instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wakeup_softirqd(void)
{
/* Interrupts are disabled: no need to stop preemption */
struct task_struct *tsk = __this_cpu_read(ksoftirqd);
if (tsk && tsk->state != TASK_RUNNING)
wake_up_process(tsk);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 20,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_pcbc_encrypt_inplace(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
{
void (*fn)(struct crypto_tfm *, u8 *, const u8 *) =
crypto_cipher_alg(tfm)->cia_encrypt;
int bsize = crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm);
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;
u8 *iv = walk->iv;
u8 tmpbuf[bsize];
do {
memcpy(tmpbuf, src, bsize);
crypto_xor(iv, src, bsize);
fn(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm), src, iv);
memcpy(iv, tmpbuf, bsize);
crypto_xor(iv, src, bsize);
src += bsize;
} while ((nbytes -= bsize) >= bsize);
memcpy(walk->iv, iv, bsize);
return nbytes;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_page(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address)
{
struct kvm *kvm = mmu_notifier_to_kvm(mn);
int need_tlb_flush, idx;
/*
* When ->invalidate_page runs, the linux pte has been zapped
* already but the page is still allocated until
* ->invalidate_page returns. So if we increase the sequence
* here the kvm page fault will notice if the spte can't be
* established because the page is going to be freed. If
* instead the kvm page fault establishes the spte before
* ->invalidate_page runs, kvm_unmap_hva will release it
* before returning.
*
* The sequence increase only need to be seen at spin_unlock
* time, and not at spin_lock time.
*
* Increasing the sequence after the spin_unlock would be
* unsafe because the kvm page fault could then establish the
* pte after kvm_unmap_hva returned, without noticing the page
* is going to be freed.
*/
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
kvm->mmu_notifier_seq++;
need_tlb_flush = kvm_unmap_hva(kvm, address) | kvm->tlbs_dirty;
/* we've to flush the tlb before the pages can be freed */
if (need_tlb_flush)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API void ModPlug_Seek(ModPlugFile* file, int millisecond)
{
if(!file) return;
openmpt_module_set_position_seconds(file->mod,(double)millisecond*0.001);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 13,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 GetRelyingPartyIdString(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model) {
static constexpr char kRpIdUrlPrefix[] = "https://";
static constexpr int kDialogWidth = 300;
const auto& rp_id = dialog_model->relying_party_id();
DCHECK(!rp_id.empty());
GURL rp_id_url(kRpIdUrlPrefix + rp_id);
auto max_static_string_length = gfx::GetStringWidthF(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_GENERIC_TITLE), gfx::FontList(),
gfx::Typesetter::DEFAULT);
return url_formatter::ElideHost(rp_id_url, gfx::FontList(),
kDialogWidth - max_static_string_length);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 13,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gx_ttfReader__set_font(gx_ttfReader *self, gs_font_type42 *pfont)
{
self->pfont = pfont;
self->super.get_metrics = gx_ttfReader__default_get_metrics;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlIsAutoClosed(htmlDocPtr doc, htmlNodePtr elem) {
htmlNodePtr child;
if (elem == NULL) return(1);
child = elem->children;
while (child != NULL) {
if (htmlAutoCloseTag(doc, elem->name, child)) return(1);
child = child->next;
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 10,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void v9fs_statfs(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
ssize_t retval = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
struct statfs stbuf;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
retval = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "d", &fid);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
retval = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
retval = v9fs_co_statfs(pdu, &fidp->path, &stbuf);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out;
}
retval = v9fs_fill_statfs(s, pdu, &stbuf);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out;
}
retval += offset;
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, retval);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: construct_le_tlv(struct sc_apdu *apdu, unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t data_tlv_len,
unsigned char *le_tlv, size_t * le_tlv_len, const unsigned char key_type)
{
size_t block_size = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 16 : 8);
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len) = 0x97;
if (apdu->le > 0x7F) {
/* Le' > 0x7E, use extended APDU */
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + 1) = 2;
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + 2) = (unsigned char)(apdu->le / 0x100);
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + 3) = (unsigned char)(apdu->le % 0x100);
memcpy(le_tlv, apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len, 4);
*le_tlv_len = 4;
}
else {
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + 1) = 1;
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + 2) = (unsigned char)apdu->le;
memcpy(le_tlv, apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len, 3);
*le_tlv_len = 3;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 26,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockWidgetInputHandler* input_handler() {
return widget_impl_->input_handler();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBox::scroll(ScrollDirection direction, ScrollGranularity granularity, float multiplier, Node** stopNode)
{
RenderLayer* l = layer();
if (l && l->scroll(direction, granularity, multiplier)) {
if (stopNode)
*stopNode = node();
return true;
}
if (stopNode && *stopNode && *stopNode == node())
return true;
RenderBlock* b = containingBlock();
if (b && !b->isRenderView())
return b->scroll(direction, granularity, multiplier, stopNode);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* WebsiteSettingsPopupView::CreatePermissionsTab() {
views::View* pane = new views::View();
pane->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 1));
cookie_dialog_link_ = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_SHOW_SITE_DATA));
cookie_dialog_link_->set_listener(this);
site_data_content_ = new views::View();
views::View* site_data_section =
CreateSection(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TITLE_SITE_DATA),
site_data_content_,
cookie_dialog_link_);
pane->AddChildView(site_data_section);
return pane;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_annot_mapping_free (PopplerAnnotMapping *mapping)
{
if (!mapping)
return;
if (mapping->annot)
g_object_unref (mapping->annot);
g_free (mapping);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dentry_needs_remove_privs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
int mask = 0;
int ret;
if (IS_NOSEC(inode))
return 0;
mask = should_remove_suid(dentry);
ret = security_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret)
mask |= ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
return mask;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 8,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLFormControlElement::formEnctype() const
{
const AtomicString& formEnctypeAttr = fastGetAttribute(formenctypeAttr);
if (formEnctypeAttr.isNull())
return emptyString();
return FormSubmission::Attributes::parseEncodingType(formEnctypeAttr);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseChunk(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *chunk, int size,
int terminate) {
int end_in_lf = 0;
int remain = 0;
size_t old_avail = 0;
size_t avail = 0;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(ctxt->errNo);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(-1);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_START)
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
if ((size > 0) && (chunk != NULL) && (!terminate) &&
(chunk[size - 1] == '\r')) {
end_in_lf = 1;
size--;
}
xmldecl_done:
if ((size > 0) && (chunk != NULL) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL) && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
size_t base = xmlBufGetInputBase(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input);
size_t cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
int res;
old_avail = xmlBufUse(ctxt->input->buf->buffer);
/*
* Specific handling if we autodetected an encoding, we should not
* push more than the first line ... which depend on the encoding
* And only push the rest once the final encoding was detected
*/
if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_START) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL) && (ctxt->input->buf->encoder != NULL)) {
unsigned int len = 45;
if ((xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UTF-16")) ||
(xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UTF16")))
len = 90;
else if ((xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UCS-4")) ||
(xmlStrcasestr(BAD_CAST ctxt->input->buf->encoder->name,
BAD_CAST "UCS4")))
len = 180;
if (ctxt->input->buf->rawconsumed < len)
len -= ctxt->input->buf->rawconsumed;
/*
* Change size for reading the initial declaration only
* if size is greater than len. Otherwise, memmove in xmlBufferAdd
* will blindly copy extra bytes from memory.
*/
if ((unsigned int) size > len) {
remain = size - len;
size = len;
} else {
remain = 0;
}
}
res = xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, size, chunk);
if (res < 0) {
ctxt->errNo = XML_PARSER_EOF;
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return (XML_PARSER_EOF);
}
xmlBufSetInputBaseCur(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input, base, cur);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: pushed %d\n", size);
#endif
} else if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && ctxt->input->buf != NULL) {
xmlParserInputBufferPtr in = ctxt->input->buf;
if ((in->encoder != NULL) && (in->buffer != NULL) &&
(in->raw != NULL)) {
int nbchars;
size_t base = xmlBufGetInputBase(in->buffer, ctxt->input);
size_t current = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
nbchars = xmlCharEncInput(in, terminate);
if (nbchars < 0) {
/* TODO 2.6.0 */
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlParseChunk: encoder error\n");
return(XML_ERR_INVALID_ENCODING);
}
xmlBufSetInputBaseCur(in->buffer, ctxt->input, base, current);
}
}
}
if (remain != 0) {
xmlParseTryOrFinish(ctxt, 0);
} else {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->buf != NULL))
avail = xmlBufUse(ctxt->input->buf->buffer);
/*
* Depending on the current state it may not be such
* a good idea to try parsing if there is nothing in the chunk
* which would be worth doing a parser state transition and we
* need to wait for more data
*/
if ((terminate) || (avail > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) ||
(old_avail == 0) || (avail == 0) ||
(xmlParseCheckTransition(ctxt,
(const char *)&ctxt->input->base[old_avail],
avail - old_avail)))
xmlParseTryOrFinish(ctxt, terminate);
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(ctxt->errNo);
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) > XML_MAX_LOOKUP_LIMIT) ||
((ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base) > XML_MAX_LOOKUP_LIMIT)) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "Huge input lookup");
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
}
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(ctxt->errNo);
if (remain != 0) {
chunk += size;
size = remain;
remain = 0;
goto xmldecl_done;
}
if ((end_in_lf == 1) && (ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf != NULL)) {
size_t base = xmlBufGetInputBase(ctxt->input->buf->buffer,
ctxt->input);
size_t current = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, 1, "\r");
xmlBufSetInputBaseCur(ctxt->input->buf->buffer, ctxt->input,
base, current);
}
if (terminate) {
/*
* Check for termination
*/
int cur_avail = 0;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
cur_avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
cur_avail = xmlBufUse(ctxt->input->buf->buffer) -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
if ((ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
(ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EPILOG)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EPILOG) && (cur_avail > 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
if (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
}
if (ctxt->wellFormed == 0)
return((xmlParserErrors) ctxt->errNo);
else
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: link_info_nautilus_link_read_callback (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
LinkInfoReadState *state;
gsize file_size;
char *file_contents;
gboolean result;
NautilusDirectory *directory;
state = user_data;
if (state->directory == NULL)
{
/* Operation was cancelled. Bail out */
link_info_read_state_free (state);
return;
}
directory = nautilus_directory_ref (state->directory);
result = g_file_load_contents_finish (G_FILE (source_object),
res,
&file_contents, &file_size,
NULL, NULL);
state->directory->details->link_info_read_state = NULL;
async_job_end (state->directory, "link info");
link_info_got_data (state->directory, state->file, result, file_size, file_contents);
if (result)
{
g_free (file_contents);
}
link_info_read_state_free (state);
nautilus_directory_unref (directory);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsBuffer(GLuint client_id) {
const BufferManager::BufferInfo* buffer = GetBufferInfo(client_id);
return buffer && buffer->IsValid() && !buffer->IsDeleted();
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppp_output_wakeup(struct ppp_channel *chan)
{
struct channel *pch = chan->ppp;
if (!pch)
return;
ppp_channel_push(pch);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GoogleMdmEnrollmentStatusForTesting::~GoogleMdmEnrollmentStatusForTesting() {
g_enrollment_status = EnrollmentStatus::kDontForce;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 29,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_pmlcb(int idx, unsigned long val)
{
switch (idx) {
case 0:
mtpmr(PMRN_PMLCB0, val);
break;
case 1:
mtpmr(PMRN_PMLCB1, val);
break;
case 2:
mtpmr(PMRN_PMLCB2, val);
break;
case 3:
mtpmr(PMRN_PMLCB3, val);
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "oops trying to write PMLCB%d\n", idx);
}
isync();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ConvertHexadecimalToIDAlphabet(std::string* id) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < id->size(); ++i) {
int val;
if (base::HexStringToInt(id->begin() + i, id->begin() + i + 1, &val))
(*id)[i] = val + 'a';
else
(*id)[i] = 'a';
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *am_generate_id(request_rec *r)
{
int rc;
char *ret;
int rand_data_len;
unsigned char *rand_data;
int i;
unsigned char b;
int hi, low;
ret = (char *)apr_palloc(r->pool, AM_ID_LENGTH + 1);
/* We need to round the length of the random data _up_, in case the
* length of the session id isn't even.
*/
rand_data_len = (AM_ID_LENGTH + 1) / 2;
/* Fill the last rand_data_len bytes of the string with
* random bytes. This allows us to overwrite from the beginning of
* the string.
*/
rand_data = (unsigned char *)&ret[AM_ID_LENGTH - rand_data_len];
/* Generate random numbers. */
rc = am_generate_random_bytes(r, rand_data, rand_data_len);
if(rc != OK) {
return NULL;
}
/* Convert the random bytes to hexadecimal. Note that we will write
* AM_ID_LENGTH+1 characters if we have a non-even length of the
* session id. This is OK - we will simply overwrite the last character
* with the null-terminator afterwards.
*/
for(i = 0; i < AM_ID_LENGTH; i += 2) {
b = rand_data[i / 2];
hi = (b >> 4) & 0xf;
low = b & 0xf;
if(hi >= 0xa) {
ret[i] = 'a' + hi - 0xa;
} else {
ret[i] = '0' + hi;
}
if(low >= 0xa) {
ret[i+1] = 'a' + low - 0xa;
} else {
ret[i+1] = '0' + low;
}
}
/* Add null-terminator- */
ret[AM_ID_LENGTH] = '\0';
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 21,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x25_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct x25_sock *x25;
int rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
goto out;
rc = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (sock->type != SOCK_SEQPACKET)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (protocol)
goto out;
rc = -ENOBUFS;
if ((sk = x25_alloc_socket(net)) == NULL)
goto out;
x25 = x25_sk(sk);
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
x25_init_timers(sk);
sock->ops = &x25_proto_ops;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = x25_backlog_rcv;
x25->t21 = sysctl_x25_call_request_timeout;
x25->t22 = sysctl_x25_reset_request_timeout;
x25->t23 = sysctl_x25_clear_request_timeout;
x25->t2 = sysctl_x25_ack_holdback_timeout;
x25->state = X25_STATE_0;
x25->cudmatchlength = 0;
set_bit(X25_ACCPT_APPRV_FLAG, &x25->flags); /* normally no cud */
/* on call accept */
x25->facilities.winsize_in = X25_DEFAULT_WINDOW_SIZE;
x25->facilities.winsize_out = X25_DEFAULT_WINDOW_SIZE;
x25->facilities.pacsize_in = X25_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
x25->facilities.pacsize_out = X25_DEFAULT_PACKET_SIZE;
x25->facilities.throughput = 0; /* by default don't negotiate
throughput */
x25->facilities.reverse = X25_DEFAULT_REVERSE;
x25->dte_facilities.calling_len = 0;
x25->dte_facilities.called_len = 0;
memset(x25->dte_facilities.called_ae, '\0',
sizeof(x25->dte_facilities.called_ae));
memset(x25->dte_facilities.calling_ae, '\0',
sizeof(x25->dte_facilities.calling_ae));
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* Browser::OpenURLFromTab(TabContents* source,
const OpenURLParams& params) {
browser::NavigateParams nav_params(this, params.url, params.transition);
nav_params.source_contents =
tabstrip_model()->GetTabContentsAt(
tabstrip_model()->GetWrapperIndex(source));
nav_params.referrer = params.referrer;
nav_params.disposition = params.disposition;
nav_params.tabstrip_add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_NONE;
nav_params.window_action = browser::NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
nav_params.user_gesture = true;
nav_params.override_encoding = params.override_encoding;
browser::Navigate(&nav_params);
return nav_params.target_contents ?
nav_params.target_contents->tab_contents() : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: clnp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *pptr, u_int length)
{
const uint8_t *optr,*source_address,*dest_address;
u_int li,tlen,nsap_offset,source_address_length,dest_address_length, clnp_pdu_type, clnp_flags;
const struct clnp_header_t *clnp_header;
const struct clnp_segment_header_t *clnp_segment_header;
uint8_t rfd_error_major,rfd_error_minor;
clnp_header = (const struct clnp_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*clnp_header);
li = clnp_header->length_indicator;
optr = pptr;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CLNP"));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (clnp_header->version != CLNP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "version %d packet not supported", clnp_header->version));
return (0);
}
if (li > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator(%u) > PDU size (%u)!", li, length));
return (0);
}
if (li < sizeof(struct clnp_header_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator %u < min PDU size:", li));
while (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", *pptr++));
return (0);
}
/* FIXME further header sanity checking */
clnp_pdu_type = clnp_header->type & CLNP_PDU_TYPE_MASK;
clnp_flags = clnp_header->type & CLNP_FLAG_MASK;
pptr += sizeof(struct clnp_header_t);
li -= sizeof(struct clnp_header_t);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
dest_address_length = *pptr;
pptr += 1;
li -= 1;
if (li < dest_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, dest_address_length);
dest_address = pptr;
pptr += dest_address_length;
li -= dest_address_length;
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr += 1;
li -= 1;
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header and addresses"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
source_address = pptr;
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s > %s, %s, length %u",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
isonsap_string(ndo, source_address, source_address_length),
isonsap_string(ndo, dest_address, dest_address_length),
tok2str(clnp_pdu_values,"unknown (%u)",clnp_pdu_type),
length));
return (1);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s PDU, hlen: %u, v: %u, lifetime: %u.%us, Segment PDU length: %u, checksum: 0x%04x",
tok2str(clnp_pdu_values, "unknown (%u)",clnp_pdu_type),
clnp_header->length_indicator,
clnp_header->version,
clnp_header->lifetime/2,
(clnp_header->lifetime%2)*5,
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_header->segment_length),
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_header->cksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, optr, EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_header->cksum), 7,
clnp_header->length_indicator);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tFlags [%s]",
bittok2str(clnp_flag_values, "none", clnp_flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tsource address (length %u): %s\n\tdest address (length %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, source_address, source_address_length),
dest_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, dest_address, dest_address_length)));
if (clnp_flags & CLNP_SEGMENT_PART) {
if (li < sizeof(const struct clnp_segment_header_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "li < size of fixed part of CLNP header, addresses, and segment part"));
return (0);
}
clnp_segment_header = (const struct clnp_segment_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*clnp_segment_header);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tData Unit ID: 0x%04x, Segment Offset: %u, Total PDU Length: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_segment_header->data_unit_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_segment_header->segment_offset),
EXTRACT_16BITS(clnp_segment_header->total_length)));
pptr+=sizeof(const struct clnp_segment_header_t);
li-=sizeof(const struct clnp_segment_header_t);
}
/* now walk the options */
while (li >= 2) {
u_int op, opli;
const uint8_t *tptr;
if (li < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opts/li"));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
op = *pptr++;
opli = *pptr++;
li -= 2;
if (opli > li) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", opt (%d) too long", op));
return (0);
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, opli);
li -= opli;
tptr = pptr;
tlen = opli;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option #%u, length %u, value: ",
tok2str(clnp_option_values,"Unknown",op),
op,
opli));
/*
* We've already checked that the entire option is present
* in the captured packet with the ND_TCHECK2() call.
* Therefore, we don't need to do ND_TCHECK()/ND_TCHECK2()
* checks.
* We do, however, need to check tlen, to make sure we
* don't run past the end of the option.
*/
switch (op) {
case CLNP_OPTION_ROUTE_RECORDING: /* those two options share the format */
case CLNP_OPTION_SOURCE_ROUTING:
if (tlen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s",
tok2str(clnp_option_sr_rr_values,"Unknown",*tptr),
tok2str(clnp_option_sr_rr_string_values, "Unknown Option %u", op)));
nsap_offset=*(tptr+1);
if (nsap_offset == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Bad NSAP offset (0)"));
break;
}
nsap_offset-=1; /* offset to nsap list */
if (nsap_offset > tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Bad NSAP offset (past end of option)"));
break;
}
tptr+=nsap_offset;
tlen-=nsap_offset;
while (tlen > 0) {
source_address_length=*tptr;
if (tlen < source_address_length+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NSAP address goes past end of option"));
break;
}
if (source_address_length > 0) {
source_address=(tptr+1);
ND_TCHECK2(*source_address, source_address_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NSAP address (length %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, source_address, source_address_length)));
}
tlen-=source_address_length+1;
}
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_PRIORITY:
if (tlen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%1x", *tptr&0x0f));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_QOS_MAINTENANCE:
if (tlen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Format Code: %s",
tok2str(clnp_option_scope_values, "Reserved", *tptr&CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_MASK)));
if ((*tptr&CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_MASK) == CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_GLOBAL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t QoS Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(clnp_option_qos_global_values,
"none",
*tptr&CLNP_OPTION_OPTION_QOS_MASK)));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_SECURITY:
if (tlen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Format Code: %s, Security-Level %u",
tok2str(clnp_option_scope_values,"Reserved",*tptr&CLNP_OPTION_SCOPE_MASK),
*(tptr+1)));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_DISCARD_REASON:
if (tlen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opt len"));
return (0);
}
rfd_error_major = (*tptr&0xf0) >> 4;
rfd_error_minor = *tptr&0x0f;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Class: %s Error (0x%01x), %s (0x%01x)",
tok2str(clnp_option_rfd_class_values,"Unknown",rfd_error_major),
rfd_error_major,
tok2str(clnp_option_rfd_error_class[rfd_error_major],"Unknown",rfd_error_minor),
rfd_error_minor));
break;
case CLNP_OPTION_PADDING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "padding data"));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined Options that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", opli);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", opli);
pptr += opli;
}
switch (clnp_pdu_type) {
case CLNP_PDU_ER: /* fall through */
case CLNP_PDU_ERP:
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (*(pptr) == NLPID_CLNP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t-----original packet-----\n\t"));
/* FIXME recursion protection */
clnp_print(ndo, pptr, length - clnp_header->length_indicator);
break;
}
case CLNP_PDU_DT:
case CLNP_PDU_MD:
case CLNP_PDU_ERQ:
default:
/* dump the PDU specific data */
if (length-(pptr-optr) > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t undecoded non-header data, length %u", length-clnp_header->length_indicator));
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", length - (pptr - optr));
}
}
return (1);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|clnp]"));
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13055/IS-IS: fix an Extended IS Reachability sub-TLV
In isis_print_is_reach_subtlv() one of the case blocks did not check that
the sub-TLV "V" is actually present and could over-read the input buffer.
Add a length check to fix that and remove a useless boundary check from
a loop because the boundary is tested for the full length of "V" before
the switch block.
Update one of the prior test cases as it turns out it depended on this
previously incorrect code path to make it to its own malformed structure
further down the buffer, the bugfix has changed its output.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 15,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __get_nat_bitmaps(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
unsigned int nat_bits_bytes = nm_i->nat_blocks / BITS_PER_BYTE;
unsigned int i;
__u64 cp_ver = cur_cp_version(ckpt);
block_t nat_bits_addr;
if (!enabled_nat_bits(sbi, NULL))
return 0;
nm_i->nat_bits_blocks = F2FS_BYTES_TO_BLK((nat_bits_bytes << 1) + 8 +
F2FS_BLKSIZE - 1);
nm_i->nat_bits = kzalloc(nm_i->nat_bits_blocks << F2FS_BLKSIZE_BITS,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nm_i->nat_bits)
return -ENOMEM;
nat_bits_addr = __start_cp_addr(sbi) + sbi->blocks_per_seg -
nm_i->nat_bits_blocks;
for (i = 0; i < nm_i->nat_bits_blocks; i++) {
struct page *page = get_meta_page(sbi, nat_bits_addr++);
memcpy(nm_i->nat_bits + (i << F2FS_BLKSIZE_BITS),
page_address(page), F2FS_BLKSIZE);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
}
cp_ver |= (cur_cp_crc(ckpt) << 32);
if (cpu_to_le64(cp_ver) != *(__le64 *)nm_i->nat_bits) {
disable_nat_bits(sbi, true);
return 0;
}
nm_i->full_nat_bits = nm_i->nat_bits + 8;
nm_i->empty_nat_bits = nm_i->full_nat_bits + nat_bits_bytes;
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_NOTICE, "Found nat_bits in checkpoint");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6_frags_sysctl_register(void)
{
ip6_ctl_header = register_net_sysctl_rotable(net_ipv6_ctl_path,
ip6_frags_ctl_table);
return ip6_ctl_header == NULL ? -ENOMEM : 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void svm_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
BUG_ON(!(gif_set(svm)));
trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr);
++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr |
SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::ChromeContentBrowserClient(
ChromeFeatureListCreator* chrome_feature_list_creator)
: chrome_feature_list_creator_(chrome_feature_list_creator),
weak_factory_(this) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedDevChannelOrigins); ++i)
allowed_dev_channel_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedDevChannelOrigins[i]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedFileHandleOrigins); ++i)
allowed_file_handle_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedFileHandleOrigins[i]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins); ++i)
allowed_socket_origins_.insert(kPredefinedAllowedSocketOrigins[i]);
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientPluginsPart);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientChromeOsPart);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart);
#endif
extra_parts_.push_back(new ChromeContentBrowserClientPerformanceManagerPart);
gpu_binder_registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&metrics::CallStackProfileCollector::Create));
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_out_ts_cache_definition(STREAM s, uint16 entries, uint16 maxcellsize)
{
out_uint16_le(s, entries);
out_uint16_le(s, maxcellsize);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int register_netdevice_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct net_device *last;
struct net *net;
int err;
rtnl_lock();
err = raw_notifier_chain_register(&netdev_chain, nb);
if (err)
goto unlock;
if (dev_boot_phase)
goto unlock;
for_each_net(net) {
for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
err = nb->notifier_call(nb, NETDEV_REGISTER, dev);
err = notifier_to_errno(err);
if (err)
goto rollback;
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
continue;
nb->notifier_call(nb, NETDEV_UP, dev);
}
}
unlock:
rtnl_unlock();
return err;
rollback:
last = dev;
for_each_net(net) {
for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
if (dev == last)
break;
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
nb->notifier_call(nb, NETDEV_GOING_DOWN, dev);
nb->notifier_call(nb, NETDEV_DOWN, dev);
}
nb->notifier_call(nb, NETDEV_UNREGISTER, dev);
nb->notifier_call(nb, NETDEV_UNREGISTER_BATCH, dev);
}
}
raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&netdev_chain, nb);
goto unlock;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::PrintDelegate(LocalFrame* frame) {
NotifyPopupOpeningObservers();
if (web_view_->Client())
web_view_->Client()->PrintPage(WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type, phnum, shnum, notecount;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_size != 0)
fsize = st.st_size;
else
fsize = SIZE_UNKNOWN;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous
commit.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
{
static int die_counter;
oops_enter();
spin_lock_irq(&die_lock);
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
printk("%s: %04lx [#%d]\n", str, err & 0xffff, ++die_counter);
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
printk("Process: %s (pid: %d, stack limit = %p)\n", current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current), task_stack_page(current) + 1);
if (!user_mode(regs) || in_interrupt())
dump_mem("Stack: ", regs->regs[15], THREAD_SIZE +
(unsigned long)task_stack_page(current));
notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
if (kexec_should_crash(current))
crash_kexec(regs);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops)
panic("Fatal exception");
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tty_init_termios(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct ktermios *tp;
int idx = tty->index;
tp = tty->driver->termios[idx];
if (tp == NULL) {
tp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ktermios[2]), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(tp, &tty->driver->init_termios,
sizeof(struct ktermios));
tty->driver->termios[idx] = tp;
}
tty->termios = tp;
tty->termios_locked = tp + 1;
/* Compatibility until drivers always set this */
tty->termios->c_ispeed = tty_termios_input_baud_rate(tty->termios);
tty->termios->c_ospeed = tty_termios_baud_rate(tty->termios);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ForwardUntilMatchingProviderHost() {
while (!IsAtEnd()) {
if (predicate_.is_null() || predicate_.Run(GetProviderHost()))
return;
provider_host_iterator_++;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::runModalAlertDialog(const blink::WebString& message) {
RunJavaScriptMessage(JAVASCRIPT_MESSAGE_TYPE_ALERT,
message,
base::string16(),
frame_->document().url(),
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 43 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Font PlatformFontSkia::DeriveFont(int size_delta,
int style,
Font::Weight weight) const {
const int new_size = font_size_pixels_ + size_delta;
DCHECK_GT(new_size, 0);
std::string new_family = font_family_;
bool success = true;
sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface =
(weight == weight_ && style == style_)
? typeface_
: CreateSkTypeface(style, weight, &new_family, &success);
if (!success) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not find any font: " << new_family << ", "
<< kFallbackFontFamilyName << ". Falling back to the default";
return Font(new PlatformFontSkia);
}
FontRenderParamsQuery query;
query.families.push_back(new_family);
query.pixel_size = new_size;
query.style = style;
return Font(new PlatformFontSkia(std::move(typeface), new_family, new_size,
style, weight,
gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, NULL)));
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862 | 0 | 15,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 5,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DirectoryEntrySync::trace(Visitor* visitor)
{
EntrySync::trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asn1_expand_octet_string (asn1_node definitions, asn1_node * element,
const char *octetName, const char *objectName)
{
char name[2 * ASN1_MAX_NAME_SIZE + 1], value[ASN1_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
int retCode = ASN1_SUCCESS, result;
int len, len2, len3;
asn1_node p2, aux = NULL;
asn1_node octetNode = NULL, objectNode = NULL;
char errorDescription[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
if ((definitions == NULL) || (*element == NULL))
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
octetNode = asn1_find_node (*element, octetName);
if (octetNode == NULL)
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
if (type_field (octetNode->type) != ASN1_ETYPE_OCTET_STRING)
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
if (octetNode->value == NULL)
return ASN1_VALUE_NOT_FOUND;
objectNode = asn1_find_node (*element, objectName);
if (objectNode == NULL)
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
if (type_field (objectNode->type) != ASN1_ETYPE_OBJECT_ID)
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
if (objectNode->value == NULL)
return ASN1_VALUE_NOT_FOUND;
/* search the OBJECT_ID into definitions */
p2 = definitions->down;
while (p2)
{
if ((type_field (p2->type) == ASN1_ETYPE_OBJECT_ID) &&
(p2->type & CONST_ASSIGN))
{
strcpy (name, definitions->name);
strcat (name, ".");
strcat (name, p2->name);
len = sizeof (value);
result = asn1_read_value (definitions, name, value, &len);
if ((result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
&& (!_asn1_strcmp (objectNode->value, value)))
{
p2 = p2->right; /* pointer to the structure to
use for expansion */
while ((p2) && (p2->type & CONST_ASSIGN))
p2 = p2->right;
if (p2)
{
strcpy (name, definitions->name);
strcat (name, ".");
strcat (name, p2->name);
result = asn1_create_element (definitions, name, &aux);
if (result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
_asn1_cpy_name (aux, octetNode);
len2 =
asn1_get_length_der (octetNode->value,
octetNode->value_len, &len3);
if (len2 < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
result =
asn1_der_decoding (&aux, octetNode->value + len3,
len2, errorDescription);
if (result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
_asn1_set_right (aux, octetNode->right);
_asn1_set_right (octetNode, aux);
result = asn1_delete_structure (&octetNode);
if (result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
aux = NULL;
break;
}
else
{ /* error with asn1_delete_structure */
asn1_delete_structure (&aux);
retCode = result;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* error with asn1_der_decoding */
retCode = result;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* error with asn1_create_element */
retCode = result;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* error with the pointer to the structure to exapand */
retCode = ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID;
break;
}
}
}
p2 = p2->right;
}
if (!p2)
retCode = ASN1_VALUE_NOT_VALID;
return retCode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnDisconnected() {
navigator_vr_->EnqueueVREvent(VRDisplayEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::vrdisplaydisconnect, true, false, this, "disconnect"));
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Source::parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationOffsets(
off64_t offset, off64_t /* size */) {
ALOGV("parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationOffsets");
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(offset, &version, sizeof(version)) != 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset++;
uint32_t flags;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt24(offset, &flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset += 3;
uint32_t entrycount;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &entrycount)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset += 4;
if (entrycount == 0) {
return OK;
}
if (entrycount > UINT32_MAX / 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (entrycount > mCurrentSampleInfoOffsetsAllocSize) {
uint64_t *newPtr = (uint64_t *)realloc(mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets, entrycount * 8);
if (newPtr == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets = newPtr;
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsetsAllocSize = entrycount;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsetCount = entrycount;
if (mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets == NULL) {
return OK;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < entrycount; i++) {
if (version == 0) {
uint32_t tmp;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets[i] = tmp;
offset += 4;
} else {
uint64_t tmp;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets[i] = tmp;
offset += 8;
}
}
off64_t drmoffset = mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets[0]; // from moof
drmoffset += mCurrentMoofOffset;
int ivlength;
CHECK(mFormat->findInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, &ivlength));
if (ivlength != 0 && ivlength != 8 && ivlength != 16) {
ALOGW("unsupported IV length: %d", ivlength);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mCurrentSampleInfoCount; i++) {
if (i >= mCurrentSamples.size()) {
ALOGW("too few samples");
break;
}
Sample *smpl = &mCurrentSamples.editItemAt(i);
memset(smpl->iv, 0, 16);
if (mDataSource->readAt(drmoffset, smpl->iv, ivlength) != ivlength) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += ivlength;
int32_t smplinfosize = mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize;
if (smplinfosize == 0) {
smplinfosize = mCurrentSampleInfoSizes[i];
}
if (smplinfosize > ivlength) {
uint16_t numsubsamples;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt16(drmoffset, &numsubsamples)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += 2;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numsubsamples; j++) {
uint16_t numclear;
uint32_t numencrypted;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt16(drmoffset, &numclear)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += 2;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(drmoffset, &numencrypted)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += 4;
smpl->clearsizes.add(numclear);
smpl->encryptedsizes.add(numencrypted);
}
} else {
smpl->clearsizes.add(0);
smpl->encryptedsizes.add(smpl->size);
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr(void)
{
return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) &&
vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedStringAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectedstringattrAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init_ex(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
struct sc_aid *aid,
sc_pkcs15emu_opt_t *opts)
{
if (opts && (opts->flags & SC_PKCS15EMU_FLAGS_NO_CHECK)) {
return sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init(p15card);
} else {
if (p15card->card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_SC_HSM
&& p15card->card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_SC_HSM_SOC
&& p15card->card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_SC_HSM_GOID) {
return SC_ERROR_WRONG_CARD;
}
return sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_init(p15card);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 29,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnDestruct() const {
BrowserThread::DeleteOnIOThread::Destruct(this);
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::AddNewContents(TabContents* source,
TabContents* new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_pos,
bool user_gesture) {
DCHECK(disposition != SAVE_TO_DISK);
DCHECK(disposition != CURRENT_TAB);
TabContentsWrapper* source_wrapper = NULL;
BlockedContentTabHelper* source_blocked_content = NULL;
TabContentsWrapper* new_wrapper =
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(new_contents);
if (!new_wrapper)
new_wrapper = new TabContentsWrapper(new_contents);
if (source) {
source_wrapper = TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(source);
source_blocked_content = source_wrapper->blocked_content_tab_helper();
}
if (source_wrapper) {
if (source_blocked_content->all_contents_blocked()) {
source_blocked_content->AddTabContents(new_wrapper,
disposition,
initial_pos,
user_gesture);
return;
}
if ((disposition == NEW_POPUP) && !user_gesture &&
!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisablePopupBlocking)) {
GetConstrainingContentsWrapper(source_wrapper)->
blocked_content_tab_helper()->
AddPopup(new_wrapper, initial_pos, user_gesture);
return;
}
RenderViewHost* view = new_contents->render_view_host();
view->Send(new ViewMsg_DisassociateFromPopupCount(view->routing_id()));
}
browser::NavigateParams params(this, new_wrapper);
params.source_contents =
source ? tabstrip_model()->GetTabContentsAt(
tabstrip_model()->GetWrapperIndex(source))
: NULL;
params.disposition = disposition;
params.window_bounds = initial_pos;
params.window_action = browser::NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
params.user_gesture = user_gesture;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::flipForWritingMode(LayoutUnit position) const
{
if (!style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
return position;
return logicalHeight() - position;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setContext(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *context)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
const XML_Char *s = context;
while (*context != XML_T('\0')) {
if (*s == CONTEXT_SEP || *s == XML_T('\0')) {
ENTITY *e;
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
e = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), 0);
if (e)
e->open = XML_TRUE;
if (*s != XML_T('\0'))
s++;
context = s;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
else if (*s == XML_T(ASCII_EQUALS)) {
PREFIX *prefix;
if (poolLength(&parser->m_tempPool) == 0)
prefix = &dtd->defaultPrefix;
else {
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool),
sizeof(PREFIX));
if (!prefix)
return XML_FALSE;
if (prefix->name == poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool)) {
prefix->name = poolCopyString(&dtd->pool, prefix->name);
if (!prefix->name)
return XML_FALSE;
}
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
}
for (context = s + 1;
*context != CONTEXT_SEP && *context != XML_T('\0');
context++)
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *context))
return XML_FALSE;
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_FALSE;
if (addBinding(parser, prefix, NULL, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool),
&parser->m_inheritedBindings) != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return XML_FALSE;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (*context != XML_T('\0'))
++context;
s = context;
}
else {
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return XML_FALSE;
s++;
}
}
return XML_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 10,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC__bool read_subframe_verbatim_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, unsigned channel, unsigned bps, FLAC__bool do_full_decode)
{
FLAC__Subframe_Verbatim *subframe = &decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].data.verbatim;
FLAC__int32 x, *residual = decoder->private_->residual[channel];
unsigned i;
decoder->private_->frame.subframes[channel].type = FLAC__SUBFRAME_TYPE_VERBATIM;
subframe->data = residual;
for(i = 0; i < decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize; i++) {
if(!FLAC__bitreader_read_raw_int32(decoder->private_->input, &x, bps))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
residual[i] = x;
}
/* decode the subframe */
if(do_full_decode)
memcpy(decoder->private_->output[channel], subframe->data, sizeof(FLAC__int32) * decoder->private_->frame.header.blocksize);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void muscle_load_single_acl(sc_file_t* file, int operation, unsigned short acl)
{
int key;
/* Everybody by default.... */
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, operation, SC_AC_NONE, 0);
if(acl == 0xFFFF) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, operation, SC_AC_NEVER, 0);
return;
}
for(key = 0; key < 16; key++) {
if(acl >> key & 1) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, operation, SC_AC_CHV, key);
}
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 13,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserTabStripController::AddSelectionFromAnchorTo(int model_index) {
model_->AddSelectionFromAnchorTo(model_index);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> SafeBuiltins::GetRegExp() const {
return Load("RegExp", context_->v8_context());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enable_interrupts( struct airo_info *ai ) {
/* Enable the interrupts */
OUT4500( ai, EVINTEN, STATUS_INTS );
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
/*
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
* However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
* to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
* no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
* reverted because at least one application *only* set
* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
* server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
* nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
* sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
&& (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
(i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
&& i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_type = i;
X509_free(s->session->peer);
X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 3,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tracing_open_generic_tr(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct trace_array *tr = inode->i_private;
if (tracing_disabled)
return -ENODEV;
if (trace_array_get(tr) < 0)
return -ENODEV;
filp->private_data = inode->i_private;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 15,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jas_tmr_stop(jas_tmr_t *tmr)
{
if (getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &tmr->stop) < 0) {
abort();
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 21,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adjust_pool_surplus(struct hstate *h, nodemask_t *nodes_allowed,
int delta)
{
int nr_nodes, node;
VM_BUG_ON(delta != -1 && delta != 1);
if (delta < 0) {
for_each_node_mask_to_alloc(h, nr_nodes, node, nodes_allowed) {
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[node])
goto found;
}
} else {
for_each_node_mask_to_free(h, nr_nodes, node, nodes_allowed) {
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[node] <
h->nr_huge_pages_node[node])
goto found;
}
}
return 0;
found:
h->surplus_huge_pages += delta;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[node] += delta;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExternalProtocolDialog::ExternalProtocolDialog(
std::unique_ptr<const ProtocolDialogDelegate> delegate,
int render_process_host_id,
int routing_id)
: delegate_(std::move(delegate)),
render_process_host_id_(render_process_host_id),
routing_id_(routing_id),
creation_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()) {
ChromeLayoutProvider* provider = ChromeLayoutProvider::Get();
set_margins(
provider->GetDialogInsetsForContentType(views::TEXT, views::TEXT));
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::FillLayout>());
DCHECK(delegate_->GetMessageText().empty());
remember_decision_checkbox_ =
new views::Checkbox(delegate_->GetCheckboxText());
AddChildView(remember_decision_checkbox_);
WebContents* web_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
render_process_host_id_, routing_id_);
if (web_contents)
constrained_window::ShowWebModalDialogViews(this, web_contents);
chrome::RecordDialogCreation(chrome::DialogIdentifier::EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL);
}
Commit Message: Set Cancel as the default button for the external protocol dialog.
This ensures that users holding down the Enter or Space key cannot
accidentally trigger an external protocol launch.
BUG=865202
Change-Id: I2cec7b3c216b80641200c97dec2517a66b4e0b24
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142705
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576340}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8TestActiveDOMObject::GetRawTemplate()
{
V8BindingPerIsolateData* data = V8BindingPerIsolateData::current();
V8BindingPerIsolateData::TemplateMap::iterator result = data->rawTemplateMap().find(&info);
if (result != data->rawTemplateMap().end())
return result->second;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> templ = createRawTemplate();
data->rawTemplateMap().add(&info, templ);
return templ;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SystemKeyEventListener::ProcessedXEvent(XEvent* xevent) {
input_method::InputMethodManager* input_method_manager =
input_method::InputMethodManager::GetInstance();
#if !defined(USE_AURA)
if (xevent->type == FocusIn) {
input_method::HotkeyManager* hotkey_manager =
input_method_manager->GetHotkeyManager();
hotkey_manager->OnFocus();
}
#endif
if (xevent->type == KeyPress || xevent->type == KeyRelease) {
input_method::HotkeyManager* hotkey_manager =
input_method_manager->GetHotkeyManager();
if (hotkey_manager->FilterKeyEvent(*xevent))
return true;
}
if (xevent->type == xkb_event_base_) {
XkbEvent* xkey_event = reinterpret_cast<XkbEvent*>(xevent);
if (xkey_event->any.xkb_type == XkbStateNotify) {
input_method::ModifierLockStatus new_caps_lock_state =
input_method::kDontChange;
input_method::ModifierLockStatus new_num_lock_state =
input_method::kDontChange;
bool enabled = (xkey_event->state.locked_mods) & LockMask;
if (caps_lock_is_on_ != enabled) {
caps_lock_is_on_ = enabled;
new_caps_lock_state =
enabled ? input_method::kEnableLock : input_method::kDisableLock;
OnCapsLock(caps_lock_is_on_);
}
enabled = (xkey_event->state.locked_mods) & num_lock_mask_;
if (num_lock_is_on_ != enabled) {
num_lock_is_on_ = enabled;
new_num_lock_state =
enabled ? input_method::kEnableLock : input_method::kDisableLock;
}
input_method_manager->GetXKeyboard()->SetLockedModifiers(
new_caps_lock_state, new_num_lock_state);
return true;
}
} else if (xevent->type == KeyPress) {
const int32 keycode = xevent->xkey.keycode;
if (keycode) {
const unsigned int state = (xevent->xkey.state & kSupportedModifiers);
if (XKeycodeToKeysym(ui::GetXDisplay(), keycode, 0) == XK_Super_L) {
const bool shift_is_held = (state & ShiftMask);
const bool other_mods_are_held = (state & ~(ShiftMask | LockMask));
if (shift_is_held && !other_mods_are_held)
input_method_manager->GetXKeyboard()->SetCapsLockEnabled(
!caps_lock_is_on_);
}
if (!(state & (Mod1Mask | ShiftMask | ControlMask))) {
if (keycode == key_f6_ || keycode == key_brightness_down_) {
if (keycode == key_f6_)
content::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Accel_BrightnessDown_F6"));
OnBrightnessDown();
return true;
} else if (keycode == key_f7_ || keycode == key_brightness_up_) {
if (keycode == key_f7_)
content::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Accel_BrightnessUp_F7"));
OnBrightnessUp();
return true;
} else if (keycode == key_f8_ || keycode == key_volume_mute_) {
if (keycode == key_f8_)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_VolumeMute_F8"));
OnVolumeMute();
return true;
} else if (keycode == key_f9_ || keycode == key_volume_down_) {
if (keycode == key_f9_)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_VolumeDown_F9"));
OnVolumeDown();
return true;
} else if (keycode == key_f10_ || keycode == key_volume_up_) {
if (keycode == key_f10_)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_VolumeUp_F10"));
OnVolumeUp();
return true;
}
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mainloop_get_child_pid(mainloop_child_t *child)
{
return child->pid;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::InitRenderFrame(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host->IsRenderFrameLive())
return true;
SiteInstance* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
int opener_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
if (frame_tree_node_->opener())
opener_routing_id = GetOpenerRoutingID(site_instance);
int parent_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
if (frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
parent_routing_id = frame_tree_node_->parent()
->render_manager()
->GetRoutingIdForSiteInstance(site_instance);
CHECK_NE(parent_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
}
int previous_sibling_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
FrameTreeNode* previous_sibling = frame_tree_node_->PreviousSibling();
if (previous_sibling) {
previous_sibling_routing_id =
previous_sibling->render_manager()->GetRoutingIdForSiteInstance(
site_instance);
CHECK_NE(previous_sibling_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
}
int proxy_routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
RenderFrameProxyHost* existing_proxy = GetRenderFrameProxyHost(site_instance);
if (existing_proxy) {
proxy_routing_id = existing_proxy->GetRoutingID();
CHECK_NE(proxy_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
if (!existing_proxy->is_render_frame_proxy_live())
existing_proxy->InitRenderFrameProxy();
}
if (!existing_proxy && frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
RenderFrameProxyHost* parent_proxy = RenderFrameProxyHost::FromID(
render_frame_host->GetProcess()->GetID(), parent_routing_id);
if (!parent_proxy || !parent_proxy->is_render_frame_proxy_live()) {
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue("initrf_parent_proxy_exists",
parent_proxy ? "yes" : "no");
SiteInstance* parent_instance =
frame_tree_node_->parent()->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue(
"initrf_parent_is_in_same_site_instance",
site_instance == parent_instance ? "yes" : "no");
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue("initrf_parent_process_is_live",
frame_tree_node_->parent()
->current_frame_host()
->GetProcess()
->HasConnection()
? "yes"
: "no");
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue(
"initrf_render_view_is_live",
render_frame_host->render_view_host()->IsRenderViewLive() ? "yes"
: "no");
FrameTreeNode* root = frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()->root();
if (root != frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
SiteInstance* root_instance =
root->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance();
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue(
"initrf_root_is_in_same_site_instance",
site_instance == root_instance ? "yes" : "no");
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue(
"initrf_root_is_in_same_site_instance_as_parent",
parent_instance == root_instance ? "yes" : "no");
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue("initrf_root_process_is_live",
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree()
->root()
->current_frame_host()
->GetProcess()
->HasConnection()
? "yes"
: "no");
RenderFrameProxyHost* top_proxy =
root->render_manager()->GetRenderFrameProxyHost(site_instance);
if (top_proxy) {
base::debug::SetCrashKeyValue(
"initrf_root_proxy_is_live",
top_proxy->is_render_frame_proxy_live() ? "yes" : "no");
}
}
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
}
}
return delegate_->CreateRenderFrameForRenderManager(
render_frame_host, proxy_routing_id, opener_routing_id, parent_routing_id,
previous_sibling_routing_id);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkCodec::Result SkIcoCodec::onIncrementalDecode(int* rowsDecoded) {
SkASSERT(fCurrIncrementalCodec);
return fCurrIncrementalCodec->incrementalDecode(rowsDecoded);
}
Commit Message: RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <reed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <robertphillips@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <stephana@google.com>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 17,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::RepeatingCallback<void(Args...)> CreateSafeCallback(
SkiaOutputSurfaceDependency* dependency,
const base::RepeatingCallback<void(Args...)>& callback) {
DCHECK(dependency);
return base::BindRepeating(&PostAsyncTask<Args...>, dependency, callback);
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 20,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_proc_setclientid(struct nfs_client *clp, u32 program, unsigned short port, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
nfs4_verifier sc_verifier;
struct nfs4_setclientid setclientid = {
.sc_verifier = &sc_verifier,
.sc_prog = program,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETCLIENTID],
.rpc_argp = &setclientid,
.rpc_resp = clp,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
__be32 *p;
int loop = 0;
int status;
p = (__be32*)sc_verifier.data;
*p++ = htonl((u32)clp->cl_boot_time.tv_sec);
*p = htonl((u32)clp->cl_boot_time.tv_nsec);
for(;;) {
setclientid.sc_name_len = scnprintf(setclientid.sc_name,
sizeof(setclientid.sc_name), "%s/%s %s %s %u",
clp->cl_ipaddr,
rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient,
RPC_DISPLAY_ADDR),
rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient,
RPC_DISPLAY_PROTO),
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_auth->au_ops->au_name,
clp->cl_id_uniquifier);
setclientid.sc_netid_len = scnprintf(setclientid.sc_netid,
sizeof(setclientid.sc_netid),
rpc_peeraddr2str(clp->cl_rpcclient,
RPC_DISPLAY_NETID));
setclientid.sc_uaddr_len = scnprintf(setclientid.sc_uaddr,
sizeof(setclientid.sc_uaddr), "%s.%u.%u",
clp->cl_ipaddr, port >> 8, port & 255);
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, 0);
if (status != -NFS4ERR_CLID_INUSE)
break;
if (signalled())
break;
if (loop++ & 1)
ssleep(clp->cl_lease_time + 1);
else
if (++clp->cl_id_uniquifier == 0)
break;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ptrace_sethbpregs(struct task_struct *tsk, long num,
unsigned long __user *data)
{
int idx, gen_len, gen_type, implied_type, ret = 0;
u32 user_val;
struct perf_event *bp;
struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
struct perf_event_attr attr;
if (num == 0)
goto out;
else if (num < 0)
implied_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW;
else
implied_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_X;
idx = ptrace_hbp_num_to_idx(num);
if (idx < 0 || idx >= ARM_MAX_HBP_SLOTS) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (get_user(user_val, data)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
bp = tsk->thread.debug.hbp[idx];
if (!bp) {
bp = ptrace_hbp_create(tsk, implied_type);
if (IS_ERR(bp)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bp);
goto out;
}
tsk->thread.debug.hbp[idx] = bp;
}
attr = bp->attr;
if (num & 0x1) {
/* Address */
attr.bp_addr = user_val;
} else {
/* Control */
decode_ctrl_reg(user_val, &ctrl);
ret = arch_bp_generic_fields(ctrl, &gen_len, &gen_type);
if (ret)
goto out;
if ((gen_type & implied_type) != gen_type) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
attr.bp_len = gen_len;
attr.bp_type = gen_type;
attr.disabled = !ctrl.enabled;
}
ret = modify_user_hw_breakpoint(bp, &attr);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bitmap_decompress(uint8 * output, int width, int height, uint8 * input, int size, int Bpp)
{
RD_BOOL rv = False;
switch (Bpp)
{
case 1:
rv = bitmap_decompress1(output, width, height, input, size);
break;
case 2:
rv = bitmap_decompress2(output, width, height, input, size);
break;
case 3:
rv = bitmap_decompress3(output, width, height, input, size);
break;
case 4:
rv = bitmap_decompress4(output, width, height, input, size);
break;
default:
logger(Core, Debug, "bitmap_decompress(), unhandled BPP %d", Bpp);
break;
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init snd_timer_proc_init(void)
{
struct snd_info_entry *entry;
entry = snd_info_create_module_entry(THIS_MODULE, "timers", NULL);
if (entry != NULL) {
entry->c.text.read = snd_timer_proc_read;
if (snd_info_register(entry) < 0) {
snd_info_free_entry(entry);
entry = NULL;
}
}
snd_timer_proc_entry = entry;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSuppressFurtherDialogs() {
suppress_further_dialogs_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::CanExecuteScriptOnPage(const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
const UserScript* script,
std::string* error) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_data_lock_);
GURL store_url(extension_urls::GetWebstoreLaunchURL());
if ((document_url.host() == store_url.host()) &&
!CanExecuteScriptEverywhere() &&
!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kAllowScriptingGallery)) {
if (error)
*error = errors::kCannotScriptGallery;
return false;
}
if (document_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!CanExecuteScriptEverywhere()) {
return false;
}
if (top_frame_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) &&
top_frame_url.GetOrigin() !=
GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(id()).GetOrigin() &&
!CanExecuteScriptEverywhere()) {
return false;
}
if (tab_id >= 0) {
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> tab_permissions =
runtime_data_.GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
if (tab_permissions.get() &&
tab_permissions->explicit_hosts().MatchesSecurityOrigin(document_url)) {
return true;
}
}
if (script)
return script->MatchesURL(document_url);
if (runtime_data_.GetActivePermissions()->HasExplicitAccessToOrigin(
document_url)) {
return true;
}
if (error) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(errors::kCannotAccessPage,
document_url.spec());
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXFixesSetCursorName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
Atom atom;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pCursor, stuff->cursor, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
atom = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, TRUE);
return BadAlloc;
pCursor->name = atom;
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 8,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tid_smaps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return do_maps_open(inode, file, &proc_tid_smaps_op);
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int credssp_ntlm_server_init(rdpCredssp* credssp)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings = credssp->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
sspi_SecBufferAlloc(&credssp->PublicKey, credssp->transport->TlsIn->PublicKeyLength);
CopyMemory(credssp->PublicKey.pvBuffer, credssp->transport->TlsIn->PublicKey, credssp->transport->TlsIn->PublicKeyLength);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 21,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
vcpu->arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
cpu_based_vm_exec_control = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
cpu_based_vm_exec_control |= CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_check_attr_type(struct rtattr **tb, u32 type)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return PTR_ERR(algt);
if ((algt->type ^ type) & algt->mask)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InvalidState AXNodeObject::getInvalidState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kInvalid);
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return InvalidStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return InvalidStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "spelling"))
return InvalidStateSpelling;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "grammar"))
return InvalidStateGrammar;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return InvalidStateOther;
if (getNode() && getNode()->isElementNode() &&
toElement(getNode())->isFormControlElement()) {
HTMLFormControlElement* element = toHTMLFormControlElement(getNode());
HeapVector<Member<HTMLFormControlElement>> invalidControls;
bool isInvalid =
!element->checkValidity(&invalidControls, CheckValidityDispatchNoEvent);
return isInvalid ? InvalidStateTrue : InvalidStateFalse;
}
return AXObject::getInvalidState();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 20,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeContentLogicalHeight(const Length& height, LayoutUnit intrinsicContentHeight) const
{
LayoutUnit heightIncludingScrollbar = computeContentAndScrollbarLogicalHeightUsing(height, intrinsicContentHeight);
if (heightIncludingScrollbar == -1)
return -1;
return std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, adjustContentBoxLogicalHeightForBoxSizing(heightIncludingScrollbar) - scrollbarLogicalHeight());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted = sk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 12,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileUtilProxy::Move(scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& src_file_path,
const FilePath& dest_file_path,
StatusCallback* callback) {
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy,
new RelayMove(src_file_path, dest_file_path, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void trace_access_unlock(int cpu)
{
(void)cpu;
mutex_unlock(&access_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 18,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
const or_options_t *options, time_t now,
int *num_present_out, int *num_usable_out,
char **status_out)
{
smartlist_t *guards = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *mid = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *exits = smartlist_new();
double f_guard, f_mid, f_exit;
double f_path = 0.0;
/* Used to determine whether there are any exits in the consensus */
int np = 0;
/* Used to determine whether there are any exits with descriptors */
int nu = 0;
const int authdir = authdir_mode_v3(options);
count_usable_descriptors(num_present_out, num_usable_out,
mid, consensus, options, now, NULL,
USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL);
if (options->EntryNodes) {
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, guards, consensus, options, now,
options->EntryNodes, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL);
} else {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(mid, const node_t *, node, {
if (authdir) {
if (node->rs && node->rs->is_possible_guard)
smartlist_add(guards, (node_t*)node);
} else {
if (node->is_possible_guard)
smartlist_add(guards, (node_t*)node);
}
});
}
/* All nodes with exit flag
* If we're in a network with TestingDirAuthVoteExit set,
* this can cause false positives on have_consensus_path,
* incorrectly setting it to CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT. This is
* an unavoidable feature of forcing authorities to declare
* certain nodes as exits.
*/
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, exits, consensus, options, now,
NULL, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY);
log_debug(LD_NET,
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
"exits",
np,
nu);
/* We need at least 1 exit present in the consensus to consider
* building exit paths */
/* Update our understanding of whether the consensus has exits */
consensus_path_type_t old_have_consensus_path = have_consensus_path;
have_consensus_path = ((nu > 0) ?
CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT :
CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL);
if (have_consensus_path == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL
&& old_have_consensus_path != have_consensus_path) {
log_notice(LD_NET,
"The current consensus has no exit nodes. "
"Tor can only build internal paths, "
"such as paths to hidden services.");
/* However, exit nodes can reachability self-test using this consensus,
* join the network, and appear in a later consensus. This will allow
* the network to build exit paths, such as paths for world wide web
* browsing (as distinct from hidden service web browsing). */
}
f_guard = frac_nodes_with_descriptors(guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
f_mid = frac_nodes_with_descriptors(mid, WEIGHT_FOR_MID);
f_exit = frac_nodes_with_descriptors(exits, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
log_debug(LD_NET,
"f_guard: %.2f, f_mid: %.2f, f_exit: %.2f",
f_guard,
f_mid,
f_exit);
smartlist_free(guards);
smartlist_free(mid);
smartlist_free(exits);
if (options->ExitNodes) {
double f_myexit, f_myexit_unflagged;
smartlist_t *myexits= smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *myexits_unflagged = smartlist_new();
/* All nodes with exit flag in ExitNodes option */
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, myexits, consensus, options, now,
options->ExitNodes, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY);
log_debug(LD_NET,
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
"myexits",
np,
nu);
/* Now compute the nodes in the ExitNodes option where which we don't know
* what their exit policy is, or we know it permits something. */
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, myexits_unflagged,
consensus, options, now,
options->ExitNodes, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL);
log_debug(LD_NET,
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
"myexits_unflagged (initial)",
np,
nu);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(myexits_unflagged, const node_t *, node) {
if (node_has_descriptor(node) && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(node)) {
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(myexits_unflagged, node);
/* this node is not actually an exit */
np--;
/* this node is unusable as an exit */
nu--;
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
log_debug(LD_NET,
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
"myexits_unflagged (final)",
np,
nu);
f_myexit= frac_nodes_with_descriptors(myexits,WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
f_myexit_unflagged=
frac_nodes_with_descriptors(myexits_unflagged,WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
log_debug(LD_NET,
"f_exit: %.2f, f_myexit: %.2f, f_myexit_unflagged: %.2f",
f_exit,
f_myexit,
f_myexit_unflagged);
/* If our ExitNodes list has eliminated every possible Exit node, and there
* were some possible Exit nodes, then instead consider nodes that permit
* exiting to some ports. */
if (smartlist_len(myexits) == 0 &&
smartlist_len(myexits_unflagged)) {
f_myexit = f_myexit_unflagged;
}
smartlist_free(myexits);
smartlist_free(myexits_unflagged);
/* This is a tricky point here: we don't want to make it easy for a
* directory to trickle exits to us until it learns which exits we have
* configured, so require that we have a threshold both of total exits
* and usable exits. */
if (f_myexit < f_exit)
f_exit = f_myexit;
}
/* if the consensus has no exits, treat the exit fraction as 100% */
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT) {
f_exit = 1.0;
}
f_path = f_guard * f_mid * f_exit;
if (status_out)
tor_asprintf(status_out,
"%d%% of guards bw, "
"%d%% of midpoint bw, and "
"%d%% of exit bw%s = "
"%d%% of path bw",
(int)(f_guard*100),
(int)(f_mid*100),
(int)(f_exit*100),
(router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT ?
"" :
" (no exits in consensus)"),
(int)(f_path*100));
return f_path;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ext3_fsblk_t get_sb_block(void **data, struct super_block *sb)
{
ext3_fsblk_t sb_block;
char *options = (char *) *data;
if (!options || strncmp(options, "sb=", 3) != 0)
return 1; /* Default location */
options += 3;
/*todo: use simple_strtoll with >32bit ext3 */
sb_block = simple_strtoul(options, &options, 0);
if (*options && *options != ',') {
ext3_msg(sb, "error: invalid sb specification: %s",
(char *) *data);
return 1;
}
if (*options == ',')
options++;
*data = (void *) options;
return sb_block;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 5,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __svc_register(struct net *net, const char *progname,
const u32 program, const u32 version,
const int family,
const unsigned short protocol,
const unsigned short port)
{
int error = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
switch (family) {
case PF_INET:
error = __svc_rpcb_register4(net, program, version,
protocol, port);
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6:
error = __svc_rpcb_register6(net, program, version,
protocol, port);
#endif
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 15,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vp78_update_pred16x16_pred8x8_mvc_probabilities(VP8Context *s,
int mvc_size)
{
VP56RangeCoder *c = &s->c;
int i, j;
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->prob->pred16x16[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
s->prob->pred8x8c[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
for (j = 0; j < mvc_size; j++)
if (vp56_rac_get_prob_branchy(c, vp8_mv_update_prob[i][j]))
s->prob->mvc[i][j] = vp8_rac_get_nn(c);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *tcp_v4_hnd_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
struct sock *nsk;
struct request_sock **prev;
/* Find possible connection requests. */
struct request_sock *req = inet_csk_search_req(sk, &prev, th->source,
iph->saddr, iph->daddr);
if (req)
return tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, prev);
nsk = inet_lookup_established(sock_net(sk), &tcp_hashinfo, iph->saddr,
th->source, iph->daddr, th->dest, inet_iif(skb));
if (nsk) {
if (nsk->sk_state != TCP_TIME_WAIT) {
bh_lock_sock(nsk);
return nsk;
}
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(nsk));
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
if (!th->syn)
sk = cookie_v4_check(sk, skb, &(IPCB(skb)->opt));
#endif
return sk;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 23,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebPlugin* RenderFrameImpl::CreatePlugin(
blink::WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginInfo& info,
const blink::WebPluginParams& params) {
DCHECK_EQ(frame_, frame);
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
bool pepper_plugin_was_registered = false;
scoped_refptr<PluginModule> pepper_module(PluginModule::Create(
this, info, &pepper_plugin_was_registered));
if (pepper_plugin_was_registered) {
if (pepper_module.get()) {
return new PepperWebPluginImpl(pepper_module.get(), params, this);
}
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
LOG(WARNING) << "Pepper module/plugin creation failed.";
return NULL;
#else
return new WebPluginImpl(frame, params, info.path, render_view_, this);
#endif
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lua_register_hooks(apr_pool_t *p)
{
/* ap_register_output_filter("luahood", luahood, NULL, AP_FTYPE_RESOURCE); */
ap_hook_handler(lua_handler, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_create_request(create_request_config, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
/* http_request.h hooks */
ap_hook_translate_name(lua_translate_name_harness_first, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST);
ap_hook_translate_name(lua_translate_name_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_translate_name(lua_translate_name_harness_last, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST);
ap_hook_fixups(lua_fixup_harness, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_map_to_storage(lua_map_to_storage_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
/* XXX: Does not work :(
* ap_hook_check_user_id(lua_check_user_id_harness_first, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST);
*/
ap_hook_check_user_id(lua_check_user_id_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
/* XXX: Does not work :(
* ap_hook_check_user_id(lua_check_user_id_harness_last, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST);
*/
ap_hook_type_checker(lua_type_checker_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_access_checker(lua_access_checker_harness_first, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST);
ap_hook_access_checker(lua_access_checker_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_access_checker(lua_access_checker_harness_last, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST);
ap_hook_auth_checker(lua_auth_checker_harness_first, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST);
ap_hook_auth_checker(lua_auth_checker_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_auth_checker(lua_auth_checker_harness_last, NULL, NULL,
AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST);
ap_hook_insert_filter(lua_insert_filter_harness, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_quick_handler(lua_quick_harness, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
ap_hook_post_config(lua_post_config, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_pre_config(lua_pre_config, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
APR_OPTIONAL_HOOK(ap_lua, lua_open, lua_open_hook, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_REALLY_FIRST);
APR_OPTIONAL_HOOK(ap_lua, lua_request, lua_request_hook, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_REALLY_FIRST);
ap_hook_handler(lua_map_handler, NULL, NULL, AP_LUA_HOOK_FIRST);
/* Hook this right before FallbackResource kicks in */
ap_hook_fixups(lua_map_handler_fixups, NULL, NULL, AP_LUA_HOOK_LAST-2);
#if APR_HAS_THREADS
ap_hook_child_init(ap_lua_init_mutex, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
#endif
/* providers */
lua_authz_providers = apr_hash_make(p);
/* Logging catcher */
ap_hook_log_transaction(lua_log_transaction_harness,NULL,NULL,
APR_HOOK_FIRST);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_ofp14_port_ethernet_property(const struct ofpbuf *payload,
struct ofputil_phy_port *pp)
{
struct ofp14_port_desc_prop_ethernet *eth = payload->data;
if (payload->size != sizeof *eth) {
return OFPERR_OFPBPC_BAD_LEN;
}
pp->curr = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(eth->curr);
pp->advertised = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(eth->advertised);
pp->supported = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(eth->supported);
pp->peer = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(eth->peer);
pp->curr_speed = ntohl(eth->curr_speed);
pp->max_speed = ntohl(eth->max_speed);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 1,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double BaseRenderingContext2D::shadowOffsetX() const {
return GetState().ShadowOffset().Width();
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_bin_append_prepend(conn *c) {
char *key;
int nkey;
int vlen;
item *it;
assert(c != NULL);
key = binary_get_key(c);
nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
vlen = c->binary_header.request.bodylen - nkey;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Value len is %d\n", vlen);
}
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_set(key, nkey);
}
it = item_alloc(key, nkey, 0, 0, vlen+2);
if (it == 0) {
if (! item_size_ok(nkey, 0, vlen + 2)) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_E2BIG, vlen);
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_ENOMEM, vlen);
}
/* swallow the data line */
c->write_and_go = conn_swallow;
return;
}
ITEM_set_cas(it, c->binary_header.request.cas);
switch (c->cmd) {
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_APPEND:
c->cmd = NREAD_APPEND;
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_PREPEND:
c->cmd = NREAD_PREPEND;
break;
default:
assert(0);
}
c->item = it;
c->ritem = ITEM_data(it);
c->rlbytes = vlen;
conn_set_state(c, conn_nread);
c->substate = bin_read_set_value;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb(__be32 src, __be32 dst,
u8 ip_proto, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct iphdr *iph;
skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
/* Reserve room for dummy headers, this skb can pass
* through good chunk of routing engine.
*/
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
iph = skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
iph->protocol = ip_proto;
iph->saddr = src;
iph->daddr = dst;
iph->version = 0x4;
iph->frag_off = 0;
iph->ihl = 0x5;
skb_set_transport_header(skb, skb->len);
switch (iph->protocol) {
case IPPROTO_UDP: {
struct udphdr *udph;
udph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
udph->source = sport;
udph->dest = dport;
udph->len = sizeof(struct udphdr);
udph->check = 0;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_TCP: {
struct tcphdr *tcph;
tcph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr));
tcph->source = sport;
tcph->dest = dport;
tcph->doff = sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4;
tcph->rst = 1;
tcph->check = ~tcp_v4_check(sizeof(struct tcphdr),
src, dst, 0);
break;
}
case IPPROTO_ICMP: {
struct icmphdr *icmph;
icmph = skb_put_zero(skb, sizeof(struct icmphdr));
icmph->type = ICMP_ECHO;
icmph->code = 0;
}
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 25,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ValidateRendererAllocations(base::Value* dump_json) {
SCOPED_TRACE("Validating Renderer Allocation");
base::ProcessId renderer_pid = base::GetProcId(browser()
->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->GetProcess()
->GetHandle());
base::Value* heaps_v2 = FindHeapsV2(renderer_pid, dump_json);
if (GetParam() == switches::kMemlogModeAll ||
GetParam() == switches::kMemlogModeRendererSampling) {
ASSERT_TRUE(heaps_v2);
} else {
ASSERT_FALSE(heaps_v2)
<< "There should be no heap dump for the renderer.";
}
if (GetParam() == switches::kMemlogModeRendererSampling) {
EXPECT_EQ(1, NumProcessesWithName(dump_json, "Renderer"));
} else {
EXPECT_GT(NumProcessesWithName(dump_json, "Renderer"), 0);
}
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BookmarkBarViewBackground::BookmarkBarViewBackground(
BrowserView* browser_view,
BookmarkBarView* bookmark_bar_view)
: browser_view_(browser_view), bookmark_bar_view_(bookmark_bar_view) {}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_asymm_verify(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *data, size_t data_len,
const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
size_t hash_size;
int salt_len = 0;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
uint32_t hash_algo;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_VERIFY)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t)data, data_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t)sig, sig_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * num_params);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo)) {
case TEE_MAIN_ALGO_RSA:
if (cs->algo != TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5) {
hash_algo = TEE_DIGEST_HASH_TO_ALGO(cs->algo);
res = tee_hash_get_digest_size(hash_algo, &hash_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
break;
if (data_len != hash_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params,
hash_size);
}
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_verify(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
data, data_len, sig,
sig_len);
break;
case TEE_MAIN_ALGO_DSA:
hash_algo = TEE_DIGEST_HASH_TO_ALGO(cs->algo);
res = tee_hash_get_digest_size(hash_algo, &hash_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
break;
/*
* Depending on the DSA algorithm (NIST), the digital signature
* output size may be truncated to the size of a key pair
* (Q prime size). Q prime size must be less or equal than the
* hash output length of the hash algorithm involved.
*/
if (data_len > hash_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_verify(cs->algo, o->attr, data,
data_len, sig, sig_len);
break;
case TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDSA:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_verify(cs->algo, o->attr, data,
data_len, sig, sig_len);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0010: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> NormalizeImpl(
Handle<JSObject> object, Handle<FixedArrayBase> elements) {
UNREACHABLE();
return Handle<SeededNumberDictionary>();
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 19,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::GetEntryInfoPairByPathsAfterGetFirst(
const FilePath& first_path,
const FilePath& second_path,
const GetEntryInfoPairCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
scoped_ptr<EntryInfoPairResult> result(new EntryInfoPairResult);
result->first.path = first_path;
result->first.error = error;
result->first.proto = entry_proto.Pass();
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(result.Pass());
return;
}
GetEntryInfoByPath(
second_path,
base::Bind(&GDataDirectoryService::GetEntryInfoPairByPathsAfterGetSecond,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
second_path,
callback,
base::Passed(&result)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nl80211_send_scan_start(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return;
if (nl80211_send_scan_msg(msg, rdev, netdev, 0, 0, 0,
NL80211_CMD_TRIGGER_SCAN) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_scan_mcgrp.id, GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,973 |
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