instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ipv6_connect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int rc = 0;
int val;
bool connected = false;
__be16 orig_port = 0;
struct socket *socket = server->ssocket;
if (socket == NULL) {
rc = sock_create_kern(PF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM,
IPPROTO_TCP, &socket);
if (rc < 0) {
cERROR(1, "Error %d creating ipv6 socket", rc);
socket = NULL;
return rc;
}
/* BB other socket options to set KEEPALIVE, NODELAY? */
cFYI(1, "ipv6 Socket created");
server->ssocket = socket;
socket->sk->sk_allocation = GFP_NOFS;
cifs_reclassify_socket6(socket);
}
/* user overrode default port */
if (server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_port) {
rc = socket->ops->connect(socket,
(struct sockaddr *) &server->addr.sockAddr6,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), 0);
if (rc >= 0)
connected = true;
}
if (!connected) {
/* save original port so we can retry user specified port
later if fall back ports fail this time */
orig_port = server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_port;
/* do not retry on the same port we just failed on */
if (server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_port != htons(CIFS_PORT)) {
server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_port = htons(CIFS_PORT);
rc = socket->ops->connect(socket, (struct sockaddr *)
&server->addr.sockAddr6,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), 0);
if (rc >= 0)
connected = true;
}
}
if (!connected) {
server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_port = htons(RFC1001_PORT);
rc = socket->ops->connect(socket, (struct sockaddr *)
&server->addr.sockAddr6,
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), 0);
if (rc >= 0)
connected = true;
}
/* give up here - unless we want to retry on different
protocol families some day */
if (!connected) {
if (orig_port)
server->addr.sockAddr6.sin6_port = orig_port;
cFYI(1, "Error %d connecting to server via ipv6", rc);
sock_release(socket);
server->ssocket = NULL;
return rc;
}
/*
* Eventually check for other socket options to change from
* the default. sock_setsockopt not used because it expects
* user space buffer
*/
socket->sk->sk_rcvtimeo = 7 * HZ;
socket->sk->sk_sndtimeo = 5 * HZ;
if (server->tcp_nodelay) {
val = 1;
rc = kernel_setsockopt(socket, SOL_TCP, TCP_NODELAY,
(char *)&val, sizeof(val));
if (rc)
cFYI(1, "set TCP_NODELAY socket option error %d", rc);
}
server->ssocket = socket;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~DummyImeControlDelegate() {}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::CutCopyPaste(int command_id) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
ForwardCutCopyPasteToNSApp(command_id);
#else
WebContents* contents = browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (contents) {
void (WebContents::*method)();
if (command_id == IDC_CUT)
method = &content::WebContents::Cut;
else if (command_id == IDC_COPY)
method = &content::WebContents::Copy;
else
method = &content::WebContents::Paste;
if (DoCutCopyPasteForWebContents(contents, method))
return;
WebContents* devtools =
DevToolsWindow::GetInTabWebContents(contents, nullptr);
if (devtools && DoCutCopyPasteForWebContents(devtools, method))
return;
}
ui::Accelerator accelerator;
GetAccelerator(command_id, &accelerator);
GetFocusManager()->ProcessAccelerator(accelerator);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vsock_is_accept_queue_empty(struct sock *sk)
{
struct vsock_sock *vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
return list_empty(&vsk->accept_queue);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sched_group *find_busiest_group(struct lb_env *env)
{
struct sg_lb_stats *local, *busiest;
struct sd_lb_stats sds;
init_sd_lb_stats(&sds);
/*
* Compute the various statistics relavent for load balancing at
* this level.
*/
update_sd_lb_stats(env, &sds);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&sched_energy_present)) {
struct root_domain *rd = env->dst_rq->rd;
if (rcu_dereference(rd->pd) && !READ_ONCE(rd->overutilized))
goto out_balanced;
}
local = &sds.local_stat;
busiest = &sds.busiest_stat;
/* ASYM feature bypasses nice load balance check */
if (check_asym_packing(env, &sds))
return sds.busiest;
/* There is no busy sibling group to pull tasks from */
if (!sds.busiest || busiest->sum_nr_running == 0)
goto out_balanced;
/* XXX broken for overlapping NUMA groups */
sds.avg_load = (SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE * sds.total_load)
/ sds.total_capacity;
/*
* If the busiest group is imbalanced the below checks don't
* work because they assume all things are equal, which typically
* isn't true due to cpus_allowed constraints and the like.
*/
if (busiest->group_type == group_imbalanced)
goto force_balance;
/*
* When dst_cpu is idle, prevent SMP nice and/or asymmetric group
* capacities from resulting in underutilization due to avg_load.
*/
if (env->idle != CPU_NOT_IDLE && group_has_capacity(env, local) &&
busiest->group_no_capacity)
goto force_balance;
/* Misfit tasks should be dealt with regardless of the avg load */
if (busiest->group_type == group_misfit_task)
goto force_balance;
/*
* If the local group is busier than the selected busiest group
* don't try and pull any tasks.
*/
if (local->avg_load >= busiest->avg_load)
goto out_balanced;
/*
* Don't pull any tasks if this group is already above the domain
* average load.
*/
if (local->avg_load >= sds.avg_load)
goto out_balanced;
if (env->idle == CPU_IDLE) {
/*
* This CPU is idle. If the busiest group is not overloaded
* and there is no imbalance between this and busiest group
* wrt idle CPUs, it is balanced. The imbalance becomes
* significant if the diff is greater than 1 otherwise we
* might end up to just move the imbalance on another group
*/
if ((busiest->group_type != group_overloaded) &&
(local->idle_cpus <= (busiest->idle_cpus + 1)))
goto out_balanced;
} else {
/*
* In the CPU_NEWLY_IDLE, CPU_NOT_IDLE cases, use
* imbalance_pct to be conservative.
*/
if (100 * busiest->avg_load <=
env->sd->imbalance_pct * local->avg_load)
goto out_balanced;
}
force_balance:
/* Looks like there is an imbalance. Compute it */
env->src_grp_type = busiest->group_type;
calculate_imbalance(env, &sds);
return env->imbalance ? sds.busiest : NULL;
out_balanced:
env->imbalance = 0;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apply_xml_diff(xmlNode * old, xmlNode * diff, xmlNode ** new)
{
gboolean result = TRUE;
int root_nodes_seen = 0;
static struct qb_log_callsite *digest_cs = NULL;
const char *digest = crm_element_value(diff, XML_ATTR_DIGEST);
const char *version = crm_element_value(diff, XML_ATTR_CRM_VERSION);
xmlNode *child_diff = NULL;
xmlNode *added = find_xml_node(diff, "diff-added", FALSE);
xmlNode *removed = find_xml_node(diff, "diff-removed", FALSE);
CRM_CHECK(new != NULL, return FALSE);
if (digest_cs == NULL) {
digest_cs =
qb_log_callsite_get(__func__, __FILE__, "diff-digest", LOG_TRACE, __LINE__,
crm_trace_nonlog);
}
crm_trace("Substraction Phase");
for (child_diff = __xml_first_child(removed); child_diff != NULL;
child_diff = __xml_next(child_diff)) {
CRM_CHECK(root_nodes_seen == 0, result = FALSE);
if (root_nodes_seen == 0) {
*new = subtract_xml_object(NULL, old, child_diff, FALSE, NULL, NULL);
}
root_nodes_seen++;
}
if (root_nodes_seen == 0) {
*new = copy_xml(old);
} else if (root_nodes_seen > 1) {
crm_err("(-) Diffs cannot contain more than one change set..." " saw %d", root_nodes_seen);
result = FALSE;
}
root_nodes_seen = 0;
crm_trace("Addition Phase");
if (result) {
xmlNode *child_diff = NULL;
for (child_diff = __xml_first_child(added); child_diff != NULL;
child_diff = __xml_next(child_diff)) {
CRM_CHECK(root_nodes_seen == 0, result = FALSE);
if (root_nodes_seen == 0) {
add_xml_object(NULL, *new, child_diff, TRUE);
}
root_nodes_seen++;
}
}
if (root_nodes_seen > 1) {
crm_err("(+) Diffs cannot contain more than one change set..." " saw %d", root_nodes_seen);
result = FALSE;
} else if (result && digest) {
char *new_digest = NULL;
purge_diff_markers(*new); /* Purge now so the diff is ok */
new_digest = calculate_xml_versioned_digest(*new, FALSE, TRUE, version);
if (safe_str_neq(new_digest, digest)) {
crm_info("Digest mis-match: expected %s, calculated %s", digest, new_digest);
result = FALSE;
crm_trace("%p %0.6x", digest_cs, digest_cs ? digest_cs->targets : 0);
if (digest_cs && digest_cs->targets) {
save_xml_to_file(old, "diff:original", NULL);
save_xml_to_file(diff, "diff:input", NULL);
save_xml_to_file(*new, "diff:new", NULL);
}
} else {
crm_trace("Digest matched: expected %s, calculated %s", digest, new_digest);
}
free(new_digest);
} else if (result) {
purge_diff_markers(*new); /* Purge now so the diff is ok */
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Var Instance::GetLinkAtPosition(const pp::Point& point) {
pp::Point offset_point(point);
ScalePoint(device_scale_, &offset_point);
offset_point.set_x(offset_point.x() - available_area_.x());
return engine_->GetLinkAtPosition(offset_point);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_open_lsap(struct irda_sock *self, int pid)
{
notify_t notify;
if (self->lsap) {
IRDA_WARNING("%s(), busy!\n", __func__);
return -EBUSY;
}
/* Initialize callbacks to be used by the IrDA stack */
irda_notify_init(¬ify);
notify.udata_indication = irda_data_indication;
notify.instance = self;
strncpy(notify.name, "Ultra", NOTIFY_MAX_NAME);
self->lsap = irlmp_open_lsap(LSAP_CONNLESS, ¬ify, pid);
if (self->lsap == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG( 0, "%s(), Unable to allocate LSAP!\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atusb_write_reg(struct atusb *atusb, uint8_t reg, uint8_t value)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
dev_dbg(&usb_dev->dev, "atusb_write_reg: 0x%02x <- 0x%02x\n",
reg, value);
return atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_sndctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_REG_WRITE, ATUSB_REQ_TO_DEV,
value, reg, NULL, 0, 1000);
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t snd_compr_calc_avail(struct snd_compr_stream *stream,
struct snd_compr_avail *avail)
{
long avail_calc; /*this needs to be signed variable */
snd_compr_update_tstamp(stream, &avail->tstamp);
/* FIXME: This needs to be different for capture stream,
available is # of compressed data, for playback it's
remainder of buffer */
if (stream->runtime->total_bytes_available == 0 &&
stream->runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP) {
pr_debug("detected init and someone forgot to do a write\n");
return stream->runtime->buffer_size;
}
pr_debug("app wrote %lld, DSP consumed %lld\n",
stream->runtime->total_bytes_available,
stream->runtime->total_bytes_transferred);
if (stream->runtime->total_bytes_available ==
stream->runtime->total_bytes_transferred) {
pr_debug("both pointers are same, returning full avail\n");
return stream->runtime->buffer_size;
}
/* FIXME: this routine isn't consistent, in one test we use
* cumulative values and in the other byte offsets. Do we
* really need the byte offsets if the cumulative values have
* been updated? In the PCM interface app_ptr and hw_ptr are
* already cumulative */
avail_calc = stream->runtime->buffer_size -
(stream->runtime->app_pointer - stream->runtime->hw_pointer);
pr_debug("calc avail as %ld, app_ptr %lld, hw+ptr %lld\n", avail_calc,
stream->runtime->app_pointer,
stream->runtime->hw_pointer);
if (avail_calc >= stream->runtime->buffer_size)
avail_calc -= stream->runtime->buffer_size;
pr_debug("ret avail as %ld\n", avail_calc);
avail->avail = avail_calc;
return avail_calc;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgBlur() {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_RWH5"));
GetProcess()->ReceivedBadMessage();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pop_fetch_headers(struct Context *ctx)
{
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
time(&pop_data->check_time);
pop_data->clear_cache = false;
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = -1;
const int old_count = ctx->msgcount;
int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, "UIDL\r\n", NULL, fetch_uidl, ctx);
const int new_count = ctx->msgcount;
ctx->msgcount = old_count;
if (pop_data->cmd_uidl == 2)
{
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->cmd_uidl = 1;
mutt_debug(1, "set UIDL capability\n");
}
if (ret == -2 && pop_data->cmd_uidl == 2)
{
pop_data->cmd_uidl = 0;
mutt_debug(1, "unset UIDL capability\n");
snprintf(pop_data->err_msg, sizeof(pop_data->err_msg), "%s",
_("Command UIDL is not supported by server."));
}
}
if (!ctx->quiet)
{
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Fetching message headers..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, ReadInc, new_count - old_count);
}
if (ret == 0)
{
int i, deleted;
for (i = 0, deleted = 0; i < old_count; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->refno == -1)
{
ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted = true;
deleted++;
}
}
if (deleted > 0)
{
mutt_error(
ngettext("%d message has been lost. Try reopening the mailbox.",
"%d messages have been lost. Try reopening the mailbox.", deleted),
deleted);
}
bool hcached = false;
for (i = old_count; i < new_count; i++)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, i + 1 - old_count, -1);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
void *data = mutt_hcache_fetch(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
if (data)
{
char *uidl = mutt_str_strdup(ctx->hdrs[i]->data);
int refno = ctx->hdrs[i]->refno;
int index = ctx->hdrs[i]->index;
/*
* - POP dynamically numbers headers and relies on h->refno
* to map messages; so restore header and overwrite restored
* refno with current refno, same for index
* - h->data needs to a separate pointer as it's driver-specific
* data freed separately elsewhere
* (the old h->data should point inside a malloc'd block from
* hcache so there shouldn't be a memleak here)
*/
struct Header *h = mutt_hcache_restore((unsigned char *) data);
mutt_hcache_free(hc, &data);
mutt_header_free(&ctx->hdrs[i]);
ctx->hdrs[i] = h;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = refno;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = uidl;
ret = 0;
hcached = true;
}
else
#endif
if ((ret = pop_read_header(pop_data, ctx->hdrs[i])) < 0)
break;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
else
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
/*
* faked support for flags works like this:
* - if 'hcached' is true, we have the message in our hcache:
* - if we also have a body: read
* - if we don't have a body: old
* (if $mark_old is set which is maybe wrong as
* $mark_old should be considered for syncing the
* folder and not when opening it XXX)
* - if 'hcached' is false, we don't have the message in our hcache:
* - if we also have a body: read
* - if we don't have a body: new
*/
const bool bcached =
(mutt_bcache_exists(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(ctx->hdrs[i]->data)) == 0);
ctx->hdrs[i]->old = false;
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = false;
if (hcached)
{
if (bcached)
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = true;
else if (MarkOld)
ctx->hdrs[i]->old = true;
}
else
{
if (bcached)
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = true;
}
ctx->msgcount++;
}
if (i > old_count)
mx_update_context(ctx, i - old_count);
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret < 0)
{
for (int i = ctx->msgcount; i < new_count; i++)
mutt_header_free(&ctx->hdrs[i]);
return ret;
}
/* after putting the result into our structures,
* clean up cache, i.e. wipe messages deleted outside
* the availability of our cache
*/
if (MessageCacheClean)
mutt_bcache_list(pop_data->bcache, msg_cache_check, (void *) ctx);
mutt_clear_error();
return (new_count - old_count);
}
Commit Message: Ensure UID in fetch_uidl
CWE ID: CWE-824 | 0 | 29,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned xfrm6_tunnel_spi_hash_byspi(u32 spi)
{
return spi % XFRM6_TUNNEL_SPI_BYSPI_HSIZE;
}
Commit Message: [IPV6]: Fix slab corruption running ip6sic
From: Eric Sesterhenn <snakebyte@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates(void)
{
int i = FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR;
void *entry;
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, apic_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(apic_idts), true);
for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR) {
entry = irq_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR);
set_intr_gate(i, entry);
}
for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, NR_VECTORS) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
set_bit(i, system_vectors);
set_intr_gate(i, spurious_interrupt);
#else
entry = irq_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR);
set_intr_gate(i, entry);
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mVideoBitRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 2) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
if (formatParams->nIndex == 0) {
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar;
} else if (formatParams->nIndex == 1) {
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar;
} else {
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque;
}
} else {
formatParams->eCompressionFormat =
(mEncodeMode == COMBINE_MODE_WITH_ERR_RES)
? OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4
: OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(h263type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
h263type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
h263type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero = OMX_FALSE;
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition = 0;
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(mpeg4type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mpeg4type->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
mpeg4type->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
mpeg4type->nBFrames = 0;
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold = 0;
mpeg4type->bACPred = OMX_TRUE;
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize = 256;
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes = 1000;
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension = 0;
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC = OMX_FALSE;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileLevel =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(profileLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (profileLevel->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (profileLevel->nProfileIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (mEncodeMode == H263_MODE) {
profileLevel->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline;
profileLevel->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45;
} else {
profileLevel->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore;
profileLevel->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnEnablePreferredSizeChangedMode() {
if (send_preferred_size_changes_)
return;
send_preferred_size_changes_ = true;
DidUpdateLayout();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void progress_quiet(const void *cbck, const char *title, u64 done, u64 total) { }
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 9,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dex_loadcode(RBinFile *arch, RBinDexObj *bin) {
struct r_bin_t *rbin = arch->rbin;
int i;
int *methods = NULL;
int sym_count = 0;
if (!bin || bin->methods_list) {
return false;
}
bin->code_from = UT64_MAX;
bin->code_to = 0;
bin->methods_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
if (!bin->methods_list) {
return false;
}
bin->imports_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
if (!bin->imports_list) {
r_list_free (bin->methods_list);
return false;
}
bin->classes_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)__r_bin_class_free);
if (!bin->classes_list) {
r_list_free (bin->methods_list);
r_list_free (bin->imports_list);
return false;
}
if (bin->header.method_size>bin->size) {
bin->header.method_size = 0;
return false;
}
/* WrapDown the header sizes to avoid huge allocations */
bin->header.method_size = R_MIN (bin->header.method_size, bin->size);
bin->header.class_size = R_MIN (bin->header.class_size, bin->size);
bin->header.strings_size = R_MIN (bin->header.strings_size, bin->size);
if (bin->header.strings_size > bin->size) {
eprintf ("Invalid strings size\n");
return false;
}
if (bin->classes) {
ut64 amount = sizeof (int) * bin->header.method_size;
if (amount > UT32_MAX || amount < bin->header.method_size) {
return false;
}
methods = calloc (1, amount + 1);
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.class_size; i++) {
char *super_name, *class_name;
struct dex_class_t *c = &bin->classes[i];
class_name = dex_class_name (bin, c);
super_name = dex_class_super_name (bin, c);
if (dexdump) {
rbin->cb_printf ("Class #%d -\n", i);
}
parse_class (arch, bin, c, i, methods, &sym_count);
free (class_name);
free (super_name);
}
}
if (methods) {
int import_count = 0;
int sym_count = bin->methods_list->length;
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.method_size; i++) {
int len = 0;
if (methods[i]) {
continue;
}
if (bin->methods[i].class_id > bin->header.types_size - 1) {
continue;
}
if (is_class_idx_in_code_classes(bin, bin->methods[i].class_id)) {
continue;
}
char *class_name = getstr (
bin, bin->types[bin->methods[i].class_id]
.descriptor_id);
if (!class_name) {
free (class_name);
continue;
}
len = strlen (class_name);
if (len < 1) {
continue;
}
class_name[len - 1] = 0; // remove last char ";"
char *method_name = dex_method_name (bin, i);
char *signature = dex_method_signature (bin, i);
if (method_name && *method_name) {
RBinImport *imp = R_NEW0 (RBinImport);
imp->name = r_str_newf ("%s.method.%s%s", class_name, method_name, signature);
imp->type = r_str_const ("FUNC");
imp->bind = r_str_const ("NONE");
imp->ordinal = import_count++;
r_list_append (bin->imports_list, imp);
RBinSymbol *sym = R_NEW0 (RBinSymbol);
sym->name = r_str_newf ("imp.%s", imp->name);
sym->type = r_str_const ("FUNC");
sym->bind = r_str_const ("NONE");
sym->paddr = sym->vaddr = bin->b->base + bin->header.method_offset + (sizeof (struct dex_method_t) * i) ;
sym->ordinal = sym_count++;
r_list_append (bin->methods_list, sym);
sdb_num_set (mdb, sdb_fmt (0, "method.%d", i), sym->paddr, 0);
}
free (method_name);
free (signature);
free (class_name);
}
free (methods);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: fix #6857
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tty_tiocmget(struct tty_struct *tty, int __user *p)
{
int retval = -EINVAL;
if (tty->ops->tiocmget) {
retval = tty->ops->tiocmget(tty);
if (retval >= 0)
retval = put_user(retval, p);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 23,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLFormElement::LayoutObjectIsNeeded(const ComputedStyle& style) {
if (!was_demoted_)
return HTMLElement::LayoutObjectIsNeeded(style);
ContainerNode* node = parentNode();
if (!node || !node->GetLayoutObject())
return HTMLElement::LayoutObjectIsNeeded(style);
LayoutObject* parent_layout_object = node->GetLayoutObject();
bool parent_is_table_element_part =
(parent_layout_object->IsTable() && IsHTMLTableElement(*node)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsTableRow() && IsHTMLTableRowElement(*node)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsTableSection() && node->HasTagName(tbodyTag)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsLayoutTableCol() && node->HasTagName(colTag)) ||
(parent_layout_object->IsTableCell() && IsHTMLTableRowElement(*node));
if (!parent_is_table_element_part)
return true;
EDisplay display = style.Display();
bool form_is_table_part =
display == EDisplay::kTable || display == EDisplay::kInlineTable ||
display == EDisplay::kTableRowGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableHeaderGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableFooterGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableRow ||
display == EDisplay::kTableColumnGroup ||
display == EDisplay::kTableColumn || display == EDisplay::kTableCell ||
display == EDisplay::kTableCaption;
return form_is_table_part;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::free_output_buffer_header()
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("ALL output buffers are freed/released");
output_use_buffer = false;
ouput_egl_buffers = false;
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
free (m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
if (m_platform_list) {
free(m_platform_list);
m_platform_list = NULL;
}
if (drv_ctx.ptr_respbuffer) {
free (drv_ctx.ptr_respbuffer);
drv_ctx.ptr_respbuffer = NULL;
}
if (drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer) {
free (drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer);
drv_ctx.ptr_outputbuffer = NULL;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
if (drv_ctx.op_buf_ion_info) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Free o/p ion context");
free(drv_ctx.op_buf_ion_info);
drv_ctx.op_buf_ion_info = NULL;
}
#endif
if (out_dynamic_list) {
free(out_dynamic_list);
out_dynamic_list = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err leva_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_LevelAssignmentBox *ptr = (GF_LevelAssignmentBox*)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, ptr->level_count);
for (i = 0; i<ptr->level_count; i++) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->levels[i].track_id);
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, ptr->levels[i].padding_flag << 7 | (ptr->levels[i].type & 0x7F));
if (ptr->levels[i].type == 0) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->levels[i].grouping_type);
}
else if (ptr->levels[i].type == 1) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->levels[i].grouping_type);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->levels[i].grouping_type_parameter);
}
else if (ptr->levels[i].type == 4) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->levels[i].sub_track_id);
}
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScrollAnchor::FindAnchor() {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "ScrollAnchor::findAnchor");
SCOPED_BLINK_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("Layout.ScrollAnchor.TimeToFindAnchor");
FindAnchorRecursive(ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_));
if (anchor_object_) {
anchor_object_->SetIsScrollAnchorObject();
saved_relative_offset_ =
ComputeRelativeOffset(anchor_object_, scroller_, corner_);
}
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::OnPortStatusChanged() {
DCHECK(RequestContext::current());
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (transferred_)
return;
DVLOG(1) << "Control port status changed for data pipe producer " << pipe_id_;
UpdateSignalsStateNoLock();
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FloatClipRect GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorClipRect(
const PropertyTreeState& local_state,
const PropertyTreeState& ancestor_state,
OverlayScrollbarClipBehavior clip_behavior) {
if (local_state.Clip() == ancestor_state.Clip())
return FloatClipRect();
bool success = false;
auto result = LocalToAncestorClipRectInternal(
local_state.Clip(), ancestor_state.Clip(), ancestor_state.Transform(),
clip_behavior, kNonInclusiveIntersect, success);
DCHECK(success);
if (local_state.Effect() != ancestor_state.Effect())
result.ClearIsTight();
return result;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedModifyPixels::~ScopedModifyPixels() {
if (ref_)
ref_->texture()->OnDidModifyPixels();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dn_access_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct accessdata_dn *acc)
{
unsigned char *ptr = skb->data;
acc->acc_userl = *ptr++;
memcpy(&acc->acc_user, ptr, acc->acc_userl);
ptr += acc->acc_userl;
acc->acc_passl = *ptr++;
memcpy(&acc->acc_pass, ptr, acc->acc_passl);
ptr += acc->acc_passl;
acc->acc_accl = *ptr++;
memcpy(&acc->acc_acc, ptr, acc->acc_accl);
skb_pull(skb, acc->acc_accl + acc->acc_passl + acc->acc_userl + 3);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CopyOutputCallback(std::unique_ptr<CopyOutputResult> result) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 23,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int receive_filter(VirtIONet *n, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
static const uint8_t bcast[] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
static const uint8_t vlan[] = {0x81, 0x00};
uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t *)buf;
int i;
if (n->promisc)
return 1;
ptr += n->host_hdr_len;
if (!memcmp(&ptr[12], vlan, sizeof(vlan))) {
int vid = be16_to_cpup((uint16_t *)(ptr + 14)) & 0xfff;
if (!(n->vlans[vid >> 5] & (1U << (vid & 0x1f))))
return 0;
}
if (ptr[0] & 1) { // multicast
if (!memcmp(ptr, bcast, sizeof(bcast))) {
return !n->nobcast;
} else if (n->nomulti) {
return 0;
} else if (n->allmulti || n->mac_table.multi_overflow) {
return 1;
}
for (i = n->mac_table.first_multi; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (!memcmp(ptr, &n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN], ETH_ALEN)) {
return 1;
}
}
} else { // unicast
if (n->nouni) {
return 0;
} else if (n->alluni || n->mac_table.uni_overflow) {
return 1;
} else if (!memcmp(ptr, n->mac, ETH_ALEN)) {
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.first_multi; i++) {
if (!memcmp(ptr, &n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN], ETH_ALEN)) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long super_cache_count(struct shrinker *shrink,
struct shrink_control *sc)
{
struct super_block *sb;
long total_objects = 0;
sb = container_of(shrink, struct super_block, s_shrink);
if (!grab_super_passive(sb))
return 0;
if (sb->s_op && sb->s_op->nr_cached_objects)
total_objects = sb->s_op->nr_cached_objects(sb,
sc->nid);
total_objects += list_lru_count_node(&sb->s_dentry_lru,
sc->nid);
total_objects += list_lru_count_node(&sb->s_inode_lru,
sc->nid);
total_objects = vfs_pressure_ratio(total_objects);
drop_super(sb);
return total_objects;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 21,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_eval_string(char *str, zval *retval_ptr, char *string_name) /* {{{ */
{
return zend_eval_stringl(str, strlen(str), retval_ptr, string_name);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init rose_proto_init(void)
{
int i;
int rc;
if (rose_ndevs > 0x7FFFFFFF/sizeof(struct net_device *)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_proto_init - rose_ndevs parameter to large\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rc = proto_register(&rose_proto, 0);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
rose_callsign = null_ax25_address;
dev_rose = kzalloc(rose_ndevs * sizeof(struct net_device *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev_rose == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_proto_init - unable to allocate device structure\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_proto_unregister;
}
for (i = 0; i < rose_ndevs; i++) {
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
sprintf(name, "rose%d", i);
dev = alloc_netdev(0, name, rose_setup);
if (!dev) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_proto_init - unable to allocate memory\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
rc = register_netdev(dev);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: netdevice registration failed\n");
free_netdev(dev);
goto fail;
}
rose_set_lockdep_key(dev);
dev_rose[i] = dev;
}
sock_register(&rose_family_ops);
register_netdevice_notifier(&rose_dev_notifier);
ax25_register_pid(&rose_pid);
ax25_linkfail_register(&rose_linkfail_notifier);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
rose_register_sysctl();
#endif
rose_loopback_init();
rose_add_loopback_neigh();
proc_create("rose", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net, &rose_info_fops);
proc_create("rose_neigh", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net,
&rose_neigh_fops);
proc_create("rose_nodes", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net,
&rose_nodes_fops);
proc_create("rose_routes", S_IRUGO, init_net.proc_net,
&rose_routes_fops);
out:
return rc;
fail:
while (--i >= 0) {
unregister_netdev(dev_rose[i]);
free_netdev(dev_rose[i]);
}
kfree(dev_rose);
out_proto_unregister:
proto_unregister(&rose_proto);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: rose: fix info leak via msg_name in rose_recvmsg()
The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info.
Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by
the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with
memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int index_reuc_insert(
git_index *index,
git_index_reuc_entry *reuc)
{
int res;
assert(index && reuc && reuc->path != NULL);
assert(git_vector_is_sorted(&index->reuc));
res = git_vector_insert_sorted(&index->reuc, reuc, &index_reuc_on_dup);
return res == GIT_EEXISTS ? 0 : res;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 18,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetShaderiv(
GLuint shader, GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
shader, "glGetShaderiv");
if (!info) {
return;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_SHADER_SOURCE_LENGTH:
*params = info->source() ? info->source()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
case GL_COMPILE_STATUS:
*params = info->IsValid();
return;
case GL_INFO_LOG_LENGTH:
*params = info->log_info() ? info->log_info()->size() + 1 : 0;
return;
default:
break;
}
glGetShaderiv(info->service_id(), pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_process_uid(pid_t pid, uid_t *uid) {
char *p;
FILE *f;
int r;
assert(uid);
if (pid == 0)
return getuid();
if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/status", (unsigned long) pid) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
f = fopen(p, "re");
free(p);
if (!f)
return -errno;
while (!feof(f)) {
char line[LINE_MAX], *l;
if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
if (feof(f))
break;
r = -errno;
goto finish;
}
l = strstrip(line);
if (startswith(l, "Uid:")) {
l += 4;
l += strspn(l, WHITESPACE);
l[strcspn(l, WHITESPACE)] = 0;
r = parse_uid(l, uid);
goto finish;
}
}
r = -EIO;
finish:
fclose(f);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct fuse_req *get_reserved_req(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
do {
wait_event(fc->reserved_req_waitq, ff->reserved_req);
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
if (ff->reserved_req) {
req = ff->reserved_req;
ff->reserved_req = NULL;
req->stolen_file = get_file(file);
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
} while (!req);
return req;
}
Commit Message: fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int insert_inode_locked4(struct inode *inode, unsigned long hashval,
int (*test)(struct inode *, void *), void *data)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct hlist_head *head = inode_hashtable + hash(sb, hashval);
while (1) {
struct inode *old = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode_hash_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(old, head, i_hash) {
if (old->i_sb != sb)
continue;
if (!test(old, data))
continue;
spin_lock(&old->i_lock);
if (old->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE)) {
spin_unlock(&old->i_lock);
continue;
}
break;
}
if (likely(!old)) {
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode->i_state |= I_NEW;
hlist_add_head(&inode->i_hash, head);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
return 0;
}
__iget(old);
spin_unlock(&old->i_lock);
spin_unlock(&inode_hash_lock);
wait_on_inode(old);
if (unlikely(!inode_unhashed(old))) {
iput(old);
return -EBUSY;
}
iput(old);
}
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
goto err;
ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
err:
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 3,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: retrieve_from_file (const char *file, bool html, int *count)
{
uerr_t status;
struct urlpos *url_list, *cur_url;
struct iri *iri = iri_new();
char *input_file, *url_file = NULL;
const char *url = file;
status = RETROK; /* Suppose everything is OK. */
*count = 0; /* Reset the URL count. */
/* sXXXav : Assume filename and links in the file are in the locale */
set_uri_encoding (iri, opt.locale, true);
set_content_encoding (iri, opt.locale);
if (url_valid_scheme (url))
{
int dt,url_err;
struct url *url_parsed = url_parse (url, &url_err, iri, true);
if (!url_parsed)
{
char *error = url_error (url, url_err);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s.\n", url, error);
xfree (error);
iri_free (iri);
return URLERROR;
}
if (!opt.base_href)
opt.base_href = xstrdup (url);
status = retrieve_url (url_parsed, url, &url_file, NULL, NULL, &dt,
false, iri, true);
url_free (url_parsed);
if (!url_file || (status != RETROK))
return status;
if (dt & TEXTHTML)
html = true;
#ifdef ENABLE_IRI
/* If we have a found a content encoding, use it.
* ( == is okay, because we're checking for identical object) */
if (iri->content_encoding != opt.locale)
set_uri_encoding (iri, iri->content_encoding, false);
#endif
/* Reset UTF-8 encode status */
iri->utf8_encode = opt.enable_iri;
xfree (iri->orig_url);
input_file = url_file;
}
else
input_file = (char *) file;
url_list = (html ? get_urls_html (input_file, NULL, NULL, iri)
: get_urls_file (input_file));
xfree (url_file);
for (cur_url = url_list; cur_url; cur_url = cur_url->next, ++*count)
{
char *filename = NULL, *new_file = NULL, *proxy;
int dt = 0;
struct iri *tmpiri = iri_dup (iri);
struct url *parsed_url = NULL;
if (cur_url->ignore_when_downloading)
continue;
if (opt.quota && total_downloaded_bytes > opt.quota)
{
status = QUOTEXC;
break;
}
parsed_url = url_parse (cur_url->url->url, NULL, tmpiri, true);
proxy = getproxy (cur_url->url);
if ((opt.recursive || opt.page_requisites)
&& ((cur_url->url->scheme != SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
&& cur_url->url->scheme != SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
) || proxy))
{
int old_follow_ftp = opt.follow_ftp;
/* Turn opt.follow_ftp on in case of recursive FTP retrieval */
if (cur_url->url->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| cur_url->url->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
)
opt.follow_ftp = 1;
status = retrieve_tree (parsed_url ? parsed_url : cur_url->url,
tmpiri);
opt.follow_ftp = old_follow_ftp;
}
else
status = retrieve_url (parsed_url ? parsed_url : cur_url->url,
cur_url->url->url, &filename,
&new_file, NULL, &dt, opt.recursive, tmpiri,
true);
xfree (proxy);
if (parsed_url)
url_free (parsed_url);
if (filename && opt.delete_after && file_exists_p (filename))
{
DEBUGP (("\
Removing file due to --delete-after in retrieve_from_file():\n"));
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Removing %s.\n"), filename);
if (unlink (filename))
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "unlink: %s\n", strerror (errno));
dt &= ~RETROKF;
}
xfree (new_file);
xfree (filename);
iri_free (tmpiri);
}
/* Free the linked list of URL-s. */
free_urlpos (url_list);
iri_free (iri);
return status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 20,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest25(void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
uint8_t payload[4];
TCPHdr tcph;
int ret = 0;
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_CWR;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(2);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(6);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
ret = 1;
end:
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::ShowCertificateViewerInDevTools(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
scoped_refptr<net::X509Certificate> certificate) {
ShowCertificateViewer(certificate);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 4,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct mount *source_mnt,
struct mount *dest_mnt,
struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct path *parent_path)
{
HLIST_HEAD(tree_list);
struct mount *child, *p;
struct hlist_node *n;
int err;
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(dest_mnt)) {
err = invent_group_ids(source_mnt, true);
if (err)
goto out;
err = propagate_mnt(dest_mnt, dest_mp, source_mnt, &tree_list);
lock_mount_hash();
if (err)
goto out_cleanup_ids;
for (p = source_mnt; p; p = next_mnt(p, source_mnt))
set_mnt_shared(p);
} else {
lock_mount_hash();
}
if (parent_path) {
detach_mnt(source_mnt, parent_path);
attach_mnt(source_mnt, dest_mnt, dest_mp);
touch_mnt_namespace(source_mnt->mnt_ns);
} else {
mnt_set_mountpoint(dest_mnt, dest_mp, source_mnt);
commit_tree(source_mnt, NULL);
}
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(child, n, &tree_list, mnt_hash) {
struct mount *q;
hlist_del_init(&child->mnt_hash);
q = __lookup_mnt_last(&child->mnt_parent->mnt,
child->mnt_mountpoint);
commit_tree(child, q);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
return 0;
out_cleanup_ids:
while (!hlist_empty(&tree_list)) {
child = hlist_entry(tree_list.first, struct mount, mnt_hash);
umount_tree(child, 0);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
cleanup_group_ids(source_mnt, NULL);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void testInspectorManualAttachDetach(CustomInspectorTest* test, gconstpointer)
{
test->showInWindowAndWaitUntilMapped(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
test->resizeView(200, 200);
test->loadHtml("<html><body><p>WebKitGTK+ Inspector test</p></body></html>", 0);
test->waitUntilLoadFinished();
test->showAndWaitUntilFinished(false);
test->assertObjectIsDeletedWhenTestFinishes(G_OBJECT(webkit_web_inspector_get_web_view(test->m_inspector)));
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
Vector<InspectorTest::InspectorEvents>& events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::BringToFront);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->resizeViewAndAttach();
g_assert(webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 1);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Attach);
test->m_events.clear();
test->detachAndWaitUntilWindowOpened();
g_assert(!webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Detach);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::OpenWindow);
test->m_events.clear();
test->resizeViewAndAttach();
g_assert(webkit_web_inspector_is_attached(test->m_inspector));
test->m_events.clear();
test->closeAndWaitUntilClosed();
events = test->m_events;
g_assert_cmpint(events.size(), ==, 2);
g_assert_cmpint(events[0], ==, InspectorTest::Detach);
g_assert_cmpint(events[1], ==, InspectorTest::Closed);
test->m_events.clear();
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 24,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->arch.time_page) {
kvm_release_page_dirty(vcpu->arch.time_page);
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
}
free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
fx_free(vcpu);
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_free(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cliprdr_set_mode(const char *optarg)
{
ui_clip_set_mode(optarg);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxShading *GfxGouraudTriangleShading::copy() {
return new GfxGouraudTriangleShading(this);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXObject::parentObject() const {
if (isDetached())
return 0;
if (m_parent)
return m_parent;
if (axObjectCache().isAriaOwned(this))
return axObjectCache().getAriaOwnedParent(this);
return computeParent();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 21,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void init_executor(void) /* {{{ */
{
zend_init_fpu();
ZVAL_NULL(&EG(uninitialized_zval));
ZVAL_NULL(&EG(error_zval));
/* destroys stack frame, therefore makes core dumps worthless */
#if 0&&ZEND_DEBUG
original_sigsegv_handler = signal(SIGSEGV, zend_handle_sigsegv);
#endif
EG(symtable_cache_ptr) = EG(symtable_cache) - 1;
EG(symtable_cache_limit) = EG(symtable_cache) + SYMTABLE_CACHE_SIZE - 1;
EG(no_extensions) = 0;
EG(function_table) = CG(function_table);
EG(class_table) = CG(class_table);
EG(in_autoload) = NULL;
EG(autoload_func) = NULL;
EG(error_handling) = EH_NORMAL;
zend_vm_stack_init();
zend_hash_init(&EG(symbol_table), 64, NULL, ZVAL_PTR_DTOR, 0);
EG(valid_symbol_table) = 1;
zend_llist_apply(&zend_extensions, (llist_apply_func_t) zend_extension_activator);
zend_hash_init(&EG(included_files), 8, NULL, NULL, 0);
EG(ticks_count) = 0;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&EG(user_error_handler));
EG(current_execute_data) = NULL;
zend_stack_init(&EG(user_error_handlers_error_reporting), sizeof(int));
zend_stack_init(&EG(user_error_handlers), sizeof(zval));
zend_stack_init(&EG(user_exception_handlers), sizeof(zval));
zend_objects_store_init(&EG(objects_store), 1024);
EG(full_tables_cleanup) = 0;
#ifdef ZEND_WIN32
EG(timed_out) = 0;
#endif
EG(exception) = NULL;
EG(prev_exception) = NULL;
EG(scope) = NULL;
EG(ht_iterators_count) = sizeof(EG(ht_iterators_slots)) / sizeof(HashTableIterator);
EG(ht_iterators_used) = 0;
EG(ht_iterators) = EG(ht_iterators_slots);
memset(EG(ht_iterators), 0, sizeof(EG(ht_iterators_slots)));
EG(active) = 1;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 20,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int len, padded_len;
const char *emsg;
const u_char *cp;
u_char *p;
u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
int r;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8)
return 0;
/* Get length of incoming packet. */
len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input));
if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u",
len)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
return 0;
/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
/* Consume packet length. */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
* (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
* Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
*/
if (!state->receive_context.plaintext) {
emsg = NULL;
switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) {
case DEATTACK_OK:
break;
case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected";
break;
case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
emsg = "deattack denial of service detected";
break;
default:
emsg = "deattack error";
break;
}
if (emsg != NULL) {
error("%s", emsg);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
}
/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, 0, p,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* Compute packet checksum. */
checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4);
/* Skip padding. */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Test check bytes. */
if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) {
error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__,
len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet));
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (checksum != stored_checksum) {
error("Corrupted check bytes on input");
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0)
goto out;
if (state->packet_compression) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
}
state->p_read.packets++;
state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) {
error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WaitForDownloadInfo(
std::unique_ptr<std::vector<history::DownloadRow>>* results) {
history::HistoryService* hs = HistoryServiceFactory::GetForProfile(
profile_, ServiceAccessType::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
DCHECK(hs);
hs->QueryDownloads(
base::Bind(&DownloadsHistoryDataCollector::OnQueryDownloadsComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
content::RunMessageLoop();
if (result_valid_) {
*results = std::move(results_);
}
return result_valid_;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_extra(const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
int cnt= buf[5]&0x1f;
const uint8_t *p= buf+6;
while(cnt--){
int nalsize= AV_RB16(p) + 2;
if(nalsize > buf_size - (p-buf) || p[2]!=0x67)
return 0;
p += nalsize;
}
cnt = *(p++);
if(!cnt)
return 0;
while(cnt--){
int nalsize= AV_RB16(p) + 2;
if(nalsize > buf_size - (p-buf) || p[2]!=0x68)
return 0;
p += nalsize;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_sv3d(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int size, layout;
int32_t yaw, pitch, roll;
uint32_t l = 0, t = 0, r = 0, b = 0;
uint32_t tag, padding = 0;
enum AVSphericalProjection projection;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams - 1];
sc = st->priv_data;
if (atom.size < 8) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Empty spherical video box\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size <= 12 || size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('s','v','h','d')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing spherical video header\n");
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 4); /* version + flags */
avio_skip(pb, size - 12); /* metadata_source */
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('p','r','o','j')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing projection box\n");
return 0;
}
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
if (tag != MKTAG('p','r','h','d')) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Missing projection header box\n");
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 4); /* version + flags */
/* 16.16 fixed point */
yaw = avio_rb32(pb);
pitch = avio_rb32(pb);
roll = avio_rb32(pb);
size = avio_rb32(pb);
if (size > atom.size)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 4); /* version + flags */
switch (tag) {
case MKTAG('c','b','m','p'):
layout = avio_rb32(pb);
if (layout) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Unsupported cubemap layout %d\n", layout);
return 0;
}
projection = AV_SPHERICAL_CUBEMAP;
padding = avio_rb32(pb);
break;
case MKTAG('e','q','u','i'):
t = avio_rb32(pb);
b = avio_rb32(pb);
l = avio_rb32(pb);
r = avio_rb32(pb);
if (b >= UINT_MAX - t || r >= UINT_MAX - l) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid bounding rectangle coordinates "
"%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32",%"PRIu32"\n", l, t, r, b);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (l || t || r || b)
projection = AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR_TILE;
else
projection = AV_SPHERICAL_EQUIRECTANGULAR;
break;
default:
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown projection type\n");
return 0;
}
sc->spherical = av_spherical_alloc(&sc->spherical_size);
if (!sc->spherical)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->spherical->projection = projection;
sc->spherical->yaw = yaw;
sc->spherical->pitch = pitch;
sc->spherical->roll = roll;
sc->spherical->padding = padding;
sc->spherical->bound_left = l;
sc->spherical->bound_top = t;
sc->spherical->bound_right = r;
sc->spherical->bound_bottom = b;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 19,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dm_wait_event(struct mapped_device *md, int event_nr)
{
return wait_event_interruptible(md->eventq,
(event_nr != atomic_read(&md->event_nr)));
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceLoader::DidDownloadData(int length, int encoded_data_length) {
Context().DispatchDidDownloadData(resource_->Identifier(), length,
encoded_data_length);
resource_->DidDownloadData(length);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *parent_tidptr,
int __user *child_tidptr)
{
struct task_struct *p;
int trace = 0;
long nr;
/*
* We hope to recycle these flags after 2.6.26
*/
if (unlikely(clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED)) {
static int __read_mostly count = 100;
if (count > 0 && printk_ratelimit()) {
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
count--;
printk(KERN_INFO "fork(): process `%s' used deprecated "
"clone flags 0x%lx\n",
get_task_comm(comm, current),
clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED);
}
}
/*
* When called from kernel_thread, don't do user tracing stuff.
*/
if (likely(user_mode(regs)))
trace = tracehook_prepare_clone(clone_flags);
p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, regs, stack_size,
child_tidptr, NULL, trace);
/*
* Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
* might get invalid after that point, if the thread exits quickly.
*/
if (!IS_ERR(p)) {
struct completion vfork;
trace_sched_process_fork(current, p);
nr = task_pid_vnr(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT_SETTID)
put_user(nr, parent_tidptr);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
p->vfork_done = &vfork;
init_completion(&vfork);
}
tracehook_report_clone(trace, regs, clone_flags, nr, p);
/*
* We set PF_STARTING at creation in case tracing wants to
* use this to distinguish a fully live task from one that
* hasn't gotten to tracehook_report_clone() yet. Now we
* clear it and set the child going.
*/
p->flags &= ~PF_STARTING;
if (unlikely(clone_flags & CLONE_STOPPED)) {
/*
* We'll start up with an immediate SIGSTOP.
*/
sigaddset(&p->pending.signal, SIGSTOP);
set_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SIGPENDING);
__set_task_state(p, TASK_STOPPED);
} else {
wake_up_new_task(p, clone_flags);
}
tracehook_report_clone_complete(trace, regs,
clone_flags, nr, p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
freezer_do_not_count();
wait_for_completion(&vfork);
freezer_count();
tracehook_report_vfork_done(p, nr);
}
} else {
nr = PTR_ERR(p);
}
return nr;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ExecuteJavaScript(
const base::string16& javascript,
const JavaScriptResultCallback& callback) {
CHECK(CanExecuteJavaScript());
int key = g_next_javascript_callback_id++;
Send(new FrameMsg_JavaScriptExecuteRequest(routing_id_,
javascript,
key, true));
javascript_callbacks_.insert(std::make_pair(key, callback));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 21,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXObject::isPresentationalChild() const {
updateCachedAttributeValuesIfNeeded();
return m_cachedIsPresentationalChild;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 19,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
{
u32 dummy[2];
unsigned i, j;
/* skip the first msrs in the list. KVM-specific */
for (i = j = KVM_SAVE_MSRS_BEGIN; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save); i++) {
if (rdmsr_safe(msrs_to_save[i], &dummy[0], &dummy[1]) < 0)
continue;
if (j < i)
msrs_to_save[j] = msrs_to_save[i];
j++;
}
num_msrs_to_save = j;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLInputElement::altText() const
{
String alt = fastGetAttribute(altAttr);
if (alt.isNull())
alt = getAttribute(titleAttr);
if (alt.isNull())
alt = getAttribute(valueAttr);
if (alt.isEmpty())
alt = locale().queryString(blink::WebLocalizedString::InputElementAltText);
return alt;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_getct(int colorspace, int type, int assoc)
{
if (type == 1 && assoc == 0) {
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_OPACITY;
}
if (type == 0 && assoc >= 1 && assoc <= 65534) {
switch (colorspace) {
case JAS_CLRSPC_FAM_RGB:
switch (assoc) {
case JP2_CDEF_RGB_R:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_R);
break;
case JP2_CDEF_RGB_G:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_G);
break;
case JP2_CDEF_RGB_B:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_RGB_B);
break;
}
break;
case JAS_CLRSPC_FAM_YCBCR:
switch (assoc) {
case JP2_CDEF_YCBCR_Y:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_YCBCR_Y);
break;
case JP2_CDEF_YCBCR_CB:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_YCBCR_CB);
break;
case JP2_CDEF_YCBCR_CR:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_YCBCR_CR);
break;
}
break;
case JAS_CLRSPC_FAM_GRAY:
switch (assoc) {
case JP2_CDEF_GRAY_Y:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(JAS_CLRSPC_CHANIND_GRAY_Y);
break;
}
break;
default:
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_COLOR(assoc - 1);
break;
}
}
return JAS_IMAGE_CT_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 18,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_mig_target_client_disconnect_all(void)
{
RingItem *now, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(now, next, &reds->mig_target_clients) {
RedsMigTargetClient *mig_client = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(now, RedsMigTargetClient, link);
reds_client_disconnect(mig_client->client);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_durable_context(struct kvec *iov, unsigned int *num_iovec,
struct cifs_open_parms *oparms, bool use_persistent)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
if (use_persistent) {
if (oparms->reconnect)
return add_durable_reconnect_v2_context(iov, num_iovec,
oparms);
else
return add_durable_v2_context(iov, num_iovec, oparms);
}
if (oparms->reconnect) {
iov[num].iov_base = create_reconnect_durable_buf(oparms->fid);
/* indicate that we don't need to relock the file */
oparms->reconnect = false;
} else
iov[num].iov_base = create_durable_buf();
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = sizeof(struct create_durable);
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) +
iov[1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength, sizeof(struct create_durable));
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_attr_as4_aggregator (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args,
as_t *as4_aggregator_as,
struct in_addr *as4_aggregator_addr)
{
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
if (length != 8)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_ERR, "New Aggregator length is not 8 [%d]",
length);
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
0);
}
*as4_aggregator_as = stream_getl (peer->ibuf);
as4_aggregator_addr->s_addr = stream_get_ipv4 (peer->ibuf);
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_AS4_AGGREGATOR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rose_sock *rose;
if (sk == NULL) return 0;
sock_hold(sk);
sock_orphan(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
rose = rose_sk(sk);
switch (rose->state) {
case ROSE_STATE_0:
release_sock(sk);
rose_disconnect(sk, 0, -1, -1);
lock_sock(sk);
rose_destroy_socket(sk);
break;
case ROSE_STATE_2:
rose->neighbour->use--;
release_sock(sk);
rose_disconnect(sk, 0, -1, -1);
lock_sock(sk);
rose_destroy_socket(sk);
break;
case ROSE_STATE_1:
case ROSE_STATE_3:
case ROSE_STATE_4:
case ROSE_STATE_5:
rose_clear_queues(sk);
rose_stop_idletimer(sk);
rose_write_internal(sk, ROSE_CLEAR_REQUEST);
rose_start_t3timer(sk);
rose->state = ROSE_STATE_2;
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY);
break;
default:
break;
}
sock->sk = NULL;
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedSubstFont::ScopedSubstFont(PDFiumEngine* engine)
: old_engine_(g_engine_for_fontmapper) {
g_engine_for_fontmapper = engine;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FillWithEs()
{
register int i;
register unsigned char *p, *ep;
LClearAll(&curr->w_layer, 1);
curr->w_y = curr->w_x = 0;
for (i = 0; i < rows; ++i)
{
clear_mline(&curr->w_mlines[i], 0, cols + 1);
p = curr->w_mlines[i].image;
ep = p + cols;
while (p < ep)
*p++ = 'E';
}
LRefreshAll(&curr->w_layer, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::ShowMouseOverURL(const HitTestResult& result) {
if (!web_view_->Client())
return;
WebURL url;
if (!result.GetScrollbar()) {
if (result.IsLiveLink() &&
!result.AbsoluteLinkURL().GetString().IsEmpty()) {
url = result.AbsoluteLinkURL();
} else if (result.InnerNode() &&
(IsHTMLObjectElement(*result.InnerNode()) ||
IsHTMLEmbedElement(*result.InnerNode()))) {
LayoutObject* object = result.InnerNode()->GetLayoutObject();
if (object && object->IsLayoutEmbeddedContent()) {
WebPluginContainerImpl* plugin_view =
ToLayoutEmbeddedContent(object)->Plugin();
if (plugin_view) {
url = plugin_view->Plugin()->LinkAtPosition(
result.RoundedPointInInnerNodeFrame());
}
}
}
}
web_view_->Client()->SetMouseOverURL(url);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::numberOfTouchEventHandlersChanged(unsigned num_handlers) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidChangeNumTouchEvents(routing_id_, num_handlers));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n;
unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* Fool emacs indentation */
if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
else
{
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
q=p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p+=2;
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
#endif
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
{
s2n(n,q);
n+=2;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
&kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5rc)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
**
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
** Example:
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
** optional authenticator omitted.
*/
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
p+= enc_ticket->length;
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
if (authp && authp->length)
{
s2n(authp->length,p);
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
p+= authp->length;
n+= authp->length + 2;
free(authp->data);
authp->data = NULL;
authp->length = 0;
}
else
{
s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
n+=2;
}
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
** kssl_ctx->length);
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
kssl_ctx->key,iv);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
sizeof tmp_buf);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
outl += padl;
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
s2n(outl,p);
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
p+=outl;
n+=outl + 2;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
else
{
/* we get them from the cert */
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
/* generate a new random key */
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,n);
/* clean up */
memset(p,0,n);
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
n+=2;
DH_free(dh_clnt);
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
* To add such support, one needs to add
* code that checks for appropriate
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
* For example, the cert have an ECC
* key on the same curve as the server's
* and the key should be authorized for
* key agreement.
*
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
* to skip sending the certificate verify
* message.
*
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
*/
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
{
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
}
else
{
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
* We only need our private key to perform
* the ECDH computation.
*/
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (priv_key == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* generate master key from the result */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p, n);
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
}
else
{
/* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
(bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key */
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
{
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
if (!peer_cert)
peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
if (!peer_cert) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
* would be used
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
* context data */
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
8,shared_ukm)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen=255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80)
{
*(p++)=0x81;
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+3;
}
else
{
*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
n=msglen+2;
}
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
{
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
{
/* send off the data */
n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(n,p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
n+=2;
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
goto err;
}
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
else if (psk_len == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t+=psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length =
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
n = strlen(identity);
s2n(n, p);
memcpy(p, identity, n);
n+=2;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
else
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return(-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RequestContextType request_context_type() { return request_context_type_; }
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int dentry_cmp(const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char *ct, unsigned tcount)
{
/*
* Be careful about RCU walk racing with rename:
* use 'lockless_dereference' to fetch the name pointer.
*
* NOTE! Even if a rename will mean that the length
* was not loaded atomically, we don't care. The
* RCU walk will check the sequence count eventually,
* and catch it. And we won't overrun the buffer,
* because we're reading the name pointer atomically,
* and a dentry name is guaranteed to be properly
* terminated with a NUL byte.
*
* End result: even if 'len' is wrong, we'll exit
* early because the data cannot match (there can
* be no NUL in the ct/tcount data)
*/
const unsigned char *cs = lockless_dereference(dentry->d_name.name);
return dentry_string_cmp(cs, ct, tcount);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 29,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool debugfs_initialized(void)
{
return debugfs_registered;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 15,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma_create_xprt(struct svc_serv *serv,
int listener)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *cma_xprt = kzalloc(sizeof *cma_xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cma_xprt)
return NULL;
svc_xprt_init(&init_net, &svc_rdma_class, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt, serv);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_accept_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_rq_dto_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_read_complete_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_frmr_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_ctxts);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cma_xprt->sc_maps);
init_waitqueue_head(&cma_xprt->sc_send_wait);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_rq_dto_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_frmr_q_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_ctxt_lock);
spin_lock_init(&cma_xprt->sc_map_lock);
/*
* Note that this implies that the underlying transport support
* has some form of congestion control (see RFC 7530 section 3.1
* paragraph 2). For now, we assume that all supported RDMA
* transports are suitable here.
*/
set_bit(XPT_CONG_CTRL, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
if (listener)
set_bit(XPT_LISTENER, &cma_xprt->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
return cma_xprt;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 3,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getRGBLine(Guchar *in, unsigned int *out, int length) {
int i, j;
Guchar *inp, *tmp_line;
switch (colorSpace->getMode()) {
case csIndexed:
case csSeparation:
tmp_line = (Guchar *) gmalloc (length * nComps2);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nComps2; j++) {
tmp_line[i * nComps2 + j] = byte_lookup[in[i] * nComps2 + j];
}
}
colorSpace2->getRGBLine(tmp_line, out, length);
gfree (tmp_line);
break;
default:
inp = in;
for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
for (i = 0; i < nComps; i++) {
*inp = byte_lookup[*inp * nComps + i];
inp++;
}
colorSpace->getRGBLine(in, out, length);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 10,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JBIG2Stream::discardSegment(Guint segNum) {
JBIG2Segment *seg;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < globalSegments->getLength(); ++i) {
seg = (JBIG2Segment *)globalSegments->get(i);
if (seg->getSegNum() == segNum) {
globalSegments->del(i);
return;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < segments->getLength(); ++i) {
seg = (JBIG2Segment *)segments->get(i);
if (seg->getSegNum() == segNum) {
segments->del(i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_std_midi_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
struct usb_host_interface *alts)
{
struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *mshd;
struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *msepd;
/* must have the MIDIStreaming interface header descriptor*/
mshd = (struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *)alts->extra;
if (alts->extralen < 7 ||
mshd->bLength < 7 ||
mshd->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE ||
mshd->bDescriptorSubtype != USB_MS_HEADER)
return -ENODEV;
/* must have the MIDIStreaming endpoint descriptor*/
msepd = (struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *)alts->endpoint[0].extra;
if (alts->endpoint[0].extralen < 4 ||
msepd->bLength < 4 ||
msepd->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT ||
msepd->bDescriptorSubtype != UAC_MS_GENERAL ||
msepd->bNumEmbMIDIJack < 1 ||
msepd->bNumEmbMIDIJack > 16)
return -ENODEV;
return create_any_midi_quirk(chip, iface, driver, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool WhitesAreEqual(int n, cmsUInt16Number White1[], cmsUInt16Number White2[] )
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
if (abs(White1[i] - White2[i]) > 0xf000) return TRUE; // Values are so extremly different that the fixup should be avoided
if (White1[i] != White2[i]) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void migrate_page_add(struct page *page, struct list_head *pagelist,
unsigned long flags)
{
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irqtime_account_si_update(void)
{
struct cpu_usage_stat *cpustat = &kstat_this_cpu.cpustat;
unsigned long flags;
u64 latest_ns;
int ret = 0;
local_irq_save(flags);
latest_ns = this_cpu_read(cpu_softirq_time);
if (cputime64_gt(nsecs_to_cputime64(latest_ns), cpustat->softirq))
ret = 1;
local_irq_restore(flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
{
u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
int ret = 0;
if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
return ret & mask;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sock_efree(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
sock_put(skb->sk);
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillManager::IsCreditCardAutofillEnabled() {
return client_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kAutofillCreditCardEnabled) &&
client_->IsAutofillSupported();
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjId(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = jsNumber(impl->id());
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vmsplice_to_pipe(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
struct page *pages[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct partial_page partial[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
.nr_pages_max = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS,
.flags = flags,
.ops = &user_page_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = spd_release_page,
};
long ret;
pipe = get_pipe_info(file);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
if (splice_grow_spd(pipe, &spd))
return -ENOMEM;
spd.nr_pages = get_iovec_page_array(iov, nr_segs, spd.pages,
spd.partial, false,
spd.nr_pages_max);
if (spd.nr_pages <= 0)
ret = spd.nr_pages;
else
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
splice_shrink_spd(&spd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnCompositingStarted(ui::Compositor* compositor,
base::TimeTicks start_time) {
if (latency_histogram_state_ == COMPOSITING_COMMIT)
latency_histogram_state_ = COMPOSITING_STARTED;
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 17,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t o2nm_cluster_reconnect_delay_ms_show(
struct config_item *item, char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%u\n",
to_o2nm_cluster(item)->cl_reconnect_delay_ms);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_tag_and_len(unsigned int tag, size_t len, u8 **ptr)
{
int i;
u8 *p;
if (len < 128) {
i = 2;
} else if (len < 256) {
i = 3;
} else {
i = 4;
}
if (ptr) {
p = *ptr;
*p++ = (u8)tag;
switch (i) {
case 2:
*p++ = len;
break;
case 3:
*p++ = 0x81;
*p++ = len;
break;
case 4:
*p++ = 0x82;
*p++ = (u8) (len >> 8);
*p++ = (u8) (len & 0xff);
break;
}
*ptr = p;
} else {
i += len;
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sas_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)
{
struct sas_internal *i = to_sas_internal(host->transportt);
struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
struct sas_task *task;
int res = 0;
/* If the device fell off, no sense in issuing commands */
if (test_bit(SAS_DEV_GONE, &dev->state)) {
cmd->result = DID_BAD_TARGET << 16;
goto out_done;
}
if (dev_is_sata(dev)) {
spin_lock_irq(dev->sata_dev.ap->lock);
res = ata_sas_queuecmd(cmd, dev->sata_dev.ap);
spin_unlock_irq(dev->sata_dev.ap->lock);
return res;
}
task = sas_create_task(cmd, dev, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!task)
return SCSI_MLQUEUE_HOST_BUSY;
res = i->dft->lldd_execute_task(task, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (res)
goto out_free_task;
return 0;
out_free_task:
SAS_DPRINTK("lldd_execute_task returned: %d\n", res);
ASSIGN_SAS_TASK(cmd, NULL);
sas_free_task(task);
if (res == -SAS_QUEUE_FULL)
cmd->result = DID_SOFT_ERROR << 16; /* retry */
else
cmd->result = DID_ERROR << 16;
out_done:
cmd->scsi_done(cmd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CompositorImpl::IsDrawingFirstVisibleFrame() const {
return !has_submitted_frame_since_became_visible_;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool IsValidNameStart(UChar32 c) {
if ((c >= 0x02BB && c <= 0x02C1) || c == 0x559 || c == 0x6E5 || c == 0x6E6)
return true;
if (c == ':' || c == '_')
return true;
const uint32_t kNameStartMask =
WTF::Unicode::kLetter_Lowercase | WTF::Unicode::kLetter_Uppercase |
WTF::Unicode::kLetter_Other | WTF::Unicode::kLetter_Titlecase |
WTF::Unicode::kNumber_Letter;
if (!(WTF::Unicode::Category(c) & kNameStartMask))
return false;
if (c >= 0xF900 && c < 0xFFFE)
return false;
WTF::Unicode::CharDecompositionType decomp_type =
WTF::Unicode::DecompositionType(c);
if (decomp_type == WTF::Unicode::kDecompositionFont ||
decomp_type == WTF::Unicode::kDecompositionCompat)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 6,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __tg3_readphy(struct tg3 *tp, unsigned int phy_addr, int reg,
u32 *val)
{
u32 frame_val;
unsigned int loops;
int ret;
if ((tp->mi_mode & MAC_MI_MODE_AUTO_POLL) != 0) {
tw32_f(MAC_MI_MODE,
(tp->mi_mode & ~MAC_MI_MODE_AUTO_POLL));
udelay(80);
}
tg3_ape_lock(tp, tp->phy_ape_lock);
*val = 0x0;
frame_val = ((phy_addr << MI_COM_PHY_ADDR_SHIFT) &
MI_COM_PHY_ADDR_MASK);
frame_val |= ((reg << MI_COM_REG_ADDR_SHIFT) &
MI_COM_REG_ADDR_MASK);
frame_val |= (MI_COM_CMD_READ | MI_COM_START);
tw32_f(MAC_MI_COM, frame_val);
loops = PHY_BUSY_LOOPS;
while (loops != 0) {
udelay(10);
frame_val = tr32(MAC_MI_COM);
if ((frame_val & MI_COM_BUSY) == 0) {
udelay(5);
frame_val = tr32(MAC_MI_COM);
break;
}
loops -= 1;
}
ret = -EBUSY;
if (loops != 0) {
*val = frame_val & MI_COM_DATA_MASK;
ret = 0;
}
if ((tp->mi_mode & MAC_MI_MODE_AUTO_POLL) != 0) {
tw32_f(MAC_MI_MODE, tp->mi_mode);
udelay(80);
}
tg3_ape_unlock(tp, tp->phy_ape_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetConfig(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 29,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline char* getEmptyString()
{
gEmptyStringBuf->acquire();
return gEmptyString;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateMagnetometer() {
auto callback = base::Bind(&PlatformSensorFusionTest::MagnetometerCallback,
base::Unretained(this));
provider_->CreateSensor(SensorType::MAGNETOMETER, callback);
EXPECT_TRUE(magnetometer_callback_called_);
EXPECT_TRUE(magnetometer_);
EXPECT_EQ(SensorType::MAGNETOMETER, magnetometer_->GetType());
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 16,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContents* ShowSingletonTab(const GURL& page) {
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), page);
WebContents* wc = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
CHECK(wc->GetURL() == page);
WaitForLauncherThread();
WaitForMessageProcessing(wc);
return wc;
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static s32 brcmf_inform_single_bss(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg,
struct brcmf_bss_info_le *bi)
{
struct wiphy *wiphy = cfg_to_wiphy(cfg);
struct ieee80211_channel *notify_channel;
struct cfg80211_bss *bss;
struct ieee80211_supported_band *band;
struct brcmu_chan ch;
u16 channel;
u32 freq;
u16 notify_capability;
u16 notify_interval;
u8 *notify_ie;
size_t notify_ielen;
s32 notify_signal;
if (le32_to_cpu(bi->length) > WL_BSS_INFO_MAX) {
brcmf_err("Bss info is larger than buffer. Discarding\n");
return 0;
}
if (!bi->ctl_ch) {
ch.chspec = le16_to_cpu(bi->chanspec);
cfg->d11inf.decchspec(&ch);
bi->ctl_ch = ch.control_ch_num;
}
channel = bi->ctl_ch;
if (channel <= CH_MAX_2G_CHANNEL)
band = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ];
else
band = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_5GHZ];
freq = ieee80211_channel_to_frequency(channel, band->band);
notify_channel = ieee80211_get_channel(wiphy, freq);
notify_capability = le16_to_cpu(bi->capability);
notify_interval = le16_to_cpu(bi->beacon_period);
notify_ie = (u8 *)bi + le16_to_cpu(bi->ie_offset);
notify_ielen = le32_to_cpu(bi->ie_length);
notify_signal = (s16)le16_to_cpu(bi->RSSI) * 100;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "bssid: %pM\n", bi->BSSID);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Channel: %d(%d)\n", channel, freq);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Capability: %X\n", notify_capability);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Beacon interval: %d\n", notify_interval);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Signal: %d\n", notify_signal);
bss = cfg80211_inform_bss(wiphy, notify_channel,
CFG80211_BSS_FTYPE_UNKNOWN,
(const u8 *)bi->BSSID,
0, notify_capability,
notify_interval, notify_ie,
notify_ielen, notify_signal,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bss)
return -ENOMEM;
cfg80211_put_bss(wiphy, bss);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_itr(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
uint32_t interval = val & 0xffff;
trace_e1000e_irq_itr_set(val);
core->itr_guest_value = interval;
core->mac[index] = MAX(interval, E1000E_MIN_XITR);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 21,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int blkcipher_walk_next(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
unsigned int alignmask = crypto_blkcipher_alignmask(tfm);
unsigned int bsize;
unsigned int n;
int err;
n = walk->total;
if (unlikely(n < crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm))) {
desc->flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_BLOCK_LEN;
return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EINVAL);
}
walk->flags &= ~(BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW | BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY |
BLKCIPHER_WALK_DIFF);
if (!scatterwalk_aligned(&walk->in, alignmask) ||
!scatterwalk_aligned(&walk->out, alignmask)) {
walk->flags |= BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY;
if (!walk->page) {
walk->page = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!walk->page)
n = 0;
}
}
bsize = min(walk->blocksize, n);
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk->in, n);
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk->out, n);
if (unlikely(n < bsize)) {
err = blkcipher_next_slow(desc, walk, bsize, alignmask);
goto set_phys_lowmem;
}
walk->nbytes = n;
if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY) {
err = blkcipher_next_copy(walk);
goto set_phys_lowmem;
}
return blkcipher_next_fast(desc, walk);
set_phys_lowmem:
if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS) {
walk->src.phys.page = virt_to_page(walk->src.virt.addr);
walk->dst.phys.page = virt_to_page(walk->dst.virt.addr);
walk->src.phys.offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
walk->dst.phys.offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_RTG( INS_ARG )
{
DO_RTG
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID ixheaacd_dct3_32(WORD32 *input, WORD32 *output,
const WORD16 *main_twidle_fwd, const WORD16 *post_tbl,
const WORD16 *w_16, const WORD32 *p_table) {
WORD32 n, k;
WORD32 temp1[6];
WORD32 temp2[4];
WORD16 twid_re, twid_im;
WORD32 *ptr_reverse, *ptr_forward, *p_out, *ptr_out1;
const WORD16 *twidle_fwd, *twidle_rev;
ptr_forward = &input[49];
ptr_reverse = &input[47];
p_out = output;
twidle_fwd = main_twidle_fwd;
twidle_fwd += 4;
*p_out++ = input[48] >> LP_SHIFT_VAL;
*p_out++ = 0;
for (n = 1; n < DCT3_LEN / 2; n++) {
temp1[0] = *ptr_forward++;
temp1[1] = *ptr_reverse--;
temp1[0] = ixheaacd_add32(ixheaacd_shr32(temp1[0], LP_SHIFT_VAL),
ixheaacd_shr32(temp1[1], LP_SHIFT_VAL));
temp1[2] = *(ptr_forward - 33);
temp1[3] = *(ptr_reverse - 31);
temp1[1] = ixheaacd_sub32(ixheaacd_shr32(temp1[2], LP_SHIFT_VAL),
ixheaacd_shr32(temp1[3], LP_SHIFT_VAL));
twid_re = *twidle_fwd++;
twid_im = *twidle_fwd;
twidle_fwd += 3;
*p_out++ = mac32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_re, temp1[1], twid_im);
*p_out++ = msu32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_im, temp1[1], twid_re);
}
twid_re = *twidle_fwd++;
twid_im = *twidle_fwd;
twidle_fwd += 3;
temp1[1] = *ptr_reverse--;
temp1[0] = *(ptr_reverse - 31);
temp1[1] = ixheaacd_sub32(ixheaacd_shr32(temp1[1], LP_SHIFT_VAL),
ixheaacd_shr32(temp1[0], LP_SHIFT_VAL));
temp1[0] = temp1[1];
temp2[2] = mac32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_re, temp1[1], twid_im);
temp2[3] = msu32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_im, temp1[1], twid_re);
ptr_forward = output;
ptr_reverse = &output[DCT3_LEN - 1];
temp2[0] = *ptr_forward++;
temp2[1] = *ptr_forward--;
temp1[0] = -temp2[1] - temp2[3];
temp1[1] = temp2[0] - temp2[2];
temp2[0] = (temp2[0] + temp2[2] + temp1[0]);
temp2[1] = (temp2[1] - temp2[3] + temp1[1]);
temp2[0] >>= 1;
temp2[1] >>= 1;
*ptr_forward++ = temp2[0];
*ptr_forward++ = temp2[1];
twidle_fwd = post_tbl + 2;
twidle_rev = post_tbl + 14;
for (n = 1; n < DCT3_LEN / 4; n++) {
temp2[0] = *ptr_forward++;
temp2[1] = *ptr_forward--;
temp2[3] = *ptr_reverse--;
temp2[2] = *ptr_reverse++;
twid_re = *twidle_rev;
twidle_rev -= 2;
twid_im = *twidle_fwd;
twidle_fwd += 2;
temp1[0] = temp2[0] - temp2[2];
temp1[1] = (temp2[0] + temp2[2]);
temp1[2] = temp2[1] + temp2[3];
temp1[3] = (temp2[1] - temp2[3]);
temp1[4] = mac32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_re, temp1[2], twid_im);
temp1[5] = msu32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_im, temp1[2], twid_re);
temp1[1] >>= 1;
temp1[3] >>= 1;
*ptr_forward++ = temp1[1] - temp1[4];
*ptr_forward++ = temp1[3] + temp1[5];
*ptr_reverse-- = -temp1[3] + temp1[5];
*ptr_reverse-- = temp1[1] + temp1[4];
}
temp2[0] = *ptr_forward++;
temp2[1] = *ptr_forward--;
temp2[3] = *ptr_reverse--;
temp2[2] = *ptr_reverse++;
twid_re = *twidle_rev;
twidle_rev -= 2;
twid_im = *twidle_fwd;
twidle_fwd += 2;
temp1[0] = temp2[0] - temp2[2];
temp1[1] = (temp2[0] + temp2[2]);
temp1[2] = temp2[1] + temp2[3];
temp1[3] = (temp2[1] - temp2[3]);
temp1[4] = -mac32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_re, temp1[2], twid_im);
temp1[5] = msu32x16in32_dual(temp1[0], twid_im, temp1[2], twid_re);
temp1[1] >>= 1;
temp1[3] >>= 1;
*ptr_forward++ = temp1[1] + temp1[4];
*ptr_forward++ = temp1[3] + temp1[5];
ixheaacd_radix4bfly(w_16, output, 1, 4);
ixheaacd_postradixcompute4(input, output, p_table, 16);
output[0] = input[0];
output[2] = input[1];
p_out = input + 2;
ptr_forward = output + 1;
ptr_reverse = output + 30;
ptr_out1 = input + 18;
for (k = (DCT3_LEN / 4) - 1; k != 0; k--) {
WORD32 tempre, tempim;
tempre = *p_out++;
tempim = *p_out++;
*ptr_forward = (tempim);
ptr_forward += 2;
*ptr_forward = (tempre);
ptr_forward += 2;
tempre = *ptr_out1++;
tempim = *ptr_out1++;
*ptr_reverse = (tempim);
ptr_reverse -= 2;
*ptr_reverse = (tempre);
ptr_reverse -= 2;
}
{
WORD32 tempre, tempim;
tempre = *p_out++;
tempim = *p_out++;
*ptr_forward = (tempim);
ptr_forward += 2;
*ptr_forward = (tempre);
ptr_forward += 2;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 21,878 |
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