instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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| output
int64 0
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| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_commit_super(struct super_block *sb, int sync)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
struct buffer_head *sbh = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh;
int error = 0;
if (!sbh || block_device_ejected(sb))
return error;
/*
* If the file system is mounted read-only, don't update the
* superblock write time. This avoids updating the superblock
* write time when we are mounting the root file system
* read/only but we need to replay the journal; at that point,
* for people who are east of GMT and who make their clock
* tick in localtime for Windows bug-for-bug compatibility,
* the clock is set in the future, and this will cause e2fsck
* to complain and force a full file system check.
*/
if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
es->s_wtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
if (sb->s_bdev->bd_part)
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written +
((part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]) -
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1));
else
es->s_kbytes_written =
cpu_to_le64(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_kbytes_written);
if (percpu_counter_initialized(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeclusters_counter))
ext4_free_blocks_count_set(es,
EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(sb), percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeclusters_counter)));
if (percpu_counter_initialized(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter))
es->s_free_inodes_count =
cpu_to_le32(percpu_counter_sum_positive(
&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_freeinodes_counter));
BUFFER_TRACE(sbh, "marking dirty");
ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb);
if (sync)
lock_buffer(sbh);
if (buffer_write_io_error(sbh)) {
/*
* Oh, dear. A previous attempt to write the
* superblock failed. This could happen because the
* USB device was yanked out. Or it could happen to
* be a transient write error and maybe the block will
* be remapped. Nothing we can do but to retry the
* write and hope for the best.
*/
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "previous I/O error to "
"superblock detected");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
mark_buffer_dirty(sbh);
if (sync) {
unlock_buffer(sbh);
error = __sync_dirty_buffer(sbh,
test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? WRITE_FUA : WRITE_SYNC);
if (error)
return error;
error = buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
if (error) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "I/O error while writing "
"superblock");
clear_buffer_write_io_error(sbh);
set_buffer_uptodate(sbh);
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int save_fsave_header(struct task_struct *tsk, void __user *buf)
{
if (use_fxsr()) {
struct xregs_state *xsave = &tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave;
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
struct _fpstate_32 __user *fp = buf;
convert_from_fxsr(&env, tsk);
if (__copy_to_user(buf, &env, sizeof(env)) ||
__put_user(xsave->i387.swd, &fp->status) ||
__put_user(X86_FXSR_MAGIC, &fp->magic))
return -1;
} else {
struct fregs_state __user *fp = buf;
u32 swd;
if (__get_user(swd, &fp->swd) || __put_user(swd, &fp->status))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStrip::UpdateContrastRatioValues() {
if (!controller_)
return;
const SkColor inactive_bg = GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE);
const auto get_alpha = [inactive_bg](SkColor target, float contrast) {
return color_utils::GetBlendValueWithMinimumContrast(inactive_bg, target,
inactive_bg, contrast);
};
const SkColor active_bg = GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE);
const auto get_hover_opacity = [active_bg, &get_alpha](float contrast) {
return get_alpha(active_bg, contrast) / 255.0f;
};
constexpr float kStandardWidthContrast = 1.11f;
hover_opacity_min_ = get_hover_opacity(kStandardWidthContrast);
constexpr float kMinWidthContrast = 1.19f;
hover_opacity_max_ = get_hover_opacity(kMinWidthContrast);
constexpr float kRadialGradientContrast = 1.13728f;
radial_highlight_opacity_ = get_hover_opacity(kRadialGradientContrast);
const SkColor inactive_fg = GetTabForegroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE, inactive_bg);
constexpr float kTabSeparatorContrast = 2.5f;
const SkAlpha separator_alpha = get_alpha(inactive_fg, kTabSeparatorContrast);
separator_color_ =
color_utils::AlphaBlend(inactive_fg, inactive_bg, separator_alpha);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::IsScrollCornerVisible() const {
return !ScrollCornerRect().IsEmpty();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int br_ip6_multicast_query(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct mld_msg *mld;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct mld2_query *mld2q;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
unsigned long max_delay;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
const struct in6_addr *group = NULL;
int err = 0;
u16 vid = 0;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) ||
(port && port->state == BR_STATE_DISABLED))
goto out;
br_multicast_query_received(br, port, !ipv6_addr_any(&ip6h->saddr));
if (skb->len == sizeof(*mld)) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*mld))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mld = (struct mld_msg *) icmp6_hdr(skb);
max_delay = msecs_to_jiffies(ntohs(mld->mld_maxdelay));
if (max_delay)
group = &mld->mld_mca;
} else if (skb->len >= sizeof(*mld2q)) {
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*mld2q))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
mld2q = (struct mld2_query *)icmp6_hdr(skb);
if (!mld2q->mld2q_nsrcs)
group = &mld2q->mld2q_mca;
max_delay = mld2q->mld2q_mrc ? MLDV2_MRC(ntohs(mld2q->mld2q_mrc)) : 1;
}
if (!group)
goto out;
br_vlan_get_tag(skb, &vid);
mp = br_mdb_ip6_get(mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br), group, vid);
if (!mp)
goto out;
setup_timer(&mp->timer, br_multicast_group_expired, (unsigned long)mp);
mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + br->multicast_membership_interval);
mp->timer_armed = true;
max_delay *= br->multicast_last_member_count;
if (mp->mglist &&
(timer_pending(&mp->timer) ?
time_after(mp->timer.expires, now + max_delay) :
try_to_del_timer_sync(&mp->timer) >= 0))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, now + max_delay);
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (timer_pending(&p->timer) ?
time_after(p->timer.expires, now + max_delay) :
try_to_del_timer_sync(&p->timer) >= 0)
mod_timer(&p->timer, now + max_delay);
}
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseDrmSINF(
off64_t * /* offset */, off64_t data_offset) {
uint8_t updateIdTag;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &updateIdTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x01/*OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR_UPDATE_ID_TAG*/ != updateIdTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t numOfBytes;
int32_t size = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (size < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += numOfBytes;
while(size >= 11 ) {
uint8_t descriptorTag;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &descriptorTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x11/*OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR_ID_TAG*/ != descriptorTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer, 2) < 2) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += 2;
if ((buffer[1] >> 5) & 0x0001) { //url flag is set
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += 8;
if ((0x0F/*ES_ID_REF_TAG*/ != buffer[1])
|| ( 0x0A/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_POINTER_ID_TAG*/ != buffer[5])) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
SINF *sinf = new SINF;
sinf->trackID = U16_AT(&buffer[3]);
sinf->IPMPDescriptorID = buffer[7];
sinf->next = mFirstSINF;
mFirstSINF = sinf;
size -= (8 + 2 + 1);
}
if (size != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &updateIdTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if(0x05/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_UPDATE_ID_TAG*/ != updateIdTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
size = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (size < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += numOfBytes;
while (size > 0) {
uint8_t tag;
int32_t dataLen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &tag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x0B/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_ID_TAG*/ == tag) {
uint8_t id;
dataLen = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (dataLen < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
} else if (dataLen < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
data_offset += numOfBytes;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &id, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
SINF *sinf = mFirstSINF;
while (sinf && (sinf->IPMPDescriptorID != id)) {
sinf = sinf->next;
}
if (sinf == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sinf->len = dataLen - 3;
sinf->IPMPData = new (std::nothrow) char[sinf->len];
if (sinf->IPMPData == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
data_offset += 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, sinf->IPMPData, sinf->len) < sinf->len) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += sinf->len;
size -= (dataLen + numOfBytes + 1);
}
}
if (size != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 159,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: upnp_event_process_notify(struct upnp_event_notify * obj)
{
int err;
socklen_t len;
switch(obj->state) {
case EConnecting:
/* now connected or failed to connect */
len = sizeof(err);
if(getsockopt(obj->s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &len) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: getsockopt: %m", "upnp_event_process_notify");
obj->state = EError;
break;
}
if(err != 0) {
errno = err;
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s: connect(%s%s): %m",
"upnp_event_process_notify",
obj->addrstr, obj->portstr);
obj->state = EError;
break;
}
upnp_event_prepare(obj);
if(obj->state == ESending)
upnp_event_send(obj);
break;
case ESending:
upnp_event_send(obj);
break;
case EWaitingForResponse:
upnp_event_recv(obj);
break;
case EFinished:
close(obj->s);
obj->s = -1;
break;
default:
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: unknown state", "upnp_event_process_notify");
}
}
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 89,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void check_no_speaker_on_headset(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl,
struct snd_card *card)
{
const char *names_to_check[] = {
"Headset", "headset", "Headphone", "headphone", NULL};
const char **s;
bool found = false;
if (strcmp("Speaker", kctl->id.name))
return;
for (s = names_to_check; *s; s++)
if (strstr(card->shortname, *s)) {
found = true;
break;
}
if (!found)
return;
strlcpy(kctl->id.name, "Headphone", sizeof(kctl->id.name));
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: f2flac8_clip_array (const float *src, int32_t *dest, int count, int normalize)
{ float normfact, scaled_value ;
normfact = normalize ? (8.0 * 0x10) : 1.0 ;
while (--count >= 0)
{ scaled_value = src [count] * normfact ;
if (CPU_CLIPS_POSITIVE == 0 && scaled_value >= (1.0 * 0x7F))
{ dest [count] = 0x7F ;
continue ;
} ;
if (CPU_CLIPS_NEGATIVE == 0 && scaled_value <= (-8.0 * 0x10))
{ dest [count] = 0x80 ;
continue ;
} ;
dest [count] = lrintf (scaled_value) ;
} ;
return ;
} /* f2flac8_clip_array */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 67,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %s", sk, batostr(&sa->rc_bdaddr));
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (sa->rc_channel && __rfcomm_get_sock_by_addr(sa->rc_channel, &sa->rc_bdaddr)) {
err = -EADDRINUSE;
} else {
/* Save source address */
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->src, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = sa->rc_channel;
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __net_init inet6_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int err = 0;
net->ipv6.sysctl.bindv6only = 0;
net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_time = 1*HZ;
net->ipv6.sysctl.flowlabel_consistency = 1;
net->ipv6.sysctl.auto_flowlabels = IP6_DEFAULT_AUTO_FLOW_LABELS;
net->ipv6.sysctl.idgen_retries = 3;
net->ipv6.sysctl.idgen_delay = 1 * HZ;
net->ipv6.sysctl.flowlabel_state_ranges = 0;
atomic_set(&net->ipv6.fib6_sernum, 1);
err = ipv6_init_mibs(net);
if (err)
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
err = udp6_proc_init(net);
if (err)
goto out;
err = tcp6_proc_init(net);
if (err)
goto proc_tcp6_fail;
err = ac6_proc_init(net);
if (err)
goto proc_ac6_fail;
#endif
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
proc_ac6_fail:
tcp6_proc_exit(net);
proc_tcp6_fail:
udp6_proc_exit(net);
out:
ipv6_cleanup_mibs(net);
return err;
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnPairError(
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
if (--num_connecting_calls_ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
DCHECK(num_connecting_calls_ >= 0);
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to pair device: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " still in progress";
UnregisterAgent();
ConnectErrorCode error_code = ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorConnectionAttemptFailed) {
error_code = ERROR_FAILED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorFailed) {
error_code = ERROR_FAILED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorAuthenticationFailed) {
error_code = ERROR_AUTH_FAILED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorAuthenticationCanceled) {
error_code = ERROR_AUTH_CANCELED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorAuthenticationRejected) {
error_code = ERROR_AUTH_REJECTED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorAuthenticationTimeout) {
error_code = ERROR_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
}
RecordPairingResult(error_code);
error_callback.Run(error_code);
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lexer_parse_number (parser_context_t *context_p) /**< context */
{
const uint8_t *source_p = context_p->source_p;
const uint8_t *source_end_p = context_p->source_end_p;
bool can_be_float = false;
size_t length;
context_p->token.type = LEXER_LITERAL;
context_p->token.literal_is_reserved = false;
context_p->token.extra_value = LEXER_NUMBER_DECIMAL;
context_p->token.lit_location.char_p = source_p;
context_p->token.lit_location.type = LEXER_NUMBER_LITERAL;
context_p->token.lit_location.has_escape = false;
if (source_p[0] == LIT_CHAR_0
&& source_p + 1 < source_end_p)
{
if (LEXER_TO_ASCII_LOWERCASE (source_p[1]) == LIT_CHAR_LOWERCASE_X)
{
context_p->token.extra_value = LEXER_NUMBER_HEXADECIMAL;
source_p += 2;
if (source_p >= source_end_p
|| !lit_char_is_hex_digit (source_p[0]))
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_INVALID_HEX_DIGIT);
}
do
{
source_p++;
}
while (source_p < source_end_p
&& lit_char_is_hex_digit (source_p[0]));
}
else if (source_p[1] >= LIT_CHAR_0
&& source_p[1] <= LIT_CHAR_7)
{
context_p->token.extra_value = LEXER_NUMBER_OCTAL;
if (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_IS_STRICT)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_OCTAL_NUMBER_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
do
{
source_p++;
}
while (source_p < source_end_p
&& source_p[0] >= LIT_CHAR_0
&& source_p[0] <= LIT_CHAR_7);
if (source_p < source_end_p
&& source_p[0] >= LIT_CHAR_8
&& source_p[0] <= LIT_CHAR_9)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_INVALID_NUMBER);
}
}
else if (source_p[1] >= LIT_CHAR_8
&& source_p[1] <= LIT_CHAR_9)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_INVALID_NUMBER);
}
else
{
can_be_float = true;
source_p++;
}
}
else
{
do
{
source_p++;
}
while (source_p < source_end_p
&& source_p[0] >= LIT_CHAR_0
&& source_p[0] <= LIT_CHAR_9);
can_be_float = true;
}
if (can_be_float)
{
if (source_p < source_end_p
&& source_p[0] == LIT_CHAR_DOT)
{
source_p++;
while (source_p < source_end_p
&& source_p[0] >= LIT_CHAR_0
&& source_p[0] <= LIT_CHAR_9)
{
source_p++;
}
}
if (source_p < source_end_p
&& LEXER_TO_ASCII_LOWERCASE (source_p[0]) == LIT_CHAR_LOWERCASE_E)
{
source_p++;
if (source_p < source_end_p
&& (source_p[0] == LIT_CHAR_PLUS || source_p[0] == LIT_CHAR_MINUS))
{
source_p++;
}
if (source_p >= source_end_p
|| source_p[0] < LIT_CHAR_0
|| source_p[0] > LIT_CHAR_9)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_MISSING_EXPONENT);
}
do
{
source_p++;
}
while (source_p < source_end_p
&& source_p[0] >= LIT_CHAR_0
&& source_p[0] <= LIT_CHAR_9);
}
}
if (source_p < source_end_p
&& (lit_char_is_identifier_start (source_p) || source_p[0] == LIT_CHAR_BACKSLASH))
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_IDENTIFIER_AFTER_NUMBER);
}
length = (size_t) (source_p - context_p->source_p);
if (length > PARSER_MAXIMUM_IDENT_LENGTH)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LONG);
}
context_p->token.lit_location.length = (uint16_t) length;
PARSER_PLUS_EQUAL_LC (context_p->column, length);
context_p->source_p = source_p;
} /* lexer_parse_number */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SecurityHandler::AttachToRenderFrameHost() {
DCHECK(host_);
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(host_);
WebContentsObserver::Observe(web_contents);
DCHECK(enabled_);
DidChangeVisibleSecurityState();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char comps_objrtree_paircmp(void *obj1, void *obj2) {
if (strcmp(((COMPS_ObjRTreePair*)obj1)->key,
((COMPS_ObjRTreePair*)obj2)->key) != 0)
return 0;
return comps_object_cmp(((COMPS_ObjRTreePair*)obj1)->data,
((COMPS_ObjRTreePair*)obj2)->data);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsSEQ* CMSEXPORT cmsDupProfileSequenceDescription(const cmsSEQ* pseq)
{
cmsSEQ *NewSeq;
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (pseq == NULL)
return NULL;
NewSeq = (cmsSEQ*) _cmsMalloc(pseq -> ContextID, sizeof(cmsSEQ));
if (NewSeq == NULL) return NULL;
NewSeq -> seq = (cmsPSEQDESC*) _cmsCalloc(pseq ->ContextID, pseq ->n, sizeof(cmsPSEQDESC));
if (NewSeq ->seq == NULL) goto Error;
NewSeq -> ContextID = pseq ->ContextID;
NewSeq -> n = pseq ->n;
for (i=0; i < pseq->n; i++) {
memmove(&NewSeq ->seq[i].attributes, &pseq ->seq[i].attributes, sizeof(cmsUInt64Number));
NewSeq ->seq[i].deviceMfg = pseq ->seq[i].deviceMfg;
NewSeq ->seq[i].deviceModel = pseq ->seq[i].deviceModel;
memmove(&NewSeq ->seq[i].ProfileID, &pseq ->seq[i].ProfileID, sizeof(cmsProfileID));
NewSeq ->seq[i].technology = pseq ->seq[i].technology;
NewSeq ->seq[i].Manufacturer = cmsMLUdup(pseq ->seq[i].Manufacturer);
NewSeq ->seq[i].Model = cmsMLUdup(pseq ->seq[i].Model);
NewSeq ->seq[i].Description = cmsMLUdup(pseq ->seq[i].Description);
}
return NewSeq;
Error:
cmsFreeProfileSequenceDescription(NewSeq);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 40,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile cmds::DrawArrays& c =
*static_cast<const volatile cmds::DrawArrays*>(cmd_data);
return DoDrawArrays("glDrawArrays",
false,
static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode),
static_cast<GLint>(c.first),
static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count),
1);
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: externalEntityInitProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *start,
const char *end, const char **endPtr) {
enum XML_Error result = initializeEncoding(parser);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
parser->m_processor = externalEntityInitProcessor2;
return externalEntityInitProcessor2(parser, start, end, endPtr);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ion_buffer_put(struct ion_buffer *buffer)
{
return kref_put(&buffer->ref, _ion_buffer_destroy);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateUsbDeviceManager(
device::mojom::UsbDeviceManagerRequest request) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->CreateUsbDeviceManager(this,
std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_new_msr(struct edgeport_port *edge_port, __u8 msr)
{
struct async_icount *icount;
struct tty_struct *tty;
dev_dbg(&edge_port->port->dev, "%s - %02x\n", __func__, msr);
if (msr & (EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CTS | EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_DSR |
EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_RI | EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CD)) {
icount = &edge_port->port->icount;
/* update input line counters */
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CTS)
icount->cts++;
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_DSR)
icount->dsr++;
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CD)
icount->dcd++;
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_RI)
icount->rng++;
wake_up_interruptible(&edge_port->port->port.delta_msr_wait);
}
/* Save the new modem status */
edge_port->shadow_msr = msr & 0xf0;
tty = tty_port_tty_get(&edge_port->port->port);
/* handle CTS flow control */
if (tty && C_CRTSCTS(tty)) {
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_CTS)
tty_wakeup(tty);
}
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::didUpdateSecurityOrigin()
{
if (!m_frame)
return;
m_frame->script()->updateSecurityOrigin();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginServiceFilter* PluginServiceImpl::GetFilter() {
return filter_;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct vm_area_struct *vmacache_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
{
int idx = VMACACHE_HASH(addr);
int i;
count_vm_vmacache_event(VMACACHE_FIND_CALLS);
if (!vmacache_valid(mm))
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < VMACACHE_SIZE; i++) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = current->vmacache.vmas[idx];
if (vma) {
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_VMACACHE
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vma->vm_mm != mm))
break;
#endif
if (vma->vm_start <= addr && vma->vm_end > addr) {
count_vm_vmacache_event(VMACACHE_FIND_HITS);
return vma;
}
}
if (++idx == VMACACHE_SIZE)
idx = 0;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: get rid of vmacache_flush_all() entirely
Jann Horn points out that the vmacache_flush_all() function is not only
potentially expensive, it's buggy too. It also happens to be entirely
unnecessary, because the sequence number overflow case can be avoided by
simply making the sequence number be 64-bit. That doesn't even grow the
data structures in question, because the other adjacent fields are
already 64-bit.
So simplify the whole thing by just making the sequence number overflow
case go away entirely, which gets rid of all the complications and makes
the code faster too. Win-win.
[ Oleg Nesterov points out that the VMACACHE_FULL_FLUSHES statistics
also just goes away entirely with this ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 77,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bin_main(RCore *r, int mode, int va) {
RBinAddr *binmain = r_bin_get_sym (r->bin, R_BIN_SYM_MAIN);
ut64 addr;
if (!binmain) {
return false;
}
addr = va ? r_bin_a2b (r->bin, binmain->vaddr) : binmain->paddr;
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, "symbols");
r_flag_set (r->flags, "main", addr, r->blocksize);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("%"PFMT64d, addr);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
r_cons_printf ("f main @ 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", addr);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{\"vaddr\":%" PFMT64d
",\"paddr\":%" PFMT64d "}", addr, binmain->paddr);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("[Main]\n");
r_cons_printf ("vaddr=0x%08"PFMT64x" paddr=0x%08"PFMT64x"\n",
addr, binmain->paddr);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void register_fair_sched_group(struct task_group *tg, int cpu)
{
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int hiddev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct hiddev_list *list = file->private_data;
poll_wait(file, &list->hiddev->wait, wait);
if (list->head != list->tail)
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (!list->hiddev->exist)
return POLLERR | POLLHUP;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AttachUnboundGPU(ScreenPtr pScreen, ScreenPtr new)
{
assert(new->isGPU);
assert(!new->current_master);
xorg_list_add(&new->unattached_head, &pScreen->unattached_list);
new->current_master = pScreen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void lodepng_decompress_settings_init(LodePNGDecompressSettings* settings)
{
settings->ignore_adler32 = 0;
settings->custom_zlib = 0;
settings->custom_inflate = 0;
settings->custom_context = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, uint32_t flags,
unsigned index, unsigned start, unsigned count,
void *data)
{
int (*func)(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, unsigned index,
unsigned start, unsigned count, uint32_t flags,
void *data) = NULL;
switch (index) {
case VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX:
switch (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK) {
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_MASK:
func = vfio_pci_set_intx_mask;
break;
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_UNMASK:
func = vfio_pci_set_intx_unmask;
break;
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TRIGGER:
func = vfio_pci_set_intx_trigger;
break;
}
break;
case VFIO_PCI_MSI_IRQ_INDEX:
case VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX:
switch (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK) {
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_MASK:
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_UNMASK:
/* XXX Need masking support exported */
break;
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TRIGGER:
func = vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger;
break;
}
break;
case VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX:
switch (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK) {
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TRIGGER:
if (pci_is_pcie(vdev->pdev))
func = vfio_pci_set_err_trigger;
break;
}
break;
case VFIO_PCI_REQ_IRQ_INDEX:
switch (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK) {
case VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TRIGGER:
func = vfio_pci_set_req_trigger;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!func)
return -ENOTTY;
return func(vdev, index, start, count, flags, data);
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 48,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rpc_free_client(struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
{
dprintk("RPC: destroying %s client for %s\n",
clnt->cl_protname, clnt->cl_server);
if (!IS_ERR(clnt->cl_path.dentry)) {
rpc_remove_client_dir(clnt->cl_path.dentry);
rpc_put_mount();
}
if (clnt->cl_parent != clnt) {
rpc_release_client(clnt->cl_parent);
goto out_free;
}
if (clnt->cl_server != clnt->cl_inline_name)
kfree(clnt->cl_server);
out_free:
rpc_unregister_client(clnt);
rpc_free_iostats(clnt->cl_metrics);
kfree(clnt->cl_principal);
clnt->cl_metrics = NULL;
xprt_put(clnt->cl_xprt);
rpciod_down();
kfree(clnt);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string NameForChoice(const Experiment& e, int index) {
DCHECK_EQ(Experiment::MULTI_VALUE, e.type);
DCHECK_LT(index, e.num_choices);
return std::string(e.internal_name) + about_flags::testing::kMultiSeparator +
base::IntToString(index);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u64 virt_ticks(struct task_struct *p)
{
u64 utime, stime;
task_cputime(p, &utime, &stime);
return utime;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void user_space_stream_notifier_dtor(php_stream_notifier *notifier)
{
if (notifier && notifier->ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor((zval **)&(notifier->ptr));
notifier->ptr = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iw_random_dither(struct iw_context *ctx, double fraction, int x, int y,
int dithersubtype, int channel)
{
double threshold;
threshold = ((double)iwpvt_prng_rand(ctx->prng)) / (double)0xffffffff;
if(fraction>=threshold) return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: instance_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
if (!strvec)
return;
if (!reload) {
if (!global_data->instance_name) {
global_data->instance_name = set_value(strvec);
use_pid_dir = true;
}
else
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Duplicate instance definition %s - ignoring", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
}
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 75,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_marshal_header_test (void)
{
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_rtmp_packet_read(URLContext *h, RTMPPacket *p,
int chunk_size, RTMPPacket **prev_pkt, int *nb_prev_pkt)
{
uint8_t hdr;
if (ffurl_read(h, &hdr, 1) != 1)
return AVERROR(EIO);
return ff_rtmp_packet_read_internal(h, p, chunk_size, prev_pkt,
nb_prev_pkt, hdr);
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 63,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Cleanup(Vdbe *p){
sqlite3 *db = p->db;
#ifdef SQLITE_DEBUG
/* Execute assert() statements to ensure that the Vdbe.apCsr[] and
** Vdbe.aMem[] arrays have already been cleaned up. */
int i;
if( p->apCsr ) for(i=0; i<p->nCursor; i++) assert( p->apCsr[i]==0 );
if( p->aMem ){
for(i=0; i<p->nMem; i++) assert( p->aMem[i].flags==MEM_Undefined );
}
#endif
sqlite3DbFree(db, p->zErrMsg);
p->zErrMsg = 0;
p->pResultSet = 0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: load_face_in_embedded_rfork( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface,
const FT_Open_Args *args )
{
#undef FT_COMPONENT
#define FT_COMPONENT trace_raccess
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Unknown_File_Format;
int i;
char * file_names[FT_RACCESS_N_RULES];
FT_Long offsets[FT_RACCESS_N_RULES];
FT_Error errors[FT_RACCESS_N_RULES];
FT_Open_Args args2;
FT_Stream stream2 = 0;
FT_Raccess_Guess( library, stream,
args->pathname, file_names, offsets, errors );
for ( i = 0; i < FT_RACCESS_N_RULES; i++ )
{
if ( errors[i] )
{
FT_TRACE3(( "Error[%d] has occurred in rule %d\n", errors[i], i ));
continue;
}
args2.flags = FT_OPEN_PATHNAME;
args2.pathname = file_names[i] ? file_names[i] : args->pathname;
FT_TRACE3(( "Try rule %d: %s (offset=%d) ...",
i, args2.pathname, offsets[i] ));
error = FT_Stream_New( library, &args2, &stream2 );
if ( error )
{
FT_TRACE3(( "failed\n" ));
continue;
}
error = IsMacResource( library, stream2, offsets[i],
face_index, aface );
FT_Stream_Free( stream2, 0 );
FT_TRACE3(( "%s\n", error ? "failed": "successful" ));
if ( !error )
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < FT_RACCESS_N_RULES; i++)
{
if ( file_names[i] )
FT_FREE( file_names[i] );
}
/* Caller (load_mac_face) requires FT_Err_Unknown_File_Format. */
if ( error )
error = FT_Err_Unknown_File_Format;
return error;
#undef FT_COMPONENT
#define FT_COMPONENT trace_objs
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_reqs_available(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned nr)
{
struct kioctx_cpu *kcpu;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
kcpu = this_cpu_ptr(ctx->cpu);
kcpu->reqs_available += nr;
while (kcpu->reqs_available >= ctx->req_batch * 2) {
kcpu->reqs_available -= ctx->req_batch;
atomic_add(ctx->req_batch, &ctx->reqs_available);
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 72,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResourceDispatcherHostImpl()
: download_file_manager_(new DownloadFileManager(NULL)),
save_file_manager_(new SaveFileManager()),
request_id_(-1),
is_shutdown_(false),
max_outstanding_requests_cost_per_process_(
kMaxOutstandingRequestsCostPerProcess),
filter_(NULL),
delegate_(NULL),
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_(false) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!g_resource_dispatcher_host);
g_resource_dispatcher_host = this;
GetContentClient()->browser()->ResourceDispatcherHostCreated();
ANNOTATE_BENIGN_RACE(
&last_user_gesture_time_,
"We don't care about the precise value, see http://crbug.com/92889");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&appcache::AppCacheInterceptor::EnsureRegistered));
update_load_states_timer_.reset(
new base::RepeatingTimer<ResourceDispatcherHostImpl>());
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_gpu_invalidate_display(void *opaque)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 6,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iov_fault_in_pages_read(struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len)
{
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
while (len > 0) {
unsigned long this_len;
this_len = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
fault_in_pages_readable(iov->iov_base, this_len);
len -= this_len;
iov++;
}
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 166,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionSettingsHandler::~ExtensionSettingsHandler() {
if (load_extension_dialog_.get())
load_extension_dialog_->ListenerDestroyed();
registrar_.RemoveAll();
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl* RenderFrameImpl::FromRoutingID(int routing_id) {
DCHECK(RenderThread::IsMainThread());
auto iter = g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().find(routing_id);
if (iter != g_routing_id_frame_map.Get().end())
return iter->second;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteCommand(const WebString& name) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
if (name.length() <= 2)
return false;
String command = name;
command.replace(0, 1, command.Substring(0, 1).UpperASCII());
if (command[command.length() - 1] == UChar(':'))
command = command.Substring(0, command.length() - 1);
Node* plugin_lookup_context_node = nullptr;
if (WebPluginContainerImpl::SupportsCommand(name))
plugin_lookup_context_node = ContextMenuNodeInner();
std::unique_ptr<UserGestureIndicator> gesture_indicator =
Frame::NotifyUserActivation(GetFrame(), UserGestureToken::kNewGesture);
WebPluginContainerImpl* plugin_container =
GetFrame()->GetWebPluginContainer(plugin_lookup_context_node);
if (plugin_container && plugin_container->ExecuteEditCommand(name))
return true;
return GetFrame()->GetEditor().ExecuteCommand(command);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init des_generic_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_algs(des_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(des_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowHtmlDialog(HtmlDialogUIDelegate* delegate,
gfx::NativeWindow parent_window) {
window_->ShowHTMLDialog(delegate, parent_window);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _etc_hosts_lookup(const char *cszName, char *szIP, const int ciMaxIPLen) {
#define EHL_LINE_LEN 260
int iSuccess = 0;
size_t iLen;
char szLine[EHL_LINE_LEN + 1]; /* one extra for the space character (*) */
char *pcStart, *pcEnd;
FILE *fHosts;
do {
/* initialization */
fHosts = NULL;
/* sanity checks */
if ((cszName == NULL) || (szIP == NULL) || (ciMaxIPLen <= 0))
break;
szIP[0] = 0;
/* open the hosts file */
#ifdef _WIN32
pcStart = getenv("WINDIR");
if (pcStart != NULL) {
sprintf(szLine, "%s\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts", pcStart);
} else {
strcpy(szLine, "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts");
}
#else
strcpy(szLine, "/etc/hosts");
#endif
fHosts = fopen(szLine, "r");
if (fHosts == NULL)
break;
/* read line by line ... */
while (fgets(szLine, EHL_LINE_LEN, fHosts) != NULL) {
/* remove comments */
pcStart = strchr (szLine, '#');
if (pcStart != NULL)
*pcStart = 0;
strcat(szLine, " "); /* append a space character for easier parsing (*) */
/* first to appear: IP address */
iLen = strspn(szLine, "1234567890.");
if ((iLen < 7) || (iLen > 15)) /* superficial test for anything between x.x.x.x and xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx */
continue;
pcEnd = szLine + iLen;
*pcEnd = 0;
pcEnd++; /* not beyond the end of the line yet (*) */
/* check strings separated by blanks, tabs or newlines */
pcStart = pcEnd + strspn(pcEnd, " \t\n");
while (*pcStart != 0) {
pcEnd = pcStart + strcspn(pcStart, " \t\n");
*pcEnd = 0;
pcEnd++; /* not beyond the end of the line yet (*) */
if (strcasecmp(pcStart, cszName) == 0) {
strncpy(szIP, szLine, ciMaxIPLen - 1);
szIP[ciMaxIPLen - 1] = '\0';
iSuccess = 1;
break;
}
pcStart = pcEnd + strspn(pcEnd, " \t\n");
}
if (iSuccess)
break;
}
} while (0);
if (fHosts != NULL)
fclose(fHosts);
return (iSuccess);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit wp512_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shashes(wp_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(wp_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct nfs4_client *alloc_client(struct xdr_netobj name)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp;
int i;
clp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs4_client), GFP_KERNEL);
if (clp == NULL)
return NULL;
clp->cl_name.data = kmemdup(name.data, name.len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (clp->cl_name.data == NULL)
goto err_no_name;
clp->cl_ownerstr_hashtbl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) *
OWNER_HASH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!clp->cl_ownerstr_hashtbl)
goto err_no_hashtbl;
for (i = 0; i < OWNER_HASH_SIZE; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_ownerstr_hashtbl[i]);
clp->cl_name.len = name.len;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_sessions);
idr_init(&clp->cl_stateids);
atomic_set(&clp->cl_refcount, 0);
clp->cl_cb_state = NFSD4_CB_UNKNOWN;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_idhash);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_openowners);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_delegations);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_lru);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_revoked);
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_PNFS
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clp->cl_lo_states);
#endif
spin_lock_init(&clp->cl_lock);
rpc_init_wait_queue(&clp->cl_cb_waitq, "Backchannel slot table");
return clp;
err_no_hashtbl:
kfree(clp->cl_name.data);
err_no_name:
kfree(clp);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXObject* AXNodeObject::menuButtonForMenu() const {
Element* menuItem = menuItemElementForMenu();
if (menuItem) {
AXObject* menuItemAX = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(menuItem);
if (menuItemAX && menuItemAX->isMenuButton())
return menuItemAX;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FlateStream::lookChar() {
int c;
if (pred) {
return pred->lookChar();
}
while (remain == 0) {
if (endOfBlock && eof)
return EOF;
readSome();
}
c = buf[index];
return c;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _snd_pcm_hw_param_first(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
snd_pcm_hw_param_t var)
{
int changed;
if (hw_is_mask(var))
changed = snd_mask_refine_first(hw_param_mask(params, var));
else if (hw_is_interval(var))
changed = snd_interval_refine_first(hw_param_interval(params, var));
else
return -EINVAL;
if (changed) {
params->cmask |= 1 << var;
params->rmask |= 1 << var;
}
return changed;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 47,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetSchemesBypassingSecureContextCheckWhitelist(
std::set<std::string>* schemes) {
*schemes = secure_origin_whitelist::GetSchemesBypassingSecureContextCheck();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mk_vhost_fdt_worker_exit()
{
struct mk_list *head;
struct mk_list *tmp;
struct vhost_fdt_host *fdt;
if (config->fdt == MK_FALSE) {
return -1;
}
mk_list_foreach_safe(head, tmp, mk_vhost_fdt_key) {
fdt = mk_list_entry(head, struct vhost_fdt_host, _head);
mk_list_del(&fdt->_head);
mk_mem_free(fdt);
}
mk_mem_free(mk_vhost_fdt_key);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int o2nm_depend_this_node(void)
{
int ret = 0;
struct o2nm_node *local_node;
local_node = o2nm_get_node_by_num(o2nm_this_node());
if (!local_node) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = o2nm_depend_item(&local_node->nd_item);
o2nm_node_put(local_node);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int MACH0_(is_pie)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
return (bin && bin->hdr.filetype == MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.flags & MH_PIE);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rev_same_tree_as_empty(struct rev_info *revs, struct commit *commit)
{
int retval;
struct tree *t1 = commit->tree;
if (!t1)
return 0;
tree_difference = REV_TREE_SAME;
DIFF_OPT_CLR(&revs->pruning, HAS_CHANGES);
retval = diff_tree_sha1(NULL, t1->object.oid.hash, "", &revs->pruning);
return retval >= 0 && (tree_difference == REV_TREE_SAME);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __printf(2, 3) void bpf_verifier_log_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLTexSubImage2D(GLenum target, GLint level, GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, const void* pixels) {
glTexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type,
pixels);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 99,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_send_open(int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN);
packet_put_cstring(c->ctype);
packet_put_int(c->self);
packet_put_int(c->local_window);
packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket);
packet_send();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLTextAreaElement::setValueCommon(const String& newValue)
{
String normalizedValue = newValue.isNull() ? "" : newValue;
normalizedValue.replace("\r\n", "\n");
normalizedValue.replace('\r', '\n');
if (normalizedValue == value())
return;
m_value = normalizedValue;
setInnerTextValue(m_value);
setLastChangeWasNotUserEdit();
updatePlaceholderVisibility(false);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(true);
if (document().focusedElement() == this) {
unsigned endOfString = m_value.length();
setSelectionRange(endOfString, endOfString);
}
notifyFormStateChanged();
setTextAsOfLastFormControlChangeEvent(normalizedValue);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lseg_lt(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *l1 = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
LSEG *l2 = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPlt(point_dt(&l1->p[0], &l1->p[1]),
point_dt(&l2->p[0], &l2->p[1])));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const EditorInternalCommand* InternalCommand(
const String& command_name) {
static const EditorInternalCommand kEditorCommands[] = {
{WebEditingCommandType::kAlignJustified, ExecuteJustifyFull,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kAlignLeft, ExecuteJustifyLeft,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kAlignRight, ExecuteJustifyRight,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kBackColor, ExecuteBackColor, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueBackColor,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kBackwardDelete, ExecuteDeleteBackward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kBold, ExecuteToggleBold, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateBold, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kCopy, ExecuteCopy, Supported, EnabledCopy,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kCreateLink, ExecuteCreateLink, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kCut, ExecuteCut, Supported, EnabledCut,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDefaultParagraphSeparator,
ExecuteDefaultParagraphSeparator, Supported, Enabled, StateNone,
ValueDefaultParagraphSeparator, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDelete, ExecuteDelete, Supported, EnabledDelete,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteBackward, ExecuteDeleteBackward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteBackwardByDecomposingPreviousCharacter,
ExecuteDeleteBackwardByDecomposingPreviousCharacter,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteForward, ExecuteDeleteForward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteToBeginningOfLine,
ExecuteDeleteToBeginningOfLine, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteToBeginningOfParagraph,
ExecuteDeleteToBeginningOfParagraph, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteToEndOfLine, ExecuteDeleteToEndOfLine,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteToEndOfParagraph,
ExecuteDeleteToEndOfParagraph, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteToMark, ExecuteDeleteToMark,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteWordBackward, ExecuteDeleteWordBackward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kDeleteWordForward, ExecuteDeleteWordForward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kFindString, ExecuteFindString, Supported,
Enabled, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kFontName, ExecuteFontName, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueFontName, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kFontSize, ExecuteFontSize, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueFontSize, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kFontSizeDelta, ExecuteFontSizeDelta, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueFontSizeDelta,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kForeColor, ExecuteForeColor, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueForeColor,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kFormatBlock, ExecuteFormatBlock, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueFormatBlock,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kForwardDelete, ExecuteForwardDelete, Supported,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kHiliteColor, ExecuteBackColor, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kIgnoreSpelling, ExecuteIgnoreSpelling,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kIndent, ExecuteIndent, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertBacktab, ExecuteInsertBacktab,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kIsTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertHTML, ExecuteInsertHTML, Supported,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertHorizontalRule,
ExecuteInsertHorizontalRule, Supported, EnabledInRichlyEditableText,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertImage, ExecuteInsertImage, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertLineBreak, ExecuteInsertLineBreak,
Supported, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kIsTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertNewline, ExecuteInsertNewline,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kIsTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertNewlineInQuotedContent,
ExecuteInsertNewlineInQuotedContent, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertOrderedList, ExecuteInsertOrderedList,
Supported, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateOrderedList,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertParagraph, ExecuteInsertParagraph,
Supported, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertTab, ExecuteInsertTab,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kIsTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertText, ExecuteInsertText, Supported,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kIsTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kInsertUnorderedList, ExecuteInsertUnorderedList,
Supported, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateUnorderedList,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kItalic, ExecuteToggleItalic, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateItalic, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kJustifyCenter, ExecuteJustifyCenter, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateJustifyCenter, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kJustifyFull, ExecuteJustifyFull, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateJustifyFull, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kJustifyLeft, ExecuteJustifyLeft, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateJustifyLeft, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kJustifyNone, ExecuteJustifyLeft, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kJustifyRight, ExecuteJustifyRight, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateJustifyRight, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMakeTextWritingDirectionLeftToRight,
ExecuteMakeTextWritingDirectionLeftToRight,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText,
StateTextWritingDirectionLeftToRight, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMakeTextWritingDirectionNatural,
ExecuteMakeTextWritingDirectionNatural, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateTextWritingDirectionNatural,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMakeTextWritingDirectionRightToLeft,
ExecuteMakeTextWritingDirectionRightToLeft,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText,
StateTextWritingDirectionRightToLeft, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveBackward, ExecuteMoveBackward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveBackwardAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveBackwardAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveDown, ExecuteMoveDown,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveDownAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveDownAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveForward, ExecuteMoveForward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveForwardAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveForwardAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveLeft, ExecuteMoveLeft,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveLeftAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveLeftAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMovePageDown, ExecuteMovePageDown,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMovePageDownAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMovePageDownAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMovePageUp, ExecuteMovePageUp,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMovePageUpAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMovePageUpAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveParagraphBackward,
ExecuteMoveParagraphBackward, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveParagraphBackwardAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveParagraphBackwardAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveParagraphForward,
ExecuteMoveParagraphForward, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveParagraphForwardAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveParagraphForwardAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveRight, ExecuteMoveRight,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveRightAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveRightAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfDocument,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfDocument, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfDocumentAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfDocumentAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfLine,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfLine, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfLineAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfLineAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfParagraph,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfParagraph, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfParagraphAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfParagraphAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfSentence,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfSentence, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToBeginningOfSentenceAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToBeginningOfSentenceAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfDocument, ExecuteMoveToEndOfDocument,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfDocumentAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToEndOfDocumentAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfLine, ExecuteMoveToEndOfLine,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfLineAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToEndOfLineAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfParagraph,
ExecuteMoveToEndOfParagraph, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfParagraphAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToEndOfParagraphAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfSentence, ExecuteMoveToEndOfSentence,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToEndOfSentenceAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToEndOfSentenceAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToLeftEndOfLine, ExecuteMoveToLeftEndOfLine,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToLeftEndOfLineAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToLeftEndOfLineAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToRightEndOfLine,
ExecuteMoveToRightEndOfLine, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveToRightEndOfLineAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveToRightEndOfLineAndModifySelection,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveUp, ExecuteMoveUp,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveUpAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveUpAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordBackward, ExecuteMoveWordBackward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordBackwardAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveWordBackwardAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordForward, ExecuteMoveWordForward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordForwardAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveWordForwardAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordLeft, ExecuteMoveWordLeft,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordLeftAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveWordLeftAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordRight, ExecuteMoveWordRight,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kMoveWordRightAndModifySelection,
ExecuteMoveWordRightAndModifySelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kOutdent, ExecuteOutdent, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kOverWrite, ExecuteToggleOverwrite,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kPaste, ExecutePaste, Supported, EnabledPaste,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kPasteAndMatchStyle, ExecutePasteAndMatchStyle,
Supported, EnabledPaste, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kPasteGlobalSelection,
ExecutePasteGlobalSelection, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledPaste,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kPrint, ExecutePrint, Supported, Enabled,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kRedo, ExecuteRedo, Supported, EnabledRedo,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kRemoveFormat, ExecuteRemoveFormat, Supported,
EnabledRangeInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kScrollPageBackward, ExecuteScrollPageBackward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, Enabled, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kScrollPageForward, ExecuteScrollPageForward,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, Enabled, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kScrollLineUp, ExecuteScrollLineUp,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, Enabled, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kScrollLineDown, ExecuteScrollLineDown,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, Enabled, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kScrollToBeginningOfDocument,
ExecuteScrollToBeginningOfDocument, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
Enabled, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kScrollToEndOfDocument,
ExecuteScrollToEndOfDocument, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, Enabled,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSelectAll, ExecuteSelectAll, Supported,
EnabledSelectAll, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSelectLine, ExecuteSelectLine,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSelectParagraph, ExecuteSelectParagraph,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSelectSentence, ExecuteSelectSentence,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSelectToMark, ExecuteSelectToMark,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelectionAndMark, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSelectWord, ExecuteSelectWord,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSetMark, ExecuteSetMark,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelection, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kStrikethrough, ExecuteStrikethrough, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateStrikethrough, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kStyleWithCSS, ExecuteStyleWithCSS, Supported,
Enabled, StateStyleWithCSS, ValueEmpty, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSubscript, ExecuteSubscript, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateSubscript, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSuperscript, ExecuteSuperscript, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateSuperscript, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kSwapWithMark, ExecuteSwapWithMark,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledVisibleSelectionAndMark, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kToggleBold, ExecuteToggleBold,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateBold,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kToggleItalic, ExecuteToggleItalic,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateItalic,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kToggleUnderline, ExecuteUnderline,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText,
StateUnderline, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kTranspose, ExecuteTranspose, Supported,
EnableCaretInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kUnderline, ExecuteUnderline, Supported,
EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateUnderline, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kUndo, ExecuteUndo, Supported, EnabledUndo,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kUnlink, ExecuteUnlink, Supported,
EnabledRangeInRichlyEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull,
kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kUnscript, ExecuteUnscript,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kUnselect, ExecuteUnselect, Supported,
EnabledUnselect, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kUseCSS, ExecuteUseCSS, Supported, Enabled,
StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kYank, ExecuteYank, SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding,
EnabledInEditableText, StateNone, ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion,
kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kYankAndSelect, ExecuteYankAndSelect,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
{WebEditingCommandType::kAlignCenter, ExecuteJustifyCenter,
SupportedFromMenuOrKeyBinding, EnabledInRichlyEditableText, StateNone,
ValueStateOrNull, kNotTextInsertion, kDoNotAllowExecutionWhenDisabled},
};
static_assert(
arraysize(kEditorCommands) + 1 ==
static_cast<size_t>(WebEditingCommandType::kNumberOfCommandTypes),
"must handle all valid WebEditingCommandType");
WebEditingCommandType command_type =
WebEditingCommandTypeFromCommandName(command_name);
if (command_type == WebEditingCommandType::kInvalid)
return nullptr;
int command_index = static_cast<int>(command_type) - 1;
DCHECK(command_index >= 0 &&
command_index < static_cast<int>(arraysize(kEditorCommands)));
return &kEditorCommands[command_index];
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_huge_ptep_writable(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep)
{
pte_t entry;
entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(huge_ptep_get(ptep)));
if (huge_ptep_set_access_flags(vma, address, ptep, entry, 1))
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, ptep);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::runOpenPanel(Frame* frame, PassRefPtr<FileChooser> fileChooser)
{
WebViewClient* client = m_webView->client();
if (!client)
return;
WebFileChooserParams params;
params.multiSelect = fileChooser->settings().allowsMultipleFiles;
params.directory = fileChooser->settings().allowsDirectoryUpload;
params.acceptTypes = fileChooser->settings().acceptTypes();
params.selectedFiles = fileChooser->settings().selectedFiles;
if (params.selectedFiles.size() > 0)
params.initialValue = params.selectedFiles[0];
#if ENABLE(MEDIA_CAPTURE)
params.useMediaCapture = fileChooser->settings().useMediaCapture;
#endif
WebFileChooserCompletionImpl* chooserCompletion =
new WebFileChooserCompletionImpl(fileChooser);
if (client->runFileChooser(params, chooserCompletion))
return;
chooserCompletion->didChooseFile(WebVector<WebString>());
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _rpc_reconfig(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
uid_t req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred,
conf->auth_info);
if (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid))
error("Security violation, reconfig RPC from uid %d",
req_uid);
else
kill(conf->pid, SIGHUP);
forward_wait(msg);
/* Never return a message, slurmctld does not expect one */
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
/* see fuse_vma_close() for !writeback_cache case */
if (fc->writeback_cache)
write_inode_now(inode, 1);
fuse_release_common(file, FUSE_RELEASE);
/* return value is ignored by VFS */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLStyleElement::DispatchPendingEvent(
std::unique_ptr<IncrementLoadEventDelayCount> count) {
if (loaded_sheet_) {
if (GetDocument().HasListenerType(
Document::kLoadListenerAtCapturePhaseOrAtStyleElement))
DispatchEvent(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::load));
} else {
DispatchEvent(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::error));
}
count->ClearAndCheckLoadEvent();
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_count_objects(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc)
{
return pdf_xref_len(ctx, doc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vp7_update_dimensions(VP8Context *s, int width, int height)
{
return update_dimensions(s, width, height, IS_VP7);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void cast6_fpu_end(bool fpu_enabled)
{
glue_fpu_end(fpu_enabled);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static SQLITE_NOINLINE Vdbe *allocVdbe(Parse *pParse){
Vdbe *v = pParse->pVdbe = sqlite3VdbeCreate(pParse);
if( v ) sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Init, 0, 1);
if( pParse->pToplevel==0
&& OptimizationEnabled(pParse->db,SQLITE_FactorOutConst)
){
pParse->okConstFactor = 1;
}
return v;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_mmap_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct perf_event *event = vma->vm_file->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *rb;
int ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
if (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE) {
if (vmf->pgoff == 0)
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
rcu_read_lock();
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (!rb)
goto unlock;
if (vmf->pgoff && (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
goto unlock;
vmf->page = perf_mmap_to_page(rb, vmf->pgoff);
if (!vmf->page)
goto unlock;
get_page(vmf->page);
vmf->page->mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
vmf->page->index = vmf->pgoff;
ret = 0;
unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_key_prefix(struct inode *inode, u8 **key)
{
*key = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->key_prefix;
return EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->key_prefix_size;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Size WebContentsImpl::GetAutoResizeSize() {
return auto_resize_size_;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftAVC::setDecodeArgs(
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip,
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader,
size_t timeStampIx) {
size_t sizeY = outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight();
size_t sizeUV;
uint8_t *pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_ip_t);
ps_dec_op->u4_size = sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t);
ps_dec_ip->e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_DECODE;
/* When in flush and after EOS with zero byte input,
* inHeader is set to zero. Hence check for non-null */
if (inHeader) {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = timeStampIx;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer =
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = inHeader->nFilledLen;
} else {
ps_dec_ip->u4_ts = 0;
ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer = NULL;
ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes = 0;
}
if (outHeader) {
pBuf = outHeader->pBuffer;
} else {
pBuf = mFlushOutBuffer;
}
sizeUV = sizeY / 4;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[0] = sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[1] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[2] = sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0] = pBuf;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1] = pBuf + sizeY;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2] = pBuf + sizeY + sizeUV;
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs = 3;
return;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 174,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
Identity *id;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (version == 1) ?
SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER :
SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, tab->nentries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg,
BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
id->key->rsa->n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
} else {
u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(blob);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426
| 0
| 72,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __net_exit packet_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
remove_proc_entry("packet", net->proc_net);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Init() {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("RenderThreadImpl::Init", 0, "");
base::debug::TraceLog::GetInstance()->SetThreadSortIndex(
base::PlatformThread::CurrentId(),
kTraceEventRendererMainThreadSortIndex);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
blink::WebView::setUseExternalPopupMenus(true);
#endif
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(this);
ChildProcess::current()->set_main_thread(this);
suspend_webkit_shared_timer_ = true;
notify_webkit_of_modal_loop_ = true;
webkit_shared_timer_suspended_ = false;
widget_count_ = 0;
hidden_widget_count_ = 0;
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = kInitialIdleHandlerDelayMs;
idle_notifications_to_skip_ = 0;
layout_test_mode_ = false;
appcache_dispatcher_.reset(
new AppCacheDispatcher(Get(), new AppCacheFrontendImpl()));
dom_storage_dispatcher_.reset(new DomStorageDispatcher());
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset(new IndexedDBDispatcher(
thread_safe_sender()));
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset(new EmbeddedWorkerDispatcher());
media_stream_center_ = NULL;
db_message_filter_ = new DBMessageFilter();
AddFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
vc_manager_.reset(new VideoCaptureImplManager());
AddFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
peer_connection_tracker_.reset(new PeerConnectionTracker());
AddObserver(peer_connection_tracker_.get());
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ =
new P2PSocketDispatcher(GetIOMessageLoopProxy().get());
AddFilter(p2p_socket_dispatcher_.get());
webrtc_identity_service_.reset(new WebRTCIdentityService());
aec_dump_message_filter_ =
new AecDumpMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy(),
message_loop()->message_loop_proxy());
AddFilter(aec_dump_message_filter_.get());
peer_connection_factory_.reset(new PeerConnectionDependencyFactory(
p2p_socket_dispatcher_.get()));
#endif // defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
audio_input_message_filter_ =
new AudioInputMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy());
AddFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = new AudioMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy());
AddFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
midi_message_filter_ = new MidiMessageFilter(GetIOMessageLoopProxy());
AddFilter(midi_message_filter_.get());
AddFilter((new IndexedDBMessageFilter(thread_safe_sender()))->GetFilter());
AddFilter((new EmbeddedWorkerContextMessageFilter())->GetFilter());
GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderThreadStarted();
InitSkiaEventTracer();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking))
RegisterExtension(GpuBenchmarkingExtension::Get());
is_impl_side_painting_enabled_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableImplSidePainting);
WebLayerImpl::SetImplSidePaintingEnabled(is_impl_side_painting_enabled_);
is_zero_copy_enabled_ = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableZeroCopy) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableZeroCopy);
is_one_copy_enabled_ = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableOneCopy);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableLCDText)) {
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = false;
} else if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLCDText)) {
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = true;
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = false;
#else
is_lcd_text_enabled_ = true;
#endif
}
is_gpu_rasterization_enabled_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableGpuRasterization);
is_gpu_rasterization_forced_ =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceGpuRasterization);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDistanceFieldText)) {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = false;
} else if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDistanceFieldText)) {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = true;
} else {
is_distance_field_text_enabled_ = false;
}
is_low_res_tiling_enabled_ = true;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableLowResTiling) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableLowResTiling)) {
is_low_res_tiling_enabled_ = false;
}
base::FilePath media_path;
PathService::Get(DIR_MEDIA_LIBS, &media_path);
if (!media_path.empty())
media::InitializeMediaLibrary(media_path);
memory_pressure_listener_.reset(new base::MemoryPressureListener(
base::Bind(&RenderThreadImpl::OnMemoryPressure, base::Unretained(this))));
std::vector<base::DiscardableMemoryType> supported_types;
base::DiscardableMemory::GetSupportedTypes(&supported_types);
DCHECK(!supported_types.empty());
base::DiscardableMemoryType type = supported_types[0];
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kUseDiscardableMemory)) {
std::string requested_type_name = command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kUseDiscardableMemory);
base::DiscardableMemoryType requested_type =
base::DiscardableMemory::GetNamedType(requested_type_name);
if (std::find(supported_types.begin(),
supported_types.end(),
requested_type) != supported_types.end()) {
type = requested_type;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Requested discardable memory type is not supported.";
}
}
base::DiscardableMemory::SetPreferredType(type);
base::DiscardableMemory::RegisterMemoryPressureListeners();
allocate_gpu_memory_buffer_thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNumRasterThreads)) {
int num_raster_threads;
std::string string_value =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kNumRasterThreads);
if (base::StringToInt(string_value, &num_raster_threads) &&
num_raster_threads >= kMinRasterThreads &&
num_raster_threads <= kMaxRasterThreads) {
cc::RasterWorkerPool::SetNumRasterThreads(num_raster_threads);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to parse switch " <<
switches::kNumRasterThreads << ": " << string_value;
}
}
service_registry()->AddService<RenderFrameSetup>(
base::Bind(CreateRenderFrameSetup));
TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("RenderThreadImpl::Init", 0, "");
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: aura::Window* CreatePanelWindow() {
gfx::Rect rect(100, 100);
aura::Window* window = CreateTestWindowInShellWithDelegateAndType(
NULL, aura::client::WINDOW_TYPE_PANEL, 0, rect);
shelf_view_test_->RunMessageLoopUntilAnimationsDone();
return window;
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: start_monitoring_file_list (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
DirectoryLoadState *state;
if (!directory->details->file_list_monitored)
{
g_assert (!directory->details->directory_load_in_progress);
directory->details->file_list_monitored = TRUE;
nautilus_file_list_ref (directory->details->file_list);
}
if (directory->details->directory_loaded ||
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress != NULL)
{
return;
}
if (!async_job_start (directory, "file list"))
{
return;
}
mark_all_files_unconfirmed (directory);
state = g_new0 (DirectoryLoadState, 1);
state->directory = directory;
state->cancellable = g_cancellable_new ();
state->load_mime_list_hash = istr_set_new ();
state->load_file_count = 0;
g_assert (directory->details->location != NULL);
state->load_directory_file =
nautilus_directory_get_corresponding_file (directory);
state->load_directory_file->details->loading_directory = TRUE;
#ifdef DEBUG_LOAD_DIRECTORY
g_message ("load_directory called to monitor file list of %p", directory->details->location);
#endif
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress = state;
g_file_enumerate_children_async (directory->details->location,
NAUTILUS_FILE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTES,
0, /* flags */
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, /* prio */
state->cancellable,
enumerate_children_callback,
state);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CheckAuthenticationBrokenState(TabContents* tab,
int error,
bool ran_insecure_content,
bool interstitial) {
NavigationEntry* entry = tab->controller().GetActiveEntry();
ASSERT_TRUE(entry);
EXPECT_EQ(interstitial ? INTERSTITIAL_PAGE : NORMAL_PAGE,
entry->page_type());
EXPECT_EQ(SECURITY_STYLE_AUTHENTICATION_BROKEN,
entry->ssl().security_style());
ASSERT_NE(net::CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION, error);
EXPECT_EQ(error, entry->ssl().cert_status() & net::CERT_STATUS_ALL_ERRORS);
EXPECT_FALSE(entry->ssl().displayed_insecure_content());
EXPECT_EQ(ran_insecure_content, entry->ssl().ran_insecure_content());
}
Commit Message: Disable SSLUITest.TestCNInvalidStickiness, flakily hits an assertion.
TBR=rsleevi
BUG=68448, 49377
TEST=browser_tests
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6178005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70876 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 97,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ValidityMessage::ValidityMessage(const base::string16& text, bool sure)
: text(text), sure(sure) {}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 109,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::DidFailToInitializeLayerTreeFrameSink() {
layer_tree_frame_sink_request_pending_ = false;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&CompositorImpl::RequestNewLayerTreeFrameSink,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void skb_add_rx_frag(struct sk_buff *skb, int i, struct page *page, int off,
int size, unsigned int truesize)
{
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, off, size);
skb->len += size;
skb->data_len += size;
skb->truesize += truesize;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::CanDrop(const OSExchangeData& data) {
int formats;
std::set<ui::Clipboard::FormatType> format_types;
GetDropFormats(&formats, &format_types);
return enabled() && !read_only() && data.HasAnyFormat(formats, format_types);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iter_get_sequence (DBusMessageDataIter *iter)
{
_dbus_assert (iter->sequence_nos[iter->depth] >= 0);
return iter->sequence_nos[iter->depth];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::submitFromJavaScript() {
submit(nullptr, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 142,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::HasMoreIdleWork() {
return !pending_readpixel_fences_.empty() ||
async_pixel_transfer_manager_->NeedsProcessMorePendingTransfers();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount,
int fd, off_t ph_off, int ph_num, off_t fsize)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size %#lx",
CAST(unsigned long, namesz));
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size %#lx",
CAST(unsigned long, descsz));
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return offset;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return offset;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return offset;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return offset;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_AUXV) == 0) {
if (do_auxv_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz,
fd, ph_off, ph_num, fsize))
return offset;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp(CAST(char *, &nbuf[noff]), "NetBSD") == 0) {
int descw, flag;
const char *str, *tag;
if (descsz > 100)
descsz = 100;
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return offset;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
flag = FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH;
tag = "compiled for";
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
flag = FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL;
tag = "compiler model";
break;
case NT_NETBSD_EMULATION:
flag = FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_EMULATION;
tag = "emulation:";
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return offset;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return offset;
return offset;
}
if (*flags & flag)
return offset;
str = CAST(const char *, &nbuf[doff]);
descw = CAST(int, descsz);
*flags |= flag;
file_printf(ms, ", %s: %.*s", tag, descw, str);
return offset;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: Avoid reading past the end of buffer (Rui Reis)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Verify_FindMainResponseWithMultipleHits5() {
EXPECT_EQ(kFallbackTestUrl, delegate()->found_url_);
EXPECT_EQ(kManifestUrl2, delegate()->found_manifest_url_);
EXPECT_EQ(2, delegate()->found_cache_id_);
EXPECT_EQ(2, delegate()->found_group_id_);
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->found_entry_.has_response_id());
EXPECT_EQ(2 + kFallbackEntryIdOffset,
delegate()->found_fallback_entry_.response_id());
EXPECT_TRUE(delegate()->found_fallback_entry_.IsFallback());
EXPECT_EQ(kEntryUrl2, delegate()->found_namespace_entry_url_);
TestFinished();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tracing_buffers_splice_read(struct file *file, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ftrace_buffer_info *info = file->private_data;
struct trace_iterator *iter = &info->iter;
struct partial_page partial_def[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct page *pages_def[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages_def,
.partial = partial_def,
.nr_pages_max = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS,
.ops = &buffer_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = buffer_spd_release,
};
struct buffer_ref *ref;
int entries, i;
ssize_t ret = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
if (iter->snapshot && iter->tr->current_trace->use_max_tr)
return -EBUSY;
#endif
if (*ppos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (len & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) {
if (len < PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
len &= PAGE_MASK;
}
if (splice_grow_spd(pipe, &spd))
return -ENOMEM;
again:
trace_access_lock(iter->cpu_file);
entries = ring_buffer_entries_cpu(iter->trace_buffer->buffer, iter->cpu_file);
for (i = 0; i < spd.nr_pages_max && len && entries; i++, len -= PAGE_SIZE) {
struct page *page;
int r;
ref = kzalloc(sizeof(*ref), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ref) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
ref->ref = 1;
ref->buffer = iter->trace_buffer->buffer;
ref->page = ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(ref->buffer, iter->cpu_file);
if (IS_ERR(ref->page)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ref->page);
ref->page = NULL;
kfree(ref);
break;
}
ref->cpu = iter->cpu_file;
r = ring_buffer_read_page(ref->buffer, &ref->page,
len, iter->cpu_file, 1);
if (r < 0) {
ring_buffer_free_read_page(ref->buffer, ref->cpu,
ref->page);
kfree(ref);
break;
}
page = virt_to_page(ref->page);
spd.pages[i] = page;
spd.partial[i].len = PAGE_SIZE;
spd.partial[i].offset = 0;
spd.partial[i].private = (unsigned long)ref;
spd.nr_pages++;
*ppos += PAGE_SIZE;
entries = ring_buffer_entries_cpu(iter->trace_buffer->buffer, iter->cpu_file);
}
trace_access_unlock(iter->cpu_file);
spd.nr_pages = i;
/* did we read anything? */
if (!spd.nr_pages) {
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = -EAGAIN;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) || (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
goto out;
ret = wait_on_pipe(iter, true);
if (ret)
goto out;
goto again;
}
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
out:
splice_shrink_spd(&spd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _asn1_delete_list (void)
{
list_type *listElement;
while (firstElement)
{
listElement = firstElement;
firstElement = firstElement->next;
free (listElement);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rpc_async_schedule(struct work_struct *work)
{
__rpc_execute(container_of(work, struct rpc_task, u.tk_work));
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MessageRouter* ChildThread::GetRouter() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current() == message_loop());
return &router_;
}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::ExitFullscreenMode(bool will_cause_resize) {
RenderWidgetHostView* const widget_view = GetFullscreenRenderWidgetHostView();
if (widget_view) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(widget_view->GetRenderWidgetHost())
->ShutdownAndDestroyWidget(true);
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
ContentVideoView* video_view = ContentVideoView::GetInstance();
if (video_view != NULL)
video_view->ExitFullscreen();
#endif
if (delegate_)
delegate_->ExitFullscreenModeForTab(this);
if (!will_cause_resize) {
if (RenderWidgetHostView* rwhv = GetRenderWidgetHostView()) {
if (RenderWidgetHost* render_widget_host = rwhv->GetRenderWidgetHost())
render_widget_host->WasResized();
}
}
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
observer.DidToggleFullscreenModeForTab(IsFullscreenForCurrentTab(),
will_cause_resize);
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,689
|
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