instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int a2dp_command(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, char cmd)
{
char ack;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd));
/* send command */
if (send(common->ctrl_fd, &cmd, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == -1)
{
ERROR("cmd failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
/* wait for ack byte */
if (a2dp_ctrl_receive(common, &ack, 1) < 0)
return -1;
DEBUG("A2DP COMMAND %s DONE STATUS %d", dump_a2dp_ctrl_event(cmd), ack);
if (ack == A2DP_CTRL_ACK_INCALL_FAILURE)
return ack;
if (ack != A2DP_CTRL_ACK_SUCCESS)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 173,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void clamp_pollexp_and_set_MAXSTRAT(void)
{
if (G.poll_exp < MINPOLL)
G.poll_exp = MINPOLL;
if (G.poll_exp > BIGPOLL)
G.poll_exp = BIGPOLL;
G.polladj_count = 0;
G.stratum = MAXSTRAT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::IsSupportedDownload(
DownloadCheckResultReason* reason,
ClientDownloadRequest::DownloadType* type) {
return IsSupportedDownload(*item_, item_->GetTargetFilePath(), reason, type);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ib_uverbs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct ib_uverbs_device *dev;
struct ib_uverbs_file *file;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
int ret;
int module_dependent;
int srcu_key;
dev = container_of(inode->i_cdev, struct ib_uverbs_device, cdev);
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&dev->refcount))
return -ENXIO;
get_device(&dev->dev);
srcu_key = srcu_read_lock(&dev->disassociate_srcu);
mutex_lock(&dev->lists_mutex);
ib_dev = srcu_dereference(dev->ib_dev,
&dev->disassociate_srcu);
if (!ib_dev) {
ret = -EIO;
goto err;
}
/* In case IB device supports disassociate ucontext, there is no hard
* dependency between uverbs device and its low level device.
*/
module_dependent = !(ib_dev->ops.disassociate_ucontext);
if (module_dependent) {
if (!try_module_get(ib_dev->owner)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
}
file = kzalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!file) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (module_dependent)
goto err_module;
goto err;
}
file->device = dev;
kref_init(&file->ref);
mutex_init(&file->ucontext_lock);
spin_lock_init(&file->uobjects_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file->uobjects);
init_rwsem(&file->hw_destroy_rwsem);
mutex_init(&file->umap_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&file->umaps);
filp->private_data = file;
list_add_tail(&file->list, &dev->uverbs_file_list);
mutex_unlock(&dev->lists_mutex);
srcu_read_unlock(&dev->disassociate_srcu, srcu_key);
setup_ufile_idr_uobject(file);
return nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
err_module:
module_put(ib_dev->owner);
err:
mutex_unlock(&dev->lists_mutex);
srcu_read_unlock(&dev->disassociate_srcu, srcu_key);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&dev->refcount))
ib_uverbs_comp_dev(dev);
put_device(&dev->dev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConvertFlagsToSwitches(FlagsStorage* flags_storage,
base::CommandLine* command_line,
SentinelsMode sentinels) {
FlagsState::GetInstance()->ConvertFlagsToSwitches(flags_storage,
command_line,
sentinels);
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_GetReq(const struct http *hp)
{
Tcheck(hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_REQ]);
return (hp->hd[HTTP_HDR_REQ].b);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fm_mgr_config_init
(
OUT p_fm_config_conx_hdlt *p_hdl,
IN int instance,
OPTIONAL IN char *rem_address,
OPTIONAL IN char *community
)
{
fm_config_conx_hdl *hdl;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res = FM_CONF_OK;
if ( (hdl = calloc(1,sizeof(fm_config_conx_hdl))) == NULL )
{
res = FM_CONF_NO_MEM;
goto cleanup;
}
hdl->instance = instance;
*p_hdl = hdl;
if(!rem_address || (strcmp(rem_address,"localhost") == 0))
{
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_SM) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_PM) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( fm_mgr_config_mgr_connect(hdl, FM_MGR_FE) == FM_CONF_INIT_ERR )
{
res = FM_CONF_INIT_ERR;
goto cleanup;
}
}
return res;
cleanup:
if ( hdl ) {
free(hdl);
hdl = NULL;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 170,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int update_init_section(struct playlist *pls, struct segment *seg)
{
static const int max_init_section_size = 1024*1024;
HLSContext *c = pls->parent->priv_data;
int64_t sec_size;
int64_t urlsize;
int ret;
if (seg->init_section == pls->cur_init_section)
return 0;
pls->cur_init_section = NULL;
if (!seg->init_section)
return 0;
ret = open_input(c, pls, seg->init_section);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(pls->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Failed to open an initialization section in playlist %d\n",
pls->index);
return ret;
}
if (seg->init_section->size >= 0)
sec_size = seg->init_section->size;
else if ((urlsize = avio_size(pls->input)) >= 0)
sec_size = urlsize;
else
sec_size = max_init_section_size;
av_log(pls->parent, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"Downloading an initialization section of size %"PRId64"\n",
sec_size);
sec_size = FFMIN(sec_size, max_init_section_size);
av_fast_malloc(&pls->init_sec_buf, &pls->init_sec_buf_size, sec_size);
ret = read_from_url(pls, seg->init_section, pls->init_sec_buf,
pls->init_sec_buf_size, READ_COMPLETE);
ff_format_io_close(pls->parent, &pls->input);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
pls->cur_init_section = seg->init_section;
pls->init_sec_data_len = ret;
pls->init_sec_buf_read_offset = 0;
/* spec says audio elementary streams do not have media initialization
* sections, so there should be no ID3 timestamps */
pls->is_id3_timestamped = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 61,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AnimatedPropertyType SVGElement::AnimatedPropertyTypeForCSSAttribute(
const QualifiedName& attribute_name) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AttributeToPropertyTypeMap, css_property_map, ());
if (css_property_map.IsEmpty()) {
struct AttrToTypeEntry {
const QualifiedName& attr;
const AnimatedPropertyType prop_type;
};
const AttrToTypeEntry attr_to_types[] = {
{kAlignmentBaselineAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kBaselineShiftAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kBufferedRenderingAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kClipPathAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kClipRuleAttr, kAnimatedString},
{svg_names::kColorAttr, kAnimatedColor},
{kColorInterpolationAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kColorInterpolationFiltersAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kColorRenderingAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kCursorAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kDisplayAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kDominantBaselineAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFillAttr, kAnimatedColor},
{kFillOpacityAttr, kAnimatedNumber},
{kFillRuleAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFilterAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFloodColorAttr, kAnimatedColor},
{kFloodOpacityAttr, kAnimatedNumber},
{kFontFamilyAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFontSizeAttr, kAnimatedLength},
{kFontStretchAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFontStyleAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFontVariantAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kFontWeightAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kImageRenderingAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kLetterSpacingAttr, kAnimatedLength},
{kLightingColorAttr, kAnimatedColor},
{kMarkerEndAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kMarkerMidAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kMarkerStartAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kMaskAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kMaskTypeAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kOpacityAttr, kAnimatedNumber},
{kOverflowAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kPaintOrderAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kPointerEventsAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kShapeRenderingAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kStopColorAttr, kAnimatedColor},
{kStopOpacityAttr, kAnimatedNumber},
{kStrokeAttr, kAnimatedColor},
{kStrokeDasharrayAttr, kAnimatedLengthList},
{kStrokeDashoffsetAttr, kAnimatedLength},
{kStrokeLinecapAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kStrokeLinejoinAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kStrokeMiterlimitAttr, kAnimatedNumber},
{kStrokeOpacityAttr, kAnimatedNumber},
{kStrokeWidthAttr, kAnimatedLength},
{kTextAnchorAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kTextDecorationAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kTextRenderingAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kVectorEffectAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kVisibilityAttr, kAnimatedString},
{kWordSpacingAttr, kAnimatedLength},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(attr_to_types); i++)
css_property_map.Set(attr_to_types[i].attr, attr_to_types[i].prop_type);
}
return css_property_map.at(attribute_name);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_wrmsr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u64 msr_data;
msr_data = (u32)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX)
| ((u64)reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) << 32);
if (ctxt->ops->set_msr(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), msr_data))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t Curl_nss_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
return snprintf(buffer, size, "NSS/%s", NSS_VERSION);
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 50,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::registerForPageCacheSuspensionCallbacks(Element* e)
{
m_documentSuspensionCallbackElements.add(e);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::InformDeletePageDone(
const DeletePageCallback& callback,
DeletePageResult result) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("OfflinePages.DeletePageResult",
static_cast<int>(result),
static_cast<int>(DeletePageResult::RESULT_COUNT));
archive_manager_->GetStorageStats(
base::Bind(&ReportStorageHistogramsAfterDelete));
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(result);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
if (tfile->detached)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
if (dev) {
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
return -EBUSY;
if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) && dev->netdev_ops == &tap_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!!(ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) !=
!!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (tun_not_capable(tun))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE &&
(tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled > 1)) {
/* One or more queue has already been attached, no need
* to initialize the device again.
*/
return 0;
}
}
else {
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int queues = ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE ?
MAX_TAP_QUEUES : 1;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_create();
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
/* TUN device */
flags |= IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) {
/* TAP device */
flags |= IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else
return -EINVAL;
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
dev = alloc_netdev_mqs(sizeof(struct tun_struct), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, tun_setup, queues,
queues);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
err = dev_get_valid_name(net, dev, name);
if (err)
goto err_free_dev;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &tun_link_ops;
dev->ifindex = tfile->ifindex;
dev->sysfs_groups[0] = &tun_attr_group;
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->dev = dev;
tun->flags = flags;
tun->txflt.count = 0;
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
tun->align = NET_SKB_PAD;
tun->filter_attached = false;
tun->sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
tun->rx_batched = 0;
tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_dev;
}
spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_stat;
tun_net_init(dev);
tun_flow_init(tun);
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
err = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_flow;
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_detach;
}
netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_set_iff\n");
tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
(ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
/* Make sure persistent devices do not get stuck in
* xoff state.
*/
if (netif_running(tun->dev))
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(tun->dev);
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
err_detach:
tun_detach_all(dev);
/* register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() */
goto err_free_dev;
err_free_flow:
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
err_free_stat:
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
err_free_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tun: allow positive return values on dev_get_valid_name() call
If the name argument of dev_get_valid_name() contains "%d", it will try
to assign it a unit number in __dev__alloc_name() and return either the
unit number (>= 0) or an error code (< 0).
Considering positive values as error values prevent tun device creations
relying this mechanism, therefor we should only consider negative values
as errors here.
Signed-off-by: Julien Gomes <julien@arista.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 170,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codeAllEqualityTerms(
Parse *pParse, /* Parsing context */
WhereLevel *pLevel, /* Which nested loop of the FROM we are coding */
int bRev, /* Reverse the order of IN operators */
int nExtraReg, /* Number of extra registers to allocate */
char **pzAff /* OUT: Set to point to affinity string */
){
u16 nEq; /* The number of == or IN constraints to code */
u16 nSkip; /* Number of left-most columns to skip */
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe; /* The vm under construction */
Index *pIdx; /* The index being used for this loop */
WhereTerm *pTerm; /* A single constraint term */
WhereLoop *pLoop; /* The WhereLoop object */
int j; /* Loop counter */
int regBase; /* Base register */
int nReg; /* Number of registers to allocate */
char *zAff; /* Affinity string to return */
/* This module is only called on query plans that use an index. */
pLoop = pLevel->pWLoop;
assert( (pLoop->wsFlags & WHERE_VIRTUALTABLE)==0 );
nEq = pLoop->u.btree.nEq;
nSkip = pLoop->nSkip;
pIdx = pLoop->u.btree.pIndex;
assert( pIdx!=0 );
/* Figure out how many memory cells we will need then allocate them.
*/
regBase = pParse->nMem + 1;
nReg = pLoop->u.btree.nEq + nExtraReg;
pParse->nMem += nReg;
zAff = sqlite3DbStrDup(pParse->db,sqlite3IndexAffinityStr(pParse->db,pIdx));
assert( zAff!=0 || pParse->db->mallocFailed );
if( nSkip ){
int iIdxCur = pLevel->iIdxCur;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, (bRev?OP_Last:OP_Rewind), iIdxCur);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev==0);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev!=0);
VdbeComment((v, "begin skip-scan on %s", pIdx->zName));
j = sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_Goto);
pLevel->addrSkip = sqlite3VdbeAddOp4Int(v, (bRev?OP_SeekLT:OP_SeekGT),
iIdxCur, 0, regBase, nSkip);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev==0);
VdbeCoverageIf(v, bRev!=0);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, j);
for(j=0; j<nSkip; j++){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iIdxCur, j, regBase+j);
testcase( pIdx->aiColumn[j]==XN_EXPR );
VdbeComment((v, "%s", explainIndexColumnName(pIdx, j)));
}
}
/* Evaluate the equality constraints
*/
assert( zAff==0 || (int)strlen(zAff)>=nEq );
for(j=nSkip; j<nEq; j++){
int r1;
pTerm = pLoop->aLTerm[j];
assert( pTerm!=0 );
/* The following testcase is true for indices with redundant columns.
** Ex: CREATE INDEX i1 ON t1(a,b,a); SELECT * FROM t1 WHERE a=0 AND b=0; */
testcase( (pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_CODED)!=0 );
testcase( pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_VIRTUAL );
r1 = codeEqualityTerm(pParse, pTerm, pLevel, j, bRev, regBase+j);
if( r1!=regBase+j ){
if( nReg==1 ){
sqlite3ReleaseTempReg(pParse, regBase);
regBase = r1;
}else{
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_SCopy, r1, regBase+j);
}
}
if( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IN ){
if( pTerm->pExpr->flags & EP_xIsSelect ){
/* No affinity ever needs to be (or should be) applied to a value
** from the RHS of an "? IN (SELECT ...)" expression. The
** sqlite3FindInIndex() routine has already ensured that the
** affinity of the comparison has been applied to the value. */
if( zAff ) zAff[j] = SQLITE_AFF_BLOB;
}
}else if( (pTerm->eOperator & WO_ISNULL)==0 ){
Expr *pRight = pTerm->pExpr->pRight;
if( (pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_IS)==0 && sqlite3ExprCanBeNull(pRight) ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IsNull, regBase+j, pLevel->addrBrk);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
if( zAff ){
if( sqlite3CompareAffinity(pRight, zAff[j])==SQLITE_AFF_BLOB ){
zAff[j] = SQLITE_AFF_BLOB;
}
if( sqlite3ExprNeedsNoAffinityChange(pRight, zAff[j]) ){
zAff[j] = SQLITE_AFF_BLOB;
}
}
}
}
*pzAff = zAff;
return regBase;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLTextAreaElement::restoreFormControlState(const FormControlState& state)
{
setValue(state[0]);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_write_element)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *name, *content = NULL;
int name_len, content_len, retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|s!",
&name, &name_len, &content, &content_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|s!", &pind,
&name, &name_len, &content, &content_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
XMLW_NAME_CHK("Invalid Element Name");
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
if (!content) {
retval = xmlTextWriterStartElement(ptr, (xmlChar *)name);
if (retval == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
xmlTextWriterEndElement(ptr);
if (retval == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
retval = xmlTextWriterWriteElement(ptr, (xmlChar *)name, (xmlChar *)content);
}
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
return -EINVAL;
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
aa_g_profile_mode = i;
return 0;
}
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 34,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decrypt_callback(void *priv, u8 *srcdst, unsigned int nbytes)
{
const unsigned int bsize = SERPENT_BLOCK_SIZE;
struct crypt_priv *ctx = priv;
int i;
ctx->fpu_enabled = serpent_fpu_begin(ctx->fpu_enabled, nbytes);
if (nbytes >= SERPENT_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS * bsize) {
serpent_ecb_dec_16way(ctx->ctx, srcdst, srcdst);
srcdst += bsize * SERPENT_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS;
nbytes -= bsize * SERPENT_AVX2_PARALLEL_BLOCKS;
}
while (nbytes >= SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS * bsize) {
serpent_ecb_dec_8way_avx(ctx->ctx, srcdst, srcdst);
srcdst += bsize * SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS;
nbytes -= bsize * SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS;
}
for (i = 0; i < nbytes / bsize; i++, srcdst += bsize)
__serpent_decrypt(ctx->ctx, srcdst, srcdst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vm_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
{
return vm_brk_flags(addr, len, 0);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_do_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nfs4_createdata *data)
{
int status = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(dir)->client, NFS_SERVER(dir), &data->msg,
&data->arg.seq_args, &data->res.seq_res, 1);
if (status == 0) {
update_changeattr(dir, &data->res.dir_cinfo);
status = nfs_instantiate(dentry, data->res.fh, data->res.fattr);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *multi_type(struct sb_uart_port *port)
{
int type = port->type;
if (type >= ARRAY_SIZE(uart_config))
type = 0;
return uart_config[type].name;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_k(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, float c, float m, float y, float k)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
float color[4] = {c, m, y, k};
pr->dev->flags &= ~FZ_DEVFLAG_FILLCOLOR_UNDEFINED;
pdf_set_colorspace(ctx, pr, PDF_FILL, fz_device_cmyk(ctx));
pdf_set_color(ctx, pr, PDF_FILL, color);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double GetEventTimestamp(const Maybe<double>& timestamp) {
return (GetEventTimeTicks(timestamp) - base::TimeTicks()).InSecondsF();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t timer_int_route(struct HPETTimer *timer)
{
return (timer->config & HPET_TN_INT_ROUTE_MASK) >> HPET_TN_INT_ROUTE_SHIFT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
{
s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_q922_addr(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int *dlci,
u_int *addr_len, uint8_t *flags, u_int length)
{
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT))
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST(p[1]) || length < 2)
return -1;
*addr_len = 2;
*dlci = ((p[0] & 0xFC) << 2) | ((p[1] & 0xF0) >> 4);
flags[0] = p[0] & 0x02; /* populate the first flag fields */
flags[1] = p[1] & 0x0c;
flags[2] = 0; /* clear the rest of the flags */
flags[3] = 0;
if (p[1] & FR_EA_BIT)
return 1; /* 2-byte Q.922 address */
p += 2;
length -= 2;
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
(*addr_len)++; /* 3- or 4-byte Q.922 address */
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT) == 0) {
*dlci = (*dlci << 7) | (p[0] >> 1);
(*addr_len)++; /* 4-byte Q.922 address */
p++;
length--;
}
if (!ND_TTEST(p[0]) || length < 1)
return -1;
if ((p[0] & FR_EA_BIT) == 0)
return 0; /* more than 4 bytes of Q.922 address? */
flags[3] = p[0] & 0x02;
*dlci = (*dlci << 6) | (p[0] >> 2);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::blendEquation(GLenum mode) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateBlendEquation("blendEquation", mode))
return;
ContextGL()->BlendEquation(mode);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::CreateMemoryAllocatorDump(
DiscardableSharedMemoryHeap::Span* span,
const char* name,
base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump* pmd) const {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
return heap_->CreateMemoryAllocatorDump(span, name, pmd);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_msr_interception(u32 *msrpm, unsigned msr,
int read, int write)
{
u8 bit_read, bit_write;
unsigned long tmp;
u32 offset;
/*
* If this warning triggers extend the direct_access_msrs list at the
* beginning of the file
*/
WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));
offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
bit_read = 2 * (msr & 0x0f);
bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
tmp = msrpm[offset];
BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);
read ? clear_bit(bit_read, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_read, &tmp);
write ? clear_bit(bit_write, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
msrpm[offset] = tmp;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool sock_full(struct pool *pool)
{
if (strlen(pool->sockbuf))
return true;
return (socket_full(pool, 0));
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_handle_readid(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
cur_drv->head = (fdctrl->fifo[1] >> 2) & 1;
timer_mod(fdctrl->result_timer,
qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL) + (get_ticks_per_sec() / 50));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_newset(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct nft_set_ops *ops;
struct nft_af_info *afi;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nft_table *table;
struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_ctx ctx;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
unsigned int size;
bool create;
u32 ktype, dtype, flags, policy;
struct nft_set_desc desc;
int err;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_TABLE] == NULL ||
nla[NFTA_SET_NAME] == NULL ||
nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_LEN] == NULL ||
nla[NFTA_SET_ID] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&desc, 0, sizeof(desc));
ktype = NFT_DATA_VALUE;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_TYPE] != NULL) {
ktype = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_TYPE]));
if ((ktype & NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK) == NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
}
desc.klen = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_LEN]));
if (desc.klen == 0 || desc.klen > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct nft_data, data))
return -EINVAL;
flags = 0;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_FLAGS] != NULL) {
flags = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_FLAGS]));
if (flags & ~(NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_CONSTANT |
NFT_SET_INTERVAL | NFT_SET_MAP))
return -EINVAL;
}
dtype = 0;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_TYPE] != NULL) {
if (!(flags & NFT_SET_MAP))
return -EINVAL;
dtype = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_TYPE]));
if ((dtype & NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK) == NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK &&
dtype != NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
return -EINVAL;
if (dtype != NFT_DATA_VERDICT) {
if (nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_LEN] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
desc.dlen = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_LEN]));
if (desc.dlen == 0 ||
desc.dlen > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct nft_data, data))
return -EINVAL;
} else
desc.dlen = sizeof(struct nft_data);
} else if (flags & NFT_SET_MAP)
return -EINVAL;
policy = NFT_SET_POL_PERFORMANCE;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_POLICY] != NULL)
policy = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_POLICY]));
if (nla[NFTA_SET_DESC] != NULL) {
err = nf_tables_set_desc_parse(&ctx, &desc, nla[NFTA_SET_DESC]);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
create = nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE ? true : false;
afi = nf_tables_afinfo_lookup(net, nfmsg->nfgen_family, create);
if (IS_ERR(afi))
return PTR_ERR(afi);
table = nf_tables_table_lookup(afi, nla[NFTA_SET_TABLE]);
if (IS_ERR(table))
return PTR_ERR(table);
nft_ctx_init(&ctx, skb, nlh, afi, table, NULL, nla);
set = nf_tables_set_lookup(table, nla[NFTA_SET_NAME]);
if (IS_ERR(set)) {
if (PTR_ERR(set) != -ENOENT)
return PTR_ERR(set);
set = NULL;
}
if (set != NULL) {
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
return -EEXIST;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return 0;
}
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE))
return -ENOENT;
ops = nft_select_set_ops(nla, &desc, policy);
if (IS_ERR(ops))
return PTR_ERR(ops);
size = 0;
if (ops->privsize != NULL)
size = ops->privsize(nla);
err = -ENOMEM;
set = kzalloc(sizeof(*set) + size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (set == NULL)
goto err1;
nla_strlcpy(name, nla[NFTA_SET_NAME], sizeof(set->name));
err = nf_tables_set_alloc_name(&ctx, set, name);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&set->bindings);
set->ops = ops;
set->ktype = ktype;
set->klen = desc.klen;
set->dtype = dtype;
set->dlen = desc.dlen;
set->flags = flags;
set->size = desc.size;
set->policy = policy;
err = ops->init(set, &desc, nla);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
err = nft_trans_set_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWSET, set);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
list_add_tail_rcu(&set->list, &table->sets);
table->use++;
return 0;
err2:
kfree(set);
err1:
module_put(ops->owner);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 57,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event)
{
if (isLink()) {
if (focused() && isEnterKeyKeydownEvent(event) && isLiveLink()) {
event->setDefaultHandled();
dispatchSimulatedClick(event);
return;
}
if (isLinkClick(event) && isLiveLink()) {
handleClick(event);
return;
}
}
HTMLElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void icmp_xmit_unlock(struct sock *sk)
{
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_lock.slock);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLElement* Document::body() const
{
if (!documentElement())
return 0;
for (HTMLElement* child = Traversal<HTMLElement>::firstChild(*documentElement()); child; child = Traversal<HTMLElement>::nextSibling(*child)) {
if (isHTMLFrameSetElement(*child) || isHTMLBodyElement(*child))
return child;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 125,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lockdep_annotate_inode_mutex_key(struct inode *inode)
{
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
struct file_system_type *type = inode->i_sb->s_type;
/* Set new key only if filesystem hasn't already changed it */
if (lockdep_match_class(&inode->i_rwsem, &type->i_mutex_key)) {
/*
* ensure nobody is actually holding i_mutex
*/
init_rwsem(&inode->i_rwsem);
lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_rwsem,
&type->i_mutex_dir_key);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 79,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gp_abgr8(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_bytep pp = voidcast(png_const_bytep, pb);
p->r = pp[3];
p->g = pp[2];
p->b = pp[1];
p->a = pp[0];
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::clearLocalStorage()
{
if (PageGroup* group = d->m_page->groupPtr()) {
if (StorageNamespace* storage = group->localStorage())
storage->clearAllOriginsForDeletion();
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebGLTransformFeedback* WebGL2RenderingContextBase::createTransformFeedback() {
if (isContextLost())
return nullptr;
return WebGLTransformFeedback::Create(this,
WebGLTransformFeedback::TFTypeUser);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XcursorFilenameSave (const char *file,
const XcursorComments *comments,
const XcursorImages *images)
{
FILE *f;
XcursorBool ret;
if (!file || !comments || !images)
return XcursorFalse;
f = fopen (file, "w");
if (!f)
return 0;
ret = XcursorFileSave (f, comments, images);
return fclose (f) != EOF && ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct mm_struct * mm_init(struct mm_struct * mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
atomic_set(&mm->mm_users, 1);
atomic_set(&mm->mm_count, 1);
init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->mmlist);
mm->flags = (current->mm) ?
(current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK) : default_dump_filter;
mm->core_state = NULL;
mm->nr_ptes = 0;
memset(&mm->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(mm->rss_stat));
spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock);
mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
mm_init_aio(mm);
mm_init_owner(mm, p);
if (likely(!mm_alloc_pgd(mm))) {
mm->def_flags = 0;
mmu_notifier_mm_init(mm);
return mm;
}
free_mm(mm);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: pids: fix fork_idle() to setup ->pids correctly
copy_process(pid => &init_struct_pid) doesn't do attach_pid/etc.
It shouldn't, but this means that the idle threads run with the wrong
pids copied from the caller's task_struct. In x86 case the caller is
either kernel_init() thread or keventd.
In particular, this means that after the series of cpu_up/cpu_down an
idle thread (which never exits) can run with .pid pointing to nowhere.
Change fork_idle() to initialize idle->pids[] correctly. We only set
.pid = &init_struct_pid but do not add .node to list, INIT_TASK() does
the same for the boot-cpu idle thread (swapper).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Mathias Krause <Mathias.Krause@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_SAMPLE(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
struct ofpact_sample *os = ofpact_put_SAMPLE(ofpacts);
os->sampling_port = OFPP_NONE;
os->direction = NX_ACTION_SAMPLE_DEFAULT;
char *key, *value;
while (ofputil_parse_key_value(&arg, &key, &value)) {
char *error = NULL;
if (!strcmp(key, "probability")) {
error = str_to_u16(value, "probability", &os->probability);
if (!error && os->probability == 0) {
error = xasprintf("invalid probability value \"%s\"", value);
}
} else if (!strcmp(key, "collector_set_id")) {
error = str_to_u32(value, &os->collector_set_id);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "obs_domain_id")) {
error = str_to_u32(value, &os->obs_domain_id);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "obs_point_id")) {
error = str_to_u32(value, &os->obs_point_id);
} else if (!strcmp(key, "sampling_port")) {
if (!ofputil_port_from_string(value, &os->sampling_port)) {
error = xasprintf("%s: unknown port", value);
}
} else if (!strcmp(key, "ingress")) {
os->direction = NX_ACTION_SAMPLE_INGRESS;
} else if (!strcmp(key, "egress")) {
os->direction = NX_ACTION_SAMPLE_EGRESS;
} else {
error = xasprintf("invalid key \"%s\" in \"sample\" argument",
key);
}
if (error) {
return error;
}
}
if (os->probability == 0) {
return xstrdup("non-zero \"probability\" must be specified on sample");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ImageBitmap* ImageBitmap::create(PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> image,
Optional<IntRect> cropRect,
const ImageBitmapOptions& options) {
return new ImageBitmap(std::move(image), cropRect, options);
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 140,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool tcp_may_undo(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
return tp->undo_marker && (!tp->undo_retrans || tcp_packet_delayed(tp));
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 51,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(utf8_encode)
{
char *arg;
XML_Char *encoded;
int arg_len, len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &arg, &arg_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
encoded = xml_utf8_encode(arg, arg_len, &len, "ISO-8859-1");
if (encoded == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(encoded, len, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Textfield::SetBackgroundColor(SkColor color) {
background_color_ = color;
use_default_background_color_ = false;
UpdateBackgroundColor();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool AllocElem(cmsContext ContextID, _cmsDICelem* e, cmsUInt32Number Count)
{
e->Offsets = (cmsUInt32Number *) _cmsCalloc(ContextID, Count, sizeof(cmsUInt32Number));
if (e->Offsets == NULL) return FALSE;
e->Sizes = (cmsUInt32Number *) _cmsCalloc(ContextID, Count, sizeof(cmsUInt32Number));
if (e->Sizes == NULL) {
_cmsFree(ContextID, e -> Offsets);
return FALSE;
}
e ->ContextID = ContextID;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArthurOutputDev::eoFill(GfxState *state)
{
m_painter->fillPath( convertPath( state, state->getPath(), Qt::OddEvenFill ), m_currentBrush );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int descriptors_changed(struct usb_device *udev,
struct usb_device_descriptor *old_device_descriptor,
struct usb_host_bos *old_bos)
{
int changed = 0;
unsigned index;
unsigned serial_len = 0;
unsigned len;
unsigned old_length;
int length;
char *buf;
if (memcmp(&udev->descriptor, old_device_descriptor,
sizeof(*old_device_descriptor)) != 0)
return 1;
if ((old_bos && !udev->bos) || (!old_bos && udev->bos))
return 1;
if (udev->bos) {
len = le16_to_cpu(udev->bos->desc->wTotalLength);
if (len != le16_to_cpu(old_bos->desc->wTotalLength))
return 1;
if (memcmp(udev->bos->desc, old_bos->desc, len))
return 1;
}
/* Since the idVendor, idProduct, and bcdDevice values in the
* device descriptor haven't changed, we will assume the
* Manufacturer and Product strings haven't changed either.
* But the SerialNumber string could be different (e.g., a
* different flash card of the same brand).
*/
if (udev->serial)
serial_len = strlen(udev->serial) + 1;
len = serial_len;
for (index = 0; index < udev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; index++) {
old_length = le16_to_cpu(udev->config[index].desc.wTotalLength);
len = max(len, old_length);
}
buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOIO);
if (buf == NULL) {
dev_err(&udev->dev, "no mem to re-read configs after reset\n");
/* assume the worst */
return 1;
}
for (index = 0; index < udev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; index++) {
old_length = le16_to_cpu(udev->config[index].desc.wTotalLength);
length = usb_get_descriptor(udev, USB_DT_CONFIG, index, buf,
old_length);
if (length != old_length) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "config index %d, error %d\n",
index, length);
changed = 1;
break;
}
if (memcmp(buf, udev->rawdescriptors[index], old_length)
!= 0) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "config index %d changed (#%d)\n",
index,
((struct usb_config_descriptor *) buf)->
bConfigurationValue);
changed = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!changed && serial_len) {
length = usb_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber,
buf, serial_len);
if (length + 1 != serial_len) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "serial string error %d\n",
length);
changed = 1;
} else if (memcmp(buf, udev->serial, length) != 0) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "serial string changed\n");
changed = 1;
}
}
kfree(buf);
return changed;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void M_fs_path_split(const char *path, char **dir, char **name, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_list_str_t *parts;
char *temp;
if (dir == NULL && name == NULL)
return;
if (dir != NULL)
*dir = NULL;
if (name != NULL)
*name = NULL;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
if (dir != NULL) {
*dir = M_strdup(".");
}
return;
}
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
parts = M_fs_path_componentize_path(path, sys_type);
temp = M_list_str_take_at(parts, M_list_str_len(parts)-1);
if (M_list_str_len(parts) == 0 && M_fs_path_isabs(path, sys_type)) {
M_list_str_insert(parts, temp);
M_free(temp);
temp = NULL;
}
if (temp != NULL && *temp == '\0') {
M_free(temp);
temp = NULL;
}
if (name != NULL) {
*name = temp;
} else {
M_free(temp);
}
if (dir != NULL) {
*dir = M_fs_path_join_parts(parts, sys_type);
if (*dir == NULL) {
*dir = M_strdup(".");
}
}
M_list_str_destroy(parts);
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 79,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void destroy_inodecache(void)
{
/*
* Make sure all delayed rcu free inodes are flushed before we
* destroy cache.
*/
rcu_barrier();
kmem_cache_destroy(ext4_inode_cachep);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::setLocationBarHeight(int height) {
if (!proxy_) {
construct_props_->location_bar_height = height;
} else {
proxy_->setLocationBarHeight(height);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setup_report_key(struct packet_command *cgc, unsigned agid, unsigned type)
{
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_REPORT_KEY;
cgc->cmd[10] = type | (agid << 6);
switch (type) {
case 0: case 8: case 5: {
cgc->buflen = 8;
break;
}
case 1: {
cgc->buflen = 16;
break;
}
case 2: case 4: {
cgc->buflen = 12;
break;
}
}
cgc->cmd[9] = cgc->buflen;
cgc->data_direction = CGC_DATA_READ;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 76,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stsd_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(s, 4)
return gf_isom_box_array_read_ex(s, bs, stsd_AddBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STSD);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::loadEventFired(Frame* frame)
{
if (!frame->isMainFrame())
return;
m_frontend->loadEventFired(currentTime());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendShutdownWithPendingCreate(bool fast) {
net::TestCompletionCallback cb;
{
ASSERT_TRUE(CleanupCacheDir());
disk_cache::BackendFlags flags =
fast ? disk_cache::kNone : disk_cache::kNoRandom;
CreateBackend(flags);
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
int rv = cache_->CreateEntry("some key", &entry, cb.callback());
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(net::ERR_IO_PENDING));
cache_.reset();
EXPECT_FALSE(cb.have_result());
}
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
EXPECT_FALSE(cb.have_result());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::LoadedState::setupInputSurface() {
status_t err = OK;
if (mCodec->mRepeatFrameDelayUs > 0ll) {
err = mCodec->mOMX->setInternalOption(
mCodec->mNode,
kPortIndexInput,
IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_REPEAT_PREVIOUS_FRAME_DELAY,
&mCodec->mRepeatFrameDelayUs,
sizeof(mCodec->mRepeatFrameDelayUs));
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] Unable to configure option to repeat previous "
"frames (err %d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(),
err);
return err;
}
}
if (mCodec->mMaxPtsGapUs > 0ll) {
err = mCodec->mOMX->setInternalOption(
mCodec->mNode,
kPortIndexInput,
IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_TIMESTAMP_GAP,
&mCodec->mMaxPtsGapUs,
sizeof(mCodec->mMaxPtsGapUs));
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] Unable to configure max timestamp gap (err %d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(),
err);
return err;
}
}
if (mCodec->mMaxFps > 0) {
err = mCodec->mOMX->setInternalOption(
mCodec->mNode,
kPortIndexInput,
IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_FPS,
&mCodec->mMaxFps,
sizeof(mCodec->mMaxFps));
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] Unable to configure max fps (err %d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(),
err);
return err;
}
}
if (mCodec->mTimePerCaptureUs > 0ll
&& mCodec->mTimePerFrameUs > 0ll) {
int64_t timeLapse[2];
timeLapse[0] = mCodec->mTimePerFrameUs;
timeLapse[1] = mCodec->mTimePerCaptureUs;
err = mCodec->mOMX->setInternalOption(
mCodec->mNode,
kPortIndexInput,
IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_TIME_LAPSE,
&timeLapse[0],
sizeof(timeLapse));
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] Unable to configure time lapse (err %d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(),
err);
return err;
}
}
if (mCodec->mCreateInputBuffersSuspended) {
bool suspend = true;
err = mCodec->mOMX->setInternalOption(
mCodec->mNode,
kPortIndexInput,
IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_SUSPEND,
&suspend,
sizeof(suspend));
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] Unable to configure option to suspend (err %d)",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(),
err);
return err;
}
}
uint32_t usageBits;
if (mCodec->mOMX->getParameter(
mCodec->mNode, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits,
&usageBits, sizeof(usageBits)) == OK) {
mCodec->mInputFormat->setInt32(
"using-sw-read-often", !!(usageBits & GRALLOC_USAGE_SW_READ_OFTEN));
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void f_midi_in_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
struct f_midi *midi = (struct f_midi *) data;
f_midi_transmit(midi);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 91,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_av_execute_service(bool b_enable) {
if (b_enable) {
/* TODO: Removed BTA_SEC_AUTHORIZE since the Java/App does not
* handle this request in order to allow incoming connections to succeed.
* We need to put this back once support for this is added */
/* Added BTA_AV_FEAT_NO_SCO_SSPD - this ensures that the BTA does not
* auto-suspend av streaming on AG events(SCO or Call). The suspend shall
* be initiated by the app/audioflinger layers */
/* Support for browsing for SDP record should work only if we enable BROWSE
* while registering. */
#if (AVRC_METADATA_INCLUDED == TRUE)
BTA_AvEnable(BTA_SEC_AUTHENTICATE,
BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG | BTA_AV_FEAT_METADATA | BTA_AV_FEAT_VENDOR |
BTA_AV_FEAT_NO_SCO_SSPD
#if (AVRC_ADV_CTRL_INCLUDED == TRUE)
| BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT | BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL |
BTA_AV_FEAT_BROWSE
#endif
,
bte_av_callback);
#else
BTA_AvEnable(BTA_SEC_AUTHENTICATE,
(BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG | BTA_AV_FEAT_NO_SCO_SSPD), bte_av_callback);
#endif
BTA_AvRegister(BTA_AV_CHNL_AUDIO, BTIF_AV_SERVICE_NAME, 0, NULL,
UUID_SERVCLASS_AUDIO_SOURCE);
} else {
BTA_AvDeregister(btif_av_cb.bta_handle);
BTA_AvDisable();
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 163,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sock_enable_timestamp(struct sock *sk, int flag)
{
if (!sock_flag(sk, flag)) {
unsigned long previous_flags = sk->sk_flags;
sock_set_flag(sk, flag);
/*
* we just set one of the two flags which require net
* time stamping, but time stamping might have been on
* already because of the other one
*/
if (!(previous_flags & SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP))
net_enable_timestamp();
}
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vm_stat_get(void *_offset, u64 *val)
{
unsigned offset = (long)_offset;
struct kvm *kvm;
struct kvm_stat_data stat_tmp = {.offset = offset};
u64 tmp_val;
*val = 0;
spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
stat_tmp.kvm = kvm;
vm_stat_get_per_vm((void *)&stat_tmp, &tmp_val);
*val += tmp_val;
}
spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned int flags,
struct used_address *used_address,
unsigned int allowed_msghdr_flags)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int ctl_len;
ssize_t err;
msg_sys->msg_name = &address;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags)
err = get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat, NULL, &iov);
else
err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg, NULL, &iov);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
flags |= (msg_sys->msg_flags & allowed_msghdr_flags);
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct cmsghdr) !=
CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)));
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && msg_sys->msg_name &&
used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
if (msg_sys->msg_name)
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
kfree(iov);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_startSingleplayer_f( void ) {
char binName[MAX_OSPATH];
#if defined(_WIN64) || defined(__WIN64__)
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "ioWolfSP." ARCH_STRING ".exe");
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#elif defined(_WIN32) || defined(__WIN32__)
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "ioWolfSP." BIN_STRING ".exe");
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#elif defined(__i386__) && (!defined(_WIN32) || !defined(__WIN32__))
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "./iowolfsp." BIN_STRING );
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#else
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "./iowolfsp." ARCH_STRING );
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#endif
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcXFixesDispatch(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesReq);
if (stuff->xfixesReqType >= XFixesNumberRequests)
return BadRequest;
return (*SProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConversionContext::SwitchToClip(const ClipPaintPropertyNode* target_clip) {
if (target_clip == current_clip_)
return;
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* lca_clip =
&LowestCommonAncestor(*target_clip, *current_clip_);
while (current_clip_ != lca_clip) {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(state_stack_.size() && state_stack_.back().type == StateEntry::kClip)
<< "Error: Chunk has a clip that escaped its layer's or effect's clip."
<< "\ntarget_clip:\n"
<< target_clip->ToTreeString().Utf8().data() << "current_clip_:\n"
<< current_clip_->ToTreeString().Utf8().data();
#endif
if (!state_stack_.size() || state_stack_.back().type != StateEntry::kClip)
break;
current_clip_ = current_clip_->Parent();
StateEntry& previous_state = state_stack_.back();
if (current_clip_ == lca_clip) {
current_clip_ = lca_clip = previous_state.clip;
}
if (current_clip_ == previous_state.clip)
EndClip();
}
if (target_clip == current_clip_)
return;
Vector<const ClipPaintPropertyNode*, 1u> pending_clips;
for (const ClipPaintPropertyNode* clip = target_clip; clip != current_clip_;
clip = clip->Parent()) {
if (!clip)
break;
pending_clips.push_back(clip);
}
DCHECK(pending_clips.size());
auto pending_combined_clip_rect = pending_clips.back()->ClipRect();
const auto* lowest_combined_clip_node = pending_clips.back();
for (size_t i = pending_clips.size() - 1; i--;) {
const auto* sub_clip = pending_clips[i];
if (CombineClip(sub_clip, pending_combined_clip_rect)) {
lowest_combined_clip_node = sub_clip;
} else {
StartClip(pending_combined_clip_rect, lowest_combined_clip_node);
pending_combined_clip_rect = sub_clip->ClipRect();
lowest_combined_clip_node = sub_clip;
}
}
StartClip(pending_combined_clip_rect, lowest_combined_clip_node);
DCHECK_EQ(current_clip_, target_clip);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
HTMLCanvasElement* canvas,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
WebGLRenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(execution_context, target, level,
xoffset, yoffset, format, type,
canvas, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: icmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int plen, const u_char *bp2,
int fragmented)
{
char *cp;
const struct icmp *dp;
const struct icmp_ext_t *ext_dp;
const struct ip *ip;
const char *str, *fmt;
const struct ip *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
const uint8_t *obj_tptr;
uint32_t raw_label;
const u_char *snapend_save;
const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *icmp_mpls_ext_object_header;
u_int hlen, dport, mtu, obj_tlen, obj_class_num, obj_ctype;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
dp = (const struct icmp *)bp;
ext_dp = (const struct icmp_ext_t *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
str = buf;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_code);
switch (dp->icmp_type) {
case ICMP_ECHO:
case ICMP_ECHOREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "echo %s, id %u, seq %u",
dp->icmp_type == ICMP_ECHO ?
"request" : "reply",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_UNREACH_PROTOCOL:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_PORT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
oip = &dp->icmp_ip;
hlen = IP_HL(oip) * 4;
ouh = (const struct udphdr *)(((const u_char *)oip) + hlen);
ND_TCHECK(ouh->uh_dport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (oip->ip_p) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s tcp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s udp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %u port %u unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
oip->ip_p, dport);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_NEEDFRAG:
{
register const struct mtu_discovery *mp;
mp = (const struct mtu_discovery *)(const u_char *)&dp->icmp_void;
mtu = EXTRACT_16BITS(&mp->nexthopmtu);
if (mtu) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag (mtu %d)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst), mtu);
} else {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
}
}
break;
default:
fmt = tok2str(unreach2str, "#%d %%s unreachable",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
fmt = tok2str(type2str, "redirect-#%d %%s to net %%s",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_gwaddr));
break;
case ICMP_ROUTERADVERT:
{
register const struct ih_rdiscovery *ihp;
register const struct id_rdiscovery *idp;
u_int lifetime, num, size;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "router advertisement");
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
ihp = (const struct ih_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_void;
ND_TCHECK(*ihp);
(void)strncpy(cp, " lifetime ", sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
lifetime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ihp->ird_lifetime);
if (lifetime < 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u",
lifetime);
} else if (lifetime < 60 * 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u:%02u",
lifetime / 60, lifetime % 60);
} else {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
"%u:%02u:%02u",
lifetime / 3600,
(lifetime % 3600) / 60,
lifetime % 60);
}
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
num = ihp->ird_addrnum;
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " %d:", num);
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
size = ihp->ird_addrsiz;
if (size != 2) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
" [size %d]", size);
break;
}
idp = (const struct id_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_data;
while (num-- > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*idp);
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " {%s %u}",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &idp->ird_addr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&idp->ird_pref));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
++idp;
}
}
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_INTRANS:
str = "time exceeded in-transit";
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_REASS:
str = "ip reassembly time exceeded";
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "time exceeded-#%u",
dp->icmp_code);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_PARAMPROB:
if (dp->icmp_code)
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - code %u", dp->icmp_code);
else {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_pptr);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - octet %u", dp->icmp_pptr);
}
break;
case ICMP_MASKREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_mask);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "address mask is 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_mask));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMP:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp query id %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMPREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ttime);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp reply id %u seq %u: org %s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq),
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_otime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", recv %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_rtime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", xmit %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_ttime)));
break;
default:
str = tok2str(icmp2str, "type-#%d", dp->icmp_type);
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ICMP %s, length %u", str, plen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { /* don't attempt checksumming if this is a frag */
if (ND_TTEST2(*bp, plen)) {
uint16_t sum;
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)dp;
vec[0].len = plen;
sum = in_cksum(vec, 1);
if (sum != 0) {
uint16_t icmp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_cksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (wrong icmp cksum %x (->%x)!)",
icmp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(icmp_sum, sum)));
}
}
}
/*
* print the remnants of the IP packet.
* save the snaplength as this may get overidden in the IP printer.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && ICMP_ERRTYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
bp += 8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
ndo->ndo_snaplen = ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
snapend_save = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&ip->ip_len);
ip_print(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip->ip_len));
ndo->ndo_snapend = snapend_save;
}
/*
* Attempt to decode the MPLS extensions only for some ICMP types.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && plen > ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN && ICMP_MPLS_EXT_TYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext_dp);
/*
* Check first if the mpls extension header shows a non-zero length.
* If the length field is not set then silently verify the checksum
* to check if an extension header is present. This is expedient,
* however not all implementations set the length field proper.
*/
if (!ext_dp->icmp_length &&
ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1)) {
return;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMPLS extension v%u",
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res))));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res)) !=
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " packet not supported"));
return;
}
hlen = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (ND_TTEST2(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res, hlen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = hlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum 0x%04x (%scorrect), length %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ext_dp->icmp_ext_checksum),
in_cksum(vec, 1) ? "in" : "",
hlen));
}
hlen -= 4; /* subtract common header size */
obj_tptr = (const uint8_t *)ext_dp->icmp_ext_data;
while (hlen > sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t)) {
icmp_mpls_ext_object_header = (const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*icmp_mpls_ext_object_header);
obj_tlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->length);
obj_class_num = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->class_num;
obj_ctype = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->ctype;
obj_tptr += sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %u, length %u",
tok2str(icmp_mpls_ext_obj_values,"unknown",obj_class_num),
obj_class_num,
obj_ctype,
obj_tlen));
hlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t); /* length field includes tlv header */
/* infinite loop protection */
if ((obj_class_num == 0) ||
(obj_tlen < sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t))) {
return;
}
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
switch (obj_class_num) {
case 1:
switch(obj_ctype) {
case 1:
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
raw_label = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t label %u, exp %u", MPLS_LABEL(raw_label), MPLS_EXP(raw_label)));
if (MPLS_STACK(raw_label))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u", MPLS_TTL(raw_label)));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case 2:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
break;
}
if (hlen < obj_tlen)
break;
hlen -= obj_tlen;
obj_tptr += obj_tlen;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14462/ICMP: Add a missing bounds check
In icmp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add two tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void snd_timer_user_copy_id(struct snd_timer_id *id, struct snd_timer *timer)
{
id->dev_class = timer->tmr_class;
id->dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_NONE;
id->card = timer->card ? timer->card->number : -1;
id->device = timer->tmr_device;
id->subdevice = timer->tmr_subdevice;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ofscmp(const void *a_, const void *b_)
{
struct in_pack_object *a = (struct in_pack_object *)a_;
struct in_pack_object *b = (struct in_pack_object *)b_;
if (a->offset < b->offset)
return -1;
else if (a->offset > b->offset)
return 1;
else
return oidcmp(&a->object->oid, &b->object->oid);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int imap_tags_edit(struct Context *ctx, const char *tags, char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
char *new = NULL;
char *checker = NULL;
struct ImapData *idata = (struct ImapData *) ctx->data;
/* Check for \* flags capability */
if (!imap_has_flag(&idata->flags, NULL))
{
mutt_error(_("IMAP server doesn't support custom flags"));
return -1;
}
*buf = '\0';
if (tags)
strncpy(buf, tags, buflen);
if (mutt_get_field("Tags: ", buf, buflen, 0) != 0)
return -1;
/* each keyword must be atom defined by rfc822 as:
*
* atom = 1*<any CHAR except specials, SPACE and CTLs>
* CHAR = ( 0.-127. )
* specials = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / "@"
* / "," / ";" / ":" / "\" / <">
* / "." / "[" / "]"
* SPACE = ( 32. )
* CTLS = ( 0.-31., 127.)
*
* And must be separated by one space.
*/
new = buf;
checker = buf;
SKIPWS(checker);
while (*checker != '\0')
{
if (*checker < 32 || *checker >= 127 || // We allow space because it's the separator
*checker == 40 || // (
*checker == 41 || // )
*checker == 60 || // <
*checker == 62 || // >
*checker == 64 || // @
*checker == 44 || // ,
*checker == 59 || // ;
*checker == 58 || // :
*checker == 92 || // backslash
*checker == 34 || // "
*checker == 46 || // .
*checker == 91 || // [
*checker == 93) // ]
{
mutt_error(_("Invalid IMAP flags"));
return 0;
}
/* Skip duplicate space */
while (*checker == ' ' && *(checker + 1) == ' ')
checker++;
/* copy char to new and go the next one */
*new ++ = *checker++;
}
*new = '\0';
new = buf; /* rewind */
mutt_str_remove_trailing_ws(new);
if (mutt_str_strcmp(tags, buf) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SetThreadName(const std::thread::native_handle_type &thread, const char *name)
{
#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__linux) || defined(linux)
char name_trunc[16];
strncpy(name_trunc, name, sizeof(name_trunc));
name_trunc[sizeof(name_trunc)-1] = '\0';
return pthread_setname_np(thread, name_trunc);
#elif defined(macintosh) || defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__APPLE_CC__)
return 0;
#elif defined(__NetBSD__)
char name_trunc[PTHREAD_MAX_NAMELEN_NP];
strncpy(name_trunc, name, sizeof(name_trunc));
name_trunc[sizeof(name_trunc)-1] = '\0';
return pthread_setname_np(thread, "%s", (void *)name_trunc);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)
char name_trunc[PTHREAD_MAX_NAMELEN_NP];
strncpy(name_trunc, name, sizeof(name_trunc));
name_trunc[sizeof(name_trunc)-1] = '\0';
pthread_setname_np(thread, name_trunc);
return 0;
#elif defined(__FreeBSD__)
char name_trunc[PTHREAD_MAX_NAMELEN_NP];
strncpy(name_trunc, name, sizeof(name_trunc));
name_trunc[sizeof(name_trunc)-1] = '\0';
pthread_set_name_np(thread, name_trunc);
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto)
CWE ID: CWE-93
| 0
| 90,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void enqueue_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page)
{
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
list_add(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_freelists[nid]);
h->free_huge_pages++;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zsetcolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr ep;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
gs_client_color cc;
int n_comps, n_numeric_comps, num_offset = 0, code, depth;
PS_colour_space_t *space;
/* initialize the client color pattern pointer for GC */
cc.pattern = 0;
/* check for a pattern color space */
if ((n_comps = cs_num_components(pcs)) < 0) {
n_comps = -n_comps;
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
ref *pImpl, pPatInst;
code = dict_find_string(op, "Implementation", &pImpl);
if (code != 0) {
code = array_get(imemory, pImpl, 0, &pPatInst);
if (code < 0)
return code;
n_numeric_comps = ( pattern_instance_uses_base_space(cc.pattern)
? n_comps - 1
: 0 );
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
} else
n_numeric_comps = 0;
num_offset = 1;
} else
n_numeric_comps = n_comps;
/* gather the numeric operands */
code = float_params(op - num_offset, n_numeric_comps, cc.paint.values);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* The values are copied to graphic state and compared with */
/* other colors by memcmp() in gx_hld_saved_color_equal() */
/* This is the easiest way to avoid indeterminism */
memset(cc.paint.values + n_numeric_comps, 0,
sizeof(cc.paint.values) - sizeof(*cc.paint.values)*n_numeric_comps);
code = get_space_object(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &space);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (space->validatecomponents) {
code = space->validatecomponents(i_ctx_p,
&istate->colorspace[0].array,
cc.paint.values, n_numeric_comps);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
/* pass the color to the graphic library */
if ((code = gs_setcolor(igs, &cc)) >= 0) {
if (n_comps > n_numeric_comps) {
istate->pattern[0] = *op; /* save pattern dict or null */
}
}
/* Check the color spaces, to see if we need to run any tint transform
* procedures. Some Adobe applications *eg Photoshop) expect that the
* tint transform will be run and use this to set up duotone DeviceN
* spaces.
*/
code = validate_spaces(i_ctx_p, &istate->colorspace[0].array, &depth);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up for the continuation procedure which will do the work */
/* Make sure the exec stack has enough space */
check_estack(5);
/* A place holder for data potentially used by transform functions */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'depth' of the space returned during checking above */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store the 'stage' of processing (initially 0) */
ep = esp += 1;
make_int(ep, 0);
/* Store a pointer to the color space stored on the operand stack
* as the stack may grow unpredictably making further access
* to the space difficult
*/
ep = esp += 1;
*ep = istate->colorspace[0].array;
/* Finally, the actual continuation routine */
push_op_estack(setcolor_cont);
return o_push_estack;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 1
| 164,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipa_poly_line(wmfAPI * API, wmfPolyLine_t * polyline)
{
if (polyline->count <= 2)
return;
if (TO_DRAW(polyline))
{
int
point;
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
util_set_pen(API, polyline->dc);
DrawPathStart(WmfDrawingWand);
DrawPathMoveToAbsolute(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(polyline->pt[0].x),
YC(polyline->pt[0].y));
for (point = 1; point < polyline->count; point++)
{
DrawPathLineToAbsolute(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(polyline->pt[point].x),
YC(polyline->pt[point].y));
}
DrawPathFinish(WmfDrawingWand);
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int json_array_extend(json_t *json, json_t *other_json)
{
json_array_t *array, *other;
size_t i;
if(!json_is_array(json) || !json_is_array(other_json))
return -1;
array = json_to_array(json);
other = json_to_array(other_json);
if(!json_array_grow(array, other->entries, 1))
return -1;
for(i = 0; i < other->entries; i++)
json_incref(other->table[i]);
array_copy(array->table, array->entries, other->table, 0, other->entries);
array->entries += other->entries;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 40,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 170,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: main( int argc,
char* argv[] )
{
grEvent event;
parse_cmdline( &argc, &argv );
#if FREETYPE_MAJOR == 2 && FREETYPE_MINOR == 0 && FREETYPE_PATCH <= 8
if ( status.debug )
{
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
FT_SetTraceLevel( trace_any, (FT_Byte)status.trace_level );
#else
status.trace_level = 0;
#endif
}
#elif 0
/* `setenv' and `putenv' is not ANSI and I don't want to mess */
/* with this portability issue right now... */
if ( status.debug )
{
char temp[32];
sprintf( temp, "any=%d", status.trace_level );
setenv( "FT2_DEBUG", temp );
}
#endif
/* Initialize engine */
handle = FTDemo_New( status.encoding );
FT_Library_SetLcdFilter( handle->library, FT_LCD_FILTER_DEFAULT );
if ( status.preload )
FTDemo_Set_Preload( handle, 1 );
for ( ; argc > 0; argc--, argv++ )
FTDemo_Install_Font( handle, argv[0] );
if ( handle->num_fonts == 0 )
Fatal( "could not find/open any font file" );
display = FTDemo_Display_New( gr_pixel_mode_rgb24 );
if ( !display )
Fatal( "could not allocate display surface" );
memset( display->fore_color.chroma, 0, 4 );
memset( display->back_color.chroma, 0xff, 4 );
grSetTitle( display->surface,
"FreeType Glyph Viewer - press F1 for help" );
status.Fail = 0;
event_font_change( 0 );
if ( status.lcd_mode >= 0 )
handle->lcd_mode = status.lcd_mode;
FTDemo_Update_Current_Flags( handle );
for ( ;; )
{
FTDemo_Display_Clear( display );
switch ( status.render_mode )
{
case RENDER_MODE_ALL:
error = Render_All( handle->current_font->num_indices,
status.Num );
break;
case RENDER_MODE_EMBOLDEN:
error = Render_Embolden( handle->current_font->num_indices,
status.Num );
break;
case RENDER_MODE_SLANTED:
error = Render_Slanted( handle->current_font->num_indices,
status.Num );
break;
case RENDER_MODE_STROKE:
error = Render_Stroke( handle->current_font->num_indices,
status.Num );
break;
case RENDER_MODE_TEXT:
error = Render_Text( -1, status.Num );
break;
case RENDER_MODE_WATERFALL:
error = Render_Waterfall( status.ptsize );
break;
}
write_header( error );
#if FREETYPE_MAJOR == 2 && FREETYPE_MINOR < 2
if ( status.dump_cache_stats )
{
/* dump simple cache manager statistics */
fprintf( stderr, "cache manager [ nodes, bytes, average ] = "
" [ %d, %ld, %f ]\n",
handle->cache_manager->num_nodes,
handle->cache_manager->cur_weight,
handle->cache_manager->num_nodes > 0
? handle->cache_manager->cur_weight * 1.0 /
handle->cache_manager->num_nodes
: 0.0 );
}
#endif
status.header = 0;
grListenSurface( display->surface, 0, &event );
if ( Process_Event( &event ) )
break;
}
printf( "Execution completed successfully.\n" );
printf( "Fails = %d\n", status.Fail );
FTDemo_Display_Done( display );
FTDemo_Done( handle );
exit( 0 ); /* for safety reasons */
return 0; /* never reached */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: device_partition_table_create (Device *device,
const char *scheme,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
device->priv->device_is_system_internal ? "org.freedesktop.udisks.change-system-internal"
: "org.freedesktop.udisks.change",
"PartitionTableCreate",
TRUE,
device_partition_table_create_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
g_strdup (scheme),
g_free,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_orphan_add(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_block_rsv *block_rsv = NULL;
int reserve = 0;
int insert = 0;
int ret;
if (!root->orphan_block_rsv) {
block_rsv = btrfs_alloc_block_rsv(root, BTRFS_BLOCK_RSV_TEMP);
if (!block_rsv)
return -ENOMEM;
}
spin_lock(&root->orphan_lock);
if (!root->orphan_block_rsv) {
root->orphan_block_rsv = block_rsv;
} else if (block_rsv) {
btrfs_free_block_rsv(root, block_rsv);
block_rsv = NULL;
}
if (!test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_HAS_ORPHAN_ITEM,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags)) {
#if 0
/*
* For proper ENOSPC handling, we should do orphan
* cleanup when mounting. But this introduces backward
* compatibility issue.
*/
if (!xchg(&root->orphan_item_inserted, 1))
insert = 2;
else
insert = 1;
#endif
insert = 1;
atomic_inc(&root->orphan_inodes);
}
if (!test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_ORPHAN_META_RESERVED,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags))
reserve = 1;
spin_unlock(&root->orphan_lock);
/* grab metadata reservation from transaction handle */
if (reserve) {
ret = btrfs_orphan_reserve_metadata(trans, inode);
BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOSPC in reservation; Logic error? JDM */
}
/* insert an orphan item to track this unlinked/truncated file */
if (insert >= 1) {
ret = btrfs_insert_orphan_item(trans, root, btrfs_ino(inode));
if (ret) {
atomic_dec(&root->orphan_inodes);
if (reserve) {
clear_bit(BTRFS_INODE_ORPHAN_META_RESERVED,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
btrfs_orphan_release_metadata(inode);
}
if (ret != -EEXIST) {
clear_bit(BTRFS_INODE_HAS_ORPHAN_ITEM,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
return ret;
}
}
ret = 0;
}
/* insert an orphan item to track subvolume contains orphan files */
if (insert >= 2) {
ret = btrfs_insert_orphan_item(trans, root->fs_info->tree_root,
root->root_key.objectid);
if (ret && ret != -EEXIST) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void llc_conn_resend_i_pdu_as_cmd(struct sock *sk, u8 nr, u8 first_p_bit)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct llc_pdu_sn *pdu;
u16 nbr_unack_pdus;
struct llc_sock *llc;
u8 howmany_resend = 0;
llc_conn_remove_acked_pdus(sk, nr, &nbr_unack_pdus);
if (!nbr_unack_pdus)
goto out;
/*
* Process unack PDUs only if unack queue is not empty; remove
* appropriate PDUs, fix them up, and put them on mac_pdu_q.
*/
llc = llc_sk(sk);
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&llc->pdu_unack_q)) != NULL) {
pdu = llc_pdu_sn_hdr(skb);
llc_pdu_set_cmd_rsp(skb, LLC_PDU_CMD);
llc_pdu_set_pf_bit(skb, first_p_bit);
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
first_p_bit = 0;
llc->vS = LLC_I_GET_NS(pdu);
howmany_resend++;
}
if (howmany_resend > 0)
llc->vS = (llc->vS + 1) % LLC_2_SEQ_NBR_MODULO;
/* any PDUs to re-send are queued up; start sending to MAC */
llc_conn_send_pdus(sk);
out:;
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 68,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteServiceGetCharacteristics(
const std::string& service_instance_id,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const base::Optional<BluetoothUUID>& characteristics_uuid,
RemoteServiceGetCharacteristicsCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RecordGetCharacteristicsCharacteristic(quantity, characteristics_uuid);
if (characteristics_uuid &&
BluetoothBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(characteristics_uuid.value())) {
RecordGetCharacteristicsOutcome(quantity,
UMAGetCharacteristicOutcome::BLOCKLISTED);
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::BLOCKLISTED_CHARACTERISTIC_UUID,
base::nullopt /* characteristics */);
return;
}
const CacheQueryResult query_result =
QueryCacheForService(service_instance_id);
if (query_result.outcome == CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER) {
return;
}
if (query_result.outcome != CacheQueryOutcome::SUCCESS) {
RecordGetCharacteristicsOutcome(quantity, query_result.outcome);
std::move(callback).Run(query_result.GetWebResult(),
base::nullopt /* characteristics */);
return;
}
std::vector<device::BluetoothRemoteGattCharacteristic*> characteristics =
characteristics_uuid ? query_result.service->GetCharacteristicsByUUID(
characteristics_uuid.value())
: query_result.service->GetCharacteristics();
std::vector<blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristicPtr>
response_characteristics;
for (device::BluetoothRemoteGattCharacteristic* characteristic :
characteristics) {
if (BluetoothBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(characteristic->GetUUID())) {
continue;
}
std::string characteristic_instance_id = characteristic->GetIdentifier();
auto insert_result = characteristic_id_to_service_id_.insert(
std::make_pair(characteristic_instance_id, service_instance_id));
if (!insert_result.second)
DCHECK(insert_result.first->second == service_instance_id);
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristicPtr characteristic_ptr =
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::New();
characteristic_ptr->instance_id = characteristic_instance_id;
characteristic_ptr->uuid = characteristic->GetUUID();
characteristic_ptr->properties =
static_cast<uint32_t>(characteristic->GetProperties());
response_characteristics.push_back(std::move(characteristic_ptr));
if (quantity == blink::mojom::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::SINGLE) {
break;
}
}
if (!response_characteristics.empty()) {
RecordGetCharacteristicsOutcome(quantity,
UMAGetCharacteristicOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS,
std::move(response_characteristics));
return;
}
RecordGetCharacteristicsOutcome(
quantity, characteristics_uuid
? UMAGetCharacteristicOutcome::NOT_FOUND
: UMAGetCharacteristicOutcome::NO_CHARACTERISTICS);
std::move(callback).Run(
characteristics_uuid
? blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHARACTERISTIC_NOT_FOUND
: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_CHARACTERISTICS_FOUND,
base::nullopt /* characteristics */);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableBackgroundFetchUploads(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetBackgroundFetchUploadsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_anal_bb(RAnal *anal, RAnalBlock *bb, ut64 addr, ut8 *buf, ut64 len, int head) {
RAnalOp *op = NULL;
int oplen, idx = 0;
if (bb->addr == -1) {
bb->addr = addr;
}
len -= 16; // XXX: hack to avoid segfault by x86im
while (idx < len) {
if (!(op = r_anal_op_new ())) {
eprintf ("Error: new (op)\n");
return R_ANAL_RET_ERROR;
}
if ((oplen = r_anal_op (anal, op, addr + idx, buf + idx, len - idx, R_ANAL_OP_MASK_VAL)) == 0) {
r_anal_op_free (op);
op = NULL;
if (idx == 0) {
VERBOSE_ANAL eprintf ("Unknown opcode at 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", addr+idx);
return R_ANAL_RET_END;
}
break;
}
if (oplen < 1) {
goto beach;
}
r_anal_bb_set_offset (bb, bb->ninstr++, addr + idx - bb->addr);
idx += oplen;
bb->size += oplen;
if (head) {
bb->type = R_ANAL_BB_TYPE_HEAD;
}
switch (op->type) {
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP:
r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond);
bb->cond = r_anal_cond_new_from_op (op);
break;
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CJMP:
if (bb->cond) {
bb->cond->type = R_ANAL_COND_EQ;
} else VERBOSE_ANAL eprintf ("Unknown conditional for block 0x%"PFMT64x"\n", bb->addr);
bb->conditional = 1;
bb->fail = op->fail;
bb->jump = op->jump;
bb->type |= R_ANAL_BB_TYPE_BODY;
goto beach;
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_JMP:
bb->jump = op->jump;
bb->type |= R_ANAL_BB_TYPE_BODY;
goto beach;
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UJMP:
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_IJMP:
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RJMP:
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_IRJMP:
bb->type |= R_ANAL_BB_TYPE_FOOT;
goto beach;
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RET:
bb->type |= R_ANAL_BB_TYPE_LAST;
goto beach;
case R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LEA:
{
RAnalValue *src = op->src[0];
if (src && src->reg && anal->reg) {
const char *pc = anal->reg->name[R_REG_NAME_PC];
RAnalValue *dst = op->dst;
if (dst && dst->reg && !strcmp (src->reg->name, pc)) {
int memref = anal->bits/8;
ut8 b[8];
ut64 ptr = idx+addr+src->delta;
anal->iob.read_at (anal->iob.io, ptr, b, memref);
r_anal_xrefs_set (anal, addr+idx-op->size, ptr, R_ANAL_REF_TYPE_DATA);
}
}
}
}
r_anal_op_free (op);
}
return bb->size;
beach:
r_anal_op_free (op);
return R_ANAL_RET_END;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCommitURL(int child_id,
const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return;
if (IsPseudoScheme(url.scheme()))
return;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
if (url.SchemeIsBlob() || url.SchemeIsFileSystem()) {
if (IsMalformedBlobUrl(url))
return;
GrantCommitURL(child_id, GURL(origin.Serialize()));
}
if (!origin.unique())
GrantCommitOrigin(child_id, origin);
if (IsWebSafeScheme(url.scheme()))
return;
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
auto state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return;
if (origin.unique()) {
state->second->GrantCommitScheme(url.scheme());
} else {
state->second->GrantRequestScheme(url.scheme());
}
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IRCView::search(const QString& pattern, bool caseSensitive, bool wholeWords, bool forward, bool fromCursor)
{
if (pattern.isEmpty())
return true;
m_pattern = pattern;
m_forward = forward;
m_searchFlags = 0;
if (caseSensitive)
m_searchFlags |= QTextDocument::FindCaseSensitively;
if (wholeWords)
m_searchFlags |= QTextDocument::FindWholeWords;
if (!fromCursor)
m_forward ? moveCursor(QTextCursor::Start) : moveCursor(QTextCursor::End);
return searchNext();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_ext_calc_credits_for_single_extent(struct inode *inode, int nrblocks,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
if (path) {
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
int ret = 0;
/* probably there is space in leaf? */
if (le16_to_cpu(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries)
< le16_to_cpu(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max)) {
/*
* There are some space in the leaf tree, no
* need to account for leaf block credit
*
* bitmaps and block group descriptor blocks
* and other metadat blocks still need to be
* accounted.
*/
/* 1 bitmap, 1 block group descriptor */
ret = 2 + EXT4_META_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
}
return ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, nrblocks);
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
{
int err = security_socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, msg_data_left(msg), flags);
return err ?: sock_recvmsg_nosec(sock, msg, flags);
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::GetGeolocationServiceContext() {
return geolocation_service_context_.get();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
memcpy(state->open_stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->open_stateid.data));
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BiquadDSPKernel::updateCoefficientsIfNecessary(bool useSmoothing, bool forceUpdate)
{
if (forceUpdate || biquadProcessor()->filterCoefficientsDirty()) {
double value1;
double value2;
double gain;
double detune; // in Cents
if (biquadProcessor()->hasSampleAccurateValues()) {
value1 = biquadProcessor()->parameter1()->finalValue();
value2 = biquadProcessor()->parameter2()->finalValue();
gain = biquadProcessor()->parameter3()->finalValue();
detune = biquadProcessor()->parameter4()->finalValue();
} else if (useSmoothing) {
value1 = biquadProcessor()->parameter1()->smoothedValue();
value2 = biquadProcessor()->parameter2()->smoothedValue();
gain = biquadProcessor()->parameter3()->smoothedValue();
detune = biquadProcessor()->parameter4()->smoothedValue();
} else {
value1 = biquadProcessor()->parameter1()->value();
value2 = biquadProcessor()->parameter2()->value();
gain = biquadProcessor()->parameter3()->value();
detune = biquadProcessor()->parameter4()->value();
}
double nyquist = this->nyquist();
double normalizedFrequency = value1 / nyquist;
if (detune)
normalizedFrequency *= pow(2, detune / 1200);
switch (biquadProcessor()->type()) {
case BiquadProcessor::LowPass:
m_biquad.setLowpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::HighPass:
m_biquad.setHighpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::BandPass:
m_biquad.setBandpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::LowShelf:
m_biquad.setLowShelfParams(normalizedFrequency, gain);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::HighShelf:
m_biquad.setHighShelfParams(normalizedFrequency, gain);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::Peaking:
m_biquad.setPeakingParams(normalizedFrequency, value2, gain);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::Notch:
m_biquad.setNotchParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
case BiquadProcessor::Allpass:
m_biquad.setAllpassParams(normalizedFrequency, value2);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enum CodecID ff_mov_get_lpcm_codec_id(int bps, int flags)
{
if (flags & 1) { // floating point
if (flags & 2) { // big endian
if (bps == 32) return CODEC_ID_PCM_F32BE;
else if (bps == 64) return CODEC_ID_PCM_F64BE;
} else {
if (bps == 32) return CODEC_ID_PCM_F32LE;
else if (bps == 64) return CODEC_ID_PCM_F64LE;
}
} else {
if (flags & 2) {
if (bps == 8)
if (flags & 4) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S8;
else return CODEC_ID_PCM_U8;
else if (bps == 16) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S16BE;
else if (bps == 24) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S24BE;
else if (bps == 32) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S32BE;
} else {
if (bps == 8)
if (flags & 4) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S8;
else return CODEC_ID_PCM_U8;
else if (bps == 16) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE;
else if (bps == 24) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S24LE;
else if (bps == 32) return CODEC_ID_PCM_S32LE;
}
}
return CODEC_ID_NONE;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_privileged_over(pid_t pid, uid_t uid, uid_t victim, bool req_ns_root)
{
char fpath[PROCLEN];
int ret;
bool answer = false;
uid_t nsuid;
if (victim == -1 || uid == -1)
return false;
/*
* If the request is one not requiring root in the namespace,
* then having the same uid suffices. (i.e. uid 1000 has write
* access to files owned by uid 1000
*/
if (!req_ns_root && uid == victim)
return true;
ret = snprintf(fpath, PROCLEN, "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PROCLEN)
return false;
FILE *f = fopen(fpath, "r");
if (!f)
return false;
/* if caller's not root in his namespace, reject */
nsuid = convert_id_to_ns(f, uid);
if (nsuid)
goto out;
/*
* If victim is not mapped into caller's ns, reject.
* XXX I'm not sure this check is needed given that fuse
* will be sending requests where the vfs has converted
*/
nsuid = convert_id_to_ns(f, victim);
if (nsuid == -1)
goto out;
answer = true;
out:
fclose(f);
return answer;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rx_cache_insert(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const struct ip *ip, int dport)
{
struct rx_cache_entry *rxent;
const struct rx_header *rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t)))
return;
rxent = &rx_cache[rx_cache_next];
if (++rx_cache_next >= RX_CACHE_SIZE)
rx_cache_next = 0;
rxent->callnum = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->callNumber);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&rxent->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&rxent->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
rxent->dport = dport;
rxent->serviceId = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rxh->serviceId);
rxent->opcode = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FLTIsBBoxFilter(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode)
{
if (!psFilterNode || !psFilterNode->pszValue)
return 0;
if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "BBOX") == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 68,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Stream::~Stream() {
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: secret_blinded (gcry_mpi_t output, gcry_mpi_t input,
RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits)
{
gcry_mpi_t r; /* Random number needed for blinding. */
gcry_mpi_t ri; /* Modular multiplicative inverse of r. */
gcry_mpi_t bldata; /* Blinded data to decrypt. */
/* First, we need a random number r between 0 and n - 1, which is
* relatively prime to n (i.e. it is neither p nor q). The random
* number needs to be only unpredictable, thus we employ the
* gcry_create_nonce function by using GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM with
* gcry_mpi_randomize. */
r = mpi_snew (nbits);
ri = mpi_snew (nbits);
bldata = mpi_snew (nbits);
do
{
_gcry_mpi_randomize (r, nbits, GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM);
mpi_mod (r, r, sk->n);
}
while (!mpi_invm (ri, r, sk->n));
/* Do blinding. We calculate: y = (x * r^e) mod n, where r is the
* random number, e is the public exponent, x is the non-blinded
* input data and n is the RSA modulus. */
mpi_powm (bldata, r, sk->e, sk->n);
mpi_mulm (bldata, bldata, input, sk->n);
/* Perform decryption. */
secret (output, bldata, sk);
_gcry_mpi_release (bldata);
/* Undo blinding. Here we calculate: y = (x * r^-1) mod n, where x
* is the blinded decrypted data, ri is the modular multiplicative
* inverse of r and n is the RSA modulus. */
mpi_mulm (output, output, ri, sk->n);
_gcry_mpi_release (r);
_gcry_mpi_release (ri);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 17,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_sysexit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data, rcx, rdx;
int usermode;
u16 cs_sel = 0, ss_sel = 0;
/* inject #GP if in real mode or Virtual 8086 mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL ||
ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
if ((ctxt->rex_prefix & 0x8) != 0x0)
usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
else
usermode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
rcx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX);
rdx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX);
cs.dpl = 3;
ss.dpl = 3;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
switch (usermode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 16);
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ss_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 24);
rcx = (u32)rcx;
rdx = (u32)rdx;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
cs_sel = (u16)(msr_data + 32);
if (msr_data == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
if (is_noncanonical_address(rcx) ||
is_noncanonical_address(rdx))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
}
cs_sel |= SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel |= SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ctxt->_eip = rdx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = rcx;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputDispatcher::InputState::~InputState() {
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: my_object_get_val (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = obj->val;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 165,103
|
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