbuflen);
/* the object is now cached, see what we have */
r = piv_parse_discovery(card, rbuf, rbuflen, 0);
err:
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mmap_zero(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
return -ENOSYS;
#endif
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
return shmem_zero_setup(vma);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long DocumentLoader::MainResourceIdentifier() const {
return main_resource_ ? main_resource_->Identifier() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: user_extension_authentication_done (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gpointer user_data)
{
GDBusInterfaceInfo *interface = user_data;
const gchar *method_name;
method_name = g_dbus_method_invocation_get_method_name (invocation);
if (g_str_equal (method_name, "Get"))
user_extension_get_property (user, daemon, interface, invocation);
else if (g_str_equal (method_name, "GetAll"))
user_extension_get_all_properties (user, daemon, interface, invocation);
else if (g_str_equal (method_name, "Set"))
user_extension_set_property (user, daemon, interface, invocation);
else
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 4,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::RemoteSuspend(int)
{
int retval = this->Suspend();
jic->Suspend();
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AccessibilityUIElement::ariaIsGrabbed() const
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char *skb_pull_rcsum(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
BUG_ON(len > skb->len);
skb->len -= len;
BUG_ON(skb->len < skb->data_len);
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, skb->data, len);
return skb->data += len;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTraceBeginCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::TraceBeginCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::TraceBeginCHROMIUM*>(cmd_data);
Bucket* category_bucket = GetBucket(c.category_bucket_id);
Bucket* name_bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
static constexpr size_t kMaxStrLen = 256;
if (!category_bucket || category_bucket->size() == 0 ||
category_bucket->size() > kMaxStrLen || !name_bucket ||
name_bucket->size() == 0 || name_bucket->size() > kMaxStrLen) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string category_name;
std::string trace_name;
if (!category_bucket->GetAsString(&category_name) ||
!name_bucket->GetAsString(&trace_name)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
debug_marker_manager_.PushGroup(trace_name);
if (!gpu_tracer_->Begin(category_name, trace_name, kTraceCHROMIUM)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTraceBeginCHROMIUM", "unable to create begin trace");
return error::kNoError;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage3DBucket(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage3DBucket& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage3DBucket*>(
cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLuint bucket_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.bucket_id);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
if (state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(bucket_id);
if (!bucket)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
uint32_t image_size = bucket->size();
const void* data = bucket->GetData(0, image_size);
DCHECK(data || !image_size);
return DoCompressedTexImage(target, level, internal_format, width, height,
depth, border, image_size, data,
ContextState::k3D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProfileSyncService::~ProfileSyncService() {
sync_prefs_.RemoveSyncPrefObserver(this);
Shutdown();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::OnRecognitionStart(int session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!SessionExists(session_id))
return;
auto iter = sessions_.find(session_id);
if (iter->second->ui) {
iter->second->ui->OnStarted(base::OnceClosure(),
MediaStreamUIProxy::WindowIdCallback());
}
DCHECK_EQ(primary_session_id_, session_id);
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* delegate_listener = GetDelegateListener())
delegate_listener->OnRecognitionStart(session_id);
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* listener = GetListener(session_id))
listener->OnRecognitionStart(session_id);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rtc::scoped_refptr<rtc::RTCCertificate> certificate() { return certificate_; }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint16_t atombios_get_connector_object_id(struct drm_device *dev,
int connector_type,
uint16_t devices)
{
struct radeon_device *rdev = dev->dev_private;
if (rdev->flags & RADEON_IS_IGP) {
return supported_devices_connector_object_id_convert
[connector_type];
} else if (((connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII) ||
(connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVID)) &&
(devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP2_SUPPORT)) {
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
struct atom_context *ctx = mode_info->atom_context;
int index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, XTMDS_Info);
uint16_t size, data_offset;
uint8_t frev, crev;
ATOM_XTMDS_INFO *xtmds;
if (atom_parse_data_header(ctx, index, &size, &frev, &crev, &data_offset)) {
xtmds = (ATOM_XTMDS_INFO *)(ctx->bios + data_offset);
if (xtmds->ucSupportedLink & ATOM_XTMDS_SUPPORTED_DUALLINK) {
if (connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII)
return CONNECTOR_OBJECT_ID_DUAL_LINK_DVI_I;
else
return CONNECTOR_OBJECT_ID_DUAL_LINK_DVI_D;
} else {
if (connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII)
return CONNECTOR_OBJECT_ID_SINGLE_LINK_DVI_I;
else
return CONNECTOR_OBJECT_ID_SINGLE_LINK_DVI_D;
}
} else
return supported_devices_connector_object_id_convert
[connector_type];
} else {
return supported_devices_connector_object_id_convert
[connector_type];
}
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsClient::requestDockWindow() {
Send(new DevToolsHostMsg_RequestDockWindow(routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,856
|
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