instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::OpenURLsInBrowser(
Browser* browser,
bool process_startup,
const std::vector<GURL>& urls) {
std::vector<Tab> tabs;
UrlsToTabs(urls, &tabs);
return OpenTabsInBrowser(browser, process_startup, tabs);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst,
u_int bridge_pad)
{
uint32_t orgcode;
register u_short et;
register int ret;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 5);
if (caplen < 5 || length < 5)
goto trunc;
orgcode = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
et = EXTRACT_16BITS(p + 3);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
/*
* Somebody's already printed the MAC addresses, if there
* are any, so just print the SNAP header, not the MAC
* addresses.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "oui %s (0x%06x), %s %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", orgcode),
orgcode,
(orgcode == 0x000000 ? "ethertype" : "pid"),
tok2str(oui_to_struct_tok(orgcode), "Unknown", et),
et, length - 5));
}
p += 5;
length -= 5;
caplen -= 5;
switch (orgcode) {
case OUI_ENCAP_ETHER:
case OUI_CISCO_90:
/*
* This is an encapsulated Ethernet packet,
* or a packet bridged by some piece of
* Cisco hardware; the protocol ID is
* an Ethernet protocol type.
*/
ret = ethertype_print(ndo, et, p, length, caplen, src, dst);
if (ret)
return (ret);
break;
case OUI_APPLETALK:
if (et == ETHERTYPE_ATALK) {
/*
* No, I have no idea why Apple used one
* of their own OUIs, rather than
* 0x000000, and an Ethernet packet
* type, for Appletalk data packets,
* but used 0x000000 and an Ethernet
* packet type for AARP packets.
*/
ret = ethertype_print(ndo, et, p, length, caplen, src, dst);
if (ret)
return (ret);
}
break;
case OUI_CISCO:
switch (et) {
case PID_CISCO_CDP:
cdp_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case PID_CISCO_DTP:
dtp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case PID_CISCO_UDLD:
udld_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case PID_CISCO_VTP:
vtp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case PID_CISCO_PVST:
case PID_CISCO_VLANBRIDGE:
stp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
default:
break;
}
break;
case OUI_RFC2684:
switch (et) {
case PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS:
case PID_RFC2684_ETH_NOFCS:
/*
* XXX - remove the last two bytes for
* PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS?
*/
/*
* Skip the padding.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, bridge_pad);
caplen -= bridge_pad;
length -= bridge_pad;
p += bridge_pad;
/*
* What remains is an Ethernet packet.
*/
ether_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, NULL, NULL);
return (1);
case PID_RFC2684_802_5_FCS:
case PID_RFC2684_802_5_NOFCS:
/*
* XXX - remove the last two bytes for
* PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS?
*/
/*
* Skip the padding, but not the Access
* Control field.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, bridge_pad);
caplen -= bridge_pad;
length -= bridge_pad;
p += bridge_pad;
/*
* What remains is an 802.5 Token Ring
* packet.
*/
token_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case PID_RFC2684_FDDI_FCS:
case PID_RFC2684_FDDI_NOFCS:
/*
* XXX - remove the last two bytes for
* PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS?
*/
/*
* Skip the padding.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*p, bridge_pad + 1);
caplen -= bridge_pad + 1;
length -= bridge_pad + 1;
p += bridge_pad + 1;
/*
* What remains is an FDDI packet.
*/
fddi_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case PID_RFC2684_BPDU:
stp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
}
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
/*
* Nobody printed the link-layer addresses, so print them, if
* we have any.
*/
if (src != NULL && dst != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr)));
}
/*
* Print the SNAP header, but if the OUI is 000000, don't
* bother printing it, and report the PID as being an
* ethertype.
*/
if (orgcode == 0x000000) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SNAP, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", et),
et, length));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SNAP, oui %s (0x%06x), pid %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", orgcode),
orgcode,
tok2str(oui_to_struct_tok(orgcode), "Unknown", et),
et, length));
}
}
return (0);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|snap]"));
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodHMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(1, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (V8TestInterface::HasInstance(info[0], info.GetIsolate())) {
OverloadedMethodH1Method(info);
return;
}
if (V8TestInterfaceEmpty::HasInstance(info[0], info.GetIsolate())) {
OverloadedMethodH2Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodH");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_inode_walk(TSK_FS_INFO * fs, TSK_INUM_T start_inum,
TSK_INUM_T end_inum, TSK_FS_META_FLAG_ENUM flags,
TSK_FS_META_WALK_CB action, void *ptr)
{
TSK_INUM_T inum;
TSK_FS_FILE *fs_file;
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_inode_walk: start_inum: %" PRIuINUM " end_inum: %"
PRIuINUM " flags: %" PRIu32 "\n", start_inum, end_inum, flags);
/*
* Sanity checks.
*/
if (start_inum < fs->first_inum || start_inum > fs->last_inum) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_WALK_RNG);
tsk_error_set_errstr("inode_walk: Start inode: %" PRIuINUM "",
start_inum);
return 1;
}
else if (end_inum < fs->first_inum || end_inum > fs->last_inum
|| end_inum < start_inum) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_WALK_RNG);
tsk_error_set_errstr("inode_walk: End inode: %" PRIuINUM "",
end_inum);
return 1;
}
/* If ORPHAN is wanted, then make sure that the flags are correct */
if (flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_ORPHAN) {
flags |= TSK_FS_META_FLAG_UNALLOC;
flags &= ~TSK_FS_META_FLAG_ALLOC;
flags |= TSK_FS_META_FLAG_USED;
flags &= ~TSK_FS_META_FLAG_UNUSED;
}
else {
if (((flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_ALLOC) == 0) &&
((flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_UNALLOC) == 0)) {
flags |= (TSK_FS_META_FLAG_ALLOC | TSK_FS_META_FLAG_UNALLOC);
}
/* If neither of the USED or UNUSED flags are set, then set them
* both
*/
if (((flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_USED) == 0) &&
((flags & TSK_FS_META_FLAG_UNUSED) == 0)) {
flags |= (TSK_FS_META_FLAG_USED | TSK_FS_META_FLAG_UNUSED);
}
}
if ((fs_file = tsk_fs_file_alloc(fs)) == NULL)
return 1;
if ((fs_file->meta = tsk_fs_meta_alloc(HFS_FILE_CONTENT_LEN)) == NULL)
return 1;
if (start_inum > end_inum)
XSWAP(start_inum, end_inum);
for (inum = start_inum; inum <= end_inum; ++inum) {
int retval;
if (hfs_inode_lookup(fs, fs_file, inum)) {
if (tsk_error_get_errno() == TSK_ERR_FS_INODE_NUM) {
tsk_error_reset();
continue;
}
else {
return 1;
}
}
if ((fs_file->meta->flags & flags) != fs_file->meta->flags)
continue;
/* call action */
retval = action(fs_file, ptr);
if (retval == TSK_WALK_STOP) {
tsk_fs_file_close(fs_file);
return 0;
}
else if (retval == TSK_WALK_ERROR) {
tsk_fs_file_close(fs_file);
return 1;
}
}
tsk_fs_file_close(fs_file);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 29,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::resetDataSource() {
mAudioTimeUs = 0;
mVideoTimeUs = 0;
mHTTPService.clear();
mHttpSource.clear();
mUri.clear();
mUriHeaders.clear();
mFd = -1;
mOffset = 0;
mLength = 0;
setDrmPlaybackStatusIfNeeded(Playback::STOP, 0);
mDecryptHandle = NULL;
mDrmManagerClient = NULL;
mStarted = false;
mStopRead = true;
}
Commit Message: GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool hctx_may_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,
struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt)
{
unsigned int depth, users;
if (!hctx || !(hctx->flags & BLK_MQ_F_TAG_SHARED))
return true;
if (!test_bit(BLK_MQ_S_TAG_ACTIVE, &hctx->state))
return true;
/*
* Don't try dividing an ant
*/
if (bt->depth == 1)
return true;
users = atomic_read(&hctx->tags->active_queues);
if (!users)
return true;
/*
* Allow at least some tags
*/
depth = max((bt->depth + users - 1) / users, 4U);
return atomic_read(&hctx->nr_active) < depth;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
int *curves, size_t ncurves)
{
unsigned char *clist, *p;
size_t i;
/* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
* while curve ids < 32
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
if (!clist)
return 0;
for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
{
unsigned long idmask;
int id;
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
idmask = 1L << id;
if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
{
OPENSSL_free(clist);
return 0;
}
dup_list |= idmask;
s2n(id, p);
}
if (*pext)
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = clist;
*pextlen = ncurves * 2;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcCreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
{
PixmapPtr pMap;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
REQUEST(xCreatePixmapReq);
DepthPtr pDepth;
int i, rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCreatePixmapReq);
client->errorValue = stuff->pid;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (!stuff->width || !stuff->height) {
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->width > 32767 || stuff->height > 32767) {
/* It is allowed to try and allocate a pixmap which is larger than
* 32767 in either dimension. However, all of the framebuffer code
* is buggy and does not reliably draw to such big pixmaps, basically
* because the Region data structure operates with signed shorts
* for the rectangles in it.
*
* Furthermore, several places in the X server computes the
* size in bytes of the pixmap and tries to store it in an
* integer. This integer can overflow and cause the allocated size
* to be much smaller.
*
* So, such big pixmaps are rejected here with a BadAlloc
*/
return BadAlloc;
}
if (stuff->depth != 1) {
pDepth = pDraw->pScreen->allowedDepths;
for (i = 0; i < pDraw->pScreen->numDepths; i++, pDepth++)
if (pDepth->depth == stuff->depth)
goto CreatePmap;
client->errorValue = stuff->depth;
return BadValue;
}
CreatePmap:
pMap = (PixmapPtr) (*pDraw->pScreen->CreatePixmap)
(pDraw->pScreen, stuff->width, stuff->height, stuff->depth, 0);
if (pMap) {
pMap->drawable.serialNumber = NEXT_SERIAL_NUMBER;
pMap->drawable.id = stuff->pid;
/* security creation/labeling check */
rc = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP,
pMap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
if (rc != Success) {
(*pDraw->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pMap);
return rc;
}
if (AddResource(stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP, (void *) pMap))
return Success;
}
return BadAlloc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 12,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Compositor::ReenableSwap() {
DCHECK(context_factory_private_);
context_factory_private_->ResizeDisplay(this, size_);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsRestartNeededToCommitChanges() {
return FlagsState::GetInstance()->IsRestartNeededToCommitChanges();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(config_get_hash) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *hash = php_ini_get_configuration_hash();
array_init(return_value);
zend_hash_apply_with_arguments(hash TSRMLS_CC, (apply_func_args_t) add_config_entry_cb, 1, return_value);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
#if defined(IPC_MESSAGE_LOG_ENABLED)
Send(new ChildProcessMsg_SetIPCLoggingEnabled(
IPC::Logging::GetInstance()->Enabled()));
#endif
Send(new ChildProcessMsg_AskBeforeShutdown());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
{
monitor_child_pid = pid;
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage3D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLintptr offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexture3DBinding("texSubImage3D", target))
return;
if (!bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage3D",
"no bound PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
if (unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_) {
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage3D",
"FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA isn't allowed for uploading 3D textures");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexFunc("texSubImage3D", kTexSubImage, kSourceUnpackBuffer,
target, level, 0, width, height, depth, 0, format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset))
return;
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("texSubImage3D", "offset", offset))
return;
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width,
height, depth, format, type,
reinterpret_cast<const void*>(offset));
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TypedUrlModelAssociator::InitSyncNodeFromChromeId(
const std::string& node_id,
sync_api::BaseNode* sync_node) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
const struct iovec *from, int from_offset,
int len)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
int i, copy = start - offset;
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
/* Copy header. */
if (copy > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (memcpy_fromiovecend(skb->data + offset, from, from_offset,
copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from_offset += copy;
}
/* Copy paged appendix. Hmm... why does this look so complicated? */
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
int end;
const skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + skb_frag_size(frag);
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
int err;
u8 *vaddr;
struct page *page = skb_frag_page(frag);
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vaddr = kmap(page);
err = memcpy_fromiovecend(vaddr + frag->page_offset +
offset - start,
from, from_offset, copy);
kunmap(page);
if (err)
goto fault;
if (!(len -= copy))
return 0;
offset += copy;
from_offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + frag_iter->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(frag_iter,
offset - start,
from,
from_offset,
copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from_offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
if (!len)
return 0;
fault:
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeRenderMessageFilter::~ChromeRenderMessageFilter() {
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::Find(int request_id,
const base::string16& search_text,
const blink::WebFindOptions& options) {
if (search_text.empty()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (browser_plugin_embedder_ &&
browser_plugin_embedder_->Find(request_id, search_text, options)) {
return;
}
GetMainFrame()->Send(new FrameMsg_Find(GetMainFrame()->GetRoutingID(),
request_id, search_text, options));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::Delete() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_Delete(focused_frame->GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("DeleteSelection"));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::hasCustomFocusLogic() const
{
return m_inputType->hasCustomFocusLogic();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int test_set_oom_score_adj(int new_val)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand = current->sighand;
int old_val;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
old_val = current->signal->oom_score_adj;
if (new_val != old_val) {
if (new_val == OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN)
atomic_inc(¤t->mm->oom_disable_count);
else if (old_val == OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN)
atomic_dec(¤t->mm->oom_disable_count);
current->signal->oom_score_adj = new_val;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
return old_val;
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update_mctime(struct inode *inode)
{
struct timespec now = ubifs_current_time(inode);
struct ubifs_inode *ui = ubifs_inode(inode);
struct ubifs_info *c = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
if (mctime_update_needed(inode, &now)) {
int err, release;
struct ubifs_budget_req req = { .dirtied_ino = 1,
.dirtied_ino_d = ALIGN(ui->data_len, 8) };
err = ubifs_budget_space(c, &req);
if (err)
return err;
mutex_lock(&ui->ui_mutex);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ubifs_current_time(inode);
release = ui->dirty;
mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);
mutex_unlock(&ui->ui_mutex);
if (release)
ubifs_release_budget(c, &req);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(is_soap_fault)
{
zval *fault;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &fault) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_P(fault) == IS_OBJECT &&
instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_P(fault), soap_fault_class_entry TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nft_validate_data_load(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, enum nft_registers reg,
const struct nft_data *data,
enum nft_data_types type)
{
int err;
switch (reg) {
case NFT_REG_VERDICT:
if (data == NULL || type != NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
return -EINVAL;
if (data->verdict == NFT_GOTO || data->verdict == NFT_JUMP) {
err = nf_tables_check_loops(ctx, data->chain);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (ctx->chain->level + 1 > data->chain->level) {
if (ctx->chain->level + 1 == NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE)
return -EMLINK;
data->chain->level = ctx->chain->level + 1;
}
}
return 0;
default:
if (data != NULL && type != NFT_DATA_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 8,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Tar::Create(const wxString& dmod_folder, double *compression_ratio, wxProgressDialog* aProgressDialog)
{
if (!bCanCompress)
return wxEmptyString;
wxString strCwd = ::wxGetCwd();
::wxSetWorkingDirectory(strCompressDir);
bool result = CreateReal(dmod_folder, compression_ratio, aProgressDialog);
::wxSetWorkingDirectory(strCwd);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 4,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t)
{
return send_signal(sig, info, t, 0);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tty_hung_up_p(struct file *filp)
{
return (filp->f_op == &hung_up_tty_fops);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t userpolicy_type_attrsize(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
return nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_type));
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::updateViewportConstraintStatus(RenderLayer* layer)
{
if (isViewportConstrainedFixedOrStickyLayer(layer))
addViewportConstrainedLayer(layer);
else
removeViewportConstrainedLayer(layer);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
if (cfs_rq->on_list) {
list_del_rcu(&cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
cfs_rq->on_list = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 26,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int preempt_count_equals(int preempt_offset)
{
int nested = preempt_count() + rcu_preempt_depth();
return (nested == preempt_offset);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_drain_donequeue(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb, struct CommandControlBlock *pCCB, bool error)
{
int id, lun;
if ((pCCB->acb != acb) || (pCCB->startdone != ARCMSR_CCB_START)) {
if (pCCB->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_ABORTED) {
struct scsi_cmnd *abortcmd = pCCB->pcmd;
if (abortcmd) {
id = abortcmd->device->id;
lun = abortcmd->device->lun;
abortcmd->result |= DID_ABORT << 16;
arcmsr_ccb_complete(pCCB);
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: pCCB ='0x%p' isr got aborted command \n",
acb->host->host_no, pCCB);
}
return;
}
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: isr get an illegal ccb command \
done acb = '0x%p'"
"ccb = '0x%p' ccbacb = '0x%p' startdone = 0x%x"
" ccboutstandingcount = %d \n"
, acb->host->host_no
, acb
, pCCB
, pCCB->acb
, pCCB->startdone
, atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount));
return;
}
arcmsr_report_ccb_state(acb, pCCB, error);
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_invept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 vmx_instruction_info, types;
unsigned long type;
gva_t gva;
struct x86_exception e;
struct {
u64 eptp, gpa;
} operand;
if (!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) ||
!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps & VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf);
types = (vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps >> VMX_EPT_EXTENT_SHIFT) & 6;
if (type >= 32 || !(types & (1 << type))) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
/* According to the Intel VMX instruction reference, the memory
* operand is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==global)
*/
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx_instruction_info, false, &gva))
return 1;
if (kvm_read_guest_virt(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva, &operand,
sizeof(operand), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
switch (type) {
case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL:
/*
* TODO: track mappings and invalidate
* single context requests appropriately
*/
case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT:
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
break;
default:
BUG_ON(1);
break;
}
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
IncludePrivacySensitiveFields include_privacy_sensitive_fields) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 16,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionPromptImpl::CanAcceptRequestUpdate() {
return !(bubble_delegate_ && bubble_delegate_->IsMouseHovered());
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vsock_dev_compat_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
return vsock_dev_do_ioctl(filp, cmd, compat_ptr(arg));
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ldm_relative(const u8 *buffer, int buflen, int base, int offset)
{
base += offset;
if (!buffer || offset < 0 || base > buflen) {
if (!buffer)
ldm_error("!buffer");
if (offset < 0)
ldm_error("offset (%d) < 0", offset);
if (base > buflen)
ldm_error("base (%d) > buflen (%d)", base, buflen);
return -1;
}
if (base + buffer[base] >= buflen) {
ldm_error("base (%d) + buffer[base] (%d) >= buflen (%d)", base,
buffer[base], buflen);
return -1;
}
return buffer[base] + offset + 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ImeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_imeAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ImeAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jboolean AwContents::RestoreFromOpaqueState(
JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jbyteArray state) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
std::vector<uint8> state_vector;
base::android::JavaByteArrayToByteVector(env, state, &state_vector);
base::Pickle pickle(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(state_vector.data()),
state_vector.size());
base::PickleIterator iterator(pickle);
return RestoreFromPickle(&iterator, web_contents_.get());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vector_clipf_c_opposite_sign(float *dst, const float *src, float *min, float *max, int len){
int i;
uint32_t mini = *(uint32_t*)min;
uint32_t maxi = *(uint32_t*)max;
uint32_t maxisign = maxi ^ (1U<<31);
uint32_t *dsti = (uint32_t*)dst;
const uint32_t *srci = (const uint32_t*)src;
for(i=0; i<len; i+=8) {
dsti[i + 0] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 0], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 1] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 1], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 2] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 2], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 3] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 3], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 4] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 4], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 5] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 5], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 6] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 6], mini, maxi, maxisign);
dsti[i + 7] = clipf_c_one(srci[i + 7], mini, maxi, maxisign);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncable::ModelTypeSet ProfileSyncService::GetEncryptedDataTypes() const {
DCHECK(encrypted_types_.Has(syncable::PASSWORDS));
return encrypted_types_;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_fd_select_get( CFF_FDSelect fdselect,
FT_UInt glyph_index )
{
FT_Byte fd = 0;
switch ( fdselect->format )
{
case 0:
fd = fdselect->data[glyph_index];
break;
case 3:
/* first, compare to cache */
if ( (FT_UInt)( glyph_index - fdselect->cache_first ) <
fdselect->cache_count )
{
fd = fdselect->cache_fd;
break;
}
/* then, lookup the ranges array */
{
FT_Byte* p = fdselect->data;
FT_Byte* p_limit = p + fdselect->data_size;
FT_Byte fd2;
FT_UInt first, limit;
first = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
do
{
if ( glyph_index < first )
break;
fd2 = *p++;
limit = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
if ( glyph_index < limit )
{
fd = fd2;
/* update cache */
fdselect->cache_first = first;
fdselect->cache_count = limit-first;
fdselect->cache_fd = fd2;
break;
}
first = limit;
} while ( p < p_limit );
}
break;
default:
;
}
return fd;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncer::StringOrdinal AppListSyncableService::GetOemFolderPos() {
VLOG(1) << "GetOemFolderPos: " << first_app_list_sync_;
if (!first_app_list_sync_) {
VLOG(1) << "Sync items exist, placing OEM folder at end.";
syncer::StringOrdinal last;
for (SyncItemMap::iterator iter = sync_items_.begin();
iter != sync_items_.end(); ++iter) {
SyncItem* sync_item = iter->second;
if (sync_item->item_ordinal.IsValid() &&
(!last.IsValid() || sync_item->item_ordinal.GreaterThan(last))) {
last = sync_item->item_ordinal;
}
}
if (last.IsValid())
return last.CreateAfter();
}
AppListItemList* item_list = model_->top_level_item_list();
if (item_list->item_count() == 0)
return syncer::StringOrdinal();
size_t oem_index = 0;
for (; oem_index < item_list->item_count() - 1; ++oem_index) {
AppListItem* cur_item = item_list->item_at(oem_index);
if (cur_item->id() == extensions::kWebStoreAppId)
break;
}
syncer::StringOrdinal oem_ordinal;
AppListItem* prev = item_list->item_at(oem_index);
if (oem_index + 1 < item_list->item_count()) {
AppListItem* next = item_list->item_at(oem_index + 1);
oem_ordinal = prev->position().CreateBetween(next->position());
} else {
oem_ordinal = prev->position().CreateAfter();
}
VLOG(1) << "Placing OEM Folder at: " << oem_index
<< " position: " << oem_ordinal.ToDebugString();
return oem_ordinal;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfer_backport_seen_item(struct xfer_item *item,
struct seen *seendb)
{
struct mailbox *mailbox = item->mailbox;
struct seqset *outlist = NULL;
struct seendata sd = SEENDATA_INITIALIZER;
int r;
outlist = seqset_init(mailbox->i.last_uid, SEQ_MERGE);
struct mailbox_iter *iter = mailbox_iter_init(mailbox, 0, ITER_SKIP_EXPUNGED);
const message_t *msg;
while ((msg = mailbox_iter_step(iter))) {
const struct index_record *record = msg_record(msg);
if (record->system_flags & FLAG_SEEN)
seqset_add(outlist, record->uid, 1);
else
seqset_add(outlist, record->uid, 0);
}
mailbox_iter_done(&iter);
sd.lastread = mailbox->i.recenttime;
sd.lastuid = mailbox->i.recentuid;
sd.lastchange = mailbox->i.last_appenddate;
sd.seenuids = seqset_cstring(outlist);
if (!sd.seenuids) sd.seenuids = xstrdup("");
r = seen_write(seendb, mailbox->uniqueid, &sd);
seen_freedata(&sd);
seqset_free(outlist);
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest38 (void)
{
int ret = 0;
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
uint8_t payload[128];
TCPHdr tcph;
PacketQueue pq;
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(29847);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(2);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
/* last_ack value should be 1 as the previous sent ACK value is out of
window */
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack != 1) {
printf("the server.last_ack should be 1, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack);
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 127, 128); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 127;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq != 128) {
printf("the server.next_seq should be 128, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq);
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(256); // in window, but beyond next_seq
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(5);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
/* last_ack value should be 256, as the previous sent ACK value
is inside window */
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack != 256) {
printf("the server.last_ack should be 1, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack);
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(128);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(8);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) {
printf("failed in processing packet in StreamTcpPacket\n");
goto end;
}
/* last_ack value should be 256 as the previous sent ACK value is inside
window */
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack != 256) {
printf("the server.last_ack should be 256, but it is %"PRIu32"\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.last_ack);
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline USHORT CheckSumCalculatorFlat(PVOID buffer, ULONG len)
{
return RawCheckSumFinalize(RawCheckSumCalculator(buffer, len));
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoginHandlerAndroid(
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info,
content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter web_contents_getter,
LoginAuthRequiredCallback auth_required_callback)
: LoginHandler(auth_info,
web_contents_getter,
std::move(auth_required_callback)) {}
Commit Message: Auto-dismiss http auth dialogs on navigation for Android.
BUG=884179
Change-Id: I18287e9c641045d5a74f3804e06ca17485e38957
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227482
Commit-Queue: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#591747}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_stop_endpoint(struct net_device *dev, bool keepprofile, bool getdbglogs)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)ar6k_priv(dev);
/* Stop the transmit queues */
netif_stop_queue(dev);
/* Disable the target and the interrupts associated with it */
if (ar->arWmiReady == true)
{
if (!bypasswmi)
{
bool disconnectIssued;
disconnectIssued = (ar->arConnected) || (ar->arConnectPending);
ar6000_disconnect(ar);
if (!keepprofile) {
ar6000_init_profile_info(ar);
}
A_UNTIMEOUT(&ar->disconnect_timer);
if (getdbglogs) {
ar6000_dbglog_get_debug_logs(ar);
}
ar->arWmiReady = false;
wmi_shutdown(ar->arWmi);
ar->arWmiEnabled = false;
ar->arWmi = NULL;
/*
* After wmi_shudown all WMI events will be dropped.
* We need to cleanup the buffers allocated in AP mode
* and give disconnect notification to stack, which usually
* happens in the disconnect_event.
* Simulate the disconnect_event by calling the function directly.
* Sometimes disconnect_event will be received when the debug logs
* are collected.
*/
if (disconnectIssued) {
if(ar->arNetworkType & AP_NETWORK) {
ar6000_disconnect_event(ar, DISCONNECT_CMD, bcast_mac, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
ar6000_disconnect_event(ar, DISCONNECT_CMD, ar->arBssid, 0, NULL, 0);
}
}
ar->user_savedkeys_stat = USER_SAVEDKEYS_STAT_INIT;
ar->user_key_ctrl = 0;
}
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("%s(): WMI stopped\n", __func__));
}
else
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("%s(): WMI not ready 0x%lx 0x%lx\n",
__func__, (unsigned long) ar, (unsigned long) ar->arWmi));
/* Shut down WMI if we have started it */
if(ar->arWmiEnabled == true)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("%s(): Shut down WMI\n", __func__));
wmi_shutdown(ar->arWmi);
ar->arWmiEnabled = false;
ar->arWmi = NULL;
}
}
if (ar->arHtcTarget != NULL) {
#ifdef EXPORT_HCI_BRIDGE_INTERFACE
if (NULL != ar6kHciTransCallbacks.cleanupTransport) {
ar6kHciTransCallbacks.cleanupTransport(NULL);
}
#else
if (NULL != ar->exitCallback) {
struct ar3k_config_info ar3kconfig;
int status;
A_MEMZERO(&ar3kconfig,sizeof(ar3kconfig));
ar6000_set_default_ar3kconfig(ar, (void *)&ar3kconfig);
status = ar->exitCallback(&ar3kconfig);
if (0 != status) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("Failed to reset AR3K baud rate! \n"));
}
}
if (setuphci)
ar6000_cleanup_hci(ar);
#endif
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,(" Shutting down HTC .... \n"));
/* stop HTC */
HTCStop(ar->arHtcTarget);
}
if (resetok) {
/* try to reset the device if we can
* The driver may have been configure NOT to reset the target during
* a debug session */
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,(" Attempting to reset target on instance destroy.... \n"));
if (ar->arHifDevice != NULL) {
bool coldReset = (ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6003) ? true: false;
ar6000_reset_device(ar->arHifDevice, ar->arTargetType, true, coldReset);
}
} else {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,(" Host does not want target reset. \n"));
}
/* Done with cookies */
ar6000_cookie_cleanup(ar);
/* cleanup any allocated AMSDU buffers */
ar6000_cleanup_amsdu_rxbufs(ar);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
download_manager_ = NULL;
ui_thread_.message_loop()->RunAllPending();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
{
if (table[i].id == id)
return table[i].nid;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::DidOpenFile(int request_id,
const GURL& path,
base::PlatformFileError result,
base::PlatformFile file,
base::ProcessHandle peer_handle) {
if (result == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
IPC::PlatformFileForTransit file_for_transit =
file != base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue ?
IPC::GetFileHandleForProcess(file, peer_handle, true) :
IPC::InvalidPlatformFileForTransit();
open_filesystem_urls_.insert(path);
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidOpenFile(request_id, file_for_transit));
} else {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, result));
}
UnregisterOperation(request_id);
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sysapi_translate_arch( const char *machine, const char *)
{
char tmp[64];
char *tmparch;
#if defined(AIX)
/* AIX machines have a ton of different models encoded into the uname
structure, so go to some other function to decode and group the
architecture together */
struct utsname buf;
if( uname(&buf) < 0 ) {
return NULL;
}
return( get_aix_arch( &buf ) );
#elif defined(HPUX)
return( get_hpux_arch( ) );
#else
if( !strcmp(machine, "alpha") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "ALPHA" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i86pc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i686") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i586") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i486") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "i386") ) { //LDAP entry
#if defined(Darwin)
/* Mac OS X often claims to be i386 in uname, even if the
* hardware is x86_64 and the OS can run 64-bit binaries.
* We'll base our architecture name on the default build
* target for gcc. In 10.5 and earlier, that's i386.
* On 10.6, it's x86_64.
* The value we're querying is the kernel version.
* 10.6 kernels have a version that starts with "10."
* Older versions have a lower first number.
*/
int ret;
char val[32];
size_t len = sizeof(val);
/* assume x86 */
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
ret = sysctlbyname("kern.osrelease", &val, &len, NULL, 0);
if (ret == 0 && strncmp(val, "10.", 3) == 0) {
/* but we could be proven wrong */
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
#else
sprintf( tmp, "INTEL" );
#endif
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ia64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "IA64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "x86_64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "amd64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "X86_64" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4u") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4u" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4m") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sun4c") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "sparc") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "SUN4x" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "Power Macintosh") ) { //LDAP entry
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc32") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC" );
}
else if( !strcmp(machine, "ppc64") ) {
sprintf( tmp, "PPC64" );
}
else {
sprintf( tmp, machine );
}
tmparch = strdup( tmp );
if( !tmparch ) {
EXCEPT( "Out of memory!" );
}
return( tmparch );
#endif /* if HPUX else */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 1 | 8,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: split_quoted(const gchar* src, const gboolean unquote) {
/* split on unquoted space, return array of strings;
remove a layer of quotes and backslashes if unquote */
if (!src) return NULL;
gboolean dq = FALSE;
gboolean sq = FALSE;
GArray *a = g_array_new (TRUE, FALSE, sizeof(gchar*));
GString *s = g_string_new ("");
const gchar *p;
gchar **ret;
gchar *dup;
for (p = src; *p != '\0'; p++) {
if ((*p == '\\') && unquote) g_string_append_c(s, *++p);
else if (*p == '\\') { g_string_append_c(s, *p++);
g_string_append_c(s, *p); }
else if ((*p == '"') && unquote && !sq) dq = !dq;
else if (*p == '"' && !sq) { g_string_append_c(s, *p);
dq = !dq; }
else if ((*p == '\'') && unquote && !dq) sq = !sq;
else if (*p == '\'' && !dq) { g_string_append_c(s, *p);
sq = ! sq; }
else if ((*p == ' ') && !dq && !sq) {
dup = g_strdup(s->str);
g_array_append_val(a, dup);
g_string_truncate(s, 0);
} else g_string_append_c(s, *p);
}
dup = g_strdup(s->str);
g_array_append_val(a, dup);
ret = (gchar**)a->data;
g_array_free (a, FALSE);
g_string_free (s, TRUE);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INST_HANDLER (lat) { // LAT Z, Rd
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 'z', 1, 0, 0, 0); // 0: Read (RAMPZ:Z)
ESIL_A ("r%d,^,", d); // 0: (Z) ^ Rd
ESIL_A ("DUP,r%d,=,", d); // Rd = [0]
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 'z', 1, 0, 0, 1); // Store in RAM
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t tail = (i << 1) + 1;
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, p, tail * sizeof(uint32_t),
__LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, tail);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Prevent wrap around (Remi Collet at redhat)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 10,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_handle_pHYs(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte buf[9];
png_uint_32 res_x, res_y;
int unit_type;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_pHYs");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
else if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_pHYs) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
if (length != 9)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 9);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
res_x = png_get_uint_32(buf);
res_y = png_get_uint_32(buf + 4);
unit_type = buf[8];
png_set_pHYs(png_ptr, info_ptr, res_x, res_y, unit_type);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 21,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int thread_cpu_clock_get(const clockid_t which_clock,
struct timespec64 *tp)
{
return posix_cpu_clock_get(THREAD_CLOCK, tp);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 21,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FPDF_BOOL PDFiumEngine::Pause_NeedToPauseNow(IFSDK_PAUSE* param) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
return base::Time::Now() - engine->last_progressive_start_time_ >
engine->progressive_paint_timeout_;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
(spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
if (*ctx == NULL)
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
/*
* If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
*/
if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
&(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
output_token);
(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
} else {
ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetServiceTextureId(
uint32_t client_texture_id,
uint32_t* service_texture_id) {
return resources_->texture_id_map.GetServiceID(client_texture_id,
service_texture_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
{
struct kvm_segment cs;
kvm_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
cs.selector = vector << 8;
cs.base = vector << 12;
kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void comps_rtree_data_destroy_v(void * rtd) {
comps_rtree_data_destroy((COMPS_RTreeData*)rtd);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ActiveTabTest()
: current_channel(version_info::Channel::DEV),
extension(CreateTestExtension("deadbeef", true, false)),
another_extension(CreateTestExtension("feedbeef", true, false)),
extension_without_active_tab(CreateTestExtension("badbeef",
false,
false)),
extension_with_tab_capture(CreateTestExtension("cafebeef",
true,
true)) {}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedCustomIntegralAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "reflectedCustomIntegralAttr", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setIntegralAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentIntegralAttrAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual bool openWindow()
{
m_events.append(OpenWindow);
g_main_loop_quit(m_mainLoop);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OneClickSigninSyncStarter::SigninDialogDelegate::SigninDialogDelegate(
base::WeakPtr<OneClickSigninSyncStarter> sync_starter)
: sync_starter_(sync_starter) {
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltCopyTextString(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr target,
const xmlChar *string, int noescape)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
int len;
if (string == NULL)
return(NULL);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_COPY_TEXT,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltCopyTextString: copy text %s\n",
string));
#endif
/*
* Play safe and reset the merging mechanism for every new
* target node.
*/
if ((target == NULL) || (target->children == NULL)) {
ctxt->lasttext = NULL;
}
/* handle coalescing of text nodes here */
len = xmlStrlen(string);
if ((ctxt->type == XSLT_OUTPUT_XML) &&
(ctxt->style->cdataSection != NULL) &&
(target != NULL) &&
(target->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(((target->ns == NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->cdataSection,
target->name, NULL) != NULL)) ||
((target->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->style->cdataSection,
target->name, target->ns->href) != NULL))))
{
/*
* Process "cdata-section-elements".
*/
if ((target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
{
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewCDataBlock(ctxt->output, string, len);
} else if (noescape) {
/*
* Process "disable-output-escaping".
*/
if ((target != NULL) && (target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(target->last->name == xmlStringTextNoenc))
{
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewTextLen(string, len);
if (copy != NULL)
copy->name = xmlStringTextNoenc;
} else {
/*
* Default processing.
*/
if ((target != NULL) && (target->last != NULL) &&
(target->last->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) &&
(target->last->name == xmlStringText)) {
return(xsltAddTextString(ctxt, target->last, string, len));
}
copy = xmlNewTextLen(string, len);
}
if (copy != NULL) {
if (target != NULL)
copy = xsltAddChild(target, copy);
ctxt->lasttext = copy->content;
ctxt->lasttsize = len;
ctxt->lasttuse = len;
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, target,
"xsltCopyTextString: text copy failed\n");
ctxt->lasttext = NULL;
}
return(copy);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 5,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LinkStyle* HTMLLinkElement::GetLinkStyle() const {
if (!link_ || link_->GetType() != LinkResource::kStyle)
return nullptr;
return static_cast<LinkStyle*>(link_.Get());
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 17,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int json_string_set_nocheck(json_t *json, const char *value)
{
char *dup;
json_string_t *string;
if(!json_is_string(json) || !value)
return -1;
dup = jsonp_strdup(value);
if(!dup)
return -1;
string = json_to_string(json);
jsonp_free(string->value);
string->value = dup;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 13,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::EventHandlerAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_eventHandlerAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::EventHandlerAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean rpc_event_dispatch(GSource *source, GSourceFunc callback, gpointer connection)
{
return rpc_dispatch(connection) != RPC_ERROR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_set_polygon_stipple(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct pipe_poly_stipple *ps)
{
if (vrend_state.use_core_profile) {
static const unsigned bit31 = 1 << 31;
GLubyte *stip = calloc(1, 1024);
int i, j;
if (!ctx->pstip_inited)
vrend_init_pstipple_texture(ctx);
if (!stip)
return;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) {
if (ps->stipple[i] & (bit31 >> j))
stip[i * 32 + j] = 0;
else
stip[i * 32 + j] = 255;
}
}
glBindTexture(GL_TEXTURE_2D, ctx->pstipple_tex_id);
glTexSubImage2D(GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, 0, 0, 32, 32,
GL_RED, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, stip);
free(stip);
return;
}
glPolygonStipple((const GLubyte *)ps->stipple);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 11,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_proc_fs_locations(struct rpc_clnt *client, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *name,
struct nfs4_fs_locations *fs_locations,
struct page *page)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir),
_nfs4_proc_fs_locations(client, dir, name, fs_locations, page),
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void willRemoveChildren(ContainerNode* container)
{
NodeVector children;
getChildNodes(container, children);
container->document()->nodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(container);
#if ENABLE(MUTATION_OBSERVERS)
ChildListMutationScope mutation(container);
#endif
for (NodeVector::const_iterator it = children.begin(); it != children.end(); it++) {
Node* child = it->get();
#if ENABLE(MUTATION_OBSERVERS)
mutation.willRemoveChild(child);
child->notifyMutationObserversNodeWillDetach();
#endif
dispatchChildRemovalEvents(child);
ChildFrameDisconnector(child).disconnect();
}
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ManifestUmaUtil::ParseSucceeded(const Manifest& manifest) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(kUMANameParseSuccess, true);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.IsEmpty", manifest.IsEmpty());
if (manifest.IsEmpty())
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.name", !manifest.name.is_null());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.short_name",
!manifest.short_name.is_null());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.start_url",
!manifest.start_url.is_empty());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.display",
manifest.display != blink::kWebDisplayModeUndefined);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Manifest.HasProperty.orientation",
manifest.orientation != blink::kWebScreenOrientationLockDefault);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.icons", !manifest.icons.empty());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.share_target",
manifest.share_target.has_value());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Manifest.HasProperty.gcm_sender_id",
!manifest.gcm_sender_id.is_null());
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void putname(struct filename *name)
{
BUG_ON(name->refcnt <= 0);
if (--name->refcnt > 0)
return;
if (name->name != name->iname) {
__putname(name->name);
kfree(name);
} else
__putname(name);
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) == 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 4,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean S_AL_BufferInit( void )
{
if(alBuffersInitialised)
return qtrue;
memset(knownSfx, 0, sizeof(knownSfx));
numSfx = 0;
default_sfx = S_AL_BufferFind( "***DEFAULT***" );
S_AL_BufferUse(default_sfx);
knownSfx[default_sfx].isLocked = qtrue;
alBuffersInitialised = qtrue;
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 15,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ModulateHSB(const double percent_hue,
const double percent_saturation,const double percent_brightness,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
brightness,
hue,
saturation;
/*
Increase or decrease color brightness, saturation, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToHSB(*red,*green,*blue,&hue,&saturation,&brightness);
hue+=fmod((percent_hue-100.0),200.0)/200.0;
saturation*=0.01*percent_saturation;
brightness*=0.01*percent_brightness;
ConvertHSBToRGB(hue,saturation,brightness,red,green,blue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
{
char *s;
u32 len;
if (selinux_enforcing)
return -EINVAL;
if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
kfree(s);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, setFlags)
{
zval *object = getThis();
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long ar_flags = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &ar_flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->ar_flags = (intern->ar_flags & SPL_ARRAY_INT_MASK) | (ar_flags & ~SPL_ARRAY_INT_MASK);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __filemap_fdatawrite_range(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t start,
loff_t end, int sync_mode)
{
int ret;
struct writeback_control wbc = {
.sync_mode = sync_mode,
.nr_to_write = mapping->nrpages * 2,
.range_start = start,
.range_end = end,
};
if (!mapping_cap_writeback_dirty(mapping))
return 0;
ret = do_writepages(mapping, &wbc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_NewDir_f( void ) {
char *filter;
char **dirnames;
int ndirs;
int i;
if ( Cmd_Argc() < 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: fdir <filter>\n" );
Com_Printf( "example: fdir *q3dm*.bsp\n");
return;
}
filter = Cmd_Argv( 1 );
Com_Printf( "---------------\n" );
dirnames = FS_ListFilteredFiles( "", "", filter, &ndirs, qfalse );
FS_SortFileList(dirnames, ndirs);
for ( i = 0; i < ndirs; i++ ) {
FS_ConvertPath(dirnames[i]);
Com_Printf( "%s\n", dirnames[i] );
}
Com_Printf( "%d files listed\n", ndirs );
FS_FreeFileList( dirnames );
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 27,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
sshbuf_len(conf));
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
*/
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmyk_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *cmyk, float *rgb)
{
#ifdef SLOWCMYK /* from poppler */
float c = cmyk[0], m = cmyk[1], y = cmyk[2], k = cmyk[3];
float r, g, b, x;
float cm = c * m;
float c1m = m - cm;
float cm1 = c - cm;
float c1m1 = 1 - m - cm1;
float c1m1y = c1m1 * y;
float c1m1y1 = c1m1 - c1m1y;
float c1my = c1m * y;
float c1my1 = c1m - c1my;
float cm1y = cm1 * y;
float cm1y1 = cm1 - cm1y;
float cmy = cm * y;
float cmy1 = cm - cmy;
/* this is a matrix multiplication, unrolled for performance */
x = c1m1y1 * k; /* 0 0 0 1 */
r = g = b = c1m1y1 - x; /* 0 0 0 0 */
r += 0.1373f * x;
g += 0.1216f * x;
b += 0.1255f * x;
x = c1m1y * k; /* 0 0 1 1 */
r += 0.1098f * x;
g += 0.1020f * x;
x = c1m1y - x; /* 0 0 1 0 */
r += x;
g += 0.9490f * x;
x = c1my1 * k; /* 0 1 0 1 */
r += 0.1412f * x;
x = c1my1 - x; /* 0 1 0 0 */
r += 0.9255f * x;
b += 0.5490f * x;
x = c1my * k; /* 0 1 1 1 */
r += 0.1333f * x;
x = c1my - x; /* 0 1 1 0 */
r += 0.9294f * x;
g += 0.1098f * x;
b += 0.1412f * x;
x = cm1y1 * k; /* 1 0 0 1 */
g += 0.0588f * x;
b += 0.1412f * x;
x = cm1y1 - x; /* 1 0 0 0 */
g += 0.6784f * x;
b += 0.9373f * x;
x = cm1y * k; /* 1 0 1 1 */
g += 0.0745f * x;
x = cm1y - x; /* 1 0 1 0 */
g += 0.6510f * x;
b += 0.3137f * x;
x = cmy1 * k; /* 1 1 0 1 */
b += 0.0078f * x;
x = cmy1 - x; /* 1 1 0 0 */
r += 0.1804f * x;
g += 0.1922f * x;
b += 0.5725f * x;
x = cmy * (1-k); /* 1 1 1 0 */
r += 0.2118f * x;
g += 0.2119f * x;
b += 0.2235f * x;
rgb[0] = fz_clamp(r, 0, 1);
rgb[1] = fz_clamp(g, 0, 1);
rgb[2] = fz_clamp(b, 0, 1);
#else
rgb[0] = 1 - fz_min(1, cmyk[0] + cmyk[3]);
rgb[1] = 1 - fz_min(1, cmyk[1] + cmyk[3]);
rgb[2] = 1 - fz_min(1, cmyk[2] + cmyk[3]);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SAPI_API SAPI_INPUT_FILTER_FUNC(php_default_input_filter)
{
/* TODO: check .ini setting here and apply user-defined input filter */
if(new_val_len) *new_val_len = val_len;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 21,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetRenderFrameMetadata(cc::RenderFrameMetadata metadata) {
host()->render_frame_metadata_provider()->SetLastRenderFrameMetadataForTest(
metadata);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void start_apic_timer(struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
ktime_t now;
atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
if (apic_lvtt_period(apic) || apic_lvtt_oneshot(apic)) {
/* lapic timer in oneshot or periodic mode */
now = apic->lapic_timer.timer.base->get_time();
apic->lapic_timer.period = (u64)kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT)
* APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS * apic->divide_count;
if (!apic->lapic_timer.period)
return;
/*
* Do not allow the guest to program periodic timers with small
* interval, since the hrtimers are not throttled by the host
* scheduler.
*/
if (apic_lvtt_period(apic)) {
s64 min_period = min_timer_period_us * 1000LL;
if (apic->lapic_timer.period < min_period) {
pr_info_ratelimited(
"kvm: vcpu %i: requested %lld ns "
"lapic timer period limited to %lld ns\n",
apic->vcpu->vcpu_id,
apic->lapic_timer.period, min_period);
apic->lapic_timer.period = min_period;
}
}
hrtimer_start(&apic->lapic_timer.timer,
ktime_add_ns(now, apic->lapic_timer.period),
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
apic_debug("%s: bus cycle is %" PRId64 "ns, now 0x%016"
PRIx64 ", "
"timer initial count 0x%x, period %lldns, "
"expire @ 0x%016" PRIx64 ".\n", __func__,
APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS, ktime_to_ns(now),
kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT),
apic->lapic_timer.period,
ktime_to_ns(ktime_add_ns(now,
apic->lapic_timer.period)));
} else if (apic_lvtt_tscdeadline(apic)) {
/* lapic timer in tsc deadline mode */
u64 guest_tsc, tscdeadline = apic->lapic_timer.tscdeadline;
u64 ns = 0;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
unsigned long this_tsc_khz = vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
unsigned long flags;
if (unlikely(!tscdeadline || !this_tsc_khz))
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
now = apic->lapic_timer.timer.base->get_time();
guest_tsc = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(vcpu, native_read_tsc());
if (likely(tscdeadline > guest_tsc)) {
ns = (tscdeadline - guest_tsc) * 1000000ULL;
do_div(ns, this_tsc_khz);
}
hrtimer_start(&apic->lapic_timer.timer,
ktime_add_ns(now, ns), HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 5,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btreeFree(struct BTREE *btree) {
free(btree->records);
}
Commit Message: Fixed security issue 1
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LogLuv32fromXYZ(float XYZ[3], int em)
{
unsigned int Le, ue, ve;
double u, v, s;
/* encode luminance */
Le = (unsigned int)LogL16fromY(XYZ[1], em);
/* encode color */
s = XYZ[0] + 15.*XYZ[1] + 3.*XYZ[2];
if (!Le || s <= 0.) {
u = U_NEU;
v = V_NEU;
} else {
u = 4.*XYZ[0] / s;
v = 9.*XYZ[1] / s;
}
if (u <= 0.) ue = 0;
else ue = itrunc(UVSCALE*u, em);
if (ue > 255) ue = 255;
if (v <= 0.) ve = 0;
else ve = itrunc(UVSCALE*v, em);
if (ve > 255) ve = 255;
/* combine encodings */
return (Le << 16 | ue << 8 | ve);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_usbmidi_transmit_byte(struct usbmidi_out_port *port,
uint8_t b, struct urb *urb)
{
uint8_t p0 = port->cable;
void (*output_packet)(struct urb*, uint8_t, uint8_t, uint8_t, uint8_t) =
port->ep->umidi->usb_protocol_ops->output_packet;
if (b >= 0xf8) {
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x0f, b, 0, 0);
} else if (b >= 0xf0) {
switch (b) {
case 0xf0:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_1;
break;
case 0xf1:
case 0xf3:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_1PARAM;
break;
case 0xf2:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_1;
break;
case 0xf4:
case 0xf5:
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
case 0xf6:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x05, 0xf6, 0, 0);
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
case 0xf7:
switch (port->state) {
case STATE_SYSEX_0:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x05, 0xf7, 0, 0);
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_1:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x06, port->data[0],
0xf7, 0);
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_2:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x07, port->data[0],
port->data[1], 0xf7);
break;
}
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
} else if (b >= 0x80) {
port->data[0] = b;
if (b >= 0xc0 && b <= 0xdf)
port->state = STATE_1PARAM;
else
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_1;
} else { /* b < 0x80 */
switch (port->state) {
case STATE_1PARAM:
if (port->data[0] < 0xf0) {
p0 |= port->data[0] >> 4;
} else {
p0 |= 0x02;
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
output_packet(urb, p0, port->data[0], b, 0);
break;
case STATE_2PARAM_1:
port->data[1] = b;
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_2;
break;
case STATE_2PARAM_2:
if (port->data[0] < 0xf0) {
p0 |= port->data[0] >> 4;
port->state = STATE_2PARAM_1;
} else {
p0 |= 0x03;
port->state = STATE_UNKNOWN;
}
output_packet(urb, p0, port->data[0], port->data[1], b);
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_0:
port->data[0] = b;
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_1;
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_1:
port->data[1] = b;
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_2;
break;
case STATE_SYSEX_2:
output_packet(urb, p0 | 0x04, port->data[0],
port->data[1], b);
port->state = STATE_SYSEX_0;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
loff_t new_size = 0;
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int flags;
ext4_lblk_t lblk;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
/*
* Encrypted inodes can't handle collapse range or insert
* range since we would need to re-encrypt blocks with a
* different IV or XTS tweak (which are based on the logical
* block number).
*
* XXX It's not clear why zero range isn't working, but we'll
* leave it disabled for encrypted inodes for now. This is a
* bug we should fix....
*/
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) &&
(mode & (FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE | FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE |
FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Return error if mode is not supported */
if (mode & ~(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE |
FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE | FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE |
FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
return ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, len);
ret = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE)
return ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE)
return ext4_insert_range(inode, offset, len);
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)
return ext4_zero_range(file, offset, len, mode);
trace_ext4_fallocate_enter(inode, offset, len, mode);
lblk = offset >> blkbits;
max_blocks = EXT4_MAX_BLOCKS(len, offset, blkbits);
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNWRIT_EXT;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
inode_lock(inode);
/*
* We only support preallocation for extent-based files only
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
(offset + len > i_size_read(inode) ||
offset + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize)) {
new_size = offset + len;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, new_size);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
inode_dio_wait(inode);
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file, lblk, max_blocks, new_size, flags);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (file->f_flags & O_SYNC && EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal) {
ret = jbd2_complete_transaction(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal,
EXT4_I(inode)->i_sync_tid);
}
out:
inode_unlock(inode);
trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_Frame( int msec ) {
if ( !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
#ifdef USE_CURL
if(clc.downloadCURLM) {
CL_cURL_PerformDownload();
if(clc.cURLDisconnected) {
cls.realFrametime = msec;
cls.frametime = msec;
cls.realtime += cls.frametime;
SCR_UpdateScreen();
S_Update();
Con_RunConsole();
cls.framecount++;
return;
}
}
#endif
if ( cls.cddialog ) {
cls.cddialog = qfalse;
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_NEED_CD );
} else if ( clc.state == CA_DISCONNECTED && !( Key_GetCatcher( ) & KEYCATCH_UI )
&& !com_sv_running->integer && uivm ) {
S_StopAllSounds();
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_MAIN );
}
if ( ( CL_VideoRecording( ) && cl_aviFrameRate->integer && msec ) || ( cl_avidemo->integer && msec ) ) {
if ( clc.state == CA_ACTIVE || cl_forceavidemo->integer ) {
if ( cl_avidemo->integer ) { // Legacy (screenshot) method
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_NOW, "screenshot silent\n" );
msec = ( 1000 / cl_avidemo->integer ) * com_timescale->value;
if ( msec == 0 ) {
msec = 1;
}
} else { // ioquake3 method
float fps = MIN(cl_aviFrameRate->value * com_timescale->value, 1000.0f);
float frameDuration = MAX(1000.0f / fps, 1.0f) + clc.aviVideoFrameRemainder;
CL_TakeVideoFrame( );
msec = (int)frameDuration;
clc.aviVideoFrameRemainder = frameDuration - msec;
}
}
}
if( cl_autoRecordDemo->integer ) {
if( clc.state == CA_ACTIVE && !clc.demorecording && !clc.demoplaying ) {
qtime_t now;
char *nowString;
char *p;
char mapName[ MAX_QPATH ];
char serverName[ MAX_OSPATH ];
Com_RealTime( &now );
nowString = va( "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
1900 + now.tm_year,
1 + now.tm_mon,
now.tm_mday,
now.tm_hour,
now.tm_min,
now.tm_sec );
Q_strncpyz( serverName, clc.servername, MAX_OSPATH );
p = strstr( serverName, ":" );
if( p ) {
*p = '.';
}
Q_strncpyz( mapName, COM_SkipPath( cl.mapname ), sizeof( cl.mapname ) );
COM_StripExtension(mapName, mapName, sizeof(mapName));
Cbuf_ExecuteText( EXEC_NOW,
va( "record %s-%s-%s", nowString, serverName, mapName ) );
}
else if( clc.state != CA_ACTIVE && clc.demorecording ) {
CL_StopRecord_f( );
}
}
cls.realFrametime = msec;
cls.frametime = msec;
cls.realtime += cls.frametime;
if ( cl_timegraph->integer ) {
SCR_DebugGraph ( cls.realFrametime * 0.25 );
}
CL_CheckUserinfo();
CL_CheckTimeout();
CL_SendCmd();
CL_CheckForResend();
CL_SetCGameTime();
SCR_UpdateScreen();
S_Update();
#ifdef USE_VOIP
CL_CaptureVoip();
#endif
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
CL_UpdateMumble();
#endif
SCR_RunCinematic();
Con_RunConsole();
cls.framecount++;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 21,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: magic_compile(struct magic_set *ms, const char *magicfile)
{
if (ms == NULL)
return -1;
return file_apprentice(ms, magicfile, FILE_COMPILE);
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t fremovexattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename,
const char *name)
{
char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dirfd, filename);
int ret;
ret = lremovexattr(proc_path, name);
g_free(proc_path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iwbmp_read_file_header(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
iw_byte buf[14];
if(!iwbmp_read(rctx,buf,14)) return 0;
rctx->fileheader_size = 14;
if(buf[0]=='B' && buf[1]=='A') { // OS/2 Bitmap Array
if(!iwbmp_read(rctx,buf,14)) return 0;
rctx->fileheader_size += 14;
}
if(buf[0]=='B' && buf[1]=='M') {
;
}
else if((buf[0]=='C' && buf[1]=='I') || // OS/2 Color Icon
(buf[0]=='C' && buf[1]=='P') || // OS/2 Color Pointer
(buf[0]=='I' && buf[1]=='C') || // OS/2 Icon
(buf[0]=='P' && buf[1]=='T')) // OS/2 Pointer
{
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"This type of BMP file is not supported");
return 0;
}
else {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Not a BMP file");
return 0;
}
rctx->bfOffBits = iw_get_ui32le(&buf[10]);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 25,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<std::vector<unsigned char> >::Write(Message* m,
const param_type& p) {
if (p.empty()) {
m->WriteData(NULL, 0);
} else {
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&p.front()),
static_cast<int>(p.size()));
}
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::UpdateNewTabButtonBorder() {
const int extra_vertical_space = GetLayoutConstant(TAB_HEIGHT) -
GetLayoutConstant(TABSTRIP_TOOLBAR_OVERLAP) -
NewTabButton::kButtonSize.height();
constexpr int kHorizontalInset = 8;
new_tab_button_->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(gfx::Insets(
extra_vertical_space / 2, kHorizontalInset, 0, kHorizontalInset)));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 access,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
void *data = val;
int r = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
while (bytes) {
gpa_t gpa = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, addr, access,
exception);
unsigned offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
unsigned toread = min(bytes, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
int ret;
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
ret = kvm_read_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, data,
offset, toread);
if (ret < 0) {
r = X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
goto out;
}
bytes -= toread;
data += toread;
addr += toread;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_amf_write_field_name(uint8_t **dst, const char *str)
{
bytestream_put_be16(dst, strlen(str));
bytestream_put_buffer(dst, str, strlen(str));
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,493 |
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