instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_xdr_dec_setacl(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, void *res)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(&xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_setattr(&xdr, res);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::clear() {
frame().inputMethodController().clear();
m_shouldStyleWithCSS = false;
m_defaultParagraphSeparator = EditorParagraphSeparatorIsDiv;
m_lastEditCommand = nullptr;
m_undoStack->clear();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL freerdp_peer_initialize(freerdp_peer* client)
{
client->context->rdp->settings->ServerMode = TRUE;
client->context->rdp->settings->FrameAcknowledge = 0;
client->context->rdp->settings->LocalConnection = client->local;
client->context->rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL;
if (client->context->rdp->settings->RdpKeyFile != NULL)
{
client->context->rdp->settings->RdpServerRsaKey =
key_new(client->context->rdp->settings->RdpKeyFile);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 3,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::ShouldDisplayErrorPageForFailedLoad(
int error_code,
const GURL& unreachable_url) {
if (error_code == net::ERR_ABORTED)
return false;
if (error_code == net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT &&
render_view_->renderer_preferences_.disable_client_blocked_error_page) {
return false;
}
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldSuppressErrorPage(
this, unreachable_url)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> ContainerNode::children()
{
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLCollection>(this, NodeChildren);
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eager_reader_t *eager_reader_new(
int fd_to_read,
const allocator_t *allocator,
size_t buffer_size,
size_t max_buffer_count,
const char *thread_name) {
assert(fd_to_read != INVALID_FD);
assert(allocator != NULL);
assert(buffer_size > 0);
assert(max_buffer_count > 0);
assert(thread_name != NULL && *thread_name != '\0');
eager_reader_t *ret = osi_calloc(sizeof(eager_reader_t));
if (!ret) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate memory for new eager_reader.", __func__);
goto error;
}
ret->allocator = allocator;
ret->inbound_fd = fd_to_read;
ret->bytes_available_fd = eventfd(0, 0);
if (ret->bytes_available_fd == INVALID_FD) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create output reading semaphore.", __func__);
goto error;
}
ret->buffer_size = buffer_size;
ret->buffers = fixed_queue_new(max_buffer_count);
if (!ret->buffers) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create buffers queue.", __func__);
goto error;
}
ret->inbound_read_thread = thread_new(thread_name);
if (!ret->inbound_read_thread) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to make reading thread.", __func__);
goto error;
}
ret->inbound_read_object = reactor_register(
thread_get_reactor(ret->inbound_read_thread),
fd_to_read,
ret,
inbound_data_waiting,
NULL
);
return ret;
error:;
eager_reader_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 21,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rfcomm_set_owner_w(struct sk_buff *skb, struct rfcomm_dev *dev)
{
tty_port_get(&dev->port);
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &dev->wmem_alloc);
skb->sk = (void *) dev;
skb->destructor = rfcomm_wfree;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::MakeUnaccelerated() {
CreateImageFromMailboxIfNeeded();
return StaticBitmapImage::Create(
texture_holder_->GetSkImage()->makeNonTextureImage());
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
if (FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
break ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 11,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void OnJSONParseFailed(const std::string& error_message) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
manifest_parse_complete_ = true;
error_ = error_message;
parse_error_ = BeginInstallWithManifestFunction::MANIFEST_ERROR;
ReportResultsIfComplete();
}
Commit Message: Adding tests for new webstore beginInstallWithManifest method.
BUG=75821
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6900059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83080 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Backtrace::VerifyReadWordArgs(uintptr_t ptr, word_t* out_value) {
if (ptr & (sizeof(word_t)-1)) {
BACK_LOGW("invalid pointer %p", reinterpret_cast<void*>(ptr));
*out_value = static_cast<word_t>(-1);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't demangle symbol names.
Bug: http://b/27299236
Change-Id: I26ef47f80d4d6048a316ba51e83365ff65d70439
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::enqueueDispatchEntriesLocked(nsecs_t currentTime,
const sp<Connection>& connection, EventEntry* eventEntry, const InputTarget* inputTarget) {
bool wasEmpty = connection->outboundQueue.isEmpty();
enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(connection, eventEntry, inputTarget,
InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_EXIT);
enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(connection, eventEntry, inputTarget,
InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_OUTSIDE);
enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(connection, eventEntry, inputTarget,
InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_ENTER);
enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(connection, eventEntry, inputTarget,
InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_IS);
enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(connection, eventEntry, inputTarget,
InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_EXIT);
enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(connection, eventEntry, inputTarget,
InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_ENTER);
if (wasEmpty && !connection->outboundQueue.isEmpty()) {
startDispatchCycleLocked(currentTime, connection);
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_init_from_data (bson_iter_t *iter, /* OUT */
const uint8_t *data, /* IN */
size_t length) /* IN */
{
uint32_t len_le;
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (data);
if (BSON_UNLIKELY ((length < 5) || (length > INT_MAX))) {
memset (iter, 0, sizeof *iter);
return false;
}
memcpy (&len_le, data, sizeof (len_le));
if (BSON_UNLIKELY ((size_t) BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (len_le) != length)) {
memset (iter, 0, sizeof *iter);
return false;
}
if (BSON_UNLIKELY (data[length - 1])) {
memset (iter, 0, sizeof *iter);
return false;
}
iter->raw = (uint8_t *) data;
iter->len = length;
iter->off = 0;
iter->type = 0;
iter->key = 0;
iter->d1 = 0;
iter->d2 = 0;
iter->d3 = 0;
iter->d4 = 0;
iter->next_off = 4;
iter->err_off = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 12,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_key_string(decryption_key_t* dk)
{
gchar* output_string = NULL;
if(dk == NULL || dk->key == NULL)
return NULL;
switch(dk->type) {
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
output_string = g_strdup(dk->key->str);
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
if(dk->ssid == NULL)
output_string = g_strdup(dk->key->str);
else
output_string = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s",
dk->key->str, format_uri(dk->ssid, ":"));
break;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PMK:
output_string = g_strdup(dk->key->str);
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
return output_string;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rdfa_parse_start(rdfacontext* context)
{
int rval = RDFA_PARSE_SUCCESS;
context->wb_allocated = sizeof(char) * READ_BUFFER_SIZE;
context->working_buffer = (char*)malloc(context->wb_allocated + 1);
*context->working_buffer = '\0';
#ifndef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
context->parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
#endif
context->done = 0;
context->context_stack = rdfa_create_list(32);
rdfa_push_item(context->context_stack, context, RDFALIST_FLAG_CONTEXT);
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
context->sax2 = raptor_new_sax2(context->world, context->locator,
context->context_stack);
#else
#endif
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
raptor_sax2_set_start_element_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_start_element);
raptor_sax2_set_end_element_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_end_element);
raptor_sax2_set_characters_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_character_data);
raptor_sax2_set_namespace_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_namespace_handler);
#else
XML_SetUserData(context->parser, context->context_stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(context->parser, start_element, end_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(context->parser, character_data);
#endif
rdfa_init_context(context);
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
if(1) {
raptor_parser* rdf_parser = (raptor_parser*)context->callback_data;
/* Optionally forbid internal network and file requests in the
* XML parser
*/
raptor_sax2_set_option(context->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET));
raptor_sax2_set_option(context->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE));
if(rdf_parser->uri_filter)
raptor_sax2_set_uri_filter(context->sax2, rdf_parser->uri_filter,
rdf_parser->uri_filter_user_data);
}
context->base_uri=raptor_new_uri(context->sax2->world, (const unsigned char*)context->base);
raptor_sax2_parse_start(context->sax2, context->base_uri);
#endif
return rval;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 13,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mm_struct *check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
/*
* Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
* against old credentials.
*/
err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
mm = __check_mem_permission(task);
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return mm;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AddressFlagsToNetAddressAttributes(int flags) {
int result = 0;
if (flags & IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY) {
result |= IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY;
}
if (flags & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED) {
result |= IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_DEPRECATED;
}
if (flags & IN6_IFF_ANYCAST) {
result |= IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_ANYCAST;
}
if (flags & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE) {
result |= IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_TENTATIVE;
}
if (flags & IN6_IFF_DUPLICATED) {
result |= IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_DUPLICATED;
}
if (flags & IN6_IFF_DETACHED) {
result |= IP_ADDRESS_ATTRIBUTE_DETACHED;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 29,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vhost_scsi_write_pending_status(struct se_cmd *se_cmd)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *ovl_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
const char *dev_name, void *raw_data)
{
return mount_nodev(fs_type, flags, raw_data, ovl_fill_super);
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t BackendImpl::GetCurrentEntryId() const {
return data_->header.this_id;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_vcpu_compatible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) == lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_reserve_next_event(struct ring_buffer *buffer,
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer,
unsigned long length)
{
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
struct rb_event_info info;
int nr_loops = 0;
u64 diff;
rb_start_commit(cpu_buffer);
#ifdef CONFIG_RING_BUFFER_ALLOW_SWAP
/*
* Due to the ability to swap a cpu buffer from a buffer
* it is possible it was swapped before we committed.
* (committing stops a swap). We check for it here and
* if it happened, we have to fail the write.
*/
barrier();
if (unlikely(ACCESS_ONCE(cpu_buffer->buffer) != buffer)) {
local_dec(&cpu_buffer->committing);
local_dec(&cpu_buffer->commits);
return NULL;
}
#endif
info.length = rb_calculate_event_length(length);
again:
info.add_timestamp = 0;
info.delta = 0;
/*
* We allow for interrupts to reenter here and do a trace.
* If one does, it will cause this original code to loop
* back here. Even with heavy interrupts happening, this
* should only happen a few times in a row. If this happens
* 1000 times in a row, there must be either an interrupt
* storm or we have something buggy.
* Bail!
*/
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > 1000))
goto out_fail;
info.ts = rb_time_stamp(cpu_buffer->buffer);
diff = info.ts - cpu_buffer->write_stamp;
/* make sure this diff is calculated here */
barrier();
/* Did the write stamp get updated already? */
if (likely(info.ts >= cpu_buffer->write_stamp)) {
info.delta = diff;
if (unlikely(test_time_stamp(info.delta)))
rb_handle_timestamp(cpu_buffer, &info);
}
event = __rb_reserve_next(cpu_buffer, &info);
if (unlikely(PTR_ERR(event) == -EAGAIN)) {
if (info.add_timestamp)
info.length -= RB_LEN_TIME_EXTEND;
goto again;
}
if (!event)
goto out_fail;
return event;
out_fail:
rb_end_commit(cpu_buffer);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputMethodLibraryImpl::Observer::~Observer() {}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::WillCreateWebSocket(
content::RenderFrameHost* frame,
network::mojom::WebSocketRequest* request,
network::mojom::AuthenticationHandlerPtr* auth_handler,
network::mojom::TrustedHeaderClientPtr* header_client) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
auto* web_request_api =
extensions::BrowserContextKeyedAPIFactory<extensions::WebRequestAPI>::Get(
frame->GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext());
if (!web_request_api)
return;
web_request_api->MaybeProxyWebSocket(frame, request, auth_handler,
header_client);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetupBackgroundTracingManager() {
content::BackgroundTracingManager::GetInstance()
->InvalidateTriggerHandlesForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char16_t* utf8_to_utf16_n(const uint8_t* src, size_t srcLen, char16_t* dst, size_t dstLen) {
const uint8_t* const u8end = src + srcLen;
const uint8_t* u8cur = src;
const char16_t* const u16end = dst + dstLen;
char16_t* u16cur = dst;
while (u8cur < u8end && u16cur < u16end) {
size_t u8len = utf8_codepoint_len(*u8cur);
uint32_t codepoint = utf8_to_utf32_codepoint(u8cur, u8len);
if (codepoint <= 0xFFFF) {
*u16cur++ = (char16_t) codepoint;
} else {
codepoint = codepoint - 0x10000;
*u16cur++ = (char16_t) ((codepoint >> 10) + 0xD800);
if (u16cur >= u16end) {
return u16cur-1;
}
*u16cur++ = (char16_t) ((codepoint & 0x3FF) + 0xDC00);
}
u8cur += u8len;
}
return u16cur;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_listen(void)
{
int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
if (listen_sock < 0) {
/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/*
* Set socket options.
* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
*/
if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
&on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
}
freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
if (!num_listen_socks)
fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::dirxmlCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ConsoleHelper(info).reportCall(ConsoleAPIType::kDirXML);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 27,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setPromptDialog(QQmlComponent* promptDialog)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->promptDialog == promptDialog)
return;
d->promptDialog = promptDialog;
emit promptDialogChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inputPush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr value)
{
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (value == NULL))
return(-1);
if (ctxt->inputNr >= ctxt->inputMax) {
ctxt->inputMax *= 2;
ctxt->inputTab =
(xmlParserInputPtr *) xmlRealloc(ctxt->inputTab,
ctxt->inputMax *
sizeof(ctxt->inputTab[0]));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeInputStream(value);
ctxt->inputMax /= 2;
value = NULL;
return (-1);
}
}
ctxt->inputTab[ctxt->inputNr] = value;
ctxt->input = value;
return (ctxt->inputNr++);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 11,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *packet_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
return seq_hlist_next_rcu(v, &net->packet.sklist, pos);
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int get_dwords(EHCIState *ehci, uint32_t addr,
uint32_t *buf, int num)
{
int i;
if (!ehci->as) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_HSE);
ehci->usbcmd &= ~USBCMD_RUNSTOP;
trace_usb_ehci_dma_error();
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++, buf++, addr += sizeof(*buf)) {
dma_memory_read(ehci->as, addr, buf, sizeof(*buf));
*buf = le32_to_cpu(*buf);
}
return num;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 22,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void checkSecurityForNodeVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::checkSecurityForNodeVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init unix_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int error = -ENOMEM;
net->unx.sysctl_max_dgram_qlen = 10;
if (unix_sysctl_register(net))
goto out;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if (!proc_create("unix", 0, net->proc_net, &unix_seq_fops)) {
unix_sysctl_unregister(net);
goto out;
}
#endif
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Chunk::Chunk(Container* parent, WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
{
this->needsRewrite = (parent) ? parent->needsRewrite : false;
this->parent = parent;
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
this->pos = file->Offset();
this->tag = XIO::ReadUns32_LE(file);
this->size = XIO::ReadUns32_LE(file);
if ((this->pos + this->size + 8) > handler->initialFileSize) {
XMP_Throw("Bad RIFF chunk size", kXMPErr_BadFileFormat);
}
this->data.reserve((XMP_Int32) this->size);
this->data.assign((XMP_Int32) this->size, '\0');
file->ReadAll((void*)this->data.data(), (XMP_Int32) this->size);
if (this->size & 1) {
file->Seek(1, kXMP_SeekFromCurrent);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 25,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int blk_fill_sghdr_rq(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct sg_io_hdr *hdr, fmode_t mode)
{
if (copy_from_user(rq->cmd, hdr->cmdp, hdr->cmd_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (blk_verify_command(rq->cmd, mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
/*
* fill in request structure
*/
rq->cmd_len = hdr->cmd_len;
rq->cmd_type = REQ_TYPE_BLOCK_PC;
rq->timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(hdr->timeout);
if (!rq->timeout)
rq->timeout = q->sg_timeout;
if (!rq->timeout)
rq->timeout = BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT;
if (rq->timeout < BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT)
rq->timeout = BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MATCHER(CompareMetricsIgnoringMillisecondsSinceFormParsed, "") {
const auto& lhs = ::testing::get<0>(arg);
const std::pair<const char*, int64_t>& rhs = ::testing::get<1>(arg);
return lhs.first == base::HashMetricName(rhs.first) &&
(lhs.second == rhs.second ||
(lhs.second > 0 &&
rhs.first ==
UkmSuggestionFilledType::kMillisecondsSinceFormParsedName));
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kgdb_correct_hw_break(void)
{
int breakno;
for (breakno = 0; breakno < HBP_NUM; breakno++) {
struct perf_event *bp;
struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
int val;
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
if (!breakinfo[breakno].enabled)
continue;
if (dbg_is_early) {
set_debugreg(breakinfo[breakno].addr, breakno);
early_dr7 |= encode_dr7(breakno,
breakinfo[breakno].len,
breakinfo[breakno].type);
set_debugreg(early_dr7, 7);
continue;
}
bp = *per_cpu_ptr(breakinfo[breakno].pev, cpu);
info = counter_arch_bp(bp);
if (bp->attr.disabled != 1)
continue;
bp->attr.bp_addr = breakinfo[breakno].addr;
bp->attr.bp_len = breakinfo[breakno].len;
bp->attr.bp_type = breakinfo[breakno].type;
info->address = breakinfo[breakno].addr;
info->len = breakinfo[breakno].len;
info->type = breakinfo[breakno].type;
val = arch_install_hw_breakpoint(bp);
if (!val)
bp->attr.disabled = 0;
}
if (!dbg_is_early)
hw_breakpoint_restore();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct gs_tx_context *gs_alloc_tx_context(struct gs_can *dev)
{
int i = 0;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->tx_ctx_lock, flags);
for (; i < GS_MAX_TX_URBS; i++) {
if (dev->tx_context[i].echo_id == GS_MAX_TX_URBS) {
dev->tx_context[i].echo_id = i;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->tx_ctx_lock, flags);
return &dev->tx_context[i];
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->tx_ctx_lock, flags);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for the transfer buffers.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zonca <e@ethanzonca.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v4.8
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8WrapperInstantiationScope::securityCheck(v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::Local<v8::Context> contextForWrapper)
{
if (m_context.IsEmpty())
return;
Frame* frame = toFrameIfNotDetached(contextForWrapper);
if (!frame)
return;
const DOMWrapperWorld& currentWorld = DOMWrapperWorld::world(m_context);
RELEASE_ASSERT(currentWorld.worldId() == DOMWrapperWorld::world(contextForWrapper).worldId());
if (currentWorld.isMainWorld()) {
RELEASE_ASSERT(BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(isolate, frame, DoNotReportSecurityError));
}
}
Commit Message: Rethrow cross-site exceptions as security errors
BUG=530301
R=epertoso@chromium.org,haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1339023002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@202211 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_add_alg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
int exact = 0;
const char *name;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct crypto_user_alg *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nlattr *priority = attrs[CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL];
if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!null_terminated(p->cru_name) || !null_terminated(p->cru_driver_name))
return -EINVAL;
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
exact = 1;
if (priority && !exact)
return -EINVAL;
alg = crypto_alg_match(p, exact);
if (alg) {
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return -EEXIST;
}
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
name = p->cru_driver_name;
else
name = p->cru_name;
alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(name, p->cru_type, p->cru_mask);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
if (priority)
alg->cra_priority = nla_get_u32(priority);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void WriteAlphaData(void* pixels,
uint32_t row_count,
uint32_t channel_count,
uint32_t alpha_channel_index,
uint32_t unpadded_row_size,
uint32_t padded_row_size,
pixel_data_type alpha_value) {
DCHECK_GT(channel_count, 0U);
DCHECK_EQ(unpadded_row_size % sizeof(pixel_data_type), 0U);
uint32_t unpadded_row_size_in_elements =
unpadded_row_size / sizeof(pixel_data_type);
DCHECK_EQ(padded_row_size % sizeof(pixel_data_type), 0U);
uint32_t padded_row_size_in_elements =
padded_row_size / sizeof(pixel_data_type);
pixel_data_type* dst =
static_cast<pixel_data_type*>(pixels) + alpha_channel_index;
for (uint32_t yy = 0; yy < row_count; ++yy) {
pixel_data_type* end = dst + unpadded_row_size_in_elements;
for (pixel_data_type* d = dst; d < end; d += channel_count) {
*d = alpha_value;
}
dst += padded_row_size_in_elements;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillPopupBaseView::~AutofillPopupBaseView() {
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->ViewDestroyed();
RemoveWidgetObservers();
}
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __hwahc_set_cluster_id(struct hwahc *hwahc, u8 cluster_id)
{
int result;
struct wusbhc *wusbhc = &hwahc->wusbhc;
struct wahc *wa = &hwahc->wa;
struct device *dev = &wa->usb_iface->dev;
result = usb_control_msg(wa->usb_dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(wa->usb_dev, 0),
WUSB_REQ_SET_CLUSTER_ID,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
cluster_id,
wa->usb_iface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (result < 0)
dev_err(dev, "Cannot set WUSB Cluster ID to 0x%02x: %d\n",
cluster_id, result);
else
wusbhc->cluster_id = cluster_id;
dev_info(dev, "Wireless USB Cluster ID set to 0x%02x\n", cluster_id);
return result;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 16,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_vdec::release_output_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
unsigned i=0,j=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Value of m_out_mem_ptr %p",m_out_mem_ptr);
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
for (; j < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount ; j++) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count,j)) {
break;
}
}
if (j == drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
} else {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 filter_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *buf)
{
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
struct tipc_msg *msg = buf_msg(buf);
unsigned int limit = rcvbuf_limit(sk, buf);
u32 res = TIPC_OK;
/* Reject message if it is wrong sort of message for socket */
if (msg_type(msg) > TIPC_DIRECT_MSG)
return TIPC_ERR_NO_PORT;
if (sock->state == SS_READY) {
if (msg_connected(msg))
return TIPC_ERR_NO_PORT;
} else {
res = filter_connect(tipc_sk(sk), &buf);
if (res != TIPC_OK || buf == NULL)
return res;
}
/* Reject message if there isn't room to queue it */
if (sk_rmem_alloc_get(sk) + buf->truesize >= limit)
return TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD;
/* Enqueue message */
TIPC_SKB_CB(buf)->handle = NULL;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, buf);
skb_set_owner_r(buf, sk);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
return TIPC_OK;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::StaticSaveSameObjectAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_staticSaveSameObjectAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::StaticSaveSameObjectAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conditionalAttr2AttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.conditionalAttr2._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
int v = toInt32(value);
imp->setConditionalAttr2(v);
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ext4_init_fs(void)
{
int i, err;
ext4_check_flag_values();
for (i = 0; i < EXT4_WQ_HASH_SZ; i++) {
mutex_init(&ext4__aio_mutex[i]);
init_waitqueue_head(&ext4__ioend_wq[i]);
}
err = ext4_init_pageio();
if (err)
return err;
err = ext4_init_system_zone();
if (err)
goto out7;
ext4_kset = kset_create_and_add("ext4", NULL, fs_kobj);
if (!ext4_kset)
goto out6;
ext4_proc_root = proc_mkdir("fs/ext4", NULL);
if (!ext4_proc_root)
goto out5;
err = ext4_init_feat_adverts();
if (err)
goto out4;
err = ext4_init_mballoc();
if (err)
goto out3;
err = ext4_init_xattr();
if (err)
goto out2;
err = init_inodecache();
if (err)
goto out1;
register_as_ext2();
register_as_ext3();
err = register_filesystem(&ext4_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out;
ext4_li_info = NULL;
mutex_init(&ext4_li_mtx);
return 0;
out:
unregister_as_ext2();
unregister_as_ext3();
destroy_inodecache();
out1:
ext4_exit_xattr();
out2:
ext4_exit_mballoc();
out3:
ext4_exit_feat_adverts();
out4:
remove_proc_entry("fs/ext4", NULL);
out5:
kset_unregister(ext4_kset);
out6:
ext4_exit_system_zone();
out7:
ext4_exit_pageio();
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response InspectorPageAgent::addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument(
const String& source,
String* identifier) {
return addScriptToEvaluateOnLoad(source, identifier);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_cmd_delete_tcb(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
/* If it is a non-temporary association belonging to a TCP-style
* listening socket that is not closed, do not free it so that accept()
* can pick it up later.
*/
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) &&
(!asoc->temp) && (sk->sk_shutdown != SHUTDOWN_MASK))
return;
sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
sctp_association_free(asoc);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *newsk;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
struct sock *sk;
int err = 0;
if ((sk = sock->sk) == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_release;
}
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_release;
}
/*
* The write queue this time is holding sockets ready to use
* hooked into the SABM we saved
*/
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb)
break;
if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
err = -EWOULDBLOCK;
break;
}
if (!signal_pending(current)) {
release_sock(sk);
schedule();
lock_sock(sk);
continue;
}
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
if (err)
goto out_release;
newsk = skb->sk;
sock_graft(newsk, newsock);
/* Now attach up the new socket */
skb->sk = NULL;
kfree_skb(skb);
sk->sk_ack_backlog--;
out_release:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BeginTrace() {
BeginSpecificTrace("*");
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool asn1_write_OctetString(struct asn1_data *data, const void *p, size_t length)
{
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
asn1_write(data, p, length);
asn1_pop_tag(data);
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 17,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetShadowCascadeOrder(ShadowCascadeOrder order) {
DCHECK_NE(order, ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeNone);
if (order == shadow_cascade_order_)
return;
if (order == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV0) {
may_contain_v0_shadow_ = true;
if (shadow_cascade_order_ == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV1)
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kMixedShadowRootV0AndV1);
}
if (shadow_cascade_order_ == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV0 &&
order == ShadowCascadeOrder::kShadowCascadeV1) {
SetNeedsStyleRecalc(
kSubtreeStyleChange,
StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(StyleChangeReason::kShadow));
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kMixedShadowRootV0AndV1);
}
if (order > shadow_cascade_order_)
shadow_cascade_order_ = order;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 10,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmd_loadBuffer(Buffer *buf, int prop, int linkid)
{
if (buf == NULL) {
disp_err_message("Can't load string", FALSE);
}
else if (buf != NO_BUFFER) {
buf->bufferprop |= (BP_INTERNAL | prop);
if (!(buf->bufferprop & BP_NO_URL))
copyParsedURL(&buf->currentURL, &Currentbuf->currentURL);
if (linkid != LB_NOLINK) {
buf->linkBuffer[REV_LB[linkid]] = Currentbuf;
Currentbuf->linkBuffer[linkid] = buf;
}
pushBuffer(buf);
}
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 10,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_hw_handler(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct multipath *m)
{
unsigned hw_argc;
int ret;
struct dm_target *ti = m->ti;
static struct dm_arg _args[] = {
{0, 1024, "invalid number of hardware handler args"},
};
if (dm_read_arg_group(_args, as, &hw_argc, &ti->error))
return -EINVAL;
if (!hw_argc)
return 0;
m->hw_handler_name = kstrdup(dm_shift_arg(as), GFP_KERNEL);
request_module("scsi_dh_%s", m->hw_handler_name);
if (scsi_dh_handler_exist(m->hw_handler_name) == 0) {
ti->error = "unknown hardware handler type";
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (hw_argc > 1) {
char *p;
int i, j, len = 4;
for (i = 0; i <= hw_argc - 2; i++)
len += strlen(as->argv[i]) + 1;
p = m->hw_handler_params = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p) {
ti->error = "memory allocation failed";
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
j = sprintf(p, "%d", hw_argc - 1);
for (i = 0, p+=j+1; i <= hw_argc - 2; i++, p+=j+1)
j = sprintf(p, "%s", as->argv[i]);
}
dm_consume_args(as, hw_argc - 1);
return 0;
fail:
kfree(m->hw_handler_name);
m->hw_handler_name = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderObject* Element::createRenderer(RenderStyle* style)
{
return RenderObject::createObject(this, style);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
char *ep, *line_opts;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
*ep-- = '\0';
/*
* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
* key options.
*/
line_opts = NULL;
if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
;
line_opts = cp;
cp = ep;
}
if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
return -1;
}
/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
continue;
debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
loc, cert->principals[i]);
found = 1;
}
if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return found ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_UpdateVoipIgnore(const char *idstr, qboolean ignore)
{
if ((*idstr >= '0') && (*idstr <= '9')) {
const int id = atoi(idstr);
if ((id >= 0) && (id < MAX_CLIENTS)) {
clc.voipIgnore[id] = ignore;
CL_AddReliableCommand(va("voip %s %d",
ignore ? "ignore" : "unignore", id), qfalse);
Com_Printf("VoIP: %s ignoring player #%d\n",
ignore ? "Now" : "No longer", id);
return;
}
}
Com_Printf("VoIP: invalid player ID#\n");
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 10,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLTextAreaElement::valueMissing() const
{
return willValidate() && valueMissing(value());
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cipso_v4_sock_delattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int hdr_delta;
struct ip_options *opt;
struct inet_sock *sk_inet;
sk_inet = inet_sk(sk);
opt = sk_inet->opt;
if (opt == NULL || opt->cipso == 0)
return;
hdr_delta = cipso_v4_delopt(&sk_inet->opt);
if (sk_inet->is_icsk && hdr_delta > 0) {
struct inet_connection_sock *sk_conn = inet_csk(sk);
sk_conn->icsk_ext_hdr_len -= hdr_delta;
sk_conn->icsk_sync_mss(sk, sk_conn->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 11,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundEvent::set(const sp<Sample>& sample, int channelID, float leftVolume,
float rightVolume, int priority, int loop, float rate)
{
mSample = sample;
mChannelID = channelID;
mLeftVolume = leftVolume;
mRightVolume = rightVolume;
mPriority = priority;
mLoop = loop;
mRate =rate;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlCtxtReset(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
xmlParserInputPtr input;
xmlDictPtr dict;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
xmlInitParser();
dict = ctxt->dict;
while ((input = inputPop(ctxt)) != NULL) { /* Non consuming */
xmlFreeInputStream(input);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->spaceNr = 0;
if (ctxt->spaceTab != NULL) {
ctxt->spaceTab[0] = -1;
ctxt->space = &ctxt->spaceTab[0];
} else {
ctxt->space = NULL;
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->version);
ctxt->version = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->directory);
ctxt->directory = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->extSubURI = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->extSubSystem);
ctxt->extSubSystem = NULL;
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL)
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->hasExternalSubset = 0;
ctxt->hasPErefs = 0;
ctxt->html = 1;
ctxt->external = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
ctxt->token = 0;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->nsWellFormed = 1;
ctxt->disableSAX = 0;
ctxt->valid = 1;
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_OK;
ctxt->depth = 0;
ctxt->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
if (ctxt->attsDefault != NULL) {
xmlHashFree(ctxt->attsDefault, (xmlHashDeallocator) xmlFree);
ctxt->attsDefault = NULL;
}
if (ctxt->attsSpecial != NULL) {
xmlHashFree(ctxt->attsSpecial, NULL);
ctxt->attsSpecial = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 19,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StateBase* startObjectState(v8::Handle<v8::Object> object, StateBase* next)
{
m_writer.writeGenerateFreshObject();
return push(new ObjectState(object, next));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::BindFakePluginWindowHandle(bool opaque) {
Send(new PluginHostMsg_BindFakePluginWindowHandle(route_id_, opaque));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
switch (type) {
case content::NOTIFICATION_SSL_VISIBLE_STATE_CHANGED:
if (chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this) &&
&chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this)->GetController() ==
content::Source<NavigationController>(source).ptr())
UpdateToolbar(false);
break;
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNLOADED: {
if (window()->GetLocationBar())
window()->GetLocationBar()->UpdatePageActions();
if (content::Details<extensions::UnloadedExtensionInfo>(
details)->reason != extension_misc::UNLOAD_REASON_TERMINATE) {
const Extension* extension =
content::Details<extensions::UnloadedExtensionInfo>(
details)->extension;
for (int i = tab_strip_model_->count() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
WebContents* tc = chrome::GetTabContentsAt(this, i)->web_contents();
if (tc->GetURL().SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
tc->GetURL().host() == extension->id())
chrome::CloseWebContents(this, tc);
}
}
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_PROCESS_TERMINATED: {
Profile* profile = content::Source<Profile>(source).ptr();
if (profile_->IsSameProfile(profile) && window()->GetLocationBar())
window()->GetLocationBar()->InvalidatePageActions();
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNINSTALLED:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOADED:
if (window() && window()->GetLocationBar())
window()->GetLocationBar()->UpdatePageActions();
break;
#if defined(ENABLE_THEMES)
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED:
window()->UserChangedTheme();
break;
#endif
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENT_SETTINGS_CHANGED: {
WebContents* web_contents = content::Source<WebContents>(source).ptr();
if (web_contents == chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->UpdateContentSettingsIcons();
}
break;
}
case content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED:
UpdateBookmarkBarState(BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_STATE);
break;
case content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED:
UpdateBookmarkBarState(BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_STATE);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Got a notification we didn't register for.";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: build_encrypt_ctxt(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *pneg_ctxt)
{
pneg_ctxt->ContextType = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_CAPABILITIES;
pneg_ctxt->DataLength = cpu_to_le16(6);
pneg_ctxt->CipherCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[0] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM;
pneg_ctxt->Ciphers[1] = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
{
proc_free_inum(ns->proc_inum);
put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
kfree(ns);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_ioctx_users(struct percpu_ref *ref)
{
struct kioctx *ctx = container_of(ref, struct kioctx, users);
struct kiocb *req;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
while (!list_empty(&ctx->active_reqs)) {
req = list_first_entry(&ctx->active_reqs,
struct kiocb, ki_list);
list_del_init(&req->ki_list);
kiocb_cancel(req);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
percpu_ref_kill(&ctx->reqs);
percpu_ref_put(&ctx->reqs);
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Effect_Create(preproc_effect_t *effect,
preproc_session_t *session,
effect_handle_t *interface)
{
effect->session = session;
*interface = (effect_handle_t)&effect->itfe;
return Effect_SetState(effect, PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_CREATED);
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *newext, int at)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *fidx;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
int i = at, k, m, a;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, oldblock;
__le32 border;
ext4_fsblk_t *ablocks = NULL; /* array of allocated blocks */
int err = 0;
/* make decision: where to split? */
/* FIXME: now decision is simplest: at current extent */
/* if current leaf will be split, then we should use
* border from split point */
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr));
if (path[depth].p_ext != EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
border = path[depth].p_ext[1].ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be split."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
} else {
border = newext->ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be added."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
}
/*
* If error occurs, then we break processing
* and mark filesystem read-only. index won't
* be inserted and tree will be in consistent
* state. Next mount will repair buffers too.
*/
/*
* Get array to track all allocated blocks.
* We need this to handle errors and free blocks
* upon them.
*/
ablocks = kzalloc(sizeof(ext4_fsblk_t) * depth, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ablocks)
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate all needed blocks */
ext_debug("allocate %d blocks for indexes/leaf\n", depth - at);
for (a = 0; a < depth - at; a++) {
newblock = ext4_ext_new_meta_block(handle, inode, path,
newext, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
goto cleanup;
ablocks[a] = newblock;
}
/* initialize new leaf */
newblock = ablocks[--a];
BUG_ON(newblock == 0);
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = 0;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_depth = 0;
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh);
/* move remainder of path[depth] to the new leaf */
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries != path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max);
/* start copy from next extent */
/* TODO: we could do it by single memmove */
m = 0;
path[depth].p_ext++;
while (path[depth].p_ext <=
EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
ext_debug("move %d:%llu:[%d]%d in new leaf %llu\n",
le32_to_cpu(path[depth].p_ext->ee_block),
ext_pblock(path[depth].p_ext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(path[depth].p_ext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(path[depth].p_ext),
newblock);
/*memmove(ex++, path[depth].p_ext++,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent));
neh->eh_entries++;*/
path[depth].p_ext++;
m++;
}
if (m) {
memmove(ex, path[depth].p_ext-m, sizeof(struct ext4_extent)*m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old leaf */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
/* create intermediate indexes */
k = depth - at - 1;
BUG_ON(k < 0);
if (k)
ext_debug("create %d intermediate indices\n", k);
/* insert new index into current index block */
/* current depth stored in i var */
i = depth - 1;
while (k--) {
oldblock = newblock;
newblock = ablocks[--a];
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
neh->eh_depth = cpu_to_le16(depth - i);
fidx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh);
fidx->ei_block = border;
ext4_idx_store_pblock(fidx, oldblock);
ext_debug("int.index at %d (block %llu): %u -> %llu\n",
i, newblock, le32_to_cpu(border), oldblock);
/* copy indexes */
m = 0;
path[i].p_idx++;
ext_debug("cur 0x%p, last 0x%p\n", path[i].p_idx,
EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
BUG_ON(EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) !=
EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
while (path[i].p_idx <= EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr)) {
ext_debug("%d: move %d:%llu in new index %llu\n", i,
le32_to_cpu(path[i].p_idx->ei_block),
idx_pblock(path[i].p_idx),
newblock);
/*memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx++,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx));
neh->eh_entries++;
BUG_ON(neh->eh_entries > neh->eh_max);*/
path[i].p_idx++;
m++;
}
if (m) {
memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx - m,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old index */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[i].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
i--;
}
/* insert new index */
err = ext4_ext_insert_index(handle, inode, path + at,
le32_to_cpu(border), newblock);
cleanup:
if (bh) {
if (buffer_locked(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
if (err) {
/* free all allocated blocks in error case */
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if (!ablocks[i])
continue;
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, 0, ablocks[i], 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA);
}
}
kfree(ablocks);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 75 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EmulationHandler::Wire(UberDispatcher* dispatcher) {
Emulation::Dispatcher::wire(dispatcher, this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnSend(const IPC::Message& msg, int socket_id,
const net::IPEndPoint& socket_address,
const std::vector<char>& data) {
P2PSocketHost* socket = LookupSocket(msg.routing_id(), socket_id);
if (!socket) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received P2PHostMsg_Send for invalid socket_id.";
return;
}
socket->Send(socket_address, data);
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const MockAutoFillMetrics* metric_logger() const {
return static_cast<const MockAutoFillMetrics*>(
AutoFillManager::metric_logger());
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WandExport void ProcessScriptOptions(MagickCLI *cli_wand,const char *filename,
int argc,char **argv,int index)
{
ScriptTokenInfo
*token_info;
CommandOptionFlags
option_type;
int
count;
char
*option,
*arg1,
*arg2;
assert(filename != (char *) NULL ); /* at least one argument - script name */
assert(cli_wand != (MagickCLI *) NULL);
assert(cli_wand->signature == MagickWandSignature);
if (cli_wand->wand.debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CommandEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Processing script \"%s\"", filename);
/* open file script or stream, and set up tokenizer */
token_info = AcquireScriptTokenInfo(filename);
if (token_info == (ScriptTokenInfo *) NULL) {
CLIWandExceptionFile(OptionFatalError,"UnableToOpenScript",filename);
return;
}
/* define the error location string for use in exceptions
order of localtion format escapes: filename, line, column */
cli_wand->location="in \"%s\" at line %u,column %u";
if ( LocaleCompare("-", filename) == 0 )
cli_wand->filename="stdin";
else
cli_wand->filename=filename;
/* Process Options from Script */
option = arg1 = arg2 = (char*) NULL;
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
while (1) {
RestoreMSCWarning
{ MagickBooleanType status = GetScriptToken(token_info);
cli_wand->line=token_info->token_line;
cli_wand->column=token_info->token_column;
if (status == MagickFalse)
break; /* error or end of options */
}
do { /* use break to loop to exception handler and loop */
/* save option details */
CloneString(&option,token_info->token);
/* get option, its argument count, and option type */
cli_wand->command = GetCommandOptionInfo(option);
count=cli_wand->command->type;
option_type=(CommandOptionFlags) cli_wand->command->flags;
#if 0
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr, "Script: %u,%u: \"%s\" matched \"%s\"\n",
cli_wand->line, cli_wand->line, option, cli_wand->command->mnemonic );
#endif
/* handle a undefined option - image read - always for "magick-script" */
if ( option_type == UndefinedOptionFlag ||
(option_type & NonMagickOptionFlag) != 0 ) {
#if MagickCommandDebug >= 3
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr, "Script %u,%u Non-Option: \"%s\"\n",
cli_wand->line, cli_wand->line, option);
#endif
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse) {
/* non-option -- treat as a image read */
cli_wand->command=(const OptionInfo *) NULL;
CLIOption(cli_wand,"-read",option);
break; /* next option */
}
CLIWandException(OptionFatalError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
break; /* next option */
}
if ( count >= 1 ) {
if (GetScriptToken(token_info) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandException(OptionFatalError,"MissingArgument",option);
CloneString(&arg1,token_info->token);
}
else
CloneString(&arg1,(char *) NULL);
if ( count >= 2 ) {
if (GetScriptToken(token_info) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionFatalError,"MissingArgument",option);
CloneString(&arg2,token_info->token);
}
else
CloneString(&arg2,(char *) NULL);
/*
Process Options
*/
#if MagickCommandDebug >= 3
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr,
"Script %u,%u Option: \"%s\" Count: %d Flags: %04x Args: \"%s\" \"%s\"\n",
cli_wand->line,cli_wand->line,option,count,option_type,arg1,arg2);
#endif
/* Hard Deprecated Options, no code to execute - error */
if ( (option_type & DeprecateOptionFlag) != 0 ) {
CLIWandException(OptionError,"DeprecatedOptionNoCode",option);
break; /* next option */
}
/* MagickCommandGenesis() options have no place in a magick script */
if ( (option_type & GenesisOptionFlag) != 0 ) {
CLIWandException(OptionError,"InvalidUseOfOption",option);
break; /* next option */
}
/* handle any special 'script' options */
if ( (option_type & SpecialOptionFlag) != 0 ) {
if ( LocaleCompare(option,"-exit") == 0 ) {
goto loop_exit; /* break out of loop - return from script */
}
if ( LocaleCompare(option,"-script") == 0 ) {
/* FUTURE: call new script from this script - error for now */
CLIWandException(OptionError,"InvalidUseOfOption",option);
break; /* next option */
}
/* FUTURE: handle special script-argument options here */
/* handle any other special operators now */
CLIWandException(OptionError,"InvalidUseOfOption",option);
break; /* next option */
}
/* Process non-specific Option */
CLIOption(cli_wand, option, arg1, arg2);
(void) fflush(stdout);
(void) fflush(stderr);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
} while (0); /* break block to next option */
RestoreMSCWarning
#if MagickCommandDebug >= 5
fprintf(stderr, "Script Image Count = %ld\n",
GetImageListLength(cli_wand->wand.images) );
#endif
if (CLICatchException(cli_wand, MagickFalse) != MagickFalse)
break; /* exit loop */
}
/*
Loop exit - check for some tokenization error
*/
loop_exit:
#if MagickCommandDebug >= 3
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr, "Script End: %d\n", token_info->status);
#endif
switch( token_info->status ) {
case TokenStatusOK:
case TokenStatusEOF:
if (cli_wand->image_list_stack != (Stack *) NULL)
CLIWandException(OptionError,"UnbalancedParenthesis", "(eof)");
else if (cli_wand->image_info_stack != (Stack *) NULL)
CLIWandException(OptionError,"UnbalancedBraces", "(eof)");
break;
case TokenStatusBadQuotes:
/* Ensure last token has a sane length for error report */
if( strlen(token_info->token) > INITAL_TOKEN_LENGTH-1 ) {
token_info->token[INITAL_TOKEN_LENGTH-4] = '.';
token_info->token[INITAL_TOKEN_LENGTH-3] = '.';
token_info->token[INITAL_TOKEN_LENGTH-2] = '.';
token_info->token[INITAL_TOKEN_LENGTH-1] = '\0';
}
CLIWandException(OptionFatalError,"ScriptUnbalancedQuotes",
token_info->token);
break;
case TokenStatusMemoryFailed:
CLIWandException(OptionFatalError,"ScriptTokenMemoryFailed","");
break;
case TokenStatusBinary:
CLIWandException(OptionFatalError,"ScriptIsBinary","");
break;
}
(void) fflush(stdout);
(void) fflush(stderr);
if (cli_wand->wand.debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CommandEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Script End \"%s\"", filename);
/* Clean up */
token_info = DestroyScriptTokenInfo(token_info);
CloneString(&option,(char *) NULL);
CloneString(&arg1,(char *) NULL);
CloneString(&arg2,(char *) NULL);
return;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usb_kick_hub_wq(struct usb_device *hdev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(hdev);
if (hub)
kick_hub_wq(hub);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform4fv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform4fv",
Program::kUniform4f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL_VEC4) {
GLsizei num_values = count * 4;
scoped_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii] != 0.0f);
}
glUniform4iv(real_location, count, temp.get());
} else {
glUniform4fv(real_location, count, value);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::deleteSampler(WebGLSampler* sampler) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sampler_units_.size(); ++i) {
if (sampler == sampler_units_[i]) {
sampler_units_[i] = nullptr;
ContextGL()->BindSampler(i, 0);
}
}
DeleteObject(sampler);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_pkt_buffer_have(git_oid *oid, git_buf *buf)
{
char oidhex[GIT_OID_HEXSZ + 1];
memset(oidhex, 0x0, sizeof(oidhex));
git_oid_fmt(oidhex, oid);
return git_buf_printf(buf, "%s%s\n", pkt_have_prefix, oidhex);
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapter::RemoveObserver(BluetoothAdapter::Observer* observer) {
DCHECK(observer);
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nl80211_send_unprot_disassoc(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, const u8 *buf,
size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
{
nl80211_send_mlme_event(rdev, netdev, buf, len,
NL80211_CMD_UNPROT_DISASSOCIATE, gfp);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc,
XcursorChunkHeader *chunkHeader)
{
if (!file || !fileHeader || !chunkHeader)
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorSeekToToc (file, fileHeader, toc))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->header))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->type))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->subtype))
return XcursorFalse;
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &chunkHeader->version))
return XcursorFalse;
/* sanity check */
if (chunkHeader->type != fileHeader->tocs[toc].type ||
chunkHeader->subtype != fileHeader->tocs[toc].subtype)
return XcursorFalse;
return XcursorTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 1,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jspEvaluate(const char *str, bool stringIsStatic) {
/* using a memory area is more efficient, but the interpreter
* may use substrings from it for function code. This means that
* if the string goes away, everything gets corrupted - hence
* the option here.
*/
JsVar *evCode;
if (stringIsStatic)
evCode = jsvNewNativeString((char*)str, strlen(str));
else
evCode = jsvNewFromString(str);
if (!evCode) return 0;
JsVar *v = 0;
if (!jsvIsMemoryFull())
v = jspEvaluateVar(evCode, 0, 0);
jsvUnLock(evCode);
return v;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sco_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p bdaddr %s status %d", hcon, batostr(&hcon->dst), status);
if (hcon->type != SCO_LINK && hcon->type != ESCO_LINK)
return -EINVAL;
if (!status) {
struct sco_conn *conn;
conn = sco_conn_add(hcon, status);
if (conn)
sco_conn_ready(conn);
} else
sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_err(status));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_GetFilePath_From_Mac_ATS_Name( const char* fontName,
UInt8* path,
UInt32 maxPathSize,
FT_Long* face_index )
{
FSRef ref;
FT_Error err;
err = FT_GetFileRef_From_Mac_ATS_Name( fontName, &ref, face_index );
if ( err )
return err;
if ( noErr != FSRefMakePath( &ref, path, maxPathSize ) )
return FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PopupType AutofillManager::GetPopupType(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
const AutofillField* autofill_field = GetAutofillField(form, field);
if (!autofill_field)
return PopupType::kUnspecified;
switch (autofill_field->Type().group()) {
case NO_GROUP:
case PASSWORD_FIELD:
case TRANSACTION:
case USERNAME_FIELD:
case UNFILLABLE:
return PopupType::kUnspecified;
case CREDIT_CARD:
return PopupType::kCreditCards;
case ADDRESS_HOME:
case ADDRESS_BILLING:
return PopupType::kAddresses;
case NAME:
case NAME_BILLING:
case EMAIL:
case COMPANY:
case PHONE_HOME:
case PHONE_BILLING:
return FormHasAddressField(form) ? PopupType::kAddresses
: PopupType::kPersonalInformation;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_ts_hash_sort(TsHashTable *ht, sort_func_t sort_func, compare_func_t compare_func, int renumber)
{
int retval;
begin_write(ht);
retval = zend_hash_sort(TS_HASH(ht), sort_func, compare_func, renumber);
end_write(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
const struct cred *cred;
if (task) {
if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
task_dumpable(task)) {
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(task);
inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
inode->i_uid = 0;
inode->i_gid = 0;
}
inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID | S_ISGID);
security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
put_task_struct(task);
return 1;
}
d_drop(dentry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~CloseDialogCallbackWrapper() {}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoftAMR::~SoftAMR() {
if (mMode == MODE_NARROW) {
GSMDecodeFrameExit(&mState);
mState = NULL;
} else {
free(mDecoderBuf);
mDecoderBuf = NULL;
mState = NULL;
mDecoderCookie = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: SoftAMR: check output buffer size to avoid overflow.
Bug: 27662364
Change-Id: I7b26892c41d6f2e690e77478ab855c2fed1ff6b0
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mark_page_dirty_in_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
gfn_t gfn)
{
if (memslot && memslot->dirty_bitmap) {
unsigned long rel_gfn = gfn - memslot->base_gfn;
/* TODO: introduce set_bit_le() and use it */
test_and_set_bit_le(rel_gfn, memslot->dirty_bitmap);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionService::SyncBundle* ExtensionService::GetSyncBundleForModelType(
syncable::ModelType type) {
GET_SYNC_BUNDLE_FOR_MODEL_TYPE_BODY();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void withScriptStateVoidExceptionMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "withScriptStateVoidException", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
imp->withScriptStateVoidException(&state, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.throwIfNeeded())
return;
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: svc_create(struct svc_program *prog, unsigned int bufsize,
struct svc_serv_ops *ops)
{
return __svc_create(prog, bufsize, /*npools*/1, ops);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 11,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_MulFix14( FT_Int32 a,
FT_Int b )
{
FT_Int32 sign;
FT_UInt32 ah, al, mid, lo, hi;
sign = a ^ b;
if ( a < 0 )
a = -a;
if ( b < 0 )
b = -b;
ah = (FT_UInt32)( ( a >> 16 ) & 0xFFFFU );
al = (FT_UInt32)( a & 0xFFFFU );
lo = al * b;
mid = ah * b;
hi = mid >> 16;
mid = ( mid << 16 ) + ( 1 << 13 ); /* rounding */
lo += mid;
if ( lo < mid )
hi += 1;
mid = ( lo >> 14 ) | ( hi << 18 );
return sign >= 0 ? (FT_Int32)mid : -(FT_Int32)mid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int netdev_refcnt_read(const struct net_device *dev)
{
int i, refcnt = 0;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
refcnt += *per_cpu_ptr(dev->pcpu_refcnt, i);
return refcnt;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i, idx, r = 0;
pfn_t identity_map_pfn;
u32 tmp;
if (!enable_ept)
return 0;
/* Protect kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
if (likely(kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done))
goto out2;
identity_map_pfn = kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = alloc_identity_pagetable(kvm);
if (r < 0)
goto out2;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
for (i = 0; i < PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn,
&tmp, i * sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
if (r < 0)
goto out;
}
kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
out2:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hadamard8_intra8x8_c(/*MpegEncContext*/ void *s, uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dummy, int stride, int h){
int i;
int temp[64];
int sum=0;
av_assert2(h==8);
for(i=0; i<8; i++){
BUTTERFLY2(temp[8*i+0], temp[8*i+1], src[stride*i+0],src[stride*i+1]);
BUTTERFLY2(temp[8*i+2], temp[8*i+3], src[stride*i+2],src[stride*i+3]);
BUTTERFLY2(temp[8*i+4], temp[8*i+5], src[stride*i+4],src[stride*i+5]);
BUTTERFLY2(temp[8*i+6], temp[8*i+7], src[stride*i+6],src[stride*i+7]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+0], temp[8*i+2]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+1], temp[8*i+3]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+4], temp[8*i+6]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+5], temp[8*i+7]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+0], temp[8*i+4]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+1], temp[8*i+5]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+2], temp[8*i+6]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*i+3], temp[8*i+7]);
}
for(i=0; i<8; i++){
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*0+i], temp[8*1+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*2+i], temp[8*3+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*4+i], temp[8*5+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*6+i], temp[8*7+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*0+i], temp[8*2+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*1+i], temp[8*3+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*4+i], temp[8*6+i]);
BUTTERFLY1(temp[8*5+i], temp[8*7+i]);
sum +=
BUTTERFLYA(temp[8*0+i], temp[8*4+i])
+BUTTERFLYA(temp[8*1+i], temp[8*5+i])
+BUTTERFLYA(temp[8*2+i], temp[8*6+i])
+BUTTERFLYA(temp[8*3+i], temp[8*7+i]);
}
sum -= FFABS(temp[8*0] + temp[8*4]); // -mean
return sum;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_clear_journal_err(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_super_block *es)
{
journal_t *journal;
int j_errno;
const char *errstr;
BUG_ON(!EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_COMPAT_HAS_JOURNAL));
journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
/*
* Now check for any error status which may have been recorded in the
* journal by a prior ext4_error() or ext4_abort()
*/
j_errno = jbd2_journal_errno(journal);
if (j_errno) {
char nbuf[16];
errstr = ext4_decode_error(sb, j_errno, nbuf);
ext4_warning(sb, "Filesystem error recorded "
"from previous mount: %s", errstr);
ext4_warning(sb, "Marking fs in need of filesystem check.");
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state |= EXT4_ERROR_FS;
es->s_state |= cpu_to_le16(EXT4_ERROR_FS);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
jbd2_journal_clear_err(journal);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,674 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.