instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: megasas_get_pd_list(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
int ret = 0, pd_index = 0;
struct megasas_cmd *cmd;
struct megasas_dcmd_frame *dcmd;
struct MR_PD_LIST *ci;
struct MR_PD_ADDRESS *pd_addr;
dma_addr_t ci_h = 0;
if (instance->pd_list_not_supported) {
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "MR_DCMD_PD_LIST_QUERY "
"not supported by firmware\n");
return ret;
}
ci = instance->pd_list_buf;
ci_h = instance->pd_list_buf_h;
cmd = megasas_get_cmd(instance);
if (!cmd) {
dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG, &instance->pdev->dev, "(get_pd_list): Failed to get cmd\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
dcmd = &cmd->frame->dcmd;
memset(ci, 0, sizeof(*ci));
memset(dcmd->mbox.b, 0, MFI_MBOX_SIZE);
dcmd->mbox.b[0] = MR_PD_QUERY_TYPE_EXPOSED_TO_HOST;
dcmd->mbox.b[1] = 0;
dcmd->cmd = MFI_CMD_DCMD;
dcmd->cmd_status = MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
dcmd->sge_count = 1;
dcmd->flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_READ;
dcmd->timeout = 0;
dcmd->pad_0 = 0;
dcmd->data_xfer_len = cpu_to_le32(MEGASAS_MAX_PD * sizeof(struct MR_PD_LIST));
dcmd->opcode = cpu_to_le32(MR_DCMD_PD_LIST_QUERY);
megasas_set_dma_settings(instance, dcmd, instance->pd_list_buf_h,
(MEGASAS_MAX_PD * sizeof(struct MR_PD_LIST)));
if ((instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES) &&
!instance->mask_interrupts)
ret = megasas_issue_blocked_cmd(instance, cmd,
MFI_IO_TIMEOUT_SECS);
else
ret = megasas_issue_polled(instance, cmd);
switch (ret) {
case DCMD_FAILED:
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "MR_DCMD_PD_LIST_QUERY "
"failed/not supported by firmware\n");
if (instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES)
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
else
instance->pd_list_not_supported = 1;
break;
case DCMD_TIMEOUT:
switch (dcmd_timeout_ocr_possible(instance)) {
case INITIATE_OCR:
cmd->flags |= DRV_DCMD_SKIP_REFIRE;
/*
* DCMD failed from AEN path.
* AEN path already hold reset_mutex to avoid PCI access
* while OCR is in progress.
*/
mutex_unlock(&instance->reset_mutex);
megasas_reset_fusion(instance->host,
MFI_IO_TIMEOUT_OCR);
mutex_lock(&instance->reset_mutex);
break;
case KILL_ADAPTER:
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
break;
case IGNORE_TIMEOUT:
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "Ignore DCMD timeout: %s %d \n",
__func__, __LINE__);
break;
}
break;
case DCMD_SUCCESS:
pd_addr = ci->addr;
if ((le32_to_cpu(ci->count) >
(MEGASAS_MAX_PD_CHANNELS * MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL)))
break;
memset(instance->local_pd_list, 0,
MEGASAS_MAX_PD * sizeof(struct megasas_pd_list));
for (pd_index = 0; pd_index < le32_to_cpu(ci->count); pd_index++) {
instance->local_pd_list[le16_to_cpu(pd_addr->deviceId)].tid =
le16_to_cpu(pd_addr->deviceId);
instance->local_pd_list[le16_to_cpu(pd_addr->deviceId)].driveType =
pd_addr->scsiDevType;
instance->local_pd_list[le16_to_cpu(pd_addr->deviceId)].driveState =
MR_PD_STATE_SYSTEM;
pd_addr++;
}
memcpy(instance->pd_list, instance->local_pd_list,
sizeof(instance->pd_list));
break;
}
if (ret != DCMD_TIMEOUT)
megasas_return_cmd(instance, cmd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 90,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeUtf8AsUtf16(const std::string& str) {
const uint8_t* strData = (uint8_t*)str.data();
const size_t strLen= str.length();
const ssize_t utf16Len = utf8_to_utf16_length(strData, strLen);
if (utf16Len < 0 || utf16Len> std::numeric_limits<int32_t>::max()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
status_t err = writeInt32(utf16Len);
if (err) {
return err;
}
void* dst = writeInplace((utf16Len + 1) * sizeof(char16_t));
if (!dst) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
utf8_to_utf16(strData, strLen, (char16_t*)dst);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compat_user_backtrace(struct compat_frame_tail __user *tail,
struct perf_callchain_entry *entry)
{
struct compat_frame_tail buftail;
unsigned long err;
/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, tail, sizeof(buftail)))
return NULL;
pagefault_disable();
err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
pagefault_enable();
if (err)
return NULL;
perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
/*
* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
* (towards higher addresses).
*/
if (tail + 1 >= (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)
compat_ptr(buftail.fp))
return NULL;
return (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)compat_ptr(buftail.fp) - 1;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulator_read_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
unsigned long addr,
void *val,
unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
return emulator_read_write(ctxt, addr, val, bytes,
exception, &read_emultor);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void show_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
if (!mm)
mm = &init_mm;
pr_alert("pgd = %p\n", mm->pgd);
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
pr_alert("[%08lx] *pgd=%016llx", addr, pgd_val(*pgd));
do {
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
if (pgd_none(*pgd) || pgd_bad(*pgd))
break;
pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
if (pud_none(*pud) || pud_bad(*pud))
break;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
printk(", *pmd=%016llx", pmd_val(*pmd));
if (pmd_none(*pmd) || pmd_bad(*pmd))
break;
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
printk(", *pte=%016llx", pte_val(*pte));
pte_unmap(pte);
} while(0);
printk("\n");
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::cache_ops(
unsigned int index, unsigned int cmd)
{
if (!enabled) {
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
if (!omx || index >= omx->drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: Invalid param", __func__);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
struct ion_flush_data flush_data;
struct ion_custom_data custom_data;
memset(&flush_data, 0x0, sizeof(flush_data));
memset(&custom_data, 0x0, sizeof(custom_data));
flush_data.vaddr = pmem_baseaddress[index];
flush_data.fd = op_buf_ion_info[index].fd_ion_data.fd;
flush_data.handle = op_buf_ion_info[index].fd_ion_data.handle;
flush_data.length = buffer_size_req;
custom_data.cmd = cmd;
custom_data.arg = (unsigned long)&flush_data;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Cache %s: fd=%d handle=%d va=%p size=%d",
(cmd == ION_IOC_CLEAN_CACHES) ? "Clean" : "Invalidate",
flush_data.fd, flush_data.handle, flush_data.vaddr,
flush_data.length);
int ret = ioctl(op_buf_ion_info[index].ion_device_fd, ION_IOC_CUSTOM, &custom_data);
if (ret < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Cache %s failed: %s\n",
(cmd == ION_IOC_CLEAN_CACHES) ? "Clean" : "Invalidate",
strerror(errno));
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GDataEntry* GDataFile::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc->is_hosted_document() || doc->is_file());
GDataFile* file = new GDataFile(parent, directory_service);
file->title_ = UTF16ToUTF8(doc->title());
if (doc->is_file()) {
file->file_info_.size = doc->file_size();
file->file_md5_ = doc->file_md5();
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_EDIT_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
file->upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
} else {
file->document_extension_ = doc->GetHostedDocumentExtension();
file->file_info_.size = 0;
}
file->kind_ = doc->kind();
const Link* edit_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::EDIT);
if (edit_link)
file->edit_url_ = edit_link->href();
file->content_url_ = doc->content_url();
file->content_mime_type_ = doc->content_mime_type();
file->resource_id_ = doc->resource_id();
file->is_hosted_document_ = doc->is_hosted_document();
file->file_info_.last_modified = doc->updated_time();
file->file_info_.last_accessed = doc->updated_time();
file->file_info_.creation_time = doc->published_time();
file->deleted_ = doc->deleted();
const Link* parent_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::PARENT);
if (parent_link)
file->parent_resource_id_ = ExtractResourceId(parent_link->href());
file->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
const Link* thumbnail_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::THUMBNAIL);
if (thumbnail_link)
file->thumbnail_url_ = thumbnail_link->href();
const Link* alternate_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::ALTERNATE);
if (alternate_link)
file->alternate_url_ = alternate_link->href();
return file;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void hrtick_clear(struct rq *rq)
{
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderText* SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::handleFirstLetter(int& startOffset, int& offsetInNode)
{
RenderText* renderer = toRenderText(m_node->renderer());
startOffset = (m_node == m_startNode) ? m_startOffset : 0;
if (!renderer->isTextFragment()) {
offsetInNode = 0;
return renderer;
}
RenderTextFragment* fragment = toRenderTextFragment(renderer);
int offsetAfterFirstLetter = fragment->start();
if (startOffset >= offsetAfterFirstLetter) {
ASSERT(!m_shouldHandleFirstLetter);
offsetInNode = offsetAfterFirstLetter;
return renderer;
}
if (!m_shouldHandleFirstLetter && offsetAfterFirstLetter < m_offset) {
m_shouldHandleFirstLetter = true;
offsetInNode = offsetAfterFirstLetter;
return renderer;
}
m_shouldHandleFirstLetter = false;
offsetInNode = 0;
return firstRenderTextInFirstLetter(fragment->firstLetter());
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_printf(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsprintf(t1_line_array, fmt, args);
t1_puts(t1_line_array);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t o2nm_node_local_show(struct config_item *item, char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%d\n", to_o2nm_node(item)->nd_local);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be32 nfsd4_encode_components_esc(struct xdr_stream *xdr, char sep,
char *components, char esc_enter,
char esc_exit)
{
__be32 *p;
__be32 pathlen;
int pathlen_offset;
int strlen, count=0;
char *str, *end, *next;
dprintk("nfsd4_encode_components(%s)\n", components);
pathlen_offset = xdr->buf->len;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
p++; /* We will fill this in with @count later */
end = str = components;
while (*end) {
bool found_esc = false;
/* try to parse as esc_start, ..., esc_end, sep */
if (*str == esc_enter) {
for (; *end && (*end != esc_exit); end++)
/* find esc_exit or end of string */;
next = end + 1;
if (*end && (!*next || *next == sep)) {
str++;
found_esc = true;
}
}
if (!found_esc)
for (; *end && (*end != sep); end++)
/* find sep or end of string */;
strlen = end - str;
if (strlen) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, strlen + 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, str, strlen);
count++;
}
else
end++;
if (found_esc)
end = next;
str = end;
}
pathlen = htonl(count);
write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(xdr->buf, pathlen_offset, &pathlen, 4);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Location::pathname() const {
return DOMURLUtilsReadOnly::pathname(Url());
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_resource_valid(struct vrend_renderer_resource_create_args *args)
{
/* do not accept handle 0 */
if (args->handle == 0)
return -1;
/* limit the target */
if (args->target >= PIPE_MAX_TEXTURE_TYPES)
return -1;
if (args->format >= VIRGL_FORMAT_MAX)
return -1;
/* only texture 2d and 2d array can have multiple samples */
if (args->nr_samples > 1) {
if (args->target != PIPE_TEXTURE_2D && args->target != PIPE_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY)
return -1;
/* multisample can't have miplevels */
if (args->last_level > 0)
return -1;
}
if (args->last_level > 0) {
/* buffer and rect textures can't have mipmaps */
if (args->target == PIPE_BUFFER || args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_RECT)
return -1;
if (args->last_level > (floor(log2(MAX2(args->width, args->height))) + 1))
return -1;
}
if (args->flags != 0 && args->flags != VIRGL_RESOURCE_Y_0_TOP)
return -1;
if (args->flags & VIRGL_RESOURCE_Y_0_TOP)
if (args->target != PIPE_TEXTURE_2D && args->target != PIPE_TEXTURE_RECT)
return -1;
/* array size for array textures only */
if (args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_CUBE) {
if (args->array_size != 6)
return -1;
} else if (args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_CUBE_ARRAY) {
if (args->array_size % 6)
return -1;
} else if (args->array_size > 1) {
if (args->target != PIPE_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY &&
args->target != PIPE_TEXTURE_1D_ARRAY)
return -1;
}
if (args->bind == 0 ||
args->bind == VREND_RES_BIND_CUSTOM ||
args->bind == VREND_RES_BIND_INDEX_BUFFER ||
args->bind == VREND_RES_BIND_STREAM_OUTPUT ||
args->bind == VREND_RES_BIND_VERTEX_BUFFER ||
args->bind == VREND_RES_BIND_CONSTANT_BUFFER) {
if (args->target != PIPE_BUFFER)
return -1;
if (args->height != 1 || args->depth != 1)
return -1;
} else {
if (!((args->bind & VREND_RES_BIND_SAMPLER_VIEW) ||
(args->bind & VREND_RES_BIND_DEPTH_STENCIL) ||
(args->bind & VREND_RES_BIND_RENDER_TARGET) ||
(args->bind & VREND_RES_BIND_CURSOR)))
return -1;
if (args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_2D ||
args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_RECT ||
args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_CUBE ||
args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY ||
args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_CUBE_ARRAY) {
if (args->depth != 1)
return -1;
}
if (args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_1D ||
args->target == PIPE_TEXTURE_1D_ARRAY) {
if (args->height != 1 || args->depth != 1)
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __perf_addr_filters_adjust(struct perf_event *event, void *data)
{
struct perf_addr_filters_head *ifh = perf_event_addr_filters(event);
struct vm_area_struct *vma = data;
unsigned long off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, flags;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct perf_addr_filter *filter;
unsigned int restart = 0, count = 0;
if (!has_addr_filter(event))
return;
if (!file)
return;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ifh->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(filter, &ifh->list, entry) {
if (perf_addr_filter_match(filter, file, off,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start)) {
event->addr_filters_offs[count] = vma->vm_start;
restart++;
}
count++;
}
if (restart)
event->addr_filters_gen++;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ifh->lock, flags);
if (restart)
perf_event_stop(event, 1);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddRegistryKeyWatcher(const wchar_t* key_path) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
auto reg_key = std::make_unique<base::win::RegKey>(HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
key_path, KEY_NOTIFY);
if (reg_key->Valid() &&
reg_key->StartWatching(
base::Bind(&OpenSystemSettingsHelper::OnRegistryKeyChanged,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()))) {
registry_key_watchers_.push_back(std::move(reg_key));
}
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pfkey_dump_sp_done(struct pfkey_sock *pfk)
{
xfrm_policy_walk_done(&pfk->dump.u.policy);
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_parse_close(AVCodecParserContext *s)
{
ParseContext *pc = s->priv_data;
av_freep(&pc->buffer);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Cluster::Load(long long& pos, long& len) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
if (m_timecode >= 0) // at least partially loaded
return 0;
assert(m_pos == m_element_start);
assert(m_element_size < 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
const int status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
assert((total < 0) || (m_pos <= total)); // TODO: verify this
pos = m_pos;
long long cluster_size = -1;
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error or underflow
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id_ < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id_);
if (id_ != 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(cluster_size);
if (size == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: verify this
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
}
#if 0
len = static_cast<long>(size_);
if (cluster_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
long long timecode = -1;
long long new_pos = -1;
bool bBlock = false;
long long cluster_stop = (cluster_size < 0) ? -1 : pos + cluster_size;
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x67) { // TimeCode ID
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (timecode < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(timecode);
new_pos = pos + size;
if (bBlock)
break;
} else if (id == 0x20) { // BlockGroup ID
bBlock = true;
break;
} else if (id == 0x23) { // SimpleBlock ID
bBlock = true;
break;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
if (timecode < 0) // no timecode found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (!bBlock)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pos = new_pos; // designates position just beyond timecode payload
m_timecode = timecode; // m_timecode >= 0 means we're partially loaded
if (cluster_size >= 0)
m_element_size = cluster_stop - m_element_start;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)
{
int ret = 0;
trace_kvm_apic_write(reg, val);
switch (reg) {
case APIC_ID: /* Local APIC ID */
if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
kvm_apic_set_id(apic, val >> 24);
else
ret = 1;
break;
case APIC_TASKPRI:
report_tpr_access(apic, true);
apic_set_tpr(apic, val & 0xff);
break;
case APIC_EOI:
apic_set_eoi(apic);
break;
case APIC_LDR:
if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
kvm_apic_set_ldr(apic, val & APIC_LDR_MASK);
else
ret = 1;
break;
case APIC_DFR:
if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_DFR, val | 0x0FFFFFFF);
recalculate_apic_map(apic->vcpu->kvm);
} else
ret = 1;
break;
case APIC_SPIV: {
u32 mask = 0x3ff;
if (kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVR) & APIC_LVR_DIRECTED_EOI)
mask |= APIC_SPIV_DIRECTED_EOI;
apic_set_spiv(apic, val & mask);
if (!(val & APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED)) {
int i;
u32 lvt_val;
for (i = 0; i < APIC_LVT_NUM; i++) {
lvt_val = kvm_apic_get_reg(apic,
APIC_LVTT + 0x10 * i);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT + 0x10 * i,
lvt_val | APIC_LVT_MASKED);
}
atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
}
break;
}
case APIC_ICR:
/* No delay here, so we always clear the pending bit */
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR, val & ~(1 << 12));
apic_send_ipi(apic);
break;
case APIC_ICR2:
if (!apic_x2apic_mode(apic))
val &= 0xff000000;
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR2, val);
break;
case APIC_LVT0:
apic_manage_nmi_watchdog(apic, val);
case APIC_LVTTHMR:
case APIC_LVTPC:
case APIC_LVT1:
case APIC_LVTERR:
/* TODO: Check vector */
if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
val &= apic_lvt_mask[(reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4];
apic_set_reg(apic, reg, val);
break;
case APIC_LVTT:
if ((kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT) &
apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask) !=
(val & apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask))
hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
val &= (apic_lvt_mask[0] | apic->lapic_timer.timer_mode_mask);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT, val);
break;
case APIC_TMICT:
if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic))
break;
hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT, val);
start_apic_timer(apic);
break;
case APIC_TDCR:
if (val & 4)
apic_debug("KVM_WRITE:TDCR %x\n", val);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TDCR, val);
update_divide_count(apic);
break;
case APIC_ESR:
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic) && val != 0) {
apic_debug("KVM_WRITE:ESR not zero %x\n", val);
ret = 1;
}
break;
case APIC_SELF_IPI:
if (apic_x2apic_mode(apic)) {
apic_reg_write(apic, APIC_ICR, 0x40000 | (val & 0xff));
} else
ret = 1;
break;
default:
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (ret)
apic_debug("Local APIC Write to read-only register %x\n", reg);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hns_nic_poll_controller(struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
unsigned long flags;
int i;
local_irq_save(flags);
for (i = 0; i < priv->ae_handle->q_num * 2; i++)
napi_schedule(&priv->ring_data[i].napi);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlBufSetAllocationScheme(xmlBufPtr buf,
xmlBufferAllocationScheme scheme) {
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error != 0)) {
#ifdef DEBUG_BUFFER
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlBufSetAllocationScheme: buf == NULL or in error\n");
#endif
return(-1);
}
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) ||
(buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO))
return(-1);
if ((scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_DOUBLEIT) ||
(scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_EXACT) ||
(scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_HYBRID) ||
(scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) ||
(scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED)) {
buf->alloc = scheme;
if (buf->buffer)
buf->buffer->alloc = scheme;
return(0);
}
/*
* Switching a buffer ALLOC_IO has the side effect of initializing
* the contentIO field with the current content
*/
if (scheme == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) {
buf->alloc = XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO;
buf->contentIO = buf->content;
}
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String AXListBoxOption::textAlternative(bool recursive,
bool inAriaLabelledByTraversal,
AXObjectSet& visited,
AXNameFrom& nameFrom,
AXRelatedObjectVector* relatedObjects,
NameSources* nameSources) const {
if (nameSources)
ASSERT(relatedObjects);
if (!getNode())
return String();
bool foundTextAlternative = false;
String textAlternative = ariaTextAlternative(
recursive, inAriaLabelledByTraversal, visited, nameFrom, relatedObjects,
nameSources, &foundTextAlternative);
if (foundTextAlternative && !nameSources)
return textAlternative;
nameFrom = AXNameFromContents;
textAlternative = toHTMLOptionElement(getNode())->displayLabel();
if (nameSources) {
nameSources->push_back(NameSource(foundTextAlternative));
nameSources->back().type = nameFrom;
nameSources->back().text = textAlternative;
foundTextAlternative = true;
}
return textAlternative;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetURLText(const base::string16& text) {
if (editor_->details_.type != BookmarkEditor::EditDetails::NEW_FOLDER)
editor_->url_tf_->SetText(text);
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:scripttext@host.com is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct bpf_func_state *func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
return cur->frame[reg->frameno];
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnUpdateTargetURL(int32 page_id, const GURL& url) {
if (!is_swapped_out_)
delegate_->UpdateTargetURL(page_id, url);
Send(new ViewMsg_UpdateTargetURL_ACK(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void md_do_sync(struct md_thread *thread)
{
struct mddev *mddev = thread->mddev;
struct mddev *mddev2;
unsigned int currspeed = 0,
window;
sector_t max_sectors,j, io_sectors, recovery_done;
unsigned long mark[SYNC_MARKS];
unsigned long update_time;
sector_t mark_cnt[SYNC_MARKS];
int last_mark,m;
struct list_head *tmp;
sector_t last_check;
int skipped = 0;
struct md_rdev *rdev;
char *desc, *action = NULL;
struct blk_plug plug;
/* just incase thread restarts... */
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery))
return;
if (mddev->ro) {/* never try to sync a read-only array */
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
return;
}
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery)) {
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_CHECK, &mddev->recovery)) {
desc = "data-check";
action = "check";
} else if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_REQUESTED, &mddev->recovery)) {
desc = "requested-resync";
action = "repair";
} else
desc = "resync";
} else if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &mddev->recovery))
desc = "reshape";
else
desc = "recovery";
mddev->last_sync_action = action ?: desc;
/* we overload curr_resync somewhat here.
* 0 == not engaged in resync at all
* 2 == checking that there is no conflict with another sync
* 1 == like 2, but have yielded to allow conflicting resync to
* commense
* other == active in resync - this many blocks
*
* Before starting a resync we must have set curr_resync to
* 2, and then checked that every "conflicting" array has curr_resync
* less than ours. When we find one that is the same or higher
* we wait on resync_wait. To avoid deadlock, we reduce curr_resync
* to 1 if we choose to yield (based arbitrarily on address of mddev structure).
* This will mean we have to start checking from the beginning again.
*
*/
do {
mddev->curr_resync = 2;
try_again:
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery))
goto skip;
for_each_mddev(mddev2, tmp) {
if (mddev2 == mddev)
continue;
if (!mddev->parallel_resync
&& mddev2->curr_resync
&& match_mddev_units(mddev, mddev2)) {
DEFINE_WAIT(wq);
if (mddev < mddev2 && mddev->curr_resync == 2) {
/* arbitrarily yield */
mddev->curr_resync = 1;
wake_up(&resync_wait);
}
if (mddev > mddev2 && mddev->curr_resync == 1)
/* no need to wait here, we can wait the next
* time 'round when curr_resync == 2
*/
continue;
/* We need to wait 'interruptible' so as not to
* contribute to the load average, and not to
* be caught by 'softlockup'
*/
prepare_to_wait(&resync_wait, &wq, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery) &&
mddev2->curr_resync >= mddev->curr_resync) {
printk(KERN_INFO "md: delaying %s of %s"
" until %s has finished (they"
" share one or more physical units)\n",
desc, mdname(mddev), mdname(mddev2));
mddev_put(mddev2);
if (signal_pending(current))
flush_signals(current);
schedule();
finish_wait(&resync_wait, &wq);
goto try_again;
}
finish_wait(&resync_wait, &wq);
}
}
} while (mddev->curr_resync < 2);
j = 0;
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery)) {
/* resync follows the size requested by the personality,
* which defaults to physical size, but can be virtual size
*/
max_sectors = mddev->resync_max_sectors;
atomic64_set(&mddev->resync_mismatches, 0);
/* we don't use the checkpoint if there's a bitmap */
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_REQUESTED, &mddev->recovery))
j = mddev->resync_min;
else if (!mddev->bitmap)
j = mddev->recovery_cp;
} else if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &mddev->recovery))
max_sectors = mddev->resync_max_sectors;
else {
/* recovery follows the physical size of devices */
max_sectors = mddev->dev_sectors;
j = MaxSector;
rcu_read_lock();
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev)
if (rdev->raid_disk >= 0 &&
!test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags) &&
!test_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags) &&
rdev->recovery_offset < j)
j = rdev->recovery_offset;
rcu_read_unlock();
/* If there is a bitmap, we need to make sure all
* writes that started before we added a spare
* complete before we start doing a recovery.
* Otherwise the write might complete and (via
* bitmap_endwrite) set a bit in the bitmap after the
* recovery has checked that bit and skipped that
* region.
*/
if (mddev->bitmap) {
mddev->pers->quiesce(mddev, 1);
mddev->pers->quiesce(mddev, 0);
}
}
printk(KERN_INFO "md: %s of RAID array %s\n", desc, mdname(mddev));
printk(KERN_INFO "md: minimum _guaranteed_ speed:"
" %d KB/sec/disk.\n", speed_min(mddev));
printk(KERN_INFO "md: using maximum available idle IO bandwidth "
"(but not more than %d KB/sec) for %s.\n",
speed_max(mddev), desc);
is_mddev_idle(mddev, 1); /* this initializes IO event counters */
io_sectors = 0;
for (m = 0; m < SYNC_MARKS; m++) {
mark[m] = jiffies;
mark_cnt[m] = io_sectors;
}
last_mark = 0;
mddev->resync_mark = mark[last_mark];
mddev->resync_mark_cnt = mark_cnt[last_mark];
/*
* Tune reconstruction:
*/
window = 32*(PAGE_SIZE/512);
printk(KERN_INFO "md: using %dk window, over a total of %lluk.\n",
window/2, (unsigned long long)max_sectors/2);
atomic_set(&mddev->recovery_active, 0);
last_check = 0;
if (j>2) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"md: resuming %s of %s from checkpoint.\n",
desc, mdname(mddev));
mddev->curr_resync = j;
} else
mddev->curr_resync = 3; /* no longer delayed */
mddev->curr_resync_completed = j;
sysfs_notify(&mddev->kobj, NULL, "sync_completed");
md_new_event(mddev);
update_time = jiffies;
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->resync_start(mddev, j, max_sectors);
blk_start_plug(&plug);
while (j < max_sectors) {
sector_t sectors;
skipped = 0;
if (!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE, &mddev->recovery) &&
((mddev->curr_resync > mddev->curr_resync_completed &&
(mddev->curr_resync - mddev->curr_resync_completed)
> (max_sectors >> 4)) ||
time_after_eq(jiffies, update_time + UPDATE_FREQUENCY) ||
(j - mddev->curr_resync_completed)*2
>= mddev->resync_max - mddev->curr_resync_completed
)) {
/* time to update curr_resync_completed */
wait_event(mddev->recovery_wait,
atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active) == 0);
mddev->curr_resync_completed = j;
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery) &&
j > mddev->recovery_cp)
mddev->recovery_cp = j;
update_time = jiffies;
set_bit(MD_CHANGE_CLEAN, &mddev->flags);
sysfs_notify(&mddev->kobj, NULL, "sync_completed");
}
while (j >= mddev->resync_max &&
!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery)) {
/* As this condition is controlled by user-space,
* we can block indefinitely, so use '_interruptible'
* to avoid triggering warnings.
*/
flush_signals(current); /* just in case */
wait_event_interruptible(mddev->recovery_wait,
mddev->resync_max > j
|| test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR,
&mddev->recovery));
}
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery))
break;
sectors = mddev->pers->sync_request(mddev, j, &skipped);
if (sectors == 0) {
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
break;
}
if (!skipped) { /* actual IO requested */
io_sectors += sectors;
atomic_add(sectors, &mddev->recovery_active);
}
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery))
break;
j += sectors;
if (j > 2)
mddev->curr_resync = j;
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->resync_info_update(mddev, j, max_sectors);
mddev->curr_mark_cnt = io_sectors;
if (last_check == 0)
/* this is the earliest that rebuild will be
* visible in /proc/mdstat
*/
md_new_event(mddev);
if (last_check + window > io_sectors || j == max_sectors)
continue;
last_check = io_sectors;
repeat:
if (time_after_eq(jiffies, mark[last_mark] + SYNC_MARK_STEP )) {
/* step marks */
int next = (last_mark+1) % SYNC_MARKS;
mddev->resync_mark = mark[next];
mddev->resync_mark_cnt = mark_cnt[next];
mark[next] = jiffies;
mark_cnt[next] = io_sectors - atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active);
last_mark = next;
}
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery))
break;
/*
* this loop exits only if either when we are slower than
* the 'hard' speed limit, or the system was IO-idle for
* a jiffy.
* the system might be non-idle CPU-wise, but we only care
* about not overloading the IO subsystem. (things like an
* e2fsck being done on the RAID array should execute fast)
*/
cond_resched();
recovery_done = io_sectors - atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active);
currspeed = ((unsigned long)(recovery_done - mddev->resync_mark_cnt))/2
/((jiffies-mddev->resync_mark)/HZ +1) +1;
if (currspeed > speed_min(mddev)) {
if (currspeed > speed_max(mddev)) {
msleep(500);
goto repeat;
}
if (!is_mddev_idle(mddev, 0)) {
/*
* Give other IO more of a chance.
* The faster the devices, the less we wait.
*/
wait_event(mddev->recovery_wait,
!atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active));
}
}
}
printk(KERN_INFO "md: %s: %s %s.\n",mdname(mddev), desc,
test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery)
? "interrupted" : "done");
/*
* this also signals 'finished resyncing' to md_stop
*/
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
wait_event(mddev->recovery_wait, !atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active));
/* tell personality that we are finished */
mddev->pers->sync_request(mddev, max_sectors, &skipped);
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
md_cluster_ops->resync_finish(mddev);
if (!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_CHECK, &mddev->recovery) &&
mddev->curr_resync > 2) {
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery)) {
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery)) {
if (mddev->curr_resync >= mddev->recovery_cp) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"md: checkpointing %s of %s.\n",
desc, mdname(mddev));
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_ERROR,
&mddev->recovery))
mddev->recovery_cp =
mddev->curr_resync_completed;
else
mddev->recovery_cp =
mddev->curr_resync;
}
} else
mddev->recovery_cp = MaxSector;
} else {
if (!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery))
mddev->curr_resync = MaxSector;
rcu_read_lock();
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev)
if (rdev->raid_disk >= 0 &&
mddev->delta_disks >= 0 &&
!test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags) &&
!test_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags) &&
rdev->recovery_offset < mddev->curr_resync)
rdev->recovery_offset = mddev->curr_resync;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
skip:
set_bit(MD_CHANGE_DEVS, &mddev->flags);
spin_lock(&mddev->lock);
if (!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery)) {
/* We completed so min/max setting can be forgotten if used. */
if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_REQUESTED, &mddev->recovery))
mddev->resync_min = 0;
mddev->resync_max = MaxSector;
} else if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_REQUESTED, &mddev->recovery))
mddev->resync_min = mddev->curr_resync_completed;
mddev->curr_resync = 0;
spin_unlock(&mddev->lock);
wake_up(&resync_wait);
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
return;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateStencilSettings(
const char* function_name) {
if (stencil_mask_ != stencil_mask_back_ ||
stencil_func_ref_ != stencil_func_ref_back_ ||
stencil_func_mask_ != stencil_func_mask_back_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"front and back stencils settings do not match");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vrend_renderer_init(struct vrend_if_cbs *cbs, uint32_t flags)
{
int gl_ver;
virgl_gl_context gl_context;
struct virgl_gl_ctx_param ctx_params;
if (!vrend_state.inited) {
vrend_state.inited = true;
vrend_object_init_resource_table();
vrend_clicbs = cbs;
}
ctx_params.shared = false;
ctx_params.major_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MAJOR;
ctx_params.minor_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MINOR;
gl_context = vrend_clicbs->create_gl_context(0, &ctx_params);
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, gl_context);
gl_ver = epoxy_gl_version();
vrend_state.gl_major_ver = gl_ver / 10;
vrend_state.gl_minor_ver = gl_ver % 10;
if (gl_ver > 30 && !epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_compatibility")) {
fprintf(stderr, "gl_version %d - core profile enabled\n", gl_ver);
vrend_state.use_core_profile = 1;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "gl_version %d - compat profile\n", gl_ver);
}
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_robustness"))
vrend_state.have_robustness = true;
else
fprintf(stderr,"WARNING: running without ARB robustness in place may crash\n");
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_MESA_pack_invert"))
vrend_state.have_mesa_invert = true;
if (gl_ver >= 43 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_vertex_attrib_binding"))
vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding = true;
if (gl_ver >= 33 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_sampler_objects"))
vrend_state.have_samplers = true;
if (gl_ver >= 33 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_shader_bit_encoding"))
vrend_state.have_bit_encoding = true;
if (gl_ver >= 31)
vrend_state.have_gl_prim_restart = true;
else if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_NV_primitive_restart"))
vrend_state.have_nv_prim_restart = true;
if (gl_ver >= 40 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_transform_feedback2"))
vrend_state.have_tf2 = true;
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample") && epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_texture_multisample")) {
vrend_state.have_multisample = true;
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample_blit_scaled"))
vrend_state.have_ms_scaled_blit = true;
}
/* callbacks for when we are cleaning up the object table */
vrend_resource_set_destroy_callback(vrend_destroy_resource_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_QUERY, vrend_destroy_query_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SURFACE, vrend_destroy_surface_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER, vrend_destroy_shader_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_VIEW, vrend_destroy_sampler_view_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_STREAMOUT_TARGET, vrend_destroy_so_target_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_STATE, vrend_destroy_sampler_state_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_VERTEX_ELEMENTS, vrend_destroy_vertex_elements_object);
vrend_build_format_list();
vrend_clicbs->destroy_gl_context(gl_context);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.fence_list);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.fence_wait_list);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.waiting_query_list);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.active_ctx_list);
/* create 0 context */
vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(0, 0, NULL);
vrend_state.eventfd = -1;
if (flags & VREND_USE_THREAD_SYNC) {
vrend_renderer_use_threaded_sync();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::setNormalProxy( Proxy *proxy )
{
if ( !server->can_cache_proxies ) {
return;
}
if ( normal_proxy != NULL && proxy == normal_proxy->proxy ) {
return;
}
if ( normal_proxy != NULL ) {
server->UnregisterProxy( normal_proxy->proxy );
}
GahpProxyInfo *gahp_proxy = server->RegisterProxy( proxy );
ASSERT(gahp_proxy);
normal_proxy = gahp_proxy;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoAudioOutputIPC::ReceivedDeviceAuthorization(
media::OutputDeviceStatus status,
const media::AudioParameters& params,
const std::string& device_id) const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
delegate_->OnDeviceAuthorized(status, params, device_id);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RequestFaviconSyncForPageURL(const GURL& page_url) {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
quit_closure_ = run_loop.QuitClosure();
favicon_service_->GetRawFaviconForPageURL(
page_url, {favicon_base::IconType::kFavicon}, gfx::kFaviconSize,
/*fallback_to_host=*/false,
base::Bind(&RemoveFaviconTester::SaveResultAndQuit,
base::Unretained(this)),
&tracker_);
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 154,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init snd_card_info_init(void)
{
struct snd_info_entry *entry;
entry = snd_info_create_module_entry(THIS_MODULE, "cards", NULL);
if (! entry)
return -ENOMEM;
entry->c.text.read = snd_card_info_read;
if (snd_info_register(entry) < 0) {
snd_info_free_entry(entry);
return -ENOMEM;
}
snd_card_info_entry = entry;
#ifdef MODULE
entry = snd_info_create_module_entry(THIS_MODULE, "modules", NULL);
if (entry) {
entry->c.text.read = snd_card_module_info_read;
if (snd_info_register(entry) < 0)
snd_info_free_entry(entry);
else
snd_card_module_info_entry = entry;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 36,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
{
unsigned long flags;
cachep = cache_from_obj(cachep, objp);
if (!cachep)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
debug_check_no_locks_freed(objp, cachep->object_size);
if (!(cachep->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
debug_check_no_obj_freed(objp, cachep->object_size);
__cache_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_);
local_irq_restore(flags);
trace_kmem_cache_free(_RET_IP_, objp);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TriggerShowLoginWizardFinish(
std::string switch_locale,
std::unique_ptr<ShowLoginWizardSwitchLanguageCallbackData> data) {
if (switch_locale.empty()) {
ShowLoginWizardFinish(data->first_screen, data->startup_manifest);
} else {
chromeos::locale_util::SwitchLanguageCallback callback(
base::Bind(&OnLanguageSwitchedCallback, base::Passed(std::move(data))));
chromeos::locale_util::SwitchLanguage(
switch_locale, true, true /* login_layouts_only */, callback,
ProfileManager::GetActiveUserProfile());
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_lookup_alternate_content(fz_xml *node)
{
for (node = fz_xml_down(node); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "mc:Choice") && fz_xml_att(node, "Requires"))
{
char list[64];
char *next = list, *item;
fz_strlcpy(list, fz_xml_att(node, "Requires"), sizeof(list));
while ((item = fz_strsep(&next, " \t\r\n")) != NULL && (!*item || !strcmp(item, "xps")));
if (!item)
return fz_xml_down(node);
}
else if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "mc:Fallback"))
return fz_xml_down(node);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool hid_match_one_id(struct hid_device *hdev,
const struct hid_device_id *id)
{
return (id->bus == HID_BUS_ANY || id->bus == hdev->bus) &&
(id->group == HID_GROUP_ANY || id->group == hdev->group) &&
(id->vendor == HID_ANY_ID || id->vendor == hdev->vendor) &&
(id->product == HID_ANY_ID || id->product == hdev->product);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t ReverbGetDecayTime(ReverbContext *pContext){
LVREV_ControlParams_st ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_GetControlParameters", "ReverbGetDecayTime")
if(ActiveParams.T60 != pContext->SavedDecayTime){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : ReverbGetDecayTime() has wrong level -> %d %d\n",
ActiveParams.T60, pContext->SavedDecayTime);
}
return (uint32_t)ActiveParams.T60;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownload(
DownloadItem* item,
const base::Closure& user_complete_callback) {
return IsDownloadReadyForCompletion(item, base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownloadInternal,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), item->GetId(), user_complete_callback));
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
u32 opt;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_L2CAP)
return l2cap_sock_setsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(sec), optlen);
if (copy_from_user((char *) &sec, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sec.level < BT_SECURITY_LOW ||
sec.level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec.level;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
bt_sk(sk)->defer_setup = opt;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void local_flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
/* FIXME: Optimize this later.. */
flush_tlb_all();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState(
WebFrameLoadType load_type,
bool is_same_document,
HistoryItem::ViewState* view_state,
HistoryScrollRestorationType scroll_restoration_type) {
LocalFrameView* view = frame_->View();
if (!view || !view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea() ||
!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad() ||
!frame_->IsAttached()) {
return;
}
if (!NeedsHistoryItemRestore(load_type) || !view_state)
return;
bool should_restore_scroll =
scroll_restoration_type != kScrollRestorationManual;
bool should_restore_scale = view_state->page_scale_factor_;
bool can_restore_without_clamping =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->ClampScrollOffset(
view_state->scroll_offset_) == view_state->scroll_offset_;
bool should_force_clamping = !frame_->IsLoading() || is_same_document;
if (!can_restore_without_clamping && should_force_clamping)
frame_->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayout();
bool can_restore_without_annoying_user =
!GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().was_scrolled_by_user &&
(can_restore_without_clamping || should_force_clamping ||
!should_restore_scroll);
if (!can_restore_without_annoying_user)
return;
if (should_restore_scroll) {
ScrollOffset previous_offset =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset();
bool did_restore =
ShouldSerializeScrollAnchor() &&
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->RestoreScrollAnchor(
{view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.selector_,
LayoutPoint(view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.offset_.x,
view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.offset_.y),
view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.simhash_});
if (!did_restore) {
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->SetScrollOffset(
view_state->scroll_offset_, kProgrammaticScroll);
}
did_restore |= (previous_offset !=
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset());
if (did_restore) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Layout.ScrollRestoration.PrecededByJsScroll",
GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().was_scrolled_by_js);
}
}
if (frame_->IsMainFrame()) {
ScrollOffset visual_viewport_offset(
view_state->visual_viewport_scroll_offset_);
if (visual_viewport_offset.Width() == -1 &&
visual_viewport_offset.Height() == -1) {
visual_viewport_offset =
view_state->scroll_offset_ -
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset();
}
VisualViewport& visual_viewport = frame_->GetPage()->GetVisualViewport();
if (should_restore_scale && should_restore_scroll) {
visual_viewport.SetScaleAndLocation(view_state->page_scale_factor_,
FloatPoint(visual_viewport_offset));
} else if (should_restore_scale) {
visual_viewport.SetScale(view_state->page_scale_factor_);
} else if (should_restore_scroll) {
visual_viewport.SetLocation(FloatPoint(visual_viewport_offset));
}
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator =
frame_->GetPage()->GetScrollingCoordinator())
scrolling_coordinator->FrameViewRootLayerDidChange(view);
}
GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().did_restore_from_history = true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void* GenericMPEdup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsStageDup((cmsStage*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_ws_write(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char *buf, uint32_t buf_len, uint8_t opcode)
{
struct ws_header h;
memset(&h, 0, sizeof(struct ws_header));
h.fin = 1;
h.mask = ucc->ws_mask;
h.opcode = opcode;
h.payload_len = buf_len;
if (h.payload_len + WS_HEADER_SIZE > ucc->netbuf_size) {
free(ucc->netbuf);
ucc->netbuf_size = h.payload_len + WS_HEADER_SIZE;
ucc->netbuf = malloc((size_t) ucc->netbuf_size);
}
uint64_t out_size = 0;
ws_serialize(&h, &ucc->seed, buf, ucc->netbuf, &out_size);
return ucc->write(ucc->ctx, ucc->netbuf, (uint32_t) out_size);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 84,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udp_lib_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen,
int (*push_pending_frames)(struct sock *))
{
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
int val;
int err = 0;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case UDP_CORK:
if (val != 0) {
up->corkflag = 1;
} else {
up->corkflag = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
(*push_pending_frames)(sk);
release_sock(sk);
}
break;
case UDP_ENCAP:
switch (val) {
case 0:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
up->encap_rcv = xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case UDP_ENCAP_L2TPINUDP:
up->encap_type = val;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
break;
/*
* UDP-Lite's partial checksum coverage (RFC 3828).
*/
/* The sender sets actual checksum coverage length via this option.
* The case coverage > packet length is handled by send module. */
case UDPLITE_SEND_CSCOV:
if (!is_udplite) /* Disable the option on UDP sockets */
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (val != 0 && val < 8) /* Illegal coverage: use default (8) */
val = 8;
else if (val > USHRT_MAX)
val = USHRT_MAX;
up->pcslen = val;
up->pcflag |= UDPLITE_SEND_CC;
break;
/* The receiver specifies a minimum checksum coverage value. To make
* sense, this should be set to at least 8 (as done below). If zero is
* used, this again means full checksum coverage. */
case UDPLITE_RECV_CSCOV:
if (!is_udplite) /* Disable the option on UDP sockets */
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (val != 0 && val < 8) /* Avoid silly minimal values. */
val = 8;
else if (val > USHRT_MAX)
val = USHRT_MAX;
up->pcrlen = val;
up->pcflag |= UDPLITE_RECV_CC;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void acm_write_bulk(struct urb *urb)
{
struct acm_wb *wb = urb->context;
struct acm *acm = wb->instance;
unsigned long flags;
int status = urb->status;
if (status || (urb->actual_length != urb->transfer_buffer_length))
dev_vdbg(&acm->data->dev, "%s - len %d/%d, status %d\n",
__func__,
urb->actual_length,
urb->transfer_buffer_length,
status);
spin_lock_irqsave(&acm->write_lock, flags);
acm_write_done(acm, wb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acm->write_lock, flags);
schedule_work(&acm->work);
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StartupBrowserCreator::AddFirstRunTab(const GURL& url) {
first_run_tabs_.push_back(url);
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 137,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_heap_it_rewind(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/* do nothing, the iterator always points to the top element */
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool is_frwd(struct usb_device *dev)
{
return ((le16_to_cpu(dev->descriptor.idVendor) == VENDOR_ID_FRWD) &&
(le16_to_cpu(dev->descriptor.idProduct) == PRODUCT_ID_CYPHIDCOM_FRWD));
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void yv12_extend_frame_bottom_c(YV12_BUFFER_CONFIG *ybf)
{
int i;
unsigned char *src_ptr1, *src_ptr2;
unsigned char *dest_ptr2;
unsigned int Border;
int plane_stride;
int plane_height;
/***********/
/* Y Plane */
/***********/
Border = ybf->border;
plane_stride = ybf->y_stride;
plane_height = ybf->y_height;
src_ptr1 = ybf->y_buffer - Border;
src_ptr2 = src_ptr1 + (plane_height * plane_stride) - plane_stride;
dest_ptr2 = src_ptr2 + plane_stride;
for (i = 0; i < (int)Border; i++)
{
memcpy(dest_ptr2, src_ptr2, plane_stride);
dest_ptr2 += plane_stride;
}
/***********/
/* U Plane */
/***********/
plane_stride = ybf->uv_stride;
plane_height = ybf->uv_height;
Border /= 2;
src_ptr1 = ybf->u_buffer - Border;
src_ptr2 = src_ptr1 + (plane_height * plane_stride) - plane_stride;
dest_ptr2 = src_ptr2 + plane_stride;
for (i = 0; i < (int)(Border); i++)
{
memcpy(dest_ptr2, src_ptr2, plane_stride);
dest_ptr2 += plane_stride;
}
/***********/
/* V Plane */
/***********/
src_ptr1 = ybf->v_buffer - Border;
src_ptr2 = src_ptr1 + (plane_height * plane_stride) - plane_stride;
dest_ptr2 = src_ptr2 + plane_stride;
for (i = 0; i < (int)(Border); i++)
{
memcpy(dest_ptr2, src_ptr2, plane_stride);
dest_ptr2 += plane_stride;
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
if (m->flags & NXFMF_INITIAL) {
ofproto_collect_ofmonitor_refresh_rules(m, 0, rules);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int media_device_get_info(struct media_device *dev,
struct media_device_info __user *__info)
{
struct media_device_info info;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
strlcpy(info.driver, dev->dev->driver->name, sizeof(info.driver));
strlcpy(info.model, dev->model, sizeof(info.model));
strlcpy(info.serial, dev->serial, sizeof(info.serial));
strlcpy(info.bus_info, dev->bus_info, sizeof(info.bus_info));
info.media_version = MEDIA_API_VERSION;
info.hw_revision = dev->hw_revision;
info.driver_version = dev->driver_version;
if (copy_to_user(__info, &info, sizeof(*__info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 39,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterPSDImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PSB");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PSD");
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
/* Address WBINVD may be executed by guest */
if (need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu)) {
if (kvm_x86_ops->has_wbinvd_exit())
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
else if (vcpu->cpu != -1 && vcpu->cpu != cpu)
smp_call_function_single(vcpu->cpu,
wbinvd_ipi, NULL, 1);
}
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
/* Apply any externally detected TSC adjustments (due to suspend) */
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment)) {
adjust_tsc_offset_host(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment);
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment = 0;
set_bit(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, &vcpu->requests);
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu != cpu) || check_tsc_unstable()) {
s64 tsc_delta = !vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc ? 0 :
native_read_tsc() - vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc;
if (tsc_delta < 0)
mark_tsc_unstable("KVM discovered backwards TSC");
if (check_tsc_unstable()) {
u64 offset = kvm_x86_ops->compute_tsc_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc);
kvm_x86_ops->write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup = 1;
}
/*
* On a host with synchronized TSC, there is no need to update
* kvmclock on vcpu->cpu migration
*/
if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.use_master_clock || vcpu->cpu == -1)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
if (vcpu->cpu != cpu)
kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
vcpu->cpu = cpu;
}
accumulate_steal_time(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorResourceAgent::didReceiveWebSocketFrame(unsigned long identifier, int opCode, bool masked, const char* payload, size_t payloadLength)
{
RefPtr<TypeBuilder::Network::WebSocketFrame> frameObject = TypeBuilder::Network::WebSocketFrame::create()
.setOpcode(opCode)
.setMask(masked)
.setPayloadData(String(payload, payloadLength));
m_frontend->webSocketFrameReceived(IdentifiersFactory::requestId(identifier), currentTime(), frameObject);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate::GetMessageText() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SESSION_CRASHED_VIEW_MESSAGE);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ClientMajorVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
VidModePrivPtr pPriv;
pPriv = VM_GETPRIV(client);
if (!pPriv)
return 0;
else
return pPriv->major;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btrfs_dirty_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
int ret;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_DUMMY, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags))
return 0;
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (ret && ret == -ENOSPC) {
/* whoops, lets try again with the full transaction */
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
}
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (BTRFS_I(inode)->delayed_node)
btrfs_balance_delayed_items(root);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~WorkerThreadTask() { }
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::IsFullscreen() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSObject* createRangeError(ExecState* exec, const UString& message)
{
return createRangeError(exec->lexicalGlobalObject(), message);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftG711::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = mIsMLaw ? OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeMULaw
: OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeALaw;
} else {
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
}
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CrossSiteRedirectResponseHandler(const net::EmbeddedTestServer* test_server,
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
net::HttpStatusCode http_status_code;
size_t length_of_chosen_prefix;
std::string prefix_302("/cross-site/");
std::string prefix_307("/cross-site-307/");
if (base::StartsWith(request.relative_url, prefix_302,
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
http_status_code = net::HTTP_MOVED_PERMANENTLY;
length_of_chosen_prefix = prefix_302.length();
} else if (base::StartsWith(request.relative_url, prefix_307,
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
http_status_code = net::HTTP_TEMPORARY_REDIRECT;
length_of_chosen_prefix = prefix_307.length();
} else {
return std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse>();
}
std::string params = request.relative_url.substr(length_of_chosen_prefix);
size_t slash = params.find('/');
if (slash == std::string::npos)
return std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse>();
GURL::Replacements replace_host;
replace_host.SetHostStr(base::StringPiece(params).substr(0, slash));
GURL redirect_server =
test_server->base_url().ReplaceComponents(replace_host);
std::string path = params.substr(slash + 1);
GURL redirect_target(redirect_server.Resolve(path));
DCHECK(redirect_target.is_valid());
std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse> http_response(
new net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse);
http_response->set_code(http_status_code);
http_response->AddCustomHeader("Location", redirect_target.spec());
return std::move(http_response);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline int JBIG2Bitmap::nextPixel(JBIG2BitmapPtr *ptr) {
int pix;
if (!ptr->p) {
pix = 0;
} else if (ptr->x < 0) {
++ptr->x;
pix = 0;
} else {
pix = (*ptr->p >> ptr->shift) & 1;
if (++ptr->x == w) {
ptr->p = NULL;
} else if (ptr->shift == 0) {
++ptr->p;
ptr->shift = 7;
} else {
--ptr->shift;
}
}
return pix;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_opt_anc_info(OptAnc* to, int anc)
{
if (is_left(anc))
to->left |= anc;
else
to->right |= anc;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AudioMixerAlsa::ConnectInternal() {
DCHECK(MessageLoop::current() == thread_->message_loop());
num_connection_attempts_++;
int err;
snd_mixer_t* handle = NULL;
if ((err = snd_mixer_open(&handle, 0)) < 0) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "Mixer open error: " << snd_strerror(err);
return false;
}
if ((err = snd_mixer_attach(handle, kCardName)) < 0) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "Attach to card " << kCardName << " failed: "
<< snd_strerror(err);
snd_mixer_close(handle);
return false;
}
snd_pcm_t* pcm_out_handle;
if ((err = snd_pcm_open(&pcm_out_handle,
kCardName,
SND_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK,
0)) >= 0) {
snd_pcm_close(pcm_out_handle);
} else {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "PCM open failed: " << snd_strerror(err);
}
if ((err = snd_mixer_selem_register(handle, NULL, NULL)) < 0) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "Mixer register error: " << snd_strerror(err);
snd_mixer_close(handle);
return false;
}
if ((err = snd_mixer_load(handle)) < 0) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "Mixer " << kCardName << " load error: %s"
<< snd_strerror(err);
snd_mixer_close(handle);
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Opened mixer " << kCardName << " successfully";
double min_volume_db = kDefaultMinVolumeDb;
double max_volume_db = kDefaultMaxVolumeDb;
snd_mixer_elem_t* master_element = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kMasterElementNames); ++i) {
master_element = FindElementWithName(handle, kMasterElementNames[i]);
if (master_element)
break;
}
if (!master_element) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "Unable to find a master element on " << kCardName;
snd_mixer_close(handle);
return false;
}
alsa_long_t long_low = static_cast<alsa_long_t>(kDefaultMinVolumeDb * 100);
alsa_long_t long_high = static_cast<alsa_long_t>(kDefaultMaxVolumeDb * 100);
err = snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_dB_range(
master_element, &long_low, &long_high);
if (err != 0) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_dB_range() failed:"
<< snd_strerror(err);
snd_mixer_close(handle);
return false;
}
min_volume_db = static_cast<double>(long_low) / 100.0;
max_volume_db = static_cast<double>(long_high) / 100.0;
snd_mixer_elem_t* pcm_element = FindElementWithName(handle, kPCMElementName);
if (pcm_element) {
alsa_long_t long_low = static_cast<alsa_long_t>(kDefaultMinVolumeDb * 100);
alsa_long_t long_high = static_cast<alsa_long_t>(kDefaultMaxVolumeDb * 100);
err = snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_dB_range(
pcm_element, &long_low, &long_high);
if (err != 0) {
if (num_connection_attempts_ == kConnectionAttemptToLogFailure)
LOG(WARNING) << "snd_mixer_selem_get_playback_dB_range() failed for "
<< kPCMElementName << ": " << snd_strerror(err);
snd_mixer_close(handle);
return false;
}
min_volume_db += static_cast<double>(long_low) / 100.0;
max_volume_db += static_cast<double>(long_high) / 100.0;
}
VLOG(1) << "Volume range is " << min_volume_db << " dB to "
<< max_volume_db << " dB";
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
alsa_mixer_ = handle;
master_element_ = master_element;
pcm_element_ = pcm_element;
min_volume_db_ = min_volume_db;
max_volume_db_ = max_volume_db;
volume_db_ = min(max(volume_db_, min_volume_db_), max_volume_db_);
}
EnableChromeOsTts();
ApplyState();
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecopy)
{
zval *SIM, *DIM;
long SX, SY, SW, SH, DX, DY;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
int srcH, srcW, srcY, srcX, dstY, dstX;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rrllllll", &DIM, &SIM, &DX, &DY, &SX, &SY, &SW, &SH) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_dst, gdImagePtr, &DIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
srcX = SX;
srcY = SY;
srcH = SH;
srcW = SW;
dstX = DX;
dstY = DY;
gdImageCopy(im_dst, im_src, dstX, dstY, srcX, srcY, srcW, srcH);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
#define AlignedExtent(size,alignment) \
(((size)+((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
size_t
alignment,
extent,
size;
void
*memory;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
memory=NULL;
alignment=CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
size=count*quantum;
extent=AlignedExtent(size,alignment);
if ((size == 0) || (alignment < sizeof(void *)) || (extent < size))
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
if (posix_memalign(&memory,alignment,extent) != 0)
memory=NULL;
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
memory=_aligned_malloc(extent,alignment);
#else
{
void
*p;
extent=(size+alignment-1)+sizeof(void *);
if (extent > size)
{
p=malloc(extent);
if (p != NULL)
{
memory=(void *) AlignedExtent((size_t) p+sizeof(void *),alignment);
*((void **) memory-1)=p;
}
}
}
#endif
return(memory);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 71,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLLinkElement::LoadLink(const LinkLoadParameters& params) {
return link_loader_->LoadLink(params, GetDocument(),
NetworkHintsInterfaceImpl());
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 143,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBlockFlow::shouldRelayoutForPagination(LayoutUnit& pageLogicalHeight, LayoutUnit layoutOverflowLogicalBottom) const
{
ColumnInfo* colInfo = columnInfo();
LayoutUnit columnHeight = pageLogicalHeight;
const int minColumnCount = colInfo->forcedBreaks() + 1;
const int desiredColumnCount = colInfo->desiredColumnCount();
if (minColumnCount >= desiredColumnCount) {
if (!pageLogicalHeight) {
LayoutUnit distanceBetweenBreaks = max<LayoutUnit>(colInfo->maximumDistanceBetweenForcedBreaks(),
view()->layoutState()->pageLogicalOffset(*this, borderBefore() + paddingBefore() + layoutOverflowLogicalBottom) - colInfo->forcedBreakOffset());
columnHeight = max(colInfo->minimumColumnHeight(), distanceBetweenBreaks);
}
} else if (layoutOverflowLogicalBottom > boundedMultiply(pageLogicalHeight, desiredColumnCount)) {
columnHeight = max<LayoutUnit>(colInfo->minimumColumnHeight(), ceilf(layoutOverflowLogicalBottom.toFloat() / desiredColumnCount));
}
if (columnHeight && columnHeight != pageLogicalHeight) {
pageLogicalHeight = columnHeight;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginProxy::UpdateIMEStatus() {
int input_type;
gfx::Rect caret_rect;
if (!delegate_->GetIMEStatus(&input_type, &caret_rect))
return;
Send(new PluginHostMsg_NotifyIMEStatus(route_id_, input_type, caret_rect));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnBeginNavigation(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const BeginNavigationParams& begin_params) {
CHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
if (!is_active())
return;
CommonNavigationParams validated_params = common_params;
GetProcess()->FilterURL(false, &validated_params.url);
BeginNavigationParams validated_begin_params = begin_params;
GetProcess()->FilterURL(true, &validated_begin_params.searchable_form_url);
if (waiting_for_init_) {
pendinging_navigate_ = base::MakeUnique<PendingNavigation>(
validated_params, validated_begin_params);
return;
}
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->OnBeginNavigation(
frame_tree_node(), validated_params, validated_begin_params);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI int php_var_unserialize_ex(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER)
{
var_entries *orig_var_entries = (*var_hash)->last;
zend_long orig_used_slots = orig_var_entries ? orig_var_entries->used_slots : 0;
int result;
result = php_var_unserialize_internal(UNSERIALIZE_PASSTHRU);
if (!result) {
/* If the unserialization failed, mark all elements that have been added to var_hash
* as NULL. This will forbid their use by other unserialize() calls in the same
* unserialization context. */
var_entries *e = orig_var_entries;
zend_long s = orig_used_slots;
while (e) {
for (; s < e->used_slots; s++) {
e->data[s] = NULL;
}
e = e->next;
s = 0;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72663 - destroy broken object when unserializing
(cherry picked from commit 448c9be157f4147e121f1a2a524536c75c9c6059)
CWE ID: CWE-502
| 0
| 50,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_dup_utf8 (const bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
uint32_t *length) /* OUT */
{
uint32_t local_length = 0;
const char *str;
char *ret = NULL;
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if ((str = bson_iter_utf8 (iter, &local_length))) {
ret = bson_malloc0 (local_length + 1);
memcpy (ret, str, local_length);
ret[local_length] = '\0';
}
if (length) {
*length = local_length;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rds_ib_dev_put(struct rds_ib_device *rds_ibdev)
{
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&rds_ibdev->refcount) <= 0);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rds_ibdev->refcount))
queue_work(rds_wq, &rds_ibdev->free_work);
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 40,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AuthenticatorBlePowerOnAutomaticSheetModel::IsAcceptButtonVisible() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_swevent_start_hrtimer(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
s64 period;
if (!is_sampling_event(event))
return;
period = local64_read(&hwc->period_left);
if (period) {
if (period < 0)
period = 10000;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, 0);
} else {
period = max_t(u64, 10000, hwc->sample_period);
}
hrtimer_start(&hwc->hrtimer, ns_to_ktime(period),
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char* _multi_string_alloc_and_copy( LPCWSTR in )
{
char *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( len + 2 );
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = 0xFF & in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
return chr;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID CALLBACK tq_timer_cb(PVOID arg, BOOLEAN timed_out)
{
zend_bool *php_timed_out;
/* The doc states it'll be always true, however it theoretically
could be FALSE when the thread was signaled. */
if (!timed_out) {
return;
}
php_timed_out = (zend_bool *)arg;
*php_timed_out = 1;
}
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 57,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SwapPromiseManager* LayerTreeHost::GetSwapPromiseManager() {
return &swap_promise_manager_;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_app_idx(UINT8 app_id, UINT8 *p_app_idx){
BOOLEAN found=FALSE;
UINT8 i;
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
if (btif_hl_cb.acb[i].in_use &&
(btif_hl_cb.acb[i].app_id == app_id))
{
found = TRUE;
*p_app_idx = i;
break;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s found=%d app_idx=%d", __FUNCTION__, found, i );
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_libxml_getParameterEntity(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name) {
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
return libxml2_getParameterEntity(sax2->xc, name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DocumentVisibilityObserver::DocumentVisibilityObserver(Document& document)
: m_document(nullptr)
{
registerObserver(document);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,499
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DaemonProcess::CloseDesktopSession(int terminal_id) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!IsTerminalIdKnown(terminal_id)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "An invalid terminal ID. terminal_id=" << terminal_id;
RestartNetworkProcess();
DeleteAllDesktopSessions();
return;
}
DesktopSessionList::iterator i;
for (i = desktop_sessions_.begin(); i != desktop_sessions_.end(); ++i) {
if ((*i)->id() == terminal_id) {
break;
}
}
if (i == desktop_sessions_.end())
return;
delete *i;
desktop_sessions_.erase(i);
VLOG(1) << "Daemon: closed desktop session " << terminal_id;
SendToNetwork(
new ChromotingDaemonNetworkMsg_TerminalDisconnected(terminal_id));
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void callWithScriptStateScriptArgumentsVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
RefPtr<ScriptArguments> scriptArguments(createScriptArguments(info, 0));
imp->callWithScriptStateScriptArgumentsVoidMethod(&state, scriptArguments.release());
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int mntns_inum(void *ns)
{
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns = ns;
return mnt_ns->proc_inum;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftp_delete(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *path)
{
if (ftp == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "DELE", path)) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 250) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aac_send_raw_srb(struct aac_dev* dev, void __user * arg)
{
struct fib* srbfib;
int status;
struct aac_srb *srbcmd = NULL;
struct user_aac_srb *user_srbcmd = NULL;
struct user_aac_srb __user *user_srb = arg;
struct aac_srb_reply __user *user_reply;
struct aac_srb_reply* reply;
u32 fibsize = 0;
u32 flags = 0;
s32 rcode = 0;
u32 data_dir;
void __user *sg_user[32];
void *sg_list[32];
u32 sg_indx = 0;
u32 byte_count = 0;
u32 actual_fibsize64, actual_fibsize = 0;
int i;
if (dev->in_reset) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: send raw srb -EBUSY\n"));
return -EBUSY;
}
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: No permission to send raw srb\n"));
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* Allocate and initialize a Fib then setup a SRB command
*/
if (!(srbfib = aac_fib_alloc(dev))) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
aac_fib_init(srbfib);
/* raw_srb FIB is not FastResponseCapable */
srbfib->hw_fib_va->header.XferState &= ~cpu_to_le32(FastResponseCapable);
srbcmd = (struct aac_srb*) fib_data(srbfib);
memset(sg_list, 0, sizeof(sg_list)); /* cleanup may take issue */
if(copy_from_user(&fibsize, &user_srb->count,sizeof(u32))){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy data size from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
if (fibsize > (dev->max_fib_size - sizeof(struct aac_fibhdr))) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
user_srbcmd = kmalloc(fibsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user_srbcmd) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not make a copy of the srb\n"));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if(copy_from_user(user_srbcmd, user_srb,fibsize)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy srb from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
user_reply = arg+fibsize;
flags = user_srbcmd->flags; /* from user in cpu order */
srbcmd->function = cpu_to_le32(SRBF_ExecuteScsi); // Force this
srbcmd->channel = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->channel);
srbcmd->id = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->id);
srbcmd->lun = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->lun);
srbcmd->timeout = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->timeout);
srbcmd->flags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
srbcmd->retry_limit = 0; // Obsolete parameter
srbcmd->cdb_size = cpu_to_le32(user_srbcmd->cdb_size);
memcpy(srbcmd->cdb, user_srbcmd->cdb, sizeof(srbcmd->cdb));
switch (flags & (SRB_DataIn | SRB_DataOut)) {
case SRB_DataOut:
data_dir = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
break;
case (SRB_DataIn | SRB_DataOut):
data_dir = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL;
break;
case SRB_DataIn:
data_dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE;
break;
default:
data_dir = DMA_NONE;
}
if (user_srbcmd->sg.count > ARRAY_SIZE(sg_list)) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: too many sg entries %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(srbcmd->sg.count)));
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
actual_fibsize = sizeof(struct aac_srb) - sizeof(struct sgentry) +
((user_srbcmd->sg.count & 0xff) * sizeof(struct sgentry));
actual_fibsize64 = actual_fibsize + (user_srbcmd->sg.count & 0xff) *
(sizeof(struct sgentry64) - sizeof(struct sgentry));
/* User made a mistake - should not continue */
if ((actual_fibsize != fibsize) && (actual_fibsize64 != fibsize)) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Bad Size specified in "
"Raw SRB command calculated fibsize=%lu;%lu "
"user_srbcmd->sg.count=%d aac_srb=%lu sgentry=%lu;%lu "
"issued fibsize=%d\n",
actual_fibsize, actual_fibsize64, user_srbcmd->sg.count,
sizeof(struct aac_srb), sizeof(struct sgentry),
sizeof(struct sgentry64), fibsize));
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if ((data_dir == DMA_NONE) && user_srbcmd->sg.count) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: SG with no direction specified in Raw SRB command\n"));
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
byte_count = 0;
if (dev->adapter_info.options & AAC_OPT_SGMAP_HOST64) {
struct user_sgmap64* upsg = (struct user_sgmap64*)&user_srbcmd->sg;
struct sgmap64* psg = (struct sgmap64*)&srbcmd->sg;
/*
* This should also catch if user used the 32 bit sgmap
*/
if (actual_fibsize64 == fibsize) {
actual_fibsize = actual_fibsize64;
for (i = 0; i < upsg->count; i++) {
u64 addr;
void* p;
if (upsg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Does this really need to be GFP_DMA? */
p = kmalloc(upsg->sg[i].count,GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA);
if(!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
upsg->sg[i].count,i,upsg->count));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
addr = (u64)upsg->sg[i].addr[0];
addr += ((u64)upsg->sg[i].addr[1]) << 32;
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p,sg_user[i],upsg->sg[i].count)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p, upsg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr[0] = cpu_to_le32(addr & 0xffffffff);
psg->sg[i].addr[1] = cpu_to_le32(addr>>32);
byte_count += upsg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(upsg->sg[i].count);
}
} else {
struct user_sgmap* usg;
usg = kmalloc(actual_fibsize - sizeof(struct aac_srb)
+ sizeof(struct sgmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!usg) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Allocation error in Raw SRB command\n"));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy (usg, upsg, actual_fibsize - sizeof(struct aac_srb)
+ sizeof(struct sgmap));
actual_fibsize = actual_fibsize64;
for (i = 0; i < usg->count; i++) {
u64 addr;
void* p;
if (usg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
kfree(usg);
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Does this really need to be GFP_DMA? */
p = kmalloc(usg->sg[i].count,GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA);
if(!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG "aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
usg->sg[i].count,i,usg->count));
kfree(usg);
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)usg->sg[i].addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p,sg_user[i],upsg->sg[i].count)){
kfree (usg);
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p, usg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr[0] = cpu_to_le32(addr & 0xffffffff);
psg->sg[i].addr[1] = cpu_to_le32(addr>>32);
byte_count += usg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(usg->sg[i].count);
}
kfree (usg);
}
srbcmd->count = cpu_to_le32(byte_count);
psg->count = cpu_to_le32(sg_indx+1);
status = aac_fib_send(ScsiPortCommand64, srbfib, actual_fibsize, FsaNormal, 1, 1,NULL,NULL);
} else {
struct user_sgmap* upsg = &user_srbcmd->sg;
struct sgmap* psg = &srbcmd->sg;
if (actual_fibsize64 == fibsize) {
struct user_sgmap64* usg = (struct user_sgmap64 *)upsg;
for (i = 0; i < upsg->count; i++) {
uintptr_t addr;
void* p;
if (usg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Does this really need to be GFP_DMA? */
p = kmalloc(usg->sg[i].count,GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_DMA);
if(!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
usg->sg[i].count,i,usg->count));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
addr = (u64)usg->sg[i].addr[0];
addr += ((u64)usg->sg[i].addr[1]) << 32;
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p,sg_user[i],usg->sg[i].count)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p, usg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(addr & 0xffffffff);
byte_count += usg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(usg->sg[i].count);
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < upsg->count; i++) {
dma_addr_t addr;
void* p;
if (upsg->sg[i].count >
((dev->adapter_info.options &
AAC_OPT_NEW_COMM) ?
(dev->scsi_host_ptr->max_sectors << 9) :
65536)) {
rcode = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
p = kmalloc(upsg->sg[i].count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not allocate SG buffer - size = %d buffer number %d of %d\n",
upsg->sg[i].count, i, upsg->count));
rcode = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
sg_user[i] = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)upsg->sg[i].addr;
sg_list[i] = p; // save so we can clean up later
sg_indx = i;
if (flags & SRB_DataOut) {
if(copy_from_user(p, sg_user[i],
upsg->sg[i].count)) {
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data from user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
addr = pci_map_single(dev->pdev, p,
upsg->sg[i].count, data_dir);
psg->sg[i].addr = cpu_to_le32(addr);
byte_count += upsg->sg[i].count;
psg->sg[i].count = cpu_to_le32(upsg->sg[i].count);
}
}
srbcmd->count = cpu_to_le32(byte_count);
psg->count = cpu_to_le32(sg_indx+1);
status = aac_fib_send(ScsiPortCommand, srbfib, actual_fibsize, FsaNormal, 1, 1, NULL, NULL);
}
if (status == -ERESTARTSYS) {
rcode = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto cleanup;
}
if (status != 0){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not send raw srb fib to hba\n"));
rcode = -ENXIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (flags & SRB_DataIn) {
for(i = 0 ; i <= sg_indx; i++){
byte_count = le32_to_cpu(
(dev->adapter_info.options & AAC_OPT_SGMAP_HOST64)
? ((struct sgmap64*)&srbcmd->sg)->sg[i].count
: srbcmd->sg.sg[i].count);
if(copy_to_user(sg_user[i], sg_list[i], byte_count)){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy sg data to user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
reply = (struct aac_srb_reply *) fib_data(srbfib);
if(copy_to_user(user_reply,reply,sizeof(struct aac_srb_reply))){
dprintk((KERN_DEBUG"aacraid: Could not copy reply to user\n"));
rcode = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
kfree(user_srbcmd);
for(i=0; i <= sg_indx; i++){
kfree(sg_list[i]);
}
if (rcode != -ERESTARTSYS) {
aac_fib_complete(srbfib);
aac_fib_free(srbfib);
}
return rcode;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: prevent invalid pointer dereference
It appears that driver runs into a problem here if fibsize is too small
because we allocate user_srbcmd with fibsize size only but later we
access it until user_srbcmd->sg.count to copy it over to srbcmd.
It is not correct to test (fibsize < sizeof(*user_srbcmd)) because this
structure already includes one sg element and this is not needed for
commands without data. So, we would recommend to add the following
(instead of test for fibsize == 0).
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Rajashekhara <Mahesh.Rajashekhara@pmcs.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *ioapic_handled_vectors)
{
struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = vcpu->kvm->arch.vioapic;
struct dest_map *dest_map = &ioapic->rtc_status.dest_map;
union kvm_ioapic_redirect_entry *e;
int index;
spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
/* Make sure we see any missing RTC EOI */
if (test_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map->map))
__set_bit(dest_map->vectors[vcpu->vcpu_id],
ioapic_handled_vectors);
for (index = 0; index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; index++) {
e = &ioapic->redirtbl[index];
if (e->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_LEVEL_TRIG ||
kvm_irq_has_notifier(ioapic->kvm, KVM_IRQCHIP_IOAPIC, index) ||
index == RTC_GSI) {
if (kvm_apic_match_dest(vcpu, NULL, 0,
e->fields.dest_id, e->fields.dest_mode) ||
(e->fields.trig_mode == IOAPIC_EDGE_TRIG &&
kvm_apic_pending_eoi(vcpu, e->fields.vector)))
__set_bit(e->fields.vector,
ioapic_handled_vectors);
}
}
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds accesses of rtc_eoi map
KVM was using arrays of size KVM_MAX_VCPUS with vcpu_id, but ID can be
bigger that the maximal number of VCPUs, resulting in out-of-bounds
access.
Found by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 at addr [...]
Write of size 1 by task a.out/27101
CPU: 1 PID: 27101 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:905
[...] kvm_apic_set_irq+0x10e/0x180 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:495
[...] kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0x732/0xc10 arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c:86
[...] ioapic_service+0x41d/0x760 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:360
[...] ioapic_set_irq+0x275/0x6c0 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:222
[...] kvm_ioapic_inject_all arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:235
[...] kvm_set_ioapic+0x223/0x310 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:670
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3668
[...] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x1a08/0x23c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3999
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x1fa/0x1a70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3099
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: af1bae5497b9 ("KVM: x86: bump KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID to 1023")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 47,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hns_gmac_config_loopback(void *mac_drv, enum hnae_loop loop_mode,
u8 enable)
{
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
switch (loop_mode) {
case MAC_INTERNALLOOP_MAC:
dsaf_set_dev_bit(drv, GMAC_LOOP_REG, GMAC_LP_REG_CF2MI_LP_EN_B,
!!enable);
break;
default:
dev_err(drv->dev, "loop_mode error\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t FLACSource::start(MetaData * /* params */)
{
ALOGV("FLACSource::start");
CHECK(!mStarted);
mParser->allocateBuffers();
mStarted = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::DidUpdateBrowserControls() const {
web_view_->DidUpdateBrowserControls();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sctp_pf *sctp_get_pf_specific(sa_family_t family)
{
switch (family) {
case PF_INET:
return sctp_pf_inet_specific;
case PF_INET6:
return sctp_pf_inet6_specific;
default:
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 42,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_crossEntropyCost(short const* norm, unsigned accuracyLog,
unsigned const* count, unsigned const max)
{
unsigned const shift = 8 - accuracyLog;
size_t cost = 0;
unsigned s;
assert(accuracyLog <= 8);
for (s = 0; s <= max; ++s) {
unsigned const normAcc = norm[s] != -1 ? norm[s] : 1;
unsigned const norm256 = normAcc << shift;
assert(norm256 > 0);
assert(norm256 < 256);
cost += count[s] * kInverseProbabiltyLog256[norm256];
}
return cost >> 8;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidAutoResize(const blink::WebSize& newSize) {
GetWidget()->DidAutoResize(newSize);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(time_sleep_until)
{
double d_ts, c_ts;
struct timeval tm;
struct timespec php_req, php_rem;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "d", &d_ts) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (gettimeofday((struct timeval *) &tm, NULL) != 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
c_ts = (double)(d_ts - tm.tv_sec - tm.tv_usec / 1000000.00);
if (c_ts < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Sleep until to time is less than current time");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_req.tv_sec = (time_t) c_ts;
if (php_req.tv_sec > c_ts) { /* rounding up occurred */
php_req.tv_sec--;
}
/* 1sec = 1000000000 nanoseconds */
php_req.tv_nsec = (long) ((c_ts - php_req.tv_sec) * 1000000000.00);
while (nanosleep(&php_req, &php_rem)) {
if (errno == EINTR) {
php_req.tv_sec = php_rem.tv_sec;
php_req.tv_nsec = php_rem.tv_nsec;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tx_ack(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb, void *ctx)
{
struct iwch_ep *ep = ctx;
struct cpl_wr_ack *hdr = cplhdr(skb);
unsigned int credits = ntohs(hdr->credits);
unsigned long flags;
int post_zb = 0;
PDBG("%s ep %p credits %u\n", __func__, ep, credits);
if (credits == 0) {
PDBG("%s 0 credit ack ep %p state %u\n",
__func__, ep, state_read(&ep->com));
return CPL_RET_BUF_DONE;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&ep->com.lock, flags);
BUG_ON(credits != 1);
dst_confirm(ep->dst);
if (!ep->mpa_skb) {
PDBG("%s rdma_init wr_ack ep %p state %u\n",
__func__, ep, ep->com.state);
if (ep->mpa_attr.initiator) {
PDBG("%s initiator ep %p state %u\n",
__func__, ep, ep->com.state);
if (peer2peer && ep->com.state == FPDU_MODE)
post_zb = 1;
} else {
PDBG("%s responder ep %p state %u\n",
__func__, ep, ep->com.state);
if (ep->com.state == MPA_REQ_RCVD) {
ep->com.rpl_done = 1;
wake_up(&ep->com.waitq);
}
}
} else {
PDBG("%s lsm ack ep %p state %u freeing skb\n",
__func__, ep, ep->com.state);
kfree_skb(ep->mpa_skb);
ep->mpa_skb = NULL;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->com.lock, flags);
if (post_zb)
iwch_post_zb_read(ep);
return CPL_RET_BUF_DONE;
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnDataChannel(
std::unique_ptr<RtcDataChannelHandler> handler) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnDataChannelImpl");
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackCreateDataChannel(
this, handler->channel().get(), PeerConnectionTracker::SOURCE_REMOTE);
}
if (!is_closed_)
client_->DidAddRemoteDataChannel(handler.release());
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,971
|
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