instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iwgif_read_color_table(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx, struct iw_palette *ct)
{
int i;
if(ct->num_entries<1) return 1;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,3*ct->num_entries)) return 0;
for(i=0;i<ct->num_entries;i++) {
ct->entry[i].r = rctx->rbuf[3*i+0];
ct->entry[i].g = rctx->rbuf[3*i+1];
ct->entry[i].b = rctx->rbuf[3*i+2];
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 23,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateCurrent (void)
{
struct tm localTm, gmTm;
time_t secs;
int local_s, gm_s;
exsltDateValPtr ret;
ret = exsltDateCreateDate(XS_DATETIME);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
/* get current time */
secs = time(NULL);
#if HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
localtime_r(&secs, &localTm);
#else
localTm = *localtime(&secs);
#endif
/* get real year, not years since 1900 */
ret->value.date.year = localTm.tm_year + 1900;
ret->value.date.mon = localTm.tm_mon + 1;
ret->value.date.day = localTm.tm_mday;
ret->value.date.hour = localTm.tm_hour;
ret->value.date.min = localTm.tm_min;
/* floating point seconds */
ret->value.date.sec = (double) localTm.tm_sec;
/* determine the time zone offset from local to gm time */
#if HAVE_GMTIME_R
gmtime_r(&secs, &gmTm);
#else
gmTm = *gmtime(&secs);
#endif
ret->value.date.tz_flag = 0;
#if 0
ret->value.date.tzo = (((ret->value.date.day * 1440) +
(ret->value.date.hour * 60) +
ret->value.date.min) -
((gmTm.tm_mday * 1440) + (gmTm.tm_hour * 60) +
gmTm.tm_min));
#endif
local_s = localTm.tm_hour * SECS_PER_HOUR +
localTm.tm_min * SECS_PER_MIN +
localTm.tm_sec;
gm_s = gmTm.tm_hour * SECS_PER_HOUR +
gmTm.tm_min * SECS_PER_MIN +
gmTm.tm_sec;
if (localTm.tm_year < gmTm.tm_year) {
ret->value.date.tzo = -((SECS_PER_DAY - local_s) + gm_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_year > gmTm.tm_year) {
ret->value.date.tzo = ((SECS_PER_DAY - gm_s) + local_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mon < gmTm.tm_mon) {
ret->value.date.tzo = -((SECS_PER_DAY - local_s) + gm_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mon > gmTm.tm_mon) {
ret->value.date.tzo = ((SECS_PER_DAY - gm_s) + local_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mday < gmTm.tm_mday) {
ret->value.date.tzo = -((SECS_PER_DAY - local_s) + gm_s)/60;
} else if (localTm.tm_mday > gmTm.tm_mday) {
ret->value.date.tzo = ((SECS_PER_DAY - gm_s) + local_s)/60;
} else {
ret->value.date.tzo = (local_s - gm_s)/60;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_absolute_bodysid_offset(MXFContext *mxf, int body_sid, int64_t offset, int64_t *offset_out, MXFPartition **partition_out)
{
MXFPartition *last_p = NULL;
int a, b, m, m0;
if (offset < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
a = -1;
b = mxf->partitions_count;
while (b - a > 1) {
m0 = m = (a + b) >> 1;
while (m < b && mxf->partitions[m].body_sid != body_sid)
m++;
if (m < b && mxf->partitions[m].body_offset <= offset)
a = m;
else
b = m0;
}
if (a >= 0)
last_p = &mxf->partitions[a];
if (last_p && (!last_p->essence_length || last_p->essence_length > (offset - last_p->body_offset))) {
*offset_out = last_p->essence_offset + (offset - last_p->body_offset);
if (partition_out)
*partition_out = last_p;
return 0;
}
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"failed to find absolute offset of %"PRIX64" in BodySID %i - partial file?\n",
offset, body_sid);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::preload(Resource::Type type, FetchRequest& request, const String& charset)
{
requestPreload(type, request, charset);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ApplyBlockElementCommand::rangeForParagraphSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(const VisiblePosition& endOfCurrentParagraph, Position& start, Position& end)
{
start = startOfParagraph(endOfCurrentParagraph).deepEquivalent();
end = endOfCurrentParagraph.deepEquivalent();
document().updateStyleIfNeeded();
bool isStartAndEndOnSameNode = false;
if (RenderStyle* startStyle = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(start)) {
isStartAndEndOnSameNode = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(end) && start.containerNode() == end.containerNode();
bool isStartAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(m_endOfLastParagraph) && start.containerNode() == m_endOfLastParagraph.containerNode();
if (startStyle->preserveNewline() && isNewLineAtPosition(start) && !isNewLineAtPosition(start.previous()) && start.offsetInContainerNode() > 0)
start = startOfParagraph(end.previous()).deepEquivalent();
if (!startStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() && start.offsetInContainerNode() > 0) {
int startOffset = start.offsetInContainerNode();
Text* startText = start.containerText();
splitTextNode(startText, startOffset);
start = firstPositionInNode(startText);
if (isStartAndEndOnSameNode) {
ASSERT(end.offsetInContainerNode() >= startOffset);
end = Position(startText, end.offsetInContainerNode() - startOffset);
}
if (isStartAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode) {
ASSERT(m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() >= startOffset);
m_endOfLastParagraph = Position(startText, m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() - startOffset);
}
}
}
document().updateStyleIfNeeded();
if (RenderStyle* endStyle = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(end)) {
bool isEndAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode = renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(m_endOfLastParagraph) && end.deprecatedNode() == m_endOfLastParagraph.deprecatedNode();
if (endStyle->preserveNewline() && start == end && end.offsetInContainerNode() < end.containerNode()->maxCharacterOffset()) {
int endOffset = end.offsetInContainerNode();
if (!isNewLineAtPosition(end.previous()) && isNewLineAtPosition(end))
end = Position(end.containerText(), endOffset + 1);
if (isEndAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode && end.offsetInContainerNode() >= m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode())
m_endOfLastParagraph = end;
}
if (!endStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() && end.offsetInContainerNode() && end.offsetInContainerNode() < end.containerNode()->maxCharacterOffset()) {
RefPtr<Text> endContainer = end.containerText();
splitTextNode(endContainer, end.offsetInContainerNode());
if (isStartAndEndOnSameNode)
start = firstPositionInOrBeforeNode(endContainer->previousSibling());
if (isEndAndEndOfLastParagraphOnSameNode) {
if (m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() == end.offsetInContainerNode())
m_endOfLastParagraph = lastPositionInOrAfterNode(endContainer->previousSibling());
else
m_endOfLastParagraph = Position(endContainer, m_endOfLastParagraph.offsetInContainerNode() - end.offsetInContainerNode());
}
end = lastPositionInNode(endContainer->previousSibling());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int TraceLineTo(FT_Vector *to,DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
AffineMatrix
affine;
char
path[MagickPathExtent];
affine=draw_info->affine;
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"L%g,%g",affine.tx+to->x/64.0,
affine.ty-to->y/64.0);
(void) ConcatenateString(&draw_info->primitive,path);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1589
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::DidInitiatePaint() {
pepper_delegate_.ViewInitiatedPaint();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* Document::ParentDocument() const {
if (!frame_)
return 0;
Frame* parent = frame_->Tree().Parent();
if (!parent || !parent->IsLocalFrame())
return 0;
return ToLocalFrame(parent)->GetDocument();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 3,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::MeasureAsVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_measureAsVoidMethod");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeature);
test_object_v8_internal::MeasureAsVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplPriorityQueue, insert)
{
zval *data, *priority, *elem;
spl_heap_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zz", &data, &priority) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->heap->flags & SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Heap is corrupted, heap properties are no longer ensured.", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(data);
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(priority);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_zval_ex(elem, "data", sizeof("data"), data);
add_assoc_zval_ex(elem, "priority", sizeof("priority"), priority);
spl_ptr_heap_insert(intern->heap, elem, getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sb_min_blocksize(struct super_block *sb, int size)
{
int minsize = bdev_logical_block_size(sb->s_bdev);
if (size < minsize)
size = minsize;
return sb_set_blocksize(sb, size);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long __video_do_ioctl(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
{
struct video_device *vfd = video_devdata(file);
const struct v4l2_ioctl_ops *ops = vfd->ioctl_ops;
void *fh = file->private_data;
struct v4l2_format f_copy;
long ret = -EINVAL;
if (ops == NULL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "videodev: \"%s\" has no ioctl_ops.\n",
vfd->name);
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((vfd->debug & V4L2_DEBUG_IOCTL) &&
!(vfd->debug & V4L2_DEBUG_IOCTL_ARG)) {
v4l_print_ioctl(vfd->name, cmd);
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
}
switch (cmd) {
/* --- capabilities ------------------------------------------ */
case VIDIOC_QUERYCAP:
{
struct v4l2_capability *cap = (struct v4l2_capability *)arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_querycap)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_querycap(file, fh, cap);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "driver=%s, card=%s, bus=%s, "
"version=0x%08x, "
"capabilities=0x%08x\n",
cap->driver, cap->card, cap->bus_info,
cap->version,
cap->capabilities);
break;
}
/* --- priority ------------------------------------------ */
case VIDIOC_G_PRIORITY:
{
enum v4l2_priority *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_priority)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_priority(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "priority is %d\n", *p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_PRIORITY:
{
enum v4l2_priority *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_priority)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "setting priority to %d\n", *p);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_priority(file, fh, *p);
break;
}
/* --- capture ioctls ---------------------------------------- */
case VIDIOC_ENUM_FMT:
{
struct v4l2_fmtdesc *f = arg;
switch (f->type) {
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE:
if (ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_cap(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE:
if (ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_cap_mplane)
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OVERLAY:
if (ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT:
if (ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_out(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE:
if (ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_out_mplane)
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_PRIVATE:
if (ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_type_private)
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_fmt_type_private(file,
fh, f);
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, type=%d, flags=%d, "
"pixelformat=%c%c%c%c, description='%s'\n",
f->index, f->type, f->flags,
(f->pixelformat & 0xff),
(f->pixelformat >> 8) & 0xff,
(f->pixelformat >> 16) & 0xff,
(f->pixelformat >> 24) & 0xff,
f->description);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_FMT:
{
struct v4l2_format *f = (struct v4l2_format *)arg;
/* FIXME: Should be one dump per type */
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(f->type, v4l2_type_names));
switch (f->type) {
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap) {
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap(file, fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap_mplane) {
if (fmt_sp_to_mp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file, fh,
&f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
/* Driver is currently in multi-planar format,
* we can't return it in single-planar API*/
if (f_copy.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes > 1) {
ret = -EBUSY;
break;
}
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &f->fmt.pix);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap_mplane) {
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file,
fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap) {
if (fmt_mp_to_sp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_cap(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
ret = fmt_sp_to_mp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt_mplane(vfd, &f->fmt.pix_mp);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OVERLAY:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out) {
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out(file, fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out_mplane) {
if (fmt_sp_to_mp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file, fh,
&f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
/* Driver is currently in multi-planar format,
* we can't return it in single-planar API*/
if (f_copy.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes > 1) {
ret = -EBUSY;
break;
}
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &f->fmt.pix);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out_mplane) {
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file,
fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out) {
if (fmt_mp_to_sp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
ret = fmt_sp_to_mp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt_mplane(vfd, &f->fmt.pix_mp);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_OVERLAY:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vid_out_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_CAPTURE:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vbi_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vbi_cap(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_OUTPUT:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vbi_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_vbi_out(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_CAPTURE:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_sliced_vbi_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_sliced_vbi_cap(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_OUTPUT:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_sliced_vbi_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_sliced_vbi_out(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_PRIVATE:
if (ops->vidioc_g_fmt_type_private)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fmt_type_private(file,
fh, f);
break;
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_FMT:
{
struct v4l2_format *f = (struct v4l2_format *)arg;
/* FIXME: Should be one dump per type */
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(f->type, v4l2_type_names));
switch (f->type) {
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix);
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &f->fmt.pix);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap) {
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap(file, fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap_mplane) {
if (fmt_sp_to_mp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file, fh,
&f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
if (f_copy.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes > 1) {
/* Drivers shouldn't adjust from 1-plane
* to more than 1-plane formats */
ret = -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix_mp);
v4l_print_pix_fmt_mplane(vfd, &f->fmt.pix_mp);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap_mplane) {
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file,
fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap &&
f->fmt.pix_mp.num_planes == 1) {
if (fmt_mp_to_sp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
ret = fmt_sp_to_mp(&f_copy, f);
}
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OVERLAY:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.win);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix);
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &f->fmt.pix);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out) {
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out(file, fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out_mplane) {
if (fmt_sp_to_mp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file, fh,
&f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
if (f_copy.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes > 1) {
/* Drivers shouldn't adjust from 1-plane
* to more than 1-plane formats */
ret = -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix_mp);
v4l_print_pix_fmt_mplane(vfd, &f->fmt.pix_mp);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out_mplane) {
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file,
fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out &&
f->fmt.pix_mp.num_planes == 1) {
if (fmt_mp_to_sp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_OVERLAY:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.win);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vid_out_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_CAPTURE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.vbi);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vbi_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vbi_cap(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_OUTPUT:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.vbi);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vbi_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_vbi_out(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_CAPTURE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.sliced);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_sliced_vbi_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_sliced_vbi_cap(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_OUTPUT:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.sliced);
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_sliced_vbi_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_sliced_vbi_out(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_PRIVATE:
/* CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.raw_data); <- does nothing */
if (ops->vidioc_s_fmt_type_private)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fmt_type_private(file,
fh, f);
break;
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_TRY_FMT:
{
struct v4l2_format *f = (struct v4l2_format *)arg;
/* FIXME: Should be one dump per type */
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(f->type,
v4l2_type_names));
switch (f->type) {
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap) {
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap(file, fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap_mplane) {
if (fmt_sp_to_mp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
if (f_copy.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes > 1) {
/* Drivers shouldn't adjust from 1-plane
* to more than 1-plane formats */
ret = -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &f->fmt.pix);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix_mp);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap_mplane) {
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap_mplane(file,
fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap &&
f->fmt.pix_mp.num_planes == 1) {
if (fmt_mp_to_sp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_cap(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
ret = fmt_sp_to_mp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt_mplane(vfd, &f->fmt.pix_mp);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OVERLAY:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.win);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out) {
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out(file, fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out_mplane) {
if (fmt_sp_to_mp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
if (f_copy.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes > 1) {
/* Drivers shouldn't adjust from 1-plane
* to more than 1-plane formats */
ret = -EBUSY;
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
ret = fmt_mp_to_sp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &f->fmt.pix);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.pix_mp);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out_mplane) {
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out_mplane(file,
fh, f);
} else if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out &&
f->fmt.pix_mp.num_planes == 1) {
if (fmt_mp_to_sp(f, &f_copy))
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out(file,
fh, &f_copy);
if (ret)
break;
ret = fmt_sp_to_mp(&f_copy, f);
}
if (!ret)
v4l_print_pix_fmt_mplane(vfd, &f->fmt.pix_mp);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_OVERLAY:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.win);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out_overlay)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vid_out_overlay(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_CAPTURE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.vbi);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vbi_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vbi_cap(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_OUTPUT:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.vbi);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vbi_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_vbi_out(file, fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_CAPTURE:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.sliced);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_sliced_vbi_cap)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_sliced_vbi_cap(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_OUTPUT:
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.sliced);
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_sliced_vbi_out)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_sliced_vbi_out(file,
fh, f);
break;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_PRIVATE:
/* CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(f, fmt.raw_data); <- does nothing */
if (ops->vidioc_try_fmt_type_private)
ret = ops->vidioc_try_fmt_type_private(file,
fh, f);
break;
}
break;
}
/* FIXME: Those buf reqs could be handled here,
with some changes on videobuf to allow its header to be included at
videodev2.h or being merged at videodev2.
*/
case VIDIOC_REQBUFS:
{
struct v4l2_requestbuffers *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_reqbufs)
break;
ret = check_fmt(ops, p->type);
if (ret)
break;
if (p->type < V4L2_BUF_TYPE_PRIVATE)
CLEAR_AFTER_FIELD(p, memory);
ret = ops->vidioc_reqbufs(file, fh, p);
dbgarg(cmd, "count=%d, type=%s, memory=%s\n",
p->count,
prt_names(p->type, v4l2_type_names),
prt_names(p->memory, v4l2_memory_names));
break;
}
case VIDIOC_QUERYBUF:
{
struct v4l2_buffer *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_querybuf)
break;
ret = check_fmt(ops, p->type);
if (ret)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_querybuf(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgbuf(cmd, vfd, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_QBUF:
{
struct v4l2_buffer *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_qbuf)
break;
ret = check_fmt(ops, p->type);
if (ret)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_qbuf(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgbuf(cmd, vfd, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_DQBUF:
{
struct v4l2_buffer *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_dqbuf)
break;
ret = check_fmt(ops, p->type);
if (ret)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_dqbuf(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgbuf(cmd, vfd, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_OVERLAY:
{
int *i = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_overlay)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "value=%d\n", *i);
ret = ops->vidioc_overlay(file, fh, *i);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_FBUF:
{
struct v4l2_framebuffer *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_fbuf)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_fbuf(file, fh, arg);
if (!ret) {
dbgarg(cmd, "capability=0x%x, flags=%d, base=0x%08lx\n",
p->capability, p->flags,
(unsigned long)p->base);
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &p->fmt);
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_FBUF:
{
struct v4l2_framebuffer *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_fbuf)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "capability=0x%x, flags=%d, base=0x%08lx\n",
p->capability, p->flags, (unsigned long)p->base);
v4l_print_pix_fmt(vfd, &p->fmt);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_fbuf(file, fh, arg);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_STREAMON:
{
enum v4l2_buf_type i = *(int *)arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_streamon)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(i, v4l2_type_names));
ret = ops->vidioc_streamon(file, fh, i);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_STREAMOFF:
{
enum v4l2_buf_type i = *(int *)arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_streamoff)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(i, v4l2_type_names));
ret = ops->vidioc_streamoff(file, fh, i);
break;
}
/* ---------- tv norms ---------- */
case VIDIOC_ENUMSTD:
{
struct v4l2_standard *p = arg;
v4l2_std_id id = vfd->tvnorms, curr_id = 0;
unsigned int index = p->index, i, j = 0;
const char *descr = "";
/* Return norm array in a canonical way */
for (i = 0; i <= index && id; i++) {
/* last std value in the standards array is 0, so this
while always ends there since (id & 0) == 0. */
while ((id & standards[j].std) != standards[j].std)
j++;
curr_id = standards[j].std;
descr = standards[j].descr;
j++;
if (curr_id == 0)
break;
if (curr_id != V4L2_STD_PAL &&
curr_id != V4L2_STD_SECAM &&
curr_id != V4L2_STD_NTSC)
id &= ~curr_id;
}
if (i <= index)
break;
v4l2_video_std_construct(p, curr_id, descr);
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, id=0x%Lx, name=%s, fps=%d/%d, "
"framelines=%d\n", p->index,
(unsigned long long)p->id, p->name,
p->frameperiod.numerator,
p->frameperiod.denominator,
p->framelines);
ret = 0;
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_STD:
{
v4l2_std_id *id = arg;
ret = 0;
/* Calls the specific handler */
if (ops->vidioc_g_std)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_std(file, fh, id);
else if (vfd->current_norm)
*id = vfd->current_norm;
else
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "std=0x%08Lx\n", (long long unsigned)*id);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_STD:
{
v4l2_std_id *id = arg, norm;
dbgarg(cmd, "std=%08Lx\n", (long long unsigned)*id);
norm = (*id) & vfd->tvnorms;
if (vfd->tvnorms && !norm) /* Check if std is supported */
break;
/* Calls the specific handler */
if (ops->vidioc_s_std)
ret = ops->vidioc_s_std(file, fh, &norm);
else
ret = -EINVAL;
/* Updates standard information */
if (ret >= 0)
vfd->current_norm = norm;
break;
}
case VIDIOC_QUERYSTD:
{
v4l2_std_id *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_querystd)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_querystd(file, fh, arg);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "detected std=%08Lx\n",
(unsigned long long)*p);
break;
}
/* ------ input switching ---------- */
/* FIXME: Inputs can be handled inside videodev2 */
case VIDIOC_ENUMINPUT:
{
struct v4l2_input *p = arg;
/*
* We set the flags for CAP_PRESETS, CAP_CUSTOM_TIMINGS &
* CAP_STD here based on ioctl handler provided by the
* driver. If the driver doesn't support these
* for a specific input, it must override these flags.
*/
if (ops->vidioc_s_std)
p->capabilities |= V4L2_IN_CAP_STD;
if (ops->vidioc_s_dv_preset)
p->capabilities |= V4L2_IN_CAP_PRESETS;
if (ops->vidioc_s_dv_timings)
p->capabilities |= V4L2_IN_CAP_CUSTOM_TIMINGS;
if (!ops->vidioc_enum_input)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_input(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, type=%d, "
"audioset=%d, "
"tuner=%d, std=%08Lx, status=%d\n",
p->index, p->name, p->type, p->audioset,
p->tuner,
(unsigned long long)p->std,
p->status);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_INPUT:
{
unsigned int *i = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_input)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_input(file, fh, i);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "value=%d\n", *i);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_INPUT:
{
unsigned int *i = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_input)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "value=%d\n", *i);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_input(file, fh, *i);
break;
}
/* ------ output switching ---------- */
case VIDIOC_ENUMOUTPUT:
{
struct v4l2_output *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_enum_output)
break;
/*
* We set the flags for CAP_PRESETS, CAP_CUSTOM_TIMINGS &
* CAP_STD here based on ioctl handler provided by the
* driver. If the driver doesn't support these
* for a specific output, it must override these flags.
*/
if (ops->vidioc_s_std)
p->capabilities |= V4L2_OUT_CAP_STD;
if (ops->vidioc_s_dv_preset)
p->capabilities |= V4L2_OUT_CAP_PRESETS;
if (ops->vidioc_s_dv_timings)
p->capabilities |= V4L2_OUT_CAP_CUSTOM_TIMINGS;
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_output(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, type=%d, "
"audioset=0x%x, "
"modulator=%d, std=0x%08Lx\n",
p->index, p->name, p->type, p->audioset,
p->modulator, (unsigned long long)p->std);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_OUTPUT:
{
unsigned int *i = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_output)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_output(file, fh, i);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "value=%d\n", *i);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_OUTPUT:
{
unsigned int *i = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_output)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "value=%d\n", *i);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_output(file, fh, *i);
break;
}
/* --- controls ---------------------------------------------- */
case VIDIOC_QUERYCTRL:
{
struct v4l2_queryctrl *p = arg;
if (vfd->ctrl_handler)
ret = v4l2_queryctrl(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
else if (ops->vidioc_queryctrl)
ret = ops->vidioc_queryctrl(file, fh, p);
else
break;
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x, type=%d, name=%s, min/max=%d/%d, "
"step=%d, default=%d, flags=0x%08x\n",
p->id, p->type, p->name,
p->minimum, p->maximum,
p->step, p->default_value, p->flags);
else
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x\n", p->id);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_CTRL:
{
struct v4l2_control *p = arg;
if (vfd->ctrl_handler)
ret = v4l2_g_ctrl(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
else if (ops->vidioc_g_ctrl)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_ctrl(file, fh, p);
else if (ops->vidioc_g_ext_ctrls) {
struct v4l2_ext_controls ctrls;
struct v4l2_ext_control ctrl;
ctrls.ctrl_class = V4L2_CTRL_ID2CLASS(p->id);
ctrls.count = 1;
ctrls.controls = &ctrl;
ctrl.id = p->id;
ctrl.value = p->value;
if (check_ext_ctrls(&ctrls, 1)) {
ret = ops->vidioc_g_ext_ctrls(file, fh, &ctrls);
if (ret == 0)
p->value = ctrl.value;
}
} else
break;
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x, value=%d\n", p->id, p->value);
else
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x\n", p->id);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_CTRL:
{
struct v4l2_control *p = arg;
struct v4l2_ext_controls ctrls;
struct v4l2_ext_control ctrl;
if (!vfd->ctrl_handler &&
!ops->vidioc_s_ctrl && !ops->vidioc_s_ext_ctrls)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x, value=%d\n", p->id, p->value);
if (vfd->ctrl_handler) {
ret = v4l2_s_ctrl(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
break;
}
if (ops->vidioc_s_ctrl) {
ret = ops->vidioc_s_ctrl(file, fh, p);
break;
}
if (!ops->vidioc_s_ext_ctrls)
break;
ctrls.ctrl_class = V4L2_CTRL_ID2CLASS(p->id);
ctrls.count = 1;
ctrls.controls = &ctrl;
ctrl.id = p->id;
ctrl.value = p->value;
if (check_ext_ctrls(&ctrls, 1))
ret = ops->vidioc_s_ext_ctrls(file, fh, &ctrls);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_EXT_CTRLS:
{
struct v4l2_ext_controls *p = arg;
p->error_idx = p->count;
if (vfd->ctrl_handler)
ret = v4l2_g_ext_ctrls(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
else if (ops->vidioc_g_ext_ctrls && check_ext_ctrls(p, 0))
ret = ops->vidioc_g_ext_ctrls(file, fh, p);
else
break;
v4l_print_ext_ctrls(cmd, vfd, p, !ret);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_EXT_CTRLS:
{
struct v4l2_ext_controls *p = arg;
p->error_idx = p->count;
if (!vfd->ctrl_handler && !ops->vidioc_s_ext_ctrls)
break;
v4l_print_ext_ctrls(cmd, vfd, p, 1);
if (vfd->ctrl_handler)
ret = v4l2_s_ext_ctrls(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
else if (check_ext_ctrls(p, 0))
ret = ops->vidioc_s_ext_ctrls(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_TRY_EXT_CTRLS:
{
struct v4l2_ext_controls *p = arg;
p->error_idx = p->count;
if (!vfd->ctrl_handler && !ops->vidioc_try_ext_ctrls)
break;
v4l_print_ext_ctrls(cmd, vfd, p, 1);
if (vfd->ctrl_handler)
ret = v4l2_try_ext_ctrls(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
else if (check_ext_ctrls(p, 0))
ret = ops->vidioc_try_ext_ctrls(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_QUERYMENU:
{
struct v4l2_querymenu *p = arg;
if (vfd->ctrl_handler)
ret = v4l2_querymenu(vfd->ctrl_handler, p);
else if (ops->vidioc_querymenu)
ret = ops->vidioc_querymenu(file, fh, p);
else
break;
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x, index=%d, name=%s\n",
p->id, p->index, p->name);
else
dbgarg(cmd, "id=0x%x, index=%d\n",
p->id, p->index);
break;
}
/* --- audio ---------------------------------------------- */
case VIDIOC_ENUMAUDIO:
{
struct v4l2_audio *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_enumaudio)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_enumaudio(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, capability=0x%x, "
"mode=0x%x\n", p->index, p->name,
p->capability, p->mode);
else
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d\n", p->index);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_AUDIO:
{
struct v4l2_audio *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_audio)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_audio(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, capability=0x%x, "
"mode=0x%x\n", p->index,
p->name, p->capability, p->mode);
else
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d\n", p->index);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_AUDIO:
{
struct v4l2_audio *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_audio)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, capability=0x%x, "
"mode=0x%x\n", p->index, p->name,
p->capability, p->mode);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_audio(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_ENUMAUDOUT:
{
struct v4l2_audioout *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_enumaudout)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "Enum for index=%d\n", p->index);
ret = ops->vidioc_enumaudout(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg2("index=%d, name=%s, capability=%d, "
"mode=%d\n", p->index, p->name,
p->capability, p->mode);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_AUDOUT:
{
struct v4l2_audioout *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_audout)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_audout(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg2("index=%d, name=%s, capability=%d, "
"mode=%d\n", p->index, p->name,
p->capability, p->mode);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_AUDOUT:
{
struct v4l2_audioout *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_audout)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, capability=%d, "
"mode=%d\n", p->index, p->name,
p->capability, p->mode);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_audout(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_MODULATOR:
{
struct v4l2_modulator *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_modulator)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_modulator(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, "
"capability=%d, rangelow=%d,"
" rangehigh=%d, txsubchans=%d\n",
p->index, p->name, p->capability,
p->rangelow, p->rangehigh,
p->txsubchans);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_MODULATOR:
{
struct v4l2_modulator *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_modulator)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, capability=%d, "
"rangelow=%d, rangehigh=%d, txsubchans=%d\n",
p->index, p->name, p->capability, p->rangelow,
p->rangehigh, p->txsubchans);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_modulator(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_CROP:
{
struct v4l2_crop *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_crop)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(p->type, v4l2_type_names));
ret = ops->vidioc_g_crop(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgrect(vfd, "", &p->c);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_CROP:
{
struct v4l2_crop *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_crop)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(p->type, v4l2_type_names));
dbgrect(vfd, "", &p->c);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_crop(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_CROPCAP:
{
struct v4l2_cropcap *p = arg;
/*FIXME: Should also show v4l2_fract pixelaspect */
if (!ops->vidioc_cropcap)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(p->type, v4l2_type_names));
ret = ops->vidioc_cropcap(file, fh, p);
if (!ret) {
dbgrect(vfd, "bounds ", &p->bounds);
dbgrect(vfd, "defrect ", &p->defrect);
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_JPEGCOMP:
{
struct v4l2_jpegcompression *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_jpegcomp)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_jpegcomp(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "quality=%d, APPn=%d, "
"APP_len=%d, COM_len=%d, "
"jpeg_markers=%d\n",
p->quality, p->APPn, p->APP_len,
p->COM_len, p->jpeg_markers);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_JPEGCOMP:
{
struct v4l2_jpegcompression *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_jpegcomp)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "quality=%d, APPn=%d, APP_len=%d, "
"COM_len=%d, jpeg_markers=%d\n",
p->quality, p->APPn, p->APP_len,
p->COM_len, p->jpeg_markers);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_jpegcomp(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_ENC_INDEX:
{
struct v4l2_enc_idx *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_enc_index)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_enc_index(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "entries=%d, entries_cap=%d\n",
p->entries, p->entries_cap);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_ENCODER_CMD:
{
struct v4l2_encoder_cmd *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_encoder_cmd)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_encoder_cmd(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "cmd=%d, flags=%x\n", p->cmd, p->flags);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_TRY_ENCODER_CMD:
{
struct v4l2_encoder_cmd *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_try_encoder_cmd)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_try_encoder_cmd(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "cmd=%d, flags=%x\n", p->cmd, p->flags);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_PARM:
{
struct v4l2_streamparm *p = arg;
if (ops->vidioc_g_parm) {
ret = check_fmt(ops, p->type);
if (ret)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_parm(file, fh, p);
} else {
v4l2_std_id std = vfd->current_norm;
if (p->type != V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
break;
ret = 0;
if (ops->vidioc_g_std)
ret = ops->vidioc_g_std(file, fh, &std);
else if (std == 0)
ret = -EINVAL;
if (ret == 0)
v4l2_video_std_frame_period(std,
&p->parm.capture.timeperframe);
}
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%d\n", p->type);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_PARM:
{
struct v4l2_streamparm *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_parm)
break;
ret = check_fmt(ops, p->type);
if (ret)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%d\n", p->type);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_parm(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_TUNER:
{
struct v4l2_tuner *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_tuner)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_tuner(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, type=%d, "
"capability=0x%x, rangelow=%d, "
"rangehigh=%d, signal=%d, afc=%d, "
"rxsubchans=0x%x, audmode=%d\n",
p->index, p->name, p->type,
p->capability, p->rangelow,
p->rangehigh, p->signal, p->afc,
p->rxsubchans, p->audmode);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_TUNER:
{
struct v4l2_tuner *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_tuner)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "index=%d, name=%s, type=%d, "
"capability=0x%x, rangelow=%d, "
"rangehigh=%d, signal=%d, afc=%d, "
"rxsubchans=0x%x, audmode=%d\n",
p->index, p->name, p->type,
p->capability, p->rangelow,
p->rangehigh, p->signal, p->afc,
p->rxsubchans, p->audmode);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_tuner(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_FREQUENCY:
{
struct v4l2_frequency *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_frequency)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_frequency(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "tuner=%d, type=%d, frequency=%d\n",
p->tuner, p->type, p->frequency);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_FREQUENCY:
{
struct v4l2_frequency *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_frequency)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "tuner=%d, type=%d, frequency=%d\n",
p->tuner, p->type, p->frequency);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_frequency(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_SLICED_VBI_CAP:
{
struct v4l2_sliced_vbi_cap *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_sliced_vbi_cap)
break;
/* Clear up to type, everything after type is zerod already */
memset(p, 0, offsetof(struct v4l2_sliced_vbi_cap, type));
dbgarg(cmd, "type=%s\n", prt_names(p->type, v4l2_type_names));
ret = ops->vidioc_g_sliced_vbi_cap(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg2("service_set=%d\n", p->service_set);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_LOG_STATUS:
{
if (!ops->vidioc_log_status)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_log_status(file, fh);
break;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_VIDEO_ADV_DEBUG
case VIDIOC_DBG_G_REGISTER:
{
struct v4l2_dbg_register *p = arg;
if (ops->vidioc_g_register) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = ops->vidioc_g_register(file, fh, p);
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_DBG_S_REGISTER:
{
struct v4l2_dbg_register *p = arg;
if (ops->vidioc_s_register) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = ops->vidioc_s_register(file, fh, p);
}
break;
}
#endif
case VIDIOC_DBG_G_CHIP_IDENT:
{
struct v4l2_dbg_chip_ident *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_chip_ident)
break;
p->ident = V4L2_IDENT_NONE;
p->revision = 0;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_chip_ident(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "chip_ident=%u, revision=0x%x\n", p->ident, p->revision);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_HW_FREQ_SEEK:
{
struct v4l2_hw_freq_seek *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_hw_freq_seek)
break;
dbgarg(cmd,
"tuner=%d, type=%d, seek_upward=%d, wrap_around=%d\n",
p->tuner, p->type, p->seek_upward, p->wrap_around);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_hw_freq_seek(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_ENUM_FRAMESIZES:
{
struct v4l2_frmsizeenum *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_enum_framesizes)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_framesizes(file, fh, p);
dbgarg(cmd,
"index=%d, pixelformat=%c%c%c%c, type=%d ",
p->index,
(p->pixel_format & 0xff),
(p->pixel_format >> 8) & 0xff,
(p->pixel_format >> 16) & 0xff,
(p->pixel_format >> 24) & 0xff,
p->type);
switch (p->type) {
case V4L2_FRMSIZE_TYPE_DISCRETE:
dbgarg3("width = %d, height=%d\n",
p->discrete.width, p->discrete.height);
break;
case V4L2_FRMSIZE_TYPE_STEPWISE:
dbgarg3("min %dx%d, max %dx%d, step %dx%d\n",
p->stepwise.min_width, p->stepwise.min_height,
p->stepwise.step_width, p->stepwise.step_height,
p->stepwise.max_width, p->stepwise.max_height);
break;
case V4L2_FRMSIZE_TYPE_CONTINUOUS:
dbgarg3("continuous\n");
break;
default:
dbgarg3("- Unknown type!\n");
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_ENUM_FRAMEINTERVALS:
{
struct v4l2_frmivalenum *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_enum_frameintervals)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_frameintervals(file, fh, p);
dbgarg(cmd,
"index=%d, pixelformat=%d, width=%d, height=%d, type=%d ",
p->index, p->pixel_format,
p->width, p->height, p->type);
switch (p->type) {
case V4L2_FRMIVAL_TYPE_DISCRETE:
dbgarg2("fps=%d/%d\n",
p->discrete.numerator,
p->discrete.denominator);
break;
case V4L2_FRMIVAL_TYPE_STEPWISE:
dbgarg2("min=%d/%d, max=%d/%d, step=%d/%d\n",
p->stepwise.min.numerator,
p->stepwise.min.denominator,
p->stepwise.max.numerator,
p->stepwise.max.denominator,
p->stepwise.step.numerator,
p->stepwise.step.denominator);
break;
case V4L2_FRMIVAL_TYPE_CONTINUOUS:
dbgarg2("continuous\n");
break;
default:
dbgarg2("- Unknown type!\n");
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_ENUM_DV_PRESETS:
{
struct v4l2_dv_enum_preset *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_enum_dv_presets)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_enum_dv_presets(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd,
"index=%d, preset=%d, name=%s, width=%d,"
" height=%d ",
p->index, p->preset, p->name, p->width,
p->height);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_DV_PRESET:
{
struct v4l2_dv_preset *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_dv_preset)
break;
dbgarg(cmd, "preset=%d\n", p->preset);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_dv_preset(file, fh, p);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_DV_PRESET:
{
struct v4l2_dv_preset *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_dv_preset)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_dv_preset(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "preset=%d\n", p->preset);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_QUERY_DV_PRESET:
{
struct v4l2_dv_preset *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_query_dv_preset)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_query_dv_preset(file, fh, p);
if (!ret)
dbgarg(cmd, "preset=%d\n", p->preset);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_S_DV_TIMINGS:
{
struct v4l2_dv_timings *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_s_dv_timings)
break;
switch (p->type) {
case V4L2_DV_BT_656_1120:
dbgarg2("bt-656/1120:interlaced=%d, pixelclock=%lld,"
" width=%d, height=%d, polarities=%x,"
" hfrontporch=%d, hsync=%d, hbackporch=%d,"
" vfrontporch=%d, vsync=%d, vbackporch=%d,"
" il_vfrontporch=%d, il_vsync=%d,"
" il_vbackporch=%d\n",
p->bt.interlaced, p->bt.pixelclock,
p->bt.width, p->bt.height, p->bt.polarities,
p->bt.hfrontporch, p->bt.hsync,
p->bt.hbackporch, p->bt.vfrontporch,
p->bt.vsync, p->bt.vbackporch,
p->bt.il_vfrontporch, p->bt.il_vsync,
p->bt.il_vbackporch);
ret = ops->vidioc_s_dv_timings(file, fh, p);
break;
default:
dbgarg2("Unknown type %d!\n", p->type);
break;
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_G_DV_TIMINGS:
{
struct v4l2_dv_timings *p = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_g_dv_timings)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_g_dv_timings(file, fh, p);
if (!ret) {
switch (p->type) {
case V4L2_DV_BT_656_1120:
dbgarg2("bt-656/1120:interlaced=%d,"
" pixelclock=%lld,"
" width=%d, height=%d, polarities=%x,"
" hfrontporch=%d, hsync=%d,"
" hbackporch=%d, vfrontporch=%d,"
" vsync=%d, vbackporch=%d,"
" il_vfrontporch=%d, il_vsync=%d,"
" il_vbackporch=%d\n",
p->bt.interlaced, p->bt.pixelclock,
p->bt.width, p->bt.height,
p->bt.polarities, p->bt.hfrontporch,
p->bt.hsync, p->bt.hbackporch,
p->bt.vfrontporch, p->bt.vsync,
p->bt.vbackporch, p->bt.il_vfrontporch,
p->bt.il_vsync, p->bt.il_vbackporch);
break;
default:
dbgarg2("Unknown type %d!\n", p->type);
break;
}
}
break;
}
case VIDIOC_DQEVENT:
{
struct v4l2_event *ev = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_subscribe_event)
break;
ret = v4l2_event_dequeue(fh, ev, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (ret < 0) {
dbgarg(cmd, "no pending events?");
break;
}
dbgarg(cmd,
"pending=%d, type=0x%8.8x, sequence=%d, "
"timestamp=%lu.%9.9lu ",
ev->pending, ev->type, ev->sequence,
ev->timestamp.tv_sec, ev->timestamp.tv_nsec);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_SUBSCRIBE_EVENT:
{
struct v4l2_event_subscription *sub = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_subscribe_event)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_subscribe_event(fh, sub);
if (ret < 0) {
dbgarg(cmd, "failed, ret=%ld", ret);
break;
}
dbgarg(cmd, "type=0x%8.8x", sub->type);
break;
}
case VIDIOC_UNSUBSCRIBE_EVENT:
{
struct v4l2_event_subscription *sub = arg;
if (!ops->vidioc_unsubscribe_event)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_unsubscribe_event(fh, sub);
if (ret < 0) {
dbgarg(cmd, "failed, ret=%ld", ret);
break;
}
dbgarg(cmd, "type=0x%8.8x", sub->type);
break;
}
default:
{
if (!ops->vidioc_default)
break;
ret = ops->vidioc_default(file, fh, cmd, arg);
break;
}
} /* switch */
if (vfd->debug & V4L2_DEBUG_IOCTL_ARG) {
if (ret < 0) {
v4l_print_ioctl(vfd->name, cmd);
printk(KERN_CONT " error %ld\n", ret);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_meter_request(const struct ofp_header *oh, uint32_t *meter_id)
{
const struct ofp13_meter_multipart_request *omr = ofpmsg_body(oh);
*meter_id = ntohl(omr->meter_id);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 18,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompareCharArraysWithHexError(
const string& description,
const char* actual,
const int actual_len,
const char* expected,
const int expected_len) {
const int min_len = min(actual_len, expected_len);
const int max_len = max(actual_len, expected_len);
scoped_array<bool> marks(new bool[max_len]);
bool identical = (actual_len == expected_len);
for (int i = 0; i < min_len; ++i) {
if (actual[i] != expected[i]) {
marks[i] = true;
identical = false;
} else {
marks[i] = false;
}
}
for (int i = min_len; i < max_len; ++i) {
marks[i] = true;
}
if (identical) return;
ADD_FAILURE()
<< "Description:\n"
<< description
<< "\n\nExpected:\n"
<< HexDumpWithMarks(expected, expected_len, marks.get(), max_len)
<< "\nActual:\n"
<< HexDumpWithMarks(actual, actual_len, marks.get(), max_len);
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init check_numabalancing_enable(void)
{
bool numabalancing_default = false;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING_DEFAULT_ENABLED))
numabalancing_default = true;
/* Parsed by setup_numabalancing. override == 1 enables, -1 disables */
if (numabalancing_override)
set_numabalancing_state(numabalancing_override == 1);
if (num_online_nodes() > 1 && !numabalancing_override) {
pr_info("%s automatic NUMA balancing. Configure with numa_balancing= or the kernel.numa_balancing sysctl\n",
numabalancing_default ? "Enabling" : "Disabling");
set_numabalancing_state(numabalancing_default);
}
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 1,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void append_cs_return(cs_entry *ptr)
{
unsigned short cr;
int i;
byte *p, *q, *data, *new_data;
assert(ptr != NULL && ptr->valid && ptr->used);
/* decrypt the cs data to t1_buf_array, append CS_RETURN */
p = (byte *) t1_buf_array;
data = ptr->data + 4;
cr = 4330;
for (i = 0; i < ptr->cslen; i++)
*p++ = cs_getchar();
*p = CS_RETURN;
/* encrypt the new cs data to new_data */
new_data = xtalloc(ptr->len + 1, byte);
memcpy(new_data, ptr->data, 4);
p = new_data + 4;
q = (byte *) t1_buf_array;
cr = 4330;
for (i = 0; i < ptr->cslen + 1; i++)
*p++ = cencrypt(*q++, &cr);
memcpy(p, ptr->data + 4 + ptr->cslen, ptr->len - ptr->cslen - 4);
/* update *ptr */
xfree(ptr->data);
ptr->data = new_data;
ptr->len++;
ptr->cslen++;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ohci_async_complete_packet(USBPort *port, USBPacket *packet)
{
OHCIState *ohci = container_of(packet, OHCIState, usb_packet);
trace_usb_ohci_async_complete();
ohci->async_complete = true;
ohci_process_lists(ohci, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 22,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFInput_readBits(SWFInput input, int number)
{
int ret = input->buffer;
if ( number == input->bufbits )
{
input->bufbits = 0;
input->buffer = 0;
return ret;
}
if ( number > input->bufbits )
{
number -= input->bufbits;
while( number > 8 )
{
ret <<= 8;
ret += SWFInput_getChar(input);
number -= 8;
}
input->buffer = SWFInput_getChar(input);
if ( number > 0 )
{
ret <<= number;
input->bufbits = 8-number;
ret += input->buffer >> (8-number);
input->buffer &= (1<<input->bufbits)-1;
}
return ret;
}
ret = input->buffer >> (input->bufbits-number);
input->bufbits -= number;
input->buffer &= (1<<input->bufbits)-1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 25,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_queue_stats_request(const struct ofp_header *request,
struct ofputil_queue_stats_request *oqsr)
{
switch ((enum ofp_version)request->version) {
case OFP16_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP11_VERSION: {
const struct ofp11_queue_stats_request *qsr11 = ofpmsg_body(request);
oqsr->queue_id = ntohl(qsr11->queue_id);
return ofputil_port_from_ofp11(qsr11->port_no, &oqsr->port_no);
}
case OFP10_VERSION: {
const struct ofp10_queue_stats_request *qsr10 = ofpmsg_body(request);
oqsr->queue_id = ntohl(qsr10->queue_id);
oqsr->port_no = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(qsr10->port_no));
/* OF 1.0 uses OFPP_ALL for OFPP_ANY */
if (oqsr->port_no == OFPP_ALL) {
oqsr->port_no = OFPP_ANY;
}
return 0;
}
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 25,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init gre_offload_init(void)
{
return inet_add_offload(&gre_offload, IPPROTO_GRE);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 15,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_lookup_root(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const struct nfs4_lookup_root_arg *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putrootfh(xdr, &hdr);
encode_getfh(xdr, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::Release() {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Release";
pincode_callback_.Reset();
passkey_callback_.Reset();
confirmation_callback_.Reset();
UnregisterAgent();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 9,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
{
const struct cred *old_cred;
struct cred *override_cred;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
int res;
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
return -EINVAL;
override_cred = prepare_creds();
if (!override_cred)
return -ENOMEM;
override_cred->fsuid = override_cred->uid;
override_cred->fsgid = override_cred->gid;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
/* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(override_cred->user_ns, 0);
if (!uid_eq(override_cred->uid, root_uid))
cap_clear(override_cred->cap_effective);
else
override_cred->cap_effective =
override_cred->cap_permitted;
}
old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
retry:
res = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (res)
goto out;
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* MAY_EXEC on regular files is denied if the fs is mounted
* with the "noexec" flag.
*/
res = -EACCES;
if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto out_path_release;
}
res = inode_permission(inode, mode | MAY_ACCESS);
/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
if (res || !(mode & S_IWOTH) || special_file(inode->i_mode))
goto out_path_release;
/*
* This is a rare case where using __mnt_is_readonly()
* is OK without a mnt_want/drop_write() pair. Since
* no actual write to the fs is performed here, we do
* not need to telegraph to that to anyone.
*
* By doing this, we accept that this access is
* inherently racy and know that the fs may change
* state before we even see this result.
*/
if (__mnt_is_readonly(path.mnt))
res = -EROFS;
out_path_release:
path_put(&path);
if (retry_estale(res, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
out:
revert_creds(old_cred);
put_cred(override_cred);
return res;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 28,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int verify_vc_kbmode(int fd) {
int curr_mode;
/*
* Make sure we only adjust consoles in K_XLATE or K_UNICODE mode.
* Otherwise we would (likely) interfere with X11's processing of the
* key events.
*
* http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-February/008573.html
*/
if (ioctl(fd, KDGKBMODE, &curr_mode) < 0)
return -errno;
return IN_SET(curr_mode, K_XLATE, K_UNICODE) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 1 | 29,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static apr_status_t fill_buffer(h2_stream *stream, apr_size_t amount)
{
conn_rec *c = stream->session->c;
apr_bucket *b;
apr_status_t status;
if (!stream->output) {
return APR_EOF;
}
status = h2_beam_receive(stream->output, stream->out_buffer,
APR_NONBLOCK_READ, amount);
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE2, status, stream->session->c,
"h2_stream(%ld-%d): beam_received",
stream->session->id, stream->id);
/* The buckets we reveive are using the stream->out_buffer pool as
* lifetime which is exactly what we want since this is stream->pool.
*
* However: when we send these buckets down the core output filters, the
* filter might decide to setaside them into a pool of its own. And it
* might decide, after having sent the buckets, to clear its pool.
*
* This is problematic for file buckets because it then closed the contained
* file. Any split off buckets we sent afterwards will result in a
* APR_EBADF.
*/
for (b = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(stream->out_buffer);
b != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(stream->out_buffer);
b = APR_BUCKET_NEXT(b)) {
if (APR_BUCKET_IS_FILE(b)) {
apr_bucket_file *f = (apr_bucket_file *)b->data;
apr_pool_t *fpool = apr_file_pool_get(f->fd);
if (fpool != c->pool) {
apr_bucket_setaside(b, c->pool);
if (!stream->files) {
stream->files = apr_array_make(stream->pool,
5, sizeof(apr_file_t*));
}
APR_ARRAY_PUSH(stream->files, apr_file_t*) = f->fd;
}
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::inspectCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
inspectImpl(info, false);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 27,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderMessageFilter::CheckPreparsedJsCachingEnabled() const {
static bool checked = false;
static bool result = false;
if (!checked) {
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
result = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePreparsedJsCaching);
checked = true;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 14,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hash_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
unsigned ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req));
int err;
if (len > ds)
len = ds;
else if (len < ds)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
lock_sock(sk);
if (ctx->more) {
ctx->more = 0;
ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0);
err = af_alg_wait_for_completion(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
&ctx->completion);
if (err)
goto unlock;
}
err = memcpy_to_msg(msg, ctx->result, len);
unlock:
release_sock(sk);
return err ?: len;
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data
The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.
This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Harsh Jain <harshjain.prof@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionSubtest(const std::string& extension_name,
const std::string& page_url,
int flags) {
return RunExtensionSubtestWithArgAndFlags(extension_name, page_url, nullptr,
flags);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::InitializeSyncBlocker() {
if (!web_ui())
return;
WebContents* web_contents = web_ui()->GetWebContents();
if (web_contents) {
ProfileSyncService* service = GetSyncService();
const GURL current_url = web_contents->GetVisibleURL();
if (service &&
current_url == chrome::GetSettingsUrl(chrome::kSyncSetupSubPage)) {
sync_blocker_ = service->GetSetupInProgressHandle();
}
}
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
WidgetHierarchyUpdatesSuspensionScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
unregisterNamedFlowContentNode();
cancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
if (hasRareData()) {
ElementRareData* data = elementRareData();
data->setPseudoElement(BEFORE, 0);
data->setPseudoElement(AFTER, 0);
data->setIsInCanvasSubtree(false);
data->resetComputedStyle();
data->resetDynamicRestyleObservations();
}
if (ElementShadow* shadow = this->shadow())
shadow->detach(context);
ContainerNode::detach(context);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_encoded_header_info(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_stream_info *si)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
errno = 0;
if (read_StreamsInfo(a, si) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOMEM)
archive_set_error(&a->archive, -1,
"Couldn't allocate memory");
else
archive_set_error(&a->archive, -1,
"Malformed 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (si->pi.numPackStreams == 0 || si->ci.numFolders == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, -1, "Malformed 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (zip->header_offset < si->pi.pos + si->pi.sizes[0] ||
(int64_t)(si->pi.pos + si->pi.sizes[0]) < 0 ||
si->pi.sizes[0] == 0 || (int64_t)si->pi.pos < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, -1, "Malformed Header offset");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockNetworkLayer::~MockNetworkLayer() {}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemOperation::Remove(const GURL& path_url, bool recursive,
const StatusCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(SetPendingOperationType(kOperationRemove));
base::PlatformFileError result = SetUpFileSystemPath(
path_url, &src_path_, &src_util_, PATH_FOR_WRITE);
if (result != base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(result);
delete this;
return;
}
scoped_quota_notifier_.reset(new ScopedQuotaNotifier(
file_system_context(), src_path_.origin(), src_path_.type()));
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::Delete(
&operation_context_, src_util_, src_path_, recursive,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::setContainsFullScreenElementOnAncestorsCrossingFrameBoundaries(bool flag)
{
Element* element = this;
while ((element = parentCrossingFrameBoundaries(element)))
element->setContainsFullScreenElement(flag);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nft_unregister_expr(struct nft_expr_type *type)
{
nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
list_del_rcu(&type->list);
nfnl_unlock(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 15,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteDefaultParagraphSeparator(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String& value) {
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(value, "div"))
frame.GetEditor().SetDefaultParagraphSeparator(
kEditorParagraphSeparatorIsDiv);
else if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(value, "p"))
frame.GetEditor().SetDefaultParagraphSeparator(
kEditorParagraphSeparatorIsP);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Document::cookie(ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
if (GetSettings() && !GetSettings()->GetCookieEnabled())
return String();
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccessCookies()) {
if (IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin))
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"The document is sandboxed and lacks the 'allow-same-origin' flag.");
else if (Url().ProtocolIs("data"))
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Cookies are disabled inside 'data:' URLs.");
else
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError("Access is denied for this document.");
return String();
}
if (GetSecurityOrigin()->HasSuborigin() &&
!GetSecurityOrigin()->GetSuborigin()->PolicyContains(
Suborigin::SuboriginPolicyOptions::kUnsafeCookies))
return String();
KURL cookie_url = this->CookieURL();
if (cookie_url.IsEmpty())
return String();
return Cookies(this, cookie_url);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 8,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_port_stats_from_ofp13(struct ofputil_port_stats *ops,
const struct ofp13_port_stats *ps13)
{
enum ofperr error = ofputil_port_stats_from_ofp11(ops, &ps13->ps);
if (!error) {
ops->duration_sec = ntohl(ps13->duration_sec);
ops->duration_nsec = ntohl(ps13->duration_nsec);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 2,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dvico_bluebird_xc2028_callback(void *ptr, int component,
int command, int arg)
{
struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap = ptr;
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
switch (command) {
case XC2028_TUNER_RESET:
deb_info("%s: XC2028_TUNER_RESET %d\n", __func__, arg);
cxusb_bluebird_gpio_pulse(d, 0x01, 1);
break;
case XC2028_RESET_CLK:
deb_info("%s: XC2028_RESET_CLK %d\n", __func__, arg);
break;
default:
deb_info("%s: unknown command %d, arg %d\n", __func__,
command, arg);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int netlink_change_ngroups(struct sock *sk, unsigned int groups)
{
int err;
netlink_table_grab();
err = __netlink_change_ngroups(sk, groups);
netlink_table_ungrab();
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 3,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sparse_extract_file (int fd, struct tar_stat_info *st, off_t *size)
{
bool rc = true;
struct tar_sparse_file file;
size_t i;
if (!tar_sparse_init (&file))
return dump_status_not_implemented;
file.stat_info = st;
file.fd = fd;
file.seekable = lseek (fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == 0;
file.offset = 0;
rc = tar_sparse_decode_header (&file);
for (i = 0; rc && i < file.stat_info->sparse_map_avail; i++)
rc = tar_sparse_extract_region (&file, i);
*size = file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size;
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 19,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBuffer::RenderBuffer(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder)
: decoder_(decoder),
id_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::~CorePageLoadMetricsObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove clock resolution page load histograms.
These were temporary metrics intended to understand whether high/low
resolution clocks adversely impact page load metrics. After collecting a few
months of data it was determined that clock resolution doesn't adversely
impact our metrics, and it that these histograms were no longer needed.
BUG=394757
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2155143003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#406143}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsSecure && !audio) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 8,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::didInstallPageOverlay()
{
createPageOverlayLayer();
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceLoader* ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::GetLoader(
const GlobalRequestID& id) const {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
LoaderMap::const_iterator i = pending_loaders_.find(id);
if (i == pending_loaders_.end())
return NULL;
return i->second.get();
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestDelegate() : last_used_id_(0) {}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: win32_thread_specific_data(void *private_data)
{
return((DWORD) thread_specific_data(private_data));
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *atomic_thread(void *context) {
struct atomic_test_s32_s *at = (struct atomic_test_s32_s *)context;
for (int i = 0; i < at->max_val; i++) {
usleep(1);
atomic_inc_prefix_s32(&at->data[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 8,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct rule *old_rule = rule_collection_n(&ofm->old_rules)
? rule_collection_rules(&ofm->old_rules)[0] : NULL;
struct rule *new_rule = rule_collection_rules(&ofm->new_rules)[0];
replace_rule_revert(ofproto, old_rule, new_rule);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 1,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::SetUseSecureKeyboardEntry(bool enable) {
if (enable)
EnableSecureTextInput();
else
DisableSecureTextInput();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: su_main (int argc, char **argv, int mode)
{
int optc;
const char *new_user = DEFAULT_USER, *runuser_user = NULL;
char *command = NULL;
int request_same_session = 0;
char *shell = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
struct passwd pw_copy;
gid_t *groups = NULL;
size_t ngroups = 0;
bool use_supp = false;
bool use_gid = false;
gid_t gid = 0;
static const struct option longopts[] = {
{"command", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
{"session-command", required_argument, NULL, 'C'},
{"fast", no_argument, NULL, 'f'},
{"login", no_argument, NULL, 'l'},
{"preserve-environment", no_argument, NULL, 'p'},
{"shell", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
{"group", required_argument, NULL, 'g'},
{"supp-group", required_argument, NULL, 'G'},
{"user", required_argument, NULL, 'u'}, /* runuser only */
{"help", no_argument, 0, 'h'},
{"version", no_argument, 0, 'V'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0}
};
setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain (PACKAGE);
atexit(close_stdout);
su_mode = mode;
fast_startup = false;
simulate_login = false;
change_environment = true;
while ((optc = getopt_long (argc, argv, "c:fg:G:lmps:u:hV", longopts, NULL)) != -1)
{
switch (optc)
{
case 'c':
command = optarg;
break;
case 'C':
command = optarg;
request_same_session = 1;
break;
case 'f':
fast_startup = true;
break;
case 'g':
use_gid = true;
gid = add_supp_group(optarg, &groups, &ngroups);
break;
case 'G':
use_supp = true;
add_supp_group(optarg, &groups, &ngroups);
break;
case 'l':
simulate_login = true;
break;
case 'm':
case 'p':
change_environment = false;
break;
case 's':
shell = optarg;
break;
case 'u':
if (su_mode != RUNUSER_MODE)
usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
runuser_user = optarg;
break;
case 'h':
usage(0);
case 'V':
printf(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
default:
errtryhelp(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
restricted = evaluate_uid ();
if (optind < argc && !strcmp (argv[optind], "-"))
{
simulate_login = true;
++optind;
}
if (simulate_login && !change_environment) {
warnx(_("ignoring --preserve-environment, it's mutually exclusive with --login"));
change_environment = true;
}
switch (su_mode) {
case RUNUSER_MODE:
if (runuser_user) {
/* runuser -u <user> <command> */
new_user = runuser_user;
if (shell || fast_startup || command || simulate_login) {
errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
_("options --{shell,fast,command,session-command,login} and "
"--user are mutually exclusive"));
}
if (optind == argc)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("no command was specified"));
break;
}
/* fallthrough if -u <user> is not specified, then follow
* traditional su(1) behavior
*/
case SU_MODE:
if (optind < argc)
new_user = argv[optind++];
break;
}
if ((use_supp || use_gid) && restricted)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("only root can specify alternative groups"));
logindefs_load_defaults = load_config;
pw = getpwnam (new_user);
if (! (pw && pw->pw_name && pw->pw_name[0] && pw->pw_dir && pw->pw_dir[0]
&& pw->pw_passwd))
errx (EXIT_FAILURE, _("user %s does not exist"), new_user);
/* Make a copy of the password information and point pw at the local
copy instead. Otherwise, some systems (e.g. Linux) would clobber
the static data through the getlogin call from log_su.
Also, make sure pw->pw_shell is a nonempty string.
It may be NULL when NEW_USER is a username that is retrieved via NIS (YP),
but that doesn't have a default shell listed. */
pw_copy = *pw;
pw = &pw_copy;
pw->pw_name = xstrdup (pw->pw_name);
pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup (pw->pw_passwd);
pw->pw_dir = xstrdup (pw->pw_dir);
pw->pw_shell = xstrdup (pw->pw_shell && pw->pw_shell[0]
? pw->pw_shell
: DEFAULT_SHELL);
endpwent ();
if (use_supp && !use_gid)
pw->pw_gid = groups[0];
else if (use_gid)
pw->pw_gid = gid;
authenticate (pw);
if (request_same_session || !command || !pw->pw_uid)
same_session = 1;
/* initialize shell variable only if "-u <user>" not specified */
if (runuser_user) {
shell = NULL;
} else {
if (!shell && !change_environment)
shell = getenv ("SHELL");
if (shell && getuid () != 0 && restricted_shell (pw->pw_shell))
{
/* The user being su'd to has a nonstandard shell, and so is
probably a uucp account or has restricted access. Don't
compromise the account by allowing access with a standard
shell. */
warnx (_("using restricted shell %s"), pw->pw_shell);
shell = NULL;
}
shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
}
init_groups (pw, groups, ngroups);
if (!simulate_login || command)
suppress_pam_info = 1; /* don't print PAM info messages */
create_watching_parent ();
/* Now we're in the child. */
change_identity (pw);
if (!same_session)
setsid ();
/* Set environment after pam_open_session, which may put KRB5CCNAME
into the pam_env, etc. */
modify_environment (pw, shell);
if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
warn (_("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
if (shell)
run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, max (0, argc - optind));
else {
execvp(argv[optind], &argv[optind]);
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("failed to execute %s"), argv[optind]);
}
}
Commit Message: su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 2,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::NativePixmapHandle>::Read(gfx::mojom::NativePixmapHandleDataView data,
gfx::NativePixmapHandle* out) {
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
mojo::ArrayDataView<mojo::ScopedHandle> handles_data_view;
data.GetFdsDataView(&handles_data_view);
for (size_t i = 0; i < handles_data_view.size(); ++i) {
mojo::ScopedHandle handle = handles_data_view.Take(i);
base::PlatformFile platform_file;
if (mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(handle), &platform_file) !=
MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return false;
constexpr bool auto_close = true;
out->fds.push_back(base::FileDescriptor(platform_file, auto_close));
}
return data.ReadPlanes(&out->planes);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 7,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillDialogViews::DetailsContainerView::DetailsContainerView(
const base::Closure& callback)
: bounds_changed_callback_(callback),
ignore_layouts_(false) {}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jit_fill_hole(void *area, unsigned int size)
{
/* fill whole space with int3 instructions */
memset(area, 0xcc, size);
}
Commit Message: x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs
x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying
to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction.
While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing
multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes.
Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs
may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the
pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration
the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns.
Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program.
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 23,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init tcp_sk_init(struct net *net)
{
return inet_ctl_sock_create(&net->ipv4.tcp_sock,
PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_TCP, net);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 4,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pair_decode(char *str, float8 *x, float8 *y, char **s)
{
int has_delim;
char *cp;
if (!PointerIsValid(str))
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
if ((has_delim = (*str == LDELIM)))
str++;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
*x = strtod(str, &cp);
if (cp <= str)
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *cp))
cp++;
if (*cp++ != DELIM)
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *cp))
cp++;
*y = strtod(cp, &str);
if (str <= cp)
return FALSE;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
if (has_delim)
{
if (*str != RDELIM)
return FALSE;
str++;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
str++;
}
if (s != NULL)
*s = str;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DispatchWillSubmitForm(HTMLFormElement* form) {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->WillSubmitForm(WebFormElement(form));
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 29,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8TestEventTarget::wrapSlow(PassRefPtr<TestEventTarget> impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper;
V8Proxy* proxy = 0;
wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::instantiateV8Object(proxy, &info, impl.get());
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapperHandle = v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper);
if (!hasDependentLifetime)
wrapperHandle.MarkIndependent();
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl, wrapperHandle, isolate);
return wrapper;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PTSTimeDeltaEstablished() const {
return mFirstPTSValid;
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_consider_descriptor_republication(void)
{
int i;
rend_service_t *service;
if (!consider_republishing_rend_descriptors)
return;
consider_republishing_rend_descriptors = 0;
if (!get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors)
return;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
if (service->desc && !service->desc->all_uploads_performed) {
/* If we failed in uploading a descriptor last time, try again *without*
* updating the descriptor's contents. */
upload_service_descriptor(service);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 16,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dump_cpu_task(int cpu)
{
pr_info("Task dump for CPU %d:\n", cpu);
sched_show_task(cpu_curr(cpu));
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PasswordStoreLoginsChangedObserver::~PasswordStoreLoginsChangedObserver() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool unhash_ol_stateid(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *stp)
{
struct nfs4_file *fp = stp->st_stid.sc_file;
lockdep_assert_held(&stp->st_stateowner->so_client->cl_lock);
if (list_empty(&stp->st_perfile))
return false;
spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
list_del_init(&stp->st_perfile);
spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock);
list_del(&stp->st_perstateowner);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 29,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_popf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG;
ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->eflags;
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
return emulate_popf(ctxt, &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->op_bytes);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *find_pmu_context(int ctxn)
{
struct pmu *pmu;
if (ctxn < 0)
return NULL;
list_for_each_entry(pmu, &pmus, entry) {
if (pmu->task_ctx_nr == ctxn)
return pmu->pmu_cpu_context;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lock_mutex(pthread_mutex_t *l)
{
int ret;
if ((ret = pthread_mutex_lock(l)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "pthread_mutex_lock returned:%d %s\n", ret, strerror(ret));
exit(1);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 17,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
{
Buffer m;
char *cp;
u_int len;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
buffer_init(&m);
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
if (conf != NULL)
buffer_append(conf, cp, len);
free(cp);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err avcc_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i, count;
GF_AVCConfigurationBox *ptr = (GF_AVCConfigurationBox *)s;
if (ptr->config) gf_odf_avc_cfg_del(ptr->config);
ptr->config = gf_odf_avc_cfg_new();
ptr->config->configurationVersion = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
ptr->config->AVCProfileIndication = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
ptr->config->profile_compatibility = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
ptr->config->AVCLevelIndication = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVCC) {
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
} else {
ptr->config->complete_representation = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
}
ptr->config->nal_unit_size = 1 + gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->size -= 7; //including 2nd count
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_AVCConfigSlot *sl = (GF_AVCConfigSlot *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigSlot));
sl->size = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
sl->data = (char *)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * sl->size);
gf_bs_read_data(bs, sl->data, sl->size);
gf_list_add(ptr->config->sequenceParameterSets, sl);
ptr->size -= 2+sl->size;
}
count = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_AVCConfigSlot *sl = (GF_AVCConfigSlot *)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigSlot));
sl->size = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
if (gf_bs_available(bs) < sl->size) {
gf_free(sl);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CODING, ("AVCC: Not enough bits to parse. Aborting.\n"));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
sl->data = (char *)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * sl->size);
gf_bs_read_data(bs, sl->data, sl->size);
gf_list_add(ptr->config->pictureParameterSets, sl);
ptr->size -= 2+sl->size;
}
if (ptr->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVCC) {
if (gf_avc_is_rext_profile(ptr->config->AVCProfileIndication)) {
if (!ptr->size) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
AVCState avc;
s32 idx, vui_flag_pos;
GF_AVCConfigSlot *sl = (GF_AVCConfigSlot*)gf_list_get(ptr->config->sequenceParameterSets, 0);
idx = gf_media_avc_read_sps(sl->data+1, sl->size-1, &avc, 0, (u32 *) &vui_flag_pos);
if (idx>=0) {
ptr->config->chroma_format = avc.sps[idx].chroma_format;
ptr->config->luma_bit_depth = 8 + avc.sps[idx].luma_bit_depth_m8;
ptr->config->chroma_bit_depth = 8 + avc.sps[idx].chroma_bit_depth_m8;
}
#else
/*set default values ...*/
ptr->config->chroma_format = 1;
ptr->config->luma_bit_depth = 8;
ptr->config->chroma_bit_depth = 8;
#endif
return GF_OK;
}
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
ptr->config->chroma_format = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->config->luma_bit_depth = 8 + gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->config->chroma_bit_depth = 8 + gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 8);
ptr->size -= 4;
if (count*2 > ptr->size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CODING, ("AVCC: invalid numOfSequenceParameterSetExt value. Skipping.\n"));
return GF_OK;
}
if (count) {
ptr->config->sequenceParameterSetExtensions = gf_list_new();
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_AVCConfigSlot *sl = (GF_AVCConfigSlot *)gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_AVCConfigSlot));
sl->size = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
if (gf_bs_available(bs) < sl->size) {
gf_free(sl);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CODING, ("AVCC: Not enough bits to parse. Aborting.\n"));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
sl->data = (char *)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * sl->size);
gf_bs_read_data(bs, sl->data, sl->size);
gf_list_add(ptr->config->sequenceParameterSetExtensions, sl);
ptr->size -= sl->size + 2;
}
}
}
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_calc_poc(codec_t *ps_codec, nal_header_t *ps_nal, WORD8 i1_log2_max_poc_lsb, WORD32 i2_poc_lsb)
{
WORD32 i4_abs_poc, i4_poc_msb;
WORD32 max_poc_lsb;
WORD8 i1_nal_unit_type = ps_nal->i1_nal_unit_type;
max_poc_lsb = (1 << i1_log2_max_poc_lsb);
if((!ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done) && (!ps_codec->i4_pic_present))
ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb = -2 * max_poc_lsb;
if(NAL_IDR_N_LP == i1_nal_unit_type
|| NAL_IDR_W_LP == i1_nal_unit_type
|| NAL_BLA_N_LP == i1_nal_unit_type
|| NAL_BLA_W_DLP == i1_nal_unit_type
|| NAL_BLA_W_LP == i1_nal_unit_type
|| (NAL_CRA == i1_nal_unit_type && !ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done))
{
i4_poc_msb = ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb + 2 * max_poc_lsb;
ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb = 0;
ps_codec->i4_max_prev_poc_lsb = 0;
}
else
{
if((i2_poc_lsb < ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb)
&& ((ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb - i2_poc_lsb) >= max_poc_lsb / 2))
{
i4_poc_msb = ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb + max_poc_lsb;
}
else if((i2_poc_lsb > ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb)
&& ((i2_poc_lsb - ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb) > max_poc_lsb / 2))
{
i4_poc_msb = ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb - max_poc_lsb;
}
else
{
i4_poc_msb = ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb;
}
}
i4_abs_poc = i4_poc_msb + i2_poc_lsb;
ps_codec->i4_max_prev_poc_lsb = MAX(ps_codec->i4_max_prev_poc_lsb, i2_poc_lsb);
{
WORD32 is_reference_nal = ((i1_nal_unit_type <= NAL_RSV_VCL_R15) && (i1_nal_unit_type % 2 != 0)) || ((i1_nal_unit_type >= NAL_BLA_W_LP) && (i1_nal_unit_type <= NAL_RSV_RAP_VCL23));
WORD32 update_prev_poc = ((is_reference_nal) && ((i1_nal_unit_type < NAL_RADL_N) || (i1_nal_unit_type > NAL_RASL_R)));
if((0 == ps_nal->i1_nuh_temporal_id) &&
(update_prev_poc))
{
ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb = i2_poc_lsb;
ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb = i4_poc_msb;
}
}
return i4_abs_poc;
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LargeObjectPage::sweep() {
heapObjectHeader()->unmark();
arena()->getThreadState()->increaseMarkedObjectSize(size());
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_fh(__be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
unsigned int size;
fh_init(fhp, NFS3_FHSIZE);
size = ntohl(*p++);
if (size > NFS3_FHSIZE)
return NULL;
memcpy(&fhp->fh_handle.fh_base, p, size);
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size = size;
return p + XDR_QUADLEN(size);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 18,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned CLASS ph1_bithuff (int nbits, ushort *huff)
{
static UINT64 bitbuf=0;
static int vbits=0;
unsigned c;
if (nbits == -1)
return bitbuf = vbits = 0;
if (nbits == 0) return 0;
if (vbits < nbits) {
bitbuf = bitbuf << 32 | get4();
vbits += 32;
}
c = bitbuf << (64-vbits) >> (64-nbits);
if (huff) {
vbits -= huff[c] >> 8;
return (uchar) huff[c];
}
vbits -= nbits;
return c;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetEncoding(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName) {
if (parser == NULL)
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
/* Block after XML_Parse()/XML_ParseBuffer() has been called.
XXX There's no way for the caller to determine which of the
XXX possible error cases caused the XML_STATUS_ERROR return.
*/
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_PARSING
|| parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
/* Get rid of any previous encoding name */
FREE(parser, (void *)parser->m_protocolEncodingName);
if (encodingName == NULL)
/* No new encoding name */
parser->m_protocolEncodingName = NULL;
else {
/* Copy the new encoding name into allocated memory */
parser->m_protocolEncodingName = copyString(encodingName, &(parser->m_mem));
if (! parser->m_protocolEncodingName)
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
return XML_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 9,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_prepare_sample(struct perf_event_header *header,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct perf_event *event,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u64 sample_type = event->attr.sample_type;
header->type = PERF_RECORD_SAMPLE;
header->size = sizeof(*header) + event->header_size;
header->misc = 0;
header->misc |= perf_misc_flags(regs);
__perf_event_header__init_id(header, data, event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
data->ip = perf_instruction_pointer(regs);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN) {
int size = 1;
data->callchain = perf_callchain(regs);
if (data->callchain)
size += data->callchain->nr;
header->size += size * sizeof(u64);
}
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
int size = sizeof(u32);
if (data->raw)
size += data->raw->size;
else
size += sizeof(u32);
WARN_ON_ONCE(size & (sizeof(u64)-1));
header->size += size;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBufferData(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::BufferData& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLsizeiptr size = static_cast<GLsizeiptr>(c.size);
uint32 data_shm_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.data_shm_id);
uint32 data_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32>(c.data_shm_offset);
GLenum usage = static_cast<GLenum>(c.usage);
const void* data = NULL;
if (data_shm_id != 0 || data_shm_offset != 0) {
data = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(data_shm_id, data_shm_offset, size);
if (!data) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
buffer_manager()->ValidateAndDoBufferData(&state_, target, size, data, usage);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::SetMemoryAllocation(
const GpuMemoryAllocation& allocation) {
allocation_ = allocation;
SendMemoryAllocationToProxy(allocation);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sockaddr_setport(struct sockaddr *sa, ev_uint16_t port)
{
if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port = htons(port);
} else if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port = htons(port);
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 18,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int comm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
int ret;
ret = single_open(filp, comm_show, NULL);
if (!ret) {
struct seq_file *m = filp->private_data;
m->private = inode;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestBrowserClient(MediaObserver* media_observer)
: media_observer_(media_observer) {}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6mr_vif_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open_net(inode, file, &ip6mr_vif_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct ipmr_vif_iter));
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::concatCTM(const AffineTransform& transform)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
#if USE(WXGC)
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
if (gc)
gc->ConcatTransform(transform);
#endif
return;
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void *dummy)
{
unsigned long long boot_pgd_ptr;
unsigned long long pgd_ptr;
unsigned long hyp_stack_ptr;
unsigned long stack_page;
unsigned long vector_ptr;
/* Switch from the HYP stub to our own HYP init vector */
__hyp_set_vectors(kvm_get_idmap_vector());
boot_pgd_ptr = (unsigned long long)kvm_mmu_get_boot_httbr();
pgd_ptr = (unsigned long long)kvm_mmu_get_httbr();
stack_page = __get_cpu_var(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page);
hyp_stack_ptr = stack_page + PAGE_SIZE;
vector_ptr = (unsigned long)__kvm_hyp_vector;
__cpu_init_hyp_mode(boot_pgd_ptr, pgd_ptr, hyp_stack_ptr, vector_ptr);
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void swap_free_obj(struct page *page, unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
swap(((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[a],
((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[b]);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool EnableCaretInEditableText(LocalFrame& frame,
Event* event,
EditorCommandSource source) {
frame.GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (source == kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding &&
!frame.Selection().SelectionHasFocus())
return false;
const VisibleSelection& selection =
frame.GetEditor().SelectionForCommand(event);
return selection.IsCaret() && selection.IsContentEditable();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ztoken(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
switch (r_type(op)) {
default:
return_op_typecheck(op);
case t_file: {
stream *s;
scanner_state state;
check_read_file(i_ctx_p, s, op);
check_ostack(1);
gs_scanner_init(&state, op);
return token_continue(i_ctx_p, &state, true);
}
case t_string: {
ref token;
/* -1 is to remove the string operand in case of error. */
int orig_ostack_depth = ref_stack_count(&o_stack) - 1;
int code;
/* Don't pop the operand in case of invalidaccess. */
if (!r_has_attr(op, a_read))
return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
code = gs_scan_string_token(i_ctx_p, op, &token);
switch (code) {
case scan_EOF: /* no tokens */
make_false(op);
return 0;
default:
if (code < 0) {
/*
* Clear anything that may have been left on the ostack,
* including the string operand.
*/
if (orig_ostack_depth < ref_stack_count(&o_stack))
pop(ref_stack_count(&o_stack)- orig_ostack_depth);
return code;
}
}
push(2);
op[-1] = token;
make_true(op);
return 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodLMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(2, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
break;
case 2:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
OverloadedMethodL1Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodL");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FormControlState HTMLSelectElement::saveFormControlState() const
{
const Vector<HTMLElement*>& items = listItems();
size_t length = items.size();
FormControlState state;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
if (!items[i]->hasTagName(optionTag))
continue;
HTMLOptionElement* option = toHTMLOptionElement(items[i]);
if (!option->selected())
continue;
state.append(option->value());
if (!multiple())
break;
}
return state;
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowInlineScript(
Element* element,
const String& contextURL,
const String& nonce,
const WTF::OrdinalNumber& contextLine,
const String& scriptContent,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
DCHECK(element);
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowInlineScript>(
m_policies, element, contextURL, nonce, contextLine, reportingPolicy,
scriptContent);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HashTable* spl_dllist_object_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp) /* {{{{ */
{
spl_dllist_object *intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(obj);
spl_ptr_llist_element *current = intern->llist->head, *next;
zval tmp, dllist_array;
zend_string *pnstr;
int i = 0;
HashTable *debug_info;
*is_temp = 1;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(debug_info);
zend_hash_init(debug_info, 1, NULL, ZVAL_PTR_DTOR, 0);
zend_hash_copy(debug_info, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref);
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplDoublyLinkedList, "flags", sizeof("flags")-1);
ZVAL_LONG(&tmp, intern->flags);
zend_hash_add(debug_info, pnstr, &tmp);
zend_string_release(pnstr);
array_init(&dllist_array);
while (current) {
next = current->next;
add_index_zval(&dllist_array, i, ¤t->data);
if (Z_REFCOUNTED(current->data)) {
Z_ADDREF(current->data);
}
i++;
current = next;
}
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplDoublyLinkedList, "dllist", sizeof("dllist")-1);
zend_hash_add(debug_info, pnstr, &dllist_array);
zend_string_release(pnstr);
return debug_info;
}
/* }}}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 9,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_get_init_creds_keyblock(krb5_context context,
krb5_creds *creds,
krb5_principal client,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock,
krb5_deltat start_time,
const char *in_tkt_service,
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *options)
{
krb5_init_creds_context ctx;
krb5_error_code ret;
memset(creds, 0, sizeof(*creds));
ret = krb5_init_creds_init(context, client, NULL, NULL, start_time, options, &ctx);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_init_creds_set_service(context, ctx, in_tkt_service);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_init_creds_set_keyblock(context, ctx, keyblock);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = krb5_init_creds_get(context, ctx);
if (ret == 0)
krb5_process_last_request(context, options, ctx);
out:
if (ret == 0)
krb5_init_creds_get_creds(context, ctx, creds);
if (ctx)
krb5_init_creds_free(context, ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 12,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<TouchList> Document::createTouchList(WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<Touch>>& touches) const
{
return TouchList::adopt(touches);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __migrate_task(struct task_struct *p, int src_cpu, int dest_cpu)
{
struct rq *rq_dest, *rq_src;
int ret = 0;
if (unlikely(!cpu_active(dest_cpu)))
return ret;
rq_src = cpu_rq(src_cpu);
rq_dest = cpu_rq(dest_cpu);
raw_spin_lock(&p->pi_lock);
double_rq_lock(rq_src, rq_dest);
/* Already moved. */
if (task_cpu(p) != src_cpu)
goto done;
/* Affinity changed (again). */
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(dest_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(p)))
goto fail;
/*
* If we're not on a rq, the next wake-up will ensure we're
* placed properly.
*/
if (p->on_rq) {
dequeue_task(rq_src, p, 0);
set_task_cpu(p, dest_cpu);
enqueue_task(rq_dest, p, 0);
check_preempt_curr(rq_dest, p, 0);
}
done:
ret = 1;
fail:
double_rq_unlock(rq_src, rq_dest);
raw_spin_unlock(&p->pi_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean S_AL_BufferInit( void )
{
if(alBuffersInitialised)
return qtrue;
memset(knownSfx, 0, sizeof(knownSfx));
numSfx = 0;
default_sfx = S_AL_BufferFind("sound/feedback/hit.wav");
S_AL_BufferUse(default_sfx);
knownSfx[default_sfx].isLocked = qtrue;
alBuffersInitialised = qtrue;
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 25,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_AddGameDirectory( const char *path, const char *dir, qboolean allowUnzippedDLLs ) {
searchpath_t *sp;
int i;
searchpath_t *search;
pack_t *pak;
char curpath[MAX_OSPATH + 1], *pakfile;
int numfiles;
char **pakfiles;
char *sorted[MAX_PAKFILES];
Q_strncpyz(curpath, FS_BuildOSPath(path, dir, ""), sizeof(curpath));
curpath[strlen(curpath) - 1] = '\0'; // strip the trailing slash
for ( sp = fs_searchpaths ; sp ; sp = sp->next ) {
if ( sp->dir && !Q_stricmp( sp->dir->path, path ) && !Q_stricmp( sp->dir->gamedir, dir ) ) {
return; // we've already got this one
}
}
Q_strncpyz( fs_gamedir, dir, sizeof( fs_gamedir ) );
pakfile = FS_BuildOSPath( path, dir, "" );
pakfile[ strlen( pakfile ) - 1 ] = 0; // strip the trailing slash
pakfiles = Sys_ListFiles( pakfile, ".pk3", NULL, &numfiles, qfalse );
if ( numfiles > MAX_PAKFILES ) {
numfiles = MAX_PAKFILES;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < numfiles ; i++ ) {
sorted[i] = pakfiles[i];
if ( !Q_strncmp( sorted[i],"mp_",3 ) ) {
memcpy( sorted[i],"zz",2 );
}
}
qsort( sorted, numfiles, sizeof(char*), paksort );
for ( i = 0 ; i < numfiles ; i++ ) {
if ( Q_strncmp( sorted[i],"sp_",3 ) ) { // JPW NERVE -- exclude sp_*
if ( !Q_strncmp( sorted[i],"zz_",3 ) ) {
memcpy( sorted[i],"mp",2 );
}
pakfile = FS_BuildOSPath( path, dir, sorted[i] );
if ( ( pak = FS_LoadZipFile( pakfile, sorted[i] ) ) == 0 ) {
continue;
}
Q_strncpyz(pak->pakPathname, curpath, sizeof(pak->pakPathname));
strcpy( pak->pakGamename, dir );
search = Z_Malloc( sizeof( searchpath_t ) );
search->pack = pak;
search->next = fs_searchpaths;
fs_searchpaths = search;
}
}
Sys_FreeFileList( pakfiles );
search = Z_Malloc (sizeof(searchpath_t));
search->dir = Z_Malloc( sizeof( *search->dir ) );
Q_strncpyz(search->dir->path, path, sizeof(search->dir->path));
Q_strncpyz(search->dir->fullpath, curpath, sizeof(search->dir->fullpath));
Q_strncpyz(search->dir->gamedir, dir, sizeof(search->dir->gamedir));
search->dir->allowUnzippedDLLs = allowUnzippedDLLs;
search->next = fs_searchpaths;
fs_searchpaths = search;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 23,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageScale(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr im_scaled = NULL;
if (src == NULL || src->interpolation_id < 0 || src->interpolation_id > GD_METHOD_COUNT) {
return 0;
}
switch (src->interpolation_id) {
/*Special cases, optimized implementations */
case GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleNearestNeighbour(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BILINEAR_FIXED:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBilinear(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BICUBIC_FIXED:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBicubicFixed(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
/* generic */
default:
if (src->interpolation == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
im_scaled = gdImageScaleTwoPass(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
}
return im_scaled;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSetOverlayRoutingToken(
const base::UnguessableToken& token) {
overlay_routing_token_ = token;
for (const auto& cb : pending_routing_token_callbacks_)
cb.Run(overlay_routing_token_.value());
pending_routing_token_callbacks_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 lvid_get_unique_id(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct logicalVolIntegrityDesc *lvid;
struct logicalVolHeaderDesc *lvhd;
u64 uniqueID;
u64 ret;
bh = sbi->s_lvid_bh;
if (!bh)
return 0;
lvid = (struct logicalVolIntegrityDesc *)bh->b_data;
lvhd = (struct logicalVolHeaderDesc *)lvid->logicalVolContentsUse;
mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
ret = uniqueID = le64_to_cpu(lvhd->uniqueID);
if (!(++uniqueID & 0xFFFFFFFF))
uniqueID += 16;
lvhd->uniqueID = cpu_to_le64(uniqueID);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned long zap_pmd_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct zap_details *details)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next - addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
if (!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem)) {
pr_err("%s: mmap_sem is unlocked! addr=0x%lx end=0x%lx vma->vm_start=0x%lx vma->vm_end=0x%lx\n",
__func__, addr, end,
vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_end);
BUG();
}
#endif
split_huge_page_pmd(vma, addr, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
goto next;
/* fall through */
}
/*
* Here there can be other concurrent MADV_DONTNEED or
* trans huge page faults running, and if the pmd is
* none or trans huge it can change under us. This is
* because MADV_DONTNEED holds the mmap_sem in read
* mode.
*/
if (pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd))
goto next;
next = zap_pte_range(tlb, vma, pmd, addr, next, details);
next:
cond_resched();
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return addr;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,905 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.