instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_next_ext_header(LHAFileHeader **header,
LHAInputStream *stream,
uint8_t **ext_header,
size_t *ext_header_len)
{
*ext_header_len
= lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, RAW_DATA_LEN(header) - 2));
if (*ext_header_len == 0) {
*ext_header = NULL;
return 1;
}
*ext_header = extend_raw_data(header, stream, *ext_header_len);
return *ext_header != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_dongle_scantime(struct brcmf_if *ifp)
{
s32 err = 0;
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_SCAN_CHANNEL_TIME,
BRCMF_SCAN_CHANNEL_TIME);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Scan assoc time error (%d)\n", err);
goto dongle_scantime_out;
}
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_SCAN_UNASSOC_TIME,
BRCMF_SCAN_UNASSOC_TIME);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Scan unassoc time error (%d)\n", err);
goto dongle_scantime_out;
}
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_SCAN_PASSIVE_TIME,
BRCMF_SCAN_PASSIVE_TIME);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Scan passive time error (%d)\n", err);
goto dongle_scantime_out;
}
dongle_scantime_out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_access(u32 access, struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
{
unsigned char mask = 1 << access;
return (bool)(stp->st_access_bmap & mask);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DiscoveryEnded(const std::string& adapter_id) {
VLOG(2) << "Discovery ended on " << adapter_id;
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.notifyBluetoothSearchComplete");
chromeos::BluetoothManager* bluetooth_manager =
chromeos::BluetoothManager::GetInstance();
DCHECK(bluetooth_manager);
chromeos::BluetoothAdapter* default_adapter =
bluetooth_manager->DefaultAdapter();
ValidateDefaultAdapter(default_adapter);
if (default_adapter == NULL) {
VLOG(1) << "DiscoveryEnded: no default adapter";
return;
}
default_adapter->StopDiscovery();
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: g_NPN_PostURL(NPP instance, const char *url, const char *target, uint32_t len, const char *buf, NPBool file)
{
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_PostURL not called from the main thread\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
if (instance == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
PluginInstance *plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
if (plugin == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
D(bugiI("NPN_PostURL instance=%p\n", instance));
npw_plugin_instance_ref(plugin);
NPError ret = invoke_NPN_PostURL(plugin, url, target, len, buf, file);
npw_plugin_instance_unref(plugin);
D(bugiD("NPN_PostURL return: %d [%s]\n", ret, string_of_NPError(ret)));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::LostCapture() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->LostCapture();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason)
{
console_verbose();
printk(KERN_CRIT "Bad mode in %s handler detected\n", handler[reason]);
die("Oops - bad mode", regs, 0);
local_irq_disable();
panic("bad mode");
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RemoveShaderInfo(int32_t id) {
if (GetShaderCacheFactorySingleton())
GetShaderCacheFactorySingleton()->RemoveCacheInfo(id);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsActive() const {
if (ui::ActiveWindowWatcherX::WMSupportsActivation())
return is_active_;
return gtk_window_is_active(window_);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setLineDash(const Vector<double>& dash) {
if (!LineDashSequenceIsValid(dash))
return;
ModifiableState().SetLineDash(dash);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 reg, u64 *data)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
u32 low, high = 0;
if (!kvm_vcpu_has_lapic(vcpu))
return 1;
if (apic_reg_read(apic, reg, 4, &low))
return 1;
if (reg == APIC_ICR)
apic_reg_read(apic, APIC_ICR2, 4, &high);
*data = (((u64)high) << 32) | low;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ef_debug(u_char level, const char *message, ...)
{
va_list ap;
/* if not in debug don't print anything */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->debug < level)
return;
/* print the message */
va_start(ap, message);
vfprintf (stderr, message, ap);
fflush(stderr);
va_end(ap);
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
{
struct file *file;
struct filename *tmp = getname(library);
int error = PTR_ERR(tmp);
static const struct open_flags uselib_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN
};
if (IS_ERR(tmp))
goto out;
file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, tmp, &uselib_flags, LOOKUP_FOLLOW);
putname(tmp);
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
error = -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto exit;
error = -EACCES;
if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto exit;
fsnotify_open(file);
error = -ENOEXEC;
if(file->f_op) {
struct linux_binfmt * fmt;
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
if (!fmt->load_shlib)
continue;
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
error = fmt->load_shlib(file);
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
if (error != -ENOEXEC)
break;
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
}
exit:
fput(file);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(apr_time_t) ap_rationalize_mtime(request_rec *r, apr_time_t mtime)
{
apr_time_t now;
/* For all static responses, it's almost certain that the file was
* last modified before the beginning of the request. So there's
* no reason to call time(NULL) again. But if the response has been
* created on demand, then it might be newer than the time the request
* started. In this event we really have to call time(NULL) again
* so that we can give the clients the most accurate Last-Modified. If we
* were given a time in the future, we return the current time - the
* Last-Modified can't be in the future.
*/
now = (mtime < r->request_time) ? r->request_time : apr_time_now();
return (mtime > now) ? now : mtime;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 44,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::UpdateWidgetImportance(
ChildProcessImportance old_value,
ChildProcessImportance new_value) {
DCHECK_NE(old_value, new_value);
DCHECK(widget_importance_counts_[static_cast<size_t>(old_value)]);
widget_importance_counts_[static_cast<size_t>(old_value)]--;
widget_importance_counts_[static_cast<size_t>(new_value)]++;
UpdateProcessPriority();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebMediaPlayer* RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer(
WebFrame* frame, const WebKit::WebURL& url, WebMediaPlayerClient* client) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver, observers_, WillCreateMediaPlayer(frame, client));
const CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (MediaStreamImpl::CheckMediaStream(url)) {
EnsureMediaStreamImpl();
return new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerMS(
frame, client, AsWeakPtr(), media_stream_impl_, new RenderMediaLog());
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GpuChannelHost* gpu_channel_host =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_VIDEODECODEACCELERATOR_INITIALIZE);
if (!gpu_channel_host) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to establish GPU channel for media player";
return NULL;
}
scoped_refptr<cc::ContextProvider> context_provider =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->OffscreenContextProviderForMainThread();
if (!context_provider->InitializeOnMainThread() ||
!context_provider->BindToCurrentThread()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get context3d for media player";
return NULL;
}
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) {
if (!media_bridge_manager_.get()) {
media_bridge_manager_.reset(
new webkit_media::MediaPlayerBridgeManagerImpl(1));
}
return new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerInProcessAndroid(
frame,
client,
cookieJar(frame),
media_player_manager_.get(),
media_bridge_manager_.get(),
new StreamTextureFactoryImpl(
context_provider->Context3d(), gpu_channel_host, routing_id_),
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableMediaHistoryLogging));
}
if (!media_player_proxy_) {
media_player_proxy_ = new WebMediaPlayerProxyImplAndroid(
this, media_player_manager_.get());
}
return new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerImplAndroid(
frame,
client,
media_player_manager_.get(),
media_player_proxy_,
new StreamTextureFactoryImpl(
context_provider->Context3d(), gpu_channel_host, routing_id_));
#endif
scoped_refptr<media::AudioRendererSink> sink;
if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAudio)) {
if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableRendererSideMixing)) {
sink = RenderThreadImpl::current()->GetAudioRendererMixerManager()->
CreateInput(routing_id_);
DVLOG(1) << "Using AudioRendererMixerManager-provided sink: " << sink;
} else {
scoped_refptr<RendererAudioOutputDevice> device =
AudioDeviceFactory::NewOutputDevice();
device->SetSourceRenderView(routing_id_);
sink = device;
DVLOG(1) << "Using AudioDeviceFactory-provided sink: " << sink;
}
}
scoped_refptr<media::GpuVideoDecoder::Factories> gpu_factories;
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl* context3d = NULL;
if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideoDecode))
context3d = RenderThreadImpl::current()->GetGpuVDAContext3D();
if (context3d) {
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> factories_loop =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->compositor_message_loop_proxy();
if (!factories_loop)
factories_loop = base::MessageLoopProxy::current();
GpuChannelHost* gpu_channel_host =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_VIDEODECODEACCELERATOR_INITIALIZE);
gpu_factories = new RendererGpuVideoDecoderFactories(
gpu_channel_host, factories_loop, context3d);
}
webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerParams params(
sink, gpu_factories, new RenderMediaLog());
WebMediaPlayer* media_player =
GetContentClient()->renderer()->OverrideCreateWebMediaPlayer(
this, frame, client, AsWeakPtr(), params);
if (!media_player) {
media_player = new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerImpl(
frame, client, AsWeakPtr(), params);
}
return media_player;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CommonNavigationParams MakeCommonNavigationParams(
const WebSecurityOrigin& current_origin,
std::unique_ptr<blink::WebNavigationInfo> info,
int load_flags,
bool has_download_sandbox_flag,
bool from_ad) {
DCHECK(!info->url_request.RequestorOrigin().IsNull());
Referrer referrer(
GURL(info->url_request.HttpHeaderField(WebString::FromUTF8("Referer"))
.Latin1()),
info->url_request.GetReferrerPolicy());
DCHECK(info->navigation_type != blink::kWebNavigationTypeBackForward);
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::Value navigation_type =
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT;
if (info->navigation_type == blink::kWebNavigationTypeReload) {
if (load_flags & net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE)
navigation_type = FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE;
else
navigation_type = FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD;
}
base::Optional<SourceLocation> source_location;
if (!info->source_location.url.IsNull()) {
source_location = SourceLocation(info->source_location.url.Latin1(),
info->source_location.line_number,
info->source_location.column_number);
}
CSPDisposition should_check_main_world_csp =
info->should_check_main_world_content_security_policy ==
blink::kWebContentSecurityPolicyDispositionCheck
? CSPDisposition::CHECK
: CSPDisposition::DO_NOT_CHECK;
const RequestExtraData* extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(info->url_request.GetExtraData());
DCHECK(extra_data);
NavigationDownloadPolicy download_policy;
RenderFrameImpl::MaybeSetDownloadFramePolicy(
info->is_opener_navigation, info->url_request, current_origin,
has_download_sandbox_flag,
info->blocking_downloads_in_sandbox_without_user_activation_enabled,
from_ad, &download_policy);
return CommonNavigationParams(
info->url_request.Url(), info->url_request.RequestorOrigin(), referrer,
extra_data->transition_type(), navigation_type, download_policy,
info->frame_load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem, GURL(),
GURL(), static_cast<PreviewsState>(info->url_request.GetPreviewsState()),
base::TimeTicks::Now(), info->url_request.HttpMethod().Latin1(),
GetRequestBodyForWebURLRequest(info->url_request), source_location,
false /* started_from_context_menu */, info->url_request.HasUserGesture(),
InitiatorCSPInfo(should_check_main_world_csp,
BuildContentSecurityPolicyList(info->initiator_csp),
info->initiator_csp.self_source.has_value()
? base::Optional<CSPSource>(BuildCSPSource(
info->initiator_csp.self_source.value()))
: base::nullopt),
info->href_translate.Latin1(), info->input_start);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MOCK_IMPL(void,
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved,(entry_connection_t *conn,
int answer_type,
size_t answer_len,
const uint8_t *answer,
int ttl,
time_t expires))
{
char buf[384];
size_t replylen;
if (ttl >= 0) {
if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
tor_addr_t a;
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&a, get_uint32(answer));
if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) {
client_dns_set_addressmap(conn,
conn->socks_request->address, &a,
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
}
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) {
tor_addr_t a;
tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&a, (char*)answer);
if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) {
client_dns_set_addressmap(conn,
conn->socks_request->address, &a,
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
}
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
char *cp = tor_strndup((char*)answer, answer_len);
client_dns_set_reverse_addressmap(conn,
conn->socks_request->address,
cp,
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
tor_free(cp);
}
}
if (ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->is_dns_request) {
if (conn->dns_server_request) {
/* We had a request on our DNS port: answer it. */
dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, (char*)answer, ttl);
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
return;
} else {
/* This must be a request from the controller. Since answers to those
* requests are not cached, they do not generate an ADDRMAP event on
* their own. */
tell_controller_about_resolved_result(conn, answer_type, answer_len,
(char*)answer, ttl, expires);
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
return;
}
/* We shouldn't need to free conn here; it gets marked by the caller. */
}
if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 4) {
buf[0] = 0x00; /* version */
if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
buf[1] = SOCKS4_GRANTED;
set_uint16(buf+2, 0);
memcpy(buf+4, answer, 4); /* address */
replylen = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
} else { /* "error" */
buf[1] = SOCKS4_REJECT;
memset(buf+2, 0, 6);
replylen = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
}
} else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 5) {
/* SOCKS5 */
buf[0] = 0x05; /* version */
if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
buf[3] = 0x01; /* IPv4 address type */
memcpy(buf+4, answer, 4); /* address */
set_uint16(buf+8, 0); /* port == 0. */
replylen = 10;
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) {
buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
buf[3] = 0x04; /* IPv6 address type */
memcpy(buf+4, answer, 16); /* address */
set_uint16(buf+20, 0); /* port == 0. */
replylen = 22;
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
buf[3] = 0x03; /* Domainname address type */
buf[4] = (char)answer_len;
memcpy(buf+5, answer, answer_len); /* address */
set_uint16(buf+5+answer_len, 0); /* port == 0. */
replylen = 5+answer_len+2;
} else {
buf[1] = SOCKS5_HOST_UNREACHABLE;
memset(buf+2, 0, 8);
replylen = 10;
}
} else {
/* no socks version info; don't send anything back */
return;
}
connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, buf, replylen,
(answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 ||
answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 ||
answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME) ?
0 : END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment() {
FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasDepthAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_depth_format_ != 0;
}
return back_buffer_has_depth_;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_set_inode_index(struct inode *dir, u64 *index)
{
int ret = 0;
if (BTRFS_I(dir)->index_cnt == (u64)-1) {
ret = btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count(dir);
if (ret) {
ret = btrfs_set_inode_index_count(dir);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
*index = BTRFS_I(dir)->index_cnt;
BTRFS_I(dir)->index_cnt++;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setAuxEffectSendLevel(float level)
{
ALOGV("[%d] setAuxEffectSendLevel(%f)", mConnId, level);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
if (mAudioOutput != 0) return mAudioOutput->setAuxEffectSendLevel(level);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void callWithScriptStateScriptArgumentsVoidMethodOptionalBooleanArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
RefPtr<ScriptArguments> scriptArguments(createScriptArguments(info, 1));
imp->callWithScriptStateScriptArgumentsVoidMethodOptionalBooleanArg(&state, scriptArguments.release());
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(bool, optionalBooleanArg, info[0]->BooleanValue());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
RefPtr<ScriptArguments> scriptArguments(createScriptArguments(info, 1));
imp->callWithScriptStateScriptArgumentsVoidMethodOptionalBooleanArg(&state, scriptArguments.release(), optionalBooleanArg);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageType(Image *image,const ImageType type)
{
const char
*artifact;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
status=MagickTrue;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
image_info->dither=image->dither;
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"dither");
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"dither",artifact);
switch (type)
{
case BilevelType:
{
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
{
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
(void) NormalizeImage(image);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=2;
quantize_info->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->colors=2;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case GrayscaleMatteType:
{
if (SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case PaletteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->number_colors=256;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
}
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PaletteBilevelMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
(void) BilevelImageChannel(image,AlphaChannel,(double) QuantumRange/2.0);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case PaletteMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(image_info);
quantize_info->colorspace=TransparentColorspace;
status=QuantizeImage(quantize_info,image);
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
break;
}
case TrueColorType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case TrueColorMatteType:
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case ColorSeparationType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
image->matte=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case ColorSeparationMatteType:
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
{
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
}
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
status=SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
break;
}
case OptimizeType:
case UndefinedType:
break;
}
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
image->type=type;
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 168,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getUniformBlockIndex(
WebGLProgram* program,
const String& uniform_block_name) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getUniformBlockIndex", program))
return 0;
if (!ValidateString("getUniformBlockIndex", uniform_block_name))
return 0;
return ContextGL()->GetUniformBlockIndex(ObjectOrZero(program),
uniform_block_name.Utf8().data());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fsub(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m, int n)
{
BOTH_PRmn(ARITH_X, SUB);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs4_label *label)
{
if (label)
return server->attr_bitmask;
return server->attr_bitmask_nl;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GlobalConfirmInfoBar::DelegateProxy::Accept() {
base::WeakPtr<GlobalConfirmInfoBar> info_bar = global_info_bar_;
if (info_bar) {
info_bar->OnInfoBarRemoved(info_bar_, false);
info_bar->delegate_->Accept();
}
if (info_bar)
info_bar->Close();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BackendIO::BackendIO(InFlightIO* controller, BackendImpl* backend,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback)
: BackgroundIO(controller),
backend_(backend),
callback_(callback),
operation_(OP_NONE),
entry_ptr_(NULL),
iterator_(NULL),
entry_(NULL),
index_(0),
offset_(0),
buf_len_(0),
truncate_(false),
offset64_(0),
start_(NULL) {
start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SAPI_API int sapi_send_headers(TSRMLS_D)
{
int retval;
int ret = FAILURE;
if (SG(headers_sent) || SG(request_info).no_headers || SG(callback_run)) {
return SUCCESS;
}
/* Success-oriented. We set headers_sent to 1 here to avoid an infinite loop
* in case of an error situation.
*/
if (SG(sapi_headers).send_default_content_type && sapi_module.send_headers) {
sapi_header_struct default_header;
uint len;
SG(sapi_headers).mimetype = get_default_content_type(0, &len TSRMLS_CC);
default_header.header_len = sizeof("Content-type: ") - 1 + len;
default_header.header = emalloc(default_header.header_len + 1);
memcpy(default_header.header, "Content-type: ", sizeof("Content-type: ") - 1);
memcpy(default_header.header + sizeof("Content-type: ") - 1, SG(sapi_headers).mimetype, len + 1);
sapi_header_add_op(SAPI_HEADER_ADD, &default_header TSRMLS_CC);
SG(sapi_headers).send_default_content_type = 0;
}
if (SG(callback_func) && !SG(callback_run)) {
SG(callback_run) = 1;
sapi_run_header_callback(TSRMLS_C);
}
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
if (sapi_module.send_headers) {
retval = sapi_module.send_headers(&SG(sapi_headers) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
retval = SAPI_HEADER_DO_SEND;
}
switch (retval) {
case SAPI_HEADER_SENT_SUCCESSFULLY:
ret = SUCCESS;
break;
case SAPI_HEADER_DO_SEND: {
sapi_header_struct http_status_line;
char buf[255];
if (SG(sapi_headers).http_status_line) {
http_status_line.header = SG(sapi_headers).http_status_line;
http_status_line.header_len = strlen(SG(sapi_headers).http_status_line);
} else {
http_status_line.header = buf;
http_status_line.header_len = slprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "HTTP/1.0 %d X", SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code);
}
sapi_module.send_header(&http_status_line, SG(server_context) TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_llist_apply_with_argument(&SG(sapi_headers).headers, (llist_apply_with_arg_func_t) sapi_module.send_header, SG(server_context) TSRMLS_CC);
if(SG(sapi_headers).send_default_content_type) {
sapi_header_struct default_header;
sapi_get_default_content_type_header(&default_header TSRMLS_CC);
sapi_module.send_header(&default_header, SG(server_context) TSRMLS_CC);
sapi_free_header(&default_header);
}
sapi_module.send_header(NULL, SG(server_context) TSRMLS_CC);
ret = SUCCESS;
break;
case SAPI_HEADER_SEND_FAILED:
SG(headers_sent) = 0;
ret = FAILURE;
break;
}
sapi_send_headers_free(TSRMLS_C);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Update header handling to RFC 7230
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 56,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int UDPSocketLibevent::DoBind(const IPEndPoint& address) {
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
int rv = bind(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv == 0)
return OK;
int last_error = errno;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketBindErrorFromPosix", last_error);
return MapSystemError(last_error);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 171,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::createFirstLetterRenderer(RenderObject* firstLetterBlock, RenderObject* currentChild, unsigned length)
{
ASSERT(length && currentChild->isText());
RenderObject* firstLetterContainer = currentChild->parent();
RenderStyle* pseudoStyle = styleForFirstLetter(firstLetterBlock, firstLetterContainer);
RenderObject* firstLetter = 0;
if (pseudoStyle->display() == INLINE)
firstLetter = RenderInline::createAnonymous(&document());
else
firstLetter = RenderBlockFlow::createAnonymous(&document());
firstLetter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
firstLetterContainer->addChild(firstLetter, currentChild);
RenderText* textObj = toRenderText(currentChild);
String oldText = textObj->originalText();
ASSERT(oldText.impl());
RenderTextFragment* remainingText =
new RenderTextFragment(textObj->node() ? textObj->node() : &textObj->document(), oldText.impl(), length, oldText.length() - length);
remainingText->setStyle(textObj->style());
if (remainingText->node())
remainingText->node()->setRenderer(remainingText);
firstLetterContainer->addChild(remainingText, textObj);
firstLetterContainer->removeChild(textObj);
remainingText->setFirstLetter(firstLetter);
toRenderBoxModelObject(firstLetter)->setFirstLetterRemainingText(remainingText);
RenderTextFragment* letter =
new RenderTextFragment(remainingText->node() ? remainingText->node() : &remainingText->document(), oldText.impl(), 0, length);
letter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
firstLetter->addChild(letter);
textObj->destroy();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pfkey_xfrm_policy2msg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir)
{
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
struct sadb_address *addr;
struct sadb_lifetime *lifetime;
struct sadb_x_policy *pol;
struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx;
int i;
int size;
int sockaddr_size = pfkey_sockaddr_size(xp->family);
int socklen = pfkey_sockaddr_len(xp->family);
size = pfkey_xfrm_policy2msg_size(xp);
/* call should fill header later */
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
memset(hdr, 0, size); /* XXX do we need this ? */
/* src address */
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC;
addr->sadb_address_proto = pfkey_proto_from_xfrm(xp->selector.proto);
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = xp->selector.prefixlen_s;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
if (!pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&xp->selector.saddr,
xp->selector.sport,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
xp->family))
BUG();
/* dst address */
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST;
addr->sadb_address_proto = pfkey_proto_from_xfrm(xp->selector.proto);
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen = xp->selector.prefixlen_d;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&xp->selector.daddr, xp->selector.dport,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
xp->family);
/* hard time */
lifetime = (struct sadb_lifetime *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime));
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_len =
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)/sizeof(uint64_t);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations = _X2KEY(xp->lft.hard_packet_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes = _X2KEY(xp->lft.hard_byte_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime = xp->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime = xp->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds;
/* soft time */
lifetime = (struct sadb_lifetime *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime));
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_len =
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)/sizeof(uint64_t);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations = _X2KEY(xp->lft.soft_packet_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes = _X2KEY(xp->lft.soft_byte_limit);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime = xp->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime = xp->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds;
/* current time */
lifetime = (struct sadb_lifetime *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime));
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_len =
sizeof(struct sadb_lifetime)/sizeof(uint64_t);
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_exttype = SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations = xp->curlft.packets;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes = xp->curlft.bytes;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime = xp->curlft.add_time;
lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime = xp->curlft.use_time;
pol = (struct sadb_x_policy *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy));
pol->sadb_x_policy_len = sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)/sizeof(uint64_t);
pol->sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY;
pol->sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD;
if (xp->action == XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW) {
if (xp->xfrm_nr)
pol->sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC;
else
pol->sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE;
}
pol->sadb_x_policy_dir = dir+1;
pol->sadb_x_policy_reserved = 0;
pol->sadb_x_policy_id = xp->index;
pol->sadb_x_policy_priority = xp->priority;
for (i=0; i<xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
const struct xfrm_tmpl *t = xp->xfrm_vec + i;
struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq;
int req_size;
int mode;
req_size = sizeof(struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest);
if (t->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL) {
socklen = pfkey_sockaddr_len(t->encap_family);
req_size += socklen * 2;
} else {
size -= 2*socklen;
}
rq = (void*)skb_put(skb, req_size);
pol->sadb_x_policy_len += req_size/8;
memset(rq, 0, sizeof(*rq));
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len = req_size;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto = t->id.proto;
if ((mode = pfkey_mode_from_xfrm(t->mode)) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode = mode;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level = IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE;
if (t->reqid)
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level = IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE;
if (t->optional)
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level = IPSEC_LEVEL_USE;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid = t->reqid;
if (t->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL) {
u8 *sa = (void *)(rq + 1);
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&t->saddr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *)sa,
t->encap_family);
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&t->id.daddr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) (sa + socklen),
t->encap_family);
}
}
/* security context */
if ((xfrm_ctx = xp->security)) {
int ctx_size = pfkey_xfrm_policy2sec_ctx_size(xp);
sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *) skb_put(skb, ctx_size);
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len = ctx_size / sizeof(uint64_t);
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_doi = xfrm_ctx->ctx_doi;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_alg = xfrm_ctx->ctx_alg;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_len = xfrm_ctx->ctx_len;
memcpy(sec_ctx + 1, xfrm_ctx->ctx_str,
xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
}
hdr->sadb_msg_len = size / sizeof(uint64_t);
hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = atomic_read(&xp->refcnt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HasPermissionsForContentUri(const base::FilePath& file,
int permissions) {
DCHECK(!file.empty());
DCHECK(file.IsContentUri());
if (!permissions)
return false;
base::FilePath file_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FileMap::const_iterator it = file_permissions_.find(file_path);
if (it != file_permissions_.end())
return (it->second & permissions) == permissions;
return false;
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtnl_port_fill(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
u32 ext_filter_mask)
{
int err;
if (!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_port || !dev->dev.parent ||
!(ext_filter_mask & RTEXT_FILTER_VF))
return 0;
err = rtnl_port_self_fill(skb, dev);
if (err)
return err;
if (dev_num_vf(dev->dev.parent)) {
err = rtnl_vf_ports_fill(skb, dev);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned long l, llen;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
x = NULL;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
} else {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init pppol2tp_init(void)
{
int err;
err = register_pernet_device(&pppol2tp_net_ops);
if (err)
goto out;
err = proto_register(&pppol2tp_sk_proto, 0);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pppol2tp_pernet;
err = register_pppox_proto(PX_PROTO_OL2TP, &pppol2tp_proto);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pppol2tp_proto;
#ifdef CONFIG_L2TP_V3
err = l2tp_nl_register_ops(L2TP_PWTYPE_PPP, &pppol2tp_nl_cmd_ops);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pppox;
#endif
pr_info("PPPoL2TP kernel driver, %s\n", PPPOL2TP_DRV_VERSION);
out:
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_L2TP_V3
out_unregister_pppox:
unregister_pppox_proto(PX_PROTO_OL2TP);
#endif
out_unregister_pppol2tp_proto:
proto_unregister(&pppol2tp_sk_proto);
out_unregister_pppol2tp_pernet:
unregister_pernet_device(&pppol2tp_net_ops);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseShadow::removeJob( const char* reason )
{
this->removeJobPre(reason);
DC_Exit( JOB_SHOULD_REMOVE );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
{
struct thread_struct *thread = &(tsk->thread);
unsigned long val = 0;
if (n < HBP_NUM) {
struct perf_event *bp;
if (ptrace_get_breakpoints(tsk) < 0)
return -ESRCH;
bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
if (!bp)
val = 0;
else
val = bp->hw.info.address;
ptrace_put_breakpoints(tsk);
} else if (n == 6) {
val = thread->debugreg6;
} else if (n == 7) {
val = thread->ptrace_dr7;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
return aes_set_key_common(tfm, crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), in_key, key_len);
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hash_object_field_end(void *state, char *fname, bool isnull)
{
JHashState *_state = (JHashState *) state;
JsonHashEntry *hashentry;
bool found;
/*
* Ignore nested fields.
*/
if (_state->lex->lex_level > 2)
return;
/*
* Ignore field names >= NAMEDATALEN - they can't match a record field.
* (Note: without this test, the hash code would truncate the string at
* NAMEDATALEN-1, and could then match against a similarly-truncated
* record field name. That would be a reasonable behavior, but this code
* has previously insisted on exact equality, so we keep this behavior.)
*/
if (strlen(fname) >= NAMEDATALEN)
return;
hashentry = hash_search(_state->hash, fname, HASH_ENTER, &found);
/*
* found being true indicates a duplicate. We don't do anything about
* that, a later field with the same name overrides the earlier field.
*/
hashentry->isnull = isnull;
if (_state->save_json_start != NULL)
{
int len = _state->lex->prev_token_terminator - _state->save_json_start;
char *val = palloc((len + 1) * sizeof(char));
memcpy(val, _state->save_json_start, len);
val[len] = '\0';
hashentry->val = val;
}
else
{
/* must have had a scalar instead */
hashentry->val = _state->saved_scalar;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: update_info_luks (Device *device)
{
if (g_strcmp0 (device->priv->id_type, "crypto_LUKS") == 0 && device->priv->holders_objpath->len == 1)
{
device_set_device_is_luks (device, TRUE);
device_set_luks_holder (device, device->priv->holders_objpath->pdata[0]);
}
else
{
device_set_device_is_luks (device, FALSE);
device_set_luks_holder (device, NULL);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::SVGAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_svgAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::SVGAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::DisableSafeBrowsing(DownloadItem* item) {
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
SafeBrowsingState* state = static_cast<SafeBrowsingState*>(
item->GetExternalData(&safe_browsing_id));
DCHECK(!state);
if (!state)
state = new SafeBrowsingState();
state->SetVerdict(DownloadProtectionService::SAFE);
item->SetExternalData(&safe_browsing_id, state);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *ltrim(const char *s)
{
while (isspace(*s))
s++;
return s;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 91,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FileBrowserPrivateGetDriveConnectionStateFunction::RunSync() {
api::file_browser_private::DriveConnectionState result;
switch (drive::util::GetDriveConnectionStatus(GetProfile())) {
case drive::util::DRIVE_DISCONNECTED_NOSERVICE:
result.type = kDriveConnectionTypeOffline;
result.reason.reset(new std::string(kDriveConnectionReasonNoService));
break;
case drive::util::DRIVE_DISCONNECTED_NONETWORK:
result.type = kDriveConnectionTypeOffline;
result.reason.reset(new std::string(kDriveConnectionReasonNoNetwork));
break;
case drive::util::DRIVE_DISCONNECTED_NOTREADY:
result.type = kDriveConnectionTypeOffline;
result.reason.reset(new std::string(kDriveConnectionReasonNotReady));
break;
case drive::util::DRIVE_CONNECTED_METERED:
result.type = kDriveConnectionTypeMetered;
break;
case drive::util::DRIVE_CONNECTED:
result.type = kDriveConnectionTypeOnline;
break;
}
results_ = api::file_browser_private::GetDriveConnectionState::Results::
Create(result);
drive::EventLogger* logger = file_manager::util::GetLogger(GetProfile());
if (logger)
logger->Log(logging::LOG_INFO, "%s succeeded.", name().c_str());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_set_blocking)
{
zval *arg1;
int block;
long arg2;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &arg1, &arg2) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &arg1);
block = arg2;
if (php_stream_set_option(stream, PHP_STREAM_OPTION_BLOCKING, block == 0 ? 0 : 1, NULL) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value)
{
if (!value || (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
void *p = (void *)value;
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, p);
} else if (type == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
ASN1_OBJECT *odup;
odup = OBJ_dup(value);
if (!odup)
return 0;
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, odup);
} else {
ASN1_STRING *sdup;
sdup = ASN1_STRING_dup(value);
if (!sdup)
return 0;
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, sdup);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 6,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void f2fs_drop_extent_tree(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et = F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT);
write_lock(&et->lock);
__free_extent_tree(sbi, et);
__drop_largest_extent(inode, 0, UINT_MAX);
write_unlock(&et->lock);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void S_AL_StartCapture( void )
{
if (alCaptureDevice != NULL)
qalcCaptureStart(alCaptureDevice);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int chksum_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int length, u8 *out)
{
struct chksum_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
return __chksum_finup(&mctx->key, data, length, out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Context> V8Proxy::mainWorldContext(Frame* frame)
{
V8Proxy* proxy = retrieve(frame);
if (!proxy)
return v8::Local<v8::Context>();
return proxy->mainWorldContext();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int activity_manager_connect() {
int amfd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (amfd >= 0) {
struct sockaddr_un address;
int err;
memset(&address, 0, sizeof(address));
address.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(address.sun_path, NCRASH_SOCKET_PATH, sizeof(address.sun_path));
err = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(connect(
amfd, reinterpret_cast<struct sockaddr*>(&address), sizeof(address)));
if (!err) {
struct timeval tv;
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof(tv));
tv.tv_sec = 1; // tight leash
err = setsockopt(amfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof(tv));
if (!err) {
tv.tv_sec = 3; // 3 seconds on handshake read
err = setsockopt(amfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof(tv));
}
}
if (err) {
close(amfd);
amfd = -1;
}
}
return amfd;
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDidStartLoading() {
delegate_->DidStartLoading(this);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline MagickOffsetType ReadPixelCacheRegion(
const CacheInfo *restrict cache_info,const MagickOffsetType offset,
const MagickSizeType length,unsigned char *restrict buffer)
{
register MagickOffsetType
i;
ssize_t
count;
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_PREAD)
if (lseek(cache_info->file,offset,SEEK_SET) < 0)
return((MagickOffsetType) -1);
#endif
count=0;
for (i=0; i < (MagickOffsetType) length; i+=count)
{
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_PREAD)
count=read(cache_info->file,buffer+i,(size_t) MagickMin(length-i,
(MagickSizeType) SSIZE_MAX));
#else
count=pread(cache_info->file,buffer+i,(size_t) MagickMin(length-i,
(MagickSizeType) SSIZE_MAX),(off_t) (offset+i));
#endif
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
}
return(i);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 73,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool regs_within_kernel_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr)
{
return ((addr & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) ==
(kernel_stack_pointer(regs) & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct mii_bus *mdiobus_alloc_size(size_t size)
{
struct mii_bus *bus;
size_t aligned_size = ALIGN(sizeof(*bus), NETDEV_ALIGN);
size_t alloc_size;
int i;
/* If we alloc extra space, it should be aligned */
if (size)
alloc_size = aligned_size + size;
else
alloc_size = sizeof(*bus);
bus = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bus)
return NULL;
bus->state = MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED;
if (size)
bus->priv = (void *)bus + aligned_size;
/* Initialise the interrupts to polling */
for (i = 0; i < PHY_MAX_ADDR; i++)
bus->irq[i] = PHY_POLL;
return bus;
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 89,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcOpenFont(ClientPtr client)
{
int err;
REQUEST(xOpenFontReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xOpenFontReq, stuff->nbytes);
client->errorValue = stuff->fid;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->fid, client);
err = OpenFont(client, stuff->fid, (Mask) 0,
stuff->nbytes, (char *) &stuff[1]);
if (err == Success) {
return Success;
}
else
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_meta_trans_blocks(struct inode *inode, int nrblocks, int chunk)
{
ext4_group_t groups, ngroups = ext4_get_groups_count(inode->i_sb);
int gdpblocks;
int idxblocks;
int ret = 0;
/*
* How many index blocks need to touch to modify nrblocks?
* The "Chunk" flag indicating whether the nrblocks is
* physically contiguous on disk
*
* For Direct IO and fallocate, they calls get_block to allocate
* one single extent at a time, so they could set the "Chunk" flag
*/
idxblocks = ext4_index_trans_blocks(inode, nrblocks, chunk);
ret = idxblocks;
/*
* Now let's see how many group bitmaps and group descriptors need
* to account
*/
groups = idxblocks;
if (chunk)
groups += 1;
else
groups += nrblocks;
gdpblocks = groups;
if (groups > ngroups)
groups = ngroups;
if (groups > EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gdb_count)
gdpblocks = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gdb_count;
/* bitmaps and block group descriptor blocks */
ret += groups + gdpblocks;
/* Blocks for super block, inode, quota and xattr blocks */
ret += EXT4_META_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int printportlist(char *buf, int bufsize, struct portlist* pl, char * delim){
int printed = 0;
for(; pl; pl = pl->next){
if(printed > (bufsize - 64)) break;
if(pl->startport != pl->endport)
printed += sprintf(buf+printed, "%hu-%hu%s", pl->startport, pl->endport, pl->next?delim:"");
else {
/*
struct servent *se=NULL;
if(pl->startport)se = getservbyport((int)ntohs(pl->startport), NULL);
printed += sprintf(buf+printed, "%hu(%s)%s", pl->startport, se?se->s_name:"unknown", pl->next?delim:"");
*/
printed += sprintf(buf+printed, "%hu%s", pl->startport, pl->next?delim:"");
}
if(printed > (bufsize - 64)) {
printed += sprintf(buf+printed, "...");
break;
}
}
return printed;
}
Commit Message: Fix: out-of-bounds write and few more bugs in 'admin' configuration upload
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenMobilePlanTabAndActivate() {
OpenURL(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIMobileSetupURL), GURL(),
NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB, PageTransition::LINK);
window_->Activate();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool tcp_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *to,
struct sk_buff *from,
bool *fragstolen)
{
int delta;
*fragstolen = false;
/* Its possible this segment overlaps with prior segment in queue */
if (TCP_SKB_CB(from)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(to)->end_seq)
return false;
if (!skb_try_coalesce(to, from, fragstolen, &delta))
return false;
atomic_add(delta, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
sk_mem_charge(sk, delta);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPRCVCOALESCE);
TCP_SKB_CB(to)->end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(from)->end_seq;
TCP_SKB_CB(to)->ack_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(from)->ack_seq;
TCP_SKB_CB(to)->tcp_flags |= TCP_SKB_CB(from)->tcp_flags;
return true;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 55,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ConvertBigEndian(HFSPlusVolumeHeader* header) {
ConvertBigEndian(&header->signature);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->version);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->attributes);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->lastMountedVersion);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->journalInfoBlock);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->createDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->modifyDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->backupDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->checkedDate);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->fileCount);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->folderCount);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->blockSize);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->totalBlocks);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->freeBlocks);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->nextAllocation);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->rsrcClumpSize);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->dataClumpSize);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->nextCatalogID);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->writeCount);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->encodingsBitmap);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->allocationFile);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->extentsFile);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->catalogFile);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->attributesFile);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->startupFile);
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_core_cmd(RCore *core, const char *cstr, int log) {
char *cmd, *ocmd, *ptr, *rcmd;
int ret = false, i;
r_th_lock_enter (core->lock);
if (core->cmdfilter) {
const char *invalid_chars = ";|>`@";
for (i = 0; invalid_chars[i]; i++) {
if (strchr (cstr, invalid_chars[i])) {
ret = true;
goto beach;
}
}
if (strncmp (cstr, core->cmdfilter, strlen (core->cmdfilter))) {
ret = true;
goto beach;
}
}
if (core->cmdremote) {
if (*cstr != '=' && *cstr != 'q' && strncmp (cstr, "!=", 2)) {
r_io_system (core->io, cstr);
goto beach; // false
}
}
if (!cstr || *cstr == '|') {
goto beach; // false;
}
if (!strncmp (cstr, "/*", 2)) {
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
goto beach; // false
}
core->incomment = true;
} else if (!strncmp (cstr, "*/", 2)) {
core->incomment = false;
goto beach; // false
}
if (core->incomment) {
goto beach; // false
}
if (log && (*cstr && (*cstr != '.' || !strncmp (cstr, ".(", 2)))) {
free (core->lastcmd);
core->lastcmd = strdup (cstr);
}
ocmd = cmd = malloc (strlen (cstr) + 4096);
if (!ocmd) {
goto beach;
}
r_str_cpy (cmd, cstr);
if (log) {
r_line_hist_add (cstr);
}
if (core->cmd_depth < 1) {
eprintf ("r_core_cmd: That was too deep (%s)...\n", cmd);
free (ocmd);
free (core->oobi);
core->oobi = NULL;
core->oobi_len = 0;
goto beach;
}
core->cmd_depth--;
for (rcmd = cmd;;) {
ptr = strchr (rcmd, '\n');
if (ptr) {
*ptr = '\0';
}
ret = r_core_cmd_subst (core, rcmd);
if (ret == -1) {
eprintf ("|ERROR| Invalid command '%s' (0x%02x)\n", rcmd, *rcmd);
break;
}
if (!ptr) {
break;
}
rcmd = ptr + 1;
}
r_th_lock_leave (core->lock);
/* run pending analysis commands */
if (core->anal->cmdtail) {
char *res = core->anal->cmdtail;
core->anal->cmdtail = NULL;
r_core_cmd_lines (core, res);
free (res);
}
core->cmd_depth++;
free (ocmd);
free (core->oobi);
core->oobi = NULL;
core->oobi_len = 0;
return ret;
beach:
r_th_lock_leave (core->lock);
/* run pending analysis commands */
if (core->anal->cmdtail) {
char *res = core->anal->cmdtail;
core->anal->cmdtail = NULL;
r_core_cmd0 (core, res);
free (res);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Com_RealTime( qtime_t *qtime ) {
time_t t;
struct tm *tms;
t = time( NULL );
if ( !qtime ) {
return t;
}
tms = localtime( &t );
if ( tms ) {
qtime->tm_sec = tms->tm_sec;
qtime->tm_min = tms->tm_min;
qtime->tm_hour = tms->tm_hour;
qtime->tm_mday = tms->tm_mday;
qtime->tm_mon = tms->tm_mon;
qtime->tm_year = tms->tm_year;
qtime->tm_wday = tms->tm_wday;
qtime->tm_yday = tms->tm_yday;
qtime->tm_isdst = tms->tm_isdst;
}
return t;
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic;
ASSERT(vcpu != NULL);
apic_debug("apic_init %d\n", vcpu->vcpu_id);
apic = kzalloc(sizeof(*apic), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!apic)
goto nomem;
vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!apic->regs) {
printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
vcpu->vcpu_id);
goto nomem_free_apic;
}
apic->vcpu = vcpu;
hrtimer_init(&apic->lapic_timer.timer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
apic->lapic_timer.timer.function = apic_timer_fn;
/*
* APIC is created enabled. This will prevent kvm_lapic_set_base from
* thinking that APIC satet has changed.
*/
vcpu->arch.apic_base = MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu,
APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE);
static_key_slow_inc(&apic_sw_disabled.key); /* sw disabled at reset */
kvm_lapic_reset(vcpu);
kvm_iodevice_init(&apic->dev, &apic_mmio_ops);
return 0;
nomem_free_apic:
kfree(apic);
nomem:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderSVGImage::RenderSVGImage(SVGImageElement* impl)
: RenderSVGModelObject(impl)
, m_needsBoundariesUpdate(true)
, m_needsTransformUpdate(true)
, m_imageResource(RenderImageResource::create())
{
m_imageResource->initialize(this);
}
Commit Message: Avoid drawing SVG image content when the image is of zero size.
R=pdr
BUG=330420
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/109753004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@164536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebMediaPlayer::LoadTiming WebMediaPlayerMS::Load(
LoadType load_type,
const blink::WebMediaPlayerSource& source,
CORSMode /*cors_mode*/) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_NE(load_type, kLoadTypeMediaSource);
web_stream_ = GetWebMediaStreamFromWebMediaPlayerSource(source);
if (!web_stream_.IsNull())
web_stream_.AddObserver(this);
compositor_ = new WebMediaPlayerMSCompositor(
compositor_task_runner_, io_task_runner_, web_stream_,
create_submitter_callback_, surface_layer_for_video_enabled_,
AsWeakPtr());
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateLoading);
SetReadyState(WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveNothing);
std::string stream_id =
web_stream_.IsNull() ? std::string() : web_stream_.Id().Utf8();
media_log_->AddEvent(media_log_->CreateLoadEvent(stream_id));
frame_deliverer_.reset(new WebMediaPlayerMS::FrameDeliverer(
AsWeakPtr(),
base::BindRepeating(&WebMediaPlayerMSCompositor::EnqueueFrame,
compositor_),
media_task_runner_, worker_task_runner_, gpu_factories_));
video_frame_provider_ = renderer_factory_->GetVideoRenderer(
web_stream_,
media::BindToCurrentLoop(
base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerMS::OnSourceError, AsWeakPtr())),
frame_deliverer_->GetRepaintCallback(), io_task_runner_);
RenderFrame* const frame = RenderFrame::FromWebFrame(frame_);
int routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
GURL url = source.IsURL() ? GURL(source.GetAsURL()) : GURL();
if (frame) {
media::ReportMetrics(load_type, url, *frame_, media_log_.get());
routing_id = frame->GetRoutingID();
}
audio_renderer_ = renderer_factory_->GetAudioRenderer(
web_stream_, routing_id, initial_audio_output_device_id_);
if (!audio_renderer_)
WebRtcLogMessage("Warning: Failed to instantiate audio renderer.");
if (!video_frame_provider_ && !audio_renderer_) {
SetNetworkState(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateNetworkError);
return blink::WebMediaPlayer::LoadTiming::kImmediate;
}
if (audio_renderer_) {
audio_renderer_->SetVolume(volume_);
audio_renderer_->Start();
if (!web_stream_.IsNull()) {
blink::WebVector<blink::WebMediaStreamTrack> audio_tracks =
web_stream_.AudioTracks();
DCHECK_GT(audio_tracks.size(), 0U);
current_audio_track_id_ = audio_tracks[0].Id();
}
}
if (video_frame_provider_) {
video_frame_provider_->Start();
if (!web_stream_.IsNull()) {
blink::WebVector<blink::WebMediaStreamTrack> video_tracks =
web_stream_.VideoTracks();
DCHECK_GT(video_tracks.size(), 0U);
current_video_track_id_ = video_tracks[0].Id();
}
}
if (audio_renderer_ &&
(client_->IsAudioElement() || !video_frame_provider_)) {
SetReadyState(WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveMetadata);
SetReadyState(WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveEnoughData);
}
return blink::WebMediaPlayer::LoadTiming::kImmediate;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CWD_API int realpath_cache_max_buckets(TSRMLS_D)
{
return (sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)) / sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)[0]));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 9,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
void **p)
{
size_t i;
s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, flags);
if (!s)
return 0;
cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(s, flags);
local_irq_disable();
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
void *objp = __do_cache_alloc(s, flags);
if (unlikely(!objp))
goto error;
p[i] = objp;
}
local_irq_enable();
cache_alloc_debugcheck_after_bulk(s, flags, size, p, _RET_IP_);
/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled section */
if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO))
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
memset(p[i], 0, s->object_size);
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, size, p);
/* FIXME: Trace call missing. Christoph would like a bulk variant */
return size;
error:
local_irq_enable();
cache_alloc_debugcheck_after_bulk(s, flags, i, p, _RET_IP_);
slab_post_alloc_hook(s, flags, i, p);
__kmem_cache_free_bulk(s, i, p);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalDOMWindow::blur() {}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void drop_links(struct nameidata *nd)
{
int i = nd->depth;
while (i--) {
struct saved *last = nd->stack + i;
struct inode *inode = last->inode;
if (last->cookie && inode->i_op->put_link) {
inode->i_op->put_link(inode, last->cookie);
last->cookie = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 43,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::bindAttribLocation(WebGLProgram* program,
GLuint index,
const String& name) {
if (!ValidateWebGLObject("bindAttribLocation", program))
return;
if (!ValidateLocationLength("bindAttribLocation", name))
return;
if (IsPrefixReserved(name)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindAttribLocation",
"reserved prefix");
return;
}
ContextGL()->BindAttribLocation(ObjectOrZero(program), index,
name.Utf8().data());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL URLFixerUpper::FixupRelativeFile(const FilePath& base_dir,
const FilePath& text) {
FilePath old_cur_directory;
if (!base_dir.empty()) {
file_util::GetCurrentDirectory(&old_cur_directory);
file_util::SetCurrentDirectory(base_dir);
}
FilePath::StringType trimmed;
PrepareStringForFileOps(text, &trimmed);
bool is_file = true;
FilePath full_path;
if (!ValidPathForFile(trimmed, &full_path)) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
std::wstring unescaped = UTF8ToWide(UnescapeURLComponent(
WideToUTF8(trimmed),
UnescapeRule::SPACES | UnescapeRule::URL_SPECIAL_CHARS));
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
std::string unescaped = UnescapeURLComponent(
trimmed,
UnescapeRule::SPACES | UnescapeRule::URL_SPECIAL_CHARS);
#endif
if (!ValidPathForFile(unescaped, &full_path))
is_file = false;
}
if (!base_dir.empty())
file_util::SetCurrentDirectory(old_cur_directory);
if (is_file) {
GURL file_url = net::FilePathToFileURL(full_path);
if (file_url.is_valid())
return GURL(UTF16ToUTF8(net::FormatUrl(file_url, std::string(),
net::kFormatUrlOmitUsernamePassword, UnescapeRule::NORMAL, NULL,
NULL, NULL)));
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
std::string text_utf8 = WideToUTF8(text.value());
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
std::string text_utf8 = text.value();
#endif
return FixupURL(text_utf8, std::string());
}
Commit Message: Be a little more careful whether something is an URL or a file path.
BUG=72492
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95731 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::~ResourceDispatcherHostImpl() {
DCHECK(g_resource_dispatcher_host);
g_resource_dispatcher_host = NULL;
AsyncResourceHandler::GlobalCleanup();
for (PendingRequestList::const_iterator i = pending_requests_.begin();
i != pending_requests_.end(); ++i) {
transferred_navigations_.erase(i->first);
}
STLDeleteValues(&pending_requests_);
DCHECK(transferred_navigations_.empty());
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RuleSet* CSSDefaultStyleSheets::viewSourceStyle()
{
if (!defaultViewSourceStyle) {
defaultViewSourceStyle = RuleSet::create().leakPtr();
defaultViewSourceStyle->addRulesFromSheet(parseUASheet(sourceUserAgentStyleSheet, sizeof(sourceUserAgentStyleSheet)), screenEval());
}
return defaultViewSourceStyle;
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gmt_offset (time_t s)
{
long gmtoff;
#if !HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
struct tm tm_local = *localtime (&s);
struct tm tm_gmt = *gmtime (&s);
gmtoff = tm_diff (&tm_local, &tm_gmt);
#else
gmtoff = localtime (&s)->tm_gmtoff;
#endif
return gmtoff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compare_read(struct display *dp, int applied_transforms)
{
/* Compare the png_info from read_ip with original_info */
size_t rowbytes;
png_uint_32 width, height;
int bit_depth, color_type;
int interlace_method, compression_method, filter_method;
const char *e = NULL;
png_get_IHDR(dp->read_pp, dp->read_ip, &width, &height, &bit_depth,
&color_type, &interlace_method, &compression_method, &filter_method);
# define C(item) if (item != dp->item) \
display_log(dp, APP_WARNING, "IHDR " #item "(%lu) changed to %lu",\
(unsigned long)dp->item, (unsigned long)item), e = #item
/* The IHDR should be identical: */
C(width);
C(height);
C(bit_depth);
C(color_type);
C(interlace_method);
C(compression_method);
C(filter_method);
/* 'e' remains set to the name of the last thing changed: */
if (e)
display_log(dp, APP_ERROR, "IHDR changed (%s)", e);
/* All the chunks from the original PNG should be preserved in the output PNG
* because the PNG format has not been changed.
*/
{
unsigned long chunks =
png_get_valid(dp->read_pp, dp->read_ip, 0xffffffff);
if (chunks != dp->chunks)
display_log(dp, APP_FAIL, "PNG chunks changed from 0x%lx to 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)dp->chunks, chunks);
}
/* rowbytes should be the same */
rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(dp->read_pp, dp->read_ip);
/* NOTE: on 64-bit systems this may trash the top bits of rowbytes,
* which could lead to weird error messages.
*/
if (rowbytes != dp->original_rowbytes)
display_log(dp, APP_ERROR, "PNG rowbytes changed from %lu to %lu",
(unsigned long)dp->original_rowbytes, (unsigned long)rowbytes);
/* The rows should be the same too, unless the applied transforms includes
* the shift transform, in which case low bits may have been lost.
*/
{
png_bytepp rows = png_get_rows(dp->read_pp, dp->read_ip);
unsigned int mask; /* mask (if not zero) for the final byte */
if (bit_depth < 8)
{
/* Need the stray bits at the end, this depends only on the low bits
* of the image width; overflow does not matter. If the width is an
* exact multiple of 8 bits this gives a mask of 0, not 0xff.
*/
mask = 0xff & (0xff00 >> ((bit_depth * width) & 7));
}
else
mask = 0;
if (rows == NULL)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_rows returned NULL");
if ((applied_transforms & PNG_TRANSFORM_SHIFT) == 0 ||
(dp->active_transforms & PNG_TRANSFORM_SHIFT) == 0 ||
color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
unsigned long y;
for (y=0; y<height; ++y)
{
png_bytep row = rows[y];
png_bytep orig = dp->original_rows[y];
if (memcmp(row, orig, rowbytes-(mask != 0)) != 0 || (mask != 0 &&
((row[rowbytes-1] & mask) != (orig[rowbytes-1] & mask))))
{
size_t x;
/* Find the first error */
for (x=0; x<rowbytes-1; ++x) if (row[x] != orig[x])
break;
display_log(dp, APP_FAIL,
"byte(%lu,%lu) changed 0x%.2x -> 0x%.2x",
(unsigned long)x, (unsigned long)y, orig[x], row[x]);
return 0; /* don't keep reporting failed rows on 'continue' */
}
}
}
else
{
unsigned long y;
int bpp; /* bits-per-pixel then bytes-per-pixel */
/* components are up to 8 bytes in size */
png_byte sig_bits[8];
png_color_8p sBIT;
if (png_get_sBIT(dp->read_pp, dp->read_ip, &sBIT) != PNG_INFO_sBIT)
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR,
"active shift transform but no sBIT in file");
switch (color_type)
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
sig_bits[0] = sBIT->gray;
bpp = bit_depth;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GA:
sig_bits[0] = sBIT->gray;
sig_bits[1] = sBIT->alpha;
bpp = 2 * bit_depth;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
sig_bits[0] = sBIT->red;
sig_bits[1] = sBIT->green;
sig_bits[2] = sBIT->blue;
bpp = 3 * bit_depth;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGBA:
sig_bits[0] = sBIT->red;
sig_bits[1] = sBIT->green;
sig_bits[2] = sBIT->blue;
sig_bits[3] = sBIT->alpha;
bpp = 4 * bit_depth;
break;
default:
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_ERROR, "invalid colour type %d",
color_type);
/*NOTREACHED*/
bpp = 0;
break;
}
{
int b;
for (b=0; 8*b<bpp; ++b)
{
/* libpng should catch this; if not there is a security issue
* because an app (like this one) may overflow an array. In fact
* libpng doesn't catch this at present.
*/
if (sig_bits[b] == 0 || sig_bits[b] > bit_depth/*!palette*/)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG,
"invalid sBIT[%u] value %d returned for PNG bit depth %d",
b, sig_bits[b], bit_depth);
}
}
if (bpp < 8 && bpp != bit_depth)
{
/* sanity check; this is a grayscale PNG; something is wrong in the
* code above.
*/
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "invalid bpp %u for bit_depth %u",
bpp, bit_depth);
}
switch (bit_depth)
{
int b;
case 16: /* Two bytes per component, bit-endian */
for (b = (bpp >> 4); b > 0; )
{
unsigned int sig = (unsigned int)(0xffff0000 >> sig_bits[b]);
sig_bits[2*b+1] = (png_byte)sig;
sig_bits[2*b+0] = (png_byte)(sig >> 8); /* big-endian */
}
break;
case 8: /* One byte per component */
for (b=0; b*8 < bpp; ++b)
sig_bits[b] = (png_byte)(0xff00 >> sig_bits[b]);
break;
case 1: /* allowed, but dumb */
/* Value is 1 */
sig_bits[0] = 0xff;
break;
case 2: /* Replicate 4 times */
/* Value is 1 or 2 */
b = 0x3 & ((0x3<<2) >> sig_bits[0]);
b |= b << 2;
b |= b << 4;
sig_bits[0] = (png_byte)b;
break;
case 4: /* Relicate twice */
/* Value is 1, 2, 3 or 4 */
b = 0xf & ((0xf << 4) >> sig_bits[0]);
b |= b << 4;
sig_bits[0] = (png_byte)b;
break;
default:
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "invalid bit depth %d", bit_depth);
break;
}
/* Convert bpp to bytes; this gives '1' for low-bit depth grayscale,
* where there are multiple pixels per byte.
*/
bpp = (bpp+7) >> 3;
/* The mask can be combined with sig_bits[0] */
if (mask != 0)
{
mask &= sig_bits[0];
if (bpp != 1 || mask == 0)
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "mask calculation error %u, %u",
bpp, mask);
}
for (y=0; y<height; ++y)
{
png_bytep row = rows[y];
png_bytep orig = dp->original_rows[y];
unsigned long x;
for (x=0; x<(width-(mask!=0)); ++x)
{
int b;
for (b=0; b<bpp; ++b)
{
if ((*row++ & sig_bits[b]) != (*orig++ & sig_bits[b]))
{
display_log(dp, APP_FAIL,
"significant bits at (%lu[%u],%lu) changed %.2x->%.2x",
x, b, y, orig[-1], row[-1]);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (mask != 0 && (*row & mask) != (*orig & mask))
{
display_log(dp, APP_FAIL,
"significant bits at (%lu[end],%lu) changed", x, y);
return 0;
}
} /* for y */
}
}
return 1; /* compare succeeded */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx,
SSL_SESSION *session)
{
server_rec *s;
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc;
IDCONST unsigned char *id;
unsigned int idlen;
/*
* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context
*/
if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) {
return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */
}
sc = mySrvConfig(s);
/*
* Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
id = (unsigned char *)SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen);
#else
id = session->session_id;
idlen = session->session_id_length;
#endif
/* TODO: Do we need a temp pool here, or are we always shutting down? */
ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen, sc->mc->pPool);
ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen,
"OK", "dead", 0);
return;
}
Commit Message: modssl: reset client-verify state when renegotiation is aborted
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1750779 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 52,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs_callback_up(u32 minorversion, struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
{
struct svc_serv *serv;
struct nfs_callback_data *cb_info = &nfs_callback_info[minorversion];
int ret;
struct net *net = xprt->xprt_net;
mutex_lock(&nfs_callback_mutex);
serv = nfs_callback_create_svc(minorversion);
if (IS_ERR(serv)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(serv);
goto err_create;
}
ret = nfs_callback_up_net(minorversion, serv, net, xprt);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_net;
ret = nfs_callback_start_svc(minorversion, xprt, serv);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_start;
cb_info->users++;
/*
* svc_create creates the svc_serv with sv_nrthreads == 1, and then
* svc_prepare_thread increments that. So we need to call svc_destroy
* on both success and failure so that the refcount is 1 when the
* thread exits.
*/
err_net:
if (!cb_info->users)
cb_info->serv = NULL;
svc_destroy(serv);
err_create:
mutex_unlock(&nfs_callback_mutex);
return ret;
err_start:
nfs_callback_down_net(minorversion, serv, net);
dprintk("NFS: Couldn't create server thread; err = %d\n", ret);
goto err_net;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API int r_core_cmd(RCore *core, const char *cstr, int log) {
char *cmd, *ocmd, *ptr, *rcmd;
int ret = false, i;
if (core->cmdfilter) {
const char *invalid_chars = ";|>`@";
for (i = 0; invalid_chars[i]; i++) {
if (strchr (cstr, invalid_chars[i])) {
ret = true;
goto beach;
}
}
if (strncmp (cstr, core->cmdfilter, strlen (core->cmdfilter))) {
ret = true;
goto beach;
}
}
if (core->cmdremote) {
if (*cstr != '=' && *cstr != 'q' && strncmp (cstr, "!=", 2)) {
char *res = r_io_system (core->io, cstr);
if (res) {
r_cons_printf ("%s\n", res);
free (res);
}
goto beach; // false
}
}
if (!cstr || (*cstr == '|' && cstr[1] != '?')) {
goto beach; // false;
}
if (!strncmp (cstr, "/*", 2)) {
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
goto beach; // false
}
core->incomment = true;
} else if (!strncmp (cstr, "*/", 2)) {
core->incomment = false;
goto beach; // false
}
if (core->incomment) {
goto beach; // false
}
if (log && (*cstr && (*cstr != '.' || !strncmp (cstr, ".(", 2)))) {
free (core->lastcmd);
core->lastcmd = strdup (cstr);
}
ocmd = cmd = malloc (strlen (cstr) + 4096);
if (!ocmd) {
goto beach;
}
r_str_cpy (cmd, cstr);
if (log) {
r_line_hist_add (cstr);
}
if (core->cons->context->cmd_depth < 1) {
eprintf ("r_core_cmd: That was too deep (%s)...\n", cmd);
free (ocmd);
R_FREE (core->oobi);
core->oobi_len = 0;
goto beach;
}
core->cons->context->cmd_depth--;
for (rcmd = cmd;;) {
ptr = strchr (rcmd, '\n');
if (ptr) {
*ptr = '\0';
}
ret = r_core_cmd_subst (core, rcmd);
if (ret == -1) {
eprintf ("|ERROR| Invalid command '%s' (0x%02x)\n", rcmd, *rcmd);
break;
}
if (!ptr) {
break;
}
rcmd = ptr + 1;
}
/* run pending analysis commands */
run_pending_anal (core);
core->cons->context->cmd_depth++;
free (ocmd);
R_FREE (core->oobi);
core->oobi_len = 0;
return ret;
beach:
if (r_list_empty (core->tasks)) {
r_th_lock_leave (core->lock);
} else {
RListIter *iter;
RCoreTask *task;
r_list_foreach (core->tasks, iter, task) {
r_th_pause (task->thread, false);
}
}
/* run pending analysis commands */
run_pending_anal (core);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 87,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct rtnl_link_stats64 *dev_get_stats(struct net_device *dev,
struct rtnl_link_stats64 *storage)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
if (ops->ndo_get_stats64) {
memset(storage, 0, sizeof(*storage));
ops->ndo_get_stats64(dev, storage);
} else if (ops->ndo_get_stats) {
netdev_stats_to_stats64(storage, ops->ndo_get_stats(dev));
} else {
netdev_stats_to_stats64(storage, &dev->stats);
}
storage->rx_dropped += (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&dev->rx_dropped);
storage->tx_dropped += (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&dev->tx_dropped);
storage->rx_nohandler += (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&dev->rx_nohandler);
return storage;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::Shutdown() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderProcessObserver, observers_, OnRenderProcessShutdown());
ChildThread::Shutdown();
if (memory_observer_) {
message_loop()->RemoveTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
memory_observer_.reset();
}
if (webkit_platform_support_) {
webkit_platform_support_->web_database_observer_impl()->
WaitForAllDatabasesToClose();
}
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = NULL;
}
RemoveFilter(audio_input_message_filter_.get());
audio_input_message_filter_ = NULL;
RemoveFilter(audio_message_filter_.get());
audio_message_filter_ = NULL;
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
RTCPeerConnectionHandler::DestructAllHandlers();
peer_connection_factory_.reset();
#endif
RemoveFilter(vc_manager_->video_capture_message_filter());
vc_manager_.reset();
RemoveFilter(db_message_filter_.get());
db_message_filter_ = NULL;
if (file_thread_)
file_thread_->Stop();
if (compositor_output_surface_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
compositor_output_surface_filter_ = NULL;
}
media_thread_.reset();
compositor_thread_.reset();
input_handler_manager_.reset();
if (input_event_filter_.get()) {
RemoveFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_event_filter_ = NULL;
}
embedded_worker_dispatcher_.reset();
main_thread_indexed_db_dispatcher_.reset();
if (webkit_platform_support_)
blink::shutdown();
lazy_tls.Pointer()->Set(NULL);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
NPChannelBase::CleanupChannels();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 171,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickPrivate ColorspaceType GetPixelCacheColorspace(const Cache cache)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (cache_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
cache_info->filename);
return(cache_info->colorspace);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_NPP_StreamAsFile(rpc_connection_t *connection)
{
D(bug("handle_NPP_StreamAsFile\n"));
PluginInstance *plugin;
NPStream *stream;
char *fname;
int error = rpc_method_get_args(connection,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, &plugin,
RPC_TYPE_NP_STREAM, &stream,
RPC_TYPE_STRING, &fname,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPP_StreamAsFile() get args", error);
return error;
}
g_NPP_StreamAsFile(PLUGIN_INSTANCE_NPP(plugin), stream, fname);
if (fname)
free(fname);
return rpc_method_send_reply (connection, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct request_list *__blk_queue_next_rl(struct request_list *rl,
struct request_queue *q)
{
struct list_head *ent;
struct blkcg_gq *blkg;
/*
* Determine the current blkg list_head. The first entry is
* root_rl which is off @q->blkg_list and mapped to the head.
*/
if (rl == &q->root_rl) {
ent = &q->blkg_list;
/* There are no more block groups, hence no request lists */
if (list_empty(ent))
return NULL;
} else {
blkg = container_of(rl, struct blkcg_gq, rl);
ent = &blkg->q_node;
}
/* walk to the next list_head, skip root blkcg */
ent = ent->next;
if (ent == &q->root_blkg->q_node)
ent = ent->next;
if (ent == &q->blkg_list)
return NULL;
blkg = container_of(ent, struct blkcg_gq, q_node);
return &blkg->rl;
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestContentClient::TestContentClient() {
FilePath content_resources_pack_path;
PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &content_resources_pack_path);
content_resources_pack_path = content_resources_pack_path.Append(
FILE_PATH_LITERAL("content_resources.pak"));
data_pack_.Load(content_resources_pack_path);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jint WebContentsAndroid::GetBackgroundColor(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid* rwhva = GetRenderWidgetHostViewAndroid();
if (!rwhva)
return SK_ColorWHITE;
return rwhva->GetCachedBackgroundColor();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::StartDragging(LocalFrame* frame,
const WebDragData& drag_data,
WebDragOperationsMask mask,
const WebImage& drag_image,
const WebPoint& drag_image_offset) {
WebLocalFrameImpl* web_frame = WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame);
WebReferrerPolicy policy = web_frame->GetDocument().GetReferrerPolicy();
web_frame->LocalRoot()->FrameWidget()->StartDragging(
policy, drag_data, mask, drag_image, drag_image_offset);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::bindToExecutionContext(
ExecutionContext* executionContext) {
m_executionContext = executionContext;
applyPolicySideEffectsToExecutionContext();
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InitConstructClientIdCtx(ConstructClientIdCtx *ctx)
{
ctx->numIds = 0;
ctx->resultBytes = 0;
xorg_list_init(&ctx->response);
memset(ctx->sentClientMasks, 0, sizeof(ctx->sentClientMasks));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegateImpl::UnpinApp(const std::string& extension_id) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rpc_task_force_reencode(struct rpc_task *task)
{
task->tk_rqstp->rq_snd_buf.len = 0;
task->tk_rqstp->rq_bytes_sent = 0;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::RemovePendingLoader(
const LoaderMap::iterator& iter) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = iter->second->GetRequestInfo();
if (info->keepalive())
keepalive_statistics_recorder_.OnLoadFinished(info->GetChildID());
IncrementOutstandingRequestsMemory(-1, *info);
pending_loaders_.erase(iter);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 152,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Free_PairPos( HB_GPOS_SubTable* st )
{
HB_UShort format1, format2;
HB_PairPos* pp = &st->pair;
format1 = pp->ValueFormat1;
format2 = pp->ValueFormat2;
switch ( pp->PosFormat )
{
case 1:
Free_PairPos1( &pp->ppf.ppf1, format1, format2 );
break;
case 2:
Free_PairPos2( &pp->ppf.ppf2, format1, format2 );
break;
default:
break;
}
_HB_OPEN_Free_Coverage( &pp->Coverage );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::ShowContextMenu(const blink::WebContextMenuData& data) {
ContextMenuParams params = ContextMenuParamsBuilder::Build(data);
blink::WebRect position_in_window(params.x, params.y, 0, 0);
GetRenderWidget()->ConvertViewportToWindow(&position_in_window);
params.x = position_in_window.x;
params.y = position_in_window.y;
GetRenderWidget()->OnShowHostContextMenu(¶ms);
if (GetRenderWidget()->has_host_context_menu_location()) {
params.x = GetRenderWidget()->host_context_menu_location().x();
params.y = GetRenderWidget()->host_context_menu_location().y();
}
if (params.src_url.spec().size() > url::kMaxURLChars)
params.src_url = GURL();
blink::WebRect selection_in_window(data.selection_rect);
GetRenderWidget()->ConvertViewportToWindow(&selection_in_window);
params.selection_rect = selection_in_window;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::ShowDeferredContextMenu,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), params));
#else
ShowDeferredContextMenu(params);
#endif
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void floppy_device_release(struct device *dev)
{
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int start_this_handle(journal_t *journal, handle_t *handle,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
transaction_t *transaction, *new_transaction = NULL;
tid_t tid;
int needed, need_to_start;
int nblocks = handle->h_buffer_credits;
unsigned long ts = jiffies;
if (nblocks > journal->j_max_transaction_buffers) {
printk(KERN_ERR "JBD2: %s wants too many credits (%d > %d)\n",
current->comm, nblocks,
journal->j_max_transaction_buffers);
return -ENOSPC;
}
alloc_transaction:
if (!journal->j_running_transaction) {
new_transaction = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_transaction), gfp_mask);
if (!new_transaction) {
/*
* If __GFP_FS is not present, then we may be
* being called from inside the fs writeback
* layer, so we MUST NOT fail. Since
* __GFP_NOFAIL is going away, we will arrange
* to retry the allocation ourselves.
*/
if ((gfp_mask & __GFP_FS) == 0) {
congestion_wait(BLK_RW_ASYNC, HZ/50);
goto alloc_transaction;
}
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
jbd_debug(3, "New handle %p going live.\n", handle);
/*
* We need to hold j_state_lock until t_updates has been incremented,
* for proper journal barrier handling
*/
repeat:
read_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
BUG_ON(journal->j_flags & JBD2_UNMOUNT);
if (is_journal_aborted(journal) ||
(journal->j_errno != 0 && !(journal->j_flags & JBD2_ACK_ERR))) {
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
kfree(new_transaction);
return -EROFS;
}
/* Wait on the journal's transaction barrier if necessary */
if (journal->j_barrier_count) {
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
wait_event(journal->j_wait_transaction_locked,
journal->j_barrier_count == 0);
goto repeat;
}
if (!journal->j_running_transaction) {
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (!new_transaction)
goto alloc_transaction;
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (!journal->j_running_transaction) {
jbd2_get_transaction(journal, new_transaction);
new_transaction = NULL;
}
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
goto repeat;
}
transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
/*
* If the current transaction is locked down for commit, wait for the
* lock to be released.
*/
if (transaction->t_state == T_LOCKED) {
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
prepare_to_wait(&journal->j_wait_transaction_locked,
&wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
schedule();
finish_wait(&journal->j_wait_transaction_locked, &wait);
goto repeat;
}
/*
* If there is not enough space left in the log to write all potential
* buffers requested by this operation, we need to stall pending a log
* checkpoint to free some more log space.
*/
needed = atomic_add_return(nblocks,
&transaction->t_outstanding_credits);
if (needed > journal->j_max_transaction_buffers) {
/*
* If the current transaction is already too large, then start
* to commit it: we can then go back and attach this handle to
* a new transaction.
*/
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
jbd_debug(2, "Handle %p starting new commit...\n", handle);
atomic_sub(nblocks, &transaction->t_outstanding_credits);
prepare_to_wait(&journal->j_wait_transaction_locked, &wait,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
tid = transaction->t_tid;
need_to_start = !tid_geq(journal->j_commit_request, tid);
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (need_to_start)
jbd2_log_start_commit(journal, tid);
schedule();
finish_wait(&journal->j_wait_transaction_locked, &wait);
goto repeat;
}
/*
* The commit code assumes that it can get enough log space
* without forcing a checkpoint. This is *critical* for
* correctness: a checkpoint of a buffer which is also
* associated with a committing transaction creates a deadlock,
* so commit simply cannot force through checkpoints.
*
* We must therefore ensure the necessary space in the journal
* *before* starting to dirty potentially checkpointed buffers
* in the new transaction.
*
* The worst part is, any transaction currently committing can
* reduce the free space arbitrarily. Be careful to account for
* those buffers when checkpointing.
*/
/*
* @@@ AKPM: This seems rather over-defensive. We're giving commit
* a _lot_ of headroom: 1/4 of the journal plus the size of
* the committing transaction. Really, we only need to give it
* committing_transaction->t_outstanding_credits plus "enough" for
* the log control blocks.
* Also, this test is inconsistent with the matching one in
* jbd2_journal_extend().
*/
if (__jbd2_log_space_left(journal) < jbd_space_needed(journal)) {
jbd_debug(2, "Handle %p waiting for checkpoint...\n", handle);
atomic_sub(nblocks, &transaction->t_outstanding_credits);
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (__jbd2_log_space_left(journal) < jbd_space_needed(journal))
__jbd2_log_wait_for_space(journal);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
goto repeat;
}
/* OK, account for the buffers that this operation expects to
* use and add the handle to the running transaction.
*/
update_t_max_wait(transaction, ts);
handle->h_transaction = transaction;
atomic_inc(&transaction->t_updates);
atomic_inc(&transaction->t_handle_count);
jbd_debug(4, "Handle %p given %d credits (total %d, free %d)\n",
handle, nblocks,
atomic_read(&transaction->t_outstanding_credits),
__jbd2_log_space_left(journal));
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
lock_map_acquire(&handle->h_lockdep_map);
kfree(new_transaction);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __mlx5_ib_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *ibqp,
const struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int attr_mask,
enum ib_qp_state cur_state, enum ib_qp_state new_state,
const struct mlx5_ib_modify_qp *ucmd)
{
static const u16 optab[MLX5_QP_NUM_STATE][MLX5_QP_NUM_STATE] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_INIT] = MLX5_CMD_OP_RST2INIT_QP,
},
[MLX5_QP_STATE_INIT] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_INIT] = MLX5_CMD_OP_INIT2INIT_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RTR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_INIT2RTR_QP,
},
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RTR] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RTS] = MLX5_CMD_OP_RTR2RTS_QP,
},
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RTS] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RTS] = MLX5_CMD_OP_RTS2RTS_QP,
},
[MLX5_QP_STATE_SQD] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
},
[MLX5_QP_STATE_SQER] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RTS] = MLX5_CMD_OP_SQERR2RTS_QP,
},
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = {
[MLX5_QP_STATE_RST] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2RST_QP,
[MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR] = MLX5_CMD_OP_2ERR_QP,
}
};
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(ibqp->device);
struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp = to_mqp(ibqp);
struct mlx5_ib_qp_base *base = &qp->trans_qp.base;
struct mlx5_ib_cq *send_cq, *recv_cq;
struct mlx5_qp_context *context;
struct mlx5_ib_pd *pd;
struct mlx5_ib_port *mibport = NULL;
enum mlx5_qp_state mlx5_cur, mlx5_new;
enum mlx5_qp_optpar optpar;
int mlx5_st;
int err;
u16 op;
u8 tx_affinity = 0;
mlx5_st = to_mlx5_st(ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_DRIVER ?
qp->qp_sub_type : ibqp->qp_type);
if (mlx5_st < 0)
return -EINVAL;
context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!context)
return -ENOMEM;
context->flags = cpu_to_be32(mlx5_st << 16);
if (!(attr_mask & IB_QP_PATH_MIG_STATE)) {
context->flags |= cpu_to_be32(MLX5_QP_PM_MIGRATED << 11);
} else {
switch (attr->path_mig_state) {
case IB_MIG_MIGRATED:
context->flags |= cpu_to_be32(MLX5_QP_PM_MIGRATED << 11);
break;
case IB_MIG_REARM:
context->flags |= cpu_to_be32(MLX5_QP_PM_REARM << 11);
break;
case IB_MIG_ARMED:
context->flags |= cpu_to_be32(MLX5_QP_PM_ARMED << 11);
break;
}
}
if ((cur_state == IB_QPS_RESET) && (new_state == IB_QPS_INIT)) {
if ((ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_RC) ||
(ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD &&
!(qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_SQPN_QP1)) ||
(ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_UC) ||
(ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET) ||
(ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_XRC_INI) ||
(ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_XRC_TGT)) {
if (mlx5_lag_is_active(dev->mdev)) {
u8 p = mlx5_core_native_port_num(dev->mdev);
tx_affinity = (unsigned int)atomic_add_return(1,
&dev->roce[p].next_port) %
MLX5_MAX_PORTS + 1;
context->flags |= cpu_to_be32(tx_affinity << 24);
}
}
}
if (is_sqp(ibqp->qp_type)) {
context->mtu_msgmax = (IB_MTU_256 << 5) | 8;
} else if ((ibqp->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD &&
!(qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY)) ||
ibqp->qp_type == MLX5_IB_QPT_REG_UMR) {
context->mtu_msgmax = (IB_MTU_4096 << 5) | 12;
} else if (attr_mask & IB_QP_PATH_MTU) {
if (attr->path_mtu < IB_MTU_256 ||
attr->path_mtu > IB_MTU_4096) {
mlx5_ib_warn(dev, "invalid mtu %d\n", attr->path_mtu);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
context->mtu_msgmax = (attr->path_mtu << 5) |
(u8)MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, log_max_msg);
}
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_DEST_QPN)
context->log_pg_sz_remote_qpn = cpu_to_be32(attr->dest_qp_num);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX)
context->pri_path.pkey_index = cpu_to_be16(attr->pkey_index);
/* todo implement counter_index functionality */
if (is_sqp(ibqp->qp_type))
context->pri_path.port = qp->port;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT)
context->pri_path.port = attr->port_num;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_AV) {
err = mlx5_set_path(dev, qp, &attr->ah_attr, &context->pri_path,
attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT ? attr->port_num : qp->port,
attr_mask, 0, attr, false);
if (err)
goto out;
}
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_TIMEOUT)
context->pri_path.ackto_lt |= attr->timeout << 3;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH) {
err = mlx5_set_path(dev, qp, &attr->alt_ah_attr,
&context->alt_path,
attr->alt_port_num,
attr_mask | IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_TIMEOUT,
0, attr, true);
if (err)
goto out;
}
pd = get_pd(qp);
get_cqs(qp->ibqp.qp_type, qp->ibqp.send_cq, qp->ibqp.recv_cq,
&send_cq, &recv_cq);
context->flags_pd = cpu_to_be32(pd ? pd->pdn : to_mpd(dev->devr.p0)->pdn);
context->cqn_send = send_cq ? cpu_to_be32(send_cq->mcq.cqn) : 0;
context->cqn_recv = recv_cq ? cpu_to_be32(recv_cq->mcq.cqn) : 0;
context->params1 = cpu_to_be32(MLX5_IB_ACK_REQ_FREQ << 28);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_RNR_RETRY)
context->params1 |= cpu_to_be32(attr->rnr_retry << 13);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_RETRY_CNT)
context->params1 |= cpu_to_be32(attr->retry_cnt << 16);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_MAX_QP_RD_ATOMIC) {
if (attr->max_rd_atomic)
context->params1 |=
cpu_to_be32(fls(attr->max_rd_atomic - 1) << 21);
}
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_SQ_PSN)
context->next_send_psn = cpu_to_be32(attr->sq_psn);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC) {
if (attr->max_dest_rd_atomic)
context->params2 |=
cpu_to_be32(fls(attr->max_dest_rd_atomic - 1) << 21);
}
if (attr_mask & (IB_QP_ACCESS_FLAGS | IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC))
context->params2 |= to_mlx5_access_flags(qp, attr, attr_mask);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_MIN_RNR_TIMER)
context->rnr_nextrecvpsn |= cpu_to_be32(attr->min_rnr_timer << 24);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_RQ_PSN)
context->rnr_nextrecvpsn |= cpu_to_be32(attr->rq_psn);
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_QKEY)
context->qkey = cpu_to_be32(attr->qkey);
if (qp->rq.wqe_cnt && cur_state == IB_QPS_RESET && new_state == IB_QPS_INIT)
context->db_rec_addr = cpu_to_be64(qp->db.dma);
if (cur_state == IB_QPS_RESET && new_state == IB_QPS_INIT) {
u8 port_num = (attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT ? attr->port_num :
qp->port) - 1;
/* Underlay port should be used - index 0 function per port */
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY)
port_num = 0;
mibport = &dev->port[port_num];
context->qp_counter_set_usr_page |=
cpu_to_be32((u32)(mibport->cnts.set_id) << 24);
}
if (!ibqp->uobject && cur_state == IB_QPS_RESET && new_state == IB_QPS_INIT)
context->sq_crq_size |= cpu_to_be16(1 << 4);
if (qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_SQPN_QP1)
context->deth_sqpn = cpu_to_be32(1);
mlx5_cur = to_mlx5_state(cur_state);
mlx5_new = to_mlx5_state(new_state);
if (mlx5_cur >= MLX5_QP_NUM_STATE || mlx5_new >= MLX5_QP_NUM_STATE ||
!optab[mlx5_cur][mlx5_new]) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
op = optab[mlx5_cur][mlx5_new];
optpar = ib_mask_to_mlx5_opt(attr_mask);
optpar &= opt_mask[mlx5_cur][mlx5_new][mlx5_st];
if (qp->ibqp.qp_type == IB_QPT_RAW_PACKET ||
qp->flags & MLX5_IB_QP_UNDERLAY) {
struct mlx5_modify_raw_qp_param raw_qp_param = {};
raw_qp_param.operation = op;
if (cur_state == IB_QPS_RESET && new_state == IB_QPS_INIT) {
raw_qp_param.rq_q_ctr_id = mibport->cnts.set_id;
raw_qp_param.set_mask |= MLX5_RAW_QP_MOD_SET_RQ_Q_CTR_ID;
}
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_RATE_LIMIT) {
raw_qp_param.rl.rate = attr->rate_limit;
if (ucmd->burst_info.max_burst_sz) {
if (attr->rate_limit &&
MLX5_CAP_QOS(dev->mdev, packet_pacing_burst_bound)) {
raw_qp_param.rl.max_burst_sz =
ucmd->burst_info.max_burst_sz;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
if (ucmd->burst_info.typical_pkt_sz) {
if (attr->rate_limit &&
MLX5_CAP_QOS(dev->mdev, packet_pacing_typical_size)) {
raw_qp_param.rl.typical_pkt_sz =
ucmd->burst_info.typical_pkt_sz;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
raw_qp_param.set_mask |= MLX5_RAW_QP_RATE_LIMIT;
}
err = modify_raw_packet_qp(dev, qp, &raw_qp_param, tx_affinity);
} else {
err = mlx5_core_qp_modify(dev->mdev, op, optpar, context,
&base->mqp);
}
if (err)
goto out;
qp->state = new_state;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_ACCESS_FLAGS)
qp->trans_qp.atomic_rd_en = attr->qp_access_flags;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC)
qp->trans_qp.resp_depth = attr->max_dest_rd_atomic;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT)
qp->port = attr->port_num;
if (attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH)
qp->trans_qp.alt_port = attr->alt_port_num;
/*
* If we moved a kernel QP to RESET, clean up all old CQ
* entries and reinitialize the QP.
*/
if (new_state == IB_QPS_RESET &&
!ibqp->uobject && ibqp->qp_type != IB_QPT_XRC_TGT) {
mlx5_ib_cq_clean(recv_cq, base->mqp.qpn,
ibqp->srq ? to_msrq(ibqp->srq) : NULL);
if (send_cq != recv_cq)
mlx5_ib_cq_clean(send_cq, base->mqp.qpn, NULL);
qp->rq.head = 0;
qp->rq.tail = 0;
qp->sq.head = 0;
qp->sq.tail = 0;
qp->sq.cur_post = 0;
qp->sq.last_poll = 0;
qp->db.db[MLX5_RCV_DBR] = 0;
qp->db.db[MLX5_SND_DBR] = 0;
}
out:
kfree(context);
return err;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Wait() {
message_loop_runner_->Run();
message_loop_runner_ = new MessageLoopRunner;
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,915
|
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