instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct inode *new_simple_dir(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *key,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode = new_inode(s);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
BTRFS_I(inode)->root = root;
memcpy(&BTRFS_I(inode)->location, key, sizeof(*key));
set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_DUMMY, &BTRFS_I(inode)->runtime_flags);
inode->i_ino = BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_dir_ro_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime;
inode->i_ctime = inode->i_mtime;
BTRFS_I(inode)->i_otime = inode->i_mtime;
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_compr_get_params(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_codec *params;
int retval;
if (!stream->ops->get_params)
return -EBADFD;
params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!params)
return -ENOMEM;
retval = stream->ops->get_params(stream, params);
if (retval)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg, params, sizeof(*params)))
retval = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(params);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostImpl::ProcessLayerTreeMutations() {
std::unique_ptr<BeginFrameCallbackList> callbacks(new BeginFrameCallbackList);
if (mutator_) {
const base::Closure& callback = mutator_->TakeMutations();
if (!callback.is_null())
callbacks->push_back(callback);
}
return callbacks;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 22,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dev_new_index(struct net *net)
{
int ifindex = net->ifindex;
for (;;) {
if (++ifindex <= 0)
ifindex = 1;
if (!__dev_get_by_index(net, ifindex))
return net->ifindex = ifindex;
}
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool decode_server_sort_response(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB attr;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_sort_resp_control *lsrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lsrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_sort_resp_control);
if (!lsrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_enumerated(data, &(lsrc->result))) {
return false;
}
lsrc->attr_desc = NULL;
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &attr)) {
return false;
}
lsrc->attr_desc = talloc_strndup(lsrc, (const char *)attr.data, attr.length);
if (!lsrc->attr_desc) {
return false;
}
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lsrc;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dm_pr_register(struct block_device *bdev, u64 old_key, u64 new_key,
u32 flags)
{
struct dm_pr pr = {
.old_key = old_key,
.new_key = new_key,
.flags = flags,
.fail_early = true,
};
int ret;
ret = dm_call_pr(bdev, __dm_pr_register, &pr);
if (ret && new_key) {
/* unregister all paths if we failed to register any path */
pr.old_key = new_key;
pr.new_key = 0;
pr.flags = 0;
pr.fail_early = false;
dm_call_pr(bdev, __dm_pr_register, &pr);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnPurgePluginListCache(bool reload_pages) {
EnsureWebKitInitialized();
webkit_platform_support_->set_plugin_refresh_allowed(false);
blink::resetPluginCache(reload_pages);
webkit_platform_support_->set_plugin_refresh_allowed(true);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderProcessObserver, observers_, PluginListChanged());
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 24,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void implementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::implementedAsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_shift_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t len)
{
xdr_shrink_bufhead(buf, len);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_crop_box (PopplerPage *page, PopplerRectangle *rect)
{
PDFRectangle* cropBox = page->page->getCropBox ();
rect->x1 = cropBox->x1;
rect->x2 = cropBox->x2;
rect->y1 = cropBox->y1;
rect->y2 = cropBox->y2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodeDateOnly(struct tm * tm, int style, char *str, bool EuroDates)
{
if (tm->tm_mon < 1 || tm->tm_mon > MONTHS_PER_YEAR)
return -1;
switch (style)
{
case USE_ISO_DATES:
/* compatible with ISO date formats */
if (tm->tm_year > 0)
sprintf(str, "%04d-%02d-%02d",
tm->tm_year, tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday);
else
sprintf(str, "%04d-%02d-%02d %s",
-(tm->tm_year - 1), tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday, "BC");
break;
case USE_SQL_DATES:
/* compatible with Oracle/Ingres date formats */
if (EuroDates)
sprintf(str, "%02d/%02d", tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_mon);
else
sprintf(str, "%02d/%02d", tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday);
if (tm->tm_year > 0)
sprintf(str + 5, "/%04d", tm->tm_year);
else
sprintf(str + 5, "/%04d %s", -(tm->tm_year - 1), "BC");
break;
case USE_GERMAN_DATES:
/* German-style date format */
sprintf(str, "%02d.%02d", tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_mon);
if (tm->tm_year > 0)
sprintf(str + 5, ".%04d", tm->tm_year);
else
sprintf(str + 5, ".%04d %s", -(tm->tm_year - 1), "BC");
break;
case USE_POSTGRES_DATES:
default:
/* traditional date-only style for Postgres */
if (EuroDates)
sprintf(str, "%02d-%02d", tm->tm_mday, tm->tm_mon);
else
sprintf(str, "%02d-%02d", tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday);
if (tm->tm_year > 0)
sprintf(str + 5, "-%04d", tm->tm_year);
else
sprintf(str + 5, "-%04d %s", -(tm->tm_year - 1), "BC");
break;
}
return TRUE;
} /* EncodeDateOnly() */
Commit Message: Fix handling of wide datetime input/output.
Many server functions use the MAXDATELEN constant to size a buffer for
parsing or displaying a datetime value. It was much too small for the
longest possible interval output and slightly too small for certain
valid timestamp input, particularly input with a long timezone name.
The long input was rejected needlessly; the long output caused
interval_out() to overrun its buffer. ECPG's pgtypes library has a copy
of the vulnerable functions, which bore the same vulnerabilities along
with some of its own. In contrast to the server, certain long inputs
caused stack overflow rather than failing cleanly. Back-patch to 8.4
(all supported versions).
Reported by Daniel Schüssler, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0063
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void account_process_tick(struct task_struct *p, int user_tick)
{
cputime_t one_jiffy_scaled = cputime_to_scaled(cputime_one_jiffy);
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
if (user_tick)
account_user_time(p, cputime_one_jiffy, one_jiffy_scaled);
else if ((p != rq->idle) || (irq_count() != HARDIRQ_OFFSET))
account_system_time(p, HARDIRQ_OFFSET, cputime_one_jiffy,
one_jiffy_scaled);
else
account_idle_time(cputime_one_jiffy);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::RegisterPrefs(PrefService* prefs) {
prefs->RegisterIntegerPref(prefs::kOptionsWindowLastTabIndex, 0);
prefs->RegisterIntegerPref(prefs::kExtensionSidebarWidth, -1);
prefs->RegisterIntegerPref(prefs::kMultipleProfilePrefMigration, 0);
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
prefs->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kClearPluginLSODataEnabled, true);
#else
prefs->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kClearPluginLSODataEnabled, false);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputType::RangeOverflow(const String& value) const {
if (!IsSteppable())
return false;
const Decimal numeric_value = ParseToNumberOrNaN(value);
if (!numeric_value.IsFinite())
return false;
return numeric_value > CreateStepRange(kRejectAny).Maximum();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hugetlbfs_parse_options(char *options, struct hugetlbfs_config *pconfig)
{
char *p, *rest;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int option;
unsigned long long size = 0;
enum { NO_SIZE, SIZE_STD, SIZE_PERCENT } setsize = NO_SIZE;
if (!options)
return 0;
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_uid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->uid = option;
break;
case Opt_gid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->gid = option;
break;
case Opt_mode:
if (match_octal(&args[0], &option))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->mode = option & 01777U;
break;
case Opt_size: {
/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
goto bad_val;
size = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
setsize = SIZE_STD;
if (*rest == '%')
setsize = SIZE_PERCENT;
break;
}
case Opt_nr_inodes:
/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
if (!isdigit(*args[0].from))
goto bad_val;
pconfig->nr_inodes = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
break;
case Opt_pagesize: {
unsigned long ps;
ps = memparse(args[0].from, &rest);
pconfig->hstate = size_to_hstate(ps);
if (!pconfig->hstate) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"hugetlbfs: Unsupported page size %lu MB\n",
ps >> 20);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
}
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "hugetlbfs: Bad mount option: \"%s\"\n",
p);
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
/* Do size after hstate is set up */
if (setsize > NO_SIZE) {
struct hstate *h = pconfig->hstate;
if (setsize == SIZE_PERCENT) {
size <<= huge_page_shift(h);
size *= h->max_huge_pages;
do_div(size, 100);
}
pconfig->nr_blocks = (size >> huge_page_shift(h));
}
return 0;
bad_val:
printk(KERN_ERR "hugetlbfs: Bad value '%s' for mount option '%s'\n",
args[0].from, p);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MSLPushImage(MSLInfo *msl_info,Image *image)
{
ssize_t
n;
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(msl_info != (MSLInfo *) NULL);
msl_info->n++;
n=msl_info->n;
msl_info->image_info=(ImageInfo **) ResizeQuantumMemory(msl_info->image_info,
(n+1),sizeof(*msl_info->image_info));
msl_info->draw_info=(DrawInfo **) ResizeQuantumMemory(msl_info->draw_info,
(n+1),sizeof(*msl_info->draw_info));
msl_info->attributes=(Image **) ResizeQuantumMemory(msl_info->attributes,
(n+1),sizeof(*msl_info->attributes));
msl_info->image=(Image **) ResizeQuantumMemory(msl_info->image,(n+1),
sizeof(*msl_info->image));
if ((msl_info->image_info == (ImageInfo **) NULL) ||
(msl_info->draw_info == (DrawInfo **) NULL) ||
(msl_info->attributes == (Image **) NULL) ||
(msl_info->image == (Image **) NULL))
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed")
msl_info->image_info[n]=CloneImageInfo(msl_info->image_info[n-1]);
msl_info->draw_info[n]=CloneDrawInfo(msl_info->image_info[n-1],
msl_info->draw_info[n-1]);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
msl_info->attributes[n]=AcquireImage(msl_info->image_info[n],
msl_info->exception);
else
msl_info->attributes[n]=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,
msl_info->exception);
msl_info->image[n]=(Image *) image;
if ((msl_info->image_info[n] == (ImageInfo *) NULL) ||
(msl_info->attributes[n] == (Image *) NULL))
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed")
if (msl_info->number_groups != 0)
msl_info->group_info[msl_info->number_groups-1].numImages++;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 24,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addrconf_rs_timer(unsigned long data)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = (struct inet6_dev *)data;
struct net_device *dev = idev->dev;
struct in6_addr lladdr;
write_lock(&idev->lock);
if (idev->dead || !(idev->if_flags & IF_READY))
goto out;
if (!ipv6_accept_ra(idev))
goto out;
/* Announcement received after solicitation was sent */
if (idev->if_flags & IF_RA_RCVD)
goto out;
if (idev->rs_probes++ < idev->cnf.rtr_solicits) {
write_unlock(&idev->lock);
if (!ipv6_get_lladdr(dev, &lladdr, IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
ndisc_send_rs(dev, &lladdr,
&in6addr_linklocal_allrouters);
else
goto put;
write_lock(&idev->lock);
/* The wait after the last probe can be shorter */
addrconf_mod_rs_timer(idev, (idev->rs_probes ==
idev->cnf.rtr_solicits) ?
idev->cnf.rtr_solicit_delay :
idev->cnf.rtr_solicit_interval);
} else {
/*
* Note: we do not support deprecated "all on-link"
* assumption any longer.
*/
pr_debug("%s: no IPv6 routers present\n", idev->dev->name);
}
out:
write_unlock(&idev->lock);
put:
in6_dev_put(idev);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> ObjectBackedNativeHandler::NewInstance() {
return v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate>::New(GetIsolate(), object_template_)
->NewInstance();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::setNextOutput(const sp<AudioOutput>& nextOutput) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
mNextOutput = nextOutput;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void gen_reset_hflag(DisasContext *s, uint32_t mask)
{
if (s->flags & mask) {
TCGv_i32 t = tcg_temp_new_i32();
tcg_gen_ld_i32(t, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, hflags));
tcg_gen_andi_i32(t, t, ~mask);
tcg_gen_st_i32(t, cpu_env, offsetof(CPUX86State, hflags));
tcg_temp_free_i32(t);
s->flags &= ~mask;
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 7,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool cgm_attach(const char *name, const char *lxcpath, pid_t pid)
{
bool pass = true;
char *cgroup = NULL;
char **slist = subsystems;
int i;
if (!cgm_dbus_connect()) {
ERROR("Error connecting to cgroup manager");
return false;
}
for (i = 0; slist[i]; i++) {
cgroup = try_get_abs_cgroup(name, lxcpath, slist[i]);
if (!cgroup) {
ERROR("Failed to get cgroup for controller %s", slist[i]);
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
return false;
}
if (!lxc_cgmanager_enter(pid, slist[i], cgroup, abs_cgroup_supported())) {
pass = false;
break;
}
}
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
if (!pass)
ERROR("Failed to enter group %s", cgroup);
free_abs_cgroup(cgroup);
return pass;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 29,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::SetWindowlessBuffers(
const TransportDIB::Handle& windowless_buffer0,
const TransportDIB::Handle& windowless_buffer1,
const TransportDIB::Handle& background_buffer,
const gfx::Rect& window_rect) {
CreateDIBAndCanvasFromHandle(windowless_buffer0,
window_rect,
&windowless_dibs_[0],
&windowless_canvases_[0]);
CreateDIBAndCanvasFromHandle(windowless_buffer1,
window_rect,
&windowless_dibs_[1],
&windowless_canvases_[1]);
CreateDIBAndCanvasFromHandle(background_buffer,
window_rect,
&background_dib_,
&background_canvas_);
if (delegate_->IsWindowless() && use_shm_pixmap_) {
CreateShmPixmapFromDIB(windowless_dibs_[0].get(),
window_rect,
&windowless_shm_pixmaps_[0]);
CreateShmPixmapFromDIB(windowless_dibs_[1].get(),
window_rect,
&windowless_shm_pixmaps_[1]);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned lodepng_encode24(unsigned char** out, size_t* outsize, const unsigned char* image, unsigned w, unsigned h)
{
return lodepng_encode_memory(out, outsize, image, w, h, LCT_RGB, 8);
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 4,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SelectorQueryCache& Document::GetSelectorQueryCache() {
if (!selector_query_cache_)
selector_query_cache_ = WTF::MakeUnique<SelectorQueryCache>();
return *selector_query_cache_;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 24,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcScreenSaverSuspend(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xScreenSaverSuspendReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverSuspendReq);
return ProcScreenSaverSuspend(client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool btif_get_device_type(const BD_ADDR bd_addr, int *p_device_type)
{
if (p_device_type == NULL)
return FALSE;
bt_bdaddr_t bda;
bdcpy(bda.address, bd_addr);
bdstr_t bd_addr_str;
bdaddr_to_string(&bda, bd_addr_str, sizeof(bd_addr_str));
if (!btif_config_get_int(bd_addr_str, "DevType", p_device_type))
return FALSE;
LOG_DEBUG(LOG_TAG, "%s: Device [%s] type %d", __FUNCTION__, bd_addr_str, *p_device_type);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *parent_tidptr,
int __user *child_tidptr)
{
struct task_struct *p;
int trace = 0;
long nr;
/*
* We hope to recycle these flags after 2.6.26
*/
if (unlikely(clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED)) {
static int __read_mostly count = 100;
if (count > 0 && printk_ratelimit()) {
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
count--;
printk(KERN_INFO "fork(): process `%s' used deprecated "
"clone flags 0x%lx\n",
get_task_comm(comm, current),
clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED);
}
}
/*
* When called from kernel_thread, don't do user tracing stuff.
*/
if (likely(user_mode(regs)))
trace = tracehook_prepare_clone(clone_flags);
p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
child_tidptr, NULL, trace);
/*
* Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
* might get invalid after that point, if the thread exits quickly.
*/
if (!IS_ERR(p)) {
struct completion vfork;
trace_sched_process_fork(current, p);
nr = task_pid_vnr(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
put_user(nr, parent_tidptr);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
p->vfork_done = &vfork;
init_completion(&vfork);
}
tracehook_report_clone(trace, regs, clone_flags, nr, p);
/*
* We set PF_STARTING at creation in case tracing wants to
* use this to distinguish a fully live task from one that
* hasn't gotten to tracehook_report_clone() yet. Now we
* clear it and set the child going.
*/
p->flags &= ~PF_STARTING;
if (unlikely(clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED)) {
/*
* We'll start up with an immediate SIGSTOP.
*/
sigaddset(&p->pending.signal, SIGSTOP);
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SIGPENDING);
__set_task_state(p, TASK_STOPPED);
} else {
wake_up_new_task(p, clone_flags);
}
tracehook_report_clone_complete(trace, regs,
clone_flags, nr, p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
freezer_do_not_count();
wait_for_completion(&vfork);
freezer_count();
tracehook_report_vfork_done(p, nr);
}
} else {
nr = PTR_ERR(p);
}
return nr;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TracingControllerImpl::OnMetadataAvailable(base::Value metadata) {
DCHECK(!filtered_metadata_);
is_metadata_available_ = true;
MetadataFilterPredicate metadata_filter;
if (trace_config_->IsArgumentFilterEnabled()) {
if (delegate_)
metadata_filter = delegate_->GetMetadataFilterPredicate();
}
if (metadata_filter.is_null()) {
filtered_metadata_ = base::DictionaryValue::From(
base::Value::ToUniquePtrValue(std::move(metadata)));
} else {
filtered_metadata_ = std::make_unique<base::DictionaryValue>();
for (auto it : metadata.DictItems()) {
if (metadata_filter.Run(it.first)) {
filtered_metadata_->SetKey(it.first, std::move(it.second));
} else {
filtered_metadata_->SetKey(it.first, base::Value("__stripped__"));
}
}
}
if (is_data_complete_)
CompleteFlush();
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 22,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_available(void)
{
if (nfs_exportfs_temp_fd == -1)
(void) nfs_check_exportfs();
return ((nfs_exportfs_temp_fd != -1) ? B_TRUE : B_FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __rpc_do_wake_up_task(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, struct rpc_task *task)
{
dprintk("RPC: %5u __rpc_wake_up_task (now %lu)\n",
task->tk_pid, jiffies);
/* Has the task been executed yet? If not, we cannot wake it up! */
if (!RPC_IS_ACTIVATED(task)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "RPC: Inactive task (%p) being woken up!\n", task);
return;
}
__rpc_remove_wait_queue(queue, task);
rpc_make_runnable(task);
dprintk("RPC: __rpc_wake_up_task done\n");
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int afiucv_iucv_init(void)
{
int err;
err = pr_iucv->iucv_register(&af_iucv_handler, 0);
if (err)
goto out;
/* establish dummy device */
af_iucv_driver.bus = pr_iucv->bus;
err = driver_register(&af_iucv_driver);
if (err)
goto out_iucv;
af_iucv_dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct device), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!af_iucv_dev) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_driver;
}
dev_set_name(af_iucv_dev, "af_iucv");
af_iucv_dev->bus = pr_iucv->bus;
af_iucv_dev->parent = pr_iucv->root;
af_iucv_dev->release = (void (*)(struct device *))kfree;
af_iucv_dev->driver = &af_iucv_driver;
err = device_register(af_iucv_dev);
if (err)
goto out_driver;
return 0;
out_driver:
driver_unregister(&af_iucv_driver);
out_iucv:
pr_iucv->iucv_unregister(&af_iucv_handler, 0);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: load(ImlibImage * im, ImlibProgressFunction progress, char progress_granularity,
char immediate_load)
{
static const int intoffset[] = { 0, 4, 2, 1 };
static const int intjump[] = { 8, 8, 4, 2 };
int rc;
DATA32 *ptr;
GifFileType *gif;
GifRowType *rows;
GifRecordType rec;
ColorMapObject *cmap;
int i, j, done, bg, r, g, b, w = 0, h = 0;
float per = 0.0, per_inc;
int last_per = 0, last_y = 0;
int transp;
int fd;
done = 0;
rows = NULL;
transp = -1;
/* if immediate_load is 1, then dont delay image laoding as below, or */
/* already data in this image - dont load it again */
if (im->data)
return 0;
fd = open(im->real_file, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return 0;
#if GIFLIB_MAJOR >= 5
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd, NULL);
#else
gif = DGifOpenFileHandle(fd);
#endif
if (!gif)
{
close(fd);
return 0;
}
rc = 0; /* Failure */
do
{
if (DGifGetRecordType(gif, &rec) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
if ((rec == IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE) && (!done))
{
if (DGifGetImageDesc(gif) == GIF_ERROR)
{
/* PrintGifError(); */
rec = TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE;
}
w = gif->Image.Width;
h = gif->Image.Height;
if (!IMAGE_DIMENSIONS_OK(w, h))
goto quit2;
rows = calloc(h, sizeof(GifRowType *));
if (!rows)
goto quit2;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
rows[i] = malloc(w * sizeof(GifPixelType));
if (!rows[i])
goto quit;
}
if (gif->Image.Interlace)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for (j = intoffset[i]; j < h; j += intjump[i])
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[j], w);
}
}
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
{
DGifGetLine(gif, rows[i], w);
}
}
done = 1;
}
else if (rec == EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE)
{
int ext_code;
GifByteType *ext;
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtension(gif, &ext_code, &ext);
while (ext)
{
if ((ext_code == 0xf9) && (ext[1] & 1) && (transp < 0))
{
transp = (int)ext[4];
}
ext = NULL;
DGifGetExtensionNext(gif, &ext);
}
}
}
while (rec != TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE);
if (transp >= 0)
{
SET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
else
{
UNSET_FLAG(im->flags, F_HAS_ALPHA);
}
/* set the format string member to the lower-case full extension */
/* name for the format - so example names would be: */
/* "png", "jpeg", "tiff", "ppm", "pgm", "pbm", "gif", "xpm" ... */
im->w = w;
im->h = h;
if (!im->format)
im->format = strdup("gif");
if (im->loader || immediate_load || progress)
{
bg = gif->SBackGroundColor;
cmap = (gif->Image.ColorMap ? gif->Image.ColorMap : gif->SColorMap);
im->data = (DATA32 *) malloc(sizeof(DATA32) * w * h);
if (!im->data)
goto quit;
ptr = im->data;
per_inc = 100.0 / (((float)w) * h);
for (i = 0; i < h; i++)
*ptr++ = 0x00ffffff & ((r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
else
{
r = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Red;
g = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Green;
b = cmap->Colors[rows[i][j]].Blue;
*ptr++ = (0xff << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b;
}
per += per_inc;
if (progress && (((int)per) != last_per)
&& (((int)per) % progress_granularity == 0))
{
last_per = (int)per;
if (!(progress(im, (int)per, 0, last_y, w, i)))
{
rc = 2;
goto quit;
}
last_y = i;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 14,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iscsi_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = bs->opaque;
struct iscsi_context *iscsi = NULL;
struct iscsi_url *iscsi_url = NULL;
struct scsi_task *task = NULL;
struct scsi_inquiry_standard *inq = NULL;
struct scsi_inquiry_supported_pages *inq_vpd;
char *initiator_name = NULL;
QemuOpts *opts;
Error *local_err = NULL;
const char *filename;
int i, ret = 0, timeout = 0;
opts = qemu_opts_create(&runtime_opts, NULL, 0, &error_abort);
qemu_opts_absorb_qdict(opts, options, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
filename = qemu_opt_get(opts, "filename");
iscsi_url = iscsi_parse_full_url(iscsi, filename);
if (iscsi_url == NULL) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to parse URL : %s", filename);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
memset(iscsilun, 0, sizeof(IscsiLun));
initiator_name = parse_initiator_name(iscsi_url->target);
iscsi = iscsi_create_context(initiator_name);
if (iscsi == NULL) {
error_setg(errp, "iSCSI: Failed to create iSCSI context.");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (iscsi_set_targetname(iscsi, iscsi_url->target)) {
error_setg(errp, "iSCSI: Failed to set target name.");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (iscsi_url->user[0] != '\0') {
ret = iscsi_set_initiator_username_pwd(iscsi, iscsi_url->user,
iscsi_url->passwd);
if (ret != 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to set initiator username and password");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
/* check if we got CHAP username/password via the options */
parse_chap(iscsi, iscsi_url->target, &local_err);
if (local_err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (iscsi_set_session_type(iscsi, ISCSI_SESSION_NORMAL) != 0) {
error_setg(errp, "iSCSI: Failed to set session type to normal.");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
iscsi_set_header_digest(iscsi, ISCSI_HEADER_DIGEST_NONE_CRC32C);
/* check if we got HEADER_DIGEST via the options */
parse_header_digest(iscsi, iscsi_url->target, &local_err);
if (local_err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* timeout handling is broken in libiscsi before 1.15.0 */
timeout = parse_timeout(iscsi_url->target);
#if defined(LIBISCSI_API_VERSION) && LIBISCSI_API_VERSION >= 20150621
iscsi_set_timeout(iscsi, timeout);
#else
if (timeout) {
error_report("iSCSI: ignoring timeout value for libiscsi <1.15.0");
}
#endif
if (iscsi_full_connect_sync(iscsi, iscsi_url->portal, iscsi_url->lun) != 0) {
error_setg(errp, "iSCSI: Failed to connect to LUN : %s",
iscsi_get_error(iscsi));
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
iscsilun->iscsi = iscsi;
iscsilun->aio_context = bdrv_get_aio_context(bs);
iscsilun->lun = iscsi_url->lun;
iscsilun->has_write_same = true;
task = iscsi_do_inquiry(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, 0, 0,
(void **) &inq, errp);
if (task == NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
iscsilun->type = inq->periperal_device_type;
scsi_free_scsi_task(task);
task = NULL;
iscsi_modesense_sync(iscsilun);
if (iscsilun->dpofua) {
bs->supported_write_flags = BDRV_REQ_FUA;
}
bs->supported_zero_flags = BDRV_REQ_MAY_UNMAP;
/* Check the write protect flag of the LUN if we want to write */
if (iscsilun->type == TYPE_DISK && (flags & BDRV_O_RDWR) &&
iscsilun->write_protected) {
error_setg(errp, "Cannot open a write protected LUN as read-write");
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
iscsi_readcapacity_sync(iscsilun, &local_err);
if (local_err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
bs->total_sectors = sector_lun2qemu(iscsilun->num_blocks, iscsilun);
bs->request_alignment = iscsilun->block_size;
/* We don't have any emulation for devices other than disks and CD-ROMs, so
* this must be sg ioctl compatible. We force it to be sg, otherwise qemu
* will try to read from the device to guess the image format.
*/
if (iscsilun->type != TYPE_DISK && iscsilun->type != TYPE_ROM) {
bs->sg = 1;
}
task = iscsi_do_inquiry(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, 1,
SCSI_INQUIRY_PAGECODE_SUPPORTED_VPD_PAGES,
(void **) &inq_vpd, errp);
if (task == NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < inq_vpd->num_pages; i++) {
struct scsi_task *inq_task;
struct scsi_inquiry_logical_block_provisioning *inq_lbp;
struct scsi_inquiry_block_limits *inq_bl;
switch (inq_vpd->pages[i]) {
case SCSI_INQUIRY_PAGECODE_LOGICAL_BLOCK_PROVISIONING:
inq_task = iscsi_do_inquiry(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, 1,
SCSI_INQUIRY_PAGECODE_LOGICAL_BLOCK_PROVISIONING,
(void **) &inq_lbp, errp);
if (inq_task == NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(&iscsilun->lbp, inq_lbp,
sizeof(struct scsi_inquiry_logical_block_provisioning));
scsi_free_scsi_task(inq_task);
break;
case SCSI_INQUIRY_PAGECODE_BLOCK_LIMITS:
inq_task = iscsi_do_inquiry(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, 1,
SCSI_INQUIRY_PAGECODE_BLOCK_LIMITS,
(void **) &inq_bl, errp);
if (inq_task == NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(&iscsilun->bl, inq_bl,
sizeof(struct scsi_inquiry_block_limits));
scsi_free_scsi_task(inq_task);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
scsi_free_scsi_task(task);
task = NULL;
iscsi_attach_aio_context(bs, iscsilun->aio_context);
/* Guess the internal cluster (page) size of the iscsi target by the means
* of opt_unmap_gran. Transfer the unmap granularity only if it has a
* reasonable size */
if (iscsilun->bl.opt_unmap_gran * iscsilun->block_size >= 4 * 1024 &&
iscsilun->bl.opt_unmap_gran * iscsilun->block_size <= 16 * 1024 * 1024) {
iscsilun->cluster_sectors = (iscsilun->bl.opt_unmap_gran *
iscsilun->block_size) >> BDRV_SECTOR_BITS;
if (iscsilun->lbprz) {
iscsilun->allocationmap = iscsi_allocationmap_init(iscsilun);
if (iscsilun->allocationmap == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
}
}
}
out:
qemu_opts_del(opts);
g_free(initiator_name);
if (iscsi_url != NULL) {
iscsi_destroy_url(iscsi_url);
}
if (task != NULL) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(task);
}
if (ret) {
if (iscsi != NULL) {
if (iscsi_is_logged_in(iscsi)) {
iscsi_logout_sync(iscsi);
}
iscsi_destroy_context(iscsi);
}
memset(iscsilun, 0, sizeof(IscsiLun));
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_getpreamble(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
void *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
int *val = (int *) extra;
if (!priv->has_preamble)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
*val = priv->preamble;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <comes@naic.edu>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <kilroyd@googlemail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: anybit_typmodout(int32 typmod)
{
char *res = (char *) palloc(64);
if (typmod >= 0)
snprintf(res, 64, "(%d)", typmod);
else
*res = '\0';
return res;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tracing_snapshot_alloc(void)
{
/* Give warning */
tracing_snapshot();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 24,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextureManager::SetLevelCleared(
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info, GLenum target, GLint level) {
DCHECK(info);
if (!info->SafeToRenderFrom()) {
DCHECK_NE(0, num_unsafe_textures_);
--num_unsafe_textures_;
}
num_uncleared_mips_ -= info->num_uncleared_mips();
DCHECK_GE(num_uncleared_mips_, 0);
info->SetLevelCleared(target, level);
num_uncleared_mips_ += info->num_uncleared_mips();
if (!info->SafeToRenderFrom()) {
++num_unsafe_textures_;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReflectTestInterfaceAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "reflectTestInterfaceAttribute");
TestInterfaceImplementation* cpp_value = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
if (!cpp_value) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'TestInterface'.");
return;
}
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kReflecttestinterfaceattributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::SetUserWallpaperDelayed(
const AccountId& account_id) {
ScheduleSetUserWallpaper(account_id, true);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_var_load_avar( TT_Face face )
{
FT_Stream stream = FT_FACE_STREAM(face);
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
GX_Blend blend = face->blend;
GX_AVarSegment segment;
FT_Error error = TT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong version;
FT_Long axisCount;
FT_Int i, j;
FT_ULong table_len;
FT_UNUSED( error );
blend->avar_checked = TRUE;
if ( (error = face->goto_table( face, TTAG_avar, stream, &table_len )) != 0 )
return;
if ( FT_FRAME_ENTER( table_len ) )
return;
version = FT_GET_LONG();
axisCount = FT_GET_LONG();
if ( version != 0x00010000L ||
axisCount != (FT_Long)blend->mmvar->num_axis )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( blend->avar_segment, axisCount ) )
goto Exit;
segment = &blend->avar_segment[0];
for ( i = 0; i < axisCount; ++i, ++segment )
{
segment->pairCount = FT_GET_USHORT();
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( segment->correspondence, segment->pairCount ) )
{
/* Failure. Free everything we have done so far. We must do */
/* it right now since loading the `avar' table is optional. */
for ( j = i - 1; j >= 0; --j )
FT_FREE( blend->avar_segment[j].correspondence );
FT_FREE( blend->avar_segment );
blend->avar_segment = NULL;
goto Exit;
}
for ( j = 0; j < segment->pairCount; ++j )
{
segment->correspondence[j].fromCoord =
FT_GET_SHORT() << 2; /* convert to Fixed */
segment->correspondence[j].toCoord =
FT_GET_SHORT()<<2; /* convert to Fixed */
}
}
Exit:
FT_FRAME_EXIT();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecolordeallocate)
{
zval *IM;
long index;
int col;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &IM, &index) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
/* We can return right away for a truecolor image as deallocating colours is meaningless here */
if (gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
col = index;
if (col >= 0 && col < gdImageColorsTotal(im)) {
gdImageColorDeallocate(im, col);
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Color index %d out of range", col);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 13,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::Init() {
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_scripts;
ResourceRequest initial_request{KURL(g_empty_string)};
initial_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal);
initial_request.SetFrameType(
frame_->IsMainFrame() ? network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kTopLevel
: network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested);
provisional_document_loader_ =
Client()->CreateDocumentLoader(frame_, initial_request, SubstituteData(),
ClientRedirectPolicy::kNotClientRedirect,
base::UnguessableToken::Create());
provisional_document_loader_->StartLoading();
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
state_machine_.AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument);
document_loader_->SetSentDidFinishLoad();
if (frame_->GetPage()->Paused())
SetDefersLoading(true);
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool UpdateValue(T* dest, const T& src) {
if (*dest == src)
return false;
*dest = src;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GetLiveVars(PP_Var live_vars[], uint32_t array_size) {
std::vector<PP_Var> vars =
PpapiGlobals::Get()->GetVarTracker()->GetLiveVars();
for (size_t i = 0u;
i < std::min(static_cast<size_t>(array_size), vars.size());
++i)
live_vars[i] = vars[i];
return vars.size();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputDispatcher::dispatchMotionLocked(
nsecs_t currentTime, MotionEntry* entry, DropReason* dropReason, nsecs_t* nextWakeupTime) {
if (! entry->dispatchInProgress) {
entry->dispatchInProgress = true;
logOutboundMotionDetailsLocked("dispatchMotion - ", entry);
}
if (*dropReason != DROP_REASON_NOT_DROPPED) {
setInjectionResultLocked(entry, *dropReason == DROP_REASON_POLICY
? INPUT_EVENT_INJECTION_SUCCEEDED : INPUT_EVENT_INJECTION_FAILED);
return true;
}
bool isPointerEvent = entry->source & AINPUT_SOURCE_CLASS_POINTER;
Vector<InputTarget> inputTargets;
bool conflictingPointerActions = false;
int32_t injectionResult;
if (isPointerEvent) {
injectionResult = findTouchedWindowTargetsLocked(currentTime,
entry, inputTargets, nextWakeupTime, &conflictingPointerActions);
} else {
injectionResult = findFocusedWindowTargetsLocked(currentTime,
entry, inputTargets, nextWakeupTime);
}
if (injectionResult == INPUT_EVENT_INJECTION_PENDING) {
return false;
}
setInjectionResultLocked(entry, injectionResult);
if (injectionResult != INPUT_EVENT_INJECTION_SUCCEEDED) {
if (injectionResult != INPUT_EVENT_INJECTION_PERMISSION_DENIED) {
CancelationOptions::Mode mode(isPointerEvent ?
CancelationOptions::CANCEL_POINTER_EVENTS :
CancelationOptions::CANCEL_NON_POINTER_EVENTS);
CancelationOptions options(mode, "input event injection failed");
synthesizeCancelationEventsForMonitorsLocked(options);
}
return true;
}
if (isMainDisplay(entry->displayId)) {
addMonitoringTargetsLocked(inputTargets);
}
if (conflictingPointerActions) {
CancelationOptions options(CancelationOptions::CANCEL_POINTER_EVENTS,
"conflicting pointer actions");
synthesizeCancelationEventsForAllConnectionsLocked(options);
}
dispatchEventLocked(currentTime, entry, inputTargets);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_core_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *dev,
struct ethtool_drvinfo *info)
{
struct qeth_card *card = dev->ml_priv;
strlcpy(info->driver, card->options.layer2 ? "qeth_l2" : "qeth_l3",
sizeof(info->driver));
strlcpy(info->version, "1.0", sizeof(info->version));
strlcpy(info->fw_version, card->info.mcl_level,
sizeof(info->fw_version));
snprintf(info->bus_info, sizeof(info->bus_info), "%s/%s/%s",
CARD_RDEV_ID(card), CARD_WDEV_ID(card), CARD_DDEV_ID(card));
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL rdp_send_pdu(rdpRdp* rdp, STREAM* s, UINT16 type, UINT16 channel_id)
{
UINT16 length;
UINT32 sec_bytes;
BYTE* sec_hold;
length = stream_get_length(s);
stream_set_pos(s, 0);
rdp_write_header(rdp, s, length, MCS_GLOBAL_CHANNEL_ID);
sec_bytes = rdp_get_sec_bytes(rdp);
sec_hold = s->p;
stream_seek(s, sec_bytes);
rdp_write_share_control_header(s, length - sec_bytes, type, channel_id);
s->p = sec_hold;
length += rdp_security_stream_out(rdp, s, length);
stream_set_pos(s, length);
if (transport_write(rdp->transport, s) < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->input_filter = ifn;
c->output_filter = ofn;
c->filter_ctx = ctx;
c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidNavigateMainFramePostCommit(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params) {
if (details.is_navigation_to_different_page()) {
UpdateTargetURL(render_frame_host->GetRenderViewHost(), GURL());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* rwhvb =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(GetRenderWidgetHostView());
if (rwhvb)
rwhvb->OnDidNavigateMainFrameToNewPage();
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_ = false;
theme_color_ = SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePostCommit(this);
view_->SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(CanOverscrollContent());
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
image->endian=MSBEndian;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 1 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 3 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->matte=MagickFalse;
}
}
if ((image->depth == 1) && (image->storage_class != PseudoClass))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError, "ImproperImageHeader");
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) || (length < 4) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,&has_merged_image);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if (has_merged_image != MagickFalse || GetImageListLength(image) == 1)
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image_info,image,
&psd_info,exception);
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) == 1) &&
(length != 0))
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
status=ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,exception);
if (status != MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if ((has_merged_image == MagickFalse) && (GetImageListLength(image) > 1))
{
Image
*merged;
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel);
image->background_color.opacity=TransparentOpacity;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/148
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 1,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardKeyboardEvent(
const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& key_event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::ForwardKeyboardEvent");
if (ignore_input_events_ || process_->IgnoreInputEvents())
return;
if (key_event.type == WebKeyboardEvent::Char &&
(key_event.windowsKeyCode == ui::VKEY_RETURN ||
key_event.windowsKeyCode == ui::VKEY_SPACE)) {
OnUserGesture();
}
if (WebInputEvent::isKeyboardEventType(key_event.type)) {
if (suppress_next_char_events_) {
if (key_event.type == WebKeyboardEvent::Char)
return;
suppress_next_char_events_ = false;
}
bool is_keyboard_shortcut = false;
if (delegate_ && !key_event.skip_in_browser) {
if (key_event.type == WebKeyboardEvent::RawKeyDown)
suppress_next_char_events_ = true;
if (delegate_->PreHandleKeyboardEvent(key_event, &is_keyboard_shortcut))
return;
if (key_event.type == WebKeyboardEvent::RawKeyDown)
suppress_next_char_events_ = false;
}
if (!process_->HasConnection())
return;
key_queue_.push_back(key_event);
HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100("Renderer.KeyboardQueueSize", key_queue_.size());
gesture_event_filter_->FlingHasBeenHalted();
ForwardInputEvent(key_event, sizeof(WebKeyboardEvent),
is_keyboard_shortcut);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_ap_regex(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
int i,
rv,
flags;
const char *pattern,
*source;
char *err;
ap_regex_t regex;
ap_regmatch_t matches[MODLUA_MAX_REG_MATCH+1];
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
luaL_checktype(L, 3, LUA_TSTRING);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
source = lua_tostring(L, 2);
pattern = lua_tostring(L, 3);
flags = luaL_optinteger(L, 4, 0);
rv = ap_regcomp(®ex, pattern, flags);
if (rv) {
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
err = apr_palloc(r->pool, 256);
ap_regerror(rv, ®ex, err, 256);
lua_pushstring(L, err);
return 2;
}
if (regex.re_nsub > MODLUA_MAX_REG_MATCH) {
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
err = apr_palloc(r->pool, 64);
apr_snprintf(err, 64,
"regcomp found %d matches; only %d allowed.",
regex.re_nsub, MODLUA_MAX_REG_MATCH);
lua_pushstring(L, err);
return 2;
}
rv = ap_regexec(®ex, source, MODLUA_MAX_REG_MATCH, matches, 0);
if (rv == AP_REG_NOMATCH) {
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
return 1;
}
lua_newtable(L);
for (i = 0; i <= regex.re_nsub; i++) {
lua_pushinteger(L, i);
if (matches[i].rm_so >= 0 && matches[i].rm_eo >= 0)
lua_pushstring(L,
apr_pstrndup(r->pool, source + matches[i].rm_so,
matches[i].rm_eo - matches[i].rm_so));
else
lua_pushnil(L);
lua_settable(L, -3);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Tags* Segment::GetTags() const { return m_pTags; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_ipcp_config_options(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
int len, opt;
u_int compproto, ipcomp_subopttotallen, ipcomp_subopt, ipcomp_suboptlen;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = p[1];
opt = p[0];
if (length < len)
return 0;
if (len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u (length bogus, should be >= 2)",
tok2str(ipcpopt_values,"unknown",opt),
opt,
len));
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (0x%02x), length %u",
tok2str(ipcpopt_values,"unknown",opt),
opt,
len));
switch (opt) {
case IPCPOPT_2ADDR: /* deprecated */
if (len != 10) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 10)"));
return len;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 6), 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": src %s, dst %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, p + 2),
ipaddr_string(ndo, p + 6)));
break;
case IPCPOPT_IPCOMP:
if (len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= 4)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 2);
compproto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s (0x%02x):",
tok2str(ipcpopt_compproto_values, "Unknown", compproto),
compproto));
switch (compproto) {
case PPP_VJC:
/* XXX: VJ-Comp parameters should be decoded */
break;
case IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_HDRCOMP:
if (len < IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be >= %u)",
IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_MINLEN));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_MINLEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t TCP Space %u, non-TCP Space %u" \
", maxPeriod %u, maxTime %u, maxHdr %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_16BITS(p+6),
EXTRACT_16BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(p+10),
EXTRACT_16BITS(p+12)));
/* suboptions present ? */
if (len > IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_MINLEN) {
ipcomp_subopttotallen = len - IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_MINLEN;
p += IPCPOPT_IPCOMP_MINLEN;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Suboptions, length %u", ipcomp_subopttotallen));
while (ipcomp_subopttotallen >= 2) {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
ipcomp_subopt = *p;
ipcomp_suboptlen = *(p+1);
/* sanity check */
if (ipcomp_subopt == 0 ||
ipcomp_suboptlen == 0 )
break;
/* XXX: just display the suboptions for now */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s Suboption #%u, length %u",
tok2str(ipcpopt_compproto_subopt_values,
"Unknown",
ipcomp_subopt),
ipcomp_subopt,
ipcomp_suboptlen));
ipcomp_subopttotallen -= ipcomp_suboptlen;
p += ipcomp_suboptlen;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
break;
case IPCPOPT_ADDR: /* those options share the same format - fall through */
case IPCPOPT_MOBILE4:
case IPCPOPT_PRIDNS:
case IPCPOPT_PRINBNS:
case IPCPOPT_SECDNS:
case IPCPOPT_SECNBNS:
if (len != 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (length bogus, should be = 6)"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*(p + 2), 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, p + 2)));
break;
default:
/*
* Unknown option; dump it as raw bytes now if we're
* not going to do so below.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &p[2], "\n\t ", len - 2); /* exclude TLV header */
return len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ipcp]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13029/PPP: Fix a bounds check, and clean up other bounds checks.
For configuration protocol options, use ND_TCHECK() and
ND_TCHECK_nBITS() macros, passing them the appropriate pointer argument.
This fixes one case where the ND_TCHECK2() call they replace was not
checking enough bytes.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 25,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod(longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CheckBasicServerAuth(const AuthChallengeInfo* auth_challenge) {
if (!auth_challenge)
return false;
EXPECT_FALSE(auth_challenge->is_proxy);
EXPECT_EQ("www.google.com:80", auth_challenge->challenger.ToString());
EXPECT_EQ("MyRealm1", auth_challenge->realm);
EXPECT_EQ("basic", auth_challenge->scheme);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 18,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: free_netinfo_config(
struct netinfo_config_state *config
)
{
ni_free(config->domain);
free(config);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShowImageInfo(int ShowFileInfo)
{
if (ShowFileInfo){
printf("File name : %s\n",ImageInfo.FileName);
printf("File size : %d bytes\n",ImageInfo.FileSize);
{
char Temp[20];
FileTimeAsString(Temp);
printf("File date : %s\n",Temp);
}
}
if (ImageInfo.CameraMake[0]){
printf("Camera make : %s\n",ImageInfo.CameraMake);
printf("Camera model : %s\n",ImageInfo.CameraModel);
}
if (ImageInfo.DateTime[0]){
printf("Date/Time : %s\n",ImageInfo.DateTime);
}
printf("Resolution : %d x %d\n",ImageInfo.Width, ImageInfo.Height);
if (ImageInfo.Orientation > 1){
printf("Orientation : %s\n", OrientTab[ImageInfo.Orientation]);
}
if (ImageInfo.IsColor == 0){
printf("Color/bw : Black and white\n");
}
if (ImageInfo.FlashUsed >= 0){
if (ImageInfo.FlashUsed & 1){
printf("Flash used : Yes");
switch (ImageInfo.FlashUsed){
case 0x5: printf(" (Strobe light not detected)"); break;
case 0x7: printf(" (Strobe light detected) "); break;
case 0x9: printf(" (manual)"); break;
case 0xd: printf(" (manual, return light not detected)"); break;
case 0xf: printf(" (manual, return light detected)"); break;
case 0x19:printf(" (auto)"); break;
case 0x1d:printf(" (auto, return light not detected)"); break;
case 0x1f:printf(" (auto, return light detected)"); break;
case 0x41:printf(" (red eye reduction mode)"); break;
case 0x45:printf(" (red eye reduction mode return light not detected)"); break;
case 0x47:printf(" (red eye reduction mode return light detected)"); break;
case 0x49:printf(" (manual, red eye reduction mode)"); break;
case 0x4d:printf(" (manual, red eye reduction mode, return light not detected)"); break;
case 0x4f:printf(" (red eye reduction mode, return light detected)"); break;
case 0x59:printf(" (auto, red eye reduction mode)"); break;
case 0x5d:printf(" (auto, red eye reduction mode, return light not detected)"); break;
case 0x5f:printf(" (auto, red eye reduction mode, return light detected)"); break;
}
}else{
printf("Flash used : No");
switch (ImageInfo.FlashUsed){
case 0x18:printf(" (auto)"); break;
}
}
printf("\n");
}
if (ImageInfo.FocalLength.num != 0 && ImageInfo.FocalLength.denom != 0) {
printf("Focal length : %4.1fmm",(double)ImageInfo.FocalLength.num / ImageInfo.FocalLength.denom);
if (ImageInfo.FocalLength35mmEquiv){
printf(" (35mm equivalent: %dmm)", ImageInfo.FocalLength35mmEquiv);
}
printf("\n");
}
if (ImageInfo.DigitalZoomRatio > 1){
printf("Digital Zoom : %1.3fx\n", (double)ImageInfo.DigitalZoomRatio);
}
if (ImageInfo.CCDWidth){
printf("CCD width : %4.2fmm\n",(double)ImageInfo.CCDWidth);
}
if (ImageInfo.ExposureTime){
if (ImageInfo.ExposureTime < 0.010){
printf("Exposure time: %6.4f s ",(double)ImageInfo.ExposureTime);
}else{
printf("Exposure time: %5.3f s ",(double)ImageInfo.ExposureTime);
}
if (ImageInfo.ExposureTime <= 0.5){
printf(" (1/%d)",(int)(0.5 + 1/ImageInfo.ExposureTime));
}
printf("\n");
}
if (ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber){
printf("Aperture : f/%3.3f\n",(double)ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber);
}
if (ImageInfo.Distance){
if (ImageInfo.Distance < 0){
printf("Focus dist. : Infinite\n");
}else{
printf("Focus dist. : %4.2fm\n",(double)ImageInfo.Distance);
}
}
if (ImageInfo.ISOequivalent){
printf("ISO equiv. : %2d\n",(int)ImageInfo.ISOequivalent);
}
if (ImageInfo.ExposureBias){
printf("Exposure bias: %4.2f\n",(double)ImageInfo.ExposureBias);
}
switch(ImageInfo.Whitebalance) {
case 1:
printf("Whitebalance : Manual\n");
break;
case 0:
printf("Whitebalance : Auto\n");
break;
}
switch(ImageInfo.LightSource) {
case 1:
printf("Light Source : Daylight\n");
break;
case 2:
printf("Light Source : Fluorescent\n");
break;
case 3:
printf("Light Source : Incandescent\n");
break;
case 4:
printf("Light Source : Flash\n");
break;
case 9:
printf("Light Source : Fine weather\n");
break;
case 11:
printf("Light Source : Shade\n");
break;
default:; //Quercus: 17-1-2004 There are many more modes for this, check Exif2.2 specs
}
if (ImageInfo.MeteringMode){ // 05-jan-2001 vcs
switch(ImageInfo.MeteringMode) {
case 2:
printf("Metering Mode: center weight\n");
break;
case 3:
printf("Metering Mode: spot\n");
break;
case 5:
printf("Metering Mode: matrix\n");
break;
}
}
if (ImageInfo.ExposureProgram){ // 05-jan-2001 vcs
switch(ImageInfo.ExposureProgram) {
case 1:
printf("Exposure : Manual\n");
break;
case 2:
printf("Exposure : program (auto)\n");
break;
case 3:
printf("Exposure : aperture priority (semi-auto)\n");
break;
case 4:
printf("Exposure : shutter priority (semi-auto)\n");
break;
case 5:
printf("Exposure : Creative Program (based towards depth of field)\n");
break;
case 6:
printf("Exposure : Action program (based towards fast shutter speed)\n");
break;
case 7:
printf("Exposure : Portrait Mode\n");
break;
case 8:
printf("Exposure : LandscapeMode \n");
break;
default:
break;
}
}
switch(ImageInfo.ExposureMode){
case 0: // Automatic (not worth cluttering up output for)
break;
case 1: printf("Exposure Mode: Manual\n");
break;
case 2: printf("Exposure Mode: Auto bracketing\n");
break;
}
if (ImageInfo.DistanceRange) {
printf("Focus range : ");
switch(ImageInfo.DistanceRange) {
case 1:
printf("macro");
break;
case 2:
printf("close");
break;
case 3:
printf("distant");
break;
}
printf("\n");
}
if (ImageInfo.Process != M_SOF0){
int a;
for (a=0;;a++){
if (a >= (int)PROCESS_TABLE_SIZE){
printf("Jpeg process : Unknown\n");
break;
}
if (ProcessTable[a].Tag == ImageInfo.Process){
printf("Jpeg process : %s\n",ProcessTable[a].Desc);
break;
}
}
}
if (ImageInfo.GpsInfoPresent){
printf("GPS Latitude : %s\n",ImageInfo.GpsLat);
printf("GPS Longitude: %s\n",ImageInfo.GpsLong);
if (ImageInfo.GpsAlt[0]) printf("GPS Altitude : %s\n",ImageInfo.GpsAlt);
}
if (ImageInfo.Comments[0]){
int a,c;
printf("Comment : ");
if (!ImageInfo.CommentWidchars){
for (a=0;a<MAX_COMMENT_SIZE;a++){
c = ImageInfo.Comments[a];
if (c == '\0') break;
if (c == '\n'){
if (ImageInfo.Comments[a+1] != '\0'){
printf("\nComment : ");
}else{
printf("\n");
}
}else{
putchar(c);
}
}
printf("\n");
}else{
printf("%.*ls\n", ImageInfo.CommentWidchars, (wchar_t *)ImageInfo.Comments);
}
}
if (ImageInfo.ThumbnailOffset){
printf("Map: %05d-%05d: Thumbnail\n",ImageInfo.ThumbnailOffset, ImageInfo.ThumbnailOffset+ImageInfo.ThumbnailSize);
} else {
printf("NO thumbnail");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int warn_set(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
printk(KERN_INFO KBUILD_MODNAME
": kernel >= 2.6.10 only uses 'ports' for conntrack modules\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_nat: fix access to uninitialized buffer in IRC NAT helper
Commit 5901b6be885e attempted to introduce IPv6 support into
IRC NAT helper. By doing so, the following code seemed to be removed
by accident:
ip = ntohl(exp->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.u3.ip);
sprintf(buffer, "%u %u", ip, port);
pr_debug("nf_nat_irc: inserting '%s' == %pI4, port %u\n", buffer, &ip, port);
This leads to the fact that buffer[] was left uninitialized and
contained some stack value. When we call nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(),
we call strlen(buffer) on excatly this uninitialized buffer. If we
are unlucky and the skb has enough tailroom, we overwrite resp. leak
contents with values that sit on our stack into the packet and send
that out to the receiver.
Since the rather informal DCC spec [1] does not seem to specify
IPv6 support right now, we log such occurences so that admins can
act accordingly, and drop the packet. I've looked into XChat source,
and IPv6 is not supported there: addresses are in u32 and print
via %u format string.
Therefore, restore old behaviour as in IPv4, use snprintf(). The
IRC helper does not support IPv6 by now. By this, we can safely use
strlen(buffer) in nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet() and prevent a buffer
overflow. Also simplify some code as we now have ct variable anyway.
[1] http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/rfc/ctcpspec.html
Fixes: 5901b6be885e ("netfilter: nf_nat: support IPv6 in IRC NAT helper")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: generate_hash_secret_salt(XML_Parser parser)
{
unsigned long entropy;
(void)parser;
/* "Failproof" high quality providers: */
#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF)
arc4random_buf(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("arc4random_buf", entropy);
#elif defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
writeRandomBytes_arc4random((void *)&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("arc4random", entropy);
#else
/* Try high quality providers first .. */
#ifdef _WIN32
if (writeRandomBytes_RtlGenRandom((void *)&entropy, sizeof(entropy))) {
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("RtlGenRandom", entropy);
}
#elif defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_SYSCALL_GETRANDOM)
if (writeRandomBytes_getrandom_nonblock((void *)&entropy, sizeof(entropy))) {
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("getrandom", entropy);
}
#endif
#if ! defined(_WIN32) && defined(XML_DEV_URANDOM)
if (writeRandomBytes_dev_urandom((void *)&entropy, sizeof(entropy))) {
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("/dev/urandom", entropy);
}
#endif /* ! defined(_WIN32) && defined(XML_DEV_URANDOM) */
/* .. and self-made low quality for backup: */
/* Process ID is 0 bits entropy if attacker has local access */
entropy = gather_time_entropy() ^ getpid();
/* Factors are 2^31-1 and 2^61-1 (Mersenne primes M31 and M61) */
if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 4) {
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("fallback(4)", entropy * 2147483647);
} else {
return ENTROPY_DEBUG("fallback(8)",
entropy * (unsigned long)2305843009213693951ULL);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 27,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_prepare)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
char *query, *stmtname;
int query_len, stmtname_len, id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
int leftover = 0;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
ExecStatusType status;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
if (argc == 2) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &stmtname, &stmtname_len, &query, &query_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
id = PGG(default_link);
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "rss", &pgsql_link, &stmtname, &stmtname_len, &query, &query_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (PQ_SETNONBLOCKING(pgsql, 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE,"Cannot set connection to blocking mode");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
while ((pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql))) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
leftover = 1;
}
if (leftover) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found results on this connection. Use pg_get_result() to get these results first");
}
pgsql_result = PQprepare(pgsql, stmtname, query, 0, NULL);
if ((PGG(auto_reset_persistent) & 2) && PQstatus(pgsql) != CONNECTION_OK) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
PQreset(pgsql);
pgsql_result = PQprepare(pgsql, stmtname, query, 0, NULL);
}
if (pgsql_result) {
status = PQresultStatus(pgsql_result);
} else {
status = (ExecStatusType) PQstatus(pgsql);
}
switch (status) {
case PGRES_EMPTY_QUERY:
case PGRES_BAD_RESPONSE:
case PGRES_NONFATAL_ERROR:
case PGRES_FATAL_ERROR:
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Query failed: %s", pgsql);
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
case PGRES_COMMAND_OK: /* successful command that did not return rows */
default:
if (pgsql_result) {
pg_result = (pgsql_result_handle *) emalloc(sizeof(pgsql_result_handle));
pg_result->conn = pgsql;
pg_result->result = pgsql_result;
pg_result->row = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pg_result, le_result);
} else {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TopSitesImpl::GetRedirectDistanceForURL(const MostVisitedURL& most_visited,
const GURL& url) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < most_visited.redirects.size(); i++) {
if (most_visited.redirects[i] == url)
return static_cast<int>(most_visited.redirects.size() - i - 1);
}
NOTREACHED() << "URL should always be found.";
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 24,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::SyncSelectionIfRequired() {
base::string16 text;
size_t offset;
gfx::Range range;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
if (focused_pepper_plugin_) {
focused_pepper_plugin_->GetSurroundingText(&text, &range);
offset = 0; // Pepper API does not support offset reporting.
} else
#endif
{
WebRange selection =
frame_->GetInputMethodController()->GetSelectionOffsets();
if (selection.IsNull())
return;
range = gfx::Range(selection.StartOffset(), selection.EndOffset());
if (frame_->GetInputMethodController()->TextInputType() !=
blink::kWebTextInputTypeNone) {
if (selection.StartOffset() > kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection)
offset = selection.StartOffset() - kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection;
else
offset = 0;
size_t length =
selection.EndOffset() - offset + kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection;
text = frame_->RangeAsText(WebRange(offset, length)).Utf16();
} else {
offset = selection.StartOffset();
text = frame_->SelectionAsText().Utf16();
range.set_end(range.start() + text.length());
}
}
if (selection_text_offset_ != offset ||
selection_range_ != range ||
selection_text_ != text) {
selection_text_ = text;
selection_text_offset_ = offset;
selection_range_ = range;
SetSelectedText(text, offset, range);
}
GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->UpdateSelectionBounds();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::SetupFlags() {
DCHECK(GetDrawingBuffer());
if (canvas()) {
if (Page* p = canvas()->GetDocument().GetPage()) {
synthesized_errors_to_console_ =
p->GetSettings().GetWebGLErrorsToConsoleEnabled();
}
}
is_depth_stencil_supported_ =
ExtensionsUtil()->IsExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
int retval;
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid);
if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
return -EINVAL;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
goto error;
if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid))
goto error;
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid))
goto error;
}
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
new->gid = krgid;
if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
new->egid = kegid;
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
new->sgid = ksgid;
new->fsgid = new->egid;
return commit_creds(new);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 15,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Clipboard::ReadBookmark(string16* title, std::string* url) const {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gtco_input_open(struct input_dev *inputdev)
{
struct gtco *device = input_get_drvdata(inputdev);
device->urbinfo->dev = device->usbdev;
if (usb_submit_urb(device->urbinfo, GFP_KERNEL))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious
descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in
the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface
before using it.
Also let's fix a minor coding style issue.
The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public
Red Hat Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *GetImageMask(const Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->mask == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
return(CloneImage(image->mask,0,0,MagickTrue,exception));
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 7,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Goffset JBIG2Stream::getPos() {
if (pageBitmap == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return dataPtr - pageBitmap->getDataPtr();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickPrivate const void *GetVirtualMetacontentFromNexus(const Cache cache,
NexusInfo *magick_restrict nexus_info)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (cache_info->storage_class == UndefinedClass)
return((void *) NULL);
return(nexus_info->metacontent);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordInputType::EnableSecureTextInput() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetElement().GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
frame->Selection().SetUseSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(true);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 1 | 22,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::didAssociateFormControlsTimerFired(Timer<Document>* timer)
{
ASSERT_UNUSED(timer, timer == &m_didAssociateFormControlsTimer);
if (!frame() || !frame()->page())
return;
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<Element>> associatedFormControls;
copyToVector(m_associatedFormControls, associatedFormControls);
frame()->page()->chrome().client().didAssociateFormControls(associatedFormControls, frame());
m_associatedFormControls.clear();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 16,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FeatureInfo::IsWebGL2OrES3Context() const {
return IsWebGL2OrES3ContextType(context_type_);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 3,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_os_callouts(bt_os_callouts_t *callouts) {
bt_os_callouts = callouts;
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest()
: https_server_(net::EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS) {}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int select_pkcs15_app(sc_card_t * card)
{
sc_path_t app;
int r;
/* Regular PKCS#15 AID */
sc_format_path("A000000063504B43532D3135", &app);
app.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
r = sc_select_file(card, &app, NULL);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AffineTransform& AffineTransform::scale(double s)
{
return scale(s, s);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t show_cons_active(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct console *cs[16];
int i = 0;
struct console *c;
ssize_t count = 0;
console_lock();
for_each_console(c) {
if (!c->device)
continue;
if (!c->write)
continue;
if ((c->flags & CON_ENABLED) == 0)
continue;
cs[i++] = c;
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(cs))
break;
}
while (i--) {
int index = cs[i]->index;
struct tty_driver *drv = cs[i]->device(cs[i], &index);
/* don't resolve tty0 as some programs depend on it */
if (drv && (cs[i]->index > 0 || drv->major != TTY_MAJOR))
count += tty_line_name(drv, index, buf + count);
else
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%s%d",
cs[i]->name, cs[i]->index);
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%c", i ? ' ':'\n');
}
console_unlock();
return count;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::scheduleSVGFilterLayerUpdateHack(Element& element)
{
if (element.styleChangeType() == NeedsReattachStyleChange)
return;
element.setSVGFilterNeedsLayerUpdate();
m_layerUpdateSVGFilterElements.add(&element);
scheduleLayoutTreeUpdateIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsURLHandledByDefaultLoader(const GURL& url) {
return IsURLHandledByNetworkService(url) || url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme);
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::FallbackTickFired() {
TRACE_EVENT0("android_webview", "BrowserViewRenderer::FallbackTickFired");
DCHECK(fallback_tick_pending_);
fallback_tick_fired_.Cancel();
fallback_tick_pending_ = false;
if (compositor_) {
if (hardware_enabled_ && !size_.IsEmpty()) {
CompositeHw();
} else {
ForceFakeCompositeSW();
}
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
{
mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetSurroundingContext(const base::string16& surrounding_text,
int start_offset,
int end_offset) {
test_context_ = new ContextualSearchContext(
"Bogus", true, GURL(kSomeSpecificBasePage), "utf-8");
test_context_->surrounding_text = surrounding_text;
test_context_->start_offset = start_offset;
test_context_->end_offset = end_offset;
delegate_->set_context_for_testing(test_context_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void convert2MethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::convert2Method(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GahpClient::dcloud_find( const char *service_url,
const char *username,
const char *password,
const char *instance_name,
char **instance_id )
{
static const char* command = "DELTACLOUD_VM_FIND";
if ( server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase( command ) == FALSE ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !service_url ) service_url = NULLSTRING;
if ( !username ) username = NULLSTRING;
if ( !password ) password = NULLSTRING;
if ( !instance_name ) instance_name = NULLSTRING;
MyString reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(username) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(password) );
char* esc4 = strdup( escapeGahpString(instance_name) );
bool x = reqline.sprintf("%s %s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3, esc4);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
free( esc4 );
ASSERT( x == true );
const char *buf = reqline.Value();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if ( result->argc < 2 || result->argc > 3 ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
} else if ( result->argc == 2 ) {
if ( !strcmp( result->argv[1], NULLSTRING ) ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
error_string = result->argv[1];
rc = 1;
} else {
if ( strcmp( result->argv[1], NULLSTRING ) ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
if ( strcmp( result->argv[2], NULLSTRING ) ) {
*instance_id = strdup( result->argv[2] );
} else {
*instance_id = NULL;
}
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 25,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool XmlConfigParser::IsParsingData() const {
const std::string data_path[] = {"response", "app", "data"};
return elements_.size() == arraysize(data_path) &&
std::equal(elements_.begin(), elements_.end(), data_path);
}
Commit Message: Use install_static::GetAppGuid instead of the hardcoded string in BrandcodeConfigFetcher.
Bug: 769756
Change-Id: Ifdcb0a5145ffad1d563562e2b2ea2390ff074cdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1213178
Reviewed-by: Dominic Battré <battre@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#590275}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 1,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_undump(char *tag, char *name)
{
int r = 0;
char *intname = mboxname_from_external(name, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
/* administrators only please */
if (!imapd_userisadmin)
r = IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED;
if (!r) r = mlookup(tag, name, intname, NULL);
if (!r) r = undump_mailbox(intname, imapd_in, imapd_out, imapd_authstate);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s%s\r\n",
tag,
(r == IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT &&
mboxlist_createmailboxcheck(intname, 0, 0,
imapd_userisadmin,
imapd_userid, imapd_authstate,
NULL, NULL, 0) == 0)
? "[TRYCREATE] " : "", error_message(r));
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
free(intname);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AuthenticatorSelectAccountSheetModel::OnAccept() {
dialog_model()->OnAccountSelected(selected_);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_mmap_to_page(struct ring_buffer *rb, unsigned long pgoff)
{
if (pgoff > rb->nr_pages)
return NULL;
if (pgoff == 0)
return virt_to_page(rb->user_page);
return virt_to_page(rb->data_pages[pgoff - 1]);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::ReadWatcher::OnFileCanReadWithoutBlocking(int) {
if (!socket_->read_callback_.is_null())
socket_->DidCompleteRead();
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 19,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ActivateTabAt(int index, bool user_gesture) {
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->ActivateTabAt(index, user_gesture);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest();
if (GetFrame()->FrameScheduler())
GetFrame()->FrameScheduler()->DidStartLoading(identifier);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 25,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OverrideDevicePermissionsForTesting(bool has_access) {
authorization_handler_.OverridePermissionsForTesting(has_access);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *page_follow_link_light(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct page *page = NULL;
nd_set_link(nd, page_getlink(dentry, &page));
return page;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 5,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int compare_keys(struct rtable *rt1, struct rtable *rt2)
{
return (((__force u32)rt1->rt_key_dst ^ (__force u32)rt2->rt_key_dst) |
((__force u32)rt1->rt_key_src ^ (__force u32)rt2->rt_key_src) |
(rt1->rt_mark ^ rt2->rt_mark) |
(rt1->rt_key_tos ^ rt2->rt_key_tos) |
(rt1->rt_oif ^ rt2->rt_oif) |
(rt1->rt_iif ^ rt2->rt_iif)) == 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int WMFSeekBlob(void *image,long offset)
{
return((int) SeekBlob((Image *) image,(MagickOffsetType) offset,SEEK_SET));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *am_request_hostname(request_rec *r)
{
const char *url;
apr_uri_t uri;
int ret;
url = am_reconstruct_url(r);
ret = apr_uri_parse(r->pool, url, &uri);
if (ret != APR_SUCCESS) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Failed to parse request URL: %s", url);
return NULL;
}
if (uri.hostname == NULL) {
/* This shouldn't happen, since the request URL is built with a hostname,
* but log a message to make any debuggin around this code easier.
*/
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"No hostname in request URL: %s", url);
return NULL;
}
return uri.hostname;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 9,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXvDispatch(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xReq);
UpdateCurrentTime();
if (stuff->data >= xvNumRequests) {
return BadRequest;
}
return XvProcVector[stuff->data] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int compat_mc_setsockopt(struct sock *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen,
int (*setsockopt)(struct sock *, int, int, char __user *, unsigned int))
{
char __user *koptval = optval;
int koptlen = optlen;
switch (optname) {
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
{
struct compat_group_req __user *gr32 = (void *)optval;
struct group_req __user *kgr =
compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct group_req));
u32 interface;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, gr32, sizeof(*gr32)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kgr, sizeof(struct group_req)) ||
__get_user(interface, &gr32->gr_interface) ||
__put_user(interface, &kgr->gr_interface) ||
copy_in_user(&kgr->gr_group, &gr32->gr_group,
sizeof(kgr->gr_group)))
return -EFAULT;
koptval = (char __user *)kgr;
koptlen = sizeof(struct group_req);
break;
}
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
{
struct compat_group_source_req __user *gsr32 = (void *)optval;
struct group_source_req __user *kgsr = compat_alloc_user_space(
sizeof(struct group_source_req));
u32 interface;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, gsr32, sizeof(*gsr32)) ||
!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kgsr,
sizeof(struct group_source_req)) ||
__get_user(interface, &gsr32->gsr_interface) ||
__put_user(interface, &kgsr->gsr_interface) ||
copy_in_user(&kgsr->gsr_group, &gsr32->gsr_group,
sizeof(kgsr->gsr_group)) ||
copy_in_user(&kgsr->gsr_source, &gsr32->gsr_source,
sizeof(kgsr->gsr_source)))
return -EFAULT;
koptval = (char __user *)kgsr;
koptlen = sizeof(struct group_source_req);
break;
}
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct compat_group_filter __user *gf32 = (void *)optval;
struct group_filter __user *kgf;
u32 interface, fmode, numsrc;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, gf32, __COMPAT_GF0_SIZE) ||
__get_user(interface, &gf32->gf_interface) ||
__get_user(fmode, &gf32->gf_fmode) ||
__get_user(numsrc, &gf32->gf_numsrc))
return -EFAULT;
koptlen = optlen + sizeof(struct group_filter) -
sizeof(struct compat_group_filter);
if (koptlen < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(numsrc))
return -EINVAL;
kgf = compat_alloc_user_space(koptlen);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kgf, koptlen) ||
__put_user(interface, &kgf->gf_interface) ||
__put_user(fmode, &kgf->gf_fmode) ||
__put_user(numsrc, &kgf->gf_numsrc) ||
copy_in_user(&kgf->gf_group, &gf32->gf_group,
sizeof(kgf->gf_group)) ||
(numsrc && copy_in_user(kgf->gf_slist, gf32->gf_slist,
numsrc * sizeof(kgf->gf_slist[0]))))
return -EFAULT;
koptval = (char __user *)kgf;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
return setsockopt(sock, level, optname, koptval, koptlen);
}
Commit Message: x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,429 |
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