instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BasePrefsChange::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK(type == chrome::NOTIFICATION_PREF_CHANGED);
const std::string* pref_name = content::Details<std::string>(details).ptr();
DCHECK(pref_name && pref_observer_->IsObserved(*pref_name));
ProtectorServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile())->DismissChange(this);
}
Commit Message: [protector] Refactoring of --no-protector code.
*) On DSE change, new provider is not pushed to Sync.
*) Simplified code in BrowserInit.
BUG=None
TEST=protector.py
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10065016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132398 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be16 skb_network_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb, int *depth)
{
__be16 type = skb->protocol;
/* Tunnel gso handlers can set protocol to ethernet. */
if (type == htons(ETH_P_TEB)) {
struct ethhdr *eth;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ethhdr))))
return 0;
eth = (struct ethhdr *)skb_mac_header(skb);
type = eth->h_proto;
}
return __vlan_get_protocol(skb, type, depth);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 6,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atusb_control_msg(struct atusb *atusb, unsigned int pipe,
__u8 request, __u8 requesttype,
__u16 value, __u16 index,
void *data, __u16 size, int timeout)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
int ret;
if (atusb->err)
return atusb->err;
ret = usb_control_msg(usb_dev, pipe, request, requesttype,
value, index, data, size, timeout);
if (ret < 0) {
atusb->err = ret;
dev_err(&usb_dev->dev,
"atusb_control_msg: req 0x%02x val 0x%x idx 0x%x, error %d\n",
request, value, index, ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t) TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point",
exception);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV",exception);
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK",exception);
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR",exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown",exception);
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric",
exception));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb",exception);
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb",exception);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping,exception);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image,exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if (IsStringFalse(option) == MagickFalse) /* enabled by default */
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image,exception);
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->resolution.x=x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->resolution.x-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->resolution.y-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MagickPathExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MagickPathExtent,
"%dx%d",horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor,exception);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified",exception);
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated",
exception);
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated",
exception);
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
value=(unsigned short) image->scene;
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%u",
(unsigned int) rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value,exception);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) *(p+3)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
rows*sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q,
*magick_restrict tile;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+
x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,
(uint32) image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns-1);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p--;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hb_buffer_get_script (hb_buffer_t *buffer)
{
return buffer->script;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int udf_count_free_bitmap(struct super_block *sb,
struct udf_bitmap *bitmap)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned int accum = 0;
int index;
int block = 0, newblock;
struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
uint32_t bytes;
uint8_t *ptr;
uint16_t ident;
struct spaceBitmapDesc *bm;
loc.logicalBlockNum = bitmap->s_extPosition;
loc.partitionReferenceNum = UDF_SB(sb)->s_partition;
bh = udf_read_ptagged(sb, &loc, 0, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(sb, "udf_count_free failed\n");
goto out;
} else if (ident != TAG_IDENT_SBD) {
brelse(bh);
udf_err(sb, "udf_count_free failed\n");
goto out;
}
bm = (struct spaceBitmapDesc *)bh->b_data;
bytes = le32_to_cpu(bm->numOfBytes);
index = sizeof(struct spaceBitmapDesc); /* offset in first block only */
ptr = (uint8_t *)bh->b_data;
while (bytes > 0) {
u32 cur_bytes = min_t(u32, bytes, sb->s_blocksize - index);
accum += bitmap_weight((const unsigned long *)(ptr + index),
cur_bytes * 8);
bytes -= cur_bytes;
if (bytes) {
brelse(bh);
newblock = udf_get_lb_pblock(sb, &loc, ++block);
bh = udf_tread(sb, newblock);
if (!bh) {
udf_debug("read failed\n");
goto out;
}
index = 0;
ptr = (uint8_t *)bh->b_data;
}
}
brelse(bh);
out:
return accum;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeDouble(double val)
{
return writeAligned(val);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key = A->index_key,
.match_data.raw_data = A,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.iterator = keyring_detect_cycle_iterator,
.flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME |
KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM |
KEYRING_SEARCH_DETECT_TOO_DEEP),
};
rcu_read_lock();
search_nested_keyrings(B, &ctx);
rcu_read_unlock();
return PTR_ERR(ctx.result) == -EAGAIN ? 0 : PTR_ERR(ctx.result);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if (!ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
return -EPERM;
return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETUID,
&ns->uid_map, &ns->parent->uid_map);
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::OnFullCardRequestSucceeded(
const payments::FullCardRequest& full_card_request,
const CreditCard& card,
const base::string16& cvc) {
FormStructure* form_structure = nullptr;
AutofillField* autofill_field = nullptr;
if (!GetCachedFormAndField(unmasking_form_, unmasking_field_, &form_structure,
&autofill_field))
return;
credit_card_form_event_logger_->OnDidFillSuggestion(
masked_card_, *form_structure, *autofill_field);
FillCreditCardForm(unmasking_query_id_, unmasking_form_, unmasking_field_,
card, cvc);
masked_card_ = CreditCard();
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<gfx::Image> GetImagesForAccounts(
const std::vector<AccountInfo>& accounts,
Profile* profile) {
AccountTrackerService* tracker_service =
AccountTrackerServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
std::vector<gfx::Image> images;
for (auto account : accounts) {
images.push_back(tracker_service->GetAccountImage(account.account_id));
}
return images;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::InitOriginPermissions(
const extensions::Extension* extension,
bool is_extension_active) {
if (is_extension_active &&
extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
extensions::APIPermission::kManagement)) {
blink::WebSecurityPolicy::addOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(
extension->url(),
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(content::kChromeUIScheme),
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconHost),
false);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteInsertLineBreak(LocalFrame& frame,
Event* event,
EditorCommandSource source,
const String&) {
switch (source) {
case kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding:
return TargetFrame(frame, event)
->GetEventHandler()
.HandleTextInputEvent("\n", event, kTextEventInputLineBreak);
case kCommandFromDOM:
DCHECK(frame.GetDocument());
return TypingCommand::InsertLineBreak(*frame.GetDocument());
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dspregs_active(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(target);
return regs->sr & SR_DSP ? regset->n : 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Register(BrowserContext* browser_context,
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host,
const GURL& site_url) {
DCHECK(!site_url.is_empty());
if (!ShouldTrackProcessForSite(browser_context, render_process_host,
site_url))
return;
UnmatchedServiceWorkerProcessTracker* tracker =
static_cast<UnmatchedServiceWorkerProcessTracker*>(
browser_context->GetUserData(
kUnmatchedServiceWorkerProcessTrackerKey));
if (!tracker) {
tracker = new UnmatchedServiceWorkerProcessTracker();
browser_context->SetUserData(kUnmatchedServiceWorkerProcessTrackerKey,
base::WrapUnique(tracker));
}
tracker->RegisterProcessForSite(render_process_host, site_url);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 23,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred,
struct audit_field *f,
struct audit_context *ctx,
struct audit_names *name)
{
switch (f->val) {
/* process to file object comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
/* uid comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
/* auid comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
/* euid comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
/* suid comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
/* gid comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
/* egid comparisons */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
/* sgid comparison */
case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
default:
WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: message_handlers_init(void)
{
xmpp_conn_t * const conn = connection_get_conn();
xmpp_ctx_t * const ctx = connection_get_ctx();
xmpp_handler_add(conn, _message_handler, NULL, STANZA_NAME_MESSAGE, NULL, ctx);
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 14,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ProfileChooserView::GetDiceSigninPromoShowCount() const {
return browser_->profile()->GetPrefs()->GetInteger(
prefs::kDiceSigninUserMenuPromoCount);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void semaphore_free(semaphore_t *semaphore) {
if (!semaphore)
return;
if (semaphore->fd != INVALID_FD)
close(semaphore->fd);
osi_free(semaphore);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 27,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void fwnet_make_ff_hdr(struct rfc2734_header *hdr,
unsigned ether_type, unsigned dg_size, unsigned dgl)
{
hdr->w0 = fwnet_set_hdr_lf(RFC2374_HDR_FIRSTFRAG)
| fwnet_set_hdr_dg_size(dg_size)
| fwnet_set_hdr_ether_type(ether_type);
hdr->w1 = fwnet_set_hdr_dgl(dgl);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_create_stream_output_target(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t res_handle, buffer_size, buffer_offset;
if (length != VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
res_handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_RES_HANDLE);
buffer_offset = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_BUFFER_OFFSET);
buffer_size = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return vrend_create_so_target(ctx->grctx, handle, res_handle, buffer_offset,
buffer_size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItem::DownloadState DownloadItemImpl::GetState() const {
return state_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TRBCCode xhci_disable_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid)
{
XHCISlot *slot;
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
trace_usb_xhci_ep_disable(slotid, epid);
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
slot = &xhci->slots[slotid-1];
if (!slot->eps[epid-1]) {
DPRINTF("xhci: slot %d ep %d already disabled\n", slotid, epid);
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
xhci_ep_nuke_xfers(xhci, slotid, epid, 0);
epctx = slot->eps[epid-1];
if (epctx->nr_pstreams) {
xhci_free_streams(epctx);
}
/* only touch guest RAM if we're not resetting the HC */
if (xhci->dcbaap_low || xhci->dcbaap_high) {
xhci_set_ep_state(xhci, epctx, NULL, EP_DISABLED);
}
timer_free(epctx->kick_timer);
g_free(epctx);
slot->eps[epid-1] = NULL;
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 8,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::addConsoleMessage(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ConsoleMessage> consoleMessage)
{
if (!isContextThread()) {
m_taskRunner->postTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE, AddConsoleMessageTask::create(consoleMessage->source(), consoleMessage->level(), consoleMessage->message()));
return;
}
if (!m_frame)
return;
if (!consoleMessage->scriptState() && consoleMessage->url().isNull() && !consoleMessage->lineNumber()) {
consoleMessage->setURL(url().string());
if (!isInDocumentWrite() && scriptableDocumentParser()) {
ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser();
if (parser->isParsingAtLineNumber())
consoleMessage->setLineNumber(parser->lineNumber().oneBasedInt());
}
}
m_frame->console().addMessage(consoleMessage);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info)
{
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
const node_t *r1, *r2;
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
if (conn->marked_for_close ||
conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
continue;
entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
if (!entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional &&
!entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries)
continue;
r1 = node_get_by_nickname(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
r2 = node_get_by_id(info->identity_digest);
if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2)
continue;
tor_assert(entry_conn->socks_request);
if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional) {
log_info(LD_APP, "Giving up on enclave exit '%s' for destination %s.",
safe_str_client(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name),
escaped_safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
/* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't
* think it'll be using an enclave. */
consider_plaintext_ports(entry_conn, entry_conn->socks_request->port);
}
if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries) {
if (--entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries == 0) { /* give up! */
clear_trackexithost_mappings(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name);
tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
/* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't
* think it'll be using an enclave. */
consider_plaintext_ports(entry_conn, entry_conn->socks_request->port);
}
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 3,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChildProcessLauncherHelper::LaunchProcessOnLauncherThread(
const base::LaunchOptions& options,
std::unique_ptr<PosixFileDescriptorInfo> files_to_register,
bool* is_synchronous_launch,
int* launch_result) {
*is_synchronous_launch = false;
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
DCHECK(env);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobjectArray> j_argv =
ToJavaArrayOfStrings(env, command_line()->argv());
size_t file_count = files_to_register->GetMappingSize();
DCHECK(file_count > 0);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jclass> j_file_info_class = base::android::GetClass(
env, "org/chromium/base/process_launcher/FileDescriptorInfo");
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobjectArray> j_file_infos(
env, env->NewObjectArray(file_count, j_file_info_class.obj(), NULL));
base::android::CheckException(env);
for (size_t i = 0; i < file_count; ++i) {
int fd = files_to_register->GetFDAt(i);
PCHECK(0 <= fd);
int id = files_to_register->GetIDAt(i);
const auto& region = files_to_register->GetRegionAt(i);
bool auto_close = files_to_register->OwnsFD(fd);
if (auto_close) {
ignore_result(files_to_register->ReleaseFD(fd).release());
}
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> j_file_info =
Java_ChildProcessLauncherHelperImpl_makeFdInfo(
env, id, fd, auto_close, region.offset, region.size);
PCHECK(j_file_info.obj());
env->SetObjectArrayElement(j_file_infos.obj(), i, j_file_info.obj());
}
java_peer_.Reset(Java_ChildProcessLauncherHelperImpl_createAndStart(
env, reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(this), j_argv, j_file_infos));
AddRef(); // Balanced by OnChildProcessStarted.
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {client_thread_id_},
base::BindOnce(
&ChildProcessLauncherHelper::set_java_peer_available_on_client_thread,
this));
return Process();
}
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Bo <boliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639}
CWE ID: CWE-664 | 0 | 6,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGWriteStream(TIFF* tif, void** mem, uint32* len)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
*len=0;
do
{
assert(sp->out_state<=ososEoi);
switch(sp->out_state)
{
case ososSoi:
OJPEGWriteStreamSoi(tif,mem,len);
break;
case ososQTable0:
OJPEGWriteStreamQTable(tif,0,mem,len);
break;
case ososQTable1:
OJPEGWriteStreamQTable(tif,1,mem,len);
break;
case ososQTable2:
OJPEGWriteStreamQTable(tif,2,mem,len);
break;
case ososQTable3:
OJPEGWriteStreamQTable(tif,3,mem,len);
break;
case ososDcTable0:
OJPEGWriteStreamDcTable(tif,0,mem,len);
break;
case ososDcTable1:
OJPEGWriteStreamDcTable(tif,1,mem,len);
break;
case ososDcTable2:
OJPEGWriteStreamDcTable(tif,2,mem,len);
break;
case ososDcTable3:
OJPEGWriteStreamDcTable(tif,3,mem,len);
break;
case ososAcTable0:
OJPEGWriteStreamAcTable(tif,0,mem,len);
break;
case ososAcTable1:
OJPEGWriteStreamAcTable(tif,1,mem,len);
break;
case ososAcTable2:
OJPEGWriteStreamAcTable(tif,2,mem,len);
break;
case ososAcTable3:
OJPEGWriteStreamAcTable(tif,3,mem,len);
break;
case ososDri:
OJPEGWriteStreamDri(tif,mem,len);
break;
case ososSof:
OJPEGWriteStreamSof(tif,mem,len);
break;
case ososSos:
OJPEGWriteStreamSos(tif,mem,len);
break;
case ososCompressed:
if (OJPEGWriteStreamCompressed(tif,mem,len)==0)
return(0);
break;
case ososRst:
OJPEGWriteStreamRst(tif,mem,len);
break;
case ososEoi:
OJPEGWriteStreamEoi(tif,mem,len);
break;
}
} while (*len==0);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 16,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::ProcessStartupURLs(
const std::vector<GURL>& urls_to_open) {
SessionStartupPref pref = GetSessionStartupPref(command_line_, profile_);
if (command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kTestingChannelID) &&
!command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kRestoreLastSession) &&
browser_defaults::kDefaultSessionStartupType !=
SessionStartupPref::DEFAULT) {
return false;
}
if (pref.type == SessionStartupPref::LAST) {
if (!profile_->DidLastSessionExitCleanly() &&
!command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kRestoreLastSession)) {
return false;
}
uint32 restore_behavior = SessionRestore::SYNCHRONOUS |
SessionRestore::ALWAYS_CREATE_TABBED_BROWSER;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (base::mac::WasLaunchedAsLoginOrResumeItem()) {
restore_behavior = restore_behavior &
~SessionRestore::ALWAYS_CREATE_TABBED_BROWSER;
}
#endif
Browser* browser = SessionRestore::RestoreSession(profile_,
NULL,
restore_behavior,
urls_to_open);
AddInfoBarsIfNecessary(browser);
return true;
}
Browser* browser = ProcessSpecifiedURLs(urls_to_open);
if (!browser)
return false;
AddInfoBarsIfNecessary(browser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void on_btn_failed_cb(GtkButton *button)
{
/* Since the Repeat button has been introduced, the event chain isn't
* terminated upon a failure in order to be able to continue in processing
* in the retry action.
*
* Now, user decided to run the emergency analysis instead of trying to
* reconfigure libreport, so we have to terminate the event chain.
*/
gtk_widget_hide(g_btn_repeat);
terminate_event_chain(TERMINATE_NOFLAGS);
/* Show detailed log */
gtk_expander_set_expanded(g_exp_report_log, TRUE);
clear_warnings();
update_ls_details_checkboxes(EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME);
start_event_run(EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME);
/* single shot button -> hide after click */
gtk_widget_hide(GTK_WIDGET(button));
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendImpl::FlushForTesting() {
g_internal_cache_thread.Get().FlushForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmci_transport_send_negotiate(struct sock *sk, size_t size)
{
return vmci_transport_send_control_pkt(
sk,
VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_NEGOTIATE,
size, 0, NULL,
VSOCK_PROTO_INVALID,
VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckCanDownload(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& web_contents_getter,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& request_method,
CanDownloadCallback can_download_cb) {
DownloadRequestLimiter* limiter =
g_browser_process->download_request_limiter();
if (limiter) {
DownloadRequestLimiter::Callback cb =
base::Bind(&CheckDownloadComplete, base::Passed(&can_download_cb));
limiter->CanDownload(web_contents_getter, url, request_method, cb);
}
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBlock::RenderTextInfo::RenderTextInfo()
: m_text(0)
, m_font(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int convertCompoundSelectToSubquery(Walker *pWalker, Select *p){
int i;
Select *pNew;
Select *pX;
sqlite3 *db;
struct ExprList_item *a;
SrcList *pNewSrc;
Parse *pParse;
Token dummy;
if( p->pPrior==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
if( p->pOrderBy==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
for(pX=p; pX && (pX->op==TK_ALL || pX->op==TK_SELECT); pX=pX->pPrior){}
if( pX==0 ) return WRC_Continue;
a = p->pOrderBy->a;
for(i=p->pOrderBy->nExpr-1; i>=0; i--){
if( a[i].pExpr->flags & EP_Collate ) break;
}
if( i<0 ) return WRC_Continue;
/* If we reach this point, that means the transformation is required. */
pParse = pWalker->pParse;
db = pParse->db;
pNew = sqlite3DbMallocZero(db, sizeof(*pNew) );
if( pNew==0 ) return WRC_Abort;
memset(&dummy, 0, sizeof(dummy));
pNewSrc = sqlite3SrcListAppendFromTerm(pParse,0,0,0,&dummy,pNew,0,0);
if( pNewSrc==0 ) return WRC_Abort;
*pNew = *p;
p->pSrc = pNewSrc;
p->pEList = sqlite3ExprListAppend(pParse, 0, sqlite3Expr(db, TK_ASTERISK, 0));
p->op = TK_SELECT;
p->pWhere = 0;
pNew->pGroupBy = 0;
pNew->pHaving = 0;
pNew->pOrderBy = 0;
p->pPrior = 0;
p->pNext = 0;
p->pWith = 0;
p->selFlags &= ~SF_Compound;
assert( (p->selFlags & SF_Converted)==0 );
p->selFlags |= SF_Converted;
assert( pNew->pPrior!=0 );
pNew->pPrior->pNext = pNew;
pNew->pLimit = 0;
return WRC_Continue;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_inject_forget_client_openowners(struct sockaddr_storage *addr,
size_t addr_size)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
struct nfs4_client *clp;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(current->nsproxy->net_ns,
nfsd_net_id);
LIST_HEAD(reaplist);
if (!nfsd_netns_ready(nn))
return count;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
clp = nfsd_find_client(addr, addr_size);
if (clp)
count = nfsd_collect_client_openowners(clp, &reaplist, 0);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
nfsd_reap_openowners(&reaplist);
return count;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 16,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LruData* BackendImpl::GetLruData() {
return &data_->header.lru;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::flowAwareBorderEnd() const
{
if (isHorizontalFlow())
return isLeftToRightFlow() ? borderRight() : borderLeft();
return isLeftToRightFlow() ? borderBottom() : borderTop();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void console_unblank(void)
{
struct console *c;
/*
* console_unblank can no longer be called in interrupt context unless
* oops_in_progress is set to 1..
*/
if (oops_in_progress) {
if (down_trylock(&console_sem) != 0)
return;
} else
console_lock();
console_locked = 1;
console_may_schedule = 0;
for_each_console(c)
if ((c->flags & CON_ENABLED) && c->unblank)
c->unblank();
console_unlock();
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void irq_enter(void)
{
rcu_irq_enter();
if (is_idle_task(current) && !in_interrupt()) {
/*
* Prevent raise_softirq from needlessly waking up ksoftirqd
* here, as softirq will be serviced on return from interrupt.
*/
local_bh_disable();
tick_irq_enter();
_local_bh_enable();
}
__irq_enter();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 18,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_get_n_visible_tables(const struct ofproto *ofproto)
{
uint8_t n = ofproto->n_tables;
/* Count only non-hidden tables in the number of tables. (Hidden tables,
* if present, are always at the end.) */
while(n && (ofproto->tables[n - 1].flags & OFTABLE_HIDDEN)) {
n--;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 19,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
const vpx_rational_t tb = video->timebase();
timebase_ = static_cast<double>(tb.num) / tb.den;
duration_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 3,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
if (c->ctypes) {
OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
c->ctypes = NULL;
}
if (!p || !len)
return 1;
if (len > 0xff)
return 0;
c->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!c->ctypes)
return 0;
memcpy(c->ctypes, p, len);
c->ctype_num = len;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int muscle_update_binary(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int idx, const u8* buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
int r;
mscfs_file_t *file;
msc_id objectId;
u8* oid = objectId.id;
r = mscfs_check_selection(fs, -1);
if(r < 0) SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
file = &fs->cache.array[fs->currentFileIndex];
objectId = file->objectId;
/* memcpy(objectId.id, file->objectId.id, 4); */
if(!file->ef) {
oid[0] = oid[2];
oid[1] = oid[3];
oid[2] = oid[3] = 0;
}
if(file->size < idx + count) {
int newFileSize = idx + count;
u8* buffer = malloc(newFileSize);
if(buffer == NULL) SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
r = msc_read_object(card, objectId, 0, buffer, file->size);
/* TODO: RETRIEVE ACLS */
if(r < 0) goto update_bin_free_buffer;
r = msc_delete_object(card, objectId, 0);
if(r < 0) goto update_bin_free_buffer;
r = msc_create_object(card, objectId, newFileSize, 0,0,0);
if(r < 0) goto update_bin_free_buffer;
memcpy(buffer + idx, buf, count);
r = msc_update_object(card, objectId, 0, buffer, newFileSize);
if(r < 0) goto update_bin_free_buffer;
file->size = newFileSize;
update_bin_free_buffer:
free(buffer);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
} else {
r = msc_update_object(card, objectId, idx, buf, count);
}
/* mscfs_clear_cache(fs); */
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 27,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedCustomBooleanAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueBool(info, imp->fastHasAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentBooleanAttrAttr));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CopyElementsImpl(FixedArrayBase* from, uint32_t from_start,
FixedArrayBase* to, ElementsKind from_kind,
uint32_t to_start, int packed_size,
int copy_size) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
ElementsKind to_kind = KindTraits::Kind;
switch (from_kind) {
case FAST_SMI_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_HOLEY_SMI_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_HOLEY_ELEMENTS:
CopyObjectToObjectElements(from, from_kind, from_start, to, to_kind,
to_start, copy_size);
break;
case FAST_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_HOLEY_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS: {
AllowHeapAllocation allow_allocation;
DCHECK(IsFastObjectElementsKind(to_kind));
CopyDoubleToObjectElements(from, from_start, to, to_start, copy_size);
break;
}
case DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS:
CopyDictionaryToObjectElements(from, from_start, to, to_kind, to_start,
copy_size);
break;
case FAST_SLOPPY_ARGUMENTS_ELEMENTS:
case SLOW_SLOPPY_ARGUMENTS_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_STRING_WRAPPER_ELEMENTS:
case SLOW_STRING_WRAPPER_ELEMENTS:
#define TYPED_ARRAY_CASE(Type, type, TYPE, ctype, size) case TYPE##_ELEMENTS:
TYPED_ARRAYS(TYPED_ARRAY_CASE)
#undef TYPED_ARRAY_CASE
UNREACHABLE();
break;
case NO_ELEMENTS:
break; // Nothing to do.
}
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 10,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int yr_re_fast_exec(
uint8_t* code,
uint8_t* input_data,
size_t input_forwards_size,
size_t input_backwards_size,
int flags,
RE_MATCH_CALLBACK_FUNC callback,
void* callback_args,
int* matches)
{
RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS* repeat_any_args;
uint8_t* code_stack[MAX_FAST_RE_STACK];
uint8_t* input_stack[MAX_FAST_RE_STACK];
int matches_stack[MAX_FAST_RE_STACK];
uint8_t* ip = code;
uint8_t* input = input_data;
uint8_t* next_input;
uint8_t* next_opcode;
uint8_t mask;
uint8_t value;
int i;
int stop;
int input_incr;
int sp = 0;
int bytes_matched;
int max_bytes_matched;
max_bytes_matched = flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS ?
(int) input_backwards_size :
(int) input_forwards_size;
input_incr = flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS ? -1 : 1;
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS)
input--;
code_stack[sp] = code;
input_stack[sp] = input;
matches_stack[sp] = 0;
sp++;
while (sp > 0)
{
sp--;
ip = code_stack[sp];
input = input_stack[sp];
bytes_matched = matches_stack[sp];
stop = FALSE;
while(!stop)
{
if (*ip == RE_OPCODE_MATCH)
{
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_EXHAUSTIVE)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(callback(
flags & RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS ? input + 1 : input_data,
bytes_matched,
flags,
callback_args));
break;
}
else
{
if (matches != NULL)
*matches = bytes_matched;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (bytes_matched >= max_bytes_matched)
break;
switch(*ip)
{
case RE_OPCODE_LITERAL:
if (*input == *(ip + 1))
{
bytes_matched++;
input += input_incr;
ip += 2;
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case RE_OPCODE_MASKED_LITERAL:
value = *(int16_t*)(ip + 1) & 0xFF;
mask = *(int16_t*)(ip + 1) >> 8;
if ((*input & mask) == value)
{
bytes_matched++;
input += input_incr;
ip += 3;
}
else
{
stop = TRUE;
}
break;
case RE_OPCODE_ANY:
bytes_matched++;
input += input_incr;
ip += 1;
break;
case RE_OPCODE_REPEAT_ANY_UNGREEDY:
repeat_any_args = (RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS*)(ip + 1);
next_opcode = ip + 1 + sizeof(RE_REPEAT_ANY_ARGS);
for (i = repeat_any_args->min + 1; i <= repeat_any_args->max; i++)
{
next_input = input + i * input_incr;
if (bytes_matched + i >= max_bytes_matched)
break;
if ( *(next_opcode) != RE_OPCODE_LITERAL ||
(*(next_opcode) == RE_OPCODE_LITERAL &&
*(next_opcode + 1) == *next_input))
{
if (sp >= MAX_FAST_RE_STACK)
return -4;
code_stack[sp] = next_opcode;
input_stack[sp] = next_input;
matches_stack[sp] = bytes_matched + i;
sp++;
}
}
input += input_incr * repeat_any_args->min;
bytes_matched += repeat_any_args->min;
ip = next_opcode;
break;
default:
assert(FALSE);
}
}
}
if (matches != NULL)
*matches = -1;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h.
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 20,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebViewTest::TapElementById(WebInputEvent::Type type,
const WebString& id) {
DCHECK(web_view_helper_.GetWebView());
Element* element = static_cast<Element*>(
web_view_helper_.LocalMainFrame()->GetDocument().GetElementById(id));
return TapElement(type, element);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_setvfinfo(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr **tb)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (tb[IFLA_VF_MAC]) {
struct ifla_vf_mac *ivm = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_MAC]);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_mac)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_mac(dev, ivm->vf,
ivm->mac);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_VLAN]) {
struct ifla_vf_vlan *ivv = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_VLAN]);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_vlan)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_vlan(dev, ivv->vf, ivv->vlan,
ivv->qos);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_TX_RATE]) {
struct ifla_vf_tx_rate *ivt = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_TX_RATE]);
struct ifla_vf_info ivf;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_get_vf_config)
err = ops->ndo_get_vf_config(dev, ivt->vf, &ivf);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_rate)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_rate(dev, ivt->vf,
ivf.min_tx_rate,
ivt->rate);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_RATE]) {
struct ifla_vf_rate *ivt = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_RATE]);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_rate)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_rate(dev, ivt->vf,
ivt->min_tx_rate,
ivt->max_tx_rate);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_SPOOFCHK]) {
struct ifla_vf_spoofchk *ivs = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_SPOOFCHK]);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_spoofchk)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_spoofchk(dev, ivs->vf,
ivs->setting);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE]) {
struct ifla_vf_link_state *ivl = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_LINK_STATE]);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_link_state)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_link_state(dev, ivl->vf,
ivl->link_state);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_RSS_QUERY_EN]) {
struct ifla_vf_rss_query_en *ivrssq_en;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
ivrssq_en = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_RSS_QUERY_EN]);
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_rss_query_en)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_rss_query_en(dev, ivrssq_en->vf,
ivrssq_en->setting);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_TRUST]) {
struct ifla_vf_trust *ivt = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_TRUST]);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_trust)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_trust(dev, ivt->vf, ivt->setting);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_IB_NODE_GUID]) {
struct ifla_vf_guid *ivt = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_IB_NODE_GUID]);
if (!ops->ndo_set_vf_guid)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return handle_vf_guid(dev, ivt, IFLA_VF_IB_NODE_GUID);
}
if (tb[IFLA_VF_IB_PORT_GUID]) {
struct ifla_vf_guid *ivt = nla_data(tb[IFLA_VF_IB_PORT_GUID]);
if (!ops->ndo_set_vf_guid)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return handle_vf_guid(dev, ivt, IFLA_VF_IB_PORT_GUID);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InterstitialPage* InterstitialPage::GetInterstitialPage(
WebContents* web_contents) {
InitInterstitialPageMap();
InterstitialPageMap::const_iterator iter =
g_web_contents_to_interstitial_page->find(web_contents);
if (iter == g_web_contents_to_interstitial_page->end())
return NULL;
return iter->second;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::updateLabel(TreeScope* scope, const AtomicString& oldForAttributeValue, const AtomicString& newForAttributeValue)
{
ASSERT(hasTagName(labelTag));
if (!inDocument())
return;
if (oldForAttributeValue == newForAttributeValue)
return;
if (!oldForAttributeValue.isEmpty())
scope->removeLabel(oldForAttributeValue, static_cast<HTMLLabelElement*>(this));
if (!newForAttributeValue.isEmpty())
scope->addLabel(newForAttributeValue, static_cast<HTMLLabelElement*>(this));
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int common_hrtimer_try_to_cancel(struct k_itimer *timr)
{
return hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&timr->it.real.timer);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 27,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_header_get_flag (DBusHeader *header,
dbus_uint32_t flag)
{
const unsigned char *flags_p;
flags_p = _dbus_string_get_const_data_len (&header->data, FLAGS_OFFSET, 1);
return (*flags_p & flag) != 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int huff_reader_get_symbol(HuffReader *r, GetBitContext *gb)
{
if (r->simple) {
if (r->nb_symbols == 1)
return r->simple_symbols[0];
else
return r->simple_symbols[get_bits1(gb)];
} else
return webp_get_vlc(gb, r->vlc.table);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 merge_hevc_config(GF_ISOFile *dest, u32 tk_id, GF_ISOFile *orig, u32 src_track, Bool force_cat)
{
u32 i;
GF_HEVCConfig *hevc_src, *hevc_dst;
u32 dst_tk = gf_isom_get_track_by_id(dest, tk_id);
hevc_src = gf_isom_hevc_config_get(orig, src_track, 1);
hevc_dst = gf_isom_hevc_config_get(dest, dst_tk, 1);
if (hevc_src->profile_idc != hevc_dst->profile_idc) dst_tk = 0;
else if (hevc_src->level_idc != hevc_dst->level_idc) dst_tk = 0;
else if (hevc_src->general_profile_compatibility_flags != hevc_dst->general_profile_compatibility_flags ) dst_tk = 0;
else {
/*rewrite all samples if using different NALU size*/
if (hevc_src->nal_unit_size > hevc_dst->nal_unit_size) {
gf_media_avc_rewrite_samples(dest, dst_tk, 8*hevc_dst->nal_unit_size, 8*hevc_src->nal_unit_size);
hevc_dst->nal_unit_size = hevc_src->nal_unit_size;
} else if (hevc_src->nal_unit_size < hevc_dst->nal_unit_size) {
gf_media_avc_rewrite_samples(orig, src_track, 8*hevc_src->nal_unit_size, 8*hevc_dst->nal_unit_size);
}
/*merge PS*/
for (i=0; i<gf_list_count(hevc_src->param_array); i++) {
u32 k;
GF_HEVCParamArray *src_ar = gf_list_get(hevc_src->param_array, i);
for (k=0; k<gf_list_count(hevc_dst->param_array); k++) {
GF_HEVCParamArray *dst_ar = gf_list_get(hevc_dst->param_array, k);
if (dst_ar->type==src_ar->type) {
if (!merge_parameter_set(src_ar->nalus, dst_ar->nalus, "SPS"))
dst_tk = 0;
break;
}
}
}
gf_isom_hevc_config_update(dest, dst_tk, 1, hevc_dst);
}
gf_odf_hevc_cfg_del(hevc_src);
gf_odf_hevc_cfg_del(hevc_dst);
if (!dst_tk) {
dst_tk = gf_isom_get_track_by_id(dest, tk_id);
gf_isom_set_nalu_extract_mode(orig, src_track, GF_ISOM_NALU_EXTRACT_INBAND_PS_FLAG);
if (!force_cat) {
gf_isom_hevc_set_inband_config(dest, dst_tk, 1);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Concatenating track ID %d even though sample descriptions do not match\n", tk_id);
}
}
return dst_tk;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HarfBuzzShaper::offsetForPosition(float targetX)
{
int charactersSoFar = 0;
float currentX = 0;
if (m_run.rtl()) {
charactersSoFar = m_normalizedBufferLength;
for (int i = m_harfBuzzRuns.size() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
charactersSoFar -= m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->numCharacters();
float nextX = currentX + m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->width();
float offsetForRun = targetX - currentX;
if (offsetForRun >= 0 && offsetForRun <= m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->width()) {
const unsigned index = m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->characterIndexForXPosition(offsetForRun);
return charactersSoFar + index;
}
currentX = nextX;
}
} else {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_harfBuzzRuns.size(); ++i) {
float nextX = currentX + m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->width();
float offsetForRun = targetX - currentX;
if (offsetForRun >= 0 && offsetForRun <= m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->width()) {
const unsigned index = m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->characterIndexForXPosition(offsetForRun);
return charactersSoFar + index;
}
charactersSoFar += m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->numCharacters();
currentX = nextX;
}
}
return charactersSoFar;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mp_change_speed(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct MP_TERMIOS *old_termios)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = state->info->tty;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
if (!tty || port->type == PORT_UNKNOWN)
return;
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CRTSCTS)
state->info->flags |= UIF_CTS_FLOW;
else
state->info->flags &= ~UIF_CTS_FLOW;
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CLOCAL)
state->info->flags &= ~UIF_CHECK_CD;
else
state->info->flags |= UIF_CHECK_CD;
port->ops->set_termios(port, &tty->termios, old_termios);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_set_neg_mechs(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
const gss_OID_set mech_list)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)cred_handle;
/* Store mech_list in spcred for use in negotiation logic. */
gss_release_oid_set(minor_status, &spcred->neg_mechs);
ret = generic_gss_copy_oid_set(minor_status, mech_list,
&spcred->neg_mechs);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 20,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestClearPreviewedFormWithElement(const char* html) {
LoadHTML(html);
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, web_frame);
FormCache form_cache(web_frame);
std::vector<FormData> forms = form_cache.ExtractNewForms();
ASSERT_EQ(1U, forms.size());
WebInputElement firstname = GetInputElementById("firstname");
firstname.SetAutofillState(WebAutofillState::kPreviewed);
WebInputElement lastname = GetInputElementById("lastname");
lastname.SetAutofillState(WebAutofillState::kPreviewed);
WebInputElement email = GetInputElementById("email");
email.SetAutofillState(WebAutofillState::kPreviewed);
WebInputElement email2 = GetInputElementById("email2");
email2.SetAutofillState(WebAutofillState::kPreviewed);
WebInputElement phone = GetInputElementById("phone");
phone.SetAutofillState(WebAutofillState::kPreviewed);
lastname.SetSuggestedValue(WebString::FromASCII("Earp"));
email.SetSuggestedValue(WebString::FromASCII("wyatt@earp.com"));
email2.SetSuggestedValue(WebString::FromASCII("wyatt@earp.com"));
phone.SetSuggestedValue(WebString::FromASCII("650-777-9999"));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ClearPreviewedFormWithElement(lastname, WebAutofillState::kNotFilled));
EXPECT_EQ(ASCIIToUTF16("Wyatt"), firstname.Value().Utf16());
EXPECT_TRUE(firstname.SuggestedValue().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_TRUE(firstname.IsAutofilled());
EXPECT_TRUE(lastname.Value().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_TRUE(lastname.SuggestedValue().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_FALSE(lastname.IsAutofilled());
EXPECT_TRUE(email.Value().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_TRUE(email.SuggestedValue().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_FALSE(email.IsAutofilled());
EXPECT_TRUE(email2.Value().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_TRUE(email2.SuggestedValue().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_FALSE(email2.IsAutofilled());
EXPECT_TRUE(phone.Value().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_TRUE(phone.SuggestedValue().IsEmpty());
EXPECT_FALSE(phone.IsAutofilled());
EXPECT_EQ(0, lastname.SelectionStart());
EXPECT_EQ(0, lastname.SelectionEnd());
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ebt_watcher_to_user(const struct ebt_entry_watcher *w,
const char *base, char __user *ubase)
{
return ebt_obj_to_user(ubase + ((char *)w - base),
w->u.watcher->name, w->data, sizeof(*w),
w->u.watcher->usersize, w->watcher_size);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 29,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void h2_session_ev_no_io(h2_session *session, int arg, const char *msg)
{
switch (session->state) {
case H2_SESSION_ST_BUSY:
/* Nothing to READ, nothing to WRITE on the master connection.
* Possible causes:
* - we wait for the client to send us sth
* - we wait for started tasks to produce output
* - we have finished all streams and the client has sent GO_AWAY
*/
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE2, 0, session->c,
"h2_session(%ld): NO_IO event, %d streams open",
session->id, session->open_streams);
h2_conn_io_flush(&session->io);
if (session->open_streams > 0) {
if (h2_mplx_awaits_data(session->mplx)) {
/* waiting for at least one stream to produce data */
transit(session, "no io", H2_SESSION_ST_WAIT);
}
else {
/* we have streams open, and all are submitted and none
* is suspended. The only thing keeping us from WRITEing
* more must be the flow control.
* This means we only wait for WINDOW_UPDATE from the
* client and can block on READ. */
transit(session, "no io (flow wait)", H2_SESSION_ST_IDLE);
session->idle_until = apr_time_now() + session->s->timeout;
session->keep_sync_until = session->idle_until;
/* Make sure we have flushed all previously written output
* so that the client will react. */
if (h2_conn_io_flush(&session->io) != APR_SUCCESS) {
dispatch_event(session, H2_SESSION_EV_CONN_ERROR, 0, NULL);
return;
}
}
}
else if (session->local.accepting) {
/* When we have no streams, but accept new, switch to idle */
apr_time_t now = apr_time_now();
transit(session, "no io (keepalive)", H2_SESSION_ST_IDLE);
session->idle_until = (session->remote.emitted_count?
session->s->keep_alive_timeout :
session->s->timeout) + now;
session->keep_sync_until = now + apr_time_from_sec(1);
}
else {
/* We are no longer accepting new streams and there are
* none left. Time to leave. */
h2_session_shutdown(session, arg, msg, 0);
transit(session, "no io", H2_SESSION_ST_DONE);
}
break;
default:
/* nop */
break;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::DidFinishPrinting(PrintingResult result) {
bool store_print_pages_params = true;
if (result == FAIL_PRINT) {
DisplayPrintJobError();
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_ && print_pages_params_.get()) {
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintingFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
}
} else if (result == FAIL_PREVIEW) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
store_print_pages_params = false;
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_)
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
else
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewCancelled(routing_id(), cookie));
print_preview_context_.Failed(notify_browser_of_print_failure_);
}
if (print_web_view_) {
print_web_view_->close();
print_web_view_ = NULL;
}
if (store_print_pages_params) {
old_print_pages_params_.reset(print_pages_params_.release());
} else {
print_pages_params_.reset();
old_print_pages_params_.reset();
}
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 9,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestWindowDelegate(int hittest_code) {
set_window_component(hittest_code);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *ext4_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
struct buffer_head *bh;
if (dentry->d_name.len > EXT4_NAME_LEN)
return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL);
inode = NULL;
if (bh) {
__u32 ino = le32_to_cpu(de->inode);
brelse(bh);
if (!ext4_valid_inum(dir->i_sb, ino)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "bad inode number: %u", ino);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
if (unlikely(ino == dir->i_ino)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "'%.*s' linked to parent dir",
dentry->d_name.len,
dentry->d_name.name);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
inode = ext4_iget(dir->i_sb, ino);
if (inode == ERR_PTR(-ESTALE)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir,
"deleted inode referenced: %u",
ino);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
}
return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HistoryNavigationBeforeCommitInjector(WebContentsImpl* web_contents,
const GURL& url)
: FrameHostInterceptor(web_contents),
did_trigger_history_navigation_(false),
url_(url) {}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_get_property(unsigned long prop_set,
unsigned long index,
void *name, uint32_t *name_len,
void *buf, uint32_t *blen,
uint32_t *prop_type)
{
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
TEE_Result res;
TEE_Result res2;
const struct tee_props *prop;
uint32_t klen;
size_t klen_size;
uint32_t elen;
prop = get_prop_struct(prop_set, index);
if (!prop)
return TEE_ERROR_ITEM_NOT_FOUND;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Get the property type */
if (prop_type) {
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(prop_type, &prop->prop_type,
sizeof(*prop_type));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property */
if (buf && blen) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, blen, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (prop->get_prop_func) {
klen_size = klen;
res = prop->get_prop_func(sess, buf, &klen_size);
klen = klen_size;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &klen, sizeof(*blen));
} else {
if (klen < prop->len)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(buf, prop->data,
prop->len);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(blen, &prop->len,
sizeof(*blen));
}
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
/* Get the property name */
if (name && name_len) {
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&klen, name_len, sizeof(klen));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
elen = strlen(prop->name) + 1;
if (klen < elen)
res = TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
else
res = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name, prop->name, elen);
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(name_len, &elen, sizeof(*name_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI int php_copy_file_ctx(char *src, char *dest, int src_flg, php_stream_context *ctx TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream *srcstream = NULL, *deststream = NULL;
int ret = FAILURE;
php_stream_statbuf src_s, dest_s;
switch (php_stream_stat_path_ex(src, 0, &src_s, ctx)) {
case -1:
/* non-statable stream */
goto safe_to_copy;
break;
case 0:
break;
default: /* failed to stat file, does not exist? */
return ret;
}
if (S_ISDIR(src_s.sb.st_mode)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The first argument to copy() function cannot be a directory");
return FAILURE;
}
switch (php_stream_stat_path_ex(dest, PHP_STREAM_URL_STAT_QUIET | PHP_STREAM_URL_STAT_NOCACHE, &dest_s, ctx)) {
case -1:
/* non-statable stream */
goto safe_to_copy;
break;
case 0:
break;
default: /* failed to stat file, does not exist? */
return ret;
}
if (S_ISDIR(dest_s.sb.st_mode)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The second argument to copy() function cannot be a directory");
return FAILURE;
}
if (!src_s.sb.st_ino || !dest_s.sb.st_ino) {
goto no_stat;
}
if (src_s.sb.st_ino == dest_s.sb.st_ino && src_s.sb.st_dev == dest_s.sb.st_dev) {
return ret;
} else {
goto safe_to_copy;
}
no_stat:
{
char *sp, *dp;
int res;
if ((sp = expand_filepath(src, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
return ret;
}
if ((dp = expand_filepath(dest, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
efree(sp);
goto safe_to_copy;
}
res =
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
!strcmp(sp, dp);
#else
!strcasecmp(sp, dp);
#endif
efree(sp);
efree(dp);
if (res) {
return ret;
}
}
safe_to_copy:
srcstream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(src, "rb", src_flg | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, ctx);
if (!srcstream) {
return ret;
}
deststream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(dest, "wb", REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, ctx);
if (srcstream && deststream) {
ret = php_stream_copy_to_stream_ex(srcstream, deststream, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, NULL);
}
if (srcstream) {
php_stream_close(srcstream);
}
if (deststream) {
php_stream_close(deststream);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 26,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void part_init(struct blk_desc *dev_desc)
{
struct part_driver *drv =
ll_entry_start(struct part_driver, part_driver);
const int n_ents = ll_entry_count(struct part_driver, part_driver);
struct part_driver *entry;
blkcache_invalidate(dev_desc->if_type, dev_desc->devnum);
dev_desc->part_type = PART_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
for (entry = drv; entry != drv + n_ents; entry++) {
int ret;
ret = entry->test(dev_desc);
debug("%s: try '%s': ret=%d\n", __func__, entry->name, ret);
if (!ret) {
dev_desc->part_type = entry->part_type;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DecodeIPV6ExtHdrs(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
SCEnter();
uint8_t *orig_pkt = pkt;
uint8_t nh = 0; /* careful, 0 is actually a real type */
uint16_t hdrextlen = 0;
uint16_t plen;
char dstopts = 0;
char exthdr_fh_done = 0;
int hh = 0;
int rh = 0;
int eh = 0;
int ah = 0;
nh = IPV6_GET_NH(p);
plen = len;
while(1)
{
/* No upper layer, but we do have data. Suspicious. */
if (nh == IPPROTO_NONE && plen > 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_DATA_AFTER_NONE_HEADER);
SCReturn;
}
if (plen < 2) { /* minimal needed in a hdr */
SCReturn;
}
switch(nh)
{
case IPPROTO_TCP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeTCP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeUDP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeICMPV6(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_SCTP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeSCTP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
hdrextlen = 8 + (*(pkt+1) * 8); /* 8 bytes + length in 8 octet units */
SCLogDebug("hdrextlen %"PRIu8, hdrextlen);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
if (rh) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_RH);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
rh = 1;
IPV6_EXTHDR_SET_RH(p);
uint8_t ip6rh_type = *(pkt + 2);
if (ip6rh_type == 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_RH_TYPE_0);
}
p->ip6eh.rh_type = ip6rh_type;
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
{
IPV6OptHAO hao_s, *hao = &hao_s;
IPV6OptRA ra_s, *ra = &ra_s;
IPV6OptJumbo jumbo_s, *jumbo = &jumbo_s;
uint16_t optslen = 0;
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
hdrextlen = (*(pkt+1) + 1) << 3;
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
uint8_t *ptr = pkt + 2; /* +2 to go past nxthdr and len */
/* point the pointers to right structures
* in Packet. */
if (nh == IPPROTO_HOPOPTS) {
if (hh) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_HH);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
hh = 1;
optslen = ((*(pkt + 1) + 1 ) << 3) - 2;
}
else if (nh == IPPROTO_DSTOPTS)
{
if (dstopts == 0) {
optslen = ((*(pkt + 1) + 1 ) << 3) - 2;
dstopts = 1;
} else if (dstopts == 1) {
optslen = ((*(pkt + 1) + 1 ) << 3) - 2;
dstopts = 2;
} else {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_DH);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
}
if (optslen > plen) {
/* since the packet is long enough (we checked
* plen against hdrlen, the optlen must be malformed. */
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
/** \todo move into own function to loaded on demand */
uint16_t padn_cnt = 0;
uint16_t other_cnt = 0;
uint16_t offset = 0;
while(offset < optslen)
{
if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_PAD1)
{
padn_cnt++;
offset++;
ptr++;
continue;
}
if (offset + 1 >= optslen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
/* length field for each opt */
uint8_t ip6_optlen = *(ptr + 1);
/* see if the optlen from the packet fits the total optslen */
if ((offset + 1 + ip6_optlen) > optslen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_PADN) /* PadN */
{
padn_cnt++;
/* a zero padN len would be weird */
if (ip6_optlen == 0)
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_ZERO_LEN_PADN);
}
else if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_RA) /* RA */
{
ra->ip6ra_type = *(ptr);
ra->ip6ra_len = ip6_optlen;
if (ip6_optlen < sizeof(ra->ip6ra_value)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
memcpy(&ra->ip6ra_value, (ptr + 2), sizeof(ra->ip6ra_value));
ra->ip6ra_value = SCNtohs(ra->ip6ra_value);
other_cnt++;
}
else if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_JUMBO) /* Jumbo */
{
jumbo->ip6j_type = *(ptr);
jumbo->ip6j_len = ip6_optlen;
if (ip6_optlen < sizeof(jumbo->ip6j_payload_len)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
memcpy(&jumbo->ip6j_payload_len, (ptr+2), sizeof(jumbo->ip6j_payload_len));
jumbo->ip6j_payload_len = SCNtohl(jumbo->ip6j_payload_len);
}
else if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_HAO) /* HAO */
{
hao->ip6hao_type = *(ptr);
hao->ip6hao_len = ip6_optlen;
if (ip6_optlen < sizeof(hao->ip6hao_hoa)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
memcpy(&hao->ip6hao_hoa, (ptr+2), sizeof(hao->ip6hao_hoa));
other_cnt++;
} else {
if (nh == IPPROTO_HOPOPTS)
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_HOPOPTS_UNKNOWN_OPT);
else
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_DSTOPTS_UNKNOWN_OPT);
other_cnt++;
}
uint16_t optlen = (*(ptr + 1) + 2);
ptr += optlen; /* +2 for opt type and opt len fields */
offset += optlen;
}
/* flag packets that have only padding */
if (padn_cnt > 0 && other_cnt == 0) {
if (nh == IPPROTO_HOPOPTS)
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_HOPOPTS_ONLY_PADDING);
else
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_DSTOPTS_ONLY_PADDING);
}
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT:
{
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
/* store the offset of this extension into the packet
* past the ipv6 header. We use it in defrag for creating
* a defragmented packet without the frag header */
if (exthdr_fh_done == 0) {
p->ip6eh.fh_offset = pkt - orig_pkt;
exthdr_fh_done = 1;
}
uint16_t prev_hdrextlen = hdrextlen;
hdrextlen = sizeof(IPV6FragHdr);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
/* for the frag header, the length field is reserved */
if (*(pkt + 1) != 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_FH_NON_ZERO_RES_FIELD);
/* non fatal, lets try to continue */
}
if (IPV6_EXTHDR_ISSET_FH(p)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_FH);
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
/* set the header flag first */
IPV6_EXTHDR_SET_FH(p);
/* parse the header and setup the vars */
DecodeIPV6FragHeader(p, pkt, hdrextlen, plen, prev_hdrextlen);
/* if FH has offset 0 and no more fragments are coming, we
* parse this packet further right away, no defrag will be
* needed. It is a useless FH then though, so we do set an
* decoder event. */
if (p->ip6eh.fh_more_frags_set == 0 && p->ip6eh.fh_offset == 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_USELESS_FH);
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
/* the rest is parsed upon reassembly */
p->flags |= PKT_IS_FRAGMENT;
SCReturn;
}
case IPPROTO_ESP:
{
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
hdrextlen = sizeof(IPV6EspHdr);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
if (eh) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_EH);
SCReturn;
}
eh = 1;
nh = IPPROTO_NONE;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_AH:
{
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
/* we need the header as a minimum */
hdrextlen = sizeof(IPV6AuthHdr);
/* the payload len field is the number of extra 4 byte fields,
* IPV6AuthHdr already contains the first */
if (*(pkt+1) > 0)
hdrextlen += ((*(pkt+1) - 1) * 4);
SCLogDebug("hdrextlen %"PRIu8, hdrextlen);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
IPV6AuthHdr *ahhdr = (IPV6AuthHdr *)pkt;
if (ahhdr->ip6ah_reserved != 0x0000) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_AH_RES_NOT_NULL);
}
if (ah) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_AH);
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
ah = 1;
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_IPIP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeIPv4inIPv6(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
/* none, last header */
case IPPROTO_NONE:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_ICMP:
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p,IPV6_WITH_ICMPV4);
SCReturn;
/* no parsing yet, just skip it */
case IPPROTO_MH:
case IPPROTO_HIP:
case IPPROTO_SHIM6:
hdrextlen = 8 + (*(pkt+1) * 8); /* 8 bytes + length in 8 octet units */
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
default:
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_UNKNOWN_NEXT_HEADER);
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
SCReturn;
}
}
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 29,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data, struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask, bool copy)
{
struct request_queue *q = rq->q;
struct bio *bio, *orig_bio;
int ret;
if (copy)
bio = bio_copy_user_iov(q, map_data, iter, gfp_mask);
else
bio = bio_map_user_iov(q, iter, gfp_mask);
if (IS_ERR(bio))
return PTR_ERR(bio);
if (map_data && map_data->null_mapped)
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_NULL_MAPPED);
iov_iter_advance(iter, bio->bi_iter.bi_size);
if (map_data)
map_data->offset += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
orig_bio = bio;
blk_queue_bounce(q, &bio);
/*
* We link the bounce buffer in and could have to traverse it
* later so we have to get a ref to prevent it from being freed
*/
bio_get(bio);
ret = blk_rq_append_bio(rq, bio);
if (ret) {
bio_endio(bio);
__blk_rq_unmap_user(orig_bio);
bio_put(bio);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cgm_lock(void)
{
lock_mutex(&cgm_mutex);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 3,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsWindow* DevToolsWindow::GetInstanceForInspectedRenderViewHost(
content::RenderViewHost* inspected_rvh) {
if (!inspected_rvh || !DevToolsAgentHost::HasFor(inspected_rvh))
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent(DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(
inspected_rvh));
return FindDevToolsWindow(agent.get());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformWebView::resizeTo(unsigned width, unsigned height)
{
if (!m_window->handle()) {
QRect newGeometry(m_window->x(), m_window->y(), width, height);
QWindowSystemInterface::handleSynchronousGeometryChange(m_window, newGeometry);
}
m_window->resize(width, height);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewFullscreenWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t route_id) {
CreateNewWidget(render_process_id, route_id, true, blink::kWebPopupTypeNone);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usb_clear_halt(struct usb_device *dev, int pipe)
{
int result;
int endp = usb_pipeendpoint(pipe);
if (usb_pipein(pipe))
endp |= USB_DIR_IN;
/* we don't care if it wasn't halted first. in fact some devices
* (like some ibmcam model 1 units) seem to expect hosts to make
* this request for iso endpoints, which can't halt!
*/
result = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0),
USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE, USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT,
USB_ENDPOINT_HALT, endp, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
/* don't un-halt or force to DATA0 except on success */
if (result < 0)
return result;
/* NOTE: seems like Microsoft and Apple don't bother verifying
* the clear "took", so some devices could lock up if you check...
* such as the Hagiwara FlashGate DUAL. So we won't bother.
*
* NOTE: make sure the logic here doesn't diverge much from
* the copy in usb-storage, for as long as we need two copies.
*/
usb_reset_endpoint(dev, endp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameReference::FrameReference(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
Reset(frame);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::TexSubImage2DImpl(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
uint32_t unpadded_row_size,
const void* pixels,
uint32_t pixels_padded_row_size,
GLboolean internal,
ScopedTransferBufferPtr* buffer,
uint32_t buffer_padded_row_size) {
DCHECK(buffer);
DCHECK_GE(level, 0);
DCHECK_GT(height, 0);
DCHECK_GT(width, 0);
DCHECK_GE(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_GE(yoffset, 0);
const int8_t* source = reinterpret_cast<const int8_t*>(pixels);
while (height) {
unsigned int desired_size =
buffer_padded_row_size * (height - 1) + unpadded_row_size;
if (!buffer->valid() || buffer->size() == 0) {
buffer->Reset(desired_size);
if (!buffer->valid()) {
return;
}
}
GLint num_rows = ComputeNumRowsThatFitInBuffer(
buffer_padded_row_size, unpadded_row_size, buffer->size(), height);
num_rows = std::min(num_rows, height);
CopyRectToBuffer(source, num_rows, unpadded_row_size,
pixels_padded_row_size, buffer->address(),
buffer_padded_row_size);
helper_->TexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, num_rows,
format, type, buffer->shm_id(), buffer->offset(),
internal);
buffer->Release();
yoffset += num_rows;
source += num_rows * pixels_padded_row_size;
height -= num_rows;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool hugetlbfs_pagecache_present(struct hstate *h,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t idx;
struct page *page;
mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
idx = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, address);
page = find_get_page(mapping, idx);
if (page)
put_page(page);
return page != NULL;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init hwsim_init_netlink(void)
{
int rc;
printk(KERN_INFO "mac80211_hwsim: initializing netlink\n");
rc = genl_register_family(&hwsim_genl_family);
if (rc)
goto failure;
rc = netlink_register_notifier(&hwsim_netlink_notifier);
if (rc) {
genl_unregister_family(&hwsim_genl_family);
goto failure;
}
return 0;
failure:
pr_debug("mac80211_hwsim: error occurred in %s\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 27,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ftrace_check_record(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, int enable, int update)
{
unsigned long flag = 0UL;
/*
* If we are updating calls:
*
* If the record has a ref count, then we need to enable it
* because someone is using it.
*
* Otherwise we make sure its disabled.
*
* If we are disabling calls, then disable all records that
* are enabled.
*/
if (enable && (rec->flags & ~FTRACE_FL_MASK))
flag = FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
/*
* If enabling and the REGS flag does not match the REGS_EN, then
* do not ignore this record. Set flags to fail the compare against
* ENABLED.
*/
if (flag &&
(!(rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS) != !(rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN)))
flag |= FTRACE_FL_REGS;
/* If the state of this record hasn't changed, then do nothing */
if ((rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_ENABLED) == flag)
return FTRACE_UPDATE_IGNORE;
if (flag) {
/* Save off if rec is being enabled (for return value) */
flag ^= rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
if (update) {
rec->flags |= FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
if (flag & FTRACE_FL_REGS) {
if (rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS)
rec->flags |= FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN;
else
rec->flags &= ~FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN;
}
}
/*
* If this record is being updated from a nop, then
* return UPDATE_MAKE_CALL.
* Otherwise, if the EN flag is set, then return
* UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL_REGS to tell the caller to convert
* from the non-save regs, to a save regs function.
* Otherwise,
* return UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL to tell the caller to convert
* from the save regs, to a non-save regs function.
*/
if (flag & FTRACE_FL_ENABLED)
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MAKE_CALL;
else if (rec->flags & FTRACE_FL_REGS_EN)
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL_REGS;
else
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MODIFY_CALL;
}
if (update) {
/* If there's no more users, clear all flags */
if (!(rec->flags & ~FTRACE_FL_MASK))
rec->flags = 0;
else
/* Just disable the record (keep REGS state) */
rec->flags &= ~FTRACE_FL_ENABLED;
}
return FTRACE_UPDATE_MAKE_NOP;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_rectangle_free (PopplerRectangle *rectangle)
{
g_free (rectangle);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::setMustDiscardMarginBefore(bool value)
{
if (style()->marginBeforeCollapse() == MDISCARD) {
ASSERT(value);
return;
}
if (!m_rareData && !value)
return;
if (!m_rareData)
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new LayoutBlockFlowRareData(this));
m_rareData->m_discardMarginBefore = value;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 13,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long __munlock_pagevec_fill(struct pagevec *pvec,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, int zoneid, unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
/*
* Initialize pte walk starting at the already pinned page where we
* are sure that there is a pte, as it was pinned under the same
* mmap_sem write op.
*/
pte = get_locked_pte(vma->vm_mm, start, &ptl);
/* Make sure we do not cross the page table boundary */
end = pgd_addr_end(start, end);
end = pud_addr_end(start, end);
end = pmd_addr_end(start, end);
/* The page next to the pinned page is the first we will try to get */
start += PAGE_SIZE;
while (start < end) {
struct page *page = NULL;
pte++;
if (pte_present(*pte))
page = vm_normal_page(vma, start, *pte);
/*
* Break if page could not be obtained or the page's node+zone does not
* match
*/
if (!page || page_zone_id(page) != zoneid)
break;
get_page(page);
/*
* Increase the address that will be returned *before* the
* eventual break due to pvec becoming full by adding the page
*/
start += PAGE_SIZE;
if (pagevec_add(pvec, page) == 0)
break;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
return start;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ApplicationClientIdForFileScanning() const {
return std::string(chrome::kApplicationClientIDStringForAVScanning);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView() {
WebKit::WebNode node = GetFocusedNode();
if (!node.isNull()) {
if (IsEditableNode(node))
webview()->scrollFocusedNodeIntoView();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppendContentBrowserClientSwitches() {
client_.AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(&command_line_, kFakeChildProcessId);
}
Commit Message: service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct mm_slot *alloc_mm_slot(void)
{
if (!mm_slot_cache) /* initialization failed */
return NULL;
return kmem_cache_zalloc(mm_slot_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea@betterlinux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 6,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CSSAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_cssAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::CSSAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::JsonReceived(const DispatchCallback& callback,
int result,
const std::string& message) {
if (result != net::OK) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
base::StringValue message_value(message);
callback.Run(&message_value);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 7,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Field_Clear( field_t *edit ) {
memset( edit->buffer, 0, MAX_EDIT_LINE );
edit->cursor = 0;
edit->scroll = 0;
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 27,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool skb_flow_dissector_uses_key(struct flow_dissector *flow_dissector,
enum flow_dissector_key_id key_id)
{
return flow_dissector->used_keys & (1 << key_id);
}
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::StopStreamDevice(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
const std::string& device_id,
int session_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DVLOG(1) << "StopStreamDevice({render_frame_id = " << render_frame_id << "} "
<< ", {device_id = " << device_id << "}, session_id = " << session_id
<< "})";
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 8,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintArtifactCompositor::PendingLayer::Upcast(
const PropertyTreeState& new_state) {
DCHECK(!requires_own_layer);
FloatClipRect float_clip_rect(bounds);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(property_tree_state, new_state,
float_clip_rect);
bounds = float_clip_rect.Rect();
property_tree_state = new_state;
rect_known_to_be_opaque = FloatRect();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 1,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_rq_unprep_clone(struct request *rq)
{
struct bio *bio;
while ((bio = rq->bio) != NULL) {
rq->bio = bio->bi_next;
bio_put(bio);
}
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit WorkerTerminationObserver(WorkerData* worker_data)
: worker_data_(worker_data) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_global_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmGlobalEntry *ptr = NULL;
int buflen = bin->buf->length;
if (sec->payload_data + 32 > buflen) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
while (i < len && len < buflen && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmGlobalEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, (ut8*)&ptr->content_type, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->mutability, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (len + 8 > buflen || !(consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r++;
}
return ret;
beach:
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderThreadImpl::HostAllocateSharedMemoryBuffer(size_t size) {
return ChildThreadImpl::AllocateSharedMemory(size);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 20,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmd_ls(void *data, const char *input) { // "ls"
RCore *core = (RCore *)data;
const char *arg = strchr (input, ' ');
if (arg) {
arg = r_str_trim_ro (arg + 1);
}
switch (*input) {
case '?': // "l?"
eprintf ("Usage: l[es] # ls to list files, le[ss] to less a file\n");
break;
case 'e': // "le"
if (arg) {
r_core_cmdf (core, "cat %s~..", arg);
} else {
eprintf ("Usage: less [file]\n");
}
break;
default: // "ls"
if (!arg) {
arg = "";
}
if (r_fs_check (core->fs, arg)) {
r_core_cmdf (core, "md %s", arg);
} else {
char *res = r_syscmd_ls (arg);
if (res) {
r_cons_print (res);
free (res);
}
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 23,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
{
int i, fail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
fail = 1;
break;
}
return !fail;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip6_copy_metadata(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from)
{
to->pkt_type = from->pkt_type;
to->priority = from->priority;
to->protocol = from->protocol;
skb_dst_drop(to);
skb_dst_set(to, dst_clone(skb_dst(from)));
to->dev = from->dev;
to->mark = from->mark;
skb_copy_hash(to, from);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED
to->tc_index = from->tc_index;
#endif
nf_copy(to, from);
skb_copy_secmark(to, from);
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,739 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.