instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readOnlyLongAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::readOnlyLongAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (const struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (const struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((const u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 7,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logger_buffer_opened_signal_cb (const void *pointer, void *data,
const char *signal,
const char *type_data, void *signal_data)
{
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) pointer;
(void) data;
(void) signal;
(void) type_data;
logger_start_buffer (signal_data, 1);
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_mmu_page_set_gfn(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, int index, gfn_t gfn)
{
if (sp->role.direct)
BUG_ON(gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, index));
else
sp->gfns[index] = gfn;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunExtremalCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
dst[j] = src[j] > 0 ? 0 : 255;
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has"
<< "an individual roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average"
<< " roundtrip error > 1/5 per block";
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 7,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gstd_get_mech(gss_OID mech_oid)
{
#ifdef HAVE_GSS_OID_TO_STR
OM_uint32 maj;
OM_uint32 min;
#endif
gss_buffer_desc buf;
unsigned char *bufp;
unsigned char nibble;
char *ret;
size_t i, k;
if (mech_oid->length == sizeof(KNC_KRB5_MECH_OID) - 1 &&
memcmp(mech_oid->elements, KNC_KRB5_MECH_OID,
sizeof(KNC_KRB5_MECH_OID) - 1) == 0) {
if ((ret = strdup("krb5")) == NULL) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc"));
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GSS_OID_TO_STR
maj = gss_oid_to_str(&min, mech_oid, &buf);
if (maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to display mechanism OID"));
return NULL;
}
ret = strndup(buf.value, buf.length);
#else
ret = strdup("");
#endif
if (!ret)
LOG(LOG_ERR, ("unable to malloc"));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: knc: fix a couple of memory leaks.
One of these can be remotely triggered during the authentication
phase which leads to a remote DoS possibility.
Pointed out by: Imre Rad <radimre83@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 18,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotifyPrunedEntries(NavigationControllerImpl* nav_controller,
bool from_front,
int count) {
PrunedDetails details;
details.from_front = from_front;
details.count = count;
nav_controller->delegate()->NotifyNavigationListPruned(details);
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_attr_intern (struct attr *attr)
{
struct attr *find;
/* Intern referenced strucutre. */
if (attr->aspath)
{
if (! attr->aspath->refcnt)
attr->aspath = aspath_intern (attr->aspath);
else
attr->aspath->refcnt++;
}
if (attr->community)
{
if (! attr->community->refcnt)
attr->community = community_intern (attr->community);
else
attr->community->refcnt++;
}
if (attr->extra)
{
struct attr_extra *attre = attr->extra;
if (attre->ecommunity)
{
if (! attre->ecommunity->refcnt)
attre->ecommunity = ecommunity_intern (attre->ecommunity);
else
attre->ecommunity->refcnt++;
}
if (attre->cluster)
{
if (! attre->cluster->refcnt)
attre->cluster = cluster_intern (attre->cluster);
else
attre->cluster->refcnt++;
}
if (attre->transit)
{
if (! attre->transit->refcnt)
attre->transit = transit_intern (attre->transit);
else
attre->transit->refcnt++;
}
}
find = (struct attr *) hash_get (attrhash, attr, bgp_attr_hash_alloc);
find->refcnt++;
return find;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ati_remote2_setup(struct ati_remote2 *ar2, unsigned int ch_mask)
{
int r, i, channel;
/*
* Configure receiver to only accept input from remote "channel"
* channel == 0 -> Accept input from any remote channel
* channel == 1 -> Only accept input from remote channel 1
* channel == 2 -> Only accept input from remote channel 2
* ...
* channel == 16 -> Only accept input from remote channel 16
*/
channel = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
if ((1 << i) & ch_mask) {
if (!(~(1 << i) & ch_mask))
channel = i + 1;
break;
}
}
r = usb_control_msg(ar2->udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(ar2->udev, 0),
0x20,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
channel, 0x0, NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (r) {
dev_err(&ar2->udev->dev, "%s - failed to set channel due to error: %d\n",
__func__, r);
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::clearInspectedContextIfNeeded(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> console)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = context->GetIsolate();
console->SetPrivate(context, inspectedContextPrivateKey(isolate), v8::External::New(isolate, nullptr));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 9,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bitmap_writer_select_commits(struct commit **indexed_commits,
unsigned int indexed_commits_nr,
int max_bitmaps)
{
unsigned int i = 0, j, next;
qsort(indexed_commits, indexed_commits_nr, sizeof(indexed_commits[0]),
date_compare);
if (writer.show_progress)
writer.progress = start_progress("Selecting bitmap commits", 0);
if (indexed_commits_nr < 100) {
for (i = 0; i < indexed_commits_nr; ++i)
push_bitmapped_commit(indexed_commits[i], NULL);
return;
}
for (;;) {
struct ewah_bitmap *reused_bitmap = NULL;
struct commit *chosen = NULL;
next = next_commit_index(i);
if (i + next >= indexed_commits_nr)
break;
if (max_bitmaps > 0 && writer.selected_nr >= max_bitmaps) {
writer.selected_nr = max_bitmaps;
break;
}
if (next == 0) {
chosen = indexed_commits[i];
reused_bitmap = find_reused_bitmap(chosen->object.oid.hash);
} else {
chosen = indexed_commits[i + next];
for (j = 0; j <= next; ++j) {
struct commit *cm = indexed_commits[i + j];
reused_bitmap = find_reused_bitmap(cm->object.oid.hash);
if (reused_bitmap || (cm->object.flags & NEEDS_BITMAP) != 0) {
chosen = cm;
break;
}
if (cm->parents && cm->parents->next)
chosen = cm;
}
}
push_bitmapped_commit(chosen, reused_bitmap);
i += next + 1;
display_progress(writer.progress, i);
}
stop_progress(&writer.progress);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContentsWrapper* Browser::AddSelectedTabWithURL(const GURL& url,
PageTransition::Type transition) {
browser::NavigateParams params(this, url, transition);
params.disposition = NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
return params.target_contents;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::enableAutoSizeMode(const IntSize& minSize, const IntSize& maxSize)
{
if (!m_autoSizeInfo)
m_autoSizeInfo = adoptPtr(new FrameViewAutoSizeInfo(this));
m_autoSizeInfo->configureAutoSizeMode(minSize, maxSize);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlHaltParser(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
if (ctxt->input != NULL) {
/*
* in case there was a specific allocation deallocate before
* overriding base
*/
if (ctxt->input->free != NULL) {
ctxt->input->free((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->base);
ctxt->input->free = NULL;
}
ctxt->input->cur = BAD_CAST"";
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->cur;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 24,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static InputMethodStatusConnection* GetConnection(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_change_handler) {
DCHECK(language_library);
DCHECK(current_input_method_changed),
DCHECK(register_ime_properties);
DCHECK(update_ime_property);
InputMethodStatusConnection* object = GetInstance();
if (!object->language_library_) {
object->language_library_ = language_library;
object->current_input_method_changed_ = current_input_method_changed;
object->register_ime_properties_= register_ime_properties;
object->update_ime_property_ = update_ime_property;
object->connection_change_handler_ = connection_change_handler;
object->MaybeRestoreConnections();
} else if (object->language_library_ != language_library) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown language_library is passed";
}
return object;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 29,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QPointF QQuickWebView::pageItemPos()
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
return d->pageItemPos();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorReceiveResponseEvent::Data(
unsigned long identifier,
LocalFrame* frame,
const ResourceResponse& response) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("requestId", request_id);
value->SetString("frame", ToHexString(frame));
value->SetInteger("statusCode", response.HttpStatusCode());
value->SetString("mimeType", response.MimeType().GetString().IsolatedCopy());
value->SetDouble("encodedDataLength", response.EncodedDataLength());
value->SetBoolean("fromCache", response.WasCached());
value->SetBoolean("fromServiceWorker", response.WasFetchedViaServiceWorker());
if (response.GetResourceLoadTiming()) {
value->BeginDictionary("timing");
RecordTiming(*response.GetResourceLoadTiming(), value.get());
value->EndDictionary();
}
if (response.WasFetchedViaServiceWorker())
value->SetBoolean("fromServiceWorker", true);
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::OnPassphraseAccepted() {
if (!sync_loop_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
host_.Call(
FROM_HERE,
&SyncBackendHost::NotifyPassphraseAccepted);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 9,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err void_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
if (s->size) return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 18,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_base_set_option_impl(struct evdns_base *base,
const char *option, const char *val, int flags)
{
ASSERT_LOCKED(base);
if (str_matches_option(option, "ndots:")) {
const int ndots = strtoint(val);
if (ndots == -1) return -1;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_SEARCH)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting ndots to %d", ndots);
if (!base->global_search_state) base->global_search_state = search_state_new();
if (!base->global_search_state) return -1;
base->global_search_state->ndots = ndots;
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "timeout:")) {
struct timeval tv;
if (evdns_strtotimeval(val, &tv) == -1) return -1;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting timeout to %s", val);
memcpy(&base->global_timeout, &tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "getaddrinfo-allow-skew:")) {
struct timeval tv;
if (evdns_strtotimeval(val, &tv) == -1) return -1;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting getaddrinfo-allow-skew to %s",
val);
memcpy(&base->global_getaddrinfo_allow_skew, &tv,
sizeof(struct timeval));
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "max-timeouts:")) {
const int maxtimeout = strtoint_clipped(val, 1, 255);
if (maxtimeout == -1) return -1;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting maximum allowed timeouts to %d",
maxtimeout);
base->global_max_nameserver_timeout = maxtimeout;
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "max-inflight:")) {
const int maxinflight = strtoint_clipped(val, 1, 65000);
if (maxinflight == -1) return -1;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting maximum inflight requests to %d",
maxinflight);
evdns_base_set_max_requests_inflight(base, maxinflight);
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "attempts:")) {
int retries = strtoint(val);
if (retries == -1) return -1;
if (retries > 255) retries = 255;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting retries to %d", retries);
base->global_max_retransmits = retries;
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "randomize-case:")) {
int randcase = strtoint(val);
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
base->global_randomize_case = randcase;
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "bind-to:")) {
/* XXX This only applies to successive nameservers, not
* to already-configured ones. We might want to fix that. */
int len = sizeof(base->global_outgoing_address);
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_NAMESERVERS)) return 0;
if (evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(val,
(struct sockaddr*)&base->global_outgoing_address, &len))
return -1;
base->global_outgoing_addrlen = len;
} else if (str_matches_option(option, "initial-probe-timeout:")) {
struct timeval tv;
if (evdns_strtotimeval(val, &tv) == -1) return -1;
if (tv.tv_sec > 3600)
tv.tv_sec = 3600;
if (!(flags & DNS_OPTION_MISC)) return 0;
log(EVDNS_LOG_DEBUG, "Setting initial probe timeout to %s",
val);
memcpy(&base->global_nameserver_probe_initial_timeout, &tv,
sizeof(tv));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_full(struct kmem_cache_node *n, struct page *page)
{
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
list_add(&page->lru, &n->full);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOverflowClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsOverflowClip(object_) && !CanOmitOverflowClip(object_)) {
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV175Enabled() &&
object_.IsSVGForeignObject()) {
state.clip_rect = ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).FrameRect());
} else if (object_.IsBox()) {
state.clip_rect = ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).OverflowClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset));
state.clip_rect_excluding_overlay_scrollbars =
ToClipRect(ToLayoutBox(object_).OverflowClipRect(
context_.current.paint_offset,
kExcludeOverlayScrollbarSizeForHitTesting));
} else {
DCHECK(object_.IsSVGViewportContainer());
const auto& viewport_container = ToLayoutSVGViewportContainer(object_);
state.clip_rect = FloatRoundedRect(
viewport_container.LocalToSVGParentTransform().Inverse().MapRect(
viewport_container.Viewport()));
}
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* existing = properties_->OverflowClip();
bool equal_ignoring_hit_test_rects =
!!existing &&
existing->EqualIgnoringHitTestRects(context_.current.clip, state);
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateOverflowClip(context_.current.clip,
std::move(state)),
equal_ignoring_hit_test_rects);
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearOverflowClip());
}
}
if (auto* overflow_clip = properties_->OverflowClip())
context_.current.clip = overflow_clip;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 18,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_parse_num( CFF_Parser parser,
FT_Byte** d )
{
if ( **d == 30 )
{
/* binary-coded decimal is truncated to integer */
return cff_parse_real( *d, parser->limit, 0, NULL ) >> 16;
}
else if ( **d == 255 )
{
/* 16.16 fixed point is used internally for CFF2 blend results. */
/* Since these are trusted values, a limit check is not needed. */
/* After the 255, 4 bytes are in host order. */
/* Blend result is rounded to integer. */
return (FT_Long)( *( (FT_UInt32 *) ( d[0] + 1 ) ) + 0x8000U ) >> 16;
}
else
return cff_parse_integer( *d, parser->limit );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 6,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vm_stat_get_per_vm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
__simple_attr_check_format("%llu\n", 0ull);
return kvm_debugfs_open(inode, file, vm_stat_get_per_vm,
NULL, "%llu\n");
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cypress_write_int_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct cypress_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, status);
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
return;
case -EPIPE:
/* Cannot call usb_clear_halt while in_interrupt */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
dev_err(dev, "%s - unexpected nonzero write status received: %d\n",
__func__, status);
cypress_set_dead(port);
break;
}
priv->write_urb_in_use = 0;
/* send any buffered data */
cypress_send(port);
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FPSObserver::FPSObserver(
AutomationProvider* automation,
IPC::Message* reply_message,
base::ProcessId renderer_id,
int routing_id)
: automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message),
renderer_id_(renderer_id),
routing_id_(routing_id) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_FPS_COMPUTED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContextState::DoLineWidth(GLfloat width) const {
api()->glLineWidthFn(
std::min(std::max(width, line_width_min_), line_width_max_));
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code errcode;
/*
* Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2PROXY_OPTIONS";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TICKET_MISMATCH";
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
}
/* Backend policy check */
errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
t2enc->client,
server,
proxy_princ);
if (errcode) {
*status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
return errcode;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 12,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_read_extent_cache(struct inode *inode, loff_t bcount,
loff_t *lbcount, struct extent_position *pos)
{
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
int ret = 0;
spin_lock(&iinfo->i_extent_cache_lock);
if ((iinfo->cached_extent.lstart <= bcount) &&
(iinfo->cached_extent.lstart != -1)) {
/* Cache hit */
*lbcount = iinfo->cached_extent.lstart;
memcpy(pos, &iinfo->cached_extent.epos,
sizeof(struct extent_position));
if (pos->bh)
get_bh(pos->bh);
ret = 1;
}
spin_unlock(&iinfo->i_extent_cache_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool test_idle_cores(int cpu, bool def)
{
struct sched_domain_shared *sds;
sds = rcu_dereference(per_cpu(sd_llc_shared, cpu));
if (sds)
return READ_ONCE(sds->has_idle_cores);
return def;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 2,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_matching_cpuid_entry(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e,
u32 function, u32 index)
{
if (e->function != function)
return 0;
if ((e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX) && e->index != index)
return 0;
if ((e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATEFUL_FUNC) &&
!(e->flags & KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 26,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Program* GetProgramInfoNotShader(
GLuint client_id, const char* function_name) {
Program* program = GetProgram(client_id);
if (!program) {
if (GetShader(client_id)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "shader passed for program");
} else {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "unknown program");
}
}
LogClientServiceForInfo(program, client_id, function_name);
return program;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::finishedLoading(double finishTime)
{
#if !USE(CF)
ASSERT(!m_frame->page()->defersLoading() || InspectorInstrumentation::isDebuggerPaused(m_frame));
#endif
RefPtr<DocumentLoader> protect(this);
if (m_identifierForLoadWithoutResourceLoader) {
frameLoader()->notifier()->dispatchDidFinishLoading(this, m_identifierForLoadWithoutResourceLoader, finishTime);
m_identifierForLoadWithoutResourceLoader = 0;
}
#if USE(CONTENT_FILTERING)
if (m_contentFilter && m_contentFilter->needsMoreData()) {
m_contentFilter->finishedAddingData();
int length;
const char* data = m_contentFilter->getReplacementData(length);
if (data)
dataReceived(m_mainResource.get(), data, length);
}
#endif
maybeFinishLoadingMultipartContent();
double responseEndTime = finishTime;
if (!responseEndTime)
responseEndTime = m_timeOfLastDataReceived;
if (!responseEndTime)
responseEndTime = monotonicallyIncreasingTime();
timing()->setResponseEnd(responseEndTime);
commitIfReady();
if (!frameLoader())
return;
if (!maybeCreateArchive()) {
if (!m_gotFirstByte)
commitData(0, 0);
frameLoader()->client()->finishedLoading(this);
}
m_writer.end();
if (!m_mainDocumentError.isNull())
return;
clearMainResourceLoader();
if (!frameLoader()->stateMachine()->creatingInitialEmptyDocument())
frameLoader()->checkLoadComplete();
if (m_frame) {
if (m_mainResource && m_frame->document()->hasManifest())
memoryCache()->remove(m_mainResource.get());
}
m_applicationCacheHost->finishedLoadingMainResource();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xhci_calc_intr_kick(XHCIState *xhci, XHCITransfer *xfer,
XHCIEPContext *epctx, uint64_t mfindex)
{
uint64_t asap = ((mfindex + epctx->interval - 1) &
~(epctx->interval-1));
uint64_t kick = epctx->mfindex_last + epctx->interval;
assert(epctx->interval != 0);
xfer->mfindex_kick = MAX(asap, kick);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 11,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockRenderThread::SetOutgoingMessageFilter(
IPC::ChannelProxy::OutgoingMessageFilter* filter) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->mul == 0)
/* use default */
return ec_wNAF_precompute_mult(group, ctx);
if (group->meth->precompute_mult != 0)
return group->meth->precompute_mult(group, ctx);
else
return 1; /* nothing to do, so report success */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 18,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_MPEcurve_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsStage* mpe = NULL;
cmsUInt16Number InputChans, OutputChans;
cmsUInt32Number i, BaseOffset;
cmsToneCurve** GammaTables;
*nItems = 0;
BaseOffset = io ->Tell(io) - sizeof(_cmsTagBase);
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &InputChans)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &OutputChans)) return NULL;
if (InputChans != OutputChans) return NULL;
GammaTables = (cmsToneCurve**) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, InputChans, sizeof(cmsToneCurve*));
if (GammaTables == NULL) return NULL;
if (ReadPositionTable(self, io, InputChans, BaseOffset, GammaTables, ReadMPECurve)) {
mpe = cmsStageAllocToneCurves(self ->ContextID, InputChans, GammaTables);
}
else {
mpe = NULL;
}
for (i=0; i < InputChans; i++) {
if (GammaTables[i]) cmsFreeToneCurve(GammaTables[i]);
}
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, GammaTables);
*nItems = (mpe != NULL) ? 1 : 0;
return mpe;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlSAXParseEntity(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, const char *filename) {
xmlDocPtr ret;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
ctxt = xmlCreateFileParserCtxt(filename);
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(NULL);
}
if (sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax != NULL)
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = sax;
ctxt->userData = NULL;
}
xmlParseExtParsedEnt(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed)
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long pmcraid_ioctl_driver(
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance,
unsigned int cmd,
unsigned int buflen,
void __user *user_buffer
)
{
int rc = -ENOSYS;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, user_buffer, _IOC_SIZE(cmd))) {
pmcraid_err("ioctl_driver: access fault in request buffer\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
switch (cmd) {
case PMCRAID_IOCTL_RESET_ADAPTER:
pmcraid_reset_bringup(pinstance);
rc = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 7,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::DocumentHasUnsupportedFeature(
const std::string& feature) {
std::string metric("PDF_Unsupported_");
metric += feature;
if (!unsupported_features_reported_.count(metric)) {
unsupported_features_reported_.insert(metric);
UserMetricsRecordAction(metric);
}
if (!full_)
return;
if (told_browser_about_unsupported_feature_)
return;
told_browser_about_unsupported_feature_ = true;
pp::PDF::HasUnsupportedFeature(this);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_stream_write(jas_stream_t *stream, const void *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
const char *bufptr;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", stream, buf, cnt));
if (cnt < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_write");
}
bufptr = buf;
n = 0;
while (n < cnt) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, *bufptr) == EOF) {
return n;
}
++bufptr;
++n;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string PathWithoutParams(const std::string& path) {
return GURL(std::string("chrome-devtools://devtools/") + path)
.path().substr(1);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_change_size( RenderState state,
double delta )
{
double char_size = state->char_size;
char_size += delta;
if ( char_size < 6.0 )
char_size = 6.0;
else if ( char_size > 300.0 )
char_size = 300.0;
render_state_set_size( state, char_size );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Polkit1Backend::updateCachedActions(const PolkitQt1::ActionDescription::List &actions)
{
m_knownActions.clear();
Q_FOREACH (const PolkitQt1::ActionDescription &action, actions) {
m_knownActions << action.actionId();
}
m_flyingActions = false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 13,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isis_print_extd_ip_reach(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, const char *ident, uint16_t afi)
{
char ident_buffer[20];
uint8_t prefix[sizeof(struct in6_addr)]; /* shared copy buffer for IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes */
u_int metric, status_byte, bit_length, byte_length, sublen, processed, subtlvtype, subtlvlen;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 4))
return (0);
metric = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
processed=4;
tptr+=4;
if (afi == AF_INET) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length = status_byte&0x3f;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed++;
} else if (afi == AF_INET6) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status & prefix_len byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length=*(tptr++);
if (bit_length > 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed+=2;
} else
return (0); /* somebody is fooling us */
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* prefix has variable length encoding */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, byte_length))
return (0);
memset(prefix, 0, sizeof prefix); /* clear the copy buffer */
memcpy(prefix,tptr,byte_length); /* copy as much as is stored in the TLV */
tptr+=byte_length;
processed+=byte_length;
if (afi == AF_INET)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: %15s/%u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: %s/%u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Distribution: %s, Metric: %u",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_UPDOWN(status_byte) ? "down" : "up",
metric));
if (afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sub-TLVs present"));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s%s",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_IE(status_byte) ? "External" : "Internal",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte) ? ", sub-TLVs present" : ""));
if ((afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
|| (afi == AF_INET6 && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte))
) {
/* assume that one prefix can hold more
than one subTLV - therefore the first byte must reflect
the aggregate bytecount of the subTLVs for this prefix
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1))
return (0);
sublen=*(tptr++);
processed+=sublen+1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%u)", sublen)); /* print out subTLV length */
while (sublen>0) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr,2))
return (0);
subtlvtype=*(tptr++);
subtlvlen=*(tptr++);
/* prepend the indent string */
snprintf(ident_buffer, sizeof(ident_buffer), "%s ",ident);
if (!isis_print_ip_reach_subtlv(ndo, tptr, subtlvtype, subtlvlen, ident_buffer))
return(0);
tptr+=subtlvlen;
sublen-=(subtlvlen+2);
}
}
return (processed);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12999/IS-IS: Add a missing length check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::RunScriptsAtDocumentEnd(content::RenderFrame* render_frame) {
ExtensionFrameHelper* frame_helper = ExtensionFrameHelper::Get(render_frame);
if (!frame_helper)
return; // The frame is invisible to extensions.
frame_helper->RunScriptsAtDocumentEnd();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 29,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned short ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(float f) {
unsigned temp = *(reinterpret_cast<unsigned*>(&f));
unsigned signexp = (temp >> 23) & 0x1ff;
return g_base_table[signexp] +
((temp & 0x007fffff) >> g_shift_table[signexp]);
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ablk_ctr_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
return ablk_init_common(tfm, "__driver-ctr-aes-aesni");
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BackendImpl::MaxFileSize() const {
return cache_type() == net::PNACL_CACHE ? max_size_ : max_size_ / 8;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfc_genl_dep_link_up_event(struct nfc_dev *dev, u32 target_idx,
u8 comm_mode, u8 rf_mode)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
pr_debug("DEP link is up\n");
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0, NFC_CMD_DEP_LINK_UP);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, dev->idx))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rf_mode == NFC_RF_INITIATOR &&
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX, target_idx))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_COMM_MODE, comm_mode) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_RF_MODE, rf_mode))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
dev->dep_link_up = true;
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 23,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setType(const String& type)
{
if (type.isEmpty())
removeAttribute(typeAttr);
else
setAttribute(typeAttr, type);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext2_unfreeze(struct super_block *sb)
{
/* Just write sb to clear EXT2_VALID_FS flag */
ext2_write_super(sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 9,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ZSTD_reduceTable_btlazy2(U32* const table, U32 const size, U32 const reducerValue)
{
ZSTD_reduceTable_internal(table, size, reducerValue, 1);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gather_stats(struct page *page, struct numa_maps *md, int pte_dirty,
unsigned long nr_pages)
{
int count = page_mapcount(page);
md->pages += nr_pages;
if (pte_dirty || PageDirty(page))
md->dirty += nr_pages;
if (PageSwapCache(page))
md->swapcache += nr_pages;
if (PageActive(page) || PageUnevictable(page))
md->active += nr_pages;
if (PageWriteback(page))
md->writeback += nr_pages;
if (PageAnon(page))
md->anon += nr_pages;
if (count > md->mapcount_max)
md->mapcount_max = count;
md->node[page_to_nid(page)] += nr_pages;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetZoomLevel(
PageMsg_SetZoomLevel_Command command,
double zoom_level) {
switch (command) {
case PageMsg_SetZoomLevel_Command::CLEAR_TEMPORARY:
uses_temporary_zoom_level_ = false;
break;
case PageMsg_SetZoomLevel_Command::SET_TEMPORARY:
uses_temporary_zoom_level_ = true;
break;
case PageMsg_SetZoomLevel_Command::USE_CURRENT_TEMPORARY_MODE:
if (uses_temporary_zoom_level_)
return;
break;
default:
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
webview()->HidePopups();
SetZoomLevel(zoom_level);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Identity *id;
if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1)
ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
free(id);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_filter_prepend)
{
apply_filter_to_stream(0, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 11,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: i915_gem_execbuffer_move_to_gpu(struct intel_ring_buffer *ring,
struct list_head *objects)
{
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
struct change_domains cd;
int ret;
memset(&cd, 0, sizeof(cd));
list_for_each_entry(obj, objects, exec_list)
i915_gem_object_set_to_gpu_domain(obj, ring, &cd);
if (cd.invalidate_domains | cd.flush_domains) {
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_flush(ring->dev,
cd.invalidate_domains,
cd.flush_domains,
cd.flush_rings);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (cd.flips) {
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_wait_for_flips(ring, cd.flips);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
list_for_each_entry(obj, objects, exec_list) {
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_sync_rings(obj, ring);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::uniform3fvCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.uniform3fv()");
return vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf(args, kUniform3v);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_gid(struct posix_acl_state *state, kgid_t gid)
{
struct posix_ace_state_array *a = state->groups;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < a->n; i++)
if (gid_eq(a->aces[i].gid, gid))
return i;
/* Not found: */
a->n++;
a->aces[i].gid = gid;
a->aces[i].perms.allow = state->everyone.allow;
a->aces[i].perms.deny = state->everyone.deny;
return i;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 20,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char* Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_data_encoding)(ELFOBJ *bin) {
switch (bin->ehdr.e_ident[EI_DATA]) {
case ELFDATANONE: return strdup ("none");
case ELFDATA2LSB: return strdup ("2's complement, little endian");
case ELFDATA2MSB: return strdup ("2's complement, big endian");
default: return r_str_newf ("<unknown: %x>", bin->ehdr.e_ident[EI_DATA]);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_single(int vpid)
{
if (vpid == 0)
return;
if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single())
__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT, vpid, 0);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init proc_caches_init(void)
{
sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache",
sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU|
SLAB_NOTRACK, sighand_ctor);
signal_cachep = kmem_cache_create("signal_cache",
sizeof(struct signal_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK, NULL);
files_cachep = kmem_cache_create("files_cache",
sizeof(struct files_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK, NULL);
fs_cachep = kmem_cache_create("fs_cache",
sizeof(struct fs_struct), 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK, NULL);
/*
* FIXME! The "sizeof(struct mm_struct)" currently includes the
* whole struct cpumask for the OFFSTACK case. We could change
* this to *only* allocate as much of it as required by the
* maximum number of CPU's we can ever have. The cpumask_allocation
* is at the end of the structure, exactly for that reason.
*/
mm_cachep = kmem_cache_create("mm_struct",
sizeof(struct mm_struct), ARCH_MIN_MMSTRUCT_ALIGN,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_NOTRACK, NULL);
vm_area_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(vm_area_struct, SLAB_PANIC);
mmap_init();
nsproxy_cache_init();
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int netlink_broadcast_filtered(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 portid,
u32 group, gfp_t allocation,
int (*filter)(struct sock *dsk, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data),
void *filter_data)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(ssk);
struct netlink_broadcast_data info;
struct sock *sk;
skb = netlink_trim(skb, allocation);
info.exclude_sk = ssk;
info.net = net;
info.portid = portid;
info.group = group;
info.failure = 0;
info.delivery_failure = 0;
info.congested = 0;
info.delivered = 0;
info.allocation = allocation;
info.skb = skb;
info.skb2 = NULL;
info.tx_filter = filter;
info.tx_data = filter_data;
/* While we sleep in clone, do not allow to change socket list */
netlink_lock_table();
sk_for_each_bound(sk, &nl_table[ssk->sk_protocol].mc_list)
do_one_broadcast(sk, &info);
consume_skb(skb);
netlink_unlock_table();
if (info.delivery_failure) {
kfree_skb(info.skb2);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
consume_skb(info.skb2);
if (info.delivered) {
if (info.congested && gfpflags_allow_blocking(allocation))
yield();
return 0;
}
return -ESRCH;
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 9,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SubprocessMetricsProvider* provider() { return &provider_; }
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: heap_add_entry(struct archive_read *a, struct heap_queue *heap,
struct file_info *file, uint64_t key)
{
uint64_t file_key, parent_key;
int hole, parent;
/* Expand our pending files list as necessary. */
if (heap->used >= heap->allocated) {
struct file_info **new_pending_files;
int new_size = heap->allocated * 2;
if (heap->allocated < 1024)
new_size = 1024;
/* Overflow might keep us from growing the list. */
if (new_size <= heap->allocated) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
new_pending_files = (struct file_info **)
malloc(new_size * sizeof(new_pending_files[0]));
if (new_pending_files == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ENOMEM, "Out of memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (heap->allocated)
memcpy(new_pending_files, heap->files,
heap->allocated * sizeof(new_pending_files[0]));
if (heap->files != NULL)
free(heap->files);
heap->files = new_pending_files;
heap->allocated = new_size;
}
file_key = file->key = key;
/*
* Start with hole at end, walk it up tree to find insertion point.
*/
hole = heap->used++;
while (hole > 0) {
parent = (hole - 1)/2;
parent_key = heap->files[parent]->key;
if (file_key >= parent_key) {
heap->files[hole] = file;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
/* Move parent into hole <==> move hole up tree. */
heap->files[hole] = heap->files[parent];
hole = parent;
}
heap->files[0] = file;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is missing
A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop
forever.
read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension
to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while
loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails
before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without
advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry
indefinitely.
Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an
extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this
seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate
it to a fatal error immediately anyway.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 20,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CalculatePosition(FPDF_PAGE page,
const PDFiumEngineExports::RenderingSettings& settings,
pp::Rect* dest) {
int dpi = std::max(settings.dpi_x, settings.dpi_y);
int page_width = static_cast<int>(
ConvertUnitDouble(FPDF_GetPageWidth(page), kPointsPerInch, dpi));
int page_height = static_cast<int>(
ConvertUnitDouble(FPDF_GetPageHeight(page), kPointsPerInch, dpi));
*dest = settings.bounds;
int rotate = 0; // normal orientation.
if (settings.autorotate &&
(dest->width() > dest->height()) != (page_width > page_height)) {
rotate = 3; // 90 degrees counter-clockwise.
std::swap(page_width, page_height);
}
bool scale_to_bounds = false;
if (settings.fit_to_bounds &&
((page_width > dest->width()) || (page_height > dest->height()))) {
scale_to_bounds = true;
} else if (settings.stretch_to_bounds &&
((page_width < dest->width()) || (page_height < dest->height()))) {
scale_to_bounds = true;
}
if (scale_to_bounds) {
if (settings.keep_aspect_ratio) {
double scale_factor_x = page_width;
scale_factor_x /= dest->width();
double scale_factor_y = page_height;
scale_factor_y /= dest->height();
if (scale_factor_x > scale_factor_y) {
dest->set_height(page_height / scale_factor_x);
} else {
dest->set_width(page_width / scale_factor_y);
}
}
} else {
dest->set_width(page_width);
dest->set_height(page_height);
}
if (settings.dpi_x != settings.dpi_y) {
dest->set_width(dest->width() * settings.dpi_x / dpi);
dest->set_height(dest->height() * settings.dpi_y / dpi);
}
if (settings.center_in_bounds) {
pp::Point offset(
(settings.bounds.width() * settings.dpi_x / dpi - dest->width()) / 2,
(settings.bounds.height() * settings.dpi_y / dpi - dest->height()) / 2);
dest->Offset(offset);
}
return rotate;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual WebNavigationPolicy decidePolicyForNavigation(
WebFrame*, const WebURLRequest&, WebNavigationType,
WebNavigationPolicy defaultPolicy, bool isRedirect)
{
EXPECT_FALSE(isRedirect);
return WebNavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline String Decode16BitUnicodeEscapeSequences(const String& string) {
return DecodeEscapeSequences<Unicode16BitEscapeSequence>(string,
UTF8Encoding());
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 12,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionManager::SessionManager() : port_(""), url_base_("") {}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::DidAssociateFormControl(Element* element) {
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->GetPage() || !HasFinishedParsing())
return;
if (!did_associate_form_controls_timer_.IsActive()) {
did_associate_form_controls_timer_.StartOneShot(
TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(300), FROM_HERE);
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClearStates() {
state_ = NULL;
deleted_ = NULL;
delegate_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebDocumentLoader* WebLocalFrameImpl::GetDocumentLoader() const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return DocumentLoaderForDocLoader(GetFrame()->Loader().GetDocumentLoader());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 6,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGLibjpegJpegSourceMgrTermSource(jpeg_decompress_struct* cinfo)
{
(void)cinfo;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 21,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_cgroup_exit(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
struct cgroup_subsys_state *old_css,
struct task_struct *task)
{
/*
* cgroup_exit() is called in the copy_process() failure path.
* Ignore this case since the task hasn't ran yet, this avoids
* trying to poke a half freed task state from generic code.
*/
if (!(task->flags & PF_EXITING))
return;
task_function_call(task, __perf_cgroup_move, task);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextInputManager* WebContentsImpl::GetTextInputManager() {
if (GetOuterWebContents())
return GetOuterWebContents()->GetTextInputManager();
if (!text_input_manager_)
text_input_manager_.reset(new TextInputManager());
return text_input_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReadableStreamBytesConsumer::OnRead(DOMUint8Array* buffer) {
DCHECK(is_reading_);
DCHECK(buffer);
DCHECK(!pending_buffer_);
DCHECK(!pending_offset_);
is_reading_ = false;
if (state_ == PublicState::kClosed)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(state_, PublicState::kReadableOrWaiting);
pending_buffer_ = buffer;
if (client_)
client_->OnStateChange();
}
Commit Message: ReadableStreamBytesConsumer should check read results
ReadableStreamBytesConsumer expected that the results from
ReadableStreamReaderDefaultRead should be Promise<Object> because that
is provided from ReadableStream provided by blink, but it's possible to
inject arbitrary values with the promise assimilation.
This CL adds additional checks for such injection.
Bug: 840320
Change-Id: I7b3c6a8bfcf563dd860b133ff0295dd7a5d5fea5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1049413
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Rice <ricea@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#556751}
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadHeapStats::IncreaseAllocatedObjectSize(size_t delta) {
allocated_object_size_ += delta;
ProcessHeap::IncreaseTotalAllocatedObjectSize(delta);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_write_info(struct super_block *sb, int type)
{
int ret, err;
handle_t *handle;
/* Data block + inode block */
handle = ext4_journal_start(d_inode(sb->s_root), EXT4_HT_QUOTA, 2);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
ret = dquot_commit_info(sb, type);
err = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int is_dir(const char *fname) {
assert(fname);
if (*fname == '\0')
return 0;
int rv;
struct stat s;
if (fname[strlen(fname) - 1] == '/')
rv = stat(fname, &s);
else {
char *tmp;
if (asprintf(&tmp, "%s/", fname) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot allocate memory, %s:%d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__);
errExit("asprintf");
}
rv = stat(tmp, &s);
free(tmp);
}
if (rv == -1)
return 0;
if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 19,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __apic_accept_irq(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
int vector, int level, int trig_mode,
unsigned long *dest_map)
{
int result = 0;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = apic->vcpu;
switch (delivery_mode) {
case APIC_DM_LOWEST:
vcpu->arch.apic_arb_prio++;
case APIC_DM_FIXED:
/* FIXME add logic for vcpu on reset */
if (unlikely(!apic_enabled(apic)))
break;
result = 1;
if (dest_map)
__set_bit(vcpu->vcpu_id, dest_map);
if (kvm_x86_ops->deliver_posted_interrupt)
kvm_x86_ops->deliver_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
else {
apic_set_irr(vector, apic);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode,
trig_mode, vector, false);
break;
case APIC_DM_REMRD:
result = 1;
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = 1;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
break;
case APIC_DM_SMI:
apic_debug("Ignoring guest SMI\n");
break;
case APIC_DM_NMI:
result = 1;
kvm_inject_nmi(vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
break;
case APIC_DM_INIT:
if (!trig_mode || level) {
result = 1;
/* assumes that there are only KVM_APIC_INIT/SIPI */
apic->pending_events = (1UL << KVM_APIC_INIT);
/* make sure pending_events is visible before sending
* the request */
smp_wmb();
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
} else {
apic_debug("Ignoring de-assert INIT to vcpu %d\n",
vcpu->vcpu_id);
}
break;
case APIC_DM_STARTUP:
apic_debug("SIPI to vcpu %d vector 0x%02x\n",
vcpu->vcpu_id, vector);
result = 1;
apic->sipi_vector = vector;
/* make sure sipi_vector is visible for the receiver */
smp_wmb();
set_bit(KVM_APIC_SIPI, &apic->pending_events);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
break;
case APIC_DM_EXTINT:
/*
* Should only be called by kvm_apic_local_deliver() with LVT0,
* before NMI watchdog was enabled. Already handled by
* kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr().
*/
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "TODO: unsupported delivery mode %x\n",
delivery_mode);
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_smsw(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.bytes = 2;
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xt_hook_ops_alloc(const struct xt_table *table, nf_hookfn *fn)
{
unsigned int hook_mask = table->valid_hooks;
uint8_t i, num_hooks = hweight32(hook_mask);
uint8_t hooknum;
struct nf_hook_ops *ops;
ops = kmalloc(sizeof(*ops) * num_hooks, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ops == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0, hooknum = 0; i < num_hooks && hook_mask != 0;
hook_mask >>= 1, ++hooknum) {
if (!(hook_mask & 1))
continue;
ops[i].hook = fn;
ops[i].pf = table->af;
ops[i].hooknum = hooknum;
ops[i].priority = table->priority;
++i;
}
return ops;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err paen_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, fiin_AddBox);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 11,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnMediaNotification(int64 player_cookie,
bool has_video,
bool has_audio,
bool is_playing) {
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (is_playing) {
scoped_ptr<PowerSaveBlocker> blocker;
if (has_video) {
blocker = PowerSaveBlocker::Create(
PowerSaveBlocker::kPowerSaveBlockPreventDisplaySleep,
"Playing video");
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
static_cast<PowerSaveBlockerImpl*>(blocker.get())->
InitDisplaySleepBlocker(GetView()->GetNativeView());
#endif
} else if (has_audio) {
blocker = PowerSaveBlocker::Create(
PowerSaveBlocker::kPowerSaveBlockPreventAppSuspension,
"Playing audio");
}
if (blocker)
power_save_blockers_[message_source_][player_cookie] = blocker.release();
} else {
delete power_save_blockers_[message_source_][player_cookie];
power_save_blockers_[message_source_].erase(player_cookie);
}
#endif // !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DefaultBrowserInfoBarDelegate::Cancel() {
action_taken_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("DefaultBrowserWarning.DontSetAsDefault", 1);
prefs_->SetBoolean(prefs::kCheckDefaultBrowser, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
size_t argsCount = exec->argumentCount();
if (argsCount <= 1) {
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 5,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PRStatus nspr_io_close(PRFileDesc *fd)
{
const PRCloseFN close_fn = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods()->close;
fd->secret = NULL;
return close_fn(fd);
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 26,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sec_parse_public_sig(STREAM s, uint32 len, uint8 * modulus, uint8 * exponent)
{
uint8 signature[SEC_MAX_MODULUS_SIZE];
uint32 sig_len;
if (len != 72)
{
return True;
}
memset(signature, 0, sizeof(signature));
sig_len = len - 8;
in_uint8a(s, signature, sig_len);
return rdssl_sig_ok(exponent, SEC_EXPONENT_SIZE, modulus, g_server_public_key_len,
signature, sig_len);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RaisesExceptionTestInterfaceEmptyVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "raisesExceptionTestInterfaceEmptyVoidMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
TestInterfaceEmpty* result = impl->raisesExceptionTestInterfaceEmptyVoidMethod(exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_clearflag(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
#ifdef DEBUG
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc;
int namelen;
char *name;
#endif /* DEBUG */
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_clearflag(args);
/*
* Set up the operation.
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno, -1, &bp);
if (error)
return(error);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
ASSERT(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE);
#ifdef DEBUG
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0);
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
namelen = name_loc->namelen;
name = (char *)name_loc->nameval;
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
namelen = name_rmt->namelen;
name = (char *)name_rmt->name;
}
ASSERT(be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == args->hashval);
ASSERT(namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(name, args->name, namelen) == 0);
#endif /* DEBUG */
entry->flags &= ~XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, entry, sizeof(*entry)));
if (args->rmtblkno) {
ASSERT((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0);
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
name_rmt->valueblk = cpu_to_be32(args->rmtblkno);
name_rmt->valuelen = cpu_to_be32(args->valuelen);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, name_rmt, sizeof(*name_rmt)));
}
/*
* Commit the flag value change and start the next trans in series.
*/
return xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, args->dp);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 6,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON *) cJSON_CreateDoubleArray(const double *numbers, int count)
{
size_t i = 0;
cJSON *n = NULL;
cJSON *p = NULL;
cJSON *a = NULL;
if ((count < 0) || (numbers == NULL))
{
return NULL;
}
a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for(i = 0;a && (i < (size_t)count); i++)
{
n = cJSON_CreateNumber(numbers[i]);
if(!n)
{
cJSON_Delete(a);
return NULL;
}
if(!i)
{
a->child = n;
}
else
{
suffix_object(p, n);
}
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<MessagePump> ReturnPump(std::unique_ptr<MessagePump> pump) {
return pump;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::readyStateChanged() {
setReadyState(static_cast<ReadyState>(webMediaPlayer()->getReadyState()));
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opl3_init(int ioaddr, struct module *owner)
{
int i;
int me;
if (devc == NULL)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "opl3: Device control structure not initialized.\n");
return -1;
}
if ((me = sound_alloc_synthdev()) == -1)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "opl3: Too many synthesizers\n");
return -1;
}
devc->nr_voice = 9;
devc->fm_info.device = 0;
devc->fm_info.synth_type = SYNTH_TYPE_FM;
devc->fm_info.synth_subtype = FM_TYPE_ADLIB;
devc->fm_info.perc_mode = 0;
devc->fm_info.nr_voices = 9;
devc->fm_info.nr_drums = 0;
devc->fm_info.instr_bank_size = SBFM_MAXINSTR;
devc->fm_info.capabilities = 0;
devc->left_io = ioaddr;
devc->right_io = ioaddr + 2;
if (detected_model <= 2)
devc->model = 1;
else
{
devc->model = 2;
if (detected_model == 4)
devc->is_opl4 = 1;
}
opl3_operations.info = &devc->fm_info;
synth_devs[me] = &opl3_operations;
if (owner)
synth_devs[me]->owner = owner;
sequencer_init();
devc->v_alloc = &opl3_operations.alloc;
devc->chn_info = &opl3_operations.chn_info[0];
if (devc->model == 2)
{
if (devc->is_opl4)
strcpy(devc->fm_info.name, "Yamaha OPL4/OPL3 FM");
else
strcpy(devc->fm_info.name, "Yamaha OPL3");
devc->v_alloc->max_voice = devc->nr_voice = 18;
devc->fm_info.nr_drums = 0;
devc->fm_info.synth_subtype = FM_TYPE_OPL3;
devc->fm_info.capabilities |= SYNTH_CAP_OPL3;
for (i = 0; i < 18; i++)
{
if (pv_map[i].ioaddr == USE_LEFT)
pv_map[i].ioaddr = devc->left_io;
else
pv_map[i].ioaddr = devc->right_io;
}
opl3_command(devc->right_io, OPL3_MODE_REGISTER, OPL3_ENABLE);
opl3_command(devc->right_io, CONNECTION_SELECT_REGISTER, 0x00);
}
else
{
strcpy(devc->fm_info.name, "Yamaha OPL2");
devc->v_alloc->max_voice = devc->nr_voice = 9;
devc->fm_info.nr_drums = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 18; i++)
pv_map[i].ioaddr = devc->left_io;
};
conf_printf2(devc->fm_info.name, ioaddr, 0, -1, -1);
for (i = 0; i < SBFM_MAXINSTR; i++)
devc->i_map[i].channel = -1;
return me;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_bp(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int opcode, bcode;
if (__get_user(opcode, (unsigned int __user *) exception_epc(regs)))
goto out_sigsegv;
/*
* There is the ancient bug in the MIPS assemblers that the break
* code starts left to bit 16 instead to bit 6 in the opcode.
* Gas is bug-compatible, but not always, grrr...
* We handle both cases with a simple heuristics. --macro
*/
bcode = ((opcode >> 6) & ((1 << 20) - 1));
if (bcode >= (1 << 10))
bcode >>= 10;
/*
* notify the kprobe handlers, if instruction is likely to
* pertain to them.
*/
switch (bcode) {
case BRK_KPROBE_BP:
if (notify_die(DIE_BREAK, "debug", regs, bcode, regs_to_trapnr(regs), SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
else
break;
case BRK_KPROBE_SSTEPBP:
if (notify_die(DIE_SSTEPBP, "single_step", regs, bcode, regs_to_trapnr(regs), SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
else
break;
default:
break;
}
do_trap_or_bp(regs, bcode, "Break");
return;
out_sigsegv:
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int fanout_demux_lb(struct packet_fanout *f,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int num)
{
unsigned int val = atomic_inc_return(&f->rr_cur);
return val % num;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HostCache::OnNetworkChange() {
++network_changes_;
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hns_rcb_ring_enable_hw(struct hnae_queue *q, u32 val)
{
dsaf_write_dev(q, RCB_RING_PREFETCH_EN_REG, !!val);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,773 |
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