instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static loff_t lower_offset_for_page(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
struct page *page)
{
return ecryptfs_lower_header_size(crypt_stat) +
((loff_t)page->index << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(const edge_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
if (conn->rend_data)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 17,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnMessageReceivedOnRenderThread(const IPC::Message& message) {
if (owner_)
owner_->OnMessageReceived(message);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void encode_delegreturn(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const nfs4_stateid *stateid, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_DELEGRETURN);
xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_delegreturn_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void atusb_tx_done(struct atusb *atusb, uint8_t seq)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
uint8_t expect = atusb->tx_ack_seq;
dev_dbg(&usb_dev->dev, "atusb_tx_done (0x%02x/0x%02x)\n", seq, expect);
if (seq == expect) {
/* TODO check for ifs handling in firmware */
ieee802154_xmit_complete(atusb->hw, atusb->tx_skb, false);
} else {
/* TODO I experience this case when atusb has a tx complete
* irq before probing, we should fix the firmware it's an
* unlikely case now that seq == expect is then true, but can
* happen and fail with a tx_skb = NULL;
*/
ieee802154_wake_queue(atusb->hw);
if (atusb->tx_skb)
dev_kfree_skb_irq(atusb->tx_skb);
}
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fbFetchExternalAlpha(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
int i;
CARD32 _alpha_buffer[SCANLINE_BUFFER_LENGTH];
CARD32 *alpha_buffer = _alpha_buffer;
if (!pict->alphaMap) {
fbFetchTransformed(pict, x, y, width, buffer, mask, maskBits);
return;
}
if (width > SCANLINE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
alpha_buffer = (CARD32 *) malloc(width*sizeof(CARD32));
fbFetchTransformed(pict, x, y, width, buffer, mask, maskBits);
fbFetchTransformed(pict->alphaMap, x - pict->alphaOrigin.x,
y - pict->alphaOrigin.y, width, alpha_buffer,
mask, maskBits);
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
if (!mask || mask[i] & maskBits)
{
int a = alpha_buffer[i]>>24;
WRITE(buffer + i, (a << 24)
| (div_255(Red(READ(buffer + i)) * a) << 16)
| (div_255(Green(READ(buffer + i)) * a) << 8)
| (div_255(Blue(READ(buffer + i)) * a)));
}
}
if (alpha_buffer != _alpha_buffer)
free(alpha_buffer);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 3,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXLayoutObject::elementAccessibilityHitTest(
const IntPoint& point) const {
if (isSVGImage())
return remoteSVGElementHitTest(point);
return AXObject::elementAccessibilityHitTest(point);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 4,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: projid_t from_kprojid(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid)
{
/* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */
return map_id_up(&targ->projid_map, __kprojid_val(kprojid));
}
Commit Message: userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t PaintController::BeginSubsequence() {
new_paint_chunks_.ForceNewChunk();
return new_display_item_list_.size();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void totl_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free((GF_TRPYBox *)s);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 20,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_cgroup_move_charge_write(struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct cftype *cft, u64 val)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fz_colorspace_is_device(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return cs && (cs->flags & FZ_COLORSPACE_IS_DEVICE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vp9_free_postproc_buffers(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
#if CONFIG_VP9_POSTPROC
vpx_free_frame_buffer(&cm->post_proc_buffer);
vpx_free_frame_buffer(&cm->post_proc_buffer_int);
#else
(void)cm;
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: saml2md::MetadataProvider* SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL DynamicMetadataProviderFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
{
return new DynamicMetadataProvider(e);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347 | 0 | 5,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double_lock_hb(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2)
{
if (hb1 <= hb2) {
spin_lock(&hb1->lock);
if (hb1 < hb2)
spin_lock_nested(&hb2->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
} else { /* hb1 > hb2 */
spin_lock(&hb2->lock);
spin_lock_nested(&hb1->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
}
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int bdrv_attach_dev(BlockDriverState *bs, void *dev)
/* TODO change to DeviceState *dev when all users are qdevified */
{
if (bs->dev) {
return -EBUSY;
}
bs->dev = dev;
bdrv_iostatus_reset(bs);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnUpdatedCacheStats(
const WebCache::UsageStats& stats) {
WebCacheManager::GetInstance()->ObserveStats(render_process_id_, stats);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RootWindowHostWin::OnPaint(HDC dc) {
root_window_->Draw();
ValidateRect(hwnd(), NULL);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WT_UpdateFilter (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pIntFrame, const S_ARTICULATION *pArt)
{
EAS_I32 cutoff;
/* no need to calculate filter coefficients if it is bypassed */
if (pArt->filterCutoff == DEFAULT_EAS_FILTER_CUTOFF_FREQUENCY)
{
pIntFrame->frame.k = 0;
return;
}
/* determine the dynamic cutoff frequency */
cutoff = MULT_EG1_EG1(pWTVoice->eg2Value, pArt->eg2ToFc);
cutoff += pArt->filterCutoff;
/* subtract the A5 offset and the sampling frequency */
cutoff -= FILTER_CUTOFF_FREQ_ADJUST + A5_PITCH_OFFSET_IN_CENTS;
/* limit the cutoff frequency */
if (cutoff > FILTER_CUTOFF_MAX_PITCH_CENTS)
cutoff = FILTER_CUTOFF_MAX_PITCH_CENTS;
else if (cutoff < FILTER_CUTOFF_MIN_PITCH_CENTS)
cutoff = FILTER_CUTOFF_MIN_PITCH_CENTS;
WT_SetFilterCoeffs(pIntFrame, cutoff, pArt->filterQ);
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: sanity check numSamples.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: I066888c25035ea4c60c88f316db4508dc4dab6bc
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xcbc_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
unsigned long alignmask;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH);
if (err)
return err;
alg = crypto_get_attr_alg(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
switch(alg->cra_blocksize) {
case 16:
break;
default:
goto out_put_alg;
}
inst = shash_alloc_instance("xcbc", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
err = crypto_init_spawn(shash_instance_ctx(inst), alg,
shash_crypto_instance(inst),
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask | 3;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alignmask;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.digestsize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.descsize = ALIGN(sizeof(struct xcbc_desc_ctx),
crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
(alignmask &
~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1)) +
alg->cra_blocksize * 2;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = ALIGN(sizeof(struct xcbc_tfm_ctx),
alignmask + 1) +
alg->cra_blocksize * 2;
inst->alg.base.cra_init = xcbc_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = xcbc_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = crypto_xcbc_digest_init;
inst->alg.update = crypto_xcbc_digest_update;
inst->alg.final = crypto_xcbc_digest_final;
inst->alg.setkey = crypto_xcbc_digest_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
out_free_inst:
shash_free_instance(shash_crypto_instance(inst));
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_CLEAR_ACTIONS(const struct ofpact_null *a OVS_UNUSED, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%sclear_actions%s", colors.value, colors.end);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_handle_tEXt(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_textp text_ptr;
png_charp key;
png_charp text;
png_uint_32 skip = 0;
png_size_t slength;
int ret;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_tEXt");
#ifdef PNG_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max != 0)
{
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max == 1)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
if (--png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max == 1)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "No space in chunk cache for tEXt");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
}
#endif
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR))
png_error(png_ptr, "Missing IHDR before tEXt");
if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT)
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (length > (png_uint_32)65535L)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "tEXt chunk too large to fit in memory");
skip = length - (png_uint_32)65535L;
length = (png_uint_32)65535L;
}
#endif
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr, length + 1);
if (png_ptr->chunkdata == NULL)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "No memory to process text chunk.");
return;
}
slength = (png_size_t)length;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_ptr->chunkdata, slength);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, skip))
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
key = png_ptr->chunkdata;
key[slength] = 0x00;
for (text = key; *text; text++)
/* Empty loop to find end of key */ ;
if (text != key + slength)
text++;
text_ptr = (png_textp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_sizeof(png_text));
if (text_ptr == NULL)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Not enough memory to process text chunk.");
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
text_ptr->compression = PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE;
text_ptr->key = key;
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
text_ptr->lang = NULL;
text_ptr->lang_key = NULL;
text_ptr->itxt_length = 0;
#endif
text_ptr->text = text;
text_ptr->text_length = png_strlen(text);
ret = png_set_text_2(png_ptr, info_ptr, text_ptr, 1);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
png_free(png_ptr, text_ptr);
if (ret)
png_warning(png_ptr, "Insufficient memory to process text chunk.");
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __dev_addr_add(struct dev_addr_list **list, int *count,
void *addr, int alen, int glbl)
{
struct dev_addr_list *da;
for (da = *list; da != NULL; da = da->next) {
if (memcmp(da->da_addr, addr, da->da_addrlen) == 0 &&
da->da_addrlen == alen) {
if (glbl) {
int old_glbl = da->da_gusers;
da->da_gusers = 1;
if (old_glbl)
return 0;
}
da->da_users++;
return 0;
}
}
da = kzalloc(sizeof(*da), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (da == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(da->da_addr, addr, alen);
da->da_addrlen = alen;
da->da_users = 1;
da->da_gusers = glbl ? 1 : 0;
da->next = *list;
*list = da;
(*count)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addranges_d(struct cstate *g)
{
addrange(g, '0', '9');
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 4,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 GetWord(struct ngiflib_gif * g) {
u16 r = (u16)GetByte(g);
r |= ((u16)GetByte(g) << 8);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fix "pixel overrun"
fixes #3
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::SurfacePropertiesMismatch(
const RenderWidgetSurfaceProperties& first,
const RenderWidgetSurfaceProperties& second) const {
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
RenderWidgetSurfaceProperties second_reduced = second;
second_reduced.top_controls_height = first.top_controls_height;
second_reduced.top_controls_shown_ratio = first.top_controls_shown_ratio;
second_reduced.bottom_controls_height = first.bottom_controls_height;
second_reduced.bottom_controls_shown_ratio =
first.bottom_controls_shown_ratio;
second_reduced.selection = first.selection;
return first != second_reduced;
}
#endif
return first != second;
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init trap_init(void)
{
/* Init cpu_entry_area before IST entries are set up */
setup_cpu_entry_areas();
idt_setup_traps();
/*
* Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
* "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
* to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
* It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
cea_set_pte(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT_VADDR, __pa_symbol(idt_table),
PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
idt_descr.address = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT;
/*
* Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
*/
cpu_init();
idt_setup_ist_traps();
x86_init.irqs.trap_init();
idt_setup_debugidt_traps();
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 6,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err senc_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i, j, sample_count;
GF_SampleEncryptionBox *ptr = (GF_SampleEncryptionBox *) a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SampleEncryptionBox", trace);
sample_count = gf_list_count(ptr->samp_aux_info);
fprintf(trace, "sampleCount=\"%d\">\n", sample_count);
fprintf(trace, "<FullBoxInfo Version=\"%d\" Flags=\"0x%X\"/>\n", ptr->version, ptr->flags);
for (i=0; i<sample_count; i++) {
GF_CENCSampleAuxInfo *cenc_sample = (GF_CENCSampleAuxInfo *)gf_list_get(ptr->samp_aux_info, i);
if (cenc_sample) {
fprintf(trace, "<SampleEncryptionEntry sampleNumber=\"%d\" IV_size=\"%u\" IV=\"", i+1, cenc_sample->IV_size);
dump_data_hex(trace, (char *) cenc_sample->IV, cenc_sample->IV_size);
fprintf(trace, "\"");
if (ptr->flags & 0x2) {
fprintf(trace, " SubsampleCount=\"%d\"", cenc_sample->subsample_count);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (j=0; j<cenc_sample->subsample_count; j++) {
fprintf(trace, "<SubSampleEncryptionEntry NumClearBytes=\"%d\" NumEncryptedBytes=\"%d\"/>\n", cenc_sample->subsamples[j].bytes_clear_data, cenc_sample->subsamples[j].bytes_encrypted_data);
}
} else {
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
}
fprintf(trace, "</SampleEncryptionEntry>\n");
}
}
if (!ptr->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<SampleEncryptionEntry sampleCount=\"\" IV=\"\" SubsampleCount=\"\">\n");
fprintf(trace, "<SubSampleEncryptionEntry NumClearBytes=\"\" NumEncryptedBytes=\"\"/>\n");
fprintf(trace, "</SampleEncryptionEntry>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SampleEncryptionBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usb_fasttrackpro_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev)
{
int err;
if (dev->actconfig->desc.bConfigurationValue == 1) {
dev_info(&dev->dev,
"Fast Track Pro switching to config #2\n");
/* This function has to be available by the usb core module.
* if it is not avialable the boot quirk has to be left out
* and the configuration has to be set by udev or hotplug
* rules
*/
err = usb_driver_set_configuration(dev, 2);
if (err < 0)
dev_dbg(&dev->dev,
"error usb_driver_set_configuration: %d\n",
err);
/* Always return an error, so that we stop creating a device
that will just be destroyed and recreated with a new
configuration */
return -ENODEV;
} else
dev_info(&dev->dev, "Fast Track Pro config OK\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gamma_threshold_test(png_modifier *pm, png_byte colour_type,
png_byte bit_depth, int interlace_type, double file_gamma,
double screen_gamma)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char name[64];
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "threshold ");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, file_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "/");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, screen_gamma, 3);
(void)gamma_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, 0/*palette*/, interlace_type,
file_gamma, screen_gamma, 0/*sBIT*/, 1/*threshold test*/, name,
0 /*no input precision*/,
0 /*no scale16*/, 0 /*no expand16*/, 0 /*no background*/, 0 /*hence*/,
0 /*no background gamma*/);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ping_unhash(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
pr_debug("ping_unhash(isk=%p,isk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
if (sk_hashed(sk)) {
write_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
hlist_nulls_del(&sk->sk_nulls_node);
sock_put(sk);
isk->inet_num = 0;
isk->inet_sport = 0;
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
write_unlock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
}
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ahci_populate_sglist(AHCIDevice *ad, QEMUSGList *sglist, int offset)
{
AHCICmdHdr *cmd = ad->cur_cmd;
uint32_t opts = le32_to_cpu(cmd->opts);
uint64_t prdt_addr = le64_to_cpu(cmd->tbl_addr) + 0x80;
int sglist_alloc_hint = opts >> AHCI_CMD_HDR_PRDT_LEN;
dma_addr_t prdt_len = (sglist_alloc_hint * sizeof(AHCI_SG));
dma_addr_t real_prdt_len = prdt_len;
uint8_t *prdt;
int i;
int r = 0;
int sum = 0;
int off_idx = -1;
int off_pos = -1;
int tbl_entry_size;
IDEBus *bus = &ad->port;
BusState *qbus = BUS(bus);
if (!sglist_alloc_hint) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "no sg list given by guest: 0x%08x\n", opts);
return -1;
}
/* map PRDT */
if (!(prdt = dma_memory_map(ad->hba->as, prdt_addr, &prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE))){
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "map failed\n");
return -1;
}
if (prdt_len < real_prdt_len) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "mapped less than expected\n");
r = -1;
goto out;
}
/* Get entries in the PRDT, init a qemu sglist accordingly */
if (sglist_alloc_hint > 0) {
AHCI_SG *tbl = (AHCI_SG *)prdt;
sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
tbl_entry_size = (le32_to_cpu(tbl[i].flags_size) + 1);
if (offset <= (sum + tbl_entry_size)) {
off_idx = i;
off_pos = offset - sum;
break;
}
sum += tbl_entry_size;
}
if ((off_idx == -1) || (off_pos < 0) || (off_pos > tbl_entry_size)) {
DPRINTF(ad->port_no, "%s: Incorrect offset! "
"off_idx: %d, off_pos: %d\n",
__func__, off_idx, off_pos);
r = -1;
goto out;
}
qemu_sglist_init(sglist, qbus->parent, (sglist_alloc_hint - off_idx),
ad->hba->as);
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[off_idx].addr + off_pos),
le32_to_cpu(tbl[off_idx].flags_size) + 1 - off_pos);
for (i = off_idx + 1; i < sglist_alloc_hint; i++) {
/* flags_size is zero-based */
qemu_sglist_add(sglist, le64_to_cpu(tbl[i].addr),
le32_to_cpu(tbl[i].flags_size) + 1);
}
}
out:
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, prdt, prdt_len,
DMA_DIRECTION_TO_DEVICE, prdt_len);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::matchesReadWritePseudoClass() const
{
return m_inputType->supportsReadOnly() && !isReadOnly();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ScriptController::canAccessFromCurrentOrigin(Frame *frame)
{
return !v8::Context::InContext() || V8BindingSecurity::canAccessFrame(V8BindingState::Only(), frame, true);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Free_MarkLigPos( HB_GPOS_SubTable* st)
{
HB_MarkLigPos* mlp = &st->marklig;
Free_LigatureArray( &mlp->LigatureArray, mlp->ClassCount );
Free_MarkArray( &mlp->MarkArray );
_HB_OPEN_Free_Coverage( &mlp->LigatureCoverage );
_HB_OPEN_Free_Coverage( &mlp->MarkCoverage );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ps_parser_to_coord_array( PS_Parser parser,
FT_Int max_coords,
FT_Short* coords )
{
ps_parser_skip_spaces( parser );
return ps_tocoordarray( &parser->cursor, parser->limit,
max_coords, coords );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipa_draw_chord(wmfAPI * API, wmfDrawArc_t * draw_arc)
{
util_draw_arc(API, draw_arc, magick_arc_chord);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL Extension::GetHomepageURL() const {
if (homepage_url_.is_valid())
return homepage_url_;
if (!UpdatesFromGallery())
return GURL();
GURL url(ChromeStoreLaunchURL() + std::string("/detail/") + id());
return url;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_load_metadata_files(struct super_block *sb, int partition)
{
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct udf_part_map *map;
struct udf_meta_data *mdata;
struct kernel_lb_addr addr;
map = &sbi->s_partmaps[partition];
mdata = &map->s_type_specific.s_metadata;
/* metadata address */
udf_debug("Metadata file location: block = %d part = %d\n",
mdata->s_meta_file_loc, map->s_partition_num);
mdata->s_metadata_fe = udf_find_metadata_inode_efe(sb,
mdata->s_meta_file_loc, map->s_partition_num);
if (mdata->s_metadata_fe == NULL) {
/* mirror file entry */
udf_debug("Mirror metadata file location: block = %d part = %d\n",
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc, map->s_partition_num);
mdata->s_mirror_fe = udf_find_metadata_inode_efe(sb,
mdata->s_mirror_file_loc, map->s_partition_num);
if (mdata->s_mirror_fe == NULL) {
udf_err(sb, "Both metadata and mirror metadata inode efe can not found\n");
goto error_exit;
}
}
/*
* bitmap file entry
* Note:
* Load only if bitmap file location differs from 0xFFFFFFFF (DCN-5102)
*/
if (mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc != 0xFFFFFFFF) {
addr.logicalBlockNum = mdata->s_bitmap_file_loc;
addr.partitionReferenceNum = map->s_partition_num;
udf_debug("Bitmap file location: block = %d part = %d\n",
addr.logicalBlockNum, addr.partitionReferenceNum);
mdata->s_bitmap_fe = udf_iget(sb, &addr);
if (mdata->s_bitmap_fe == NULL) {
if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
udf_warn(sb, "bitmap inode efe not found but it's ok since the disc is mounted read-only\n");
else {
udf_err(sb, "bitmap inode efe not found and attempted read-write mount\n");
goto error_exit;
}
}
}
udf_debug("udf_load_metadata_files Ok\n");
return 0;
error_exit:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableScrollTopLeftInterop(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetScrollTopLeftInteropEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 29,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DelayScrollOffsetClampScope() {
DCHECK(count_ > 0 || NeedsClampList().IsEmpty());
count_++;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 28,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::UnscopableVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unscopableVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::UnscopableVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ieee80211_sta_set_buffered(struct ieee80211_sta *pubsta,
u8 tid, bool buffered)
{
struct sta_info *sta = container_of(pubsta, struct sta_info, sta);
if (WARN_ON(tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
return;
trace_api_sta_set_buffered(sta->local, pubsta, tid, buffered);
if (buffered)
set_bit(tid, &sta->driver_buffered_tids);
else
clear_bit(tid, &sta->driver_buffered_tids);
sta_info_recalc_tim(sta);
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 17,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AudioFlinger::EffectModule::suspended() const
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
return mSuspended;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t1_include(void)
{
do {
t1_getline();
t1_scan_param();
t1_putline();
} while (t1_in_eexec == 0);
t1_start_eexec();
do {
t1_getline();
t1_scan_param();
t1_putline();
} while (!(t1_charstrings() || t1_subrs()));
t1_cs = true;
do {
t1_getline();
t1_putline();
} while (!t1_end_eexec());
t1_stop_eexec();
if (fixedcontent) { /* copy 512 zeros (not needed for PDF) */
do {
t1_getline();
t1_putline();
} while (!t1_cleartomark());
t1_check_end(); /* write "{restore}if" if found */
}
get_length3();
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 nfsd4_status_stateid_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
return (op_encode_hdr_size + op_encode_stateid_maxsz)* sizeof(__be32);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 12,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __tg3_set_mac_addr(struct tg3 *tp, int skip_mac_1)
{
u32 addr_high, addr_low;
int i;
addr_high = ((tp->dev->dev_addr[0] << 8) |
tp->dev->dev_addr[1]);
addr_low = ((tp->dev->dev_addr[2] << 24) |
(tp->dev->dev_addr[3] << 16) |
(tp->dev->dev_addr[4] << 8) |
(tp->dev->dev_addr[5] << 0));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (i == 1 && skip_mac_1)
continue;
tw32(MAC_ADDR_0_HIGH + (i * 8), addr_high);
tw32(MAC_ADDR_0_LOW + (i * 8), addr_low);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5703 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704) {
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
tw32(MAC_EXTADDR_0_HIGH + (i * 8), addr_high);
tw32(MAC_EXTADDR_0_LOW + (i * 8), addr_low);
}
}
addr_high = (tp->dev->dev_addr[0] +
tp->dev->dev_addr[1] +
tp->dev->dev_addr[2] +
tp->dev->dev_addr[3] +
tp->dev->dev_addr[4] +
tp->dev->dev_addr[5]) &
TX_BACKOFF_SEED_MASK;
tw32(MAC_TX_BACKOFF_SEED, addr_high);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::deleteShader(WebGLId shader) {
gl_->DeleteShader(shader);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ColorChooserDialog::ExecuteOpen(const ExecuteOpenParams& params) {
CHOOSECOLOR cc;
cc.lStructSize = sizeof(CHOOSECOLOR);
cc.hwndOwner = params.owner;
cc.rgbResult = skia::SkColorToCOLORREF(params.color);
cc.lpCustColors = custom_colors_;
cc.Flags = CC_ANYCOLOR | CC_FULLOPEN | CC_RGBINIT;
bool success = !!ChooseColor(&cc);
DisableOwner(cc.hwndOwner);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog, this, success,
skia::COLORREFToSkColor(cc.rgbResult), params.run_state));
}
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
R=jschuh@chromium.org, pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap_l1,
unsigned long *msr_bitmap_nested,
u32 msr, int type)
{
int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
/*
* See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
* have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
* We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
*/
if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
if (type & MSR_TYPE_R &&
!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_l1 + 0x000 / f))
/* read-low */
__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_nested + 0x000 / f);
if (type & MSR_TYPE_W &&
!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_l1 + 0x800 / f))
/* write-low */
__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_nested + 0x800 / f);
} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
msr &= 0x1fff;
if (type & MSR_TYPE_R &&
!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_l1 + 0x400 / f))
/* read-high */
__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_nested + 0x400 / f);
if (type & MSR_TYPE_W &&
!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_l1 + 0xc00 / f))
/* write-high */
__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap_nested + 0xc00 / f);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_ppt_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_ppt_t *ppt = &ms->parms.ppt;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
ppt->data = 0;
if (ms->len < 1) {
goto error;
}
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &ppt->ind)) {
goto error;
}
ppt->len = ms->len - 1;
if (ppt->len > 0) {
if (!(ppt->data = jas_malloc(ppt->len))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_read(in, (char *) ppt->data, ppt->len) != JAS_CAST(int, ppt->len)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
ppt->data = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
jpc_ppt_destroyparms(ms);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 6,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdftex_warn(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
fputs("\nWarning: module writet1 of dvips", stderr);
if (cur_file_name)
fprintf(stderr, " (file %s)", cur_file_name);
fputs(": ", stderr);
vsprintf(print_buf, fmt, args);
fputs(print_buf, stderr);
fputs("\n", stderr);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContents* WebContentsImpl::OpenURL(const OpenURLParams& params) {
if (!delegate_)
return NULL;
WebContents* new_contents = delegate_->OpenURLFromTab(this, params);
return new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Manifest::Location Extension::location() const {
return manifest_->location();
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType CheckMemoryOverflow(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
size;
size=count*quantum;
if ((count == 0) || (quantum != (size/count)))
{
errno=ENOMEM;
return(MagickTrue);
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 26,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: assegment_prepend_asns (struct assegment *seg, as_t asnum, int num)
{
as_t *newas;
int i;
if (!num)
return seg;
if (num >= AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
return seg; /* we don't do huge prepends */
if ((newas = assegment_data_new (seg->length + num)) == NULL)
return seg;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
newas[i] = asnum;
memcpy (newas + num, seg->as, ASSEGMENT_DATA_SIZE (seg->length, 1));
assegment_data_free (seg->as);
seg->as = newas;
seg->length += num;
return seg;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestBrowserWindowOwner::~TestBrowserWindowOwner() {
BrowserList::RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNmToken++;
#endif
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (c == 0) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge token, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
}
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
if ((max > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
return(buffer);
}
}
if (len == 0)
return(NULL);
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
return(NULL);
}
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 12,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void isig(int sig, struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct pid *tty_pgrp = tty_get_pgrp(tty);
if (tty_pgrp) {
kill_pgrp(tty_pgrp, sig, 1);
put_pid(tty_pgrp);
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptographicallyRandomValues(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length)
{
Platform::current()->cryptographicallyRandomValues(buffer, length);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 27,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cdrom_open(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi, struct block_device *bdev,
fmode_t mode)
{
int ret;
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "entering cdrom_open\n");
/* if this was a O_NONBLOCK open and we should honor the flags,
* do a quick open without drive/disc integrity checks. */
cdi->use_count++;
if ((mode & FMODE_NDELAY) && (cdi->options & CDO_USE_FFLAGS)) {
ret = cdi->ops->open(cdi, 1);
} else {
ret = open_for_data(cdi);
if (ret)
goto err;
cdrom_mmc3_profile(cdi);
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
ret = -EROFS;
if (cdrom_open_write(cdi))
goto err_release;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_RAM))
goto err_release;
ret = 0;
cdi->media_written = 0;
}
}
if (ret)
goto err;
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "Use count for \"/dev/%s\" now %d\n",
cdi->name, cdi->use_count);
return 0;
err_release:
if (CDROM_CAN(CDC_LOCK) && cdi->options & CDO_LOCK) {
cdi->ops->lock_door(cdi, 0);
cd_dbg(CD_OPEN, "door unlocked\n");
}
cdi->ops->release(cdi);
err:
cdi->use_count--;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NormalizeFilePath(const FilePath& path, FilePath* normalized_path) {
FilePath real_path_result;
if (!RealPath(path, &real_path_result))
return false;
stat_wrapper_t file_info;
if (CallStat(real_path_result.value().c_str(), &file_info) != 0 ||
S_ISDIR(file_info.st_mode))
return false;
*normalized_path = real_path_result;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 7,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ExecuteExtensionCommand(
const extensions::Extension* extension,
const extensions::Command& command) {
extension_keybinding_registry_->ExecuteCommand(extension->id(),
command.accelerator());
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_quant_tables(RangeCoder *c,
int16_t quant_table[MAX_CONTEXT_INPUTS][256])
{
int i;
int context_count = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
context_count *= read_quant_table(c, quant_table[i], context_count);
if (context_count > 32768U) {
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
return (context_count + 1) / 2;
}
Commit Message: ffv1dec: Check bits_per_raw_sample and colorspace for equality in ver 0/1 headers
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xt_replace_table(struct xt_table *table,
unsigned int num_counters,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
int *error)
{
struct xt_table_info *private;
int ret;
ret = xt_jumpstack_alloc(newinfo);
if (ret < 0) {
*error = ret;
return NULL;
}
/* Do the substitution. */
local_bh_disable();
private = table->private;
/* Check inside lock: is the old number correct? */
if (num_counters != private->number) {
pr_debug("num_counters != table->private->number (%u/%u)\n",
num_counters, private->number);
local_bh_enable();
*error = -EAGAIN;
return NULL;
}
newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries;
/*
* Ensure contents of newinfo are visible before assigning to
* private.
*/
smp_wmb();
table->private = newinfo;
/*
* Even though table entries have now been swapped, other CPU's
* may still be using the old entries. This is okay, because
* resynchronization happens because of the locking done
* during the get_counters() routine.
*/
local_bh_enable();
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (audit_enabled) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
if (ab) {
audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u",
table->name, table->af,
private->number);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
#endif
return private;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lzss_offset_for_position(struct lzss *lzss, int64_t pos)
{
return (int)(pos & lzss->mask);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ap_config_time_show(struct bus_type *bus, char *buf)
{
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", ap_config_time);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vnc_dpy_cursor_define(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
QEMUCursor *c)
{
VncDisplay *vd = vnc_display;
VncState *vs;
cursor_put(vd->cursor);
g_free(vd->cursor_mask);
vd->cursor = c;
cursor_get(vd->cursor);
vd->cursor_msize = cursor_get_mono_bpl(c) * c->height;
vd->cursor_mask = g_malloc0(vd->cursor_msize);
cursor_get_mono_mask(c, 0, vd->cursor_mask);
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsFeatureEnabled(
blink::mojom::FeaturePolicyFeature feature) {
return feature_policy_ && feature_policy_->IsFeatureEnabledForOrigin(
feature, GetLastCommittedOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void chmd_close(struct mschm_decompressor *base,
struct mschmd_header *chm)
{
struct mschm_decompressor_p *self = (struct mschm_decompressor_p *) base;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *nfi;
struct mspack_system *sys;
unsigned int i;
if (!base) return;
sys = self->system;
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
/* free files */
for (fi = chm->files; fi; fi = nfi) {
nfi = fi->next;
sys->free(fi);
}
for (fi = chm->sysfiles; fi; fi = nfi) {
nfi = fi->next;
sys->free(fi);
}
/* if this CHM was being decompressed, free decompression state */
if (self->d && (self->d->chm == chm)) {
if (self->d->infh) sys->close(self->d->infh);
if (self->d->state) lzxd_free(self->d->state);
sys->free(self->d);
self->d = NULL;
}
/* if this CHM had a chunk cache, free it and contents */
if (chm->chunk_cache) {
for (i = 0; i < chm->num_chunks; i++) sys->free(chm->chunk_cache[i]);
sys->free(chm->chunk_cache);
}
sys->free(chm);
}
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkit_web_view_drag_leave(GtkWidget* widget, GdkDragContext* context, guint time)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
if (!priv->droppingContexts.contains(context))
return;
g_timeout_add(0, reinterpret_cast<GSourceFunc>(doDragLeaveLater), priv->droppingContexts.get(context));
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL AppCache::GetNamespaceEntryUrl(
const std::vector<AppCacheNamespace>& namespaces,
const GURL& namespace_url) const {
size_t count = namespaces.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
if (namespaces[i].namespace_url == namespace_url)
return namespaces[i].target_url;
}
NOTREACHED();
return GURL();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollControlWasSetNeedsPaintInvalidation() {
GetLayoutBox()->SetShouldCheckForPaintInvalidation();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 27,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Handle<Object> GetImpl(Isolate* isolate, FixedArrayBase* backing_store,
uint32_t entry) {
uint32_t index = GetIndexForEntryImpl(backing_store, entry);
return handle(BackingStore::cast(backing_store)->get(index), isolate);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pcrypt_init_padata(struct padata_pcrypt *pcrypt,
const char *name)
{
int ret = -ENOMEM;
struct pcrypt_cpumask *mask;
get_online_cpus();
pcrypt->wq = alloc_workqueue("%s", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE,
1, name);
if (!pcrypt->wq)
goto err;
pcrypt->pinst = padata_alloc_possible(pcrypt->wq);
if (!pcrypt->pinst)
goto err_destroy_workqueue;
mask = kmalloc(sizeof(*mask), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mask)
goto err_free_padata;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mask->mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
kfree(mask);
goto err_free_padata;
}
cpumask_and(mask->mask, cpu_possible_mask, cpu_online_mask);
rcu_assign_pointer(pcrypt->cb_cpumask, mask);
pcrypt->nblock.notifier_call = pcrypt_cpumask_change_notify;
ret = padata_register_cpumask_notifier(pcrypt->pinst, &pcrypt->nblock);
if (ret)
goto err_free_cpumask;
ret = pcrypt_sysfs_add(pcrypt->pinst, name);
if (ret)
goto err_unregister_notifier;
put_online_cpus();
return ret;
err_unregister_notifier:
padata_unregister_cpumask_notifier(pcrypt->pinst, &pcrypt->nblock);
err_free_cpumask:
free_cpumask_var(mask->mask);
kfree(mask);
err_free_padata:
padata_free(pcrypt->pinst);
err_destroy_workqueue:
destroy_workqueue(pcrypt->wq);
err:
put_online_cpus();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_option_search_table()
{
int i, j, k;
int diff1, diff2;
char *p, *q;
/* count table size */
RC_table_size = 0;
for (j = 0; sections[j].name != NULL; j++) {
i = 0;
while (sections[j].params[i].name) {
i++;
RC_table_size++;
}
}
RC_search_table = New_N(struct rc_search_table, RC_table_size);
k = 0;
for (j = 0; sections[j].name != NULL; j++) {
i = 0;
while (sections[j].params[i].name) {
RC_search_table[k].param = §ions[j].params[i];
k++;
i++;
}
}
qsort(RC_search_table, RC_table_size, sizeof(struct rc_search_table),
(int (*)(const void *, const void *))compare_table);
diff2 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < RC_table_size - 1; i++) {
p = RC_search_table[i].param->name;
q = RC_search_table[i + 1].param->name;
for (j = 0; p[j] != '\0' && q[j] != '\0' && p[j] == q[j]; j++) ;
diff1 = j;
if (diff1 > diff2)
RC_search_table[i].uniq_pos = diff1 + 1;
else
RC_search_table[i].uniq_pos = diff2 + 1;
diff2 = diff1;
}
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 16,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OxideQQuickWebView::canGoBack() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return false;
}
return d->proxy_->canGoBack();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_pic_coding_ext(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IV_SUCCESS;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
/* extension code identifier */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][0] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[0][1] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][0] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->au2_f_code[1][1] = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,2);
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,2);
if (ps_dec->u2_picture_structure < TOP_FIELD ||
ps_dec->u2_picture_structure > FRAME_PICTURE)
{
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
ps_dec->u2_top_field_first = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_concealment_motion_vectors = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_intra_vlc_format = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_repeat_first_field = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Flush chroma_420_type */
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
ps_dec->u2_progressive_frame = impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream))
{
/* Flush v_axis, field_sequence, burst_amplitude, sub_carrier_phase */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,20);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
if(VERTICAL_SCAN == ps_dec->u2_alternate_scan)
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_vertical;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag;
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Adding check for min_width and min_height
Add check for min_wd and min_ht. Stride is updated if header
decode is done.
Bug: 74078669
Change-Id: Ided95395e1138335dbb4b05131a8551f6f7bbfcd
(cherry picked from commit 84eba4863dd50083951db83ea3cc81e015bf51da)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 5,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateDrawArrays(const char* function_name) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
if (!ValidateStencilSettings(function_name))
return false;
if (!ValidateRenderingState(function_name)) {
return false;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
if (framebuffer_binding_ && framebuffer_binding_->CheckDepthStencilStatus(
&reason) != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, function_name, reason);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t mod_strcspn(const char *string, const char *reject)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; string && string[i]; i++) {
if (string[i] == '/' && string[i+1] == '*') {
i += 2;
while ( string && string[i] && (string[i] != '*' || string[i+1] != '/') )
i++;
i++;
} else if (string[i] == '/' && string[i+1] == '/') {
i += 2;
while ( string && string[i] && string[i] != '\n' )
i++;
} else {
for (j = 0; reject && reject[j]; j++) {
if (string[i] == reject[j])
break;
}
if (reject && reject[j])
break;
}
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *page_follow_link_light(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
nd_set_link(nd, page_getlink(dentry, &page));
return page;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 21,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmu_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
int ret = 0;
/* Build tests */
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(siar) + sizeof(unsigned long) != TSO(sdar));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(sdar) + sizeof(unsigned long) != TSO(sier));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(sier) + sizeof(unsigned long) != TSO(mmcr2));
BUILD_BUG_ON(TSO(mmcr2) + sizeof(unsigned long) != TSO(mmcr0));
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S))
return -ENODEV;
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.siar, 0,
sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.sdar, sizeof(unsigned long),
2 * sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.sier, 2 * sizeof(unsigned long),
3 * sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.mmcr2, 3 * sizeof(unsigned long),
4 * sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!ret)
ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.mmcr0, 4 * sizeof(unsigned long),
5 * sizeof(unsigned long));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int amd_gpio_irq_set_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
{
int ret = 0;
u32 pin_reg;
unsigned long flags;
struct gpio_chip *gc = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
switch (type & IRQ_TYPE_SENSE_MASK) {
case IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING:
pin_reg &= ~BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_HIGH << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq);
break;
case IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_FALLING:
pin_reg &= ~BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_LOW << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq);
break;
case IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_BOTH:
pin_reg &= ~BIT(LEVEL_TRIG_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= BOTH_EADGE << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq);
break;
case IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH:
pin_reg |= LEVEL_TRIGGER << LEVEL_TRIG_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_HIGH << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF);
pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_PRESERVE_LOW_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_level_irq);
break;
case IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW:
pin_reg |= LEVEL_TRIGGER << LEVEL_TRIG_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~(ACTIVE_LEVEL_MASK << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF);
pin_reg |= ACTIVE_LOW << ACTIVE_LEVEL_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF);
pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_PRESERVE_HIGH_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_level_irq);
break;
case IRQ_TYPE_NONE:
break;
default:
dev_err(&gpio_dev->pdev->dev, "Invalid type value\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
pin_reg |= CLR_INTR_STAT << INTERRUPT_STS_OFF;
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl: amd: Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pinctrl registration
Use devm_pinctrl_register() for pin control registration and clean
error path.
Signed-off-by: Laxman Dewangan <ldewangan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 24,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vapic_register(void)
{
type_register_static(&vapic_type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int irq_mod_ticks(unsigned int usecs, unsigned int resolution)
{
if (usecs == 0)
return 0;
if (usecs < resolution)
return 1; /* never round down to 0 */
return usecs / resolution;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 current_tick_length(void)
{
return tick_length;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stat_to_qid(const struct stat *stbuf, V9fsQID *qidp)
{
size_t size;
memset(&qidp->path, 0, sizeof(qidp->path));
size = MIN(sizeof(stbuf->st_ino), sizeof(qidp->path));
memcpy(&qidp->path, &stbuf->st_ino, size);
qidp->version = stbuf->st_mtime ^ (stbuf->st_size << 8);
qidp->type = 0;
if (S_ISDIR(stbuf->st_mode)) {
qidp->type |= P9_QID_TYPE_DIR;
}
if (S_ISLNK(stbuf->st_mode)) {
qidp->type |= P9_QID_TYPE_SYMLINK;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_create_shader(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
uint16_t length)
{
struct pipe_stream_output_info so_info;
int i, ret;
uint32_t shader_offset;
unsigned num_tokens, num_so_outputs, offlen;
uint8_t *shd_text;
uint32_t type;
if (length < 5)
return EINVAL;
type = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_TYPE);
num_tokens = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_NUM_TOKENS);
offlen = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET);
num_so_outputs = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_SO_NUM_OUTPUTS);
if (num_so_outputs > PIPE_MAX_SO_OUTPUTS)
return EINVAL;
shader_offset = 6;
if (num_so_outputs) {
so_info.num_outputs = num_so_outputs;
if (so_info.num_outputs) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
so_info.stride[i] = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_SO_STRIDE(i));
for (i = 0; i < so_info.num_outputs; i++) {
uint32_t tmp = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_SO_OUTPUT0(i));
so_info.output[i].register_index = tmp & 0xff;
so_info.output[i].start_component = (tmp >> 8) & 0x3;
so_info.output[i].num_components = (tmp >> 10) & 0x7;
so_info.output[i].output_buffer = (tmp >> 13) & 0x7;
so_info.output[i].dst_offset = (tmp >> 16) & 0xffff;
}
}
shader_offset += 4 + (2 * num_so_outputs);
} else
memset(&so_info, 0, sizeof(so_info));
shd_text = get_buf_ptr(ctx, shader_offset);
ret = vrend_create_shader(ctx->grctx, handle, &so_info, (const char *)shd_text, offlen, num_tokens, type, length - shader_offset + 1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 25,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IndexedDBTransaction::Operation BindWeakOperation(
Functor&& functor,
base::WeakPtr<IndexedDBCursor> weak_cursor,
Args&&... args) {
DCHECK(weak_cursor);
IndexedDBCursor* cursor_ptr = weak_cursor.get();
return base::Bind(
&InvokeOrSucceed, std::move(weak_cursor),
base::Bind(std::forward<Functor>(functor), base::Unretained(cursor_ptr),
std::forward<Args>(args)...));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long sched_group_rt_runtime(struct task_group *tg)
{
u64 rt_runtime_us;
if (tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime == RUNTIME_INF)
return -1;
rt_runtime_us = tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
do_div(rt_runtime_us, NSEC_PER_USEC);
return rt_runtime_us;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::CopyInForeignFile(
const base::FilePath& src_local_disk_path,
const FileSystemURL& dest_url,
StatusCallback callback) {
base::File::Error error = base::File::FILE_OK;
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation = base::WrapUnique(
file_system_context_->CreateFileSystemOperation(dest_url, &error));
FileSystemOperation* operation_raw = operation.get();
OperationID id = BeginOperation(std::move(operation));
base::AutoReset<bool> beginning(&is_beginning_operation_, true);
if (!operation_raw) {
DidFinish(id, std::move(callback), error);
return id;
}
PrepareForWrite(id, dest_url);
operation_raw->CopyInForeignFile(
src_local_disk_path, dest_url,
base::BindOnce(&FileSystemOperationRunner::DidFinish, weak_ptr_, id,
std::move(callback)));
return id;
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 15,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Range> TextIterator::range() const
{
if (m_positionNode) {
if (m_positionOffsetBaseNode) {
int index = m_positionOffsetBaseNode->nodeIndex();
m_positionStartOffset += index;
m_positionEndOffset += index;
m_positionOffsetBaseNode = 0;
}
return Range::create(m_positionNode->document(), m_positionNode, m_positionStartOffset, m_positionNode, m_positionEndOffset);
}
if (m_endContainer)
return Range::create(m_endContainer->document(), m_endContainer, m_endOffset, m_endContainer, m_endOffset);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IW_INLINE unsigned int get_raw_sample_16(struct iw_context *ctx,
int x, int y, int channel)
{
size_t z;
unsigned short tmpui16;
z = y*ctx->img1.bpr + (ctx->img1_numchannels_physical*x + channel)*2;
tmpui16 = ( ((unsigned short)(ctx->img1.pixels[z+0])) <<8) | ctx->img1.pixels[z+1];
return tmpui16;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 4,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_rose *srose = (struct sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
size_t copied;
unsigned char *asmptr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int n, er, qbit;
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the queue for
* us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Now we can treat all alike */
if ((skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &er)) == NULL)
return er;
qbit = (skb->data[0] & ROSE_Q_BIT) == ROSE_Q_BIT;
skb_pull(skb, ROSE_MIN_LEN);
if (rose->qbitincl) {
asmptr = skb_push(skb, 1);
*asmptr = qbit;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (srose != NULL) {
srose->srose_family = AF_ROSE;
srose->srose_addr = rose->dest_addr;
srose->srose_call = rose->dest_call;
srose->srose_ndigis = rose->dest_ndigis;
if (msg->msg_namelen >= sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose)) {
struct full_sockaddr_rose *full_srose = (struct full_sockaddr_rose *)msg->msg_name;
for (n = 0 ; n < rose->dest_ndigis ; n++)
full_srose->srose_digis[n] = rose->dest_digis[n];
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_rose);
} else {
if (rose->dest_ndigis >= 1) {
srose->srose_ndigis = 1;
srose->srose_digi = rose->dest_digis[0];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rose);
}
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asepcos_delete_file(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *path)
{
int r, ftype, atype;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 buf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
/* use GET DATA to determine whether it is a DF or EF */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xca, 0x01, 0x84);
apdu.le = 256;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buf);
apdu.resp = buf;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1 == 0x90 && apdu.sw2 == 0x00) {
/* looks like a EF */
atype = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
ftype = 0x02;
buf[0] = path->value[path->len-2];
buf[1] = path->value[path->len-1];
} else {
/* presumably a DF */
atype = SC_APDU_CASE_1;
ftype = 0x00;
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, atype, 0xe4, ftype, 0x00);
if (atype == SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT) {
apdu.lc = 2;
apdu.datalen = 2;
apdu.data = buf;
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::PostMessageToFrame(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj,
jstring frame_name, jstring message, jstring target_origin,
jintArray sent_ports) {
base::string16 source_origin;
base::string16 j_target_origin(ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, target_origin));
base::string16 j_message(ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, message));
std::vector<int> j_ports;
if (sent_ports != nullptr) {
base::android::JavaIntArrayToIntVector(env, sent_ports, &j_ports);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AwMessagePortServiceImpl::RemoveSentPorts,
base::Unretained(AwMessagePortServiceImpl::GetInstance()),
j_ports));
}
std::vector<content::TransferredMessagePort> ports(j_ports.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < j_ports.size(); ++i)
ports[i].id = j_ports[i];
content::MessagePortProvider::PostMessageToFrame(web_contents_.get(),
source_origin,
j_target_origin,
j_message,
ports);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamDevices MediaStreamManager::ConvertToMediaStreamDevices(
MediaStreamType stream_type,
const MediaDeviceInfoArray& device_infos) {
MediaStreamDevices devices;
for (const auto& info : device_infos)
devices.emplace_back(stream_type, info.device_id, info.label,
info.video_facing);
if (stream_type != MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
return devices;
for (auto& device : devices) {
device.camera_calibration =
video_capture_manager()->GetCameraCalibration(device.id);
}
return devices;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_AddHardware(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string name = CURLEncode::URLDecode(request::findValue(&req, "name"));
std::string senabled = request::findValue(&req, "enabled");
std::string shtype = request::findValue(&req, "htype");
std::string address = request::findValue(&req, "address");
std::string sport = request::findValue(&req, "port");
std::string username = CURLEncode::URLDecode(request::findValue(&req, "username"));
std::string password = CURLEncode::URLDecode(request::findValue(&req, "password"));
std::string extra = CURLEncode::URLDecode(request::findValue(&req, "extra"));
std::string sdatatimeout = request::findValue(&req, "datatimeout");
if (
(name.empty()) ||
(senabled.empty()) ||
(shtype.empty())
)
return;
_eHardwareTypes htype = (_eHardwareTypes)atoi(shtype.c_str());
int iDataTimeout = atoi(sdatatimeout.c_str());
int mode1 = 0;
int mode2 = 0;
int mode3 = 0;
int mode4 = 0;
int mode5 = 0;
int mode6 = 0;
int port = atoi(sport.c_str());
std::string mode1Str = request::findValue(&req, "Mode1");
if (!mode1Str.empty()) {
mode1 = atoi(mode1Str.c_str());
}
std::string mode2Str = request::findValue(&req, "Mode2");
if (!mode2Str.empty()) {
mode2 = atoi(mode2Str.c_str());
}
std::string mode3Str = request::findValue(&req, "Mode3");
if (!mode3Str.empty()) {
mode3 = atoi(mode3Str.c_str());
}
std::string mode4Str = request::findValue(&req, "Mode4");
if (!mode4Str.empty()) {
mode4 = atoi(mode4Str.c_str());
}
std::string mode5Str = request::findValue(&req, "Mode5");
if (!mode5Str.empty()) {
mode5 = atoi(mode5Str.c_str());
}
std::string mode6Str = request::findValue(&req, "Mode6");
if (!mode6Str.empty()) {
mode6 = atoi(mode6Str.c_str());
}
if (IsSerialDevice(htype))
{
if (sport.empty())
return; //need to have a serial port
if (htype == HTYPE_TeleinfoMeter) {
m_sql.UpdatePreferencesVar("SmartMeterType", 0);
}
}
else if (IsNetworkDevice(htype))
{
if (address.empty() || port == 0)
return;
if (htype == HTYPE_MySensorsMQTT || htype == HTYPE_MQTT) {
std::string modeqStr = request::findValue(&req, "mode1");
if (!modeqStr.empty()) {
mode1 = atoi(modeqStr.c_str());
}
}
if (htype == HTYPE_ECODEVICES) {
m_sql.UpdatePreferencesVar("SmartMeterType", 0);
}
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_DomoticzInternal) {
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Domoticz) {
if (address.empty() || port == 0)
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_TE923) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_VOLCRAFTCO20) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_System) {
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ID FROM Hardware WHERE (Type==%d)", HTYPE_System);
if (!result.empty())
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_1WIRE) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Rtl433) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Pinger) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Kodi) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_PanasonicTV) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_LogitechMediaServer) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryBMP085) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryHTU21D) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryTSL2561) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryBME280) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryMCP23017) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Dummy) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Tellstick) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_EVOHOME_SCRIPT || htype == HTYPE_EVOHOME_SERIAL || htype == HTYPE_EVOHOME_WEB || htype == HTYPE_EVOHOME_TCP) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_PiFace) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_HTTPPOLLER) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_BleBox) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_HEOS) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Yeelight) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_XiaomiGateway) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Arilux) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_USBtinGateway) {
}
else if (
(htype == HTYPE_Wunderground) ||
(htype == HTYPE_DarkSky) ||
(htype == HTYPE_AccuWeather) ||
(htype == HTYPE_OpenWeatherMap) ||
(htype == HTYPE_ICYTHERMOSTAT) ||
(htype == HTYPE_TOONTHERMOSTAT) ||
(htype == HTYPE_AtagOne) ||
(htype == HTYPE_PVOUTPUT_INPUT) ||
(htype == HTYPE_NEST) ||
(htype == HTYPE_ANNATHERMOSTAT) ||
(htype == HTYPE_THERMOSMART) ||
(htype == HTYPE_Tado) ||
(htype == HTYPE_Netatmo)
)
{
if (
(username.empty()) ||
(password.empty())
)
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_SolarEdgeAPI)
{
if (
(username.empty())
)
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Nest_OAuthAPI) {
if (
(username == "") &&
(extra == "||")
)
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_SBFSpot) {
if (username.empty())
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_HARMONY_HUB) {
if (
(address.empty() || port == 0)
)
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Philips_Hue) {
if (
(username.empty()) ||
(address.empty() || port == 0)
)
return;
if (port == 0)
port = 80;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_WINDDELEN) {
std::string mill_id = request::findValue(&req, "Mode1");
if (
(mill_id.empty()) ||
(sport.empty())
)
return;
mode1 = atoi(mill_id.c_str());
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Honeywell) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryGPIO) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_SysfsGpio) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_OpenWebNetTCP) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Daikin) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_GoodweAPI) {
if (username.empty())
return;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_PythonPlugin) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_RaspberryPCF8574) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_OpenWebNetUSB) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_IntergasInComfortLAN2RF) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_EnphaseAPI) {
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_EcoCompteur) {
}
else
return;
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "AddHardware";
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
if (htype == HTYPE_Domoticz)
{
if (password.size() != 32)
{
password = GenerateMD5Hash(password);
}
}
else if ((htype == HTYPE_S0SmartMeterUSB) || (htype == HTYPE_S0SmartMeterTCP))
{
extra = "0;1000;0;1000;0;1000;0;1000;0;1000";
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Pinger)
{
mode1 = 30;
mode2 = 1000;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Kodi)
{
mode1 = 30;
mode2 = 1000;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_PanasonicTV)
{
mode1 = 30;
mode2 = 1000;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_LogitechMediaServer)
{
mode1 = 30;
mode2 = 1000;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_HEOS)
{
mode1 = 30;
mode2 = 1000;
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_Tellstick)
{
mode1 = 4;
mode2 = 500;
}
if (htype == HTYPE_HTTPPOLLER) {
m_sql.safe_query(
"INSERT INTO Hardware (Name, Enabled, Type, Address, Port, SerialPort, Username, Password, Extra, Mode1, Mode2, Mode3, Mode4, Mode5, Mode6, DataTimeout) VALUES ('%q',%d, %d,'%q',%d,'%q','%q','%q','%q','%q','%q', '%q', '%q', '%q', '%q', %d)",
name.c_str(),
(senabled == "true") ? 1 : 0,
htype,
address.c_str(),
port,
sport.c_str(),
username.c_str(),
password.c_str(),
extra.c_str(),
mode1Str.c_str(), mode2Str.c_str(), mode3Str.c_str(), mode4Str.c_str(), mode5Str.c_str(), mode6Str.c_str(),
iDataTimeout
);
}
else if (htype == HTYPE_PythonPlugin) {
sport = request::findValue(&req, "serialport");
m_sql.safe_query(
"INSERT INTO Hardware (Name, Enabled, Type, Address, Port, SerialPort, Username, Password, Extra, Mode1, Mode2, Mode3, Mode4, Mode5, Mode6, DataTimeout) VALUES ('%q',%d, %d,'%q',%d,'%q','%q','%q','%q','%q','%q', '%q', '%q', '%q', '%q', %d)",
name.c_str(),
(senabled == "true") ? 1 : 0,
htype,
address.c_str(),
port,
sport.c_str(),
username.c_str(),
password.c_str(),
extra.c_str(),
mode1Str.c_str(), mode2Str.c_str(), mode3Str.c_str(), mode4Str.c_str(), mode5Str.c_str(), mode6Str.c_str(),
iDataTimeout
);
}
else if (
(htype == HTYPE_RFXtrx433)||
(htype == HTYPE_RFXtrx868)
)
{
m_sql.safe_query(
"INSERT INTO Hardware (Name, Enabled, Type, Address, Port, SerialPort, Username, Password, Mode1, Mode2, Mode3, Mode4, Mode5, Mode6, DataTimeout) VALUES ('%q',%d, %d,'%q',%d,'%q','%q','%q',%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d)",
name.c_str(),
(senabled == "true") ? 1 : 0,
htype,
address.c_str(),
port,
sport.c_str(),
username.c_str(),
password.c_str(),
mode1, mode2, mode3, mode4, mode5, mode6,
iDataTimeout
);
extra = "0";
}
else {
m_sql.safe_query(
"INSERT INTO Hardware (Name, Enabled, Type, Address, Port, SerialPort, Username, Password, Extra, Mode1, Mode2, Mode3, Mode4, Mode5, Mode6, DataTimeout) VALUES ('%q',%d, %d,'%q',%d,'%q','%q','%q','%q',%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d)",
name.c_str(),
(senabled == "true") ? 1 : 0,
htype,
address.c_str(),
port,
sport.c_str(),
username.c_str(),
password.c_str(),
extra.c_str(),
mode1, mode2, mode3, mode4, mode5, mode6,
iDataTimeout
);
}
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT MAX(ID) FROM Hardware");
if (!result.empty())
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = result[0];
int ID = atoi(sd[0].c_str());
root["idx"] = sd[0].c_str(); // OTO output the created ID for easier management on the caller side (if automated)
m_mainworker.AddHardwareFromParams(ID, name, (senabled == "true") ? true : false, htype, address, port, sport, username, password, extra, mode1, mode2, mode3, mode4, mode5, mode6, iDataTimeout, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 20,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __net_init int hwsim_init_net(struct net *net)
{
hwsim_net_set_netgroup(net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 7,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Send(IPC::Message* message) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (channel_.get()) {
return channel_->Send(message);
} else {
delete message;
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,177 |
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