instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long copy_vsx_to_user(void __user *to,
struct task_struct *task)
{
u64 buf[ELF_NVSRHALFREG];
int i;
/* save FPR copy to local buffer then write to the thread_struct */
for (i = 0; i < ELF_NVSRHALFREG; i++)
buf[i] = task->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET];
return __copy_to_user(to, buf, ELF_NVSRHALFREG * sizeof(double));
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnLostSharedContext() {
scoped_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl> old_shared_context(
shared_context_.release());
scoped_ptr<GLHelper> old_helper(gl_helper_.release());
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(ImageTransportFactoryObserver,
observer_list_,
OnLostResources());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsCurrentSessionRemote() {
static const wchar_t kRdpSettingsKeyName[] =
L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server";
static const wchar_t kGlassSessionIdValueName[] = L"GlassSessionId";
if (::GetSystemMetrics(SM_REMOTESESSION))
return true;
DWORD glass_session_id = 0;
DWORD current_session_id = 0;
base::win::RegKey key(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, kRdpSettingsKeyName, KEY_READ);
if (!::ProcessIdToSessionId(::GetCurrentProcessId(), ¤t_session_id) ||
!key.Valid() ||
key.ReadValueDW(kGlassSessionIdValueName, &glass_session_id) !=
ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return false;
}
return current_session_id != glass_session_id;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 5,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport const PixelPacket *GetVirtualPixelsNexus(const Cache cache,
NexusInfo *nexus_info)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->storage_class == UndefinedClass)
return((PixelPacket *) NULL);
return((const PixelPacket *) nexus_info->pixels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewHostImpl::IsFullscreen() const {
return delegate_->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab();
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_collapse_range(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t punch_start, punch_stop;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
loff_t new_size, ioffset;
int ret;
/*
* We need to test this early because xfstests assumes that a
* collapse range of (0, 1) will return EOPNOTSUPP if the file
* system does not support collapse range.
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Collapse range works only on fs block size aligned offsets. */
if (offset & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1) ||
len & (EXT4_CLUSTER_SIZE(sb) - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
trace_ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
punch_start = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
punch_stop = (offset + len) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Need to round down offset to be aligned with page size boundary
* for page size > block size.
*/
ioffset = round_down(offset, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Write out all dirty pages */
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping, ioffset,
LLONG_MAX);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Take mutex lock */
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* There is no need to overlap collapse range with EOF, in which case
* it is effectively a truncate operation
*/
if (offset + len >= i_size_read(inode)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_mutex;
}
/* Currently just for extent based files */
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
truncate_pagecache(inode, ioffset);
/* Wait for existing dio to complete */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_dio;
}
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, punch_start,
EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - punch_start);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, punch_start, punch_stop - 1);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_ext_shift_extents(inode, handle, punch_stop,
punch_stop - punch_start, SHIFT_LEFT);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
new_size = i_size_read(inode) - len;
i_size_write(inode, new_size);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = new_size;
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 25,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Automation::SendWebKeyEvent(int tab_id,
const WebKeyEvent& key_event,
Error** error) {
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendWebKeyEventJSONRequest(
automation(), windex, tab_index, key_event, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfsd4_init_file(struct knfsd_fh *fh, unsigned int hashval,
struct nfs4_file *fp)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&state_lock);
atomic_set(&fp->fi_ref, 1);
spin_lock_init(&fp->fi_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->fi_stateids);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->fi_delegations);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->fi_clnt_odstate);
fh_copy_shallow(&fp->fi_fhandle, fh);
fp->fi_deleg_file = NULL;
fp->fi_had_conflict = false;
fp->fi_share_deny = 0;
memset(fp->fi_fds, 0, sizeof(fp->fi_fds));
memset(fp->fi_access, 0, sizeof(fp->fi_access));
#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_PNFS
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->fi_lo_states);
atomic_set(&fp->fi_lo_recalls, 0);
#endif
hlist_add_head_rcu(&fp->fi_hash, &file_hashtbl[hashval]);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 28,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SyncManager::SyncInternal::Init(
const FilePath& database_location,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const std::string& sync_server_and_path,
int port,
bool use_ssl,
HttpPostProviderFactory* post_factory,
ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar* model_safe_worker_registrar,
ChangeDelegate* change_delegate,
const std::string& user_agent,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
sync_notifier::SyncNotifier* sync_notifier,
const std::string& restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
bool setup_for_test_mode,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler) {
CHECK(!initialized_);
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DVLOG(1) << "Starting SyncInternal initialization.";
weak_handle_this_ = MakeWeakHandle(weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
registrar_ = model_safe_worker_registrar;
change_delegate_ = change_delegate;
setup_for_test_mode_ = setup_for_test_mode;
sync_notifier_.reset(sync_notifier);
AddObserver(&js_sync_manager_observer_);
SetJsEventHandler(event_handler);
AddObserver(&debug_info_event_listener_);
share_.dir_manager.reset(new DirectoryManager(database_location));
connection_manager_.reset(new SyncAPIServerConnectionManager(
sync_server_and_path, port, use_ssl, user_agent, post_factory));
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::AddIPAddressObserver(this);
observing_ip_address_changes_ = true;
connection_manager()->AddListener(this);
unrecoverable_error_handler_ = unrecoverable_error_handler;
if (!setup_for_test_mode_) {
DVLOG(1) << "Sync is bringing up SyncSessionContext.";
std::vector<SyncEngineEventListener*> listeners;
listeners.push_back(&allstatus_);
listeners.push_back(this);
SyncSessionContext* context = new SyncSessionContext(
connection_manager_.get(),
dir_manager(),
model_safe_worker_registrar,
listeners,
&debug_info_event_listener_);
context->set_account_name(credentials.email);
scheduler_.reset(new SyncScheduler(name_, context, new Syncer()));
}
bool signed_in = SignIn(credentials);
if (signed_in) {
if (scheduler()) {
scheduler()->Start(
browser_sync::SyncScheduler::CONFIGURATION_MODE, base::Closure());
}
initialized_ = true;
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
trans.GetCryptographer()->Bootstrap(restored_key_for_bootstrapping);
trans.GetCryptographer()->AddObserver(this);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(SyncManager::Observer, observers_,
OnInitializationComplete(
MakeWeakHandle(weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
signed_in));
if (!signed_in && !setup_for_test_mode_)
return false;
sync_notifier_->AddObserver(this);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kSyncThrowUnrecoverableError)) {
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
trans.GetWrappedTrans()->OnUnrecoverableError(FROM_HERE,
"Simulating unrecoverable error for testing purpose.");
}
return signed_in;
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NormalPageArena::UpdateRemainingAllocationSize() {
if (last_remaining_allocation_size_ > RemainingAllocationSize()) {
GetThreadState()->Heap().HeapStats().IncreaseAllocatedObjectSize(
last_remaining_allocation_size_ - RemainingAllocationSize());
last_remaining_allocation_size_ = RemainingAllocationSize();
}
DCHECK_EQ(last_remaining_allocation_size_, RemainingAllocationSize());
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 2,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ims_pcu_buttons_report(struct ims_pcu *pcu, u32 data)
{
struct ims_pcu_buttons *buttons = &pcu->buttons;
struct input_dev *input = buttons->input;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
unsigned short keycode = buttons->keymap[i];
if (keycode != KEY_RESERVED)
input_report_key(input, keycode, data & (1UL << i));
}
input_sync(input);
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType load_tile_rle(Image *image,Image *tile_image,
XCFDocInfo *inDocInfo,XCFLayerInfo *inLayerInfo,size_t data_length)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickOffsetType
size;
Quantum
alpha;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
bytes_per_pixel,
count,
i,
j;
unsigned char
data,
pixel,
*xcfdata,
*xcfodata,
*xcfdatalimit;
bytes_per_pixel=(ssize_t) inDocInfo->bytes_per_pixel;
xcfdata=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(data_length,sizeof(*xcfdata));
if (xcfdata == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
xcfodata=xcfdata;
count=ReadBlob(image, (size_t) data_length, xcfdata);
xcfdatalimit = xcfodata+count-1;
exception=(&image->exception);
alpha=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) inLayerInfo->alpha);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) bytes_per_pixel; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(tile_image,0,0,tile_image->columns,tile_image->rows,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
size=(MagickOffsetType) tile_image->rows*tile_image->columns;
while (size > 0)
{
if (xcfdata > xcfdatalimit)
goto bogus_rle;
pixel=(*xcfdata++);
length=(size_t) pixel;
if (length >= 128)
{
length=255-(length-1);
if (length == 128)
{
if (xcfdata >= xcfdatalimit)
goto bogus_rle;
length=(size_t) ((*xcfdata << 8) + xcfdata[1]);
xcfdata+=2;
}
size-=length;
if (size < 0)
goto bogus_rle;
if (&xcfdata[length-1] > xcfdatalimit)
goto bogus_rle;
while (length-- > 0)
{
data=(*xcfdata++);
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
}
else
{
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelRed(q));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelRed(q));
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,alpha);
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
else
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
break;
}
}
q++;
}
}
else
{
length+=1;
if (length == 128)
{
if (xcfdata >= xcfdatalimit)
goto bogus_rle;
length=(size_t) ((*xcfdata << 8) + xcfdata[1]);
xcfdata+=2;
}
size-=length;
if (size < 0)
goto bogus_rle;
if (xcfdata > xcfdatalimit)
goto bogus_rle;
pixel=(*xcfdata++);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
data=pixel;
switch (i)
{
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
}
else
{
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelRed(q));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelRed(q));
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,alpha);
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
else
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
break;
}
case 3:
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(data));
break;
}
}
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(tile_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
xcfodata=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xcfodata);
return(MagickTrue);
bogus_rle:
if (xcfodata != (unsigned char *) NULL)
xcfodata=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xcfodata);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Check for image list before we destroy the last image in XCF coder (patch sent privately by Андрей Черный)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 21,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int phar_free_alias(phar_archive_data *phar, char *alias, int alias_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (phar->refcount || phar->is_persistent) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* this archive has no open references, so emit an E_STRICT and remove it */
if (zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), phar->fname, phar->fname_len) != SUCCESS) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_issuer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 20,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int robots_fsio_fstat(pr_fh_t *fh, int fd, struct stat *st) {
if (fd != AUTH_ROBOTS_TXT_FD) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return robots_fsio_stat(NULL, NULL, st);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 18,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KeyboardOverlayHandler::KeyboardOverlayHandler(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile) {
}
Commit Message: Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct mm_struct *mm, *oldmm = current->mm;
int err;
if (!oldmm)
return NULL;
mm = allocate_mm();
if (!mm)
goto fail_nomem;
memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
mm_init_cpumask(mm);
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
mm->pmd_huge_pte = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
mm->first_nid = NUMA_PTE_SCAN_INIT;
#endif
if (!mm_init(mm, tsk))
goto fail_nomem;
if (init_new_context(tsk, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
dup_mm_exe_file(oldmm, mm);
err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);
if (err)
goto free_pt;
mm->hiwater_rss = get_mm_rss(mm);
mm->hiwater_vm = mm->total_vm;
if (mm->binfmt && !try_module_get(mm->binfmt->module))
goto free_pt;
return mm;
free_pt:
/* don't put binfmt in mmput, we haven't got module yet */
mm->binfmt = NULL;
mmput(mm);
fail_nomem:
return NULL;
fail_nocontext:
/*
* If init_new_context() failed, we cannot use mmput() to free the mm
* because it calls destroy_context()
*/
mm_free_pgd(mm);
free_mm(mm);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 85
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
event_handler_->OnGestureEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 19,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DisableSecureTextInput() {
if (!IsSecureEventInputEnabled())
return;
DisableSecureEventInput();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::CompositorTaskRunner() {
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
return compositor_task_queue_;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGLayoutSupport::computeContainerBoundingBoxes(const LayoutObject* container, FloatRect& objectBoundingBox, bool& objectBoundingBoxValid, FloatRect& strokeBoundingBox, FloatRect& paintInvalidationBoundingBox)
{
objectBoundingBox = FloatRect();
objectBoundingBoxValid = false;
strokeBoundingBox = FloatRect();
for (LayoutObject* current = container->slowFirstChild(); current; current = current->nextSibling()) {
if (current->isSVGHiddenContainer())
continue;
if (current->isSVGShape() && toLayoutSVGShape(current)->isShapeEmpty())
continue;
if (current->isSVGText() && !toLayoutSVGText(current)->isObjectBoundingBoxValid())
continue;
const AffineTransform& transform = current->localToSVGParentTransform();
updateObjectBoundingBox(objectBoundingBox, objectBoundingBoxValid, current,
transform.mapRect(current->objectBoundingBox()));
strokeBoundingBox.unite(transform.mapRect(current->paintInvalidationRectInLocalSVGCoordinates()));
}
paintInvalidationBoundingBox = strokeBoundingBox;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 8,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate* OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::get(
OxideQQuickWebView* view) {
return view->d_func();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static double filter_generalized_cubic(const double t)
{
const double a = -DEFAULT_FILTER_GENERALIZED_CUBIC;
double abs_t = (double)fabs(t);
double abs_t_sq = abs_t * abs_t;
if (abs_t < 1) return (a + 2) * abs_t_sq * abs_t - (a + 3) * abs_t_sq + 1;
if (abs_t < 2) return a * abs_t_sq * abs_t - 5 * a * abs_t_sq + 8 * a * abs_t - 4 * a;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_pre_form_item(struct pre_form *pf, struct pre_form_item *prev, int type,
char *name, char *value, char *checked)
{
struct pre_form_item *new;
if (!pf)
return NULL;
if (prev)
new = prev->next = New(struct pre_form_item);
else
new = pf->item = New(struct pre_form_item);
new->type = type;
new->name = name;
new->value = value;
if (checked && *checked && (!strcmp(checked, "0") ||
!strcasecmp(checked, "off")
|| !strcasecmp(checked, "no")))
new->checked = 0;
else
new->checked = 1;
new->next = NULL;
return new;
}
Commit Message: Prevent invalid columnPos() call in formUpdateBuffer()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/89
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 22,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response TargetHandler::Disable() {
SetAutoAttach(false, false);
SetDiscoverTargets(false);
auto_attached_sessions_.clear();
attached_sessions_.clear();
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::IDBThreadHelper(
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBConnection> connection,
const url::Origin& origin,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBContextImpl> indexed_db_context)
: indexed_db_context_(indexed_db_context),
connection_(std::move(connection)),
origin_(origin),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
idb_thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::CopyStateFrom(
const NavigationController& temp) {
const NavigationControllerImpl& source =
static_cast<const NavigationControllerImpl&>(temp);
DCHECK(GetEntryCount() == 0 && !GetPendingEntry());
if (source.GetEntryCount() == 0)
return; // Nothing new to do.
needs_reload_ = true;
InsertEntriesFrom(source, source.GetEntryCount());
for (SessionStorageNamespaceMap::const_iterator it =
source.session_storage_namespace_map_.begin();
it != source.session_storage_namespace_map_.end();
++it) {
SessionStorageNamespaceImpl* source_namespace =
static_cast<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl*>(it->second.get());
session_storage_namespace_map_[it->first] = source_namespace->Clone();
}
FinishRestore(source.last_committed_entry_index_,
RestoreType::CURRENT_SESSION);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 4,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct vfsmount *vfs)
{
int def_errors;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct super_block *sb = vfs->mnt_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%llu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (sbi->s_resuid != EXT4_DEF_RESUID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT4_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u", sbi->s_resuid);
}
if (sbi->s_resgid != EXT4_DEF_RESGID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT4_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u", sbi->s_resgid);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
if (def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
if (sbi->s_min_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",min_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
if (sbi->s_max_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",max_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_max_batch_time);
}
/*
* We're changing the default of barrier mount option, so
* let's always display its mount state so it's clear what its
* status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_async_commit");
else if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_checksum");
if (test_opt(sb, I_VERSION))
seq_puts(seq, ",i_version");
if (!test_opt(sb, DELALLOC) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_NODELALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",nodelalloc");
if (!test_opt(sb, MBLK_IO_SUBMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",nomblk_io_submit");
if (sbi->s_stripe)
seq_printf(seq, ",stripe=%lu", sbi->s_stripe);
/*
* journal mode get enabled in different ways
* So just print the value even if we didn't specify it
*/
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=journal");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=ordered");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=writeback");
if (sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks != EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS)
seq_printf(seq, ",inode_readahead_blks=%u",
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks);
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",noauto_da_alloc");
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
if (test_opt(sb, DIOREAD_NOLOCK))
seq_puts(seq, ",dioread_nolock");
if (test_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BLOCK_VALIDITY))
seq_puts(seq, ",block_validity");
if (!test_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE))
seq_puts(seq, ",noinit_itable");
else if (sbi->s_li_wait_mult != EXT4_DEF_LI_WAIT_MULT)
seq_printf(seq, ",init_itable=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_li_wait_mult);
ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageDataPlatformBackend::Init(PPB_ImageData_Impl* impl,
PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
PluginDelegate* plugin_delegate = ResourceHelper::GetPluginDelegate(impl);
if (!plugin_delegate)
return false;
platform_image_.reset(plugin_delegate->CreateImage2D(width, height));
return !!platform_image_.get();
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 9,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeLabImage(Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
y;
status=MagickTrue;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
a,
b;
a=QuantumScale*GetPixela(image,q)+0.5;
if (a > 1.0)
a-=1.0;
b=QuantumScale*GetPixelb(image,q)+0.5;
if (b > 1.0)
b-=1.0;
SetPixela(image,QuantumRange*a,q);
SetPixelb(image,QuantumRange*b,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gp_bgr8(Pixel *p, png_const_voidp pb)
{
png_const_bytep pp = voidcast(png_const_bytep, pb);
p->r = pp[2];
p->g = pp[1];
p->b = pp[0];
p->a = 255;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_register_dcl_bracket(
struct translate_ctx *ctx,
struct parsed_dcl_bracket *bracket)
{
uint uindex;
memset(bracket, 0, sizeof(struct parsed_dcl_bracket));
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
/* it can be an empty bracket [] which means its range
* is from 0 to some implied size */
if (ctx->cur[0] == ']' && ctx->implied_array_size != 0) {
bracket->first = 0;
bracket->last = ctx->implied_array_size - 1;
goto cleanup;
}
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal unsigned integer" );
return FALSE;
}
bracket->first = uindex;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (ctx->cur[0] == '.' && ctx->cur[1] == '.') {
uint uindex;
ctx->cur += 2;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
if (!parse_uint( &ctx->cur, &uindex )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal integer" );
return FALSE;
}
bracket->last = (int) uindex;
eat_opt_white( &ctx->cur );
}
else {
bracket->last = bracket->first;
}
cleanup:
if (*ctx->cur != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]' or `..'" );
return FALSE;
}
ctx->cur++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebView::handleFlickableMouseMove(const QPointF& position, qint64 eventTimestampMillis)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
QMouseEvent mouseEvent(QEvent::MouseMove, d->axisLocker.adjust(position), Qt::LeftButton, Qt::NoButton, Qt::NoModifier);
mouseEvent.setTimestamp(eventTimestampMillis);
QQuickFlickable::mouseMoveEvent(&mouseEvent);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_compress_frameChunk (ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
U32 lastFrameChunk)
{
size_t blockSize = cctx->blockSize;
size_t remaining = srcSize;
const BYTE* ip = (const BYTE*)src;
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE*)dst;
BYTE* op = ostart;
U32 const maxDist = (U32)1 << cctx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog;
assert(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog <= 31);
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_frameChunk (blockSize=%u)", (U32)blockSize);
if (cctx->appliedParams.fParams.checksumFlag && srcSize)
XXH64_update(&cctx->xxhState, src, srcSize);
while (remaining) {
ZSTD_matchState_t* const ms = &cctx->blockState.matchState;
U32 const lastBlock = lastFrameChunk & (blockSize >= remaining);
if (dstCapacity < ZSTD_blockHeaderSize + MIN_CBLOCK_SIZE)
return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space to store compressed block */
if (remaining < blockSize) blockSize = remaining;
if (ZSTD_window_needOverflowCorrection(ms->window, ip + blockSize)) {
U32 const cycleLog = ZSTD_cycleLog(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog, cctx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy);
U32 const correction = ZSTD_window_correctOverflow(&ms->window, cycleLog, maxDist, ip);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_CHAINLOG_MAX <= 30);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_WINDOWLOG_MAX_32 <= 30);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_WINDOWLOG_MAX <= 31);
ZSTD_reduceIndex(cctx, correction);
if (ms->nextToUpdate < correction) ms->nextToUpdate = 0;
else ms->nextToUpdate -= correction;
ms->loadedDictEnd = 0;
ms->dictMatchState = NULL;
}
ZSTD_window_enforceMaxDist(&ms->window, ip + blockSize, maxDist, &ms->loadedDictEnd, &ms->dictMatchState);
if (ms->nextToUpdate < ms->window.lowLimit) ms->nextToUpdate = ms->window.lowLimit;
{ size_t cSize = ZSTD_compressBlock_internal(cctx,
op+ZSTD_blockHeaderSize, dstCapacity-ZSTD_blockHeaderSize,
ip, blockSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize)) return cSize;
if (cSize == 0) { /* block is not compressible */
cSize = ZSTD_noCompressBlock(op, dstCapacity, ip, blockSize, lastBlock);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize)) return cSize;
} else {
U32 const cBlockHeader24 = lastBlock + (((U32)bt_compressed)<<1) + (U32)(cSize << 3);
MEM_writeLE24(op, cBlockHeader24);
cSize += ZSTD_blockHeaderSize;
}
ip += blockSize;
assert(remaining >= blockSize);
remaining -= blockSize;
op += cSize;
assert(dstCapacity >= cSize);
dstCapacity -= cSize;
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_frameChunk: adding a block of size %u",
(U32)cSize);
} }
if (lastFrameChunk && (op>ostart)) cctx->stage = ZSTDcs_ending;
return op-ostart;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 16,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cms_signeddata_create(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
int cms_msg_type,
int include_certchain,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **signed_data,
unsigned int *signed_data_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
PKCS7 *p7 = NULL, *inner_p7 = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNED *p7s = NULL;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7si = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(X509) * cert_stack = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest_attr = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx2;
const EVP_MD *md_tmp = NULL;
unsigned char md_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], md_data2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *digestInfo_buf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
unsigned int md_len, md_len2, alen, digestInfo_len;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) * sk;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned int sig_len = 0;
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest = NULL;
unsigned int alg_len = 0, digest_len = 0;
unsigned char *y = NULL, *alg_buf = NULL, *digest_buf = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *oid = NULL;
/* Start creating PKCS7 data. */
if ((p7 = PKCS7_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_signed);
if ((p7s = PKCS7_SIGNED_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7->d.sign = p7s;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7s->version, 3))
goto cleanup;
/* pick the correct oid for the eContentInfo */
oid = pkinit_pkcs7type2oid(plg_cryptoctx, cms_msg_type);
if (oid == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (id_cryptoctx->my_certs != NULL) {
/* create a cert chain that has at least the signer's certificate */
if ((cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
cert = sk_X509_value(id_cryptoctx->my_certs, id_cryptoctx->cert_index);
if (!include_certchain) {
pkiDebug("only including signer's certificate\n");
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(cert));
} else {
/* create a cert chain */
X509_STORE *certstore = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX certctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *certstack = NULL;
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
unsigned int i = 0, size = 0;
if ((certstore = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
pkiDebug("building certificate chain\n");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(certstore, openssl_callback);
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&certctx, certstore, cert,
id_cryptoctx->intermediateCAs);
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&certctx, id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs);
if (!X509_verify_cert(&certctx)) {
int code = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&certctx);
const char *msg = X509_verify_cert_error_string(code);
pkiDebug("failed to create a certificate chain: %s\n", msg);
if (!sk_X509_num(id_cryptoctx->trustedCAs))
pkiDebug("No trusted CAs found. Check your X509_anchors\n");
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Cannot create cert chain: %s"), msg);
goto cleanup;
}
certstack = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&certctx);
size = sk_X509_num(certstack);
pkiDebug("size of certificate chain = %d\n", size);
for(i = 0; i < size - 1; i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certstack, i);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("cert #%d: %s\n", i, buf);
sk_X509_push(cert_stack, X509_dup(x));
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&certctx);
X509_STORE_free(certstore);
sk_X509_pop_free(certstack, X509_free);
}
p7s->cert = cert_stack;
/* fill-in PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO */
if ((p7si = PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(p7si->version, 1))
goto cleanup;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&p7si->issuer_and_serial->issuer,
X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
goto cleanup;
/* because ASN1_INTEGER_set is used to set a 'long' we will do
* things the ugly way. */
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial);
if (!(p7si->issuer_and_serial->serial =
M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(X509_get_serialNumber(cert))))
goto cleanup;
/* will not fill-out EVP_PKEY because it's on the smartcard */
/* Set digest algs */
p7si->digest_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
if (p7si->digest_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_alg->parameter);
if ((p7si->digest_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
/* Set sig algs */
if (p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter != NULL)
ASN1_TYPE_free(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter);
p7si->digest_enc_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption);
if (!(p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
goto cleanup;
p7si->digest_enc_alg->parameter->type = V_ASN1_NULL;
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9){
/* don't include signed attributes for pa-type 15 request */
abuf = data;
alen = data_len;
} else {
/* add signed attributes */
/* compute sha1 digest over the EncapsulatedContentInfo */
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, data, data_len);
md_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&ctx);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_data, &md_len);
/* create a message digest attr */
digest_attr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest_attr, md_data, (int)md_len);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_messageDigest,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (char *) digest_attr);
/* create a content-type attr */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(p7si, NID_pkcs9_contentType,
V_ASN1_OBJECT, oid);
/* create the signature over signed attributes. get DER encoded value */
/* This is the place where smartcard signature needs to be calculated */
sk = p7si->auth_attr;
alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *) sk, &abuf,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN));
if (abuf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
} /* signed attributes */
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
/* Some tokens can only do RSAEncryption without sha1 hash */
/* to compute sha1WithRSAEncryption, encode the algorithm ID for the hash
* function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of type DigestInfo
* DigestInfo::=SEQUENCE {
* digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* digest OCTET STRING }
*/
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
pkiDebug("mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS\n");
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx2);
/* if this is not draft9 request, include digest signed attribute */
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, md_tmp, NULL);
else
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx2, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx2, abuf, alen);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx2, md_data2, &md_len2);
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (alg == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_sha1);
alg->parameter = NULL;
alg_len = i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, NULL);
alg_buf = malloc(alg_len);
if (alg_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digest = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (digest == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(digest, md_data2, (int)md_len2);
digest_len = i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, NULL);
digest_buf = malloc(digest_len);
if (digest_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
digestInfo_len = ASN1_object_size(1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
y = digestInfo_buf = malloc(digestInfo_len);
if (digestInfo_buf == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
ASN1_put_object(&y, 1, (int)(alg_len + digest_len), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_X509_ALGOR(alg, &y);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(digest, &y);
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
pkiDebug("signing buffer\n");
print_buffer(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len);
print_buffer_bin(digestInfo_buf, digestInfo_len, "/tmp/pkcs7_tosign");
#endif
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, digestInfo_buf,
digestInfo_len, &sig, &sig_len);
} else
#endif
{
pkiDebug("mech = %s\n",
id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 ? "CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS" : "FS");
retval = pkinit_sign_data(context, id_cryptoctx, abuf, alen,
&sig, &sig_len);
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SIG
print_buffer(sig, sig_len);
#endif
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9 )
free(abuf);
if (retval)
goto cleanup2;
/* Add signature */
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(p7si->enc_digest, (unsigned char *) sig,
(int)sig_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to add a signed digest attribute\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
/* adder signer_info to pkcs7 signed */
if (!PKCS7_add_signer(p7, p7si))
goto cleanup2;
} /* we have a certificate */
/* start on adding data to the pkcs7 signed */
retval = create_contentinfo(context, plg_cryptoctx, oid,
data, data_len, &inner_p7);
if (p7s->contents != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7s->contents);
p7s->contents = inner_p7;
*signed_data_len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, NULL);
if (!(*signed_data_len)) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = ENOMEM;
if ((p = *signed_data = malloc(*signed_data_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup2;
/* DER encode PKCS7 data */
retval = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &p);
if (!retval) {
unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval, "%s\n",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
pkiDebug("failed to der encode pkcs7\n");
goto cleanup2;
}
retval = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_CLIENT) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/client_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
if (cms_msg_type == CMS_SIGN_SERVER) {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/kdc_pkcs7_signeddata");
} else {
print_buffer_bin(*signed_data, *signed_data_len,
"/tmp/draft9_pkcs7_signeddata");
}
}
#endif
cleanup2:
if (p7si) {
if (cms_msg_type != CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9)
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
if (id_cryptoctx->pkcs11_method == 1 &&
id_cryptoctx->mech == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx2);
free(digest_buf);
free(digestInfo_buf);
free(alg_buf);
if (digest != NULL)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(digest);
}
#endif
if (alg != NULL)
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
}
cleanup:
if (p7 != NULL)
PKCS7_free(p7);
free(sig);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma_find_context(int id,
struct ucma_file *file)
{
struct ucma_context *ctx;
ctx = idr_find(&ctx_idr, id);
if (!ctx)
ctx = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
else if (ctx->file != file)
ctx = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return ctx;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(int maxAcquiredBuffers) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(maxAcquiredBuffers);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2cap_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
return -ENOTCONN;
l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
err = l2cap_chan_send(chan, msg, len, sk->sk_priority);
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pdf_zero_object(
FILE *fp,
const pdf_t *pdf,
int xref_idx,
int entry_idx)
{
int i;
char *obj;
size_t obj_sz;
xref_entry_t *entry;
entry = &pdf->xrefs[xref_idx].entries[entry_idx];
fseek(fp, entry->offset, SEEK_SET);
/* Get object and size */
obj = get_object(fp, entry->obj_id, &pdf->xrefs[xref_idx], NULL, NULL);
i = obj_sz = 0;
while (strncmp((++i)+obj, "endobj", 6))
++obj_sz;
if (obj_sz)
obj_sz += strlen("endobj") + 1;
/* Zero object */
for (i=0; i<obj_sz; i++)
fputc('0', fp);
printf("Zeroed object %d\n", entry->obj_id);
free(obj);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 10,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlXPtrGetIndex(xmlNodePtr cur) {
int i;
if (cur == NULL)
return(-1);
for (i = 1;cur != NULL;cur = cur->prev) {
if ((cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
i++;
}
}
return(i);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 8,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64_t LayerTreeHostQt::adoptImageBackingStore(Image* image)
{
if (!image)
return InvalidWebLayerID;
QPixmap* pixmap = image->nativeImageForCurrentFrame();
if (!pixmap)
return InvalidWebLayerID;
int64_t key = pixmap->cacheKey();
HashMap<int64_t, int>::iterator it = m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.find(key);
if (it != m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.end()) {
++(it->second);
return key;
}
RefPtr<ShareableBitmap> bitmap = ShareableBitmap::createShareable(image->size(), image->currentFrameHasAlpha() ? ShareableBitmap::SupportsAlpha : 0);
{
OwnPtr<WebCore::GraphicsContext> graphicsContext = bitmap->createGraphicsContext();
graphicsContext->drawImage(image, ColorSpaceDeviceRGB, IntPoint::zero());
}
ShareableBitmap::Handle handle;
bitmap->createHandle(handle);
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeHostProxy::CreateDirectlyCompositedImage(key, handle));
m_directlyCompositedImageRefCounts.add(key, 1);
return key;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
X509 *recip, unsigned int flags)
{
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
if (!env)
goto err;
/* Initialize recipient info */
ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
if (!ri)
goto merr;
pk = X509_get0_pubkey(recip);
if (!pk) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY);
goto err;
}
switch (cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk)) {
case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS:
if (!cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(ri, recip, pk, flags))
goto err;
break;
case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE:
if (!cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(ri, recip, pk, flags))
goto err;
break;
default:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT,
CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
goto merr;
return ri;
merr:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 16,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void methodWithOptionalStringIsNullStringMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithOptionalStringIsNullStringMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TaskManagerTableModel::GetGroupRangeForItem(int item,
views::GroupRange* range) {
TaskManagerModel::GroupRange range_pair =
model_->GetGroupRangeForResource(item);
range->start = range_pair.first;
range->length = range_pair.second;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: alen_array_element_start(void *state, bool isnull)
{
AlenState *_state = (AlenState *) state;
/* just count up all the level 1 elements */
if (_state->lex->lex_level == 1)
_state->count++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int ret = 1;
ctx->ctx = store;
ctx->current_method = 0;
ctx->cert = x509;
ctx->untrusted = chain;
ctx->crls = NULL;
ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
ctx->valid = 0;
ctx->chain = NULL;
ctx->error = 0;
ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->parent = NULL;
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ctx->param) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
*/
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
if (store) {
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
} else
ctx->cleanup = 0;
if (ret)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
if (ret == 0) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (store && store->check_issued)
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
else
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
if (store && store->get_issuer)
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
else
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
if (store && store->verify_cb)
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
else
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
if (store && store->verify)
ctx->verify = store->verify;
else
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
if (store && store->check_revocation)
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
else
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
if (store && store->get_crl)
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
else
ctx->get_crl = NULL;
if (store && store->check_crl)
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
else
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
if (store && store->cert_crl)
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
if (store && store->lookup_certs)
ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
else
ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
if (store && store->lookup_crls)
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
else
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
/*
* Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we
* put a corresponding "new" here.
*/
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
&(ctx->ex_data))) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sg_set_timeout(struct request_queue *q, int __user *p)
{
int timeout, err = get_user(timeout, p);
if (!err)
q->sg_timeout = clock_t_to_jiffies(timeout);
return err;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string TestURLLoader::GetReachableCrossOriginURL(
const std::string& file_name) {
std::string url = GetReachableAbsoluteURL(file_name);
std::string host("127.0.0.1");
size_t index = url.find(host);
ASSERT_NE(index, std::string::npos);
url.replace(index, host.length(), "localhost");
return url;
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 5,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_e_dch_channel_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info,
gboolean is_common, rlc_info *rlcinf,
void *data)
{
gboolean is_control_frame;
guint8 number_of_subframes;
guint8 cfn;
int n;
struct edch_t1_subframe_info subframes[16];
guint16 header_crc = 0;
proto_item * header_crc_pi = NULL;
guint header_length = 0;
if (p_fp_info->edch_type == 1) {
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (T2)");
}
/* Header CRC */
/* the bitmask doesn't properly handle this delicate case, do manually */
header_crc = (tvb_get_bits8(tvb, offset*8, 7) << 4) + tvb_get_bits8(tvb, offset*8+8, 4);
/* Frame Type */
is_control_frame = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, is_control_frame ? " [Control] " : " [Data] ");
if (is_control_frame) {
/* DCH control frame */
/* For control frame the header CRC is actually frame CRC covering all
* bytes except the first */
header_crc = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, 0, 7);
header_crc_pi = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_header_crc, tvb, 0, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_ft, tvb, 0, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
if (preferences_header_checksum) {
verify_control_frame_crc(tvb, pinfo, header_crc_pi, header_crc);
}
dissect_dch_control_frame(tree, pinfo, tvb, offset, p_fp_info);
}
else {
/********************************/
/* E-DCH data here */
guint bit_offset = 0;
guint total_pdus = 0;
guint total_bits = 0;
gboolean dissected = FALSE;
header_crc_pi = proto_tree_add_uint_format(tree, hf_fp_edch_header_crc, tvb,
offset, 2, header_crc,
"%u%u%u%u%u%u%u.%u%u%u%u.... = E-DCH Header CRC: 0x%x",
(header_crc >> 10) & 1,
(header_crc >> 9) & 1,
(header_crc >> 8) & 1,
(header_crc >> 7) & 1,
(header_crc >> 6) & 1,
(header_crc >> 5) & 1,
(header_crc >> 4) & 1,
(header_crc >> 3) & 1,
(header_crc >> 2) & 1,
(header_crc >> 1) & 1,
(header_crc >> 0) & 1, header_crc);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_ft, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* FSN */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_edch_fsn, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Number of subframes.
This was 3 bits in early releases, is 4 bits offset by 1 in later releases */
if ((p_fp_info->release >= 6) &&
((p_fp_info->release_year > 2005) ||
((p_fp_info->release_year == 2005) && (p_fp_info->release_month >= 9)))) {
/* Use 4 bits plus offset of 1 */
number_of_subframes = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x0f) + 1;
}
else {
/* Use 3 bits only */
number_of_subframes = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x07);
}
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_fp_edch_number_of_subframes, tvb, offset, 1,
number_of_subframes);
offset++;
/* CFN */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Remainder of T2 or common data frames differ here... */
if (p_fp_info->edch_type == 1) {
dissect_e_dch_t2_or_common_channel_info(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, p_fp_info,
number_of_subframes,
is_common, header_crc,
header_crc_pi, data);
return;
}
/* EDCH subframe header list */
for (n=0; n < number_of_subframes; n++) {
int i;
int start_offset = offset;
proto_item *subframe_header_ti;
proto_tree *subframe_header_tree;
/* Add subframe header subtree */
subframe_header_ti = proto_tree_add_string_format(tree, hf_fp_edch_subframe_header, tvb, offset, 0,
"", "Subframe");
subframe_header_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(subframe_header_ti, ett_fp_edch_subframe_header);
/* Number of HARQ Retransmissions */
proto_tree_add_item(subframe_header_tree, hf_fp_edch_harq_retransmissions, tvb,
offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* Subframe number */
subframes[n].subframe_number = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x07);
proto_tree_add_bits_item(subframe_header_tree, hf_fp_edch_subframe_number, tvb,
offset*8+5, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Number of MAC-es PDUs */
subframes[n].number_of_mac_es_pdus = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0xf0) >> 4;
proto_tree_add_item(subframe_header_tree, hf_fp_edch_number_of_mac_es_pdus,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
bit_offset = 4;
proto_item_append_text(subframe_header_ti, " %u header (%u MAC-es PDUs)",
subframes[n].subframe_number,
subframes[n].number_of_mac_es_pdus);
/* Details of each MAC-es PDU */
for (i=0; i < subframes[n].number_of_mac_es_pdus; i++) {
guint64 ddi;
guint64 n_pdus; /*Size of the PDU*/
proto_item *ddi_ti;
gint ddi_size = -1;
int p;
/* DDI (6 bits) */
ddi_ti = proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val(subframe_header_tree, hf_fp_edch_ddi, tvb,
offset*8 + bit_offset, 6, &ddi, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if (rlcinf) {
rlcinf->rbid[i] = (guint8)ddi;
}
/********************************/
/* Look up data in higher layers*/
/* Look up the size from this DDI value */
for (p=0; p < p_fp_info->no_ddi_entries; p++) {
if (ddi == p_fp_info->edch_ddi[p]) {
ddi_size = p_fp_info->edch_macd_pdu_size[p];
break;
}
}
if (ddi_size == -1) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ddi_ti, &ei_fp_ddi_not_defined, "DDI %u not defined for this UE!", (guint)ddi);
return;
}
else {
proto_item_append_text(ddi_ti, " (%d bits)", ddi_size);
}
subframes[n].ddi[i] = (guint8)ddi;
bit_offset += 6;
/* Number of MAC-d PDUs (6 bits) */
proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val(subframe_header_tree, hf_fp_edch_number_of_mac_d_pdus, tvb,
offset*8 + bit_offset, 6, &n_pdus, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
subframes[n].number_of_mac_d_pdus[i] = (guint8)n_pdus;
bit_offset += 6;
}
offset += ((bit_offset+7)/8);
/* Tree should cover entire subframe header */
proto_item_set_len(subframe_header_ti, offset - start_offset);
}
header_length = offset;
/* EDCH subframes */
for (n=0; n < number_of_subframes; n++) {
int i;
proto_item *subframe_ti;
proto_tree *subframe_tree;
guint bits_in_subframe = 0;
guint mac_d_pdus_in_subframe = 0;
guint lchid=0; /*Logcial channel id*/
umts_mac_info *macinf;
bit_offset = 0;
macinf = (umts_mac_info *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_umts_mac, 0);
/* Add subframe subtree */
subframe_ti = proto_tree_add_string_format(tree, hf_fp_edch_subframe, tvb, offset, 0,
"", "Subframe %u data", subframes[n].subframe_number);
subframe_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(subframe_ti, ett_fp_edch_subframe);
for (i=0; i < subframes[n].number_of_mac_es_pdus; i++) {
int m;
guint16 size = 0;
/* guint8 tsn; */
guint send_size;
proto_item *ti;
int macd_idx;
proto_tree *maces_tree = NULL;
/** TODO: Merge these two loops? **/
/* Look up mac-d pdu size for this ddi */
for (m=0; m < p_fp_info->no_ddi_entries; m++) {
if (subframes[n].ddi[i] == p_fp_info->edch_ddi[m]) {
size = p_fp_info->edch_macd_pdu_size[m];
break;
}
}
/* Look up logicalchannel id for this DDI value */
for (m=0; m < p_fp_info->no_ddi_entries; m++) {
if (subframes[n].ddi[i] == p_fp_info->edch_ddi[m]) {
lchid = p_fp_info->edch_lchId[m];
break;
}
}
if (m == p_fp_info->no_ddi_entries) {
/* Not found. Oops */
expert_add_info(pinfo, NULL, &ei_fp_unable_to_locate_ddi_entry);
return;
}
/* Send MAC-dd PDUs together as one MAC-es PDU */
send_size = size * subframes[n].number_of_mac_d_pdus[i];
/* 2 bits spare */
proto_tree_add_item(subframe_tree, hf_fp_edch_pdu_padding, tvb,
offset + (bit_offset/8),
1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
bit_offset += 2;
/* TSN */
/* tsn = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + (bit_offset/8)) & 0x3f); */
proto_tree_add_item(subframe_tree, hf_fp_edch_tsn, tvb,
offset + (bit_offset/8),
1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
bit_offset += 6;
/* PDU */
if (subframe_tree) {
ti = proto_tree_add_item(subframe_tree, hf_fp_edch_mac_es_pdu, tvb,
offset + (bit_offset/8),
((bit_offset % 8) + send_size + 7) / 8,
ENC_NA);
proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%u * %u = %u bits, PDU %d)",
size, subframes[n].number_of_mac_d_pdus[i],
send_size, n);
maces_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_fp_edch_maces);
}
for (macd_idx = 0; macd_idx < subframes[n].number_of_mac_d_pdus[i]; macd_idx++) {
if (preferences_call_mac_dissectors /*&& !rlc_is_ciphered(pinfo)*/) {
tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
pinfo->fd->subnum = macd_idx; /* set subframe number to current TB */
/* create new TVB and pass further on */
next_tvb = tvb_new_subset(tvb, offset + bit_offset/8,
((bit_offset % 8) + size + 7) / 8, -1);
/*This was all previously stored in [0] rather than [macd_idx] and cur_tb wasn't updated!*/
/*Set up information needed for MAC and lower layers*/
macinf->content[macd_idx] = lchId_type_table[lchid]; /*Set the proper Content type for the mac layer.*/
macinf->lchid[macd_idx] = lchid;
rlcinf->mode[macd_idx] = lchId_rlc_map[lchid]; /* Set RLC mode by lchid to RLC_MODE map in nbap.h */
/* Set U-RNTI to ComuncationContext signaled from nbap*/
rlcinf->urnti[macd_idx] = p_fp_info->com_context_id;
rlcinf->rbid[macd_idx] = lchid; /*subframes[n].ddi[i];*/ /*Save the DDI value for RLC*/
/*g_warning("========Setting RBID:%d for lchid:%d", subframes[n].ddi[i], lchid);*/
/* rlcinf->mode[0] = RLC_AM;*/
rlcinf->li_size[macd_idx] = RLC_LI_7BITS;
#if 0
/*If this entry exists, SECRUITY_MODE is completed*/
if ( rrc_ciph_inf && g_tree_lookup(rrc_ciph_inf, GINT_TO_POINTER((gint)p_fp_info->com_context_id)) ) {
rlcinf->ciphered[macd_idx] = TRUE;
} else {
rlcinf->ciphered[macd_idx] = FALSE;
}
#endif
rlcinf->ciphered[macd_idx] = FALSE;
rlcinf->deciphered[macd_idx] = FALSE;
p_fp_info->cur_tb = macd_idx; /*Set the transport block index (NOTE: This and not subnum is used in MAC dissector!)*/
/* TODO: use maces_tree? */
call_dissector_with_data(mac_fdd_edch_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, top_level_tree, data);
dissected = TRUE;
}
else {
/* Just add as a MAC-d PDU */
proto_tree_add_item(maces_tree, hf_fp_mac_d_pdu, tvb,
offset + (bit_offset/8),
((bit_offset % 8) + size + 7) / 8,
ENC_NA);
}
bit_offset += size;
}
bits_in_subframe += send_size;
mac_d_pdus_in_subframe += subframes[n].number_of_mac_d_pdus[i];
/* Pad out to next byte */
if (bit_offset % 8) {
bit_offset += (8 - (bit_offset % 8));
}
}
if (tree) {
/* Tree should cover entire subframe */
proto_item_set_len(subframe_ti, bit_offset/8);
/* Append summary info to subframe label */
proto_item_append_text(subframe_ti, " (%u bits in %u MAC-d PDUs)",
bits_in_subframe, mac_d_pdus_in_subframe);
}
total_pdus += mac_d_pdus_in_subframe;
total_bits += bits_in_subframe;
offset += (bit_offset/8);
}
/* Report number of subframes in info column
* do this only if no other dissector was called */
if (dissected == FALSE) {
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
" CFN = %03u (%u bits in %u pdus in %u subframes)",
cfn, total_bits, total_pdus, number_of_subframes);
}
/* Add data summary to info column */
/*col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (%u bytes in %u SDUs in %u MAC-is PDUs in %u subframes)",
total_bytes, macis_sdus_found, macis_pdus, number_of_subframes);*/
if (preferences_header_checksum) {
verify_header_crc_edch(tvb, pinfo, header_crc_pi, header_crc, header_length);
}
/* Spare extension and payload CRC (optional) */
dissect_spare_extension_and_crc(tvb, pinfo, tree,
p_fp_info->dch_crc_present, offset, header_length);
}
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tracing_snapshot(void)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Snapshot feature not enabled, but internal snapshot used");
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 22,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GaiaCookieManagerService::GaiaCookieRequest::~GaiaCookieRequest() {
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 3,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int inet_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (addr_len < sizeof(uaddr->sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
if (uaddr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
return sk->sk_prot->disconnect(sk, flags);
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && inet_autobind(sk))
return -EAGAIN;
return sk->sk_prot->connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::SetAutofillAgent(AutofillAgent* autofill_agent) {
AutofillAgent* agent = autofill_agent_.get();
if (agent)
agent->RemoveFormObserver(this);
autofill_agent_ = autofill_agent->GetWeakPtr();
autofill_agent->AddFormObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 19,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestTransactionConsumer::Read() {
state_ = READING;
read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(1024);
int result = trans_->Read(read_buf_.get(),
1024,
base::Bind(&TestTransactionConsumer::OnIOComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
DidRead(result);
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API zend_bool ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_str_exists(const HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len)
{
zend_ulong h;
Bucket *p;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
h = zend_inline_hash_func(str, len);
p = zend_hash_str_find_bucket(ht, str, len, h);
return p ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RBinFile *r_bin_file_xtr_load_bytes(RBin *bin, RBinXtrPlugin *xtr,
const char *filename,
const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz,
ut64 file_sz, ut64 baseaddr,
ut64 loadaddr, int idx, int fd,
int rawstr) {
if (!bin || !bytes) {
return NULL;
}
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_file_find_by_name (bin, filename);
if (!bf) {
bf = r_bin_file_create_append (bin, filename, bytes, sz,
file_sz, rawstr, fd, xtr->name, false);
if (!bf) {
return NULL;
}
if (!bin->cur) {
bin->cur = bf;
}
}
if (bf->xtr_data) {
r_list_free (bf->xtr_data);
}
if (xtr && bytes) {
RList *xtr_data_list = xtr->extractall_from_bytes (bin, bytes, sz);
RListIter *iter;
RBinXtrData *xtr;
r_list_foreach (xtr_data_list, iter, xtr) {
xtr->baddr = baseaddr? baseaddr : UT64_MAX;
xtr->laddr = loadaddr? loadaddr : UT64_MAX;
}
bf->loadaddr = loadaddr;
bf->xtr_data = xtr_data_list ? xtr_data_list : NULL;
}
return bf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLHeadElement* Document::head()
{
Node* de = documentElement();
if (!de)
return 0;
for (Node* node = de->firstChild(); node; node = node->nextSibling()) {
if (node->hasTagName(headTag))
return toHTMLHeadElement(node);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_push_parent_color(gx_device *dev, const gs_gstate *pgs)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_parent_color_t *new_parent_color;
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &icc_profile,
&render_cond);
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_push_parent_color\n");
/* Allocate a new one */
new_parent_color = gs_alloc_struct(dev->memory, pdf14_parent_color_t,
&st_pdf14_clr,"pdf14_clr_new");
/* Link to old one */
new_parent_color->previous = pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs;
/* Reassign new one to dev */
pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs = new_parent_color;
/* Initialize with values */
new_parent_color->get_cmap_procs = pgs->get_cmap_procs;
new_parent_color->parent_color_mapping_procs =
pdev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs;
new_parent_color->parent_color_comp_index =
pdev->procs.get_color_comp_index;
new_parent_color->parent_blending_procs = pdev->blend_procs;
new_parent_color->polarity = pdev->color_info.polarity;
new_parent_color->num_components = pdev->color_info.num_components;
new_parent_color->unpack_procs = pdev->pdf14_procs;
new_parent_color->depth = pdev->color_info.depth;
new_parent_color->max_color = pdev->color_info.max_color;
new_parent_color->max_gray = pdev->color_info.max_gray;
new_parent_color->decode = pdev->procs.decode_color;
new_parent_color->encode = pdev->procs.encode_color;
memcpy(&(new_parent_color->comp_bits),&(pdev->color_info.comp_bits),
GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
memcpy(&(new_parent_color->comp_shift),&(pdev->color_info.comp_shift),
GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
/* The ICC manager has the ICC profile for the device */
new_parent_color->icc_profile = icc_profile;
rc_increment(icc_profile);
/* isadditive is only used in ctx */
if (pdev->ctx) {
new_parent_color->isadditive = pdev->ctx->additive;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 27,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_extra_state(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = pv;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (!k->load_extra_state) {
return -1;
} else {
return k->load_extra_state(qbus->parent, f);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapter::NotifyDiscoveryError(CallbackQueue callback_queue) {
while (!callback_queue.empty()) {
std::unique_ptr<StartOrStopDiscoveryCallback> callbacks =
std::move(callback_queue.front());
callback_queue.pop();
if (callbacks->start_error_callback)
callbacks->start_error_callback.Run();
if (callbacks->stop_callback)
std::move(callbacks->stop_callback).Run();
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_queue(struct usbtest_dev *dev, struct usbtest_param_32 *param,
int pipe, struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *desc, unsigned offset)
{
struct transfer_context context;
struct usb_device *udev;
unsigned i;
unsigned long packets = 0;
int status = 0;
struct urb *urbs[param->sglen];
if (!param->sglen || param->iterations > UINT_MAX / param->sglen)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&context, 0, sizeof(context));
context.count = param->iterations * param->sglen;
context.dev = dev;
context.is_iso = !!desc;
init_completion(&context.done);
spin_lock_init(&context.lock);
udev = testdev_to_usbdev(dev);
for (i = 0; i < param->sglen; i++) {
if (context.is_iso)
urbs[i] = iso_alloc_urb(udev, pipe, desc,
param->length, offset);
else
urbs[i] = complicated_alloc_urb(udev, pipe,
param->length, 0);
if (!urbs[i]) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
packets += urbs[i]->number_of_packets;
urbs[i]->context = &context;
}
packets *= param->iterations;
if (context.is_iso) {
dev_info(&dev->intf->dev,
"iso period %d %sframes, wMaxPacket %d, transactions: %d\n",
1 << (desc->bInterval - 1),
(udev->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH) ? "micro" : "",
usb_endpoint_maxp(desc),
usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(desc));
dev_info(&dev->intf->dev,
"total %lu msec (%lu packets)\n",
(packets * (1 << (desc->bInterval - 1)))
/ ((udev->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH) ? 8 : 1),
packets);
}
spin_lock_irq(&context.lock);
for (i = 0; i < param->sglen; i++) {
++context.pending;
status = usb_submit_urb(urbs[i], GFP_ATOMIC);
if (status < 0) {
ERROR(dev, "submit iso[%d], error %d\n", i, status);
if (i == 0) {
spin_unlock_irq(&context.lock);
goto fail;
}
simple_free_urb(urbs[i]);
urbs[i] = NULL;
context.pending--;
context.submit_error = 1;
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&context.lock);
wait_for_completion(&context.done);
for (i = 0; i < param->sglen; i++) {
if (urbs[i])
simple_free_urb(urbs[i]);
}
/*
* Isochronous transfers are expected to fail sometimes. As an
* arbitrary limit, we will report an error if any submissions
* fail or if the transfer failure rate is > 10%.
*/
if (status != 0)
;
else if (context.submit_error)
status = -EACCES;
else if (context.errors >
(context.is_iso ? context.packet_count / 10 : 0))
status = -EIO;
return status;
fail:
for (i = 0; i < param->sglen; i++) {
if (urbs[i])
simple_free_urb(urbs[i]);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 6,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
fatal("Host key verification failed.");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExternalProtocolHandler::RegisterPrefs(PrefRegistrySimple* registry) {
registry->RegisterDictionaryPref(prefs::kExcludedSchemes);
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::resetLinkColor()
{
m_linkColor = Color(0, 0, 238);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::WebView* AutofillDialogViews::GetSignInWebViewForTesting() {
return sign_in_web_view_;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMD(
GLenum target,
GLsizei samples,
GLsizei storageSamples,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
DCHECK(feature_info_->feature_flags().amd_framebuffer_multisample_advanced);
api()->glRenderbufferStorageMultisampleAdvancedAMDFn(
target, samples, storageSamples, internalformat, width, height);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String DOMWindow::SanitizedCrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(
const LocalDOMWindow* calling_window) const {
if (!calling_window || !calling_window->document() || !GetFrame())
return String();
const KURL& calling_window_url = calling_window->document()->Url();
if (calling_window_url.IsNull())
return String();
const SecurityOrigin* active_origin =
calling_window->document()->GetSecurityOrigin();
String message = "Blocked a frame with origin \"" +
active_origin->ToString() +
"\" from accessing a cross-origin frame.";
return message;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextState::RestoreVertexAttribArrays(
const scoped_refptr<VertexAttribManager> attrib_manager) const {
GLuint vao_service_id = attrib_manager->service_id();
DCHECK(vao_service_id == 0);
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().native_vertex_array_object)
api()->glBindVertexArrayOESFn(vao_service_id);
for (size_t attrib_index = 0; attrib_index < attrib_manager->num_attribs();
++attrib_index) {
const VertexAttrib* attrib = attrib_manager->GetVertexAttrib(attrib_index);
Buffer* buffer = attrib->buffer();
GLuint buffer_service_id = buffer ? buffer->service_id() : 0;
api()->glBindBufferFn(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, buffer_service_id);
const void* ptr = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(attrib->offset());
api()->glVertexAttribPointerFn(attrib_index, attrib->size(), attrib->type(),
attrib->normalized(), attrib->gl_stride(),
ptr);
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().angle_instanced_arrays)
api()->glVertexAttribDivisorANGLEFn(attrib_index, attrib->divisor());
if (attrib->enabled_in_driver()) {
api()->glEnableVertexAttribArrayFn(attrib_index);
} else {
api()->glDisableVertexAttribArrayFn(attrib_index);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vop_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f)
{
struct vop_vdev *vdev;
struct vop_info *vi = container_of(f->private_data,
struct vop_info, miscdev);
vdev = kzalloc(sizeof(*vdev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vdev)
return -ENOMEM;
vdev->vi = vi;
mutex_init(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
f->private_data = vdev;
init_completion(&vdev->destroy);
complete(&vdev->destroy);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: build_model (XML_Parser parser)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
XML_Content *ret;
XML_Content *cpos;
XML_Char * str;
int allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
+ (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
ret = (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, allocsize);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
str = (XML_Char *) (&ret[dtd->scaffCount]);
cpos = &ret[1];
build_node(parser, 0, ret, &cpos, &str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 22,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_abort(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nft_trans *trans, *next;
struct nft_set *set;
list_for_each_entry_safe(trans, next, &net->nft.commit_list, list) {
switch (trans->msg_type) {
case NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE:
if (nft_trans_table_update(trans)) {
if (nft_trans_table_enable(trans)) {
nf_tables_table_disable(trans->ctx.afi,
trans->ctx.table);
trans->ctx.table->flags |= NFT_TABLE_F_DORMANT;
}
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
} else {
list_del_rcu(&trans->ctx.table->list);
}
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELTABLE:
list_add_tail_rcu(&trans->ctx.table->list,
&trans->ctx.afi->tables);
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
break;
case NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN:
if (nft_trans_chain_update(trans)) {
free_percpu(nft_trans_chain_stats(trans));
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
} else {
trans->ctx.table->use--;
list_del_rcu(&trans->ctx.chain->list);
nf_tables_unregister_hooks(trans->ctx.table,
trans->ctx.chain,
trans->ctx.afi->nops);
}
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN:
trans->ctx.table->use++;
list_add_tail_rcu(&trans->ctx.chain->list,
&trans->ctx.table->chains);
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
break;
case NFT_MSG_NEWRULE:
trans->ctx.chain->use--;
list_del_rcu(&nft_trans_rule(trans)->list);
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELRULE:
trans->ctx.chain->use++;
nft_rule_clear(trans->ctx.net, nft_trans_rule(trans));
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
break;
case NFT_MSG_NEWSET:
trans->ctx.table->use--;
list_del_rcu(&nft_trans_set(trans)->list);
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELSET:
trans->ctx.table->use++;
list_add_tail_rcu(&nft_trans_set(trans)->list,
&trans->ctx.table->sets);
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
break;
case NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM:
nft_trans_elem_set(trans)->nelems--;
set = nft_trans_elem_set(trans);
set->ops->get(set, &nft_trans_elem(trans));
set->ops->remove(set, &nft_trans_elem(trans));
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM:
nft_trans_elem_set(trans)->nelems++;
nft_trans_destroy(trans);
break;
}
}
synchronize_rcu();
list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(trans, next,
&net->nft.commit_list, list) {
list_del(&trans->list);
nf_tables_abort_release(trans);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 8,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockPluginProcessHostClient(ResourceContext* context, bool expect_fail)
: context_(context),
channel_(NULL),
set_plugin_info_called_(false),
expect_fail_(expect_fail) {
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 5,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t iov_iter_get_pages(struct iov_iter *i,
struct page **pages, size_t maxsize, unsigned maxpages,
size_t *start)
{
if (maxsize > i->count)
maxsize = i->count;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE))
return pipe_get_pages(i, pages, maxsize, maxpages, start);
iterate_all_kinds(i, maxsize, v, ({
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)v.iov_base;
size_t len = v.iov_len + (*start = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
int n;
int res;
if (len > maxpages * PAGE_SIZE)
len = maxpages * PAGE_SIZE;
addr &= ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
n = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PAGE_SIZE);
res = get_user_pages_fast(addr, n, (i->type & WRITE) != WRITE, pages);
if (unlikely(res < 0))
return res;
return (res == n ? len : res * PAGE_SIZE) - *start;
0;}),({
/* can't be more than PAGE_SIZE */
*start = v.bv_offset;
get_page(*pages = v.bv_page);
return v.bv_len;
}),({
return -EFAULT;
})
)
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::CountDeprecation(WebFeature feature) const {
if (IsDetached())
return;
Deprecation::CountDeprecation(GetFrame(), feature);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderBox::baselinePosition(FontBaseline baselineType, bool /*firstLine*/, LineDirectionMode direction, LinePositionMode /*linePositionMode*/) const
{
if (isReplaced()) {
int result = direction == HorizontalLine ? m_marginTop + height() + m_marginBottom : m_marginRight + width() + m_marginLeft;
if (baselineType == AlphabeticBaseline)
return result;
return result - result / 2;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static apr_array_header_t *parse_errorlog_string(apr_pool_t *p,
const char *s,
const char **err,
int is_main_fmt)
{
apr_array_header_t *a = apr_array_make(p, 30,
sizeof(ap_errorlog_format_item));
char *res;
int seen_msg_fmt = 0;
while (s && *s) {
ap_errorlog_format_item *item =
(ap_errorlog_format_item *)apr_array_push(a);
memset(item, 0, sizeof(*item));
res = parse_errorlog_item(p, item, &s);
if (res) {
*err = res;
return NULL;
}
if (item->flags & AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_MESSAGE) {
if (!is_main_fmt) {
*err = "%M cannot be used in once-per-request or "
"once-per-connection formats";
return NULL;
}
seen_msg_fmt = 1;
}
if (is_main_fmt && item->flags & AP_ERRORLOG_FLAG_REQUIRED) {
*err = "The '+' flag cannot be used in the main error log format";
return NULL;
}
if (!is_main_fmt && item->min_loglevel) {
*err = "The loglevel cannot be used as a condition in "
"once-per-request or once-per-connection formats";
return NULL;
}
if (item->min_loglevel > APLOG_TRACE8) {
*err = "The specified loglevel modifier is out of range";
return NULL;
}
}
if (is_main_fmt && !seen_msg_fmt) {
*err = "main ErrorLogFormat must contain message format string '%M'";
return NULL;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadFilesCheckErrors(size_t count, DownloadInfo* download_info) {
DownloadFilesCheckErrorsSetup();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
DownloadFilesCheckErrorsLoopBody(download_info[i], i);
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 15,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String FrameFetchContext::GetOutgoingReferrer() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->outgoing_referrer;
return document_->OutgoingReferrer();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wc_ecc_get_curve_idx(int curve_id)
{
int curve_idx;
for (curve_idx = 0; ecc_sets[curve_idx].size != 0; curve_idx++) {
if (curve_id == ecc_sets[curve_idx].id)
break;
}
if (ecc_sets[curve_idx].size == 0) {
return ECC_CURVE_INVALID;
}
return curve_idx;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct cgroup_ops *cgfs_ops_init(void)
{
return &cgfs_ops;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 4,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Camera2Client::commandStartFaceDetectionL(int /*type*/) {
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Starting face detection",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
status_t res;
SharedParameters::Lock l(mParameters);
switch (l.mParameters.state) {
case Parameters::DISCONNECTED:
case Parameters::STOPPED:
case Parameters::WAITING_FOR_PREVIEW_WINDOW:
case Parameters::STILL_CAPTURE:
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Cannot start face detection without preview active",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case Parameters::PREVIEW:
case Parameters::RECORD:
case Parameters::VIDEO_SNAPSHOT:
break;
}
if (l.mParameters.fastInfo.bestFaceDetectMode ==
ANDROID_STATISTICS_FACE_DETECT_MODE_OFF) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Face detection not supported",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (l.mParameters.enableFaceDetect) return OK;
l.mParameters.enableFaceDetect = true;
res = updateRequests(l.mParameters);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void randomdelay(void)
{
usleep(rand() % 15000UL); /* dummy... no need for arc4 */
}
Commit Message: Flush the command buffer after switching to TLS.
Fixes a flaw similar to CVE-2011-0411.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::overrideLogicalContentHeight() const
{
ASSERT(hasOverrideHeight());
return m_rareData->m_overrideLogicalContentHeight;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LocationBar* TestBrowserWindow::GetLocationBar() const {
return const_cast<TestLocationBar*>(&location_bar_);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int is_continuation(unsigned char c, struct tty_struct *tty)
{
return I_IUTF8(tty) && is_utf8_continuation(c);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::EmitLoginPromptVisibleCalled() {
OnLoginPromptVisible();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 84
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bin_list_sasl_mechs(conn *c) {
if (!settings.sasl) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, NULL,
c->binary_header.request.bodylen
- c->binary_header.request.keylen);
return;
}
init_sasl_conn(c);
const char *result_string = NULL;
unsigned int string_length = 0;
int result=sasl_listmech(c->sasl_conn, NULL,
"", /* What to prepend the string with */
" ", /* What to separate mechanisms with */
"", /* What to append to the string */
&result_string, &string_length,
NULL);
if (result != SASL_OK) {
/* Perhaps there's a better error for this... */
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to list SASL mechanisms.\n");
}
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_AUTH_ERROR, NULL, 0);
return;
}
write_bin_response(c, (char*)result_string, 0, 0, string_length);
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 13,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _WM_do_meta_channelprefix(struct _mdi *mdi, struct _event_data *data) {
/* placeholder function so we can record tempo in the event stream
* for conversion function _WM_Event2Midi */
#ifdef DEBUG_MIDI
uint8_t ch = data->channel;
MIDI_EVENT_DEBUG(__FUNCTION__, ch, data->data.value);
#else
UNUSED(data);
#endif
UNUSED(mdi);
return;
}
Commit Message: Add a new size parameter to _WM_SetupMidiEvent() so that it knows
where to stop reading, and adjust its users properly. Fixes bug #175
(CVE-2017-11661, CVE-2017-11662, CVE-2017-11663, CVE-2017-11664.)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionInstallDialogView::~ExtensionInstallDialogView() {
if (!handled_result_ && !done_callback_.is_null()) {
base::ResetAndReturn(&done_callback_)
.Run(ExtensionInstallPrompt::Result::USER_CANCELED);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue toJS(ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, DataView* object)
{
return wrap<JSDataView>(exec, globalObject, object);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_sample_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user,
struct pt_regs *regs,
struct pt_regs *regs_user_copy)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current);
regs_user->regs = regs;
} else if (current->mm) {
perf_get_regs_user(regs_user, regs, regs_user_copy);
} else {
regs_user->abi = PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE;
regs_user->regs = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mt_ioctl_trans(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct mtget get;
struct mtget32 __user *umget32;
struct mtpos pos;
struct mtpos32 __user *upos32;
unsigned long kcmd;
void *karg;
int err = 0;
switch(cmd) {
case MTIOCPOS32:
kcmd = MTIOCPOS;
karg = &pos;
break;
default: /* MTIOCGET32 */
kcmd = MTIOCGET;
karg = &get;
break;
}
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_ioctl (fd, kcmd, (unsigned long)karg);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (err)
return err;
switch (cmd) {
case MTIOCPOS32:
upos32 = argp;
err = __put_user(pos.mt_blkno, &upos32->mt_blkno);
break;
case MTIOCGET32:
umget32 = argp;
err = __put_user(get.mt_type, &umget32->mt_type);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_resid, &umget32->mt_resid);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_dsreg, &umget32->mt_dsreg);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_gstat, &umget32->mt_gstat);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_erreg, &umget32->mt_erreg);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_fileno, &umget32->mt_fileno);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_blkno, &umget32->mt_blkno);
break;
}
return err ? -EFAULT: 0;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLint GLES2Implementation::GetFragDataLocationHelper(GLuint program,
const char* name) {
typedef cmds::GetFragDataLocation::Result Result;
SetBucketAsCString(kResultBucketId, name);
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return -1;
}
*result = -1;
helper_->GetFragDataLocation(program, kResultBucketId, GetResultShmId(),
result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
return *result;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int decode_msg(struct sip_msg *msg,char *code, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned short int h;
char *myerror=NULL;
memcpy(&h,&code[2],2);
h=ntohs(h);
/*TODO use shorcuts in meta-info header.*/
msg->buf=&code[h];
memcpy(&h,&code[4],2);
h=ntohs(h);
msg->len=h;
if(parse_headers(msg,HDR_EOH_F,0)<0){
myerror="in parse_headers";
goto error;
}
error:
LM_ERR("(%s)\n",myerror);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: seas: safety check for target buffer size before copying message in encode_msg()
- avoid buffer overflow for large SIP messages
- reported by Stelios Tsampas
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vnc_zywrle_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
vs->zrle.type = VNC_ENCODING_ZYWRLE;
return zrle_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8Extensions& ScriptController::registeredExtensions()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(V8Extensions, extensions, ());
return extensions;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t ne2000_ioport_read(void *opaque, uint32_t addr)
{
NE2000State *s = opaque;
int offset, page, ret;
addr &= 0xf;
if (addr == E8390_CMD) {
ret = s->cmd;
} else {
page = s->cmd >> 6;
offset = addr | (page << 4);
switch(offset) {
case EN0_TSR:
ret = s->tsr;
break;
case EN0_BOUNDARY:
ret = s->boundary;
break;
case EN0_ISR:
ret = s->isr;
break;
case EN0_RSARLO:
ret = s->rsar & 0x00ff;
break;
case EN0_RSARHI:
ret = s->rsar >> 8;
break;
case EN1_PHYS ... EN1_PHYS + 5:
ret = s->phys[offset - EN1_PHYS];
break;
case EN1_CURPAG:
ret = s->curpag;
break;
case EN1_MULT ... EN1_MULT + 7:
ret = s->mult[offset - EN1_MULT];
break;
case EN0_RSR:
ret = s->rsr;
break;
case EN2_STARTPG:
ret = s->start >> 8;
break;
case EN2_STOPPG:
ret = s->stop >> 8;
break;
case EN0_RTL8029ID0:
ret = 0x50;
break;
case EN0_RTL8029ID1:
ret = 0x43;
break;
case EN3_CONFIG0:
ret = 0; /* 10baseT media */
break;
case EN3_CONFIG2:
ret = 0x40; /* 10baseT active */
break;
case EN3_CONFIG3:
ret = 0x40; /* Full duplex */
break;
default:
ret = 0x00;
break;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_NE2000
printf("NE2000: read addr=0x%x val=%02x\n", addr, ret);
#endif
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_name)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( DISP_NAME , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 7,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabStrip::HoverCardIsShowingForTab(Tab* tab) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kTabHoverCards))
return false;
return hover_card_ && hover_card_->GetWidget()->IsVisible() &&
!hover_card_->IsFadingOut() && hover_card_->GetAnchorView() == tab;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,278
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.