instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: errors_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
unsigned int n;
int rv;
rv = kstrtouint(buf, 10, &n);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
atomic_set(&rdev->corrected_errors, n);
return len;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_futex_key_refs(union futex_key *key)
{
if (!key->both.ptr)
return;
/*
* On MMU less systems futexes are always "private" as there is no per
* process address space. We need the smp wmb nevertheless - yes,
* arch/blackfin has MMU less SMP ...
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU)) {
smp_mb(); /* explicit smp_mb(); (B) */
return;
}
switch (key->both.offset & (FUT_OFF_INODE|FUT_OFF_MMSHARED)) {
case FUT_OFF_INODE:
ihold(key->shared.inode); /* implies smp_mb(); (B) */
break;
case FUT_OFF_MMSHARED:
futex_get_mm(key); /* implies smp_mb(); (B) */
break;
default:
/*
* Private futexes do not hold reference on an inode or
* mm, therefore the only purpose of calling get_futex_key_refs
* is because we need the barrier for the lockless waiter check.
*/
smp_mb(); /* explicit smp_mb(); (B) */
}
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 84,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalFrame::MaybeAllowImagePlaceholder(FetchParameters& params) const {
if (GetSettings() && GetSettings()->GetFetchImagePlaceholders()) {
params.SetAllowImagePlaceholder();
return;
}
if (Client() &&
ShouldUseClientLoFiForRequest(params.GetResourceRequest(),
Client()->GetPreviewsStateForFrame())) {
params.MutableResourceRequest().SetPreviewsState(
params.GetResourceRequest().GetPreviewsState() |
WebURLRequest::kClientLoFiOn);
params.SetAllowImagePlaceholder();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SendWaitForAllTabsToStopLoadingJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading");
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void insert_stat_node(StatNodeRef parent, StatNodeRef ref)
{
SpiceStatNode *node = &reds->stat->nodes[ref];
uint32_t pos = INVALID_STAT_REF;
uint32_t node_index;
uint32_t *head;
SpiceStatNode *n;
node->first_child_index = INVALID_STAT_REF;
head = (parent == INVALID_STAT_REF ? &reds->stat->root_index :
&reds->stat->nodes[parent].first_child_index);
node_index = *head;
while (node_index != INVALID_STAT_REF && (n = &reds->stat->nodes[node_index]) &&
strcmp(node->name, n->name) > 0) {
pos = node_index;
node_index = n->next_sibling_index;
}
if (pos == INVALID_STAT_REF) {
node->next_sibling_index = *head;
*head = ref;
} else {
n = &reds->stat->nodes[pos];
node->next_sibling_index = n->next_sibling_index;
n->next_sibling_index = ref;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebView::reload()
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
WebFrameProxy* mainFrame = d->webPageProxy->mainFrame();
if (mainFrame && !mainFrame->unreachableURL().isEmpty() && mainFrame->url() != blankURL()) {
d->webPageProxy->loadURL(mainFrame->unreachableURL());
return;
}
const bool reloadFromOrigin = true;
d->webPageProxy->reload(reloadFromOrigin);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetCoreFrame(LocalFrame* frame) {
frame_ = frame;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bind_and_listen(struct addrinfo *addr)
{
int optval;
int fd;
int rc;
char buffer[256] = { 0, };
if (addr->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void*)addr->ai_addr;
inet_ntop(addr->ai_family, &addr_in->sin6_addr, buffer, DIMOF(buffer));
} else {
struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)(void*)addr->ai_addr;
inet_ntop(addr->ai_family, &addr_in->sin_addr, buffer, DIMOF(buffer));
}
crm_trace("Attempting to bind on address %s", buffer);
fd = socket(addr->ai_family, addr->ai_socktype, addr->ai_protocol);
if (fd < 0) {
return -1;
}
/* reuse address */
optval = 1;
rc = setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if (rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't allow the reuse of local addresses by our remote listener, bind address %s", buffer);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if (addr->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
optval = 0;
rc = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &optval, sizeof(optval));
if (rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_INFO, "Couldn't disable IPV6 only on address %s", buffer);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
}
if (bind(fd, addr->ai_addr, addr->ai_addrlen) != 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if (listen(fd, 10) == -1) {
crm_err("Can not start listen on address %s", buffer);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
crm_notice("Listening on address %s", buffer);
return fd;
}
Commit Message: Fix: remote: cl#5269 - Notify other clients of a new connection only if the handshake has completed (bsc#967388)
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 73,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CoordinatorImpl::ClientInfo::ClientInfo(
const service_manager::Identity& identity,
mojom::ClientProcessPtr client,
mojom::ProcessType process_type)
: identity(identity),
client(std::move(client)),
process_type(process_type) {}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 150,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uncurl_attach_tls(struct uncurl_conn *ucc)
{
ucc->ctx = ucc->tls;
ucc->read = tls_read;
ucc->write = tls_write;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 84,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void printNavigationErrorMessage(Frame* frame, const KURL& activeURL, const char* reason)
{
String message = "Unsafe JavaScript attempt to initiate navigation for frame with URL '" + frame->document()->url().string() + "' from frame with URL '" + activeURL.string() + "'. " + reason + "\n";
frame->document()->domWindow()->printErrorMessage(message);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *print_value( cJSON *item, int depth, int fmt )
{
char *out = 0;
if ( ! item )
return 0;
switch ( ( item->type ) & 255 ) {
case cJSON_NULL: out = cJSON_strdup( "null" ); break;
case cJSON_False: out = cJSON_strdup( "false" ); break;
case cJSON_True: out = cJSON_strdup( "true" ); break;
case cJSON_Number: out = print_number( item ); break;
case cJSON_String: out = print_string( item ); break;
case cJSON_Array: out = print_array( item, depth, fmt ); break;
case cJSON_Object: out = print_object( item, depth, fmt ); break;
}
return out;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::SetMemoryPolicy(size_t bytes_limit) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
bool became_zero = memory_policy_.bytes_limit_when_visible && !bytes_limit;
bool became_non_zero =
!memory_policy_.bytes_limit_when_visible && bytes_limit;
memory_policy_.bytes_limit_when_visible = bytes_limit;
memory_policy_.num_resources_limit = kNumResourcesLimit;
if (client_)
client_->SetMemoryPolicy(memory_policy_);
if (became_zero) {
context_provider()->ContextSupport()->SetAggressivelyFreeResources(
true /* aggressively_free_resources */);
} else if (became_non_zero) {
context_provider()->ContextSupport()->SetAggressivelyFreeResources(
false /* aggressively_free_resources */);
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteImageChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const MagickBooleanType separate)
{
int
i;
size_t
channels,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
/*
Write uncompressed pixels as separate planes.
*/
channels=1;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2*channels*
next_image->columns,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
i=0;
if (IsGrayImage(next_image,&next_image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GrayQuantum);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GrayQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,IndexQuantum);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
IndexQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(next_image,MagickFalse);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,RedQuantum);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GreenQuantum);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlueQuantum);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlackQuantum);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum);
}
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
RedQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,1,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GreenQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,2,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlueQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,3,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlackQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,4,6);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,(i++ == 0) || (separate != MagickFalse) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,5,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateImage(next_image,MagickFalse);
}
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_set_coalesce(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_coalesce *ec)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
u32 max_rxcoal_tick_int = 0, max_txcoal_tick_int = 0;
u32 max_stat_coal_ticks = 0, min_stat_coal_ticks = 0;
if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
max_rxcoal_tick_int = MAX_RXCOAL_TICK_INT;
max_txcoal_tick_int = MAX_TXCOAL_TICK_INT;
max_stat_coal_ticks = MAX_STAT_COAL_TICKS;
min_stat_coal_ticks = MIN_STAT_COAL_TICKS;
}
if ((ec->rx_coalesce_usecs > MAX_RXCOL_TICKS) ||
(ec->tx_coalesce_usecs > MAX_TXCOL_TICKS) ||
(ec->rx_max_coalesced_frames > MAX_RXMAX_FRAMES) ||
(ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames > MAX_TXMAX_FRAMES) ||
(ec->rx_coalesce_usecs_irq > max_rxcoal_tick_int) ||
(ec->tx_coalesce_usecs_irq > max_txcoal_tick_int) ||
(ec->rx_max_coalesced_frames_irq > MAX_RXCOAL_MAXF_INT) ||
(ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq > MAX_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT) ||
(ec->stats_block_coalesce_usecs > max_stat_coal_ticks) ||
(ec->stats_block_coalesce_usecs < min_stat_coal_ticks))
return -EINVAL;
/* No rx interrupts will be generated if both are zero */
if ((ec->rx_coalesce_usecs == 0) &&
(ec->rx_max_coalesced_frames == 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* No tx interrupts will be generated if both are zero */
if ((ec->tx_coalesce_usecs == 0) &&
(ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames == 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* Only copy relevant parameters, ignore all others. */
tp->coal.rx_coalesce_usecs = ec->rx_coalesce_usecs;
tp->coal.tx_coalesce_usecs = ec->tx_coalesce_usecs;
tp->coal.rx_max_coalesced_frames = ec->rx_max_coalesced_frames;
tp->coal.tx_max_coalesced_frames = ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames;
tp->coal.rx_coalesce_usecs_irq = ec->rx_coalesce_usecs_irq;
tp->coal.tx_coalesce_usecs_irq = ec->tx_coalesce_usecs_irq;
tp->coal.rx_max_coalesced_frames_irq = ec->rx_max_coalesced_frames_irq;
tp->coal.tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq = ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq;
tp->coal.stats_block_coalesce_usecs = ec->stats_block_coalesce_usecs;
if (netif_running(dev)) {
tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
__tg3_set_coalesce(tp, &tp->coal);
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::didReceiveServerRedirectForProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame) {
if (frame->parent())
return;
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->provisionalDataSource();
if (!data_source) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::vector<GURL> redirects;
GetRedirectChain(data_source, &redirects);
if (redirects.size() >= 2) {
bool has_opener_set = opener_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidRedirectProvisionalLoad(routing_id_, page_id_,
has_opener_set, redirects[redirects.size() - 2], redirects.back()));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Sys_SigHandler( int signal )
{
static qboolean signalcaught = qfalse;
if( signalcaught )
{
fprintf( stderr, "DOUBLE SIGNAL FAULT: Received signal %d, exiting...\n",
signal );
}
else
{
signalcaught = qtrue;
VM_Forced_Unload_Start();
#ifndef DEDICATED
CL_Shutdown(va("Received signal %d", signal), qtrue, qtrue);
#endif
SV_Shutdown(va("Received signal %d", signal) );
VM_Forced_Unload_Done();
}
if( signal == SIGTERM || signal == SIGINT )
Sys_Exit( 1 );
else
Sys_Exit( 2 );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImeObserver::OnDeactivated(const std::string& component_id) {
if (extension_id_.empty() ||
!HasListener(input_ime::OnDeactivated::kEventName))
return;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> args(
input_ime::OnDeactivated::Create(component_id));
DispatchEventToExtension(extensions::events::INPUT_IME_ON_DEACTIVATED,
input_ime::OnDeactivated::kEventName,
std::move(args));
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 144,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlData::Fail() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
std::vector<RedirectCB> redirect_callbacks;
redirect_callbacks.swap(redirect_callbacks_);
for (const RedirectCB& cb : redirect_callbacks) {
cb.Run(nullptr);
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetVertexAttribPointerv(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetVertexAttribPointerv& c) {
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
typedef gles2::GetVertexAttribPointerv::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.pointer_shm_id, c.pointer_shm_offset, Result::ComputeSize(1));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->size != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!validators_->vertex_pointer.IsValid(pname)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM,
"glGetVertexAttribPointerv: pname GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (index >= group_->max_vertex_attribs()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetVertexAttribPointerv: index out of range.");
return error::kNoError;
}
result->SetNumResults(1);
*result->GetData() =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index)->offset();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HeapCache::free_heap(const sp<IBinder>& binder) {
free_heap( wp<IBinder>(binder) );
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jas_icclut16_input(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, jas_stream_t *in,
int cnt)
{
int i;
int j;
int clutsize;
jas_icclut16_t *lut16 = &attrval->data.lut16;
lut16->clut = 0;
lut16->intabs = 0;
lut16->intabsbuf = 0;
lut16->outtabs = 0;
lut16->outtabsbuf = 0;
if (jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut16->numinchans) ||
jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut16->numoutchans) ||
jas_iccgetuint8(in, &lut16->clutlen) ||
jas_stream_getc(in) == EOF)
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
if (jas_iccgetsint32(in, &lut16->e[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
if (jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut16->numintabents) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut16->numouttabents))
goto error;
clutsize = jas_iccpowi(lut16->clutlen, lut16->numinchans) * lut16->numoutchans;
if (!(lut16->clut = jas_alloc2(clutsize, sizeof(jas_iccuint16_t))) ||
!(lut16->intabsbuf = jas_alloc3(lut16->numinchans,
lut16->numintabents, sizeof(jas_iccuint16_t))) ||
!(lut16->intabs = jas_alloc2(lut16->numinchans,
sizeof(jas_iccuint16_t *))))
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < lut16->numinchans; ++i)
lut16->intabs[i] = &lut16->intabsbuf[i * lut16->numintabents];
if (!(lut16->outtabsbuf = jas_alloc3(lut16->numoutchans,
lut16->numouttabents, sizeof(jas_iccuint16_t))) ||
!(lut16->outtabs = jas_alloc2(lut16->numoutchans,
sizeof(jas_iccuint16_t *))))
goto error;
for (i = 0; i < lut16->numoutchans; ++i)
lut16->outtabs[i] = &lut16->outtabsbuf[i * lut16->numouttabents];
for (i = 0; i < lut16->numinchans; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < JAS_CAST(int, lut16->numintabents); ++j) {
if (jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut16->intabs[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < lut16->numoutchans; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < JAS_CAST(int, lut16->numouttabents); ++j) {
if (jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut16->outtabs[i][j]))
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < clutsize; ++i) {
if (jas_iccgetuint16(in, &lut16->clut[i]))
goto error;
}
if (JAS_CAST(int, 44 + 2 * (lut16->numinchans * lut16->numintabents +
lut16->numoutchans * lut16->numouttabents +
jas_iccpowi(lut16->clutlen, lut16->numinchans) *
lut16->numoutchans)) != cnt)
goto error;
return 0;
error:
jas_icclut16_destroy(attrval);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void trif_dump(FILE * trace, char *data, u32 data_size)
{
GF_BitStream *bs;
u32 id, independent, filter_disabled;
Bool full_picture, has_dep, tile_group;
if (!data) {
fprintf(trace, "<TileRegionGroupEntry ID=\"\" tileGroup=\"\" independent=\"\" full_picture=\"\" filter_disabled=\"\" x=\"\" y=\"\" w=\"\" h=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<TileRegionDependency tileID=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</TileRegionGroupEntry>\n");
return;
}
bs = gf_bs_new(data, data_size, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
id = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
tile_group = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
fprintf(trace, "<TileRegionGroupEntry ID=\"%d\" tileGroup=\"%d\" ", id, tile_group);
if (tile_group) {
independent = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
full_picture = (Bool)gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
filter_disabled = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
has_dep = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
fprintf(trace, "independent=\"%d\" full_picture=\"%d\" filter_disabled=\"%d\" ", independent, full_picture, filter_disabled);
if (!full_picture) {
fprintf(trace, "x=\"%d\" y=\"%d\" ", gf_bs_read_u16(bs), gf_bs_read_u16(bs));
}
fprintf(trace, "w=\"%d\" h=\"%d\" ", gf_bs_read_u16(bs), gf_bs_read_u16(bs));
if (!has_dep) {
fprintf(trace, "/>\n");
} else {
u32 count = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
while (count) {
count--;
fprintf(trace, "<TileRegionDependency tileID=\"%d\"/>\n", gf_bs_read_u16(bs) );
}
fprintf(trace, "</TileRegionGroupEntry>\n");
}
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
{
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int virtnet_set_channels(struct net_device *dev,
struct ethtool_channels *channels)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
u16 queue_pairs = channels->combined_count;
int err;
/* We don't support separate rx/tx channels.
* We don't allow setting 'other' channels.
*/
if (channels->rx_count || channels->tx_count || channels->other_count)
return -EINVAL;
if (queue_pairs > vi->max_queue_pairs || queue_pairs == 0)
return -EINVAL;
get_online_cpus();
err = virtnet_set_queues(vi, queue_pairs);
if (!err) {
netif_set_real_num_tx_queues(dev, queue_pairs);
netif_set_real_num_rx_queues(dev, queue_pairs);
virtnet_set_affinity(vi);
}
put_online_cpus();
return err;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnDidDownloadImage(
ImageDownloadCallback callback,
int id,
const GURL& image_url,
int32_t http_status_code,
const std::vector<SkBitmap>& images,
const std::vector<gfx::Size>& original_image_sizes) {
std::move(callback).Run(id, http_status_code, image_url, images,
original_image_sizes);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *xmlrpc_normalizeBuffer(const char *buf)
{
char *newbuf;
int i, len, j = 0;
len = strlen(buf);
newbuf = (char *)smalloc(sizeof(char) * len + 1);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
switch (buf[i])
{
/* ctrl char */
case 1:
break;
/* Bold ctrl char */
case 2:
break;
/* Color ctrl char */
case 3:
/* If the next character is a digit, its also removed */
if (isdigit((unsigned char)buf[i + 1]))
{
i++;
/* not the best way to remove colors
* which are two digit but no worse then
* how the Unreal does with +S - TSL
*/
if (isdigit((unsigned char)buf[i + 1]))
{
i++;
}
/* Check for background color code
* and remove it as well
*/
if (buf[i + 1] == ',')
{
i++;
if (isdigit((unsigned char)buf[i + 1]))
{
i++;
}
/* not the best way to remove colors
* which are two digit but no worse then
* how the Unreal does with +S - TSL
*/
if (isdigit((unsigned char)buf[i + 1]))
{
i++;
}
}
}
break;
/* tabs char */
case 9:
break;
/* line feed char */
case 10:
break;
/* carrage returns char */
case 13:
break;
/* Reverse ctrl char */
case 22:
break;
/* Underline ctrl char */
case 31:
break;
/* A valid char gets copied into the new buffer */
default:
/* All valid <32 characters are handled above. */
if (buf[i] > 31)
{
newbuf[j] = buf[i];
j++;
}
}
}
/* Terminate the string */
newbuf[j] = 0;
return (newbuf);
}
Commit Message: Do not copy more bytes than were allocated
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: path_center(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
#ifdef NOT_USED
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
#endif
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("function \"path_center\" not implemented")));
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnSetKnownToValidate(const std::string& signature) {
NaClBrowser::GetInstance()->SetKnownToValidate(signature, off_the_record_);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::MeasureAsOverloadedMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_measureAsOverloadedMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::MeasureAsOverloadedMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mount_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->mount_state != NULL)
{
g_cancellable_cancel (directory->details->mount_state->cancellable);
directory->details->mount_state->directory = NULL;
directory->details->mount_state = NULL;
async_job_end (directory, "mount");
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void lzxd_reset_state(struct lzxd_stream *lzx) {
int i;
lzx->R0 = 1;
lzx->R1 = 1;
lzx->R2 = 1;
lzx->header_read = 0;
lzx->block_remaining = 0;
lzx->block_type = LZX_BLOCKTYPE_INVALID;
/* initialise tables to 0 (because deltas will be applied to them) */
for (i = 0; i < LZX_MAINTREE_MAXSYMBOLS; i++) lzx->MAINTREE_len[i] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < LZX_LENGTH_MAXSYMBOLS; i++) lzx->LENGTH_len[i] = 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent a 1-byte underread of the input buffer if an odd-sized data block comes just before an uncompressed block header
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void add_dct(MpegEncContext *s,
int16_t *block, int i, uint8_t *dest, int line_size)
{
if (s->block_last_index[i] >= 0) {
s->idsp.idct_add(dest, line_size, block);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 81,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionProcessBindings::HandleResponse(int request_id, bool success,
const std::string& response,
const std::string& error) {
PendingRequestMap& pending_requests = GetPendingRequestMap();
PendingRequestMap::iterator request = pending_requests.find(request_id);
if (request == pending_requests.end())
return; // The frame went away.
v8::HandleScope handle_scope;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> argv[5];
argv[0] = v8::Integer::New(request_id);
argv[1] = v8::String::New(request->second->name.c_str());
argv[2] = v8::Boolean::New(success);
argv[3] = v8::String::New(response.c_str());
argv[4] = v8::String::New(error.c_str());
v8::Handle<v8::Value> retval = bindings_utils::CallFunctionInContext(
request->second->context, "handleResponse", arraysize(argv), argv);
#ifndef NDEBUG
if (!retval.IsEmpty() && !retval->IsUndefined()) {
std::string error = *v8::String::AsciiValue(retval);
DCHECK(false) << error;
}
#endif
request->second->context.Dispose();
request->second->context.Clear();
pending_requests.erase(request);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BrowserRenderProcessHost::VisibleWidgetCount() const {
return visible_widgets_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SavePackage::OnReceivedSavableResourceLinksForCurrentPage(
const std::vector<GURL>& resources_list,
const std::vector<Referrer>& referrers_list,
const std::vector<GURL>& frames_list) {
if (wait_state_ != RESOURCES_LIST)
return;
DCHECK(resources_list.size() == referrers_list.size());
all_save_items_count_ = static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()) +
static_cast<int>(frames_list.size());
if (download_ && download_->IsInProgress())
download_->SetTotalBytes(all_save_items_count_);
if (all_save_items_count_) {
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(resources_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = resources_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveFileCreateInfo::SaveFileSource save_source = u.SchemeIsFile() ?
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_FILE :
SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_NET;
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(u, referrers_list[i],
this, save_source);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
for (int i = 0; i < static_cast<int>(frames_list.size()); ++i) {
const GURL& u = frames_list[i];
DCHECK(u.is_valid());
SaveItem* save_item = new SaveItem(
u, Referrer(), this, SaveFileCreateInfo::SAVE_FILE_FROM_DOM);
waiting_item_queue_.push(save_item);
}
wait_state_ = NET_FILES;
DoSavingProcess();
} else {
Cancel(true);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void callFinaliser(sqlite3 *db, int offset){
int i;
if( db->aVTrans ){
VTable **aVTrans = db->aVTrans;
db->aVTrans = 0;
for(i=0; i<db->nVTrans; i++){
VTable *pVTab = aVTrans[i];
sqlite3_vtab *p = pVTab->pVtab;
if( p ){
int (*x)(sqlite3_vtab *);
x = *(int (**)(sqlite3_vtab *))((char *)p->pModule + offset);
if( x ) x(p);
}
pVTab->iSavepoint = 0;
sqlite3VtabUnlock(pVTab);
}
sqlite3DbFree(db, aVTrans);
db->nVTrans = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendIO::OnDone(bool cancel) {
if (IsEntryOperation()) {
CACHE_UMA(TIMES, "TotalIOTime", 0, ElapsedTime());
}
if (!ReturnsEntry())
return;
if (result() == net::OK) {
static_cast<EntryImpl*>(*entry_ptr_)->OnEntryCreated(backend_);
if (cancel)
(*entry_ptr_)->Close();
}
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetActiveUniformHelper(GLuint program,
GLuint index,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* size,
GLenum* type,
char* name) {
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniform::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return false;
}
result->success = false;
helper_->GetActiveUniform(program, index, kResultBucketId, GetResultShmId(),
result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
bool success = !!result->success;
if (success) {
if (size) {
*size = result->size;
}
if (type) {
*type = result->type;
}
GetResultNameHelper(bufsize, length, name);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t cifs_user_writev(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos)
{
ssize_t written;
struct inode *inode;
inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
/*
* BB - optimize the way when signing is disabled. We can drop this
* extra memory-to-memory copying and use iovec buffers for constructing
* write request.
*/
written = cifs_iovec_write(iocb->ki_filp, iov, nr_segs, &pos);
if (written > 0) {
CIFS_I(inode)->invalid_mapping = true;
iocb->ki_pos = pos;
}
return written;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 40,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct tty_struct *tty_driver_lookup_tty(struct tty_driver *driver,
struct inode *inode, int idx)
{
struct tty_struct *tty;
if (driver->ops->lookup)
tty = driver->ops->lookup(driver, inode, idx);
else
tty = driver->ttys[idx];
if (!IS_ERR(tty))
tty_kref_get(tty);
return tty;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void amd_gpio_dbg_show(struct seq_file *s, struct gpio_chip *gc)
{
u32 pin_reg;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int bank, i, pin_num;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
char *level_trig;
char *active_level;
char *interrupt_enable;
char *interrupt_mask;
char *wake_cntrl0;
char *wake_cntrl1;
char *wake_cntrl2;
char *pin_sts;
char *pull_up_sel;
char *pull_up_enable;
char *pull_down_enable;
char *output_value;
char *output_enable;
for (bank = 0; bank < AMD_GPIO_TOTAL_BANKS; bank++) {
seq_printf(s, "GPIO bank%d\t", bank);
switch (bank) {
case 0:
i = 0;
pin_num = AMD_GPIO_PINS_BANK0;
break;
case 1:
i = 64;
pin_num = AMD_GPIO_PINS_BANK1 + i;
break;
case 2:
i = 128;
pin_num = AMD_GPIO_PINS_BANK2 + i;
break;
}
for (; i < pin_num; i++) {
seq_printf(s, "pin%d\t", i);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + i * 4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
if (pin_reg & BIT(INTERRUPT_ENABLE_OFF)) {
interrupt_enable = "interrupt is enabled|";
if (!(pin_reg & BIT(ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF))
&& !(pin_reg & BIT(ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF+1)))
active_level = "Active low|";
else if (pin_reg & BIT(ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF)
&& !(pin_reg & BIT(ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF+1)))
active_level = "Active high|";
else if (!(pin_reg & BIT(ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF))
&& pin_reg & BIT(ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF+1))
active_level = "Active on both|";
else
active_level = "Unknow Active level|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF))
level_trig = "Level trigger|";
else
level_trig = "Edge trigger|";
} else {
interrupt_enable =
"interrupt is disabled|";
active_level = " ";
level_trig = " ";
}
if (pin_reg & BIT(INTERRUPT_MASK_OFF))
interrupt_mask =
"interrupt is unmasked|";
else
interrupt_mask =
"interrupt is masked|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(WAKE_CNTRL_OFF))
wake_cntrl0 = "enable wakeup in S0i3 state|";
else
wake_cntrl0 = "disable wakeup in S0i3 state|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(WAKE_CNTRL_OFF))
wake_cntrl1 = "enable wakeup in S3 state|";
else
wake_cntrl1 = "disable wakeup in S3 state|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(WAKE_CNTRL_OFF))
wake_cntrl2 = "enable wakeup in S4/S5 state|";
else
wake_cntrl2 = "disable wakeup in S4/S5 state|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(PULL_UP_ENABLE_OFF)) {
pull_up_enable = "pull-up is enabled|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(PULL_UP_SEL_OFF))
pull_up_sel = "8k pull-up|";
else
pull_up_sel = "4k pull-up|";
} else {
pull_up_enable = "pull-up is disabled|";
pull_up_sel = " ";
}
if (pin_reg & BIT(PULL_DOWN_ENABLE_OFF))
pull_down_enable = "pull-down is enabled|";
else
pull_down_enable = "Pull-down is disabled|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(OUTPUT_ENABLE_OFF)) {
pin_sts = " ";
output_enable = "output is enabled|";
if (pin_reg & BIT(OUTPUT_VALUE_OFF))
output_value = "output is high|";
else
output_value = "output is low|";
} else {
output_enable = "output is disabled|";
output_value = " ";
if (pin_reg & BIT(PIN_STS_OFF))
pin_sts = "input is high|";
else
pin_sts = "input is low|";
}
seq_printf(s, "%s %s %s %s %s %s\n"
" %s %s %s %s %s %s %s 0x%x\n",
level_trig, active_level, interrupt_enable,
interrupt_mask, wake_cntrl0, wake_cntrl1,
wake_cntrl2, pin_sts, pull_up_sel,
pull_up_enable, pull_down_enable,
output_value, output_enable, pin_reg);
}
}
}
Commit Message: pinctrl: amd: Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pinctrl registration
Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pin control registration and clean
error path.
Signed-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 96,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
while (1) {
if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
break;
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
unsigned seq;
inode = parent->d_inode;
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&parent->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(&old->d_seq, nd->seq)))
return -ECHILD;
nd->path.dentry = parent;
nd->seq = seq;
if (unlikely(!path_connected(&nd->path)))
return -ENOENT;
break;
} else {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(nd->path.mnt);
struct mount *mparent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct dentry *mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
struct inode *inode2 = mountpoint->d_inode;
unsigned seq = read_seqcount_begin(&mountpoint->d_seq);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
break;
/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
inode = inode2;
nd->seq = seq;
}
}
while (unlikely(d_mountpoint(nd->path.dentry))) {
struct mount *mounted;
mounted = __lookup_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->path.dentry);
if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
return -ECHILD;
if (!mounted)
break;
nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&nd->path.dentry->d_seq);
}
nd->inode = inode;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 51,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::removeCompositingThreadOverlay(WebOverlay* overlay)
{
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
ASSERT(Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->isCurrentThread());
if (d->compositor())
d->compositor()->removeOverlay(overlay->d->layerCompositingThread());
overlay->d->clear();
overlay->d->setPage(0);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void change_paragraph_style(HTStructured * me, HTStyle *style)
{
if (me->new_style != style) {
me->style_change = YES;
me->new_style = style;
}
me->in_word = NO;
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::CheckMediaAccessPermission(
const url::Origin& security_origin,
MediaStreamType type) {
DCHECK(type == MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
type == MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE);
return delegate_ && delegate_->CheckMediaAccessPermission(
this, security_origin.GetURL(), type);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sched_getparam, pid_t, pid, struct sched_param __user *, param)
{
struct sched_param lp = { .sched_priority = 0 };
struct task_struct *p;
int retval;
if (!param || pid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
retval = -ESRCH;
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_task_getscheduler(p);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
if (task_has_rt_policy(p))
lp.sched_priority = p->rt_priority;
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* This one might sleep, we cannot do it with a spinlock held ...
*/
retval = copy_to_user(param, &lp, sizeof(*param)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
return retval;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::getAttachedShaders(WebGLProgram* program) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getAttachedShaders", program))
return nullptr;
HeapVector<Member<WebGLShader>> shader_objects;
const GLenum kShaderType[] = {GL_VERTEX_SHADER, GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER};
for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(kShaderType) / sizeof(GLenum); ++i) {
WebGLShader* shader = program->GetAttachedShader(kShaderType[i]);
if (shader)
shader_objects.push_back(shader);
}
return shader_objects;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::~SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface() {}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftGSM::onReset() {
gsm_destroy(mGsm);
mGsm = gsm_create();
int msopt = 1;
gsm_option(mGsm, GSM_OPT_WAV49, &msopt);
mSignalledError = false;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: omx_vdec::omx_cmd_queue::~omx_cmd_queue()
{
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Block::IsKey() const
{
return ((m_flags & static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7)) != 0);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int fb_show_logo(struct fb_info *info, int rotate)
{
int y;
y = fb_show_logo_line(info, rotate, fb_logo.logo, 0,
num_online_cpus());
y = fb_show_extra_logos(info, y, rotate);
return y;
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rwpng_free_chunks(struct rwpng_chunk *chunk) {
if (!chunk) return;
rwpng_free_chunks(chunk->next);
free(chunk->data);
free(chunk);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool isJavaClassName(const StringPiece16& str) {
size_t pieces = 0;
for (const StringPiece16& piece : tokenize(str, u'.')) {
pieces++;
if (piece.empty()) {
return false;
}
if (piece.data()[0] == u'$' || piece.data()[piece.size() - 1] == u'$') {
return false;
}
if (findNonAlphaNumericAndNotInSet(piece, u"$_") != piece.end()) {
return false;
}
}
return pieces >= 2;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Mapper() {}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PipelineStatistics WebMediaPlayerImpl::GetPipelineStatistics() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return pipeline_statistics_for_test_.value_or(
pipeline_controller_.GetStatistics());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unmerge_ksm_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
unsigned long addr;
int err = 0;
for (addr = start; addr < end && !err; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
if (ksm_test_exit(vma->vm_mm))
break;
if (signal_pending(current))
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
else
err = break_ksm(vma, addr);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetX11ErrorHandlers(XErrorHandler error_handler,
XIOErrorHandler io_error_handler) {
XSetErrorHandler(error_handler ? error_handler : DefaultX11ErrorHandler);
XSetIOErrorHandler(
io_error_handler ? io_error_handler : DefaultX11IOErrorHandler);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories() {
DCHECK(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
if (!has_committed_any_navigation_)
return;
DCHECK(!IsOutOfProcessNetworkService() ||
network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_.is_bound());
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo default_factory_info;
bool bypass_redirect_checks = false;
if (recreate_default_url_loader_factory_after_network_service_crash_) {
bypass_redirect_checks = CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryAndObserve(
last_committed_origin_, mojo::MakeRequest(&default_factory_info));
}
std::unique_ptr<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>
subresource_loader_factories =
std::make_unique<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>(
std::move(default_factory_info),
blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo::SchemeMap(),
CreateInitiatorSpecificURLLoaderFactories(
initiators_requiring_separate_url_loader_factory_),
bypass_redirect_checks);
GetNavigationControl()->UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories(
std::move(subresource_loader_factories));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DispatchSyncEventOnIO(scoped_refptr<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper> context,
scoped_refptr<BackgroundSyncContext> sync_context,
const GURL& origin,
int64_t registration_id,
const std::string& tag,
bool last_chance) {
context->FindReadyRegistrationForId(
registration_id, origin,
base::Bind(&DidFindRegistrationForDispatchSyncEventOnIO, sync_context,
tag, last_chance));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(
int child_id,
const storage::FileSystemURL& filesystem_url,
int permissions) {
if (!filesystem_url.is_valid())
return false;
if (filesystem_url.path().ReferencesParent())
return false;
if (storage::VirtualPath::IsRootPath(filesystem_url.path()) &&
(permissions & ~READ_FILE_GRANT)) {
return false;
}
if (filesystem_url.mount_type() == storage::kFileSystemTypeIsolated) {
return HasPermissionsForFileSystem(
child_id, filesystem_url.mount_filesystem_id(), permissions);
}
if (!CanCommitURL(child_id, filesystem_url.origin())) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("FileSystem.OriginFailedCanCommitURL", true);
return false;
}
int found_permissions = 0;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
FileSystemPermissionPolicyMap::iterator found =
file_system_policy_map_.find(filesystem_url.type());
if (found == file_system_policy_map_.end())
return false;
found_permissions = found->second;
}
if ((found_permissions & storage::FILE_PERMISSION_READ_ONLY) &&
permissions & ~READ_FILE_GRANT) {
return false;
}
if (found_permissions & storage::FILE_PERMISSION_USE_FILE_PERMISSION)
return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, filesystem_url.path(), permissions);
if (found_permissions & storage::FILE_PERMISSION_SANDBOX)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err minf_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MediaInformationBox *ptr = (GF_MediaInformationBox *)s;
if (!s) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->InfoHeader) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->InfoHeader, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->dataInformation) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->dataInformation, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->sampleTable) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->sampleTable, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dccp_print_ack_no(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct dccp_hdr *dh = (const struct dccp_hdr *)bp;
const u_char *ackp = bp + dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh);
uint64_t ackno;
if (DCCPH_X(dh) != 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*ackp, 8);
ackno = EXTRACT_48BITS(ackp + 2);
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(*ackp, 4);
ackno = EXTRACT_24BITS(ackp + 1);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ack=%" PRIu64 ") ", ackno));
trunc:
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawPrimitive(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickStatusType
status;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" begin draw-primitive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" affine: %g,%g,%g,%g,%g,%g",draw_info->affine.sx,
draw_info->affine.rx,draw_info->affine.ry,draw_info->affine.sy,
draw_info->affine.tx,draw_info->affine.ty);
}
status=MagickTrue;
if ((IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((IsPixelInfoGray(&draw_info->fill) == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPixelInfoGray(&draw_info->stroke) == MagickFalse)))
status=SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (draw_info->compliance == SVGCompliance)
{
status&=SetImageMask(image,WritePixelMask,draw_info->clipping_mask,
exception);
status&=SetImageMask(image,CompositePixelMask,draw_info->composite_mask,
exception);
}
x=(ssize_t) ceil(ConstrainCoordinate(primitive_info->point.x-0.5));
y=(ssize_t) ceil(ConstrainCoordinate(primitive_info->point.y-0.5));
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
switch (primitive_info->primitive)
{
case AlphaPrimitive:
{
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel,exception);
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
register Quantum
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
(void) SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel,
target;
(void) GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(image_view,x,y,&target,
exception);
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,q,&pixel);
if (IsFuzzyEquivalencePixelInfo(&pixel,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
ChannelType
channel_mask;
PixelInfo
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixelInfo(image,TileVirtualPixelMethod,x,y,
&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(double) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(double) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(double) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
channel_mask=SetImageChannelMask(image,AlphaChannel);
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,draw_info,&target,x,y,
primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageChannelMask(image,channel_mask);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ColorPrimitive:
{
switch (primitive_info->method)
{
case PointMethod:
default:
{
PixelInfo
pixel;
register Quantum
*q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
(void) SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case ReplaceMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel,
target;
(void) GetOneCacheViewVirtualPixelInfo(image_view,x,y,&target,
exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,q,&pixel);
if (IsFuzzyEquivalencePixelInfo(&pixel,&target) == MagickFalse)
{
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
continue;
}
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case FloodfillMethod:
case FillToBorderMethod:
{
PixelInfo
target;
(void) GetOneVirtualPixelInfo(image,TileVirtualPixelMethod,x,y,
&target,exception);
if (primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod)
{
target.red=(double) draw_info->border_color.red;
target.green=(double) draw_info->border_color.green;
target.blue=(double) draw_info->border_color.blue;
}
status&=FloodfillPaintImage(image,draw_info,&target,x,y,
primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod ? MagickFalse :
MagickTrue,exception);
break;
}
case ResetMethod:
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel;
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ImagePrimitive:
{
AffineMatrix
affine;
char
composite_geometry[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*composite_image,
*composite_images;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
ssize_t
x1,
y1;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=AcquireImageInfo();
if (LocaleNCompare(primitive_info->text,"data:",5) == 0)
composite_images=ReadInlineImage(clone_info,primitive_info->text,
exception);
else
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename,primitive_info->text,
MagickPathExtent);
composite_images=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (composite_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=0;
break;
}
composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&composite_images);
composite_images=DestroyImageList(composite_images);
(void) SetImageProgressMonitor(composite_image,(MagickProgressMonitor)
NULL,(void *) NULL);
x1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.x-0.5);
y1=(ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info[1].point.y-0.5);
if (((x1 != 0L) && (x1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->columns)) ||
((y1 != 0L) && (y1 != (ssize_t) composite_image->rows)))
{
/*
Resize image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%gx%g!",primitive_info[1].point.x,primitive_info[1].point.y);
composite_image->filter=image->filter;
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,
composite_geometry,exception);
}
if (composite_image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(composite_image,OpaqueAlphaChannel,
exception);
if (draw_info->alpha != OpaqueAlpha)
(void) SetImageAlpha(composite_image,draw_info->alpha,exception);
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
image->gravity=draw_info->gravity;
geometry.x=x;
geometry.y=y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(composite_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) composite_image->columns,(double)
composite_image->rows,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,composite_geometry,&geometry,exception);
affine=draw_info->affine;
affine.tx=(double) geometry.x;
affine.ty=(double) geometry.y;
composite_image->interpolate=image->interpolate;
if ((draw_info->compose == OverCompositeOp) ||
(draw_info->compose == SrcOverCompositeOp))
(void) DrawAffineImage(image,composite_image,&affine,exception);
else
(void) CompositeImage(image,composite_image,draw_info->compose,
MagickTrue,geometry.x,geometry.y,exception);
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
break;
}
case PointPrimitive:
{
PixelInfo
fill_color;
register Quantum
*q;
if ((y < 0) || (y >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
break;
if ((x < 0) || (x >= (ssize_t) image->columns))
break;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,1,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetFillColor(draw_info,x,y,&fill_color,exception);
CompositePixelOver(image,&fill_color,(double) fill_color.alpha,q,
(double) GetPixelAlpha(image,q),q);
(void) SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
break;
}
case TextPrimitive:
{
char
geometry[MagickPathExtent];
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (primitive_info->text == (char *) NULL)
break;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->text,primitive_info->text);
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%+f%+f",
primitive_info->point.x,primitive_info->point.y);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->geometry,geometry);
status&=AnnotateImage(image,clone_info,exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
break;
}
default:
{
double
mid,
scale;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
if (IsEventLogging() != MagickFalse)
LogPrimitiveInfo(primitive_info);
scale=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine);
if ((draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL) &&
(fabs(draw_info->dash_pattern[0]) >= MagickEpsilon) &&
(fabs(scale*draw_info->stroke_width) >= MagickEpsilon) &&
(draw_info->stroke.alpha != (Quantum) TransparentAlpha))
{
/*
Draw dash polygon.
*/
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info,
exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
status=DrawDashPolygon(draw_info,primitive_info,image,exception);
break;
}
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*SaneStrokeWidth(image,draw_info)/2.0;
if ((mid > 1.0) &&
((draw_info->stroke.alpha != (Quantum) TransparentAlpha) ||
(draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)))
{
double
x,
y;
MagickBooleanType
closed_path;
/*
Draw strokes while respecting line cap/join attributes.
*/
closed_path=primitive_info[0].closed_subpath;
i=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
x=fabs(primitive_info[i-1].point.x-primitive_info[0].point.x);
y=fabs(primitive_info[i-1].point.y-primitive_info[0].point.y);
if ((x < MagickEpsilon) && (y < MagickEpsilon))
closed_path=MagickTrue;
if ((((draw_info->linecap == RoundCap) ||
(closed_path != MagickFalse)) &&
(draw_info->linejoin == RoundJoin)) ||
(primitive_info[i].primitive != UndefinedPrimitive))
{
status=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info,
exception);
break;
}
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->stroke_width=0.0;
clone_info->stroke.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info,
exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
status&=DrawStrokePolygon(image,draw_info,primitive_info,exception);
break;
}
status&=DrawPolygonPrimitive(image,draw_info,primitive_info,exception);
break;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (draw_info->compliance == SVGCompliance)
{
status&=SetImageMask(image,WritePixelMask,(Image *) NULL,exception);
status&=SetImageMask(image,CompositePixelMask,(Image *) NULL,exception);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," end draw-primitive");
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXObject* AXLayoutObject::previousOnLine() const {
if (!getLayoutObject())
return nullptr;
InlineBox* inlineBox = nullptr;
if (getLayoutObject()->isLayoutInline())
inlineBox = toLayoutInline(getLayoutObject())->firstLineBox();
else if (getLayoutObject()->isText())
inlineBox = toLayoutText(getLayoutObject())->firstTextBox();
if (!inlineBox)
return nullptr;
AXObject* result = nullptr;
for (InlineBox* prev = inlineBox->prevOnLine(); prev;
prev = prev->prevOnLine()) {
LayoutObject* layoutObject =
LineLayoutAPIShim::layoutObjectFrom(prev->getLineLayoutItem());
result = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(layoutObject);
if (result)
break;
}
if (result && result->roleValue() == StaticTextRole &&
result->children().size())
result = result->children()[result->children().size() - 1].get();
return result;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RouteMouseEvent(WebContents* web_contents, blink::WebMouseEvent* event) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents_impl =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents);
web_contents_impl->GetInputEventRouter()->RouteMouseEvent(
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
web_contents_impl->GetMainFrame()->GetView()),
event, ui::LatencyInfo());
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_EGL_image(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN void* eglImage)
{
(void)hComp, (void)bufferHdr, (void)port, (void)appData, (void)eglImage;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_EGL_image: Not Implemented");
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::SubmitForm(const std::string& url,
const void* data,
int length) {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(this);
request.SetURL(url);
request.SetMethod("POST");
request.AppendDataToBody(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), length);
pp::CompletionCallback callback =
form_factory_.NewCallback(&OutOfProcessInstance::FormDidOpen);
form_loader_ = CreateURLLoaderInternal();
int rv = form_loader_.Open(request, callback);
if (rv != PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING)
callback.Run(rv);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 129,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static LZWInfo *AcquireLZWInfo(Image *image,const size_t data_size)
{
LZWInfo
*lzw_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
one;
lzw_info=(LZWInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*lzw_info));
if (lzw_info == (LZWInfo *) NULL)
return((LZWInfo *) NULL);
(void) memset(lzw_info,0,sizeof(*lzw_info));
lzw_info->image=image;
lzw_info->data_size=data_size;
one=1;
lzw_info->maximum_data_value=(one << data_size)-1;
lzw_info->clear_code=lzw_info->maximum_data_value+1;
lzw_info->end_code=lzw_info->maximum_data_value+2;
lzw_info->table[0]=(size_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaximumLZWCode,
sizeof(**lzw_info->table));
lzw_info->table[1]=(size_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaximumLZWCode,
sizeof(**lzw_info->table));
if ((lzw_info->table[0] == (size_t *) NULL) ||
(lzw_info->table[1] == (size_t *) NULL))
{
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
return((LZWInfo *) NULL);
}
(void) memset(lzw_info->table[0],0,MaximumLZWCode*
sizeof(**lzw_info->table));
(void) memset(lzw_info->table[1],0,MaximumLZWCode*
sizeof(**lzw_info->table));
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) lzw_info->maximum_data_value; i++)
{
lzw_info->table[0][i]=0;
lzw_info->table[1][i]=(size_t) i;
}
ResetLZWInfo(lzw_info);
lzw_info->code_info.buffer[0]='\0';
lzw_info->code_info.buffer[1]='\0';
lzw_info->code_info.count=2;
lzw_info->code_info.bit=8*lzw_info->code_info.count;
lzw_info->code_info.eof=MagickFalse;
lzw_info->genesis=MagickTrue;
lzw_info->stack=(LZWStack *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*lzw_info->stack));
if (lzw_info->stack == (LZWStack *) NULL)
{
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
return((LZWInfo *) NULL);
}
lzw_info->stack->codes=(size_t *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2UL*
MaximumLZWCode,sizeof(*lzw_info->stack->codes));
if (lzw_info->stack->codes == (size_t *) NULL)
{
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
return((LZWInfo *) NULL);
}
lzw_info->stack->index=lzw_info->stack->codes;
lzw_info->stack->top=lzw_info->stack->codes+2*MaximumLZWCode;
return(lzw_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void withScriptStateAttributeAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptStateAttribute._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
int v = toInt32(value);
ScriptState* state = ScriptState::current();
if (!state)
return;
imp->setWithScriptStateAttribute(state, v);
if (state.hadException())
throwError(state.exception(), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_on_tx_done_update_stats(E1000ECore *core, struct NetTxPkt *tx_pkt)
{
static const int PTCregs[6] = { PTC64, PTC127, PTC255, PTC511,
PTC1023, PTC1522 };
size_t tot_len = net_tx_pkt_get_total_len(tx_pkt);
e1000x_increase_size_stats(core->mac, PTCregs, tot_len);
e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(core->mac, TPT);
e1000x_grow_8reg_if_not_full(core->mac, TOTL, tot_len);
switch (net_tx_pkt_get_packet_type(tx_pkt)) {
case ETH_PKT_BCAST:
e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(core->mac, BPTC);
break;
case ETH_PKT_MCAST:
e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(core->mac, MPTC);
break;
case ETH_PKT_UCAST:
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
core->mac[GPTC] = core->mac[TPT];
core->mac[GOTCL] = core->mac[TOTL];
core->mac[GOTCH] = core->mac[TOTH];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int mem_cgroup_move_swap_account(swp_entry_t entry,
struct mem_cgroup *from, struct mem_cgroup *to, bool need_fixup)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sort_min_max(INT16 *a, INT16 *b)
{
INT16 A, B;
if (*a < 0 || *b < 0)
return;
A = *a;
B = *b;
*a = min(A, B);
*b = max(A, B);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 17,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void file_globals_dtor(php_file_globals *file_globals_p TSRMLS_DC)
{
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int debugMutexEnd(void){ return SQLITE_OK; }
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dwarf_elf_object_access_load_section(void* obj_in,
Dwarf_Half section_index,
Dwarf_Small** section_data,
int* error)
{
dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*obj =
(dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*)obj_in;
if (section_index == 0) {
return DW_DLV_NO_ENTRY;
}
{
Elf_Scn *scn = 0;
Elf_Data *data = 0;
scn = elf_getscn(obj->elf, section_index);
if (scn == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
/* When using libelf as a producer, section data may be stored
in multiple buffers. In libdwarf however, we only use libelf
as a consumer (there is a dwarf producer API, but it doesn't
use libelf). Because of this, this single call to elf_getdata
will retrieve the entire section in a single contiguous
buffer. */
data = elf_getdata(scn, NULL);
if (data == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
*section_data = data->d_buf;
}
return DW_DLV_OK;
}
Commit Message: A DWARF related section marked SHT_NOBITS (elf section type)
is an error in the elf object. Now detected.
dwarf_elf_access.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 168,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hugetlb_register_node(struct node *node)
{
struct hstate *h;
struct node_hstate *nhs = &node_hstates[node->dev.id];
int err;
if (nhs->hugepages_kobj)
return; /* already allocated */
nhs->hugepages_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("hugepages",
&node->dev.kobj);
if (!nhs->hugepages_kobj)
return;
for_each_hstate(h) {
err = hugetlb_sysfs_add_hstate(h, nhs->hugepages_kobj,
nhs->hstate_kobjs,
&per_node_hstate_attr_group);
if (err) {
pr_err("Hugetlb: Unable to add hstate %s for node %d\n",
h->name, node->dev.id);
hugetlb_unregister_node(node);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::DoReadCallback(int rv) {
DCHECK_NE(rv, ERR_IO_PENDING);
DCHECK(!read_callback_.is_null());
CompletionCallback c = read_callback_;
read_callback_.Reset();
c.Run(rv);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport const void *AcquirePixelCachePixels(const Image *image,
MagickSizeType *length,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) exception;
*length=0;
if ((cache_info->type != MemoryCache) && (cache_info->type != MapCache))
return((const void *) NULL);
*length=cache_info->length;
return((const void *) cache_info->pixels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 73,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_pre_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *ptemp)
{
#ifndef ZTS
int threaded_mpm;
ap_mpm_query(AP_MPMQ_IS_THREADED, &threaded_mpm);
if(threaded_mpm) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, 0, "Apache is running a threaded MPM, but your PHP Module is not compiled to be threadsafe. You need to recompile PHP.");
return DONE;
}
#endif
/* When this is NULL, apache won't override the hard-coded default
* php.ini path setting. */
apache2_php_ini_path_override = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool WhitesAreEqual(int n, cmsUInt16Number White1[], cmsUInt16Number White2[] )
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
if (abs(White1[i] - White2[i]) > 0xf000) return TRUE; // Values are so extremly different that the fixup should be avoided
if (White1[i] != White2[i]) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Vec4::GetValues<GLuint>(GLuint* values) const {
DCHECK(values);
switch (type_) {
case SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT:
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < 4; ++ii)
values[ii] = static_cast<GLuint>(v_[ii].float_value);
break;
case SHADER_VARIABLE_INT:
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < 4; ++ii)
values[ii] = static_cast<GLuint>(v_[ii].int_value);
break;
case SHADER_VARIABLE_UINT:
for (size_t ii = 0; ii < 4; ++ii)
values[ii] = v_[ii].uint_value;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_create_entity_reference)
{
zval *id;
xmlNode *node;
xmlDocPtr docp = NULL;
dom_object *intern;
int ret, name_len;
char *name;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
if (xmlValidateName((xmlChar *) name, 0) != 0) {
php_dom_throw_error(INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR, dom_get_strict_error(intern->document) TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
node = xmlNewReference(docp, name);
if (!node) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_RET_OBJ((xmlNodePtr) node, &ret, intern);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionTabUtil::IsCrashURL(const GURL& url) {
GURL fixed_url =
URLFixerUpper::FixupURL(url.possibly_invalid_spec(), std::string());
return (fixed_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) &&
(fixed_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIBrowserCrashHost ||
fixed_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUICrashHost));
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 116,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ahci_dma_set_unit(IDEDMA *dma, int unit)
{
/* only a single unit per link */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ip_mc_filter_del(struct in_device *in_dev, __be32 addr)
{
char buf[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
struct net_device *dev = in_dev->dev;
if (arp_mc_map(addr, buf, dev, 0) == 0)
dev_mc_del(dev, buf);
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int key_notify_policy(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *out_skb;
struct sadb_msg *out_hdr;
int err;
out_skb = pfkey_xfrm_policy2msg_prep(xp);
if (IS_ERR(out_skb))
return PTR_ERR(out_skb);
err = pfkey_xfrm_policy2msg(out_skb, xp, dir);
if (err < 0)
return err;
out_hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) out_skb->data;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
if (c->data.byid && c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
out_hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_SPDDELETE2;
else
out_hdr->sadb_msg_type = event2poltype(c->event);
out_hdr->sadb_msg_errno = 0;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, xp_net(xp));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceLoader* ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::GetLoader(
const GlobalRequestID& id) const {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
LoaderMap::const_iterator i = pending_loaders_.find(id);
if (i == pending_loaders_.end())
return NULL;
return i->second.get();
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 132,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mixer_ctl_feature_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *uinfo)
{
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval = kcontrol->private_data;
if (cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_BOOLEAN ||
cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_INV_BOOLEAN)
uinfo->type = SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
else
uinfo->type = SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER;
uinfo->count = cval->channels;
if (cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_BOOLEAN ||
cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_INV_BOOLEAN) {
uinfo->value.integer.min = 0;
uinfo->value.integer.max = 1;
} else {
if (!cval->initialized) {
get_min_max_with_quirks(cval, 0, kcontrol);
if (cval->initialized && cval->dBmin >= cval->dBmax) {
kcontrol->vd[0].access &=
~(SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ |
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK);
snd_ctl_notify(cval->head.mixer->chip->card,
SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_INFO,
&kcontrol->id);
}
}
uinfo->value.integer.min = 0;
uinfo->value.integer.max =
(cval->max - cval->min + cval->res - 1) / cval->res;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecreatefrompng)
{
_php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_PNG, "PNG", gdImageCreateFromPng, gdImageCreateFromPngCtx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_note_netbsd_version(struct magic_set *ms, int swap, void *v)
{
uint32_t desc;
memcpy(&desc, v, sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, ", for NetBSD") == -1)
return;
/*
* The version number used to be stuck as 199905, and was thus
* basically content-free. Newer versions of NetBSD have fixed
* this and now use the encoding of __NetBSD_Version__:
*
* MMmmrrpp00
*
* M = major version
* m = minor version
* r = release ["",A-Z,Z[A-Z] but numeric]
* p = patchlevel
*/
if (desc > 100000000U) {
uint32_t ver_patch = (desc / 100) % 100;
uint32_t ver_rel = (desc / 10000) % 100;
uint32_t ver_min = (desc / 1000000) % 100;
uint32_t ver_maj = desc / 100000000;
if (file_printf(ms, " %u.%u", ver_maj, ver_min) == -1)
return;
if (ver_rel == 0 && ver_patch != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%u", ver_patch) == -1)
return;
} else if (ver_rel != 0) {
while (ver_rel > 26) {
if (file_printf(ms, "Z") == -1)
return;
ver_rel -= 26;
}
if (file_printf(ms, "%c", 'A' + ver_rel - 1)
== -1)
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid reading past the end of buffer (Rui Reis)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
{
int r = 1;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
s->
ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
if (!r)
return -1;
}
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
/* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
}
if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
/* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
} else {
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
}
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
}
if (r == 2)
/*
* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
* server opaque PRF input
*/
s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
}
# endif
s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 12,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsAppendNamedColor(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList,
const char* Name,
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3], cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS])
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
if (NamedColorList == NULL) return FALSE;
if (NamedColorList ->nColors + 1 > NamedColorList ->Allocated) {
if (!GrowNamedColorList(NamedColorList)) return FALSE;
}
for (i=0; i < NamedColorList ->ColorantCount; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].DeviceColorant[i] = Colorant == NULL? 0 : Colorant[i];
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].PCS[i] = PCS == NULL ? 0 : PCS[i];
if (Name != NULL) {
strncpy(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name, Name,
sizeof(NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name));
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[cmsMAX_PATH-1] = 0;
}
else
NamedColorList ->List[NamedColorList ->nColors].Name[0] = 0;
NamedColorList ->nColors++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 1
| 166,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::playSoundIfAnchorIsTarget() const
{
d->m_touchEventHandler->playSoundIfAnchorIsTarget();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetFirst() const {
if ((m_clusters == NULL) || (m_clusterCount <= 0))
return &m_eos;
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[0];
assert(pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::GetInterface(mojo::InterfaceRequest<Interface> request) {
GetRemoteInterfaces()->GetInterface(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::FillSection(DialogSection section,
ServerFieldType originating_type) {
DetailsGroup* group = GroupForSection(section);
TextfieldMap::iterator text_mapping =
group->textfields.find(originating_type);
if (text_mapping != group->textfields.end())
text_mapping->second->SetText(base::string16());
if (section == GetCreditCardSection() &&
AutofillType(originating_type).group() == CREDIT_CARD) {
for (ComboboxMap::const_iterator it = group->comboboxes.begin();
it != group->comboboxes.end(); ++it) {
if (AutofillType(it->first).group() == CREDIT_CARD)
it->second->SetSelectedIndex(it->second->model()->GetDefaultIndex());
}
}
UpdateSectionImpl(section, false);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 109,959
|
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