instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: method_entry_loop(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass* klass, khash_t(st)* set)
{
khint_t i;
khash_t(mt) *h = klass->mt;
if (!h || kh_size(h) == 0) return;
for (i=0;i<kh_end(h);i++) {
if (kh_exist(h, i)) {
mrb_method_t m = kh_value(h, i);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) continue;
kh_put(st, mrb, set, kh_key(h, i));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct super_block *get_super_thawed(struct block_device *bdev)
{
while (1) {
struct super_block *s = get_super(bdev);
if (!s || s->s_writers.frozen == SB_UNFROZEN)
return s;
up_read(&s->s_umount);
wait_event(s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen,
s->s_writers.frozen == SB_UNFROZEN);
put_super(s);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI php_stream *php_stream_generic_socket_factory(const char *proto, size_t protolen,
const char *resourcename, size_t resourcenamelen,
const char *persistent_id, int options, int flags,
struct timeval *timeout,
php_stream_context *context STREAMS_DC)
{
php_stream *stream = NULL;
php_netstream_data_t *sock;
php_stream_ops *ops;
/* which type of socket ? */
if (strncmp(proto, "tcp", protolen) == 0) {
ops = &php_stream_socket_ops;
} else if (strncmp(proto, "udp", protolen) == 0) {
ops = &php_stream_udp_socket_ops;
}
#ifdef AF_UNIX
else if (strncmp(proto, "unix", protolen) == 0) {
ops = &php_stream_unix_socket_ops;
} else if (strncmp(proto, "udg", protolen) == 0) {
ops = &php_stream_unixdg_socket_ops;
}
#endif
else {
/* should never happen */
return NULL;
}
sock = pemalloc(sizeof(php_netstream_data_t), persistent_id ? 1 : 0);
memset(sock, 0, sizeof(php_netstream_data_t));
sock->is_blocked = 1;
sock->timeout.tv_sec = FG(default_socket_timeout);
sock->timeout.tv_usec = 0;
/* we don't know the socket until we have determined if we are binding or
* connecting */
sock->socket = -1;
stream = php_stream_alloc_rel(ops, sock, persistent_id, "r+");
if (stream == NULL) {
pefree(sock, persistent_id ? 1 : 0);
return NULL;
}
if (flags == 0) {
return stream;
}
return stream;
}
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error.
CWE ID: CWE-918
| 0
| 67,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stat_remove(SpiceStatNode *node)
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&reds->stat_lock);
node->flags &= ~SPICE_STAT_NODE_FLAG_ENABLED;
reds->stat->generation++;
reds->stat->num_of_nodes--;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&reds->stat_lock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dns_packet_validate(DnsPacket *p) {
assert(p);
if (p->size < DNS_PACKET_HEADER_SIZE)
return -EBADMSG;
if (p->size > DNS_PACKET_SIZE_MAX)
return -EBADMSG;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: resolved: bugfix of null pointer p->question dereferencing (#6020)
See https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/systemd/+bug/1621396
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 64,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> supplementalMethod1Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestInterface.supplementalMethod1");
TestInterface* imp = V8TestInterface::toNative(args.Holder());
TestSupplemental::supplementalMethod1(imp);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int isFileInVirtualDir(
/*! [in] Directory path to be tested for virtual directory. */
char *filePath)
{
virtualDirList *pCurVirtualDir;
size_t webDirLen;
pCurVirtualDir = pVirtualDirList;
while (pCurVirtualDir != NULL) {
webDirLen = strlen(pCurVirtualDir->dirName);
if (webDirLen) {
if (pCurVirtualDir->dirName[webDirLen - 1] == '/') {
if (strncmp(pCurVirtualDir->dirName, filePath,
webDirLen) == 0)
return !0;
} else {
if (strncmp(pCurVirtualDir->dirName, filePath,
webDirLen) == 0 &&
(filePath[webDirLen] == '/' ||
filePath[webDirLen] == '\0' ||
filePath[webDirLen] == '?'))
return !0;
}
}
pCurVirtualDir = pCurVirtualDir->next;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by default
If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 73,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenPasswordManager() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Options_ShowPasswordManager"));
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kPasswordManagerSubPage);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
schedule();
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race between read and ioctl
The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.
This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 170,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *register_named_block_function_hook(const char *name,
cmd_parms *cmd,
void *mconfig,
const char *line)
{
const char *function = NULL;
ap_lua_mapped_handler_spec *spec;
int when = APR_HOOK_MIDDLE;
const char *endp = ap_strrchr_c(line, '>');
if (endp == NULL) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> directive missing closing '>'", NULL);
}
line = apr_pstrndup(cmd->temp_pool, line, endp - line);
if (line[0]) {
const char *word;
word = ap_getword_conf(cmd->temp_pool, &line);
if (*word) {
function = apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, word);
}
word = ap_getword_conf(cmd->temp_pool, &line);
if (*word) {
if (!strcasecmp("early", word)) {
when = AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST;
}
else if (!strcasecmp("late", word)) {
when = AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST;
}
else {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> 2nd argument must be 'early' or 'late'", NULL);
}
}
}
spec = apr_pcalloc(cmd->pool, sizeof(ap_lua_mapped_handler_spec));
{
cr_ctx ctx;
lua_State *lvm;
char *tmp;
int rv;
ap_directive_t **current;
hack_section_baton *baton;
spec->file_name = apr_psprintf(cmd->pool, "%s:%u",
cmd->config_file->name,
cmd->config_file->line_number);
if (function) {
spec->function_name = (char *) function;
}
else {
function = NULL;
}
ctx.cmd = cmd;
tmp = apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, cmd->err_directive->directive + 1);
ap_str_tolower(tmp);
ctx.endstr = tmp;
ctx.cfp = cmd->config_file;
ctx.startline = cmd->config_file->line_number;
/* This lua State is used only to compile the input strings -> bytecode, so we don't need anything extra. */
lvm = luaL_newstate();
lua_settop(lvm, 0);
rv = lua_load(lvm, direct_chunkreader, &ctx, spec->file_name);
if (rv != 0) {
const char *errstr = apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Lua Error:",
lua_tostring(lvm, -1), NULL);
lua_close(lvm);
return errstr;
}
else {
luaL_Buffer b;
luaL_buffinit(lvm, &b);
lua_dump(lvm, ldump_writer, &b);
luaL_pushresult(&b);
spec->bytecode_len = lua_strlen(lvm, -1);
spec->bytecode = apr_pstrmemdup(cmd->pool, lua_tostring(lvm, -1),
spec->bytecode_len);
lua_close(lvm);
}
current = mconfig;
/* Here, we have to replace our current config node for the next pass */
if (!*current) {
*current = apr_pcalloc(cmd->pool, sizeof(**current));
}
baton = apr_pcalloc(cmd->pool, sizeof(hack_section_baton));
baton->name = name;
baton->spec = spec;
baton->apr_hook_when = when;
(*current)->filename = cmd->config_file->name;
(*current)->line_num = cmd->config_file->line_number;
(*current)->directive = apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, "Lua_____ByteCodeHack");
(*current)->args = NULL;
(*current)->data = baton;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TreeWalker* Document::createTreeWalker(Node* root,
unsigned what_to_show,
V8NodeFilter* filter) {
DCHECK(root);
return TreeWalker::Create(root, what_to_show, filter);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oidc_clean_expired_state_cookies(request_rec *r, oidc_cfg *c,
const char *currentCookieName, int delete_oldest) {
int number_of_valid_state_cookies = 0;
oidc_state_cookies_t *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
char *cookie, *tokenizerCtx = NULL;
char *cookies = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, oidc_util_hdr_in_cookie_get(r));
if (cookies != NULL) {
cookie = apr_strtok(cookies, OIDC_STR_SEMI_COLON, &tokenizerCtx);
while (cookie != NULL) {
while (*cookie == OIDC_CHAR_SPACE)
cookie++;
if (strstr(cookie, OIDC_STATE_COOKIE_PREFIX) == cookie) {
char *cookieName = cookie;
while (cookie != NULL && *cookie != OIDC_CHAR_EQUAL)
cookie++;
if (*cookie == OIDC_CHAR_EQUAL) {
*cookie = '\0';
cookie++;
if ((currentCookieName == NULL)
|| (apr_strnatcmp(cookieName, currentCookieName)
!= 0)) {
oidc_proto_state_t *proto_state =
oidc_proto_state_from_cookie(r, c, cookie);
if (proto_state != NULL) {
json_int_t ts = oidc_proto_state_get_timestamp(
proto_state);
if (apr_time_now() > ts + apr_time_from_sec(c->state_timeout)) {
oidc_error(r, "state (%s) has expired",
cookieName);
oidc_util_set_cookie(r, cookieName, "", 0,
NULL);
} else {
if (first == NULL) {
first = apr_pcalloc(r->pool,
sizeof(oidc_state_cookies_t));
last = first;
} else {
last->next = apr_pcalloc(r->pool,
sizeof(oidc_state_cookies_t));
last = last->next;
}
last->name = cookieName;
last->timestamp = ts;
last->next = NULL;
number_of_valid_state_cookies++;
}
oidc_proto_state_destroy(proto_state);
}
}
}
}
cookie = apr_strtok(NULL, OIDC_STR_SEMI_COLON, &tokenizerCtx);
}
}
if (delete_oldest > 0)
number_of_valid_state_cookies = oidc_delete_oldest_state_cookies(r,
number_of_valid_state_cookies, c->max_number_of_state_cookies,
first);
return number_of_valid_state_cookies;
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 87,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compat_do_ipt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE:
ret = compat_do_replace(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
case IPT_SO_SET_ADD_COUNTERS:
ret = do_add_counters(sock_net(sk), user, len, 1);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 84,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_tx(struct vhost_net *net)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX];
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
unsigned out, in, s;
int head;
struct msghdr msg = {
.msg_name = NULL,
.msg_namelen = 0,
.msg_control = NULL,
.msg_controllen = 0,
.msg_iov = vq->iov,
.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
};
size_t len, total_len = 0;
int err;
size_t hdr_size;
struct socket *sock;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *uninitialized_var(ubufs);
bool zcopy, zcopy_used;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
sock = vq->private_data;
if (!sock)
goto out;
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
hdr_size = nvq->vhost_hlen;
zcopy = nvq->ubufs;
for (;;) {
/* Release DMAs done buffers first */
if (zcopy)
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(net, vq);
/* If more outstanding DMAs, queue the work.
* Handle upend_idx wrap around
*/
if (unlikely((nvq->upend_idx + vq->num - VHOST_MAX_PEND)
% UIO_MAXIOV == nvq->done_idx))
break;
head = vhost_get_vq_desc(&net->dev, vq, vq->iov,
ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov),
&out, &in,
NULL, NULL);
/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
if (unlikely(head < 0))
break;
/* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us they refilled. */
if (head == vq->num) {
if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
continue;
}
break;
}
if (in) {
vq_err(vq, "Unexpected descriptor format for TX: "
"out %d, int %d\n", out, in);
break;
}
/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
s = move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, hdr_size, out);
msg.msg_iovlen = out;
len = iov_length(vq->iov, out);
/* Sanity check */
if (!len) {
vq_err(vq, "Unexpected header len for TX: "
"%zd expected %zd\n",
iov_length(nvq->hdr, s), hdr_size);
break;
}
zcopy_used = zcopy && len >= VHOST_GOODCOPY_LEN
&& (nvq->upend_idx + 1) % UIO_MAXIOV !=
nvq->done_idx
&& vhost_net_tx_select_zcopy(net);
/* use msg_control to pass vhost zerocopy ubuf info to skb */
if (zcopy_used) {
struct ubuf_info *ubuf;
ubuf = nvq->ubuf_info + nvq->upend_idx;
vq->heads[nvq->upend_idx].id = head;
vq->heads[nvq->upend_idx].len = VHOST_DMA_IN_PROGRESS;
ubuf->callback = vhost_zerocopy_callback;
ubuf->ctx = nvq->ubufs;
ubuf->desc = nvq->upend_idx;
msg.msg_control = ubuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(ubuf);
ubufs = nvq->ubufs;
atomic_inc(&ubufs->refcount);
nvq->upend_idx = (nvq->upend_idx + 1) % UIO_MAXIOV;
} else {
msg.msg_control = NULL;
ubufs = NULL;
}
/* TODO: Check specific error and bomb out unless ENOBUFS? */
err = sock->ops->sendmsg(NULL, sock, &msg, len);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
if (zcopy_used) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put(ubufs);
nvq->upend_idx = ((unsigned)nvq->upend_idx - 1)
% UIO_MAXIOV;
}
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, 1);
break;
}
if (err != len)
pr_debug("Truncated TX packet: "
" len %d != %zd\n", err, len);
if (!zcopy_used)
vhost_add_used_and_signal(&net->dev, vq, head, 0);
else
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(net, vq);
total_len += len;
vhost_net_tx_packet(net);
if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
break;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CreateWebKitSessionDescription(
const webrtc::SessionDescriptionInterface* native_desc) {
if (!native_desc) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Native session description is null.";
return blink::WebRTCSessionDescription();
}
std::string sdp;
if (!native_desc->ToString(&sdp)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get SDP string of native session description.";
return blink::WebRTCSessionDescription();
}
return CreateWebKitSessionDescription(sdp, native_desc->type());
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestCase& TabletMode() {
tablet_mode = true;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: [Files app] Fix open new window command
Change background page |launcher| namesspace to use var instead of const
to be accessible in the foreground page.
Test: --gtest_filter="KeyboardOperations/FilesAppBrowserTest.Test/keyboardOpenNewWindow*"
Bug: 933302
Change-Id: I6e8cec2fd96034d8376fb247743adf1818c00adf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1477469
Commit-Queue: Luciano Pacheco <lucmult@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Noel Gordon <noel@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Luciano Pacheco <lucmult@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Noel Gordon <noel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#633486}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfc_genl_se_added(struct nfc_dev *dev, u32 se_idx, u16 type)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_EVENT_SE_ADDED);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, dev->idx) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX, se_idx) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_TYPE, type))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void trep_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_TrackExtensionPropertiesBox *ptr = (GF_TrackExtensionPropertiesBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: and_code_range_buf(BBuf* bbuf1, int not1, BBuf* bbuf2, int not2, BBuf** pbuf)
{
int r;
OnigCodePoint i, j, n1, n2, *data1, *data2;
OnigCodePoint from, to, from1, to1, from2, to2;
*pbuf = (BBuf* )NULL;
if (IS_NULL(bbuf1)) {
if (not1 != 0 && IS_NOT_NULL(bbuf2)) /* not1 != 0 -> not2 == 0 */
return bbuf_clone(pbuf, bbuf2);
return 0;
}
else if (IS_NULL(bbuf2)) {
if (not2 != 0)
return bbuf_clone(pbuf, bbuf1);
return 0;
}
if (not1 != 0)
SWAP_BBUF_NOT(bbuf1, not1, bbuf2, not2);
data1 = (OnigCodePoint* )(bbuf1->p);
data2 = (OnigCodePoint* )(bbuf2->p);
GET_CODE_POINT(n1, data1);
GET_CODE_POINT(n2, data2);
data1++;
data2++;
if (not2 == 0 && not1 == 0) { /* 1 AND 2 */
for (i = 0; i < n1; i++) {
from1 = data1[i*2];
to1 = data1[i*2+1];
for (j = 0; j < n2; j++) {
from2 = data2[j*2];
to2 = data2[j*2+1];
if (from2 > to1) break;
if (to2 < from1) continue;
from = MAX(from1, from2);
to = MIN(to1, to2);
r = add_code_range_to_buf(pbuf, from, to);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
}
else if (not1 == 0) { /* 1 AND (not 2) */
for (i = 0; i < n1; i++) {
from1 = data1[i*2];
to1 = data1[i*2+1];
r = and_code_range1(pbuf, from1, to1, data2, n2);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #60 : invalid state(CCS_VALUE) in parse_char_class()
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetViewportSize(const gfx::Size& device_viewport_size) {
if (device_viewport_size == device_viewport_size_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("cc", "LayerTreeHostImpl::SetViewportSize",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD, "width",
device_viewport_size.width(), "height",
device_viewport_size.height());
if (pending_tree_)
active_tree_->SetViewportSizeInvalid();
device_viewport_size_ = device_viewport_size;
UpdateViewportContainerSizes();
client_->OnCanDrawStateChanged(CanDraw());
SetFullViewportDamage();
active_tree_->set_needs_update_draw_properties();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Cluster::Load(long long& pos, long& len) const
{
assert(m_pSegment);
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
if (m_timecode >= 0) //at least partially loaded
return 0;
assert(m_pos == m_element_start);
assert(m_element_size < 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
const int status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
assert((total < 0) || (m_pos <= total)); //TODO: verify this
pos = m_pos;
long long cluster_size = -1;
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error or underflow
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id_ < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id_);
if (id_ != 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume id
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(cluster_size);
if (size == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: verify this
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
}
//// pos points to start of payload
#if 0
len = static_cast<long>(size_);
if (cluster_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
long long timecode = -1;
long long new_pos = -1;
bool bBlock = false;
long long cluster_stop = (cluster_size < 0) ? -1 : pos + cluster_size;
for (;;)
{
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
pos += len; //consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x67) //TimeCode ID
{
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (timecode < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(timecode);
new_pos = pos + size;
if (bBlock)
break;
}
else if (id == 0x20) //BlockGroup ID
{
bBlock = true;
break;
}
else if (id == 0x23) //SimpleBlock ID
{
bBlock = true;
break;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
if (timecode < 0) //no timecode found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (!bBlock)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pos = new_pos; //designates position just beyond timecode payload
m_timecode = timecode; // m_timecode >= 0 means we're partially loaded
if (cluster_size >= 0)
m_element_size = cluster_stop - m_element_start;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XID CreatePictureFromSkiaPixmap(Display* display, XID pixmap) {
XID picture = XRenderCreatePicture(
display, pixmap, GetRenderARGB32Format(display), 0, NULL);
return picture;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sch_handle_egress(struct sk_buff *skb, int *ret, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tcf_proto *cl = rcu_dereference_bh(dev->egress_cl_list);
struct tcf_result cl_res;
if (!cl)
return skb;
/* qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len was already set by the caller. */
qdisc_bstats_cpu_update(cl->q, skb);
switch (tcf_classify(skb, cl, &cl_res, false)) {
case TC_ACT_OK:
case TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY:
skb->tc_index = TC_H_MIN(cl_res.classid);
break;
case TC_ACT_SHOT:
qdisc_qstats_cpu_drop(cl->q);
*ret = NET_XMIT_DROP;
kfree_skb(skb);
return NULL;
case TC_ACT_STOLEN:
case TC_ACT_QUEUED:
case TC_ACT_TRAP:
*ret = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
consume_skb(skb);
return NULL;
case TC_ACT_REDIRECT:
/* No need to push/pop skb's mac_header here on egress! */
skb_do_redirect(skb);
*ret = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
return NULL;
default:
break;
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::crossAxisIntrinsicExtentForChild(RenderBox* child) const
{
return isHorizontalFlow() ? childIntrinsicHeight(child) : childIntrinsicWidth(child);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void on_failed_event(const char *event_name)
{
/* Don't show the 'on failure' button if the processed event
* was started by that button. (avoid infinite loop)
*/
if (strcmp(event_name, EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME) == 0)
return;
add_warning(
_("Processing of the problem failed. This can have many reasons but there are three most common:\n"\
"\t▫ <b>network connection problems</b>\n"\
"\t▫ <b>corrupted problem data</b>\n"\
"\t▫ <b>invalid configuration</b>"
));
if (!g_expert_mode)
{
add_warning(
_("If you want to update the configuration and try to report again, please open <b>Preferences</b> item\n"
"in the application menu and after applying the configuration changes click <b>Repeat</b> button."));
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_repeat);
}
add_warning(
_("If you are sure that this problem is not caused by network problems neither by invalid configuration\n"
"and want to help us, please click on the upload button and provide all problem data for a deep analysis.\n"\
"<i>Before you do that, please consider the security risks. Problem data may contain sensitive information like\n"\
"passwords. The uploaded data are stored in a protected storage and only a limited number of persons can read them.</i>"));
show_warnings();
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_onfail);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nft_unregister_afinfo(struct nft_af_info *afi)
{
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
list_del_rcu(&afi->list);
nfnl_unlock(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_dm_ble_tx_test_cback(void *p)
{
btif_transfer_context(btif_dm_generic_evt, BTIF_DM_CB_LE_TX_TEST,
(char *)p, 1, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __packet_snd_vnet_parse(struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr, size_t len)
{
unsigned short gso_type = 0;
if ((vnet_hdr->flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) &&
(__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr->csum_start) +
__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr->csum_offset) + 2 >
__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr->hdr_len)))
vnet_hdr->hdr_len = __cpu_to_virtio16(vio_le(),
__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr->csum_start) +
__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr->csum_offset) + 2);
if (__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr->hdr_len) > len)
return -EINVAL;
if (vnet_hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
switch (vnet_hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) {
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (vnet_hdr->gso_type & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN)
gso_type |= SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN;
if (vnet_hdr->gso_size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
vnet_hdr->gso_type = gso_type; /* changes type, temporary storage */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void unimac_mdio_writel(struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv, u32 val,
u32 offset)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MIPS) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN))
__raw_writel(val, priv->base + offset);
else
writel_relaxed(val, priv->base + offset);
}
Commit Message: net: phy: mdio-bcm-unimac: fix potential NULL dereference in unimac_mdio_probe()
platform_get_resource() may fail and return NULL, so we should
better check it's return value to avoid a NULL pointer dereference
a bit later in the code.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 83,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: format_CT(const struct ofpact_conntrack *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%sct(%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
if (a->flags & NX_CT_F_COMMIT) {
ds_put_format(s, "%scommit%s,", colors.value, colors.end);
}
if (a->recirc_table != NX_CT_RECIRC_NONE) {
ds_put_format(s, "%stable=%s%"PRIu8",",
colors.special, colors.end, a->recirc_table);
}
if (a->zone_src.field) {
ds_put_format(s, "%szone=%s", colors.param, colors.end);
mf_format_subfield(&a->zone_src, s);
ds_put_char(s, ',');
} else if (a->zone_imm) {
ds_put_format(s, "%szone=%s%"PRIu16",",
colors.param, colors.end, a->zone_imm);
}
/* If the first action is a NAT action, format it outside of the 'exec'
* envelope. */
const struct ofpact *action = a->actions;
size_t actions_len = ofpact_ct_get_action_len(a);
if (actions_len && action->type == OFPACT_NAT) {
format_NAT(ofpact_get_NAT(action), s);
ds_put_char(s, ',');
actions_len -= OFPACT_ALIGN(action->len);
action = ofpact_next(action);
}
if (actions_len) {
ds_put_format(s, "%sexec(%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
ofpacts_format(action, actions_len, s);
ds_put_format(s, "%s),%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
}
format_alg(a->alg, s);
ds_chomp(s, ',');
ds_put_format(s, "%s)%s", colors.paren, colors.end);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int burl_contains_ctrls (const buffer *b)
{
const char * const s = b->ptr;
const int used = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
for (int i = 0; i < used; ++i) {
if (s[i] == '%' && (s[i+1] < '2' || (s[i+1] == '7' && s[i+2] == 'F')))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 90,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
int idx, ret = -EINVAL;
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(kvm->vcpus[0]))
return 0;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
BUG_ON(guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
continue;
/*
* VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
* interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
* for these kind of interrupts.
*
* For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
* those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
* configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
* irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
*
* We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
*/
kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu)) {
/*
* Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
* we don't handle it in posted mode.
*/
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
host_irq);
goto out;
}
continue;
}
vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(vcpu->vcpu_id, host_irq, e->gsi,
vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
if (set)
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
else {
/* suppress notification event before unposting */
pi_set_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
pi_clear_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
}
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintArtifactCompositor::RemoveChildLayers() {
cc::LayerTreeHost* host = root_layer_->layer_tree_host();
if (!host)
return;
for (auto child : root_layer_->children()) {
host->UnregisterElement(child->element_id(), cc::ElementListType::ACTIVE);
}
root_layer_->RemoveAllChildren();
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_) {
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.clear();
extra_data_for_testing_->synthesized_clip_layers.clear();
extra_data_for_testing_->scroll_hit_test_layers.clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorHandler::TargetCrashed() {
frontend_->TargetCrashed();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLint ComputeImageDataSize(GLint width, GLint height) const {
GLint row_size = width * bytes_per_pixel_;
if (height > 1) {
GLint temp = row_size + pack_alignment_ - 1;
GLint padded_row_size = (temp / pack_alignment_) * pack_alignment_;
GLint size_of_all_but_last_row = (height - 1) * padded_row_size;
return size_of_all_but_last_row + row_size;
} else {
return height * row_size;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackFramebuffer::Create() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackFramebuffer::Create",
decoder_->GetErrorState());
Destroy();
glGenFramebuffersEXT(1, &id_);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isDefaultButtonForForm() const
{
return isSuccessfulSubmitButton() && form() && form()->defaultButton() == this;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_layoutcommit_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutcommit_data *data = calldata;
pnfs_cleanup_layoutcommit(data);
nfs_post_op_update_inode_force_wcc(data->args.inode,
data->res.fattr);
put_rpccred(data->cred);
nfs_iput_and_deactive(data->inode);
kfree(data);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hls_slice_header(HEVCContext *s)
{
GetBitContext *gb = &s->HEVClc->gb;
SliceHeader *sh = &s->sh;
int i, ret;
sh->first_slice_in_pic_flag = get_bits1(gb);
if ((IS_IDR(s) || IS_BLA(s)) && sh->first_slice_in_pic_flag) {
s->seq_decode = (s->seq_decode + 1) & 0xff;
s->max_ra = INT_MAX;
if (IS_IDR(s))
ff_hevc_clear_refs(s);
}
sh->no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 0;
if (IS_IRAP(s))
sh->no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = get_bits1(gb);
sh->pps_id = get_ue_golomb_long(gb);
if (sh->pps_id >= HEVC_MAX_PPS_COUNT || !s->ps.pps_list[sh->pps_id]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "PPS id out of range: %d\n", sh->pps_id);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!sh->first_slice_in_pic_flag &&
s->ps.pps != (HEVCPPS*)s->ps.pps_list[sh->pps_id]->data) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "PPS changed between slices.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->ps.pps = (HEVCPPS*)s->ps.pps_list[sh->pps_id]->data;
if (s->nal_unit_type == HEVC_NAL_CRA_NUT && s->last_eos == 1)
sh->no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 1;
if (s->ps.sps != (HEVCSPS*)s->ps.sps_list[s->ps.pps->sps_id]->data) {
const HEVCSPS *sps = (HEVCSPS*)s->ps.sps_list[s->ps.pps->sps_id]->data;
const HEVCSPS *last_sps = s->ps.sps;
enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmt;
if (last_sps && IS_IRAP(s) && s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_CRA_NUT) {
if (sps->width != last_sps->width || sps->height != last_sps->height ||
sps->temporal_layer[sps->max_sub_layers - 1].max_dec_pic_buffering !=
last_sps->temporal_layer[last_sps->max_sub_layers - 1].max_dec_pic_buffering)
sh->no_output_of_prior_pics_flag = 0;
}
ff_hevc_clear_refs(s);
ret = set_sps(s, sps, sps->pix_fmt);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
pix_fmt = get_format(s, sps);
if (pix_fmt < 0)
return pix_fmt;
s->avctx->pix_fmt = pix_fmt;
s->seq_decode = (s->seq_decode + 1) & 0xff;
s->max_ra = INT_MAX;
}
sh->dependent_slice_segment_flag = 0;
if (!sh->first_slice_in_pic_flag) {
int slice_address_length;
if (s->ps.pps->dependent_slice_segments_enabled_flag)
sh->dependent_slice_segment_flag = get_bits1(gb);
slice_address_length = av_ceil_log2(s->ps.sps->ctb_width *
s->ps.sps->ctb_height);
sh->slice_segment_addr = get_bitsz(gb, slice_address_length);
if (sh->slice_segment_addr >= s->ps.sps->ctb_width * s->ps.sps->ctb_height) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid slice segment address: %u.\n",
sh->slice_segment_addr);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!sh->dependent_slice_segment_flag) {
sh->slice_addr = sh->slice_segment_addr;
s->slice_idx++;
}
} else {
sh->slice_segment_addr = sh->slice_addr = 0;
s->slice_idx = 0;
s->slice_initialized = 0;
}
if (!sh->dependent_slice_segment_flag) {
s->slice_initialized = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->ps.pps->num_extra_slice_header_bits; i++)
skip_bits(gb, 1); // slice_reserved_undetermined_flag[]
sh->slice_type = get_ue_golomb_long(gb);
if (!(sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_I ||
sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_P ||
sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown slice type: %d.\n",
sh->slice_type);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (IS_IRAP(s) && sh->slice_type != HEVC_SLICE_I) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Inter slices in an IRAP frame.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->pic_output_flag = 1;
if (s->ps.pps->output_flag_present_flag)
sh->pic_output_flag = get_bits1(gb);
if (s->ps.sps->separate_colour_plane_flag)
sh->colour_plane_id = get_bits(gb, 2);
if (!IS_IDR(s)) {
int poc, pos;
sh->pic_order_cnt_lsb = get_bits(gb, s->ps.sps->log2_max_poc_lsb);
poc = ff_hevc_compute_poc(s->ps.sps, s->pocTid0, sh->pic_order_cnt_lsb, s->nal_unit_type);
if (!sh->first_slice_in_pic_flag && poc != s->poc) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Ignoring POC change between slices: %d -> %d\n", s->poc, poc);
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
poc = s->poc;
}
s->poc = poc;
sh->short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag = get_bits1(gb);
pos = get_bits_left(gb);
if (!sh->short_term_ref_pic_set_sps_flag) {
ret = ff_hevc_decode_short_term_rps(gb, s->avctx, &sh->slice_rps, s->ps.sps, 1);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
sh->short_term_rps = &sh->slice_rps;
} else {
int numbits, rps_idx;
if (!s->ps.sps->nb_st_rps) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "No ref lists in the SPS.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
numbits = av_ceil_log2(s->ps.sps->nb_st_rps);
rps_idx = numbits > 0 ? get_bits(gb, numbits) : 0;
sh->short_term_rps = &s->ps.sps->st_rps[rps_idx];
}
sh->short_term_ref_pic_set_size = pos - get_bits_left(gb);
pos = get_bits_left(gb);
ret = decode_lt_rps(s, &sh->long_term_rps, gb);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Invalid long term RPS.\n");
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_EXPLODE)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->long_term_ref_pic_set_size = pos - get_bits_left(gb);
if (s->ps.sps->sps_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag)
sh->slice_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag = get_bits1(gb);
else
sh->slice_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag = 0;
} else {
s->sh.short_term_rps = NULL;
s->poc = 0;
}
/* 8.3.1 */
if (sh->first_slice_in_pic_flag && s->temporal_id == 0 &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_TRAIL_N &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_TSA_N &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_STSA_N &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_RADL_N &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_RADL_R &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_RASL_N &&
s->nal_unit_type != HEVC_NAL_RASL_R)
s->pocTid0 = s->poc;
if (s->ps.sps->sao_enabled) {
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[0] = get_bits1(gb);
if (s->ps.sps->chroma_format_idc) {
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[1] =
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[2] = get_bits1(gb);
}
} else {
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[0] = 0;
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[1] = 0;
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[2] = 0;
}
sh->nb_refs[L0] = sh->nb_refs[L1] = 0;
if (sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_P || sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B) {
int nb_refs;
sh->nb_refs[L0] = s->ps.pps->num_ref_idx_l0_default_active;
if (sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)
sh->nb_refs[L1] = s->ps.pps->num_ref_idx_l1_default_active;
if (get_bits1(gb)) { // num_ref_idx_active_override_flag
sh->nb_refs[L0] = get_ue_golomb_long(gb) + 1;
if (sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)
sh->nb_refs[L1] = get_ue_golomb_long(gb) + 1;
}
if (sh->nb_refs[L0] > HEVC_MAX_REFS || sh->nb_refs[L1] > HEVC_MAX_REFS) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many refs: %d/%d.\n",
sh->nb_refs[L0], sh->nb_refs[L1]);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->rpl_modification_flag[0] = 0;
sh->rpl_modification_flag[1] = 0;
nb_refs = ff_hevc_frame_nb_refs(s);
if (!nb_refs) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Zero refs for a frame with P or B slices.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (s->ps.pps->lists_modification_present_flag && nb_refs > 1) {
sh->rpl_modification_flag[0] = get_bits1(gb);
if (sh->rpl_modification_flag[0]) {
for (i = 0; i < sh->nb_refs[L0]; i++)
sh->list_entry_lx[0][i] = get_bits(gb, av_ceil_log2(nb_refs));
}
if (sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B) {
sh->rpl_modification_flag[1] = get_bits1(gb);
if (sh->rpl_modification_flag[1] == 1)
for (i = 0; i < sh->nb_refs[L1]; i++)
sh->list_entry_lx[1][i] = get_bits(gb, av_ceil_log2(nb_refs));
}
}
if (sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)
sh->mvd_l1_zero_flag = get_bits1(gb);
if (s->ps.pps->cabac_init_present_flag)
sh->cabac_init_flag = get_bits1(gb);
else
sh->cabac_init_flag = 0;
sh->collocated_ref_idx = 0;
if (sh->slice_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag) {
sh->collocated_list = L0;
if (sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)
sh->collocated_list = !get_bits1(gb);
if (sh->nb_refs[sh->collocated_list] > 1) {
sh->collocated_ref_idx = get_ue_golomb_long(gb);
if (sh->collocated_ref_idx >= sh->nb_refs[sh->collocated_list]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid collocated_ref_idx: %d.\n",
sh->collocated_ref_idx);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
if ((s->ps.pps->weighted_pred_flag && sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_P) ||
(s->ps.pps->weighted_bipred_flag && sh->slice_type == HEVC_SLICE_B)) {
int ret = pred_weight_table(s, gb);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
sh->max_num_merge_cand = 5 - get_ue_golomb_long(gb);
if (sh->max_num_merge_cand < 1 || sh->max_num_merge_cand > 5) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid number of merging MVP candidates: %d.\n",
sh->max_num_merge_cand);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
sh->slice_qp_delta = get_se_golomb(gb);
if (s->ps.pps->pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag) {
sh->slice_cb_qp_offset = get_se_golomb(gb);
sh->slice_cr_qp_offset = get_se_golomb(gb);
} else {
sh->slice_cb_qp_offset = 0;
sh->slice_cr_qp_offset = 0;
}
if (s->ps.pps->chroma_qp_offset_list_enabled_flag)
sh->cu_chroma_qp_offset_enabled_flag = get_bits1(gb);
else
sh->cu_chroma_qp_offset_enabled_flag = 0;
if (s->ps.pps->deblocking_filter_control_present_flag) {
int deblocking_filter_override_flag = 0;
if (s->ps.pps->deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag)
deblocking_filter_override_flag = get_bits1(gb);
if (deblocking_filter_override_flag) {
sh->disable_deblocking_filter_flag = get_bits1(gb);
if (!sh->disable_deblocking_filter_flag) {
int beta_offset_div2 = get_se_golomb(gb);
int tc_offset_div2 = get_se_golomb(gb) ;
if (beta_offset_div2 < -6 || beta_offset_div2 > 6 ||
tc_offset_div2 < -6 || tc_offset_div2 > 6) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid deblock filter offsets: %d, %d\n",
beta_offset_div2, tc_offset_div2);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->beta_offset = beta_offset_div2 * 2;
sh->tc_offset = tc_offset_div2 * 2;
}
} else {
sh->disable_deblocking_filter_flag = s->ps.pps->disable_dbf;
sh->beta_offset = s->ps.pps->beta_offset;
sh->tc_offset = s->ps.pps->tc_offset;
}
} else {
sh->disable_deblocking_filter_flag = 0;
sh->beta_offset = 0;
sh->tc_offset = 0;
}
if (s->ps.pps->seq_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag &&
(sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[0] ||
sh->slice_sample_adaptive_offset_flag[1] ||
!sh->disable_deblocking_filter_flag)) {
sh->slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = get_bits1(gb);
} else {
sh->slice_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = s->ps.pps->seq_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag;
}
} else if (!s->slice_initialized) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Independent slice segment missing.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->num_entry_point_offsets = 0;
if (s->ps.pps->tiles_enabled_flag || s->ps.pps->entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag) {
unsigned num_entry_point_offsets = get_ue_golomb_long(gb);
if (num_entry_point_offsets > get_bits_left(gb)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "num_entry_point_offsets %d is invalid\n", num_entry_point_offsets);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->num_entry_point_offsets = num_entry_point_offsets;
if (sh->num_entry_point_offsets > 0) {
int offset_len = get_ue_golomb_long(gb) + 1;
if (offset_len < 1 || offset_len > 32) {
sh->num_entry_point_offsets = 0;
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "offset_len %d is invalid\n", offset_len);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
av_freep(&sh->entry_point_offset);
av_freep(&sh->offset);
av_freep(&sh->size);
sh->entry_point_offset = av_malloc_array(sh->num_entry_point_offsets, sizeof(unsigned));
sh->offset = av_malloc_array(sh->num_entry_point_offsets, sizeof(int));
sh->size = av_malloc_array(sh->num_entry_point_offsets, sizeof(int));
if (!sh->entry_point_offset || !sh->offset || !sh->size) {
sh->num_entry_point_offsets = 0;
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to allocate memory\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < sh->num_entry_point_offsets; i++) {
unsigned val = get_bits_long(gb, offset_len);
sh->entry_point_offset[i] = val + 1; // +1; // +1 to get the size
}
if (s->threads_number > 1 && (s->ps.pps->num_tile_rows > 1 || s->ps.pps->num_tile_columns > 1)) {
s->enable_parallel_tiles = 0; // TODO: you can enable tiles in parallel here
s->threads_number = 1;
} else
s->enable_parallel_tiles = 0;
} else
s->enable_parallel_tiles = 0;
}
if (s->ps.pps->slice_header_extension_present_flag) {
unsigned int length = get_ue_golomb_long(gb);
if (length*8LL > get_bits_left(gb)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "too many slice_header_extension_data_bytes\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
skip_bits(gb, 8); // slice_header_extension_data_byte
}
sh->slice_qp = 26U + s->ps.pps->pic_init_qp_minus26 + sh->slice_qp_delta;
if (sh->slice_qp > 51 ||
sh->slice_qp < -s->ps.sps->qp_bd_offset) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The slice_qp %d is outside the valid range "
"[%d, 51].\n",
sh->slice_qp,
-s->ps.sps->qp_bd_offset);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
sh->slice_ctb_addr_rs = sh->slice_segment_addr;
if (!s->sh.slice_ctb_addr_rs && s->sh.dependent_slice_segment_flag) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Impossible slice segment.\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Overread slice header by %d bits\n", -get_bits_left(gb));
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->HEVClc->first_qp_group = !s->sh.dependent_slice_segment_flag;
if (!s->ps.pps->cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag)
s->HEVClc->qp_y = s->sh.slice_qp;
s->slice_initialized = 1;
s->HEVClc->tu.cu_qp_offset_cb = 0;
s->HEVClc->tu.cu_qp_offset_cr = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WireToLibRange(
xRecordRange *wire_range,
XRecordRange *lib_range)
{
lib_range->core_requests.first = wire_range->coreRequestsFirst;
lib_range->core_requests.last = wire_range->coreRequestsLast;
lib_range->core_replies.first = wire_range->coreRepliesFirst;
lib_range->core_replies.last = wire_range->coreRepliesLast;
lib_range->ext_requests.ext_major.first = wire_range->extRequestsMajorFirst;
lib_range->ext_requests.ext_major.last = wire_range->extRequestsMajorLast;
lib_range->ext_requests.ext_minor.first = wire_range->extRequestsMinorFirst;
lib_range->ext_requests.ext_minor.last = wire_range->extRequestsMinorLast;
lib_range->ext_replies.ext_major.first = wire_range->extRepliesMajorFirst;
lib_range->ext_replies.ext_major.last = wire_range->extRepliesMajorLast;
lib_range->ext_replies.ext_minor.first = wire_range->extRepliesMinorFirst;
lib_range->ext_replies.ext_minor.last = wire_range->extRepliesMinorLast;
lib_range->delivered_events.first = wire_range->deliveredEventsFirst;
lib_range->delivered_events.last = wire_range->deliveredEventsLast;
lib_range->device_events.first = wire_range->deviceEventsFirst;
lib_range->device_events.last = wire_range->deviceEventsLast;
lib_range->errors.first = wire_range->errorsFirst;
lib_range->errors.last = wire_range->errorsLast;
lib_range->client_started = wire_range->clientStarted;
lib_range->client_died = wire_range->clientDied;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qboolean FS_IsExt(const char *filename, const char *ext, int namelen)
{
int extlen;
extlen = strlen(ext);
if(extlen > namelen)
return qfalse;
filename += namelen - extlen;
return !Q_stricmp(filename, ext);
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cl_block (GifCtx *ctx) /* table clear for block compress */
{
cl_hash ( (count_int) hsize, ctx );
ctx->free_ent = ctx->ClearCode + 2;
ctx->clear_flg = 1;
output( (code_int)ctx->ClearCode, ctx);
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 91,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool UnprivilegedProcessDelegate::CreateConnectedIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
ScopedHandle* client_out,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* server_out) {
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy> server;
if (!CreateIpcChannel(channel_name, kDaemonIpcSecurityDescriptor,
io_task_runner_, delegate, &server)) {
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor = NULL;
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = TRUE;
ScopedHandle client;
client.Set(CreateFile(UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
0,
&security_attributes,
OPEN_EXISTING,
SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION |
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED,
NULL));
if (!client.IsValid())
return false;
*client_out = client.Pass();
*server_out = server.Pass();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: YR_API void yr_object_print_data(
YR_OBJECT* object,
int indent,
int print_identifier)
{
YR_DICTIONARY_ITEMS* dict_items;
YR_ARRAY_ITEMS* array_items;
YR_STRUCTURE_MEMBER* member;
char indent_spaces[32];
int i;
indent = yr_min(indent, sizeof(indent_spaces) - 1);
memset(indent_spaces, '\t', indent);
indent_spaces[indent] = '\0';
if (print_identifier && object->type != OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION)
printf("%s%s", indent_spaces, object->identifier);
switch(object->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
if (((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) object)->value != UNDEFINED)
printf(" = %" PRIu64, ((YR_OBJECT_INTEGER*) object)->value);
else
printf(" = UNDEFINED");
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
if (((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) object)->value != NULL)
{
size_t l;
printf(" = \"");
for (l = 0; l < ((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) object)->value->length; l++)
{
char c = ((YR_OBJECT_STRING*) object)->value->c_string[l];
if (isprint((unsigned char) c))
printf("%c", c);
else
printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char) c);
}
printf("\"");
}
else
{
printf(" = UNDEFINED");
}
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE:
member = ((YR_OBJECT_STRUCTURE*) object)->members;
while (member != NULL)
{
if (member->object->type != OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION)
{
printf("\n");
yr_object_print_data(member->object, indent + 1, 1);
}
member = member->next;
}
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY:
array_items = ((YR_OBJECT_ARRAY*) object)->items;
if (array_items != NULL)
{
for (i = 0; i < array_items->count; i++)
{
if (array_items->objects[i] != NULL)
{
printf("\n%s\t[%d]", indent_spaces, i);
yr_object_print_data(array_items->objects[i], indent + 1, 0);
}
}
}
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY:
dict_items = ((YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY*) object)->items;
if (dict_items != NULL)
{
for (i = 0; i < dict_items->used; i++)
{
printf("\n%s\t%s", indent_spaces, dict_items->objects[i].key);
yr_object_print_data(dict_items->objects[i].obj, indent + 1, 0);
}
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::RunModalPromptDialog(
const blink::WebString& message,
const blink::WebString& default_value,
blink::WebString* actual_value) {
base::string16 result;
bool ok = RunJavaScriptDialog(JAVASCRIPT_DIALOG_TYPE_PROMPT, message.Utf16(),
default_value.Utf16(),
frame_->GetDocument().Url(), &result);
if (ok)
*actual_value = WebString::FromUTF16(result);
return ok;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int network_bind_socket (int fd, const struct addrinfo *ai, const int interface_idx)
{
#if KERNEL_SOLARIS
char loop = 0;
#else
int loop = 0;
#endif
int yes = 1;
/* allow multiple sockets to use the same PORT number */
if (setsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
&yes, sizeof(yes)) == -1) {
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (reuseaddr): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf, sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
DEBUG ("fd = %i; calling `bind'", fd);
if (bind (fd, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("bind: %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf, sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET)
{
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) ai->ai_addr;
if (IN_MULTICAST (ntohl (addr->sin_addr.s_addr)))
{
#if HAVE_STRUCT_IP_MREQN_IMR_IFINDEX
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
#else
struct ip_mreq mreq;
#endif
DEBUG ("fd = %i; IPv4 multicast address found", fd);
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
#if HAVE_STRUCT_IP_MREQN_IMR_IFINDEX
/* Set the interface using the interface index if
* possible (available). Unfortunately, the struct
* ip_mreqn is not portable. */
mreq.imr_address.s_addr = ntohl (INADDR_ANY);
mreq.imr_ifindex = interface_idx;
#else
mreq.imr_interface.s_addr = ntohl (INADDR_ANY);
#endif
if (setsockopt (fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MULTICAST_LOOP,
&loop, sizeof (loop)) == -1)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (multicast-loop): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf,
sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
if (setsockopt (fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP,
&mreq, sizeof (mreq)) == -1)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (add-membership): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf,
sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
}
else if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
{
/* Useful example: http://gsyc.escet.urjc.es/~eva/IPv6-web/examples/mcast.html */
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) ai->ai_addr;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST (&addr->sin6_addr))
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
DEBUG ("fd = %i; IPv6 multicast address found", fd);
memcpy (&mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr,
&addr->sin6_addr,
sizeof (addr->sin6_addr));
/* http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man4/ip6.4.html
* ipv6mr_interface may be set to zeroes to
* choose the default multicast interface or to
* the index of a particular multicast-capable
* interface if the host is multihomed.
* Membership is associ-associated with a
* single interface; programs running on
* multihomed hosts may need to join the same
* group on more than one interface.*/
mreq.ipv6mr_interface = interface_idx;
if (setsockopt (fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP,
&loop, sizeof (loop)) == -1)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (ipv6-multicast-loop): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf,
sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
if (setsockopt (fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP,
&mreq, sizeof (mreq)) == -1)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (ipv6-add-membership): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf,
sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
}
#if defined(HAVE_IF_INDEXTONAME) && HAVE_IF_INDEXTONAME && defined(SO_BINDTODEVICE)
/* if a specific interface was set, bind the socket to it. But to avoid
* possible problems with multicast routing, only do that for non-multicast
* addresses */
if (interface_idx != 0)
{
char interface_name[IFNAMSIZ];
if (if_indextoname (interface_idx, interface_name) == NULL)
return (-1);
DEBUG ("fd = %i; Binding socket to interface %s", fd, interface_name);
if (setsockopt (fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
interface_name,
sizeof(interface_name)) == -1 )
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (bind-if): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf, sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_IF_INDEXTONAME && SO_BINDTODEVICE */
return (0);
} /* int network_bind_socket */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_err_msg(const char *name)
{
gss_buffer_desc buffer;
if (name == NULL) {
buffer.length = 0;
buffer.value = NULL;
} else {
buffer.length = strlen(name)+1;
buffer.value = make_spnego_token(name);
}
return (buffer);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintLayerScrollableArea::GetCompositorAnimationTimeline() const {
return layer_->GetLayoutObject()
.GetFrameView()
->GetCompositorAnimationTimeline();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Textfield::OnBlur() {
gfx::RenderText* render_text = GetRenderText();
render_text->set_focused(false);
if (PlatformStyle::kTextfieldScrollsToStartOnFocusChange)
model_->MoveCursorTo(gfx::SelectionModel(0, gfx::CURSOR_FORWARD));
if (GetInputMethod()) {
GetInputMethod()->DetachTextInputClient(this);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
wm::RestoreWindowBoundsOnClientFocusLost(
GetNativeView()->GetToplevelWindow());
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
StopBlinkingCursor();
cursor_view_.SetVisible(false);
DestroyTouchSelection();
if (use_focus_ring_)
FocusRing::Uninstall(this);
SchedulePaint();
View::OnBlur();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: search_text (WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, const gboolean forward) {
if (argv_idx(argv, 0) && (*argv_idx(argv, 0) != '\0')) {
if (g_strcmp0 (uzbl.state.searchtx, argv_idx(argv, 0)) != 0) {
webkit_web_view_unmark_text_matches (page);
webkit_web_view_mark_text_matches (page, argv_idx(argv, 0), FALSE, 0);
uzbl.state.searchtx = g_strdup(argv_idx(argv, 0));
}
}
if (uzbl.state.searchtx) {
if (uzbl.state.verbose)
printf ("Searching: %s\n", uzbl.state.searchtx);
webkit_web_view_set_highlight_text_matches (page, TRUE);
webkit_web_view_search_text (page, uzbl.state.searchtx, FALSE, forward, TRUE);
}
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: circle_eq(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(circle_ar(circle1), circle_ar(circle2)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nextproto4_cksum(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct ip *ip, const uint8_t *data,
u_int len, u_int covlen, u_int next_proto)
{
struct phdr {
uint32_t src;
uint32_t dst;
u_char mbz;
u_char proto;
uint16_t len;
} ph;
struct cksum_vec vec[2];
/* pseudo-header.. */
ph.len = htons((uint16_t)len);
ph.mbz = 0;
ph.proto = next_proto;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ph.src, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (IP_HL(ip) == 5)
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&ph.dst, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(uint32_t));
else
ph.dst = ip_finddst(ndo, ip);
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(void *)&ph;
vec[0].len = sizeof(ph);
vec[1].ptr = data;
vec[1].len = covlen;
return (in_cksum(vec, 2));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13037/IP: Add bounds checks when printing time stamp options.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int msg_len;
unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p;
if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A)
{
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
*(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
msg_len = p - msg;
dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf,
DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len);
s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */
return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 45,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewHostManager::RenderViewHostManager(
RenderViewHostDelegate* render_view_delegate,
RenderWidgetHostDelegate* render_widget_delegate,
Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
cross_navigation_pending_(false),
render_view_delegate_(render_view_delegate),
render_widget_delegate_(render_widget_delegate),
render_view_host_(NULL),
pending_render_view_host_(NULL),
interstitial_page_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int posix_get_realtime_coarse(clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
*tp = current_kernel_time64();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 85,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterFileSystemPermissionPolicy(
storage::FileSystemType type,
int policy) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
file_system_policy_map_[type] = policy;
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunLoop::Quit() {
if (!origin_task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence()) {
origin_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&RunLoop::Quit, Unretained(this)));
return;
}
quit_called_ = true;
if (running_ && delegate_->active_run_loops_.top() == this) {
delegate_->Quit();
}
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setDecoder(PassRefPtr<TextResourceDecoder> decoder)
{
m_decoder = decoder;
setEncoding(m_decoder ? m_decoder->encoding() : WTF::TextEncoding());
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta;
bool useBackup = mMetadataType[portIndex] != kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
OMX_U8 *data = static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer());
if (useBackup) {
data = new (std::nothrow) OMX_U8[allottedSize];
if (data == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
memset(data, 0, allottedSize);
if (allottedSize != params->size()) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, BAD_VALUE, SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete[] data;
return BAD_VALUE;
}
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyToOmx */, false /* copyFromOmx */, data);
} else {
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyFromOmx */, false /* copyToOmx */, NULL);
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, data);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: do not convert ANWB to gralloc source in emptyBuffer
Bug: 29422020
Bug: 31412859
Change-Id: If48e3e0b6f1af99a459fdc3f6f03744bbf0dc375
(cherry picked from commit 534bb6132a6a664f90b42b3ef81298b42efb3dc2)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 174,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void freefieldlist(struct fieldlist *l)
{
struct fieldlist *n;
while (l) {
n = l->next;
free(l->section);
strarray_free(l->fields);
free(l->trail);
if (l->rock) free(l->rock);
free((char *)l);
l = n;
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShouldQuicRaceStaleDNSOnConnection(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "race_stale_dns_on_connection"),
"true");
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 152,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::addAllArchiveResources(Archive* archive)
{
if (!m_archiveResourceCollection)
m_archiveResourceCollection = adoptPtr(new ArchiveResourceCollection);
ASSERT(archive);
if (!archive)
return;
m_archiveResourceCollection->addAllResources(archive);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NewlibPackagedAppTest() : PackagedAppTest("newlib") { }
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err tref_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackReferenceBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackReferenceBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmpget)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_GET, SNMP_VERSION_1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool pvscsi_vmstate_need_pcie_device(void *opaque)
{
PVSCSIState *s = PVSCSI(opaque);
return !(s->compat_flags & PVSCSI_COMPAT_DISABLE_PCIE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_read_lgcy_rx_descr(E1000ECore *core, uint8_t *desc, hwaddr *buff_addr)
{
struct e1000_rx_desc *d = (struct e1000_rx_desc *) desc;
*buff_addr = le64_to_cpu(d->buffer_addr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 6,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sig_channel_created(CHANNEL_REC *channel)
{
g_return_if_fail(IS_CHANNEL(channel));
channel->nicks = g_hash_table_new((GHashFunc) g_istr_hash,
(GCompareFunc) g_istr_equal);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: post_post_garbage_hack( httpd_conn* hc )
{
char buf[2];
/* If we are in a sub-process, turn on no-delay mode in case we
** previously cleared it.
*/
if ( sub_process )
httpd_set_ndelay( hc->conn_fd );
/* And read up to 2 bytes. */
(void) read( hc->conn_fd, buf, sizeof(buf) );
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderViewHostManager::CreateRenderView(
SiteInstance* instance,
int opener_route_id,
bool swapped_out) {
CHECK(instance);
RenderViewHostImpl* new_render_view_host = static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(
GetSwappedOutRenderViewHost(instance));
if (new_render_view_host) {
if (!swapped_out)
new_render_view_host->GetProcess()->AddPendingView();
} else {
new_render_view_host = static_cast<RenderViewHostImpl*>(
RenderViewHostFactory::Create(instance,
render_view_delegate_, render_widget_delegate_, MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
swapped_out, delegate_->
GetControllerForRenderManager().GetSessionStorageNamespace(
instance)));
if (swapped_out) {
swapped_out_hosts_[instance->GetId()] = new_render_view_host;
} else {
new_render_view_host->GetProcess()->AddPendingView();
}
bool success = InitRenderView(new_render_view_host, opener_route_id);
if (success) {
new_render_view_host->GetView()->Hide();
} else if (!swapped_out) {
CancelPending();
}
}
if (!swapped_out)
pending_render_view_host_ = new_render_view_host;
return new_render_view_host->GetRoutingID();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::formatForDebugger(char* buffer, unsigned length) const
{
StringBuilder result;
String s;
result.append(nodeName());
s = getIdAttribute();
if (s.length() > 0) {
if (result.length() > 0)
result.appendLiteral("; ");
result.appendLiteral("id=");
result.append(s);
}
s = getAttribute(classAttr);
if (s.length() > 0) {
if (result.length() > 0)
result.appendLiteral("; ");
result.appendLiteral("class=");
result.append(s);
}
strncpy(buffer, result.toString().utf8().data(), length - 1);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShellContentUtilityClient::RegisterNetworkBinders(
service_manager::BinderRegistry* registry) {
network_service_test_helper_->RegisterNetworkBinders(registry);
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::ipSecDeleteSecurityAssociation(
int32_t transformId, const std::string& sourceAddress, const std::string& destinationAddress,
int32_t spi, int32_t markValue, int32_t markMask) {
ALOGD("XfrmController:%s, line=%d", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__);
ALOGD("transformId=%d", transformId);
ALOGD("sourceAddress=%s", sourceAddress.c_str());
ALOGD("destinationAddress=%s", destinationAddress.c_str());
ALOGD("spi=%0.8x", spi);
ALOGD("markValue=%x", markValue);
ALOGD("markMask=%x", markMask);
XfrmId saId{};
netdutils::Status ret =
fillXfrmId(sourceAddress, destinationAddress, spi, markValue, markMask, transformId, &saId);
if (!isOk(ret)) {
return ret;
}
XfrmSocketImpl sock;
netdutils::Status socketStatus = sock.open();
if (!isOk(socketStatus)) {
ALOGD("Sock open failed for XFRM, line=%d", __LINE__);
return socketStatus;
}
ret = deleteSecurityAssociation(saId, sock);
if (!isOk(ret)) {
ALOGD("Failed to delete Security Association, line=%d", __LINE__);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909
| 0
| 162,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_bundle_commit(struct ofconn *ofconn, uint32_t id, uint16_t flags)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
ovs_version_t version = ofproto->tables_version + 1;
struct ofp_bundle *bundle;
struct ofp_bundle_entry *be;
enum ofperr error;
bundle = ofconn_get_bundle(ofconn, id);
if (!bundle) {
return OFPERR_OFPBFC_BAD_ID;
}
if (bundle->flags != flags) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_BAD_FLAGS;
} else {
bool prev_is_port_mod = false;
error = 0;
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
/* 1. Begin. */
LIST_FOR_EACH (be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PORT_MOD) {
/* Our port mods are not atomic. */
if (flags & OFPBF_ATOMIC) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_FAILED;
} else {
prev_is_port_mod = true;
error = port_mod_start(ofconn, &be->opm.pm, &be->opm.port);
}
} else {
/* Flow & group mods between port mods are applied as a single
* version, but the versions are published only after we know
* the commit is successful. */
if (prev_is_port_mod) {
prev_is_port_mod = false;
++version;
}
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
/* Store the version in which the changes should take
* effect. */
be->ofm.version = version;
error = ofproto_flow_mod_start(ofproto, &be->ofm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
/* Store the version in which the changes should take
* effect. */
be->ogm.version = version;
error = ofproto_group_mod_start(ofproto, &be->ogm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
be->opo.version = version;
error = ofproto_packet_out_start(ofproto, &be->opo);
} else {
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
if (error) {
break;
}
}
if (error) {
/* Send error referring to the original message. */
if (error) {
ofconn_send_error(ofconn, &be->ofp_msg, error);
error = OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_FAILED;
}
/* 2. Revert. Undo all the changes made above. */
LIST_FOR_EACH_REVERSE_CONTINUE(be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
ofproto_flow_mod_revert(ofproto, &be->ofm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
ofproto_group_mod_revert(ofproto, &be->ogm);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
ofproto_packet_out_revert(ofproto, &be->opo);
}
/* Nothing needs to be reverted for a port mod. */
}
} else {
/* 4. Finish. */
LIST_FOR_EACH (be, node, &bundle->msg_list) {
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PORT_MOD) {
/* Perform the actual port mod. This is not atomic, i.e.,
* the effects will be immediately seen by upcall
* processing regardless of the lookup version. It should
* be noted that port configuration changes can originate
* also from OVSDB changes asynchronously to all upcall
* processing. */
port_mod_finish(ofconn, &be->opm.pm, be->opm.port);
} else {
version =
(be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) ? be->ofm.version :
(be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) ? be->ogm.version :
(be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) ? be->opo.version :
version;
/* Bump the lookup version to the one of the current
* message. This makes all the changes in the bundle at
* this version visible to lookups at once. */
if (ofproto->tables_version < version) {
ofproto->tables_version = version;
ofproto->ofproto_class->set_tables_version(
ofproto, ofproto->tables_version);
}
struct openflow_mod_requester req = { ofconn,
&be->ofp_msg };
if (be->type == OFPTYPE_FLOW_MOD) {
ofproto_flow_mod_finish(ofproto, &be->ofm, &req);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
ofproto_group_mod_finish(ofproto, &be->ogm, &req);
} else if (be->type == OFPTYPE_PACKET_OUT) {
ofproto_packet_out_finish(ofproto, &be->opo);
}
}
}
}
ofmonitor_flush(ofproto->connmgr);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
/* The bundle is discarded regardless the outcome. */
ofp_bundle_remove__(ofconn, bundle);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct rpc_task *__nlm_async_call(struct nlm_rqst *req, u32 proc, struct rpc_message *msg, const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops)
{
struct nlm_host *host = req->a_host;
struct rpc_clnt *clnt;
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_message = msg,
.callback_ops = tk_ops,
.callback_data = req,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
dprintk("lockd: call procedure %d on %s (async)\n",
(int)proc, host->h_name);
/* If we have no RPC client yet, create one. */
clnt = nlm_bind_host(host);
if (clnt == NULL)
goto out_err;
msg->rpc_proc = &clnt->cl_procinfo[proc];
task_setup_data.rpc_client = clnt;
/* bootstrap and kick off the async RPC call */
return rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
out_err:
tk_ops->rpc_release(req);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOLCK);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 42,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt,
u8 *data, int len, int *dir)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct sadb_x_policy *pol = (struct sadb_x_policy*)data;
struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
switch (sk->sk_family) {
case AF_INET:
if (opt != IP_IPSEC_POLICY) {
*dir = -EOPNOTSUPP;
return NULL;
}
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6:
if (opt != IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY) {
*dir = -EOPNOTSUPP;
return NULL;
}
break;
#endif
default:
*dir = -EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
*dir = -EINVAL;
if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy) ||
pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8 > len ||
pol->sadb_x_policy_type > IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS ||
(!pol->sadb_x_policy_dir || pol->sadb_x_policy_dir > IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND))
return NULL;
xp = xfrm_policy_alloc(net, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (xp == NULL) {
*dir = -ENOBUFS;
return NULL;
}
xp->action = (pol->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD ?
XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW);
xp->lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->family = sk->sk_family;
xp->xfrm_nr = 0;
if (pol->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC &&
(*dir = parse_ipsecrequests(xp, pol)) < 0)
goto out;
/* security context too */
if (len >= (pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8 +
sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx))) {
char *p = (char *)pol;
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx;
p += pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8;
sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *)p;
if (len < pol->sadb_x_policy_len*8 +
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len) {
*dir = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if ((*dir = verify_sec_ctx_len(p)))
goto out;
uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx);
*dir = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
kfree(uctx);
if (*dir)
goto out;
}
*dir = pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1;
return xp;
out:
xp->walk.dead = 1;
xfrm_policy_destroy(xp);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trash_or_delete_internal (GList *files,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
gboolean try_trash,
NautilusDeleteCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
DeleteJob *job;
/* TODO: special case desktop icon link files ... */
job = op_job_new (DeleteJob, parent_window);
job->files = g_list_copy_deep (files, (GCopyFunc) g_object_ref, NULL);
job->try_trash = try_trash;
job->user_cancel = FALSE;
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
if (try_trash)
{
inhibit_power_manager ((CommonJob *) job, _("Trashing Files"));
}
else
{
inhibit_power_manager ((CommonJob *) job, _("Deleting Files"));
}
if (!nautilus_file_undo_manager_is_operating () && try_trash)
{
job->common.undo_info = nautilus_file_undo_info_trash_new (g_list_length (files));
}
task = g_task_new (NULL, NULL, delete_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, delete_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum WebGLRenderingContextBase::checkFramebufferStatus(GLenum target) {
if (isContextLost())
return GL_FRAMEBUFFER_UNSUPPORTED;
if (!ValidateFramebufferTarget(target)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "checkFramebufferStatus",
"invalid target");
return 0;
}
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer_binding = GetFramebufferBinding(target);
if (framebuffer_binding) {
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
GLenum status = framebuffer_binding->CheckDepthStencilStatus(&reason);
if (status != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
EmitGLWarning("checkFramebufferStatus", reason);
return status;
}
}
return ContextGL()->CheckFramebufferStatus(target);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_background(ASS_Renderer *render_priv, EventImages *event_images)
{
void *nbuffer = ass_aligned_alloc(1, event_images->width * event_images->height, false);
if (!nbuffer)
return;
memset(nbuffer, 0xFF, event_images->width * event_images->height);
ASS_Image *img = my_draw_bitmap(nbuffer, event_images->width,
event_images->height,
event_images->width,
event_images->left,
event_images->top,
render_priv->state.c[3], NULL);
if (img) {
img->next = event_images->imgs;
event_images->imgs = img;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned short cma_family(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
return id_priv->id.route.addr.src_addr.ss_family;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int socket_connect_unix(const char *filename)
{
struct sockaddr_un name;
int sfd = -1;
size_t size;
struct stat fst;
if (stat(filename, &fst) != 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: stat '%s': %s\n", __func__, filename,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISSOCK(fst.st_mode)) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: File '%s' is not a socket!\n", __func__,
filename);
return -1;
}
if ((sfd = socket(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: socket: %s\n", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
name.sun_family = AF_LOCAL;
strncpy(name.sun_path, filename, sizeof(name.sun_path));
name.sun_path[sizeof(name.sun_path) - 1] = 0;
size = (offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path)
+ strlen(name.sun_path) + 1);
if (connect(sfd, (struct sockaddr *) &name, size) < 0) {
socket_close(sfd);
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: connect: %s\n", __func__,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return sfd;
}
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 52,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void srpt_get_ioc(struct srpt_port *sport, u32 slot,
struct ib_dm_mad *mad)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev = sport->sdev;
struct ib_dm_ioc_profile *iocp;
iocp = (struct ib_dm_ioc_profile *)mad->data;
if (!slot || slot > 16) {
mad->mad_hdr.status
= cpu_to_be16(DM_MAD_STATUS_INVALID_FIELD);
return;
}
if (slot > 2) {
mad->mad_hdr.status
= cpu_to_be16(DM_MAD_STATUS_NO_IOC);
return;
}
memset(iocp, 0, sizeof *iocp);
strcpy(iocp->id_string, SRPT_ID_STRING);
iocp->guid = cpu_to_be64(srpt_service_guid);
iocp->vendor_id = cpu_to_be32(sdev->device->attrs.vendor_id);
iocp->device_id = cpu_to_be32(sdev->device->attrs.vendor_part_id);
iocp->device_version = cpu_to_be16(sdev->device->attrs.hw_ver);
iocp->subsys_vendor_id = cpu_to_be32(sdev->device->attrs.vendor_id);
iocp->subsys_device_id = 0x0;
iocp->io_class = cpu_to_be16(SRP_REV16A_IB_IO_CLASS);
iocp->io_subclass = cpu_to_be16(SRP_IO_SUBCLASS);
iocp->protocol = cpu_to_be16(SRP_PROTOCOL);
iocp->protocol_version = cpu_to_be16(SRP_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
iocp->send_queue_depth = cpu_to_be16(sdev->srq_size);
iocp->rdma_read_depth = 4;
iocp->send_size = cpu_to_be32(srp_max_req_size);
iocp->rdma_size = cpu_to_be32(min(sport->port_attrib.srp_max_rdma_size,
1U << 24));
iocp->num_svc_entries = 1;
iocp->op_cap_mask = SRP_SEND_TO_IOC | SRP_SEND_FROM_IOC |
SRP_RDMA_READ_FROM_IOC | SRP_RDMA_WRITE_FROM_IOC;
mad->mad_hdr.status = 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setup_rootfs_pivot_root(const char *rootfs, const char *pivotdir)
{
int oldroot = -1, newroot = -1;
oldroot = open("/", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
if (oldroot < 0) {
SYSERROR("Error opening old-/ for fchdir");
return -1;
}
newroot = open(rootfs, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
if (newroot < 0) {
SYSERROR("Error opening new-/ for fchdir");
goto fail;
}
/* change into new root fs */
if (fchdir(newroot)) {
SYSERROR("can't chdir to new rootfs '%s'", rootfs);
goto fail;
}
/* pivot_root into our new root fs */
if (pivot_root(".", ".")) {
SYSERROR("pivot_root syscall failed");
goto fail;
}
/*
* at this point the old-root is mounted on top of our new-root
* To unmounted it we must not be chdir'd into it, so escape back
* to old-root
*/
if (fchdir(oldroot) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Error entering oldroot");
goto fail;
}
if (umount2(".", MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Error detaching old root");
goto fail;
}
if (fchdir(newroot) < 0) {
SYSERROR("Error re-entering newroot");
goto fail;
}
close(oldroot);
close(newroot);
DEBUG("pivot_root syscall to '%s' successful", rootfs);
return 0;
fail:
if (oldroot != -1)
close(oldroot);
if (newroot != -1)
close(newroot);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int can_do_mlock(void)
{
if (capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
return 1;
if (rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) != 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::enterPictureInPicture(
WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowSizeCallback callback) {
if (GetWebMediaPlayer())
GetWebMediaPlayer()->EnterPictureInPicture(std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_bin_search(struct extent_buffer *eb, struct btrfs_key *key,
int level, int *slot)
{
return bin_search(eb, key, level, slot);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_alloc_limit (size_t size)
{
alloc_limit = size;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 68,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pg_init_done(void *data, int errors)
{
struct pgpath *pgpath = data;
struct priority_group *pg = pgpath->pg;
struct multipath *m = pg->m;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned delay_retry = 0;
/* device or driver problems */
switch (errors) {
case SCSI_DH_OK:
break;
case SCSI_DH_NOSYS:
if (!m->hw_handler_name) {
errors = 0;
break;
}
DMERR("Could not failover the device: Handler scsi_dh_%s "
"Error %d.", m->hw_handler_name, errors);
/*
* Fail path for now, so we do not ping pong
*/
fail_path(pgpath);
break;
case SCSI_DH_DEV_TEMP_BUSY:
/*
* Probably doing something like FW upgrade on the
* controller so try the other pg.
*/
bypass_pg(m, pg, 1);
break;
case SCSI_DH_RETRY:
/* Wait before retrying. */
delay_retry = 1;
case SCSI_DH_IMM_RETRY:
case SCSI_DH_RES_TEMP_UNAVAIL:
if (pg_init_limit_reached(m, pgpath))
fail_path(pgpath);
errors = 0;
break;
default:
/*
* We probably do not want to fail the path for a device
* error, but this is what the old dm did. In future
* patches we can do more advanced handling.
*/
fail_path(pgpath);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (errors) {
if (pgpath == m->current_pgpath) {
DMERR("Could not failover device. Error %d.", errors);
m->current_pgpath = NULL;
m->current_pg = NULL;
}
} else if (!m->pg_init_required)
pg->bypassed = 0;
if (--m->pg_init_in_progress)
/* Activations of other paths are still on going */
goto out;
if (!m->pg_init_required)
m->queue_io = 0;
m->pg_init_delay_retry = delay_retry;
queue_work(kmultipathd, &m->process_queued_ios);
/*
* Wake up any thread waiting to suspend.
*/
wake_up(&m->pg_init_wait);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ViewDestroyed() {
RejectMouseLockOrUnlockIfNecessary();
SetView(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jas_matrix_setall(jas_matrix_t *matrix, jas_seqent_t val)
{
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
int rowstep;
jas_seqent_t *data;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
*data = val;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void compute_mac(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, u8 *data, int n,
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx)
{
unsigned int bs = 16;
u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
u8 *idata = pctx->idata;
int datalen, getlen;
datalen = n;
/* first time in here, block may be partially filled. */
getlen = bs - pctx->ilen;
if (datalen >= getlen) {
memcpy(idata + pctx->ilen, data, getlen);
crypto_xor(odata, idata, bs);
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, odata, odata);
datalen -= getlen;
data += getlen;
pctx->ilen = 0;
}
/* now encrypt rest of data */
while (datalen >= bs) {
crypto_xor(odata, data, bs);
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, odata, odata);
datalen -= bs;
data += bs;
}
/* check and see if there's leftover data that wasn't
* enough to fill a block.
*/
if (datalen) {
memcpy(idata + pctx->ilen, data, datalen);
pctx->ilen += datalen;
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: linux_md_remove_component_device_changed_cb (Daemon *daemon,
const char *object_path,
gpointer user_data)
{
RemoveComponentData *data = user_data;
Device *device;
GError *error;
error = NULL;
device = daemon_local_find_by_object_path (daemon, object_path);
if (device == data->slave)
{
if (device_local_is_busy (data->slave, FALSE, &error))
{
dbus_g_method_return_error (data->context, error);
g_error_free (error);
}
else
{
gchar *fs_create_options[] =
{ NULL };
/* yay! now scrub it! */
device_filesystem_create (data->slave, "empty", fs_create_options, data->context);
/* TODO: leaking data? */
g_signal_handler_disconnect (daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
g_source_remove (data->device_changed_timeout_id);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_send_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr,
__be16 sport)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (x->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP)
return -EINVAL;
if (!x->encap)
return -EINVAL;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_mapping_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_mapping(skb, x, ipaddr, sport) < 0)
BUG();
return nlmsg_multicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_MAPPING, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jpc_enc_rlvl_t *rlvl_create(jpc_enc_rlvl_t *rlvl, jpc_enc_cp_t *cp,
jpc_enc_tcmpt_t *tcmpt, jpc_tsfb_band_t *bandinfos)
{
uint_fast16_t rlvlno;
uint_fast32_t tlprctlx;
uint_fast32_t tlprctly;
uint_fast32_t brprcbrx;
uint_fast32_t brprcbry;
uint_fast16_t bandno;
jpc_enc_band_t *band;
/* Deduce the resolution level. */
rlvlno = rlvl - tcmpt->rlvls;
/* Initialize members required for error recovery. */
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->tcmpt = tcmpt;
/* Compute the coordinates of the top-left and bottom-right
corners of the tile-component at this resolution. */
rlvl->tlx = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(jas_seq2d_xstart(tcmpt->data), tcmpt->numrlvls -
1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->tly = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(jas_seq2d_ystart(tcmpt->data), tcmpt->numrlvls -
1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->brx = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(jas_seq2d_xend(tcmpt->data), tcmpt->numrlvls -
1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->bry = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(jas_seq2d_yend(tcmpt->data), tcmpt->numrlvls -
1 - rlvlno);
if (rlvl->tlx >= rlvl->brx || rlvl->tly >= rlvl->bry) {
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
return rlvl;
}
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = cp->tccp.prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = cp->tccp.prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
if (!rlvlno) {
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(cp->tccp.cblkwidthexpn, rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(cp->tccp.cblkheightexpn, rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
/* Compute the number of precincts. */
tlprctlx = JPC_FLOORTOMULTPOW2(rlvl->tlx, rlvl->prcwidthexpn);
tlprctly = JPC_FLOORTOMULTPOW2(rlvl->tly, rlvl->prcheightexpn);
brprcbrx = JPC_CEILTOMULTPOW2(rlvl->brx, rlvl->prcwidthexpn);
brprcbry = JPC_CEILTOMULTPOW2(rlvl->bry, rlvl->prcheightexpn);
rlvl->numhprcs = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(brprcbrx - tlprctlx, rlvl->prcwidthexpn);
rlvl->numvprcs = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(brprcbry - tlprctly, rlvl->prcheightexpn);
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands, sizeof(jpc_enc_band_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands; bandno < rlvl->numbands;
++bandno, ++band) {
band->prcs = 0;
band->data = 0;
band->rlvl = rlvl;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands; bandno < rlvl->numbands;
++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band_create(band, cp, rlvl, bandinfos)) {
goto error;
}
}
return rlvl;
error:
rlvl_destroy(rlvl);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hstore_to_array_internal(HStore *hs, int ndims)
{
HEntry *entries = ARRPTR(hs);
char *base = STRPTR(hs);
int count = HS_COUNT(hs);
int out_size[2] = {0, 2};
int lb[2] = {1, 1};
Datum *out_datums;
bool *out_nulls;
int i;
Assert(ndims < 3);
if (count == 0 || ndims == 0)
return construct_empty_array(TEXTOID);
out_size[0] = count * 2 / ndims;
out_datums = palloc(sizeof(Datum) * count * 2);
out_nulls = palloc(sizeof(bool) * count * 2);
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i)
{
text *key = cstring_to_text_with_len(HS_KEY(entries, base, i),
HS_KEYLEN(entries, i));
out_datums[i * 2] = PointerGetDatum(key);
out_nulls[i * 2] = false;
if (HS_VALISNULL(entries, i))
{
out_datums[i * 2 + 1] = (Datum) 0;
out_nulls[i * 2 + 1] = true;
}
else
{
text *item = cstring_to_text_with_len(HS_VAL(entries, base, i),
HS_VALLEN(entries, i));
out_datums[i * 2 + 1] = PointerGetDatum(item);
out_nulls[i * 2 + 1] = false;
}
}
return construct_md_array(out_datums, out_nulls,
ndims, out_size, lb,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i');
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcCreateColormap(ClientPtr client)
{
VisualPtr pVisual;
ColormapPtr pmap;
Colormap mid;
WindowPtr pWin;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
REQUEST(xCreateColormapReq);
int i, result;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCreateColormapReq);
if ((stuff->alloc != AllocNone) && (stuff->alloc != AllocAll)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->alloc;
return BadValue;
}
mid = stuff->mid;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(mid, client);
result = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
pScreen = pWin->drawable.pScreen;
for (i = 0, pVisual = pScreen->visuals;
i < pScreen->numVisuals; i++, pVisual++) {
if (pVisual->vid != stuff->visual)
continue;
return CreateColormap(mid, pScreen, pVisual, &pmap,
(int) stuff->alloc, client->index);
}
client->errorValue = stuff->visual;
return BadMatch;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FeatureInfo::FeatureInfo() {
InitializeBasicState(base::CommandLine::InitializedForCurrentProcess()
? base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
: nullptr);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 137,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hstore_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
HStore *in = PG_GETARG_HS(0);
int buflen,
i;
int count = HS_COUNT(in);
char *out,
*ptr;
char *base = STRPTR(in);
HEntry *entries = ARRPTR(in);
if (count == 0)
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(pstrdup(""));
buflen = 0;
/*
* this loop overestimates due to pessimistic assumptions about escaping,
* so very large hstore values can't be output. this could be fixed, but
* many other data types probably have the same issue. This replaced code
* that used the original varlena size for calculations, which was wrong
* in some subtle ways.
*/
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
/* include "" and => and comma-space */
buflen += 6 + 2 * HS_KEYLEN(entries, i);
/* include "" only if nonnull */
buflen += 2 + (HS_VALISNULL(entries, i)
? 2
: 2 * HS_VALLEN(entries, i));
}
out = ptr = palloc(buflen);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
*ptr++ = '"';
ptr = cpw(ptr, HS_KEY(entries, base, i), HS_KEYLEN(entries, i));
*ptr++ = '"';
*ptr++ = '=';
*ptr++ = '>';
if (HS_VALISNULL(entries, i))
{
*ptr++ = 'N';
*ptr++ = 'U';
*ptr++ = 'L';
*ptr++ = 'L';
}
else
{
*ptr++ = '"';
ptr = cpw(ptr, HS_VAL(entries, base, i), HS_VALLEN(entries, i));
*ptr++ = '"';
}
if (i + 1 != count)
{
*ptr++ = ',';
*ptr++ = ' ';
}
}
*ptr = '\0';
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(out);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutoFillManager::set_metric_logger(
const AutoFillMetrics* metric_logger) {
metric_logger_.reset(metric_logger);
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,904
|
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