instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltFuncNewFunctionData (void) {
exsltFuncFunctionData *ret;
ret = (exsltFuncFunctionData *) xmlMalloc (sizeof(exsltFuncFunctionData));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"exsltFuncNewFunctionData: not enough memory\n");
return (NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(exsltFuncFunctionData));
ret->nargs = 0;
ret->content = NULL;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TestRenderWidgetHostView::SupportsSpeech() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* ProfileChooserView::GetInitiallyFocusedView() {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!GetFocusManager() || !GetFocusManager()->keyboard_accessible())
return nullptr;
#endif
return signin_current_profile_button_;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_keywords )
{
UEnumeration* e = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* kw_key = NULL;
int32_t kw_key_len = 0;
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
/*
ICU expects the buffer to be allocated before calling the function
and so the buffer size has been explicitly specified
ICU uloc.h #define ULOC_KEYWORD_AND_VALUES_CAPACITY 100
hence the kw_value buffer size is 100
*/
char* kw_value = NULL;
int32_t kw_value_len = 100;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name, &loc_name_len ) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_get_keywords: unable to parse input params", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Get the keywords */
e = uloc_openKeywords( loc_name, &status );
if( e != NULL )
{
/* Traverse it, filling the return array. */
array_init( return_value );
while( ( kw_key = uenum_next( e, &kw_key_len, &status ) ) != NULL ){
kw_value = ecalloc( 1 , kw_value_len );
/* Get the keyword value for each keyword */
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len , &status );
if (status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR) {
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
kw_value_len=uloc_getKeywordValue( loc_name,kw_key, kw_value, kw_value_len+1 , &status );
} else if(!U_FAILURE(status)) {
kw_value = erealloc( kw_value , kw_value_len+1);
}
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "locale_get_keywords: Error encountered while getting the keyword value for the keyword", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
if( kw_value){
efree( kw_value );
}
zval_dtor(return_value);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
add_assoc_stringl( return_value, (char *)kw_key, kw_value , kw_value_len, 0);
} /* end of while */
} /* end of if e!=NULL */
uenum_close( e );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2cap_sock_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p backlog %d", sk, backlog);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND || sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->mode) {
case L2CAP_MODE_BASIC:
break;
case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
if (enable_ertm)
break;
/* fall through */
default:
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto done;
}
if (!l2cap_pi(sk)->psm) {
bdaddr_t *src = &bt_sk(sk)->src;
u16 psm;
err = -EINVAL;
write_lock_bh(&l2cap_sk_list.lock);
for (psm = 0x1001; psm < 0x1100; psm += 2)
if (!__l2cap_get_sock_by_addr(cpu_to_le16(psm), src)) {
l2cap_pi(sk)->psm = cpu_to_le16(psm);
l2cap_pi(sk)->sport = cpu_to_le16(psm);
err = 0;
break;
}
write_unlock_bh(&l2cap_sk_list.lock);
if (err < 0)
goto done;
}
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool emulator_get_cached_descriptor(struct desc_struct *desc, int seg,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_segment var;
kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
if (var.unusable)
return false;
if (var.g)
var.limit >>= 12;
set_desc_limit(desc, var.limit);
set_desc_base(desc, (unsigned long)var.base);
desc->type = var.type;
desc->s = var.s;
desc->dpl = var.dpl;
desc->p = var.present;
desc->avl = var.avl;
desc->l = var.l;
desc->d = var.db;
desc->g = var.g;
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 41,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int c, mode; /* client id */
struct snd_seq_client *client;
struct snd_seq_user_client *user;
int err;
err = nonseekable_open(inode, file);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(®ister_mutex))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
client = seq_create_client1(-1, SNDRV_SEQ_DEFAULT_EVENTS);
if (client == NULL) {
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
return -ENOMEM; /* failure code */
}
mode = snd_seq_file_flags(file);
if (mode & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_INPUT)
client->accept_input = 1;
if (mode & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OUTPUT)
client->accept_output = 1;
user = &client->data.user;
user->fifo = NULL;
user->fifo_pool_size = 0;
if (mode & SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_INPUT) {
user->fifo_pool_size = SNDRV_SEQ_DEFAULT_CLIENT_EVENTS;
user->fifo = snd_seq_fifo_new(user->fifo_pool_size);
if (user->fifo == NULL) {
seq_free_client1(client);
kfree(client);
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
usage_alloc(&client_usage, 1);
client->type = USER_CLIENT;
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
c = client->number;
file->private_data = client;
/* fill client data */
user->file = file;
sprintf(client->name, "Client-%d", c);
/* make others aware this new client */
snd_seq_system_client_ev_client_start(c);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameHost* WebContentsImpl::GetGuestByInstanceID(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
int browser_plugin_instance_id) {
BrowserPluginGuestManager* guest_manager =
GetBrowserContext()->GetGuestManager();
if (!guest_manager)
return nullptr;
WebContents* guest = guest_manager->GetGuestByInstanceID(
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(), browser_plugin_instance_id);
if (!guest)
return nullptr;
return guest->GetMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::Instance* Instance::GetInstance() {
return this;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipgre_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
/* All the routers (except for Linux) return only
8 bytes of packet payload. It means, that precise relaying of
ICMP in the real Internet is absolutely infeasible.
Moreover, Cisco "wise men" put GRE key to the third word
in GRE header. It makes impossible maintaining even soft state for keyed
GRE tunnels with enabled checksum. Tell them "thank you".
Well, I wonder, rfc1812 was written by Cisco employee,
what the hell these idiots break standrads established
by themself???
*/
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
__be16 *p = (__be16*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
int grehlen = (iph->ihl<<2) + 4;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct ip_tunnel *t;
__be16 flags;
flags = p[0];
if (flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ|GRE_ROUTING|GRE_VERSION)) {
if (flags&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
return;
if (flags&GRE_KEY) {
grehlen += 4;
if (flags&GRE_CSUM)
grehlen += 4;
}
}
/* If only 8 bytes returned, keyed message will be dropped here */
if (skb_headlen(skb) < grehlen)
return;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
return;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
/* Impossible event. */
return;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
/* Soft state for pmtu is maintained by IP core. */
return;
default:
/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
I believe they are just ether pollution. --ANK
*/
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
return;
break;
}
rcu_read_lock();
t = ipgre_tunnel_lookup(skb->dev, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
flags & GRE_KEY ?
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1) : 0,
p[1]);
if (t == NULL || t->parms.iph.daddr == 0 ||
ipv4_is_multicast(t->parms.iph.daddr))
goto out;
if (t->parms.iph.ttl == 0 && type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
goto out;
if (time_before(jiffies, t->err_time + IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO))
t->err_count++;
else
t->err_count = 1;
t->err_time = jiffies;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ScriptController::attachDebugger(void*)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_next_index_insert_new(HashTable *ht, zval *pData ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
return _zend_hash_index_add_or_update_i(ht, ht->nNextFreeElement, pData, HASH_ADD | HASH_ADD_NEW | HASH_ADD_NEXT ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 69,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_timer_user_gparams(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_gparams __user *_gparams)
{
struct snd_timer_gparams gparams;
if (copy_from_user(&gparams, _gparams, sizeof(gparams)))
return -EFAULT;
return timer_set_gparams(&gparams);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct snd_seq_client *seq_create_client1(int client_index, int poolsize)
{
unsigned long flags;
int c;
struct snd_seq_client *client;
/* init client data */
client = kzalloc(sizeof(*client), GFP_KERNEL);
if (client == NULL)
return NULL;
client->pool = snd_seq_pool_new(poolsize);
if (client->pool == NULL) {
kfree(client);
return NULL;
}
client->type = NO_CLIENT;
snd_use_lock_init(&client->use_lock);
rwlock_init(&client->ports_lock);
mutex_init(&client->ports_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&client->ports_list_head);
/* find free slot in the client table */
spin_lock_irqsave(&clients_lock, flags);
if (client_index < 0) {
for (c = SNDRV_SEQ_DYNAMIC_CLIENTS_BEGIN;
c < SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_CLIENTS;
c++) {
if (clienttab[c] || clienttablock[c])
continue;
clienttab[client->number = c] = client;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
return client;
}
} else {
if (clienttab[client_index] == NULL && !clienttablock[client_index]) {
clienttab[client->number = client_index] = client;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
return client;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&clients_lock, flags);
snd_seq_pool_delete(&client->pool);
kfree(client);
return NULL; /* no free slot found or busy, return failure code */
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldOpenDownload(
content::DownloadItem* item,
const content::DownloadOpenDelayedCallback& callback) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(item->GetWebContents());
if (download_helper)
return true;
if (proxy_download_delegate_)
return proxy_download_delegate_->ShouldOpenDownload(item, callback);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Always mark content downloaded by devtools delegate as potentially dangerous
Bug: 805445
Change-Id: I7051f519205e178db57e23320ab979f8fa9ce38b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894782
Commit-Queue: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533215}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::InvalidateStickyConstraintsFor(
PaintLayer* layer,
bool needs_compositing_update) {
if (PaintLayerScrollableAreaRareData* d = RareData()) {
d->sticky_constraints_map_.erase(layer);
if (needs_compositing_update &&
layer->GetLayoutObject().StyleRef().HasStickyConstrainedPosition()) {
layer->SetNeedsCompositingInputsUpdate();
layer->GetLayoutObject().SetNeedsPaintPropertyUpdate();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::Image* OmniboxPopupViewGtk::IconForMatch(
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
bool selected,
bool is_selected_keyword) {
const SkBitmap* bitmap = model_->GetIconIfExtensionMatch(match);
if (bitmap) {
if (!ContainsKey(images_, bitmap)) {
images_[bitmap] = new gfx::Image(gfx::GdkPixbufFromSkBitmap(bitmap));
}
return images_[bitmap];
}
int icon;
if (is_selected_keyword)
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_TTS;
else if (match.starred)
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_STAR;
else
icon = AutocompleteMatch::TypeToIcon(match.type);
if (selected) {
switch (icon) {
case IDR_OMNIBOX_EXTENSION_APP:
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_EXTENSION_APP_DARK;
break;
case IDR_OMNIBOX_HTTP:
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_HTTP_DARK;
break;
case IDR_OMNIBOX_HISTORY:
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_HISTORY_DARK;
break;
case IDR_OMNIBOX_SEARCH:
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_SEARCH_DARK;
break;
case IDR_OMNIBOX_STAR:
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_STAR_DARK;
break;
case IDR_OMNIBOX_TTS:
icon = IDR_OMNIBOX_TTS_DARK;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
return theme_service_->GetImageNamed(icon);
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GaiaCookieManagerService::OnMergeSessionFailure(
const GoogleServiceAuthError& error) {
DCHECK(requests_.front().request_type() ==
GaiaCookieRequestType::ADD_ACCOUNT);
VLOG(1) << "Failed MergeSession"
<< " account=" << requests_.front().account_id()
<< " error=" << error.ToString();
if (++fetcher_retries_ < kMaxFetcherRetries && error.IsTransientError()) {
fetcher_backoff_.InformOfRequest(false);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("OAuth2Login.MergeSessionRetry",
error.state(), GoogleServiceAuthError::NUM_STATES);
fetcher_timer_.Start(
FROM_HERE, fetcher_backoff_.GetTimeUntilRelease(),
base::Bind(&SigninClient::DelayNetworkCall,
base::Unretained(signin_client_),
base::Bind(
&GaiaCookieManagerService::StartFetchingMergeSession,
base::Unretained(this))));
return;
}
uber_token_ = std::string();
const std::string account_id = requests_.front().account_id();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("OAuth2Login.MergeSessionFailure",
error.state(), GoogleServiceAuthError::NUM_STATES);
HandleNextRequest();
SignalComplete(account_id, error);
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 129,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned HTMLMediaElement::webkitAudioDecodedByteCount() const {
if (!webMediaPlayer())
return 0;
return webMediaPlayer()->audioDecodedByteCount();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reset_buffer_flags(struct n_tty_data *ldata)
{
ldata->read_head = ldata->canon_head = ldata->read_tail = 0;
ldata->echo_head = ldata->echo_tail = ldata->echo_commit = 0;
ldata->echo_mark = 0;
ldata->line_start = 0;
ldata->erasing = 0;
bitmap_zero(ldata->read_flags, N_TTY_BUF_SIZE);
ldata->push = 0;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 39,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::reset() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (is_in_reset_function_ || !frame)
return;
is_in_reset_function_ = true;
if (DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(EventTypeNames::reset)) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled) {
is_in_reset_function_ = false;
return;
}
ListedElement::List elements(ListedElements());
for (const auto& element : elements) {
if (element->IsFormControlElement())
ToHTMLFormControlElement(element)->Reset();
}
is_in_reset_function_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodUnsignedShortArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodUnsignedShortArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned lengthOfContentsInNode(Node* node)
{
switch (node->nodeType()) {
case Node::TEXT_NODE:
case Node::CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case Node::COMMENT_NODE:
return static_cast<CharacterData*>(node)->length();
case Node::PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
return static_cast<ProcessingInstruction*>(node)->data().length();
case Node::ELEMENT_NODE:
case Node::ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case Node::ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE:
case Node::ENTITY_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case Node::NOTATION_NODE:
case Node::XPATH_NAMESPACE_NODE:
return node->childNodeCount();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const char __user *pathname)
{
int error;
struct filename *name;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct path path;
struct qstr last;
int type;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
unsigned int lookup_flags = 0;
retry:
name = user_path_parent(dfd, pathname,
&path, &last, &type, lookup_flags);
if (IS_ERR(name))
return PTR_ERR(name);
error = -EISDIR;
if (type != LAST_NORM)
goto exit1;
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit1;
retry_deleg:
inode_lock_nested(path.dentry->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dentry = __lookup_hash(&last, path.dentry, lookup_flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
/* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
if (last.name[last.len])
goto slashes;
inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (d_is_negative(dentry))
goto slashes;
ihold(inode);
error = security_path_unlink(&path, dentry);
if (error)
goto exit2;
error = vfs_unlink(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, &delegated_inode);
exit2:
dput(dentry);
}
inode_unlock(path.dentry->d_inode);
if (inode)
iput(inode); /* truncate the inode here */
inode = NULL;
if (delegated_inode) {
error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode);
if (!error)
goto retry_deleg;
}
mnt_drop_write(path.mnt);
exit1:
path_put(&path);
putname(name);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
inode = NULL;
goto retry;
}
return error;
slashes:
if (d_is_negative(dentry))
error = -ENOENT;
else if (d_is_dir(dentry))
error = -EISDIR;
else
error = -ENOTDIR;
goto exit2;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 51,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TopSitesImpl::GetPageThumbnail(
const GURL& url,
bool prefix_match,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedMemory>* bytes) {
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (thread_safe_cache_->GetPageThumbnail(url, bytes))
return true;
}
for (const auto& prepopulated_page : prepopulated_pages_) {
if (url == prepopulated_page.most_visited.url) {
*bytes =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytesForScale(
prepopulated_page.thumbnail_id, ui::SCALE_FACTOR_100P);
return true;
}
}
if (prefix_match) {
std::vector<GURL> url_list;
url_list.push_back(url);
if (url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
url_list.push_back(ToggleHTTPAndHTTPS(url));
for (const GURL& url : url_list) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
GURL canonical_url = thread_safe_cache_->GetGeneralizedCanonicalURL(url);
if (!canonical_url.is_empty() &&
thread_safe_cache_->GetPageThumbnail(canonical_url, bytes)) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnDelete() {
frame_->ExecuteCommand(WebString::FromUTF8("Delete"));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_satisfies(request_rec *r)
{
if (access_compat_ap_satisfies) {
return access_compat_ap_satisfies(r);
}
return SATISFY_NOSPEC;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double GM2TabStyle::GetHoverAnimationValue() const {
if (!hover_controller_)
return 0.0;
return hover_controller_->GetAnimationValue();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bdrv_close(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
if (bs->job) {
block_job_cancel_sync(bs->job);
}
bdrv_drain_all(); /* complete I/O */
bdrv_flush(bs);
bdrv_drain_all(); /* in case flush left pending I/O */
notifier_list_notify(&bs->close_notifiers, bs);
if (bs->drv) {
if (bs->backing_hd) {
bdrv_unref(bs->backing_hd);
bs->backing_hd = NULL;
}
bs->drv->bdrv_close(bs);
g_free(bs->opaque);
#ifdef _WIN32
if (bs->is_temporary) {
unlink(bs->filename);
}
#endif
bs->opaque = NULL;
bs->drv = NULL;
bs->copy_on_read = 0;
bs->backing_file[0] = '\0';
bs->backing_format[0] = '\0';
bs->total_sectors = 0;
bs->encrypted = 0;
bs->valid_key = 0;
bs->sg = 0;
bs->growable = 0;
bs->zero_beyond_eof = false;
QDECREF(bs->options);
bs->options = NULL;
if (bs->file != NULL) {
bdrv_unref(bs->file);
bs->file = NULL;
}
}
bdrv_dev_change_media_cb(bs, false);
/*throttling disk I/O limits*/
if (bs->io_limits_enabled) {
bdrv_io_limits_disable(bs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void virtio_config_writeb(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr, uint32_t data)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint8_t val = data;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return;
}
stb_p(vdev->config + addr, val);
if (k->set_config) {
k->set_config(vdev, vdev->config);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuzzerTests(U32 seed, U32 nbTests, unsigned startTest, U32 const maxDurationS, double compressibility, int bigTests)
{
static const U32 maxSrcLog = 23;
static const U32 maxSampleLog = 22;
size_t const srcBufferSize = (size_t)1<<maxSrcLog;
size_t const dstBufferSize = (size_t)1<<maxSampleLog;
size_t const cBufferSize = ZSTD_compressBound(dstBufferSize);
BYTE* cNoiseBuffer[5];
BYTE* const cBuffer = (BYTE*) malloc (cBufferSize);
BYTE* const dstBuffer = (BYTE*) malloc (dstBufferSize);
BYTE* const mirrorBuffer = (BYTE*) malloc (dstBufferSize);
ZSTD_CCtx* const refCtx = ZSTD_createCCtx();
ZSTD_CCtx* const ctx = ZSTD_createCCtx();
ZSTD_DCtx* const dctx = ZSTD_createDCtx();
U32 result = 0;
U32 testNb = 0;
U32 coreSeed = seed;
UTIL_time_t const startClock = UTIL_getTime();
U64 const maxClockSpan = maxDurationS * SEC_TO_MICRO;
int const cLevelLimiter = bigTests ? 3 : 2;
/* allocation */
cNoiseBuffer[0] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[1] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[2] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[3] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
cNoiseBuffer[4] = (BYTE*)malloc (srcBufferSize);
CHECK (!cNoiseBuffer[0] || !cNoiseBuffer[1] || !cNoiseBuffer[2] || !cNoiseBuffer[3] || !cNoiseBuffer[4]
|| !dstBuffer || !mirrorBuffer || !cBuffer || !refCtx || !ctx || !dctx,
"Not enough memory, fuzzer tests cancelled");
/* Create initial samples */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[0], srcBufferSize, 0.00, 0., coreSeed); /* pure noise */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[1], srcBufferSize, 0.05, 0., coreSeed); /* barely compressible */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[2], srcBufferSize, compressibility, 0., coreSeed);
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[3], srcBufferSize, 0.95, 0., coreSeed); /* highly compressible */
RDG_genBuffer(cNoiseBuffer[4], srcBufferSize, 1.00, 0., coreSeed); /* sparse content */
/* catch up testNb */
for (testNb=1; testNb < startTest; testNb++) FUZ_rand(&coreSeed);
/* main test loop */
for ( ; (testNb <= nbTests) || (UTIL_clockSpanMicro(startClock) < maxClockSpan); testNb++ ) {
BYTE* srcBuffer; /* jumping pointer */
U32 lseed;
size_t sampleSize, maxTestSize, totalTestSize;
size_t cSize, totalCSize, totalGenSize;
U64 crcOrig;
BYTE* sampleBuffer;
const BYTE* dict;
size_t dictSize;
/* notification */
if (nbTests >= testNb) { DISPLAYUPDATE(2, "\r%6u/%6u ", testNb, nbTests); }
else { DISPLAYUPDATE(2, "\r%6u ", testNb); }
FUZ_rand(&coreSeed);
{ U32 const prime1 = 2654435761U; lseed = coreSeed ^ prime1; }
/* srcBuffer selection [0-4] */
{ U32 buffNb = FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 0x7F;
if (buffNb & 7) buffNb=2; /* most common : compressible (P) */
else {
buffNb >>= 3;
if (buffNb & 7) {
const U32 tnb[2] = { 1, 3 }; /* barely/highly compressible */
buffNb = tnb[buffNb >> 3];
} else {
const U32 tnb[2] = { 0, 4 }; /* not compressible / sparse */
buffNb = tnb[buffNb >> 3];
} }
srcBuffer = cNoiseBuffer[buffNb];
}
/* select src segment */
sampleSize = FUZ_randomLength(&lseed, maxSampleLog);
/* create sample buffer (to catch read error with valgrind & sanitizers) */
sampleBuffer = (BYTE*)malloc(sampleSize);
CHECK(sampleBuffer==NULL, "not enough memory for sample buffer");
{ size_t const sampleStart = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - sampleSize);
memcpy(sampleBuffer, srcBuffer + sampleStart, sampleSize); }
crcOrig = XXH64(sampleBuffer, sampleSize, 0);
/* compression tests */
{ int const cLevelPositive =
( FUZ_rand(&lseed) %
(ZSTD_maxCLevel() - (FUZ_highbit32((U32)sampleSize) / cLevelLimiter)) )
+ 1;
int const cLevel = ((FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 15) == 3) ?
- (int)((FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 7) + 1) : /* test negative cLevel */
cLevelPositive;
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: Simple compression test (level %i) \n", testNb, cLevel);
cSize = ZSTD_compressCCtx(ctx, cBuffer, cBufferSize, sampleBuffer, sampleSize, cLevel);
CHECK(ZSTD_isError(cSize), "ZSTD_compressCCtx failed : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(cSize));
/* compression failure test : too small dest buffer */
if (cSize > 3) {
const size_t missing = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (cSize-2)) + 1; /* no problem, as cSize > 4 (frameHeaderSizer) */
const size_t tooSmallSize = cSize - missing;
const U32 endMark = 0x4DC2B1A9;
memcpy(dstBuffer+tooSmallSize, &endMark, 4);
{ size_t const errorCode = ZSTD_compressCCtx(ctx, dstBuffer, tooSmallSize, sampleBuffer, sampleSize, cLevel);
CHECK(!ZSTD_isError(errorCode), "ZSTD_compressCCtx should have failed ! (buffer too small : %u < %u)", (U32)tooSmallSize, (U32)cSize); }
{ U32 endCheck; memcpy(&endCheck, dstBuffer+tooSmallSize, 4);
CHECK(endCheck != endMark, "ZSTD_compressCCtx : dst buffer overflow"); }
} }
/* frame header decompression test */
{ ZSTD_frameHeader zfh;
CHECK_Z( ZSTD_getFrameHeader(&zfh, cBuffer, cSize) );
CHECK(zfh.frameContentSize != sampleSize, "Frame content size incorrect");
}
/* Decompressed size test */
{ unsigned long long const rSize = ZSTD_findDecompressedSize(cBuffer, cSize);
CHECK(rSize != sampleSize, "decompressed size incorrect");
}
/* successful decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: simple decompression test \n", testNb);
{ size_t const margin = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 1) ? 0 : (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 31) + 1;
size_t const dSize = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, sampleSize + margin, cBuffer, cSize);
CHECK(dSize != sampleSize, "ZSTD_decompress failed (%s) (srcSize : %u ; cSize : %u)", ZSTD_getErrorName(dSize), (U32)sampleSize, (U32)cSize);
{ U64 const crcDest = XXH64(dstBuffer, sampleSize, 0);
CHECK(crcOrig != crcDest, "decompression result corrupted (pos %u / %u)", (U32)findDiff(sampleBuffer, dstBuffer, sampleSize), (U32)sampleSize);
} }
free(sampleBuffer); /* no longer useful after this point */
/* truncated src decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: decompression of truncated source \n", testNb);
{ size_t const missing = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (cSize-2)) + 1; /* no problem, as cSize > 4 (frameHeaderSizer) */
size_t const tooSmallSize = cSize - missing;
void* cBufferTooSmall = malloc(tooSmallSize); /* valgrind will catch read overflows */
CHECK(cBufferTooSmall == NULL, "not enough memory !");
memcpy(cBufferTooSmall, cBuffer, tooSmallSize);
{ size_t const errorCode = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, dstBufferSize, cBufferTooSmall, tooSmallSize);
CHECK(!ZSTD_isError(errorCode), "ZSTD_decompress should have failed ! (truncated src buffer)"); }
free(cBufferTooSmall);
}
/* too small dst decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: decompress into too small dst buffer \n", testNb);
if (sampleSize > 3) {
size_t const missing = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (sampleSize-2)) + 1; /* no problem, as cSize > 4 (frameHeaderSizer) */
size_t const tooSmallSize = sampleSize - missing;
static const BYTE token = 0xA9;
dstBuffer[tooSmallSize] = token;
{ size_t const errorCode = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, tooSmallSize, cBuffer, cSize);
CHECK(!ZSTD_isError(errorCode), "ZSTD_decompress should have failed : %u > %u (dst buffer too small)", (U32)errorCode, (U32)tooSmallSize); }
CHECK(dstBuffer[tooSmallSize] != token, "ZSTD_decompress : dst buffer overflow");
}
/* noisy src decompression test */
if (cSize > 6) {
/* insert noise into src */
{ U32 const maxNbBits = FUZ_highbit32((U32)(cSize-4));
size_t pos = 4; /* preserve magic number (too easy to detect) */
for (;;) {
/* keep some original src */
{ U32 const nbBits = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxNbBits;
size_t const mask = (1<<nbBits) - 1;
size_t const skipLength = FUZ_rand(&lseed) & mask;
pos += skipLength;
}
if (pos >= cSize) break;
/* add noise */
{ U32 const nbBitsCodes = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxNbBits;
U32 const nbBits = nbBitsCodes ? nbBitsCodes-1 : 0;
size_t const mask = (1<<nbBits) - 1;
size_t const rNoiseLength = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & mask) + 1;
size_t const noiseLength = MIN(rNoiseLength, cSize-pos);
size_t const noiseStart = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - noiseLength);
memcpy(cBuffer + pos, srcBuffer + noiseStart, noiseLength);
pos += noiseLength;
} } }
/* decompress noisy source */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: decompress noisy source \n", testNb);
{ U32 const endMark = 0xA9B1C3D6;
memcpy(dstBuffer+sampleSize, &endMark, 4);
{ size_t const decompressResult = ZSTD_decompress(dstBuffer, sampleSize, cBuffer, cSize);
/* result *may* be an unlikely success, but even then, it must strictly respect dst buffer boundaries */
CHECK((!ZSTD_isError(decompressResult)) && (decompressResult>sampleSize),
"ZSTD_decompress on noisy src : result is too large : %u > %u (dst buffer)", (U32)decompressResult, (U32)sampleSize);
}
{ U32 endCheck; memcpy(&endCheck, dstBuffer+sampleSize, 4);
CHECK(endMark!=endCheck, "ZSTD_decompress on noisy src : dst buffer overflow");
} } } /* noisy src decompression test */
/*===== Bufferless streaming compression test, scattered segments and dictionary =====*/
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: Bufferless streaming compression test \n", testNb);
{ U32 const testLog = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxSrcLog;
U32 const dictLog = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % maxSrcLog;
int const cLevel = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) %
(ZSTD_maxCLevel() -
(MAX(testLog, dictLog) / cLevelLimiter))) +
1;
maxTestSize = FUZ_rLogLength(&lseed, testLog);
if (maxTestSize >= dstBufferSize) maxTestSize = dstBufferSize-1;
dictSize = FUZ_rLogLength(&lseed, dictLog); /* needed also for decompression */
dict = srcBuffer + (FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - dictSize));
DISPLAYLEVEL(6, "fuzzer t%u: Compressing up to <=%u bytes at level %i with dictionary size %u \n",
testNb, (U32)maxTestSize, cLevel, (U32)dictSize);
if (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 0xF) {
CHECK_Z ( ZSTD_compressBegin_usingDict(refCtx, dict, dictSize, cLevel) );
} else {
ZSTD_compressionParameters const cPar = ZSTD_getCParams(cLevel, ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN, dictSize);
ZSTD_frameParameters const fPar = { FUZ_rand(&lseed)&1 /* contentSizeFlag */,
!(FUZ_rand(&lseed)&3) /* contentChecksumFlag*/,
0 /*NodictID*/ }; /* note : since dictionary is fake, dictIDflag has no impact */
ZSTD_parameters const p = FUZ_makeParams(cPar, fPar);
CHECK_Z ( ZSTD_compressBegin_advanced(refCtx, dict, dictSize, p, 0) );
}
CHECK_Z( ZSTD_copyCCtx(ctx, refCtx, 0) );
}
{ U32 const nbChunks = (FUZ_rand(&lseed) & 127) + 2;
U32 n;
XXH64_state_t xxhState;
XXH64_reset(&xxhState, 0);
for (totalTestSize=0, cSize=0, n=0 ; n<nbChunks ; n++) {
size_t const segmentSize = FUZ_randomLength(&lseed, maxSampleLog);
size_t const segmentStart = FUZ_rand(&lseed) % (srcBufferSize - segmentSize);
if (cBufferSize-cSize < ZSTD_compressBound(segmentSize)) break; /* avoid invalid dstBufferTooSmall */
if (totalTestSize+segmentSize > maxTestSize) break;
{ size_t const compressResult = ZSTD_compressContinue(ctx, cBuffer+cSize, cBufferSize-cSize, srcBuffer+segmentStart, segmentSize);
CHECK (ZSTD_isError(compressResult), "multi-segments compression error : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(compressResult));
cSize += compressResult;
}
XXH64_update(&xxhState, srcBuffer+segmentStart, segmentSize);
memcpy(mirrorBuffer + totalTestSize, srcBuffer+segmentStart, segmentSize);
totalTestSize += segmentSize;
}
{ size_t const flushResult = ZSTD_compressEnd(ctx, cBuffer+cSize, cBufferSize-cSize, NULL, 0);
CHECK (ZSTD_isError(flushResult), "multi-segments epilogue error : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(flushResult));
cSize += flushResult;
}
crcOrig = XXH64_digest(&xxhState);
}
/* streaming decompression test */
DISPLAYLEVEL(5, "fuzzer t%u: Bufferless streaming decompression test \n", testNb);
/* ensure memory requirement is good enough (should always be true) */
{ ZSTD_frameHeader zfh;
CHECK( ZSTD_getFrameHeader(&zfh, cBuffer, ZSTD_frameHeaderSize_max),
"ZSTD_getFrameHeader(): error retrieving frame information");
{ size_t const roundBuffSize = ZSTD_decodingBufferSize_min(zfh.windowSize, zfh.frameContentSize);
CHECK_Z(roundBuffSize);
CHECK((roundBuffSize > totalTestSize) && (zfh.frameContentSize!=ZSTD_CONTENTSIZE_UNKNOWN),
"ZSTD_decodingBufferSize_min() requires more memory (%u) than necessary (%u)",
(U32)roundBuffSize, (U32)totalTestSize );
} }
if (dictSize<8) dictSize=0, dict=NULL; /* disable dictionary */
CHECK_Z( ZSTD_decompressBegin_usingDict(dctx, dict, dictSize) );
totalCSize = 0;
totalGenSize = 0;
while (totalCSize < cSize) {
size_t const inSize = ZSTD_nextSrcSizeToDecompress(dctx);
size_t const genSize = ZSTD_decompressContinue(dctx, dstBuffer+totalGenSize, dstBufferSize-totalGenSize, cBuffer+totalCSize, inSize);
CHECK (ZSTD_isError(genSize), "ZSTD_decompressContinue error : %s", ZSTD_getErrorName(genSize));
totalGenSize += genSize;
totalCSize += inSize;
}
CHECK (ZSTD_nextSrcSizeToDecompress(dctx) != 0, "frame not fully decoded");
CHECK (totalGenSize != totalTestSize, "streaming decompressed data : wrong size")
CHECK (totalCSize != cSize, "compressed data should be fully read")
{ U64 const crcDest = XXH64(dstBuffer, totalTestSize, 0);
CHECK(crcOrig != crcDest, "streaming decompressed data corrupted (pos %u / %u)",
(U32)findDiff(mirrorBuffer, dstBuffer, totalTestSize), (U32)totalTestSize);
}
} /* for ( ; (testNb <= nbTests) */
DISPLAY("\r%u fuzzer tests completed \n", testNb-1);
_cleanup:
ZSTD_freeCCtx(refCtx);
ZSTD_freeCCtx(ctx);
ZSTD_freeDCtx(dctx);
free(cNoiseBuffer[0]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[1]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[2]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[3]);
free(cNoiseBuffer[4]);
free(cBuffer);
free(dstBuffer);
free(mirrorBuffer);
return result;
_output_error:
result = 1;
goto _cleanup;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 169,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutTestContentRendererClient::~LayoutTestContentRendererClient() {
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Matches(const String& url, const String& pattern) {
Vector<String> parts;
pattern.Split("*", parts);
size_t pos = 0;
for (const String& part : parts) {
pos = url.Find(part, pos);
if (pos == kNotFound)
return false;
pos += part.length();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool skb_may_tx_timestamp(struct sock *sk, bool tsonly)
{
bool ret;
if (likely(sysctl_tstamp_allow_data || tsonly))
return true;
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
ret = sk->sk_socket && sk->sk_socket->file &&
file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW);
read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateImageBitmap(
const char* function_name,
ImageBitmap* bitmap,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (bitmap->IsNeutered()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"The source data has been detached.");
return false;
}
if (!bitmap->OriginClean()) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"The ImageBitmap contains cross-origin data, and may not be loaded.");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ff_mpv_frame_end(MpegEncContext *s)
{
emms_c();
if (s->current_picture.reference)
ff_thread_report_progress(&s->current_picture_ptr->tf, INT_MAX, 0);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 81,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len __maybe_unused)
{
if (glob_match(r->pattern, str))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t CameraClient::startCameraMode(camera_mode mode) {
LOG1("startCameraMode(%d)", mode);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
status_t result = checkPidAndHardware();
if (result != NO_ERROR) return result;
switch(mode) {
case CAMERA_PREVIEW_MODE:
if (mSurface == 0 && mPreviewWindow == 0) {
LOG1("mSurface is not set yet.");
}
return startPreviewMode();
case CAMERA_RECORDING_MODE:
if (mSurface == 0 && mPreviewWindow == 0) {
ALOGE("mSurface or mPreviewWindow must be set before startRecordingMode.");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
return startRecordingMode();
default:
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool testNormalizeSyntaxHelper(const wchar_t * uriText, const wchar_t * expectedNormalized,
unsigned int mask = static_cast<unsigned int>(-1)) {
UriParserStateW stateW;
int res;
UriUriW testUri;
stateW.uri = &testUri;
res = uriParseUriW(&stateW, uriText);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&testUri);
return false;
}
UriUriW expectedUri;
stateW.uri = &expectedUri;
res = uriParseUriW(&stateW, expectedNormalized);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&testUri);
uriFreeUriMembersW(&expectedUri);
return false;
}
res = uriNormalizeSyntaxExW(&testUri, mask);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&testUri);
uriFreeUriMembersW(&expectedUri);
return false;
}
bool equalAfter = (URI_TRUE == uriEqualsUriW(&testUri, &expectedUri));
res = uriNormalizeSyntaxExW(&testUri, mask);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&testUri);
uriFreeUriMembersW(&expectedUri);
return false;
}
equalAfter = equalAfter
&& (URI_TRUE == uriEqualsUriW(&testUri, &expectedUri));
uriFreeUriMembersW(&testUri);
uriFreeUriMembersW(&expectedUri);
return equalAfter;
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 75,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDeleteBuffers(
GLsizei n,
const volatile GLuint* buffers) {
if (n < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "n cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLuint> service_ids(n, 0);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
GLuint client_id = buffers[ii];
for (auto& buffer_binding : bound_buffers_) {
if (buffer_binding.second == client_id) {
buffer_binding.second = 0;
}
resources_->mapped_buffer_map.erase(client_id);
}
service_ids[ii] =
resources_->buffer_id_map.GetServiceIDOrInvalid(client_id);
resources_->buffer_id_map.RemoveClientID(client_id);
auto is_the_deleted_buffer = [client_id](const auto& update) {
return update.first == client_id;
};
base::EraseIf(buffer_shadow_updates_, is_the_deleted_buffer);
for (PendingQuery& pending_query : pending_queries_) {
base::EraseIf(pending_query.buffer_shadow_updates, is_the_deleted_buffer);
}
}
api()->glDeleteBuffersARBFn(n, service_ids.data());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: keyPressEventProc(int c)
{
CurrentKey = c;
w3mFuncList[(int)GlobalKeymap[c]].func();
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_longopts(opt_struct *longopts)
{
opt_struct *p;
if (longopts) {
for (p = longopts; p && p->opt_char != '-'; p++) {
if (p->opt_name != NULL) {
efree((char *)(p->opt_name));
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct bpf_map *__bpf_map_get(struct fd f)
{
if (!f.file)
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
if (f.file->f_op != &bpf_map_fops) {
fdput(f);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return f.file->private_data;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned ScriptProfiler::requestHeapStatsUpdate(ScriptProfiler::OutputStream* stream)
{
HeapStatsStream heapStatsStream(stream);
return v8::Isolate::GetCurrent()->GetHeapProfiler()->GetHeapStats(&heapStatsStream);
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ProgressFlingIfNeeded(TimeTicks current_time) {
browser_fling_needs_begin_frame_ = false;
fling_scheduler_->ProgressFlingOnBeginFrameIfneeded(current_time);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint8_t adts_frame(adts_header *adts, bitfile *ld)
{
/* faad_byte_align(ld); */
if (adts_fixed_header(adts, ld))
return 5;
adts_variable_header(adts, ld);
adts_error_check(adts, ld);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::UpdateCursor(const WebCursor& cursor) {
if (current_cursor_.GetCursorType() != GDK_CURSOR_IS_PIXMAP &&
current_cursor_.GetCursorType() == cursor.GetCursorType()) {
return;
}
current_cursor_ = cursor;
ShowCurrentCursor();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsUIBindings::DevToolsUIBindings(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: profile_(Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext())),
android_bridge_(DevToolsAndroidBridge::Factory::GetForProfile(profile_)),
web_contents_(web_contents),
delegate_(new DefaultBindingsDelegate(web_contents_)),
devices_updates_enabled_(false),
frontend_loaded_(false),
reloading_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
g_instances.Get().push_back(this);
frontend_contents_observer_.reset(new FrontendWebContentsObserver(this));
web_contents_->GetMutableRendererPrefs()->can_accept_load_drops = false;
file_helper_.reset(new DevToolsFileHelper(web_contents_, profile_, this));
file_system_indexer_ = new DevToolsFileSystemIndexer();
extensions::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::CreateForWebContents(
web_contents_);
embedder_message_dispatcher_.reset(
DevToolsEmbedderMessageDispatcher::CreateForDevToolsFrontend(this));
frontend_host_.reset(content::DevToolsFrontendHost::Create(
web_contents_->GetMainFrame(),
base::Bind(&DevToolsUIBindings::HandleMessageFromDevToolsFrontend,
base::Unretained(this))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_put_addr)
{
int addrlen;
long type;
char *addr;
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
zval *z_radh;
struct in_addr intern_addr;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rls", &z_radh, &type, &addr, &addrlen)
== FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(raddesc, radius_descriptor *, &z_radh, -1, "rad_handle", le_radius);
if (inet_aton(addr, &intern_addr) == 0) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Error converting Address");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (rad_put_addr(raddesc->radh, type, intern_addr) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_posix_buf(umode_t mode)
{
struct create_posix *buf;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct create_posix),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
buf->ccontext.DataOffset =
cpu_to_le16(offsetof(struct create_posix, Mode));
buf->ccontext.DataLength = cpu_to_le32(4);
buf->ccontext.NameOffset =
cpu_to_le16(offsetof(struct create_posix, Name));
buf->ccontext.NameLength = cpu_to_le16(16);
/* SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX is "0x93AD25509CB411E7B42383DE968BCD7C" */
buf->Name[0] = 0x93;
buf->Name[1] = 0xAD;
buf->Name[2] = 0x25;
buf->Name[3] = 0x50;
buf->Name[4] = 0x9C;
buf->Name[5] = 0xB4;
buf->Name[6] = 0x11;
buf->Name[7] = 0xE7;
buf->Name[8] = 0xB4;
buf->Name[9] = 0x23;
buf->Name[10] = 0x83;
buf->Name[11] = 0xDE;
buf->Name[12] = 0x96;
buf->Name[13] = 0x8B;
buf->Name[14] = 0xCD;
buf->Name[15] = 0x7C;
buf->Mode = cpu_to_le32(mode);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "mode on posix create 0%o", mode);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tun_set_queue(struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct tun_struct *tun;
int ret = 0;
rtnl_lock();
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_ATTACH_QUEUE) {
tun = tfile->detached;
if (!tun) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto unlock;
}
ret = security_tun_dev_attach_queue(tun->security);
if (ret < 0)
goto unlock;
ret = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_DETACH_QUEUE) {
tun = rtnl_dereference(tfile->tun);
if (!tun || !(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) || tfile->detached)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
__tun_detach(tfile, false);
} else
ret = -EINVAL;
unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_METHOD(PDOStatement, nextRowset)
{
PHP_STMT_GET_OBJ;
if (!stmt->methods->next_rowset) {
pdo_raise_impl_error(stmt->dbh, stmt, "IM001", "driver does not support multiple rowsets" TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PDO_STMT_CLEAR_ERR();
if (!pdo_stmt_do_next_rowset(stmt TSRMLS_CC)) {
PDO_HANDLE_STMT_ERR();
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 72,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AudioTrackList& HTMLMediaElement::audioTracks() {
return *m_audioTracks;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void smb1cli_req_flags(enum protocol_types protocol,
uint32_t smb1_capabilities,
uint8_t smb_command,
uint8_t additional_flags,
uint8_t clear_flags,
uint8_t *_flags,
uint16_t additional_flags2,
uint16_t clear_flags2,
uint16_t *_flags2)
{
uint8_t flags = 0;
uint16_t flags2 = 0;
if (protocol >= PROTOCOL_LANMAN1) {
flags |= FLAG_CASELESS_PATHNAMES;
flags |= FLAG_CANONICAL_PATHNAMES;
}
if (protocol >= PROTOCOL_LANMAN2) {
flags2 |= FLAGS2_LONG_PATH_COMPONENTS;
flags2 |= FLAGS2_EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTES;
}
if (protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
flags2 |= FLAGS2_IS_LONG_NAME;
if (smb1_capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
flags2 |= FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS;
}
if (smb1_capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) {
flags2 |= FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES;
}
if (smb1_capabilities & CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY) {
flags2 |= FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
}
}
flags |= additional_flags;
flags &= ~clear_flags;
flags2 |= additional_flags2;
flags2 &= ~clear_flags2;
*_flags = flags;
*_flags2 = flags2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ppp_find_channel(struct ppp_net *pn, int unit)
{
struct channel *pch;
list_for_each_entry(pch, &pn->new_channels, list) {
if (pch->file.index == unit) {
list_move(&pch->list, &pn->all_channels);
return pch;
}
}
list_for_each_entry(pch, &pn->all_channels, list) {
if (pch->file.index == unit)
return pch;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 52,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: infinite_recursive_call_check_trav(Node* node, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r;
switch (NODE_TYPE(node)) {
case NODE_LIST:
case NODE_ALT:
do {
r = infinite_recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_CAR(node), env);
} while (r == 0 && IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
break;
case NODE_ANCHOR:
if (! ANCHOR_HAS_BODY(ANCHOR_(node))) {
r = 0;
break;
}
/* fall */
case NODE_QUANT:
r = infinite_recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_BODY(node), env);
break;
case NODE_BAG:
{
BagNode* en = BAG_(node);
if (en->type == BAG_MEMORY) {
if (NODE_IS_RECURSION(node) && NODE_IS_CALLED(node)) {
int ret;
NODE_STATUS_ADD(node, MARK1);
ret = infinite_recursive_call_check(NODE_BODY(node), env, 1);
if (ret < 0) return ret;
else if ((ret & (RECURSION_MUST | RECURSION_INFINITE)) != 0)
return ONIGERR_NEVER_ENDING_RECURSION;
NODE_STATUS_REMOVE(node, MARK1);
}
}
else if (en->type == BAG_IF_ELSE) {
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Then)) {
r = infinite_recursive_call_check_trav(en->te.Then, env);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Else)) {
r = infinite_recursive_call_check_trav(en->te.Else, env);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
}
r = infinite_recursive_call_check_trav(NODE_BODY(node), env);
break;
default:
r = 0;
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WTF::Optional<IntRect> ChromeClientImpl::VisibleContentRectForPainting() const {
return web_view_->GetDevToolsEmulator()->VisibleContentRectForPainting();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void free_mm_slot(struct mm_slot *mm_slot)
{
kmem_cache_free(mm_slot_cache, mm_slot);
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestInterstitialPageDelegate::OnDontProceed() {
interstitial_page_->OnDontProceed();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
{
int i;
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_dentry_lru);
list_lru_destroy(&s->s_inode_lru);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
free_percpu(s->s_files);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++)
percpu_counter_destroy(&s->s_writers.counter[i]);
security_sb_free(s);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
kfree(s->s_subtype);
kfree(s->s_options);
kfree_rcu(s, rcu);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 166,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetCrashSignalFD(const base::CommandLine& command_line) {
if (!breakpad::IsCrashReporterEnabled())
return -1;
std::string process_type =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess) {
static breakpad::CrashHandlerHostLinux* crash_handler = NULL;
if (!crash_handler)
crash_handler = CreateCrashHandlerHost(process_type);
return crash_handler->GetDeathSignalSocket();
}
if (process_type == switches::kPluginProcess) {
static breakpad::CrashHandlerHostLinux* crash_handler = NULL;
if (!crash_handler)
crash_handler = CreateCrashHandlerHost(process_type);
return crash_handler->GetDeathSignalSocket();
}
if (process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
static breakpad::CrashHandlerHostLinux* crash_handler = NULL;
if (!crash_handler)
crash_handler = CreateCrashHandlerHost(process_type);
return crash_handler->GetDeathSignalSocket();
}
if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess) {
static breakpad::CrashHandlerHostLinux* crash_handler = NULL;
if (!crash_handler)
crash_handler = CreateCrashHandlerHost(process_type);
return crash_handler->GetDeathSignalSocket();
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_String(String* string) {
if (string) {
free (string->szKey);
free (string->Value);
free (string);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dgram_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len)
{
struct sockaddr_ieee802154 *addr = (struct sockaddr_ieee802154 *)uaddr;
struct dgram_sock *ro = dgram_sk(sk);
int err = -EINVAL;
struct net_device *dev;
lock_sock(sk);
ro->bound = 0;
if (len < sizeof(*addr))
goto out;
if (addr->family != AF_IEEE802154)
goto out;
dev = ieee802154_get_dev(sock_net(sk), &addr->addr);
if (!dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
if (dev->type != ARPHRD_IEEE802154) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out_put;
}
memcpy(&ro->src_addr, &addr->addr, sizeof(struct ieee802154_addr));
ro->bound = 1;
err = 0;
out_put:
dev_put(dev);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadUrlSBClient(
const content::DownloadItem& item,
const DownloadProtectionService::CheckDownloadCallback& callback,
const scoped_refptr<SafeBrowsingUIManager>& ui_manager,
const scoped_refptr<SafeBrowsingDatabaseManager>& database_manager)
: DownloadSBClient(item, callback, ui_manager,
DOWNLOAD_URL_CHECKS_TOTAL,
DOWNLOAD_URL_CHECKS_MALWARE),
database_manager_(database_manager) { }
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
int retval;
tty_lock();
retval = __tty_fasync(fd, filp, on);
tty_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
{
enum ovl_path_type type;
int err;
err = ovl_check_sticky(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry->d_parent);
if (err)
goto out_drop_write;
type = ovl_path_type(dentry);
if (OVL_TYPE_PURE_UPPER(type)) {
err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir);
} else {
const struct cred *old_cred;
struct cred *override_cred;
err = -ENOMEM;
override_cred = prepare_creds();
if (!override_cred)
goto out_drop_write;
/*
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN for setting xattr on whiteout, opaque dir
* CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE for create in workdir, rename
* CAP_FOWNER for removing whiteout from sticky dir
* CAP_FSETID for chmod of opaque dir
* CAP_CHOWN for chown of opaque dir
*/
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_FOWNER);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_FSETID);
cap_raise(override_cred->cap_effective, CAP_CHOWN);
old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, is_dir);
revert_creds(old_cred);
put_cred(override_cred);
}
out_drop_write:
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExclusiveAccessBubbleViews* BrowserView::GetExclusiveAccessBubble() {
return exclusive_access_bubble();
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit TestSSLConfigService(const SSLConfig& config) : config_(config) {}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long __find_rev_next_zero_bit(const unsigned long *addr,
unsigned long size, unsigned long offset)
{
const unsigned long *p = addr + BIT_WORD(offset);
unsigned long result = size;
unsigned long tmp;
if (offset >= size)
return size;
size -= (offset & ~(BITS_PER_LONG - 1));
offset %= BITS_PER_LONG;
while (1) {
if (*p == ~0UL)
goto pass;
tmp = __reverse_ulong((unsigned char *)p);
if (offset)
tmp |= ~0UL << (BITS_PER_LONG - offset);
if (size < BITS_PER_LONG)
tmp |= ~0UL >> size;
if (tmp != ~0UL)
goto found;
pass:
if (size <= BITS_PER_LONG)
break;
size -= BITS_PER_LONG;
offset = 0;
p++;
}
return result;
found:
return result - size + __reverse_ffz(tmp);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool vhost_enable_notify(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
u16 avail_idx;
int r;
if (!(vq->used_flags & VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY))
return false;
vq->used_flags &= ~VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY;
if (!vhost_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
r = vhost_update_used_flags(vq);
if (r) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to enable notification at %p: %d\n",
&vq->used->flags, r);
return false;
}
} else {
r = vhost_update_avail_event(vq, vq->avail_idx);
if (r) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to update avail event index at %p: %d\n",
vhost_avail_event(vq), r);
return false;
}
}
/* They could have slipped one in as we were doing that: make
* sure it's written, then check again. */
smp_mb();
r = __get_user(avail_idx, &vq->avail->idx);
if (r) {
vq_err(vq, "Failed to check avail idx at %p: %d\n",
&vq->avail->idx, r);
return false;
}
return avail_idx != vq->avail_idx;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaManager::GetLRUOrigin(
StorageType type,
const GetLRUOriginCallback& callback) {
LazyInitialize();
DCHECK(lru_origin_callback_.is_null());
lru_origin_callback_ = callback;
if (db_disabled_) {
lru_origin_callback_.Run(GURL());
lru_origin_callback_.Reset();
return;
}
std::set<GURL>* exceptions = new std::set<GURL>;
for (std::map<GURL, int>::const_iterator p = origins_in_use_.begin();
p != origins_in_use_.end();
++p) {
if (p->second > 0)
exceptions->insert(p->first);
}
for (std::map<GURL, int>::const_iterator p = origins_in_error_.begin();
p != origins_in_error_.end();
++p) {
if (p->second > QuotaManager::kThresholdOfErrorsToBeBlacklisted)
exceptions->insert(p->first);
}
GURL* url = new GURL;
PostTaskAndReplyWithResultForDBThread(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GetLRUOriginOnDBThread,
type,
base::Owned(exceptions),
special_storage_policy_,
base::Unretained(url)),
base::Bind(&QuotaManager::DidGetLRUOrigin,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Owned(url)));
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebPage::WebPage(WebPageClient* client, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& pageGroupName, const Platform::IntRect& rect)
{
globalInitialize();
d = new WebPagePrivate(this, client, rect);
d->init(pageGroupName);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RefPtr<ComputedStyle> Document::StyleForElementIgnoringPendingStylesheets(
Element* element) {
DCHECK_EQ(element->GetDocument(), this);
StyleEngine::IgnoringPendingStylesheet ignoring(GetStyleEngine());
if (!element->CanParticipateInFlatTree())
return EnsureStyleResolver().StyleForElement(element, nullptr);
ContainerNode* parent = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::Parent(*element);
const ComputedStyle* parent_style =
parent ? parent->EnsureComputedStyle() : nullptr;
ContainerNode* layout_parent =
parent ? LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::LayoutParent(*element) : nullptr;
const ComputedStyle* layout_parent_style =
layout_parent ? layout_parent->EnsureComputedStyle() : parent_style;
return EnsureStyleResolver().StyleForElement(element, parent_style,
layout_parent_style);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bdrv_io_limits_disable(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
bs->io_limits_enabled = false;
bdrv_start_throttled_reqs(bs);
throttle_destroy(&bs->throttle_state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlobDataHandle::~BlobDataHandle()
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_internalURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: box_area(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(box_ar(box));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cieadomain(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
int code;
ref CIEdict, *tempref;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &CIEdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If we have a RangeA entry in the dictionary, get the
* values from that
*/
code = dict_find_string(&CIEdict, "RangeA", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
code = get_cie_param_array(imemory, tempref, 2, ptr);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else {
/* Default values for CIEBasedA */
ptr[0] = 0;
ptr[1] = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::eoClip(GfxState *state) {
doPath (cairo, state, state->getPath());
cairo_set_fill_rule (cairo, CAIRO_FILL_RULE_EVEN_ODD);
cairo_clip (cairo);
LOG (printf ("clip-eo\n"));
if (cairo_shape) {
doPath (cairo_shape, state, state->getPath());
cairo_set_fill_rule (cairo_shape, CAIRO_FILL_RULE_EVEN_ODD);
cairo_clip (cairo_shape);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(const char *) cJSON_GetErrorPtr(void)
{
return (const char*) (global_error.json + global_error.position);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4DataSource::initCheck() const {
return mSource->initCheck();
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline enum ib_qp_state to_ib_qp_state(enum mlx5_qp_state mlx5_state)
{
switch (mlx5_state) {
case MLX5_QP_STATE_RST: return IB_QPS_RESET;
case MLX5_QP_STATE_INIT: return IB_QPS_INIT;
case MLX5_QP_STATE_RTR: return IB_QPS_RTR;
case MLX5_QP_STATE_RTS: return IB_QPS_RTS;
case MLX5_QP_STATE_SQ_DRAINING:
case MLX5_QP_STATE_SQD: return IB_QPS_SQD;
case MLX5_QP_STATE_SQER: return IB_QPS_SQE;
case MLX5_QP_STATE_ERR: return IB_QPS_ERR;
default: return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void apic_set_isr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
if (!__apic_test_and_set_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_ISR))
++apic->isr_count;
BUG_ON(apic->isr_count > MAX_APIC_VECTOR);
/*
* ISR (in service register) bit is set when injecting an interrupt.
* The highest vector is injected. Thus the latest bit set matches
* the highest bit in ISR.
*/
apic->highest_isr_cache = vec;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void megasas_command_cancel(SCSIRequest *req)
{
MegasasCmd *cmd = req->hba_private;
if (cmd) {
megasas_abort_command(cmd);
} else {
scsi_req_unref(req);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::InitPrintSettings(bool fit_to_paper_size) {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_GetDefaultPrintSettings(routing_id(),
&settings.params));
bool result = true;
if (!PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsValid(settings.params))
result = false;
if (result &&
(settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || settings.params.document_cookie == 0)) {
NOTREACHED();
result = false;
}
ignore_css_margins_ = false;
settings.pages.clear();
settings.params.print_scaling_option =
WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionSourceSize;
if (fit_to_paper_size) {
settings.params.print_scaling_option =
WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionFitToPrintableArea;
}
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::get_pending_result(const char *,const char *)
{
Gahp_Args* r = NULL;
if ( (m_mode == blocking) && (!pending_result) ) {
for (;;) {
server->poll();
if ( pending_result ) {
break;
}
if ( pending_timeout && (time(NULL) > pending_timeout) ) {
break;
}
sleep(1); // block for one second and then poll again...
}
}
if ( pending_result ) {
ASSERT(pending_reqid == 0);
r = pending_result;
pending_result = NULL; // must do this before calling clear_pending!
clear_pending();
}
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::setRemoteDescription(const WebRTCVoidRequest& request, const WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor& remoteDescription)
{
if (!remoteDescription.isNull() && remoteDescription.type() == "answer") {
m_remoteDescription = remoteDescription;
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, true));
} else
postTask(new RTCVoidRequestTask(this, request, false));
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::SetUserWallpaperDelayed(
const AccountId& account_id) {
ScheduleSetUserWallpaper(account_id, true);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltTransformCacheCreate(void)
{
xsltTransformCachePtr ret;
ret = (xsltTransformCachePtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltTransformCache));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltTransformCacheCreate : malloc failed\n");
return(NULL);
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xsltTransformCache));
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
{
u64 rh, rl, t, z = 0;
/* fully reduce (p1,p2)+(len,0) mod p127 */
t = p1 >> 63;
p1 &= m63;
ADD128(p1, p2, len, t);
/* At this point, (p1,p2) is at most 2^127+(len<<64) */
t = (p1 > m63) + ((p1 == m63) && (p2 == m64));
ADD128(p1, p2, z, t);
p1 &= m63;
/* compute (p1,p2)/(2^64-2^32) and (p1,p2)%(2^64-2^32) */
t = p1 + (p2 >> 32);
t += (t >> 32);
t += (u32)t > 0xfffffffeu;
p1 += (t >> 32);
p2 += (p1 << 32);
/* compute (p1+k1)%p64 and (p2+k2)%p64 */
p1 += k1;
p1 += (0 - (p1 < k1)) & 257;
p2 += k2;
p2 += (0 - (p2 < k2)) & 257;
/* compute (p1+k1)*(p2+k2)%p64 */
MUL64(rh, rl, p1, p2);
t = rh >> 56;
ADD128(t, rl, z, rh);
rh <<= 8;
ADD128(t, rl, z, rh);
t += t << 8;
rl += t;
rl += (0 - (rl < t)) & 257;
rl += (0 - (rl > p64-1)) & 257;
return rl;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void scheduler_tick(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct task_struct *curr = rq->curr;
sched_clock_tick();
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
update_rq_clock(rq);
update_cpu_load_active(rq);
curr->sched_class->task_tick(rq, curr, 0);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
perf_event_task_tick();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->idle_at_tick = idle_cpu(cpu);
trigger_load_balance(rq, cpu);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CheckWindowAndItemPlacement(aura::Window* first, aura::Window* second) {
Shelf* shelf = GetPrimaryShelf();
const gfx::Rect first_item_bounds =
shelf->GetScreenBoundsOfItemIconForWindow(first);
const gfx::Rect second_item_bounds =
shelf->GetScreenBoundsOfItemIconForWindow(second);
if (!base::i18n::IsRTL()) {
EXPECT_TRUE((first->bounds().x() < second->bounds().x()) ||
(first->bounds().y() < second->bounds().y()));
EXPECT_TRUE((first_item_bounds.x() < second_item_bounds.x()) ||
(first_item_bounds.y() < second_item_bounds.y()));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE((first->bounds().x() > second->bounds().x()) ||
(first->bounds().y() < second->bounds().y()));
EXPECT_TRUE((first_item_bounds.x() > second_item_bounds.x()) ||
(first_item_bounds.y() < second_item_bounds.y()));
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_update_rtt_min(struct sock *sk, u32 rtt_us)
{
const u32 now = tcp_time_stamp, wlen = sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen * HZ;
struct rtt_meas *m = tcp_sk(sk)->rtt_min;
struct rtt_meas rttm = { .rtt = (rtt_us ? : 1), .ts = now };
u32 elapsed;
/* Check if the new measurement updates the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd choices */
if (unlikely(rttm.rtt <= m[0].rtt))
m[0] = m[1] = m[2] = rttm;
else if (rttm.rtt <= m[1].rtt)
m[1] = m[2] = rttm;
else if (rttm.rtt <= m[2].rtt)
m[2] = rttm;
elapsed = now - m[0].ts;
if (unlikely(elapsed > wlen)) {
/* Passed entire window without a new min so make 2nd choice
* the new min & 3rd choice the new 2nd. So forth and so on.
*/
m[0] = m[1];
m[1] = m[2];
m[2] = rttm;
if (now - m[0].ts > wlen) {
m[0] = m[1];
m[1] = rttm;
if (now - m[0].ts > wlen)
m[0] = rttm;
}
} else if (m[1].ts == m[0].ts && elapsed > wlen / 4) {
/* Passed a quarter of the window without a new min so
* take 2nd choice from the 2nd quarter of the window.
*/
m[2] = m[1] = rttm;
} else if (m[2].ts == m[1].ts && elapsed > wlen / 2) {
/* Passed half the window without a new min so take the 3rd
* choice from the last half of the window.
*/
m[2] = rttm;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 55,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnNavigate(const ViewMsg_Navigate_Params& params) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
LOG(ERROR) << "OnNavigate: url=" << params.url
<< ", webview=" << webview()
<< ", reload=" << IsReload(params)
<< ", paerams.state.empty=" << params.state.empty();
#endif
MaybeHandleDebugURL(params.url);
if (!webview())
return;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, Navigate(params.url));
bool is_reload = IsReload(params);
if (IsBackForwardToStaleEntry(params, is_reload))
return;
if (is_swapped_out_)
SetSwappedOut(false);
history_list_offset_ = params.current_history_list_offset;
history_list_length_ = params.current_history_list_length;
if (history_list_length_ >= 0)
history_page_ids_.resize(history_list_length_, -1);
if (params.pending_history_list_offset >= 0 &&
params.pending_history_list_offset < history_list_length_)
history_page_ids_[params.pending_history_list_offset] = params.page_id;
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(params.url);
WebFrame* main_frame = webview()->mainFrame();
if (is_reload && main_frame->currentHistoryItem().isNull()) {
is_reload = false;
}
pending_navigation_params_.reset(new ViewMsg_Navigate_Params);
*pending_navigation_params_.get() = params;
if (is_reload) {
bool ignore_cache = (params.navigation_type ==
ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE);
main_frame->reload(ignore_cache);
} else if (!params.state.empty()) {
DCHECK_NE(params.page_id, -1);
main_frame->loadHistoryItem(
webkit_glue::HistoryItemFromString(params.state));
} else {
WebURLRequest request(params.url);
CHECK_EQ(params.page_id, -1);
if (main_frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled())
request.setCachePolicy(WebURLRequest::ReturnCacheDataElseLoad);
if (params.referrer.url.is_valid()) {
WebString referrer = WebSecurityPolicy::generateReferrerHeader(
params.referrer.policy,
params.url,
WebString::fromUTF8(params.referrer.url.spec()));
if (!referrer.isEmpty())
request.setHTTPHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"), referrer);
}
if (!params.extra_headers.empty()) {
for (net::HttpUtil::HeadersIterator i(params.extra_headers.begin(),
params.extra_headers.end(), "\n");
i.GetNext(); ) {
request.addHTTPHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8(i.name()),
WebString::fromUTF8(i.values()));
}
}
main_frame->loadRequest(request);
}
pending_navigation_params_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *block_devnode(struct device *dev, umode_t *mode,
kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
if (disk->devnode)
return disk->devnode(disk, mode);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jboolean ForeignSessionHelper::GetForeignSessions(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& result) {
OpenTabsUIDelegate* open_tabs = GetOpenTabsUIDelegate(profile_);
if (!open_tabs)
return false;
std::vector<const SyncedSession*> sessions;
if (!open_tabs->GetAllForeignSessions(&sessions))
return false;
DictionaryPrefUpdate pref_update(profile_->GetPrefs(),
prefs::kNtpCollapsedForeignSessions);
base::DictionaryValue* pref_collapsed_sessions = pref_update.Get();
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> collapsed_sessions(
pref_collapsed_sessions->DeepCopy());
pref_collapsed_sessions->Clear();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> last_pushed_session;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sessions.size(); ++i) {
const SyncedSession& session = *(sessions[i]);
if (ShouldSkipSession(session))
continue;
const bool is_collapsed = collapsed_sessions->HasKey(session.session_tag);
if (is_collapsed)
pref_collapsed_sessions->SetBoolean(session.session_tag, true);
last_pushed_session.Reset(Java_ForeignSessionHelper_pushSession(
env, result, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, session.session_tag),
ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, session.session_name), session.device_type,
session.modified_time.ToJavaTime()));
JNI_ForeignSessionHelper_CopySessionToJava(env, session,
last_pushed_session);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prefer SyncService over ProfileSyncService in foreign_session_helper
SyncService is the interface, ProfileSyncService is the concrete
implementation. Generally no clients should need to use the conrete
implementation - for one, testing will be much easier once everyone
uses the interface only.
Bug: 924508
Change-Id: Ia210665f8f02512053d1a60d627dea0f22758387
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1461119
Auto-Submit: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630662}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 130,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_cpu_active(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_STARTING:
case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
set_cpu_active((long)hcpu, true);
return NOTIFY_OK;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigatorImpl::NavigateToPendingEntry(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
const FrameNavigationEntry& frame_entry,
ReloadType reload_type,
bool is_same_document_history_load) {
return NavigateToEntry(frame_tree_node, frame_entry,
*controller_->GetPendingEntry(), reload_type,
is_same_document_history_load, false, true, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebViewTestClient::DidFocus() {
test_runner()->SetFocus(web_view_test_proxy_base_->web_view(), true);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: txdesc_writeback(E1000State *s, dma_addr_t base, struct e1000_tx_desc *dp)
{
uint32_t txd_upper, txd_lower = le32_to_cpu(dp->lower.data);
if (!(txd_lower & (E1000_TXD_CMD_RS|E1000_TXD_CMD_RPS)))
return 0;
txd_upper = (le32_to_cpu(dp->upper.data) | E1000_TXD_STAT_DD) &
~(E1000_TXD_STAT_EC | E1000_TXD_STAT_LC | E1000_TXD_STAT_TU);
dp->upper.data = cpu_to_le32(txd_upper);
pci_dma_write(&s->dev, base + ((char *)&dp->upper - (char *)dp),
&dp->upper, sizeof(dp->upper));
return E1000_ICR_TXDW;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,388
|
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