instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_intrmgr_pci_unint(E1000ECore *core)
{
int i;
timer_del(core->radv.timer);
timer_free(core->radv.timer);
timer_del(core->rdtr.timer);
timer_free(core->rdtr.timer);
timer_del(core->raid.timer);
timer_free(core->raid.timer);
timer_del(core->tadv.timer);
timer_free(core->tadv.timer);
timer_del(core->tidv.timer);
timer_free(core->tidv.timer);
timer_del(core->itr.timer);
timer_free(core->itr.timer);
for (i = 0; i < E1000E_MSIX_VEC_NUM; i++) {
timer_del(core->eitr[i].timer);
timer_free(core->eitr[i].timer);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MagickPNGErrorHandler(png_struct *ping,png_const_charp message)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
PNGErrorInfo
*error_info;
error_info=(PNGErrorInfo *) png_get_error_ptr(ping);
image=error_info->image;
exception=error_info->exception;
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" libpng-%s error: %s", png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),message);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,message,
"`%s'",image->filename);
#if (PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500)
/* A warning about deprecated use of jmpbuf here is unavoidable if you
* are building with libpng-1.4.x and can be ignored.
*/
longjmp(ping->jmpbuf,1);
#else
png_longjmp(ping,1);
#endif
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 63,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fmov_mem_reg(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m,
int n)
{
if (FPSCR_SZ) {
FMOV_EXT(n);
READ(FRn, Rm + 4);
n++;
READ(FRn, Rm);
} else {
READ(FRn, Rm);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int len,
int what, xmlChar end, xmlChar end2, xmlChar end3) {
xmlChar *buffer = NULL;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
size_t nbchars = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
const xmlChar *last;
xmlEntityPtr ent;
int c,l;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (str == NULL) || (len < 0))
return(NULL);
last = str + len;
if (((ctxt->depth > 40) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) ||
(ctxt->depth > 1024)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* allocate a translation buffer.
*/
buffer_size = XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(buffer_size);
if (buffer == NULL) goto mem_error;
/*
* OK loop until we reach one of the ending char or a size limit.
* we are operating on already parsed values.
*/
if (str < last)
c = CUR_SCHAR(str, l);
else
c = 0;
while ((c != 0) && (c != end) && /* non input consuming loop */
(c != end2) && (c != end3)) {
if (c == 0) break;
if ((c == '&') && (str[1] == '#')) {
int val = xmlParseStringCharRef(ctxt, &str);
if (val != 0) {
COPY_BUF(0,buffer,nbchars,val);
}
if (nbchars + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE > buffer_size) {
growBuffer(buffer, XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
} else if ((c == '&') && (what & XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF)) {
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"String decoding Entity Reference: %.30s\n",
str);
ent = xmlParseStringEntityRef(ctxt, &str);
if ((ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP) ||
(ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR))
goto int_error;
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, ent, 0);
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->checked / 2;
if ((ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype == XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (ent->content != NULL) {
COPY_BUF(0,buffer,nbchars,ent->content[0]);
if (nbchars + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE > buffer_size) {
growBuffer(buffer, XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"predefined entity has no content\n");
}
} else if ((ent != NULL) && (ent->content != NULL)) {
ctxt->depth++;
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content, what,
0, 0, 0);
ctxt->depth--;
if ((ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP) ||
(ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR))
goto int_error;
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming loop */
buffer[nbchars++] = *current++;
if (nbchars + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE > buffer_size) {
if (xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, nbchars, ent, 0))
goto int_error;
growBuffer(buffer, XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
} else if (ent != NULL) {
int i = xmlStrlen(ent->name);
const xmlChar *cur = ent->name;
buffer[nbchars++] = '&';
if (nbchars + i + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE > buffer_size) {
growBuffer(buffer, i + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
for (;i > 0;i--)
buffer[nbchars++] = *cur++;
buffer[nbchars++] = ';';
}
} else if (c == '%' && (what & XML_SUBSTITUTE_PEREF)) {
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"String decoding PE Reference: %.30s\n", str);
ent = xmlParseStringPEReference(ctxt, &str);
if (ctxt->lastError.code == XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP)
goto int_error;
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, ent, 0);
if (ent != NULL)
ctxt->nbentities += ent->checked / 2;
if (ent != NULL) {
if (ent->content == NULL) {
/*
* Note: external parsed entities will not be loaded,
* it is not required for a non-validating parser to
* complete external PEreferences coming from the
* internal subset
*/
if (((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) != 0) ||
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) != 0) ||
(ctxt->validate != 0)) {
xmlLoadEntityContent(ctxt, ent);
} else {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_PROCESSING,
"not validating will not read content for PE entity %s\n",
ent->name, NULL);
}
}
ctxt->depth++;
rep = xmlStringDecodeEntities(ctxt, ent->content, what,
0, 0, 0);
ctxt->depth--;
if (rep != NULL) {
current = rep;
while (*current != 0) { /* non input consuming loop */
buffer[nbchars++] = *current++;
if (nbchars + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE > buffer_size) {
if (xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, nbchars, ent, 0))
goto int_error;
growBuffer(buffer, XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
}
xmlFree(rep);
rep = NULL;
}
}
} else {
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,nbchars,c);
str += l;
if (nbchars + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE > buffer_size) {
growBuffer(buffer, XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE);
}
}
if (str < last)
c = CUR_SCHAR(str, l);
else
c = 0;
}
buffer[nbchars] = 0;
return(buffer);
mem_error:
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
int_error:
if (rep != NULL)
xmlFree(rep);
if (buffer != NULL)
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 163,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
u32 __user *uaddr2, u32 val2, u32 val3)
{
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
unsigned int flags = 0;
if (!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))
flags |= FLAGS_SHARED;
if (op & FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME) {
flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
if (cmd != FUTEX_WAIT && cmd != FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET && \
cmd != FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI)
return -ENOSYS;
}
switch (cmd) {
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
}
switch (cmd) {
case FUTEX_WAIT:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
case FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET:
return futex_wait(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3);
case FUTEX_WAKE:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
case FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET:
return futex_wake(uaddr, flags, val, val3);
case FUTEX_REQUEUE:
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, NULL, 0);
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE:
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, &val3, 0);
case FUTEX_WAKE_OP:
return futex_wake_op(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, val3);
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
return futex_lock_pi(uaddr, flags, timeout, 0);
case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI:
return futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, flags);
case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI:
return futex_lock_pi(uaddr, flags, NULL, 1);
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
return futex_wait_requeue_pi(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3,
uaddr2);
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, &val3, 1);
}
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 84,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jsonb_object_field(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Jsonb *jb = PG_GETARG_JSONB(0);
text *key = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
JsonbValue *v;
if (!JB_ROOT_IS_OBJECT(jb))
PG_RETURN_NULL();
v = findJsonbValueFromContainerLen(&jb->root, JB_FOBJECT,
VARDATA_ANY(key),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key));
if (v != NULL)
PG_RETURN_JSONB(JsonbValueToJsonb(v));
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileTransfer::AddDownloadFilenameRemaps(char const *remaps) {
if(!download_filename_remaps.IsEmpty()) {
download_filename_remaps += ";";
}
download_filename_remaps += remaps;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShellContentUtilityClient::~ShellContentUtilityClient() {
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ib_uverbs_release_dev(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct ib_uverbs_device *dev =
container_of(kobj, struct ib_uverbs_device, kobj);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&dev->disassociate_srcu);
kfree(dev);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~TestDevToolsClientHost() {
EXPECT_TRUE(closed_);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FramerVisitorCapturingAcks::OnAckFrame(const QuicAckFrame& frame) {
frame_ = frame;
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void gen_op_jnz_ecx(TCGMemOp size, TCGLabel *label1)
{
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_regs[R_ECX]);
gen_extu(size, cpu_tmp0);
tcg_gen_brcondi_tl(TCG_COND_NE, cpu_tmp0, 0, label1);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i;
struct mm_struct *mm = kvm->mm;
kvm_arch_sync_events(kvm);
spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_del(&kvm->vm_list);
spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
kvm_free_irq_routing(kvm);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_BUSES; i++)
kvm_io_bus_destroy(kvm->buses[i]);
kvm_coalesced_mmio_free(kvm);
#if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER)
mmu_notifier_unregister(&kvm->mmu_notifier, kvm->mm);
#else
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(kvm);
#endif
kvm_arch_destroy_vm(kvm);
kvm_destroy_devices(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem(kvm);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_free_vm(kvm);
hardware_disable_all();
mmdrop(mm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArthurOutputDev::drawImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
int *maskColors, GBool inlineImg)
{
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned int *dest;
int x, y;
ImageStream *imgStr;
Guchar *pix;
int i;
double *ctm;
QMatrix matrix;
int is_identity_transform;
buffer = (unsigned char *)gmalloc (width * height * 4);
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgStr->reset();
/* ICCBased color space doesn't do any color correction
* so check its underlying color space as well */
is_identity_transform = colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB ||
(colorMap->getColorSpace()->getMode() == csICCBased &&
((GfxICCBasedColorSpace*)colorMap->getColorSpace())->getAlt()->getMode() == csDeviceRGB);
if (maskColors) {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
for (i = 0; i < colorMap->getNumPixelComps(); ++i) {
if (pix[i] < maskColors[2*i] * 255||
pix[i] > maskColors[2*i+1] * 255) {
*dest = *dest | 0xff000000;
break;
}
}
pix += colorMap->getNumPixelComps();
dest++;
}
}
m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_ARGB32);
}
else {
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
dest = (unsigned int *) (buffer + y * 4 * width);
pix = imgStr->getLine();
colorMap->getRGBLine (pix, dest, width);
}
m_image = new QImage(buffer, width, height, QImage::Format_RGB32);
}
if (m_image == NULL || m_image->isNull()) {
qDebug() << "Null image";
delete imgStr;
return;
}
ctm = state->getCTM();
matrix.setMatrix(ctm[0] / width, ctm[1] / width, -ctm[2] / height, -ctm[3] / height, ctm[2] + ctm[4], ctm[3] + ctm[5]);
m_painter->setMatrix(matrix, true);
m_painter->drawImage( QPoint(0,0), *m_image );
delete m_image;
m_image = 0;
free (buffer);
delete imgStr;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 164,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_epoll_wait(int epfd,
struct oabi_epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, int timeout)
{
struct epoll_event *kbuf;
mm_segment_t fs;
long ret, err, i;
if (maxevents <= 0 || maxevents > (INT_MAX/sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
return -EINVAL;
kbuf = kmalloc(sizeof(*kbuf) * maxevents, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_epoll_wait(epfd, kbuf, maxevents, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ret; i++) {
__put_user_error(kbuf[i].events, &events->events, err);
__put_user_error(kbuf[i].data, &events->data, err);
events++;
}
kfree(kbuf);
return err ? -EFAULT : ret;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit crypto_algapi_exit(void)
{
crypto_exit_proc();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int php_openssl_is_private_key(EVP_PKEY* pkey TSRMLS_DC)
{
assert(pkey != NULL);
switch (pkey->type) {
#ifndef NO_RSA
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
assert(pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL);
if (pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL && (NULL == pkey->pkey.rsa->p || NULL == pkey->pkey.rsa->q)) {
return 0;
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DSA
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA1:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
assert(pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL);
if (NULL == pkey->pkey.dsa->p || NULL == pkey->pkey.dsa->q || NULL == pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key){
return 0;
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
assert(pkey->pkey.dh != NULL);
if (NULL == pkey->pkey.dh->p || NULL == pkey->pkey.dh->priv_key) {
return 0;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
assert(pkey->pkey.ec != NULL);
if ( NULL == EC_KEY_get0_private_key(pkey->pkey.ec)) {
return 0;
}
break;
#endif
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key type not supported in this PHP build!");
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool SystemUsesChromiumEVMetadata() {
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
return false;
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return false;
#else
return true;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual sp<NativeHandle> getSidebandStream() const {
Parcel data, reply;
status_t err;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
if ((err = remote()->transact(GET_SIDEBAND_STREAM, data, &reply)) != NO_ERROR) {
return NULL;
}
sp<NativeHandle> stream;
if (reply.readInt32()) {
stream = NativeHandle::create(reply.readNativeHandle(), true);
}
return stream;
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 160,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __ip_vs_del_dest(struct net *net, struct ip_vs_dest *dest)
{
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
ip_vs_stop_estimator(net, &dest->stats);
/*
* Remove it from the d-linked list with the real services.
*/
write_lock_bh(&ipvs->rs_lock);
ip_vs_rs_unhash(dest);
write_unlock_bh(&ipvs->rs_lock);
/*
* Decrease the refcnt of the dest, and free the dest
* if nobody refers to it (refcnt=0). Otherwise, throw
* the destination into the trash.
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&dest->refcnt)) {
IP_VS_DBG_BUF(3, "Removing destination %u/%s:%u\n",
dest->vfwmark,
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(dest->af, &dest->addr),
ntohs(dest->port));
ip_vs_dst_reset(dest);
/* simply decrease svc->refcnt here, let the caller check
and release the service if nobody refers to it.
Only user context can release destination and service,
and only one user context can update virtual service at a
time, so the operation here is OK */
atomic_dec(&dest->svc->refcnt);
free_percpu(dest->stats.cpustats);
kfree(dest);
} else {
IP_VS_DBG_BUF(3, "Moving dest %s:%u into trash, "
"dest->refcnt=%d\n",
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(dest->af, &dest->addr),
ntohs(dest->port),
atomic_read(&dest->refcnt));
list_add(&dest->n_list, &ipvs->dest_trash);
atomic_inc(&dest->refcnt);
}
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProCamera2Client::onExclusiveLockStolen() {
ALOGV("%s: ProClient lost exclusivity (id %d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
SharedCameraCallbacks::Lock l(mSharedCameraCallbacks);
if (mExclusiveLock && mRemoteCallback.get() != NULL) {
mRemoteCallback->onLockStatusChanged(
IProCameraCallbacks::LOCK_STOLEN);
}
mExclusiveLock = false;
detachDevice();
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodPromiseArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodPromiseArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
{
DTLS1_STATE *d1;
if (!ssl3_new(s))
return (0);
if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL)
return (0);
memset(d1, 0, sizeof *d1);
/* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
d1->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d1->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
d1->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
if (s->server) {
d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
}
d1->link_mtu = 0;
d1->mtu = 0;
if (!d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || !d1->processed_rcds.q
|| !d1->buffered_messages || !d1->sent_messages
|| !d1->buffered_app_data.q) {
if (d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)
pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (d1->processed_rcds.q)
pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
if (d1->buffered_messages)
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
if (d1->sent_messages)
pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
if (d1->buffered_app_data.q)
pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(d1);
return (0);
}
s->d1 = d1;
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardMouseEventWithLatencyInfo(
const blink::WebMouseEvent& mouse_event,
const ui::LatencyInfo& ui_latency) {
TRACE_EVENT2("input", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardMouseEvent",
"x", mouse_event.x, "y", mouse_event.y);
for (size_t i = 0; i < mouse_event_callbacks_.size(); ++i) {
if (mouse_event_callbacks_[i].Run(mouse_event))
return;
}
if (ShouldDropInputEvents())
return;
if (touch_emulator_ && touch_emulator_->HandleMouseEvent(mouse_event))
return;
MouseEventWithLatencyInfo mouse_with_latency(mouse_event, ui_latency);
latency_tracker_.OnInputEvent(mouse_event, &mouse_with_latency.latency);
input_router_->SendMouseEvent(mouse_with_latency);
if (process_->SubscribeUniformEnabled()) {
gpu::ValueState state;
state.int_value[0] = mouse_event.x;
state.int_value[1] = mouse_event.y;
process_->SendUpdateValueState(GL_MOUSE_POSITION_CHROMIUM, state);
}
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void process_bin_complete_sasl_auth(conn *c) {
assert(settings.sasl);
const char *out = NULL;
unsigned int outlen = 0;
assert(c->item);
init_sasl_conn(c);
int nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
int vlen = c->binary_header.request.bodylen - nkey;
char mech[nkey+1];
memcpy(mech, ITEM_key((item*)c->item), nkey);
mech[nkey] = 0x00;
if (settings.verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "mech: ``%s'' with %d bytes of data\n", mech, vlen);
const char *challenge = vlen == 0 ? NULL : ITEM_data((item*) c->item);
int result=-1;
switch (c->cmd) {
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_AUTH:
result = sasl_server_start(c->sasl_conn, mech,
challenge, vlen,
&out, &outlen);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_STEP:
result = sasl_server_step(c->sasl_conn,
challenge, vlen,
&out, &outlen);
break;
default:
assert(false); /* CMD should be one of the above */
/* This code is pretty much impossible, but makes the compiler
happier */
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unhandled command %d with challenge %s\n",
c->cmd, challenge);
}
break;
}
item_unlink(c->item);
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "sasl result code: %d\n", result);
}
switch(result) {
case SASL_OK:
write_bin_response(c, "Authenticated", 0, 0, strlen("Authenticated"));
break;
case SASL_CONTINUE:
add_bin_header(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_AUTH_CONTINUE, 0, 0, outlen);
if(outlen > 0) {
add_iov(c, out, outlen);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
break;
default:
if (settings.verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown sasl response: %d\n", result);
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_AUTH_ERROR, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::finalizeStream(const KURL& url)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().finalizeStream(url);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url));
callOnMainThread(&finalizeStreamTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int drm_mode_attachmode_crtc(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_crtc *crtc,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
struct drm_connector *connector;
int ret = 0;
struct drm_display_mode *dup_mode;
int need_dup = 0;
list_for_each_entry(connector, &dev->mode_config.connector_list, head) {
if (!connector->encoder)
break;
if (connector->encoder->crtc == crtc) {
if (need_dup)
dup_mode = drm_mode_duplicate(dev, mode);
else
dup_mode = mode;
ret = drm_mode_attachmode(dev, connector, dup_mode);
if (ret)
return ret;
need_dup = 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::didRemoveAllPendingStylesheet()
{
m_needsNotifyRemoveAllPendingStylesheet = false;
styleResolverChanged(RecalcStyleIfNeeded);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser())
parser->executeScriptsWaitingForStylesheets();
if (m_gotoAnchorNeededAfterStylesheetsLoad && view())
view()->scrollToFragment(m_url);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NormalPage::PoisonUnmarkedObjects() {
for (Address header_address = Payload(); header_address < PayloadEnd();) {
HeapObjectHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(header_address);
DCHECK_LT(header->size(), BlinkPagePayloadSize());
if (header->IsFree()) {
header_address += header->size();
continue;
}
if (!header->IsMarked())
ASAN_POISON_MEMORY_REGION(header->Payload(), header->PayloadSize());
header_address += header->size();
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_get_angle(const person_t* person)
{
return person->theta;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AirPDcapWepMng(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
UCHAR *decrypt_data,
guint mac_header_len,
guint *decrypt_len,
PAIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM key,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *sa,
INT offset)
{
UCHAR wep_key[AIRPDCAP_WEP_KEY_MAXLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN];
size_t keylen;
INT ret_value=1;
INT key_index;
AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM *tmp_key;
UINT8 useCache=FALSE;
UCHAR *try_data;
guint try_data_len = *decrypt_len;
try_data = (UCHAR *)g_malloc(try_data_len);
if (sa->key!=NULL)
useCache=TRUE;
for (key_index=0; key_index<(INT)ctx->keys_nr; key_index++) {
/* use the cached one, or try all keys */
if (!useCache) {
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
} else {
if (sa->key!=NULL && sa->key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try cached WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
tmp_key=sa->key;
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Cached key is not valid, try another WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
tmp_key=&ctx->keys[key_index];
}
}
/* obviously, try only WEP keys... */
if (tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Try WEP key...", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
memset(wep_key, 0, sizeof(wep_key));
memcpy(try_data, decrypt_data, *decrypt_len);
/* Costruct the WEP seed: copy the IV in first 3 bytes and then the WEP key (refer to 802-11i-2004, 8.2.1.4.3, pag. 36) */
memcpy(wep_key, try_data+mac_header_len, AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN);
keylen=tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKeyLen;
memcpy(wep_key+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN, tmp_key->KeyData.Wep.WepKey, keylen);
ret_value=AirPDcapWepDecrypt(wep_key,
keylen+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN,
try_data + (mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN),
*decrypt_len-(mac_header_len+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN+AIRPDCAP_CRC_LEN));
if (ret_value == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS)
memcpy(decrypt_data, try_data, *decrypt_len);
}
if (!ret_value && tmp_key->KeyType==AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP) {
/* the tried key is the correct one, cached in the Security Association */
sa->key=tmp_key;
if (key!=NULL) {
memcpy(key, sa->key, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_KEY_ITEM));
key->KeyType=AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
}
break;
} else {
/* the cached key was not valid, try other keys */
if (useCache==TRUE) {
useCache=FALSE;
key_index--;
}
}
}
g_free(try_data);
if (ret_value)
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "WEP DECRYPTED!!!", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* remove ICV (4bytes) from the end of packet */
*decrypt_len-=4;
if (*decrypt_len < 4) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapWepMng", "Decryption length too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_UNSUCCESS;
}
/* remove protection bit */
decrypt_data[1]&=0xBF;
/* remove IC header */
offset = mac_header_len;
*decrypt_len-=4;
memmove(decrypt_data+offset, decrypt_data+offset+AIRPDCAP_WEP_IVLEN+AIRPDCAP_WEP_KIDLEN, *decrypt_len-offset);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 51,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForTabState() {
WebContents* current_web_contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_);
if (!current_web_contents) // May be NULL during tab restore.
return;
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_BACK, CanGoBack(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FORWARD, CanGoForward(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD, CanReload(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE,
CanReload(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_RELOAD_CLEARING_CACHE,
CanReload(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DUPLICATE_TAB,
!browser_->is_app() && CanDuplicateTab(browser_));
window()->SetStarredState(
BookmarkTabHelper::FromWebContents(current_web_contents)->is_starred());
window()->ZoomChangedForActiveTab(false);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_VIEW_SOURCE,
CanViewSource(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_EMAIL_PAGE_LOCATION,
CanEmailPageLocation(browser_));
if (browser_->is_devtools())
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_OPEN_FILE, false);
NavigationController& nc = current_web_contents->GetController();
bool is_chrome_internal = HasInternalURL(nc.GetActiveEntry()) ||
current_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage();
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ENCODING_MENU,
!is_chrome_internal && current_web_contents->IsSavable());
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_CREATE_SHORTCUTS,
CanCreateApplicationShortcuts(browser_));
#endif
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_TOGGLE_REQUEST_TABLET_SITE,
CanRequestTabletSite(current_web_contents));
UpdateCommandsForContentRestrictionState();
UpdateCommandsForBookmarkEditing();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_decode_array2(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int base,
struct xdr_array2_desc *desc)
{
if (base >= buf->len)
return -EINVAL;
return xdr_xcode_array2(buf, base, desc, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void clearLoader() {
m_loader = nullptr;
m_scriptState.clear();
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListSyncableService::DeleteSyncItem(SyncItem* sync_item) {
if (SyncStarted()) {
VLOG(2) << this << " -> SYNC DELETE: " << sync_item->ToString();
SyncChange sync_change(FROM_HERE, SyncChange::ACTION_DELETE,
GetSyncDataFromSyncItem(sync_item));
sync_processor_->ProcessSyncChanges(
FROM_HERE, syncer::SyncChangeList(1, sync_change));
}
std::string item_id = sync_item->item_id;
delete sync_item;
sync_items_.erase(item_id);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_iterate_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
perf_iterate_f output,
void *data, bool all)
{
struct perf_event *event;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) {
if (!all) {
if (event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
continue;
if (!event_filter_match(event))
continue;
}
output(event, data);
}
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: epass2003_refresh(struct sc_card *card)
{
int r = SC_SUCCESS;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (exdata->sm) {
card->sm_ctx.sm_mode = 0;
r = mutual_auth(card, g_init_key_enc, g_init_key_mac);
card->sm_ctx.sm_mode = SM_MODE_TRANSMIT;
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "mutual_auth failed");
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __readwrite_bug(const char *fn)
{
printk("%s called, but not implemented\n", fn);
BUG();
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int http_header_add_tail2(struct http_msg *msg,
struct hdr_idx *hdr_idx, const char *text, int len)
{
int bytes;
bytes = buffer_insert_line2(msg->chn->buf, msg->chn->buf->p + msg->eoh, text, len);
if (!bytes)
return -1;
http_msg_move_end(msg, bytes);
return hdr_idx_add(len, 1, hdr_idx, hdr_idx->tail);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::SuppressLoadEvent() {
if (!LoadEventFinished())
load_event_progress_ = kLoadEventCompleted;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void classMethodWithOptionalMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::classMethodWithOptionalMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *opendata;
int ret;
opendata = nfs4_open_recoverdata_alloc(ctx, state);
if (IS_ERR(opendata))
return PTR_ERR(opendata);
opendata->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_DELEGATE_CUR;
memcpy(opendata->o_arg.u.delegation.data, stateid->data,
sizeof(opendata->o_arg.u.delegation.data));
ret = nfs4_open_recover(opendata, state);
nfs4_opendata_put(opendata);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RequestTextSurroundingSelection(
const TextSurroundingSelectionCallback& callback,
int max_length) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
if (!text_surrounding_selection_callback_.is_null()) {
callback.Run(base::string16(), 0, 0);
return;
}
text_surrounding_selection_callback_ = callback;
Send(
new FrameMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionRequest(GetRoutingID(), max_length));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nft_dump_stats(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nft_stats __percpu *stats)
{
struct nft_stats *cpu_stats, total;
struct nlattr *nest;
unsigned int seq;
u64 pkts, bytes;
int cpu;
memset(&total, 0, sizeof(total));
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
cpu_stats = per_cpu_ptr(stats, cpu);
do {
seq = u64_stats_fetch_begin_irq(&cpu_stats->syncp);
pkts = cpu_stats->pkts;
bytes = cpu_stats->bytes;
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_irq(&cpu_stats->syncp, seq));
total.pkts += pkts;
total.bytes += bytes;
}
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_CHAIN_COUNTERS);
if (nest == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_COUNTER_PACKETS, cpu_to_be64(total.pkts)) ||
nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_COUNTER_BYTES, cpu_to_be64(total.bytes)))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -ENOSPC;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct blkcg_gq *blkg_create(struct blkcg *blkcg,
struct request_queue *q,
struct blkcg_gq *new_blkg)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg;
struct bdi_writeback_congested *wb_congested;
int i, ret;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());
lockdep_assert_held(q->queue_lock);
/* blkg holds a reference to blkcg */
if (!css_tryget_online(&blkcg->css)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_free_blkg;
}
wb_congested = wb_congested_get_create(q->backing_dev_info,
blkcg->css.id,
GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!wb_congested) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_put_css;
}
/* allocate */
if (!new_blkg) {
new_blkg = blkg_alloc(blkcg, q, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (unlikely(!new_blkg)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_put_congested;
}
}
blkg = new_blkg;
blkg->wb_congested = wb_congested;
/* link parent */
if (blkcg_parent(blkcg)) {
blkg->parent = __blkg_lookup(blkcg_parent(blkcg), q, false);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!blkg->parent)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err_put_congested;
}
blkg_get(blkg->parent);
}
/* invoke per-policy init */
for (i = 0; i < BLKCG_MAX_POLS; i++) {
struct blkcg_policy *pol = blkcg_policy[i];
if (blkg->pd[i] && pol->pd_init_fn)
pol->pd_init_fn(blkg->pd[i]);
}
/* insert */
spin_lock(&blkcg->lock);
ret = radix_tree_insert(&blkcg->blkg_tree, q->id, blkg);
if (likely(!ret)) {
hlist_add_head_rcu(&blkg->blkcg_node, &blkcg->blkg_list);
list_add(&blkg->q_node, &q->blkg_list);
for (i = 0; i < BLKCG_MAX_POLS; i++) {
struct blkcg_policy *pol = blkcg_policy[i];
if (blkg->pd[i] && pol->pd_online_fn)
pol->pd_online_fn(blkg->pd[i]);
}
}
blkg->online = true;
spin_unlock(&blkcg->lock);
if (!ret)
return blkg;
/* @blkg failed fully initialized, use the usual release path */
blkg_put(blkg);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
err_put_congested:
wb_congested_put(wb_congested);
err_put_css:
css_put(&blkcg->css);
err_free_blkg:
blkg_free(new_blkg);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadProtectionService::IsSupportedDownload(
const content::DownloadItem& item,
const base::FilePath& target_path) const {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
DownloadCheckResultReason reason = REASON_MAX;
ClientDownloadRequest::DownloadType type =
ClientDownloadRequest::WIN_EXECUTABLE;
return (CheckClientDownloadRequest::IsSupportedDownload(
item, target_path, &reason, &type) &&
(ClientDownloadRequest::CHROME_EXTENSION != type));
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestScopedKeyboardHook::LockSpecificKey(ui::DomCode dom_code) {
keyboard_lock_active_ = true;
locked_key_ = dom_code;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_usb_apply_interface_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
int iface,
int altno)
{
/* audiophile usb: skip altsets incompatible with device_setup */
if (chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x0763, 0x2003))
return audiophile_skip_setting_quirk(chip, iface, altno);
/* quattro usb: skip altsets incompatible with device_setup */
if (chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x0763, 0x2001))
return quattro_skip_setting_quirk(chip, iface, altno);
/* fasttrackpro usb: skip altsets incompatible with device_setup */
if (chip->usb_id == USB_ID(0x0763, 0x2012))
return fasttrackpro_skip_setting_quirk(chip, iface, altno);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool netlink_filter_tap(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
bool pass = false;
/* We take the more conservative approach and
* whitelist socket protocols that may pass.
*/
switch (sk->sk_protocol) {
case NETLINK_ROUTE:
case NETLINK_USERSOCK:
case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
case NETLINK_NFLOG:
case NETLINK_XFRM:
case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
case NETLINK_GENERIC:
pass = true;
break;
}
return pass;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_dc_colored_masked_get_dev_halftone(const gx_device_color * pdevc)
{
return pdevc->colors.colored.c_ht;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_class_name_class(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *outer, struct RClass *c, mrb_sym id)
{
mrb_value name;
mrb_sym nsym = mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__classname__");
if (mrb_obj_iv_defined(mrb, (struct RObject*)c, nsym)) return;
if (outer == NULL || outer == mrb->object_class) {
name = mrb_symbol_value(id);
}
else {
name = mrb_class_path(mrb, outer);
if (mrb_nil_p(name)) { /* unnamed outer class */
if (outer != mrb->object_class) {
mrb_obj_iv_set(mrb, (struct RObject*)c, mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "__outer__"),
mrb_obj_value(outer));
}
return;
}
mrb_str_cat_cstr(mrb, name, "::");
mrb_str_cat_cstr(mrb, name, mrb_sym2name(mrb, id));
}
mrb_obj_iv_set(mrb, (struct RObject*)c, nsym, name);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uas_stat_cmplt(struct urb *urb)
{
struct iu *iu = urb->transfer_buffer;
struct Scsi_Host *shost = urb->context;
struct uas_dev_info *devinfo = (struct uas_dev_info *)shost->hostdata;
struct urb *data_in_urb = NULL;
struct urb *data_out_urb = NULL;
struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd;
struct uas_cmd_info *cmdinfo;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int idx;
int status = urb->status;
bool success;
spin_lock_irqsave(&devinfo->lock, flags);
if (devinfo->resetting)
goto out;
if (status) {
if (status != -ENOENT && status != -ECONNRESET && status != -ESHUTDOWN)
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "stat urb: status %d\n", status);
goto out;
}
idx = be16_to_cpup(&iu->tag) - 1;
if (idx >= MAX_CMNDS || !devinfo->cmnd[idx]) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
"stat urb: no pending cmd for uas-tag %d\n", idx + 1);
goto out;
}
cmnd = devinfo->cmnd[idx];
cmdinfo = (void *)&cmnd->SCp;
if (!(cmdinfo->state & COMMAND_INFLIGHT)) {
uas_log_cmd_state(cmnd, "unexpected status cmplt", 0);
goto out;
}
switch (iu->iu_id) {
case IU_ID_STATUS:
uas_sense(urb, cmnd);
if (cmnd->result != 0) {
/* cancel data transfers on error */
data_in_urb = usb_get_urb(cmdinfo->data_in_urb);
data_out_urb = usb_get_urb(cmdinfo->data_out_urb);
}
cmdinfo->state &= ~COMMAND_INFLIGHT;
uas_try_complete(cmnd, __func__);
break;
case IU_ID_READ_READY:
if (!cmdinfo->data_in_urb ||
(cmdinfo->state & DATA_IN_URB_INFLIGHT)) {
uas_log_cmd_state(cmnd, "unexpected read rdy", 0);
break;
}
uas_xfer_data(urb, cmnd, SUBMIT_DATA_IN_URB);
break;
case IU_ID_WRITE_READY:
if (!cmdinfo->data_out_urb ||
(cmdinfo->state & DATA_OUT_URB_INFLIGHT)) {
uas_log_cmd_state(cmnd, "unexpected write rdy", 0);
break;
}
uas_xfer_data(urb, cmnd, SUBMIT_DATA_OUT_URB);
break;
case IU_ID_RESPONSE:
cmdinfo->state &= ~COMMAND_INFLIGHT;
success = uas_evaluate_response_iu((struct response_iu *)iu, cmnd);
if (!success) {
/* Error, cancel data transfers */
data_in_urb = usb_get_urb(cmdinfo->data_in_urb);
data_out_urb = usb_get_urb(cmdinfo->data_out_urb);
}
uas_try_complete(cmnd, __func__);
break;
default:
uas_log_cmd_state(cmnd, "bogus IU", iu->iu_id);
}
out:
usb_free_urb(urb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
/* Unlinking of data urbs must be done without holding the lock */
if (data_in_urb) {
usb_unlink_urb(data_in_urb);
usb_put_urb(data_in_urb);
}
if (data_out_urb) {
usb_unlink_urb(data_out_urb);
usb_put_urb(data_out_urb);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int canon_copy_from_read_buf(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned char __user **b,
size_t *nr)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
size_t n, size, more, c;
size_t eol;
size_t tail;
int ret, found = 0;
/* N.B. avoid overrun if nr == 0 */
if (!*nr)
return 0;
n = min(*nr + 1, smp_load_acquire(&ldata->canon_head) - ldata->read_tail);
tail = ldata->read_tail & (N_TTY_BUF_SIZE - 1);
size = min_t(size_t, tail + n, N_TTY_BUF_SIZE);
n_tty_trace("%s: nr:%zu tail:%zu n:%zu size:%zu\n",
__func__, *nr, tail, n, size);
eol = find_next_bit(ldata->read_flags, size, tail);
more = n - (size - tail);
if (eol == N_TTY_BUF_SIZE && more) {
/* scan wrapped without finding set bit */
eol = find_next_bit(ldata->read_flags, more, 0);
found = eol != more;
} else
found = eol != size;
n = eol - tail;
if (n > N_TTY_BUF_SIZE)
n += N_TTY_BUF_SIZE;
c = n + found;
if (!found || read_buf(ldata, eol) != __DISABLED_CHAR) {
c = min(*nr, c);
n = c;
}
n_tty_trace("%s: eol:%zu found:%d n:%zu c:%zu tail:%zu more:%zu\n",
__func__, eol, found, n, c, tail, more);
ret = tty_copy_to_user(tty, *b, tail, n);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
*b += n;
*nr -= n;
if (found)
clear_bit(eol, ldata->read_flags);
smp_store_release(&ldata->read_tail, ldata->read_tail + c);
if (found) {
if (!ldata->push)
ldata->line_start = ldata->read_tail;
else
ldata->push = 0;
tty_audit_push();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 76,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void release_tree_content_recursive(struct tree_content *t)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < t->entry_count; i++)
release_tree_entry(t->entries[i]);
release_tree_content(t);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(void *value, size_t size)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
if (user_ns == &init_user_ns)
return;
posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(user_ns, &init_user_ns, value, size);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct lruvec *mem_cgroup_lru_add_list(struct zone *zone, struct page *page,
enum lru_list lru)
{
struct mem_cgroup_per_zone *mz;
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
struct page_cgroup *pc;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return &zone->lruvec;
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(page);
memcg = pc->mem_cgroup;
mz = page_cgroup_zoneinfo(memcg, page);
/* compound_order() is stabilized through lru_lock */
MEM_CGROUP_ZSTAT(mz, lru) += 1 << compound_order(page);
return &mz->lruvec;
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_backtrace()
{
HANDLE hCurrentThread;
HANDLE hThread;
DWORD dwThreadId;
DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(), GetCurrentThread(),
GetCurrentProcess(), &hCurrentThread, 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS);
hThread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, dump_thread_proc, (LPVOID)hCurrentThread,
0, &dwThreadId);
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, INFINITE);
CloseHandle(hThread);
CloseHandle(hCurrentThread);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChildProcessLauncherHelper::LaunchProcessOnLauncherThread(
const base::LaunchOptions& options,
std::unique_ptr<PosixFileDescriptorInfo> files_to_register,
bool* is_synchronous_launch,
int* launch_result) {
*is_synchronous_launch = false;
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
DCHECK(env);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobjectArray> j_argv =
ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, command_line()->argv());
size_t file_count = files_to_register->GetMappingSize();
DCHECK(file_count > 0);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jclass> j_file_info_class = base::android::GetClass(
env, "org/chromium/base/process_launcher/FileDescriptorInfo");
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobjectArray> j_file_infos(
env, env->NewObjectArray(file_count, j_file_info_class.obj(), NULL));
base::android::CheckException(env);
for (size_t i = 0; i < file_count; ++i) {
int fd = files_to_register->GetFDAt(i);
PCHECK(0 <= fd);
int id = files_to_register->GetIDAt(i);
const auto& region = files_to_register->GetRegionAt(i);
bool auto_close = files_to_register->OwnsFD(fd);
if (auto_close) {
ignore_result(files_to_register->ReleaseFD(fd).release());
}
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> j_file_info =
Java_ChildProcessLauncherHelperImpl_makeFdInfo(
env, id, fd, auto_close, region.offset, region.size);
PCHECK(j_file_info.obj());
env->SetObjectArrayElement(j_file_infos.obj(), i, j_file_info.obj());
}
java_peer_.Reset(Java_ChildProcessLauncherHelperImpl_createAndStart(
env, reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(this), j_argv, j_file_infos));
AddRef(); // Balanced by OnChildProcessStarted.
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {client_thread_id_},
base::BindOnce(
&ChildProcessLauncherHelper::set_java_peer_available_on_client_thread,
this));
return Process();
}
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Bo <boliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639}
CWE ID: CWE-664
| 0
| 151,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _find_waiter(struct waiter *w, uint32_t *jp)
{
return (w->jobid == *jp);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_make_entry(struct mm_master *mm, struct mmtree *head,
void *address, size_t size)
{
struct mm_share *tmp, *tmp2;
if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
tmp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct mm_share));
else
tmp = mm_xmalloc(mm->mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
tmp->address = address;
tmp->size = size;
tmp2 = RB_INSERT(mmtree, head, tmp);
if (tmp2 != NULL)
fatal("mm_make_entry(%p): double address %p->%p(%zu)",
mm, tmp2, address, size);
return (tmp);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestConnectionHelper(base::TaskRunner* runner,
QuicClock* clock,
MockUDPClientSocket* socket)
: QuicConnectionHelper(runner, clock, socket) {
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::RunRenovations() {
if (page_renovator_) {
page_renovator_->RunRenovations(
base::Bind(&BackgroundLoaderOffliner::RenovationsCompleted,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 139,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void authenc_esn_verify_ahash_update_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq,
int err)
{
u8 *ihash;
unsigned int authsize;
struct ablkcipher_request *abreq;
struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
struct crypto_aead *authenc_esn = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_authenc_esn_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc_esn);
struct authenc_esn_request_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
struct ahash_request *ahreq = (void *)(areq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
if (err)
goto out;
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, areq_ctx->sg, ahreq->result,
areq_ctx->cryptlen);
ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq,
aead_request_flags(req) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
areq_ctx->update_complete2, req);
err = crypto_ahash_update(ahreq);
if (err)
goto out;
ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, areq_ctx->tsg, ahreq->result,
areq_ctx->trailen);
ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, aead_request_flags(req) &
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
areq_ctx->complete, req);
err = crypto_ahash_finup(ahreq);
if (err)
goto out;
authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(authenc_esn);
cryptlen -= authsize;
ihash = ahreq->result + authsize;
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, areq_ctx->sg, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
authsize, 0);
err = crypto_memneq(ihash, ahreq->result, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
if (err)
goto out;
abreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, ctx->enc);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, aead_request_flags(req),
req->base.complete, req->base.data);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, req->src, req->dst,
cryptlen, req->iv);
err = crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(abreq);
out:
authenc_esn_request_complete(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _gnutls_read_client_hello (gnutls_session_t session, opaque * data,
int datalen)
{
uint8_t session_id_len;
int pos = 0, ret;
uint16_t suite_size, comp_size;
gnutls_protocol_t adv_version;
int neg_version;
int len = datalen;
opaque rnd[TLS_RANDOM_SIZE], *suite_ptr, *comp_ptr;
if (session->internals.v2_hello != 0)
{ /* version 2.0 */
return _gnutls_read_client_hello_v2 (session, data, datalen);
}
DECR_LEN (len, 2);
_gnutls_handshake_log ("HSK[%x]: Client's version: %d.%d\n", session,
data[pos], data[pos + 1]);
adv_version = _gnutls_version_get (data[pos], data[pos + 1]);
set_adv_version (session, data[pos], data[pos + 1]);
pos += 2;
neg_version = _gnutls_negotiate_version( session, adv_version);
if (neg_version < 0)
{
gnutls_assert();
return neg_version;
}
/* Read client random value.
*/
DECR_LEN (len, TLS_RANDOM_SIZE);
_gnutls_set_client_random (session, &data[pos]);
pos += TLS_RANDOM_SIZE;
_gnutls_tls_create_random (rnd);
_gnutls_set_server_random (session, rnd);
session->security_parameters.timestamp = time (NULL);
DECR_LEN (len, 1);
session_id_len = data[pos++];
/* RESUME SESSION
*/
if (session_id_len > TLS_MAX_SESSION_ID_SIZE)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
DECR_LEN (len, session_id_len);
ret = _gnutls_server_restore_session (session, &data[pos], session_id_len);
pos += session_id_len;
if (ret == 0)
{ /* resumed! */
resume_copy_required_values (session);
session->internals.resumed = RESUME_TRUE;
return _gnutls_user_hello_func( session, adv_version);
}
else
{
_gnutls_generate_session_id (session->security_parameters.
session_id,
&session->security_parameters.
session_id_size);
session->internals.resumed = RESUME_FALSE;
}
/* Remember ciphersuites for later
*/
DECR_LEN (len, 2);
suite_size = _gnutls_read_uint16 (&data[pos]);
pos += 2;
DECR_LEN (len, suite_size);
suite_ptr = &data[pos];
pos += suite_size;
/* Point to the compression methods
*/
DECR_LEN (len, 1);
comp_size = data[pos++]; /* z is the number of compression methods */
DECR_LEN (len, comp_size);
comp_ptr = &data[pos];
pos += comp_size;
/* Parse the extensions (if any)
*/
if (neg_version >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
{
ret = _gnutls_parse_extensions (session, EXTENSION_APPLICATION, &data[pos], len); /* len is the rest of the parsed length */
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
}
ret = _gnutls_user_hello_func( session, adv_version);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert();
return ret;
}
if (neg_version >= GNUTLS_TLS1)
{
ret = _gnutls_parse_extensions (session, EXTENSION_TLS, &data[pos], len); /* len is the rest of the parsed length */
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
}
/* select an appropriate cipher suite
*/
ret = _gnutls_server_select_suite (session, suite_ptr, suite_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* select appropriate compression method */
ret = _gnutls_server_select_comp_method (session, comp_ptr, comp_size);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_rsdr_hdr(SCV_RSDS_HEADER* rsds_hdr) {
R_FREE (rsds_hdr->file_name);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *))
{
ulong flags = (ctxt->eflags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF;
if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp))
fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE;
asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n"
: "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags),
[fastop]"+S"(fop)
: "c"(ctxt->src2.val));
ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK);
if (!fop) /* exception is returned in fop variable */
return emulate_de(ctxt);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sig_server_setup_fill_chatnet(IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn,
IRC_CHATNET_REC *ircnet)
{
if (!IS_IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn))
return;
g_return_if_fail(IS_IRCNET(ircnet));
if (ircnet->alternate_nick != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->alternate_nick);
conn->alternate_nick = g_strdup(ircnet->alternate_nick);
}
if (ircnet->usermode != NULL) {
g_free_and_null(conn->usermode);
conn->usermode = g_strdup(ircnet->usermode);
}
if (ircnet->max_kicks > 0) conn->max_kicks = ircnet->max_kicks;
if (ircnet->max_msgs > 0) conn->max_msgs = ircnet->max_msgs;
if (ircnet->max_modes > 0) conn->max_modes = ircnet->max_modes;
if (ircnet->max_whois > 0) conn->max_whois = ircnet->max_whois;
if (ircnet->max_cmds_at_once > 0)
conn->max_cmds_at_once = ircnet->max_cmds_at_once;
if (ircnet->cmd_queue_speed > 0)
conn->cmd_queue_speed = ircnet->cmd_queue_speed;
if (ircnet->max_query_chans > 0)
conn->max_query_chans = ircnet->max_query_chans;
/* Validate the SASL parameters filled by sig_chatnet_read() or cmd_network_add */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_NONE;
conn->sasl_username = NULL;
conn->sasl_password = NULL;
if (ircnet->sasl_mechanism != NULL) {
if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "plain")) {
/* The PLAIN method needs both the username and the password */
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_PLAIN;
if (ircnet->sasl_username != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_username &&
ircnet->sasl_password != NULL && *ircnet->sasl_password) {
conn->sasl_username = ircnet->sasl_username;
conn->sasl_password = ircnet->sasl_password;
} else
g_warning("The fields sasl_username and sasl_password are either missing or empty");
}
else if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp(ircnet->sasl_mechanism, "external")) {
conn->sasl_mechanism = SASL_MECHANISM_EXTERNAL;
}
else
g_warning("Unsupported SASL mechanism \"%s\" selected", ircnet->sasl_mechanism);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 169,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_userinfo(void)
{
unsigned int changed;
const char *set, *nick, *user_name, *str;
changed = 0;
/* check if nick/username/realname wasn't read from setup.. */
set = settings_get_str("real_name");
if (set == NULL || *set == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCNAME");
settings_set_str("real_name",
str != NULL ? str : g_get_real_name());
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_REAL_NAME;
}
/* username */
user_name = settings_get_str("user_name");
if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCUSER");
settings_set_str("user_name",
str != NULL ? str : g_get_user_name());
user_name = settings_get_str("user_name");
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_USER_NAME;
}
/* nick */
nick = settings_get_str("nick");
if (nick == NULL || *nick == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCNICK");
settings_set_str("nick", str != NULL ? str : user_name);
nick = settings_get_str("nick");
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_NICK;
}
/* host name */
set = settings_get_str("hostname");
if (set == NULL || *set == '\0') {
str = g_getenv("IRCHOST");
if (str != NULL) {
settings_set_str("hostname", str);
changed |= USER_SETTINGS_HOSTNAME;
}
}
signal_emit("irssi init userinfo changed", 1, GUINT_TO_POINTER(changed));
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 89,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cosine_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr,
Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
char line[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH];
if (file_seek(wth->random_fh, seek_off, SEEK_SET, err) == -1)
return FALSE;
if (file_gets(line, COSINE_LINE_LENGTH, wth->random_fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(wth->random_fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Parse the header and convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
return parse_cosine_packet(wth->random_fh, phdr, buf, line, err,
err_info);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12395
Change-Id: I43b458a73b0934e9a5c2c89d34eac5a8f21a7455
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15223
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jsvAppendStringVar(JsVar *var, const JsVar *str, size_t stridx, size_t maxLength) {
assert(jsvIsString(var));
JsvStringIterator dst;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&dst, var, 0);
jsvStringIteratorGotoEnd(&dst);
/* This isn't as fast as something single-purpose, but it's not that bad,
* and is less likely to break :) */
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNewConst(&it, str, stridx);
while (jsvStringIteratorHasChar(&it) && (maxLength-->0)) {
char ch = jsvStringIteratorGetChar(&it);
jsvStringIteratorAppend(&dst, ch);
jsvStringIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&dst);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int insert_exceptions(struct pstore *ps,
int (*callback)(void *callback_context,
chunk_t old, chunk_t new),
void *callback_context,
int *full)
{
int r;
unsigned int i;
struct core_exception e;
/* presume the area is full */
*full = 1;
for (i = 0; i < ps->exceptions_per_area; i++) {
read_exception(ps, i, &e);
/*
* If the new_chunk is pointing at the start of
* the COW device, where the first metadata area
* is we know that we've hit the end of the
* exceptions. Therefore the area is not full.
*/
if (e.new_chunk == 0LL) {
ps->current_committed = i;
*full = 0;
break;
}
/*
* Keep track of the start of the free chunks.
*/
if (ps->next_free <= e.new_chunk)
ps->next_free = e.new_chunk + 1;
/*
* Otherwise we add the exception to the snapshot.
*/
r = callback(callback_context, e.old_chunk, e.new_chunk);
if (r)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<RenderStyle> Element::originalStyleForRenderer()
{
return document()->styleResolver()->styleForElement(this);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AddPinhole(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
int r;
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<UniqueID>%d</UniqueID>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * rem_host, * rem_port, * int_ip, * int_port, * protocol, * leaseTime;
int uid = 0;
unsigned short iport, rport;
int ltime;
long proto;
char rem_ip[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
if(CheckStatus(h)==0)
return;
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
rem_host = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemoteHost");
rem_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "RemotePort");
int_ip = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalClient");
int_port = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "InternalPort");
protocol = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "Protocol");
leaseTime = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "LeaseTime");
rport = (unsigned short)(rem_port ? atoi(rem_port) : 0);
iport = (unsigned short)(int_port ? atoi(int_port) : 0);
ltime = leaseTime ? atoi(leaseTime) : -1;
errno = 0;
proto = protocol ? strtol(protocol, NULL, 0) : -1;
if(errno != 0 || proto > 65535 || proto < 0)
{
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
goto clear_and_exit;
}
if(iport == 0)
{
SoapError(h, 706, "InternalPortWilcardingNotAllowed");
goto clear_and_exit;
}
/* In particular, [IGD2] RECOMMENDS that unauthenticated and
* unauthorized control points are only allowed to invoke
* this action with:
* - InternalPort value greater than or equal to 1024,
* - InternalClient value equals to the control point's IP address.
* It is REQUIRED that InternalClient cannot be one of IPv6
* addresses used by the gateway. */
if(!int_ip || int_ip[0] == '\0' || 0 == strcmp(int_ip, "*"))
{
SoapError(h, 708, "WildCardNotPermittedInSrcIP");
goto clear_and_exit;
}
/* I guess it is useless to convert int_ip to literal ipv6 address */
if(rem_host)
{
/* trim */
while(isspace(rem_host[0]))
rem_host++;
}
/* rem_host should be converted to literal ipv6 : */
if(rem_host && (rem_host[0] != '\0') && (rem_host[0] != '*'))
{
struct addrinfo *ai, *p;
struct addrinfo hints;
int err;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
/*hints.ai_flags = */
/* hints.ai_protocol = proto; */
err = getaddrinfo(rem_host, rem_port, &hints, &ai);
if(err == 0)
{
/* take the 1st IPv6 address */
for(p = ai; p; p = p->ai_next)
{
if(p->ai_family == AF_INET6)
{
inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)p->ai_addr)->sin6_addr),
rem_ip, sizeof(rem_ip));
syslog(LOG_INFO, "resolved '%s' to '%s'", rem_host, rem_ip);
rem_host = rem_ip;
break;
}
}
freeaddrinfo(ai);
}
else
{
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "AddPinhole : getaddrinfo(%s) : %s",
rem_host, gai_strerror(err));
#if 0
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
goto clear_and_exit;
#endif
}
}
if(proto == 65535)
{
SoapError(h, 707, "ProtocolWilcardingNotAllowed");
goto clear_and_exit;
}
if(proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP
#ifdef IPPROTO_UDPITE
&& atoi(protocol) != IPPROTO_UDPLITE
#endif
)
{
SoapError(h, 705, "ProtocolNotSupported");
goto clear_and_exit;
}
if(ltime < 1 || ltime > 86400)
{
syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s: LeaseTime=%d not supported, (ip=%s)",
action, ltime, int_ip);
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
goto clear_and_exit;
}
if(PinholeVerification(h, int_ip, iport) <= 0)
goto clear_and_exit;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s: (inbound) from [%s]:%hu to [%s]:%hu with proto %ld during %d sec",
action, rem_host?rem_host:"any",
rport, int_ip, iport,
proto, ltime);
/* In cases where the RemoteHost, RemotePort, InternalPort,
* InternalClient and Protocol are the same than an existing pinhole,
* but LeaseTime is different, the device MUST extend the existing
* pinhole's lease time and return the UniqueID of the existing pinhole. */
r = upnp_add_inboundpinhole(rem_host, rport, int_ip, iport, proto, "IGD2 pinhole", ltime, &uid);
switch(r)
{
case 1: /* success */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body),
resp, action,
ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
uid, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
break;
case -1: /* not permitted */
SoapError(h, 701, "PinholeSpaceExhausted");
break;
default:
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
break;
}
/* 606 Action not authorized
* 701 PinholeSpaceExhausted
* 702 FirewallDisabled
* 703 InboundPinholeNotAllowed
* 705 ProtocolNotSupported
* 706 InternalPortWildcardingNotAllowed
* 707 ProtocolWildcardingNotAllowed
* 708 WildCardNotPermittedInSrcIP */
clear_and_exit:
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSSStyleSheet& Document::ElementSheet() {
if (!elem_sheet_)
elem_sheet_ = CSSStyleSheet::CreateInline(*this, base_url_);
return *elem_sheet_;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bdrv_create(BlockDriver *drv, const char* filename,
QEMUOptionParameter *options, Error **errp)
{
int ret;
Coroutine *co;
CreateCo cco = {
.drv = drv,
.filename = g_strdup(filename),
.options = options,
.ret = NOT_DONE,
.err = NULL,
};
if (!drv->bdrv_create) {
error_setg(errp, "Driver '%s' does not support image creation", drv->format_name);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto out;
}
if (qemu_in_coroutine()) {
/* Fast-path if already in coroutine context */
bdrv_create_co_entry(&cco);
} else {
co = qemu_coroutine_create(bdrv_create_co_entry);
qemu_coroutine_enter(co, &cco);
while (cco.ret == NOT_DONE) {
qemu_aio_wait();
}
}
ret = cco.ret;
if (ret < 0) {
if (cco.err) {
error_propagate(errp, cco.err);
} else {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not create image");
}
}
out:
g_free(cco.filename);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::OpenDownload(download::DownloadItemImpl* download) {
int num_unopened = 0;
for (const auto& it : downloads_) {
download::DownloadItemImpl* item = it.second.get();
if ((item->GetState() == download::DownloadItem::COMPLETE) &&
!item->GetOpened())
++num_unopened;
}
download::RecordOpensOutstanding(num_unopened);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OpenDownload(download);
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapter::DeleteDeviceForTesting(const std::string& address) {
devices_.erase(address);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tun_detach(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
rtnl_lock();
__tun_detach(tun);
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_sctp_status(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_status status;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
sctp_assoc_t associd;
int retval = 0;
if (len < sizeof(status)) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
len = sizeof(status);
if (copy_from_user(&status, optval, len)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
associd = status.sstat_assoc_id;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, associd);
if (!asoc) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
transport = asoc->peer.primary_path;
status.sstat_assoc_id = sctp_assoc2id(asoc);
status.sstat_state = sctp_assoc_to_state(asoc);
status.sstat_rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
status.sstat_unackdata = asoc->unack_data;
status.sstat_penddata = sctp_tsnmap_pending(&asoc->peer.tsn_map);
status.sstat_instrms = asoc->stream.incnt;
status.sstat_outstrms = asoc->stream.outcnt;
status.sstat_fragmentation_point = asoc->frag_point;
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_assoc_id = sctp_assoc2id(transport->asoc);
memcpy(&status.sstat_primary.spinfo_address, &transport->ipaddr,
transport->af_specific->sockaddr_len);
/* Map ipv4 address into v4-mapped-on-v6 address. */
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(sctp_sk(sk),
(union sctp_addr *)&status.sstat_primary.spinfo_address);
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_state = transport->state;
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_cwnd = transport->cwnd;
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_srtt = transport->srtt;
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_rto = jiffies_to_msecs(transport->rto);
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_mtu = transport->pathmtu;
if (status.sstat_primary.spinfo_state == SCTP_UNKNOWN)
status.sstat_primary.spinfo_state = SCTP_ACTIVE;
if (put_user(len, optlen)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
pr_debug("%s: len:%d, state:%d, rwnd:%d, assoc_id:%d\n",
__func__, len, status.sstat_state, status.sstat_rwnd,
status.sstat_assoc_id);
if (copy_to_user(optval, &status, len)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLMediaElement::HTMLMediaElement(const QualifiedName& tag_name,
Document& document)
: HTMLElement(tag_name, document),
PausableObject(&document),
load_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUnthrottled),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::LoadTimerFired),
progress_event_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUnthrottled),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::ProgressEventTimerFired),
playback_progress_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUnthrottled),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::PlaybackProgressTimerFired),
audio_tracks_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUnthrottled),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::AudioTracksTimerFired),
check_viewport_intersection_timer_(
document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUnthrottled),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::CheckViewportIntersectionTimerFired),
played_time_ranges_(),
async_event_queue_(MediaElementEventQueue::Create(this, &document)),
playback_rate_(1.0f),
default_playback_rate_(1.0f),
network_state_(kNetworkEmpty),
ready_state_(kHaveNothing),
ready_state_maximum_(kHaveNothing),
volume_(1.0f),
last_seek_time_(0),
previous_progress_time_(std::numeric_limits<double>::max()),
duration_(std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN()),
last_time_update_event_media_time_(
std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN()),
default_playback_start_position_(0),
load_state_(kWaitingForSource),
deferred_load_state_(kNotDeferred),
deferred_load_timer_(document.GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUnthrottled),
this,
&HTMLMediaElement::DeferredLoadTimerFired),
web_layer_(nullptr),
display_mode_(kUnknown),
official_playback_position_(0),
official_playback_position_needs_update_(true),
fragment_end_time_(std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN()),
pending_action_flags_(0),
playing_(false),
should_delay_load_event_(false),
have_fired_loaded_data_(false),
can_autoplay_(true),
muted_(false),
paused_(true),
seeking_(false),
sent_stalled_event_(false),
ignore_preload_none_(false),
text_tracks_visible_(false),
should_perform_automatic_track_selection_(true),
tracks_are_ready_(true),
processing_preference_change_(false),
playing_remotely_(false),
in_overlay_fullscreen_video_(false),
mostly_filling_viewport_(false),
audio_tracks_(AudioTrackList::Create(*this)),
video_tracks_(VideoTrackList::Create(*this)),
audio_source_node_(nullptr),
autoplay_policy_(new AutoplayPolicy(this)),
remote_playback_client_(nullptr),
media_controls_(nullptr),
controls_list_(HTMLMediaElementControlsList::Create(this)) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "HTMLMediaElement(" << (void*)this << ")";
LocalFrame* frame = document.GetFrame();
if (frame) {
remote_playback_client_ =
frame->Client()->CreateWebRemotePlaybackClient(*this);
}
SetHasCustomStyleCallbacks();
AddElementToDocumentMap(this, &document);
UseCounter::Count(document, WebFeature::kHTMLMediaElement);
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_bin_force_plugin(RBin *bin, const char *name) {
free (bin->force);
bin->force = (name && *name)? strdup (name): NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_msndmidi_new(struct snd_card *card, int device)
{
struct snd_msnd *chip = card->private_data;
struct snd_msndmidi *mpu;
struct snd_rawmidi *rmidi;
int err;
err = snd_rawmidi_new(card, "MSND-MIDI", device, 1, 1, &rmidi);
if (err < 0)
return err;
mpu = kzalloc(sizeof(*mpu), GFP_KERNEL);
if (mpu == NULL) {
snd_device_free(card, rmidi);
return -ENOMEM;
}
mpu->dev = chip;
chip->msndmidi_mpu = mpu;
rmidi->private_data = mpu;
rmidi->private_free = snd_msndmidi_free;
spin_lock_init(&mpu->input_lock);
strcpy(rmidi->name, "MSND MIDI");
snd_rawmidi_set_ops(rmidi, SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT,
&snd_msndmidi_input);
rmidi->info_flags |= SNDRV_RAWMIDI_INFO_INPUT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 64,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void SetGeneratingNodeInfo(TracedValue* value,
const LayoutObject* layout_object,
const char* id_field_name,
const char* name_field_name = nullptr) {
Node* node = nullptr;
for (; layout_object && !node; layout_object = layout_object->Parent())
node = layout_object->GeneratingNode();
if (!node)
return;
SetNodeInfo(value, node, id_field_name, name_field_name);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_win_error_from_last_error (void)
{
switch (GetLastError())
{
case 0:
return DBUS_ERROR_FAILED;
case ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES:
case ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPEN_FILES:
return DBUS_ERROR_LIMITS_EXCEEDED; /* kernel out of memory */
case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED:
case ERROR_CANNOT_MAKE:
return DBUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
case ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY:
return DBUS_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
case ERROR_FILE_EXISTS:
return DBUS_ERROR_FILE_EXISTS;
case ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND:
case ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND:
return DBUS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
}
return DBUS_ERROR_FAILED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UnlockCompositor() {
defer_compositor_lock_ = false;
compositor_lock_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: update_info_drive_adapter (Device *device)
{
Adapter *adapter;
const gchar *adapter_object_path;
adapter_object_path = NULL;
adapter = daemon_local_find_enclosing_adapter (device->priv->daemon, device->priv->native_path);
if (adapter != NULL)
{
adapter_object_path = adapter_local_get_object_path (adapter);
}
device_set_drive_adapter (device, adapter_object_path);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mca_ccb_dl_open(tMCA_CCB* p_ccb, UNUSED_ATTR tMCA_CCB_EVT* p_data) {
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_ccb->p_tx_req);
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_ccb->p_rx_msg);
p_ccb->status = MCA_CCB_STAT_NORM;
}
Commit Message: Add packet length checks in mca_ccb_hdl_req
Bug: 110791536
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ica5d8037246682fdb190b2747a86ed8d44c2869a
(cherry picked from commit 4de7ccdd914b7a178df9180d15f675b257ea6e02)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void on_btn_failed_cb(GtkButton *button)
{
/* Since the Repeat button has been introduced, the event chain isn't
* terminated upon a failure in order to be able to continue in processing
* in the retry action.
*
* Now, user decided to run the emergency analysis instead of trying to
* reconfigure libreport, so we have to terminate the event chain.
*/
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_repeat);
terminate_event_chain(TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
/* Show detailed log */
gtk_expander_set_expanded(g_exp_report_log, TRUE);
clear_warnings();
update_ls_details_checkboxes(EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME);
start_event_run(EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME);
/* single shot button -> hide after click */
gtk_widget_hide(GTK_WIDGET(button));
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PropertyTreeManager::SetupRootEffectNode() {
cc::EffectTree& effect_tree = property_trees_.effect_tree;
effect_tree.clear();
property_trees_.element_id_to_effect_node_index.clear();
cc::EffectNode& effect_node =
*effect_tree.Node(effect_tree.Insert(cc::EffectNode(), kInvalidNodeId));
DCHECK_EQ(effect_node.id, kSecondaryRootNodeId);
static UniqueObjectId unique_id = NewUniqueObjectId();
effect_node.stable_id =
CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(unique_id).ToInternalValue();
effect_node.transform_id = kRealRootNodeId;
effect_node.clip_id = kSecondaryRootNodeId;
effect_node.has_render_surface = true;
root_layer_->SetEffectTreeIndex(effect_node.id);
current_effect_id_ = effect_node.id;
current_effect_type_ = CcEffectType::kEffect;
current_effect_ = EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root();
current_clip_ = current_effect_->OutputClip();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
{
int ret;
unsigned long __user *datap = (unsigned long __user *) data;
switch (request) {
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR:
ret = ptrace_read_user(child, addr, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
ret = ptrace_write_user(child, addr, data);
break;
case PTRACE_GETREGS:
ret = copy_regset_to_user(child,
&user_arm_view, REGSET_GPR,
0, sizeof(struct pt_regs),
datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETREGS:
ret = copy_regset_from_user(child,
&user_arm_view, REGSET_GPR,
0, sizeof(struct pt_regs),
datap);
break;
case PTRACE_GETFPREGS:
ret = copy_regset_to_user(child,
&user_arm_view, REGSET_FPR,
0, sizeof(union fp_state),
datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
ret = copy_regset_from_user(child,
&user_arm_view, REGSET_FPR,
0, sizeof(union fp_state),
datap);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_IWMMXT
case PTRACE_GETWMMXREGS:
ret = ptrace_getwmmxregs(child, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETWMMXREGS:
ret = ptrace_setwmmxregs(child, datap);
break;
#endif
case PTRACE_GET_THREAD_AREA:
ret = put_user(task_thread_info(child)->tp_value,
datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL:
task_thread_info(child)->syscall = data;
ret = 0;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_CRUNCH
case PTRACE_GETCRUNCHREGS:
ret = ptrace_getcrunchregs(child, datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETCRUNCHREGS:
ret = ptrace_setcrunchregs(child, datap);
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VFP
case PTRACE_GETVFPREGS:
ret = copy_regset_to_user(child,
&user_arm_view, REGSET_VFP,
0, ARM_VFPREGS_SIZE,
datap);
break;
case PTRACE_SETVFPREGS:
ret = copy_regset_from_user(child,
&user_arm_view, REGSET_VFP,
0, ARM_VFPREGS_SIZE,
datap);
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
case PTRACE_GETHBPREGS:
if (ptrace_get_breakpoints(child) < 0)
return -ESRCH;
ret = ptrace_gethbpregs(child, addr,
(unsigned long __user *)data);
ptrace_put_breakpoints(child);
break;
case PTRACE_SETHBPREGS:
if (ptrace_get_breakpoints(child) < 0)
return -ESRCH;
ret = ptrace_sethbpregs(child, addr,
(unsigned long __user *)data);
ptrace_put_breakpoints(child);
break;
#endif
default:
ret = ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 167,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void onRttResults(wifi_request_id id, unsigned num_results, wifi_rtt_result* results[]) {
JNIHelper helper(mVM);
ALOGD("onRttResults called, vm = %p, obj = %p", mVM, mCls);
JNIObject<jobjectArray> rttResults = helper.newObjectArray(
num_results, "android/net/wifi/RttManager$RttResult", NULL);
if (rttResults == NULL) {
ALOGE("Error in allocating array");
return;
}
for (unsigned i = 0; i < num_results; i++) {
wifi_rtt_result *result = results[i];
JNIObject<jobject> rttResult = helper.createObject("android/net/wifi/RttManager$RttResult");
if (rttResult == NULL) {
ALOGE("Error in creating rtt result");
return;
}
char bssid[32];
sprintf(bssid, "%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x", result->addr[0], result->addr[1],
result->addr[2], result->addr[3], result->addr[4], result->addr[5]);
helper.setStringField(rttResult, "bssid", bssid);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "burstNumber", result->burst_num);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "measurementFrameNumber", result->measurement_number);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "successMeasurementFrameNumber", result->success_number);
helper.setIntField(rttResult, "frameNumberPerBurstPeer", result->number_per_burst_peer);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "status", result->status);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "measurementType", result->type);
helper.setIntField(rttResult, "retryAfterDuration", result->retry_after_duration);
helper.setLongField(rttResult, "ts", result->ts);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "rssi", result->rssi);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "rssiSpread", result->rssi_spread);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "txRate", result->tx_rate.bitrate);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "rxRate", result->rx_rate.bitrate);
helper.setLongField(rttResult, "rtt", result->rtt);
helper.setLongField(rttResult, "rttStandardDeviation", result->rtt_sd);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "distance", result->distance);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "distanceStandardDeviation", result->distance_sd);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "distanceSpread", result->distance_spread);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "burstDuration", result->burst_duration);
helper.setIntField( rttResult, "negotiatedBurstNum", result->negotiated_burst_num);
JNIObject<jobject> LCI = helper.createObject(
"android/net/wifi/RttManager$WifiInformationElement");
if (result->LCI != NULL && result->LCI->len > 0) {
ALOGD("Add LCI in result");
helper.setByteField(LCI, "id", result->LCI->id);
JNIObject<jbyteArray> elements = helper.newByteArray(result->LCI->len);
jbyte *bytes = (jbyte *)&(result->LCI->data[0]);
helper.setByteArrayRegion(elements, 0, result->LCI->len, bytes);
helper.setObjectField(LCI, "data", "[B", elements);
} else {
ALOGD("No LCI in result");
helper.setByteField(LCI, "id", (byte)(0xff));
}
helper.setObjectField(rttResult, "LCI",
"Landroid/net/wifi/RttManager$WifiInformationElement;", LCI);
JNIObject<jobject> LCR = helper.createObject(
"android/net/wifi/RttManager$WifiInformationElement");
if (result->LCR != NULL && result->LCR->len > 0) {
ALOGD("Add LCR in result");
helper.setByteField(LCR, "id", result->LCR->id);
JNIObject<jbyteArray> elements = helper.newByteArray(result->LCI->len);
jbyte *bytes = (jbyte *)&(result->LCR->data[0]);
helper.setByteArrayRegion(elements, 0, result->LCI->len, bytes);
helper.setObjectField(LCR, "data", "[B", elements);
} else {
ALOGD("No LCR in result");
helper.setByteField(LCR, "id", (byte)(0xff));
}
helper.setObjectField(rttResult, "LCR",
"Landroid/net/wifi/RttManager$WifiInformationElement;", LCR);
helper.setObjectArrayElement(rttResults, i, rttResult);
}
helper.reportEvent(mCls, "onRttResults", "(I[Landroid/net/wifi/RttManager$RttResult;)V",
id, rttResults.get());
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jfs_init_acl(tid_t tid, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
int rc = 0;
rc = posix_acl_create(dir, &inode->i_mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (default_acl) {
rc = __jfs_set_acl(tid, inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, default_acl);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
if (acl) {
if (!rc)
rc = __jfs_set_acl(tid, inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
JFS_IP(inode)->mode2 = (JFS_IP(inode)->mode2 & 0xffff0000) |
inode->i_mode;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_uint64(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
uint64_t *v = pv;
qemu_get_be64s(f, v);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_opt_map(OptMap* to, OptMap* from)
{
*to = *from;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr,
unsigned long shmlba)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long size;
struct file *file;
int err;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long prot;
int acc_mode;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
struct shm_file_data *sfd;
struct path path;
fmode_t f_mode;
unsigned long populate = 0;
err = -EINVAL;
if (shmid < 0)
goto out;
else if ((addr = (ulong)shmaddr)) {
if (addr & (shmlba - 1)) {
if (shmflg & SHM_RND)
addr &= ~(shmlba - 1); /* round down */
else
#ifndef __ARCH_FORCE_SHMLBA
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
#endif
goto out;
}
flags = MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED;
} else {
if ((shmflg & SHM_REMAP))
goto out;
flags = MAP_SHARED;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) {
prot = PROT_READ;
acc_mode = S_IRUGO;
f_mode = FMODE_READ;
} else {
prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
acc_mode = S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
f_mode = FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE;
}
if (shmflg & SHM_EXEC) {
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
acc_mode |= S_IXUGO;
}
/*
* We cannot rely on the fs check since SYSV IPC does have an
* additional creator id...
*/
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
rcu_read_lock();
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, acc_mode))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
/* check if shm_destroy() is tearing down shp */
if (!ipc_valid_object(&shp->shm_perm)) {
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = -EIDRM;
goto out_unlock;
}
path = shp->shm_file->f_path;
path_get(&path);
shp->shm_nattch++;
size = i_size_read(d_inode(path.dentry));
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -ENOMEM;
sfd = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sfd) {
path_put(&path);
goto out_nattch;
}
file = alloc_file(&path, f_mode,
is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file) ?
&shm_file_operations_huge :
&shm_file_operations);
err = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
kfree(sfd);
path_put(&path);
goto out_nattch;
}
file->private_data = sfd;
file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;
sfd->id = shp->shm_perm.id;
sfd->ns = get_ipc_ns(ns);
sfd->file = shp->shm_file;
sfd->vm_ops = NULL;
err = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
if (err)
goto out_fput;
if (down_write_killable(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)) {
err = -EINTR;
goto out_fput;
}
if (addr && !(shmflg & SHM_REMAP)) {
err = -EINVAL;
if (addr + size < addr)
goto invalid;
if (find_vma_intersection(current->mm, addr, addr + size))
goto invalid;
}
addr = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, &populate, NULL);
*raddr = addr;
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
err = (long)addr;
invalid:
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (populate)
mm_populate(addr, populate);
out_fput:
fput(file);
out_nattch:
down_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
shp = shm_lock(ns, shmid);
shp->shm_nattch--;
if (shm_may_destroy(ns, shp))
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
else
shm_unlock(shp);
up_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
return err;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipc/shm: Fix shmat mmap nil-page protection
The issue is described here, with a nice testcase:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192931
The problem is that shmat() calls do_mmap_pgoff() with MAP_FIXED, and the
address rounded down to 0. For the regular mmap case, the protection
mentioned above is that the kernel gets to generate the address --
arch_get_unmapped_area() will always check for MAP_FIXED and return that
address. So by the time we do security_mmap_addr(0) things get funky for
shmat().
The testcase itself shows that while a regular user crashes, root will not
have a problem attaching a nil-page. There are two possible fixes to
this. The first, and which this patch does, is to simply allow root to
crash as well -- this is also regular mmap behavior, ie when hacking up
the testcase and adding mmap(... |MAP_FIXED). While this approach is the
safer option, the second alternative is to ignore SHM_RND if the rounded
address is 0, thus only having MAP_SHARED flags. This makes the behavior
of shmat() identical to the mmap() case. The downside of this is
obviously user visible, but does make sense in that it maintains semantics
after the round-down wrt 0 address and mmap.
Passes shm related ltp tests.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486050195-18629-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reported-by: Gareth Evans <gareth.evans@contextis.co.uk>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 168,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct rmap_item *unstable_tree_search_insert(struct rmap_item *rmap_item,
struct page *page,
struct page **tree_pagep)
{
struct rb_node **new = &root_unstable_tree.rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
while (*new) {
struct rmap_item *tree_rmap_item;
struct page *tree_page;
int ret;
cond_resched();
tree_rmap_item = rb_entry(*new, struct rmap_item, node);
tree_page = get_mergeable_page(tree_rmap_item);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tree_page))
return NULL;
/*
* Don't substitute a ksm page for a forked page.
*/
if (page == tree_page) {
put_page(tree_page);
return NULL;
}
ret = memcmp_pages(page, tree_page);
parent = *new;
if (ret < 0) {
put_page(tree_page);
new = &parent->rb_left;
} else if (ret > 0) {
put_page(tree_page);
new = &parent->rb_right;
} else {
*tree_pagep = tree_page;
return tree_rmap_item;
}
}
rmap_item->address |= UNSTABLE_FLAG;
rmap_item->address |= (ksm_scan.seqnr & SEQNR_MASK);
rb_link_node(&rmap_item->node, parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&rmap_item->node, &root_unstable_tree);
ksm_pages_unshared++;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void filter_level_for_mb(VP8Context *s, VP8Macroblock *mb,
VP8FilterStrength *f, int is_vp7)
{
int interior_limit, filter_level;
if (s->segmentation.enabled) {
filter_level = s->segmentation.filter_level[mb->segment];
if (!s->segmentation.absolute_vals)
filter_level += s->filter.level;
} else
filter_level = s->filter.level;
if (s->lf_delta.enabled) {
filter_level += s->lf_delta.ref[mb->ref_frame];
filter_level += s->lf_delta.mode[mb->mode];
}
filter_level = av_clip_uintp2(filter_level, 6);
interior_limit = filter_level;
if (s->filter.sharpness) {
interior_limit >>= (s->filter.sharpness + 3) >> 2;
interior_limit = FFMIN(interior_limit, 9 - s->filter.sharpness);
}
interior_limit = FFMAX(interior_limit, 1);
f->filter_level = filter_level;
f->inner_limit = interior_limit;
f->inner_filter = is_vp7 || !mb->skip || mb->mode == MODE_I4x4 ||
mb->mode == VP8_MVMODE_SPLIT;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __ip_vs_svc_fwm_find(struct net *net, int af, __u32 fwmark)
{
unsigned int hash;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
/* Check for fwmark addressed entries */
hash = ip_vs_svc_fwm_hashkey(net, fwmark);
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[hash], f_list) {
if (svc->fwmark == fwmark && svc->af == af
&& net_eq(svc->net, net)) {
/* HIT */
return svc;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void timerfd_setup_cancel(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx, int flags)
{
if ((ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME ||
ctx->clockid == CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM) &&
(flags & TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME) && (flags & TFD_TIMER_CANCEL_ON_SET)) {
if (!ctx->might_cancel) {
ctx->might_cancel = true;
spin_lock(&cancel_lock);
list_add_rcu(&ctx->clist, &cancel_list);
spin_unlock(&cancel_lock);
}
} else if (ctx->might_cancel) {
timerfd_remove_cancel(ctx);
}
}
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 168,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::OnMap(GtkWidget* widget) {
ReStack();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,141
|
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