instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setHasDirAutoFlagRecursively(Node* firstNode, bool flag, Node* lastNode = 0)
{
firstNode->setSelfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute(flag);
Node* node = firstNode->firstChild();
while (node) {
if (node->selfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute() == flag)
return;
if (elementAffectsDirectionality(node)) {
if (node == lastNode)
return;
node = node->traverseNextSibling(firstNode);
continue;
}
node->setSelfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute(flag);
if (node == lastNode)
return;
node = node->traverseNextNode(firstNode);
}
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_favicon_received(const char *page_url, Evas_Object *icon, void *event_info)
{
Browser_Window *app_data = (Browser_Window *)event_info;
if (strcmp(page_url, ewk_view_url_get(app_data->webview)))
return;
/* Remove previous icon from URL bar */
Evas_Object *old_icon = elm_object_part_content_unset(app_data->url_bar, "icon");
if (old_icon) {
evas_object_unref(old_icon);
evas_object_del(old_icon);
}
/* Show new icon in URL bar */
if (icon) {
/* Workaround for icon display bug:
* http://trac.enlightenment.org/e/ticket/1616 */
evas_object_size_hint_min_set(icon, 48, 24);
evas_object_image_filled_set(icon, EINA_FALSE);
evas_object_image_fill_set(icon, 24, 0, 24, 24);
elm_object_part_content_set(app_data->url_bar, "icon", icon);
evas_object_ref(icon);
}
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestCustomNamedGetter::derefObject(void* object)
{
static_cast<TestCustomNamedGetter*>(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vop_host_uninit(struct vop_info *vi)
{
struct list_head *pos, *tmp;
struct vop_vdev *vdev;
mutex_lock(&vi->vop_mutex);
vop_virtio_reset_devices(vi);
list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, &vi->vdev_list) {
vdev = list_entry(pos, struct vop_vdev, list);
list_del(pos);
reinit_completion(&vdev->destroy);
mutex_unlock(&vi->vop_mutex);
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
vop_virtio_del_device(vdev);
vdev->deleted = true;
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
complete(&vdev->destroy);
mutex_lock(&vi->vop_mutex);
}
mutex_unlock(&vi->vop_mutex);
misc_deregister(&vi->miscdev);
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetShaderSource(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetShaderSource& c) {
GLuint shader = c.shader;
uint32 bucket_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.bucket_id);
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(bucket_id);
ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* info = GetShaderInfoNotProgram(
shader, "glGetShaderSource");
if (!info || !info->source()) {
bucket->SetSize(0);
return error::kNoError;
}
bucket->SetFromString(info->source()->c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_palette_transparency(const struct iw_palette *p)
{
int i;
int retval = 0;
for(i=0;i<p->num_entries;i++) {
if(p->entry[i].a!=255) retval=1;
if(p->entry[i].a!=255 && p->entry[i].a!=0) return 2;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 12,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned update_treesame(struct rev_info *revs, struct commit *commit)
{
if (commit->parents && commit->parents->next) {
unsigned n;
struct treesame_state *st;
struct commit_list *p;
unsigned relevant_parents;
unsigned relevant_change, irrelevant_change;
st = lookup_decoration(&revs->treesame, &commit->object);
if (!st)
die("update_treesame %s", sha1_to_hex(commit->object.sha1));
relevant_parents = 0;
relevant_change = irrelevant_change = 0;
for (p = commit->parents, n = 0; p; n++, p = p->next) {
if (relevant_commit(p->item)) {
relevant_change |= !st->treesame[n];
relevant_parents++;
} else
irrelevant_change |= !st->treesame[n];
}
if (relevant_parents ? relevant_change : irrelevant_change)
commit->object.flags &= ~TREESAME;
else
commit->object.flags |= TREESAME;
}
return commit->object.flags & TREESAME;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::CreateTemporaryFile() {
bool success = base::CreateTemporaryFile(&mhtml_path_);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::TemporaryFileCreatedOnIO,
this, success));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FreeWrapper(void * /* userData */, void* ptr) {
free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zend_class_entry *zend_lookup_class(zend_string *name) /* {{{ */
{
return zend_lookup_class_ex(name, NULL, 1);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 7,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static INT AirPDcapScanForKeys(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
const guint8 *data,
const guint mac_header_len,
const guint tot_len,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID id
)
{
const UCHAR *addr;
guint bodyLength;
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sta_sa;
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION sa;
guint offset = 0;
const guint8 dot1x_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
0x88, 0x8E /* Type: 802.1X authentication */
};
const guint8 bt_dot1x_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
0x00, 0x19, 0x58, /* Org. code=Bluetooth SIG */
0x00, 0x03 /* Type: Bluetooth Security */
};
const guint8 tdls_header[] = {
0xAA, /* DSAP=SNAP */
0xAA, /* SSAP=SNAP */
0x03, /* Control field=Unnumbered frame */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* Org. code=encaps. Ethernet */
0x89, 0x0D, /* Type: 802.11 - Fast Roaming Remote Request */
0x02, /* Payload Type: TDLS */
0X0C /* Action Category: TDLS */
};
const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *pEAPKey;
#ifdef _DEBUG
#define MSGBUF_LEN 255
CHAR msgbuf[MSGBUF_LEN];
#endif
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_START("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
/* cache offset in the packet data */
offset = mac_header_len;
/* check if the packet has an LLC header and the packet is 802.1X authentication (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 24) */
if (memcmp(data+offset, dot1x_header, 8) == 0 || memcmp(data+offset, bt_dot1x_header, 8) == 0) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Authentication: EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* skip LLC header */
offset+=8;
/* check if the packet is a EAPOL-Key (0x03) (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
if (data[offset+1]!=3) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not EAPOL-Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* get and check the body length (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 25) */
bodyLength=pntoh16(data+offset+2);
if ((tot_len-offset-4) < bodyLength) { /* Only check if frame is long enough for eapol header, ignore tailing garbage, see bug 9065 */
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "EAPOL body too short", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* skip EAPOL MPDU and go to the first byte of the body */
offset+=4;
pEAPKey = (const EAPOL_RSN_KEY *) (data+offset);
/* check if the key descriptor type is valid (IEEE 802.1X-2004, pg. 27) */
if (/*pEAPKey->type!=0x1 &&*/ /* RC4 Key Descriptor Type (deprecated) */
pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA2_KEY_DESCRIPTOR && /* IEEE 802.11 Key Descriptor Type (WPA2) */
pEAPKey->type != AIRPDCAP_RSN_WPA_KEY_DESCRIPTOR) /* 254 = RSN_KEY_DESCRIPTOR - WPA, */
{
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not valid key descriptor type", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* start with descriptor body */
offset+=1;
/* search for a cached Security Association for current BSSID and AP */
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sa == NULL){
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "No SA for BSSID found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
/* It could be a Pairwise Key exchange, check */
if (AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake(ctx, data, sa, offset, tot_len) == AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE)
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
if (mac_header_len + GROUP_KEY_PAYLOAD_LEN_MIN > tot_len) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Message too short for Group Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* Verify the bitfields: Key = 0(groupwise) Mic = 1 Ack = 1 Secure = 1 */
if (AIRPDCAP_EAP_KEY(data[offset+1])!=0 ||
AIRPDCAP_EAP_ACK(data[offset+1])!=1 ||
AIRPDCAP_EAP_MIC(data[offset]) != 1 ||
AIRPDCAP_EAP_SEC(data[offset]) != 1){
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Key bitfields not correct for Group Key", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* force STA address to be the broadcast MAC so we create an SA for the groupkey */
memcpy(id.sta, broadcast_mac, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
/* get the Security Association structure for the broadcast MAC and AP */
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sa == NULL){
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
/* Get the SA for the STA, since we need its pairwise key to decrpyt the group key */
/* get STA address */
if ( (addr=AirPDcapGetStaAddress((const AIRPDCAP_MAC_FRAME_ADDR4 *)(data))) != NULL) {
memcpy(id.sta, addr, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
#ifdef _DEBUG
g_snprintf(msgbuf, MSGBUF_LEN, "ST_MAC: %2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X.%2X\t", id.sta[0],id.sta[1],id.sta[2],id.sta[3],id.sta[4],id.sta[5]);
#endif
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", msgbuf, AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "SA not found", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_5);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
sta_sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sta_sa == NULL){
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
/* Try to extract the group key and install it in the SA */
return (AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey(pEAPKey, sta_sa->wpa.ptk+16, sa, tot_len-offset+1));
} else if (memcmp(data+offset, tdls_header, 10) == 0) {
const guint8 *initiator, *responder;
guint8 action;
guint status, offset_rsne = 0, offset_fte = 0, offset_link = 0, offset_timeout = 0;
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Authentication: TDLS Action Frame", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* skip LLC header */
offset+=10;
/* check if the packet is a TDLS response or confirm */
action = data[offset];
if (action!=1 && action!=2) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Not Response nor confirm", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* check status */
offset++;
status=pntoh16(data+offset);
if (status!=0) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "TDLS setup not successfull", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
/* skip Token + capabilities */
offset+=5;
/* search for RSN, Fast BSS Transition, Link Identifier and Timeout Interval IEs */
while(offset < (tot_len - 2)) {
if (data[offset] == 48) {
offset_rsne = offset;
} else if (data[offset] == 55) {
offset_fte = offset;
} else if (data[offset] == 56) {
offset_timeout = offset;
} else if (data[offset] == 101) {
offset_link = offset;
}
if (tot_len < offset + data[offset + 1] + 2) {
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
offset += data[offset + 1] + 2;
}
if (offset_rsne == 0 || offset_fte == 0 ||
offset_timeout == 0 || offset_link == 0)
{
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Cannot Find all necessary IEs", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Found RSNE/Fast BSS/Timeout Interval/Link IEs", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
/* Will create a Security Association between 2 STA. Need to get both MAC address */
initiator = &data[offset_link + 8];
responder = &data[offset_link + 14];
if (memcmp(initiator, responder, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN) < 0) {
memcpy(id.sta, initiator, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
memcpy(id.bssid, responder, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
} else {
memcpy(id.sta, responder, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
memcpy(id.bssid, initiator, AIRPDCAP_MAC_LEN);
}
sa = AirPDcapGetSaPtr(ctx, &id);
if (sa == NULL){
return AIRPDCAP_RET_REQ_DATA;
}
if (sa->validKey) {
if (memcmp(sa->wpa.nonce, data + offset_fte + 52, AIRPDCAP_WPA_NONCE_LEN) == 0) {
/* Already have valid key for this SA, no need to redo key derivation */
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
} else {
/* We are opening a new session with the same two STA, save previous sa */
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION *tmp_sa = g_new(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION, 1);
memcpy(tmp_sa, sa, sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION));
sa->next=tmp_sa;
sa->validKey = FALSE;
}
}
if (AirPDcapTDLSDeriveKey(sa, data, offset_rsne, offset_fte, offset_timeout, offset_link, action)
== AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS) {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_SUCCESS_HANDSHAKE;
}
} else {
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_PRINT_LINE("AirPDcapScanForKeys", "Skipping: not an EAPOL packet", AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_LEVEL_3);
}
AIRPDCAP_DEBUG_TRACE_END("AirPDcapScanForKeys");
return AIRPDCAP_RET_NO_VALID_HANDSHAKE;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsHttpHandler::DevToolsHttpHandler(
DevToolsManagerDelegate* delegate,
std::unique_ptr<DevToolsSocketFactory> socket_factory,
const base::FilePath& output_directory,
const base::FilePath& debug_frontend_dir)
: delegate_(delegate), weak_factory_(this) {
browser_guid_ = delegate_->IsBrowserTargetDiscoverable()
? kBrowserUrlPrefix
: base::StringPrintf("%s/%s", kBrowserUrlPrefix,
base::GenerateGUID().c_str());
std::unique_ptr<base::Thread> thread(
new base::Thread(kDevToolsHandlerThreadName));
base::Thread::Options options;
options.message_loop_type = base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO;
if (thread->StartWithOptions(options)) {
base::TaskRunner* task_runner = thread->task_runner().get();
task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&StartServerOnHandlerThread, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
std::move(thread), std::move(socket_factory),
output_directory, debug_frontend_dir, browser_guid_,
delegate_->HasBundledFrontendResources()));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Layer::IndexOfChild(const Layer* reference) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < children_.size(); ++i) {
if (children_[i].get() == reference)
return i;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpoolssAddPrinterDriver_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL Extension::GalleryUpdateUrl(bool secure) {
CommandLine* cmdline = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (cmdline->HasSwitch(switches::kAppsGalleryUpdateURL))
return GURL(cmdline->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kAppsGalleryUpdateURL));
else
return GURL(secure ? kGalleryUpdateHttpsUrl : kGalleryUpdateHttpUrl);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct anon_vma_chain *anon_vma_chain_alloc(gfp_t gfp)
{
return kmem_cache_alloc(anon_vma_chain_cachep, gfp);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncBackendHost::Core::processing_passphrase() const {
DCHECK(MessageLoop::current() == host_->frontend_loop_);
return processing_passphrase_;
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void free_vm86_irq(int irqnumber)
{
unsigned long flags;
free_irq(irqnumber, NULL);
vm86_irqs[irqnumber].tsk = NULL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&irqbits_lock, flags);
irqbits &= ~(1 << irqnumber);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&irqbits_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_stream_t *jpc_streamlist_get(jpc_streamlist_t *streamlist, int streamno)
{
assert(streamno < streamlist->numstreams);
return streamlist->streams[streamno];
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %lld\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %d bytes long.", (size_t)chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
duration = ntoh64(duration);
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
if (max_size > SIZE_MAX - 10 * 2) {
ALOGE("max sample size too big: %zu", max_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
uint32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, (int32_t*)&width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight,(int32_t*) &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
} else {
if (width > 32768 || height > 32768) {
ALOGE("can't support %u x %u video", width, height);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
*offset += chunk_size;
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[24];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
if (mLastTrack != NULL) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if ((chunk_size > SIZE_MAX) || (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size < 0 || static_cast<uint64_t>(chunk_data_size) >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::AddObserver(TabStripModelObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv)
{
return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string SessionStore::WriteBatch::PutWithoutUpdatingTracker(
const sync_pb::SessionSpecifics& specifics) {
DCHECK(AreValidSpecifics(specifics));
const std::string storage_key = GetStorageKey(specifics);
batch_->WriteData(storage_key, specifics.SerializeAsString());
return storage_key;
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void swevent_hlist_put(void)
{
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
swevent_hlist_put_cpu(cpu);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_sched_out(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
u64 tstamp = perf_event_time(event);
u64 delta;
/*
* An event which could not be activated because of
* filter mismatch still needs to have its timings
* maintained, otherwise bogus information is return
* via read() for time_enabled, time_running:
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE
&& !event_filter_match(event)) {
delta = tstamp - event->tstamp_stopped;
event->tstamp_running += delta;
event->tstamp_stopped = tstamp;
}
if (event->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
return;
perf_pmu_disable(event->pmu);
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
if (event->pending_disable) {
event->pending_disable = 0;
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF;
}
event->tstamp_stopped = tstamp;
event->pmu->del(event, 0);
event->oncpu = -1;
if (!is_software_event(event))
cpuctx->active_oncpu--;
ctx->nr_active--;
if (event->attr.freq && event->attr.sample_freq)
ctx->nr_freq--;
if (event->attr.exclusive || !cpuctx->active_oncpu)
cpuctx->exclusive = 0;
if (is_orphaned_child(event))
schedule_orphans_remove(ctx);
perf_pmu_enable(event->pmu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Tighten (and fix) the grouping condition
The fix from 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during
moving group") was incomplete in that it failed to recognise that
creating a group with events for different CPUs is semantically
broken -- they cannot be co-scheduled.
Furthermore, it leads to real breakage where, when we create an event
for CPU Y and then migrate it to form a group on CPU X, the code gets
confused where the counter is programmed -- triggered in practice
as well by me via the perf fuzzer.
Fix this by tightening the rules for creating groups. Only allow
grouping of counters that can be co-scheduled in the same context.
This means for the same task and/or the same cpu.
Fixes: 9fc81d87420d ("perf: Fix events installation during moving group")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.090683288@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isoent_make_path_table(struct archive_write *a)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
int depth, r;
int dir_number;
/*
* Init Path Table.
*/
if (iso9660->dircnt_max >= MAX_DEPTH &&
(!iso9660->opt.limit_depth || iso9660->opt.iso_level == 4))
r = isoent_alloc_path_table(a, &(iso9660->primary),
iso9660->dircnt_max + 1);
else
/* The number of levels in the hierarchy cannot exceed
* eight. */
r = isoent_alloc_path_table(a, &(iso9660->primary),
MAX_DEPTH);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
if (iso9660->opt.joliet) {
r = isoent_alloc_path_table(a, &(iso9660->joliet),
iso9660->dircnt_max + 1);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
}
/* Step 0.
* - Collect directories for primary and joliet.
*/
isoent_collect_dirs(&(iso9660->primary), NULL, 0);
if (iso9660->opt.joliet)
isoent_collect_dirs(&(iso9660->joliet), NULL, 0);
/*
* Rockridge; move deeper depth directories to rr_moved.
*/
if (iso9660->opt.rr) {
r = isoent_rr_move(a);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
}
/* Update nlink. */
isofile_connect_hardlink_files(iso9660);
/* Step 1.
* - Renew a value of the depth of that directories.
* - Resolve hardlinks.
* - Convert pathnames to ISO9660 name or UCS2(joliet).
* - Sort files by each directory.
*/
r = isoent_traverse_tree(a, &(iso9660->primary));
if (r < 0)
return (r);
if (iso9660->opt.joliet) {
r = isoent_traverse_tree(a, &(iso9660->joliet));
if (r < 0)
return (r);
}
/* Step 2.
* - Sort directories.
* - Assign all directory number.
*/
dir_number = 1;
for (depth = 0; depth < iso9660->primary.max_depth; depth++) {
r = isoent_make_path_table_2(a, &(iso9660->primary),
depth, &dir_number);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
}
if (iso9660->opt.joliet) {
dir_number = 1;
for (depth = 0; depth < iso9660->joliet.max_depth; depth++) {
r = isoent_make_path_table_2(a, &(iso9660->joliet),
depth, &dir_number);
if (r < 0)
return (r);
}
}
if (iso9660->opt.limit_dirs && dir_number > 0xffff) {
/*
* Maximum number of directories is 65535(0xffff)
* doe to size(16bit) of Parent Directory Number of
* the Path Table.
* See also ISO9660 Standard 9.4.
*/
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Too many directories(%d) over 65535.", dir_number);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Get the size of the Path Table. */
calculate_path_table_size(&(iso9660->primary));
if (iso9660->opt.joliet)
calculate_path_table_size(&(iso9660->joliet));
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 8,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GetImageId() const {
return wallpaper::WallpaperResizer::GetImageId(user_wallpaper_);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_putrootfh(struct xdr_stream *xdr)
{
return decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_PUTROOTFH);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( const char *name )
{
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
for( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
curve_info++ )
{
if( strcmp( curve_info->name, name ) == 0 )
return( curve_info );
}
return( NULL );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_uevent (struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
int retval = 0;
if (!ap_dev)
return -ENODEV;
/* Set up DEV_TYPE environment variable. */
retval = add_uevent_var(env, "DEV_TYPE=%04X", ap_dev->device_type);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Add MODALIAS= */
retval = add_uevent_var(env, "MODALIAS=ap:t%02X", ap_dev->device_type);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::lockAsync(uint32_t usage, void** vaddr, int fenceFd)
{
const Rect lockBounds(width, height);
status_t res = lockAsync(usage, lockBounds, vaddr, fenceFd);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 7,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uvesafb_setcolreg(unsigned regno, unsigned red, unsigned green,
unsigned blue, unsigned transp,
struct fb_info *info)
{
struct uvesafb_pal_entry entry;
int shift = 16 - dac_width;
int err = 0;
if (regno >= info->cmap.len)
return -EINVAL;
if (info->var.bits_per_pixel == 8) {
entry.red = red >> shift;
entry.green = green >> shift;
entry.blue = blue >> shift;
entry.pad = 0;
err = uvesafb_setpalette(&entry, 1, regno, info);
} else if (regno < 16) {
switch (info->var.bits_per_pixel) {
case 16:
if (info->var.red.offset == 10) {
/* 1:5:5:5 */
((u32 *) (info->pseudo_palette))[regno] =
((red & 0xf800) >> 1) |
((green & 0xf800) >> 6) |
((blue & 0xf800) >> 11);
} else {
/* 0:5:6:5 */
((u32 *) (info->pseudo_palette))[regno] =
((red & 0xf800) ) |
((green & 0xfc00) >> 5) |
((blue & 0xf800) >> 11);
}
break;
case 24:
case 32:
red >>= 8;
green >>= 8;
blue >>= 8;
((u32 *)(info->pseudo_palette))[regno] =
(red << info->var.red.offset) |
(green << info->var.green.offset) |
(blue << info->var.blue.offset);
break;
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Debugger::v8DebugEventCallback(const v8::Debug::EventDetails& eventDetails)
{
V8Debugger* thisPtr = toV8Debugger(eventDetails.GetCallbackData());
thisPtr->handleV8DebugEvent(eventDetails);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 11,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_send_NPWindowData(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPWindow *window = (NPWindow *)p_value;
int error;
if (window == NULL)
return RPC_ERROR_MESSAGE_ARGUMENT_INVALID;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, (Window)window->window)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, window->x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, window->y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, window->width)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, window->height)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = do_send_NPRect(message, &window->clipRect)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, window->type)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = do_send_NPSetWindowCallbackStruct(message, window->ws_info)) < 0)
return 0;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintNodeUnderContextMenu() {
const WebNode& context_menu_node = render_view()->GetContextMenuNode();
PrintNode(context_menu_node);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 20,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t mptsas_config_ioc_6(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
return MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK(6, MPI_CONFIG_PAGETYPE_IOC, 0x01,
"*l*b*b*b*b*b*b*b*b*b*b*w*l*l*l*l*b*b*w"
"*w*w*w*w*l*l*l");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
/*
* We make no effort to guess what a given thread considers to be
* its "stack". It's not even well-defined for programs written
* languages like Go.
*/
return vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
struct sock *sk;
if (!conn)
return;
BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p, err %d", hcon, conn, err);
kfree_skb(conn->rx_skb);
/* Kill channels */
while ((sk = conn->chan_list.head)) {
bh_lock_sock(sk);
l2cap_chan_del(sk, err);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
}
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)
del_timer_sync(&conn->info_timer);
hcon->l2cap_data = NULL;
kfree(conn);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_cdef_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cdef_t *cdef = &box->data.cdef;
jp2_cdefchan_t *chan;
unsigned int channo;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &cdef->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
if (!(cdef->ents = jas_alloc2(cdef->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cdefchan_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (channo = 0; channo < cdef->numchans; ++channo) {
chan = &cdef->ents[channo];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->channo) || jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->type) ||
jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->assoc)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 20,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const struct ldb_val *ldb_dn_get_component_val(struct ldb_dn *dn,
unsigned int num)
{
if ( ! ldb_dn_validate(dn)) {
return NULL;
}
if (num >= dn->comp_num) return NULL;
return &dn->components[num].value;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int commit_match(struct commit *commit, struct rev_info *opt)
{
int retval;
const char *encoding;
const char *message;
struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
if (!opt->grep_filter.pattern_list && !opt->grep_filter.header_list)
return 1;
/* Prepend "fake" headers as needed */
if (opt->grep_filter.use_reflog_filter) {
strbuf_addstr(&buf, "reflog ");
get_reflog_message(&buf, opt->reflog_info);
strbuf_addch(&buf, '\n');
}
/*
* We grep in the user's output encoding, under the assumption that it
* is the encoding they are most likely to write their grep pattern
* for. In addition, it means we will match the "notes" encoding below,
* so we will not end up with a buffer that has two different encodings
* in it.
*/
encoding = get_log_output_encoding();
message = logmsg_reencode(commit, NULL, encoding);
/* Copy the commit to temporary if we are using "fake" headers */
if (buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
if (opt->grep_filter.header_list && opt->mailmap) {
if (!buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
commit_rewrite_person(&buf, "\nauthor ", opt->mailmap);
commit_rewrite_person(&buf, "\ncommitter ", opt->mailmap);
}
/* Append "fake" message parts as needed */
if (opt->show_notes) {
if (!buf.len)
strbuf_addstr(&buf, message);
format_display_notes(commit->object.oid.hash, &buf, encoding, 1);
}
/*
* Find either in the original commit message, or in the temporary.
* Note that we cast away the constness of "message" here. It is
* const because it may come from the cached commit buffer. That's OK,
* because we know that it is modifiable heap memory, and that while
* grep_buffer may modify it for speed, it will restore any
* changes before returning.
*/
if (buf.len)
retval = grep_buffer(&opt->grep_filter, buf.buf, buf.len);
else
retval = grep_buffer(&opt->grep_filter,
(char *)message, strlen(message));
strbuf_release(&buf);
unuse_commit_buffer(commit, message);
return opt->invert_grep ? !retval : retval;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int suspend_audio_datapath(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, bool standby)
{
INFO("state %d", common->state);
if (common->ctrl_fd == AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
return -1;
if (common->state == AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPING)
return -1;
if (a2dp_command(common, A2DP_CTRL_CMD_SUSPEND) < 0)
return -1;
if (standby)
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STANDBY;
else
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_SUSPENDED;
/* disconnect audio path */
skt_disconnect(common->audio_fd);
common->audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 16,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~DownloadItemTest() {
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::NotifyObservers() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_, OnStateChanged());
sync_js_controller_.HandleJsEvent(
"onServiceStateChanged", JsEventDetails());
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 23,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int NavigationControllerImpl::GetPendingEntryIndex() const {
return pending_entry_index_;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::KeyboardEventProcessingResult DevToolsWindow::PreHandleKeyboardEvent(
WebContents* source,
const content::NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
BrowserWindow* inspected_window = GetInspectedBrowserWindow();
if (inspected_window) {
return inspected_window->PreHandleKeyboardEvent(event);
}
return content::KeyboardEventProcessingResult::NOT_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
CWE ID: CWE-668 | 0 | 20,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::AddTransceiverWithTrackOnSignalingThread(
rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::MediaStreamTrackInterface> webrtc_track,
webrtc::RtpTransceiverInit init,
TransceiverStateSurfacer* transceiver_state_surfacer,
webrtc::RTCErrorOr<rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::RtpTransceiverInterface>>*
error_or_transceiver) {
*error_or_transceiver =
native_peer_connection_->AddTransceiver(webrtc_track, init);
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::RtpTransceiverInterface>> transceivers;
if (error_or_transceiver->ok())
transceivers.push_back(error_or_transceiver->value());
transceiver_state_surfacer->Initialize(track_adapter_map_, transceivers);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 26,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *alloc_tx(struct atm_vcc *vcc, unsigned int size)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk = sk_atm(vcc);
if (sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk) && !atm_may_send(vcc, size)) {
pr_debug("Sorry: wmem_alloc = %d, size = %d, sndbuf = %d\n",
sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk), size, sk->sk_sndbuf);
return NULL;
}
while (!(skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_KERNEL)))
schedule();
pr_debug("%d += %d\n", sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk), skb->truesize);
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI int php_exec(int type, char *cmd, zval *array, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC)
{
FILE *fp;
char *buf;
int l = 0, pclose_return;
char *b, *d=NULL;
php_stream *stream;
size_t buflen, bufl = 0;
#if PHP_SIGCHILD
void (*sig_handler)() = NULL;
#endif
#if PHP_SIGCHILD
sig_handler = signal (SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
#endif
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
fp = VCWD_POPEN(cmd, "rb");
#else
fp = VCWD_POPEN(cmd, "r");
#endif
if (!fp) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to fork [%s]", cmd);
goto err;
}
stream = php_stream_fopen_from_pipe(fp, "rb");
buf = (char *) emalloc(EXEC_INPUT_BUF);
buflen = EXEC_INPUT_BUF;
if (type != 3) {
b = buf;
while (php_stream_get_line(stream, b, EXEC_INPUT_BUF, &bufl)) {
/* no new line found, let's read some more */
if (b[bufl - 1] != '\n' && !php_stream_eof(stream)) {
if (buflen < (bufl + (b - buf) + EXEC_INPUT_BUF)) {
bufl += b - buf;
buflen = bufl + EXEC_INPUT_BUF;
buf = erealloc(buf, buflen);
b = buf + bufl;
} else {
b += bufl;
}
continue;
} else if (b != buf) {
bufl += b - buf;
}
if (type == 1) {
PHPWRITE(buf, bufl);
if (php_output_get_level(TSRMLS_C) < 1) {
sapi_flush(TSRMLS_C);
}
} else if (type == 2) {
/* strip trailing whitespaces */
l = bufl;
while (l-- && isspace(((unsigned char *)buf)[l]));
if (l != (int)(bufl - 1)) {
bufl = l + 1;
buf[bufl] = '\0';
}
add_next_index_stringl(array, buf, bufl, 1);
}
b = buf;
}
if (bufl) {
/* strip trailing whitespaces if we have not done so already */
if ((type == 2 && buf != b) || type != 2) {
l = bufl;
while (l-- && isspace(((unsigned char *)buf)[l]));
if (l != (int)(bufl - 1)) {
bufl = l + 1;
buf[bufl] = '\0';
}
if (type == 2) {
add_next_index_stringl(array, buf, bufl, 1);
}
}
/* Return last line from the shell command */
RETVAL_STRINGL(buf, bufl, 1);
} else { /* should return NULL, but for BC we return "" */
RETVAL_EMPTY_STRING();
}
} else {
while((bufl = php_stream_read(stream, buf, EXEC_INPUT_BUF)) > 0) {
PHPWRITE(buf, bufl);
}
}
pclose_return = php_stream_close(stream);
efree(buf);
done:
#if PHP_SIGCHILD
if (sig_handler) {
signal(SIGCHLD, sig_handler);
}
#endif
if (d) {
efree(d);
}
return pclose_return;
err:
pclose_return = -1;
goto done;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 17,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline ssize_t WritePSDOffset(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image,
const MagickSizeType size,const MagickSizeType offset)
{
MagickSizeType
current_offset;
ssize_t
result;
current_offset=TellBlob(image);
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
if (psd_info->version == 1)
result=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size);
else
result=(WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned short) size));
SeekBlob(image,current_offset,SEEK_SET);
return(result);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 18,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
skia::PlatformBitmap* output) {
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_callback_runner(base::Bind(callback, false));
std::map<uint64, scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> >::iterator it =
image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_);
if (it == image_transport_clients_.end())
return;
ui::Texture* container = it->second;
DCHECK(container);
gfx::Size dst_size_in_pixel = ConvertSizeToPixel(this, dst_size);
if (!output->Allocate(
dst_size_in_pixel.width(), dst_size_in_pixel.height(), true))
return;
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return;
unsigned char* addr = static_cast<unsigned char*>(
output->GetBitmap().getPixels());
scoped_callback_runner.Release();
base::Callback<void(bool)> wrapper_callback = base::Bind(
&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished,
AsWeakPtr(),
callback);
++pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_gl = src_subrect;
src_subrect_in_gl.set_y(GetViewBounds().height() - src_subrect.bottom());
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel = ConvertRectToPixel(this, src_subrect_in_gl);
gl_helper->CropScaleReadbackAndCleanTexture(container->PrepareTexture(),
container->size(),
src_subrect_in_pixel,
dst_size_in_pixel,
addr,
wrapper_callback);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 3,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_apr_rmdir(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *path;
apr_status_t status;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
path = lua_tostring(L, 2);
status = apr_dir_remove(path, r->pool);
lua_pushboolean(L, (status == 0));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* Document::cloneNode(bool deep, ExceptionState&) {
Document* clone = CloneDocumentWithoutChildren();
clone->CloneDataFromDocument(*this);
if (deep)
CloneChildNodes(clone);
return clone;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 27,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Optional<AuthenticatorGetInfoResponse> ReadCTAPGetInfoResponse(
base::span<const uint8_t> buffer) {
if (buffer.size() <= kResponseCodeLength ||
GetResponseCode(buffer) != CtapDeviceResponseCode::kSuccess)
return base::nullopt;
base::Optional<CBOR> decoded_response =
cbor::CBORReader::Read(buffer.subspan(1));
if (!decoded_response || !decoded_response->is_map())
return base::nullopt;
const auto& response_map = decoded_response->GetMap();
auto it = response_map.find(CBOR(1));
if (it == response_map.end() || !it->second.is_array() ||
it->second.GetArray().size() > 2) {
return base::nullopt;
}
base::flat_set<ProtocolVersion> protocol_versions;
for (const auto& version : it->second.GetArray()) {
if (!version.is_string())
return base::nullopt;
auto protocol = ConvertStringToProtocolVersion(version.GetString());
if (protocol == ProtocolVersion::kUnknown) {
VLOG(2) << "Unexpected protocol version received.";
continue;
}
if (!protocol_versions.insert(protocol).second)
return base::nullopt;
}
if (protocol_versions.empty())
return base::nullopt;
it = response_map.find(CBOR(3));
if (it == response_map.end() || !it->second.is_bytestring() ||
it->second.GetBytestring().size() != kAaguidLength) {
return base::nullopt;
}
AuthenticatorGetInfoResponse response(std::move(protocol_versions),
it->second.GetBytestring());
it = response_map.find(CBOR(2));
if (it != response_map.end()) {
if (!it->second.is_array())
return base::nullopt;
std::vector<std::string> extensions;
for (const auto& extension : it->second.GetArray()) {
if (!extension.is_string())
return base::nullopt;
extensions.push_back(extension.GetString());
}
response.SetExtensions(std::move(extensions));
}
AuthenticatorSupportedOptions options;
it = response_map.find(CBOR(4));
if (it != response_map.end()) {
if (!it->second.is_map())
return base::nullopt;
const auto& option_map = it->second.GetMap();
auto option_map_it = option_map.find(CBOR(kPlatformDeviceMapKey));
if (option_map_it != option_map.end()) {
if (!option_map_it->second.is_bool())
return base::nullopt;
options.SetIsPlatformDevice(option_map_it->second.GetBool());
}
option_map_it = option_map.find(CBOR(kResidentKeyMapKey));
if (option_map_it != option_map.end()) {
if (!option_map_it->second.is_bool())
return base::nullopt;
options.SetSupportsResidentKey(option_map_it->second.GetBool());
}
option_map_it = option_map.find(CBOR(kUserPresenceMapKey));
if (option_map_it != option_map.end()) {
if (!option_map_it->second.is_bool())
return base::nullopt;
options.SetUserPresenceRequired(option_map_it->second.GetBool());
}
option_map_it = option_map.find(CBOR(kUserVerificationMapKey));
if (option_map_it != option_map.end()) {
if (!option_map_it->second.is_bool())
return base::nullopt;
if (option_map_it->second.GetBool()) {
options.SetUserVerificationAvailability(
AuthenticatorSupportedOptions::UserVerificationAvailability::
kSupportedAndConfigured);
} else {
options.SetUserVerificationAvailability(
AuthenticatorSupportedOptions::UserVerificationAvailability::
kSupportedButNotConfigured);
}
}
option_map_it = option_map.find(CBOR(kClientPinMapKey));
if (option_map_it != option_map.end()) {
if (!option_map_it->second.is_bool())
return base::nullopt;
if (option_map_it->second.GetBool()) {
options.SetClientPinAvailability(
AuthenticatorSupportedOptions::ClientPinAvailability::
kSupportedAndPinSet);
} else {
options.SetClientPinAvailability(
AuthenticatorSupportedOptions::ClientPinAvailability::
kSupportedButPinNotSet);
}
}
response.SetOptions(std::move(options));
}
it = response_map.find(CBOR(5));
if (it != response_map.end()) {
if (!it->second.is_unsigned())
return base::nullopt;
response.SetMaxMsgSize(it->second.GetUnsigned());
}
it = response_map.find(CBOR(6));
if (it != response_map.end()) {
if (!it->second.is_array())
return base::nullopt;
std::vector<uint8_t> supported_pin_protocols;
for (const auto& protocol : it->second.GetArray()) {
if (!protocol.is_unsigned())
return base::nullopt;
supported_pin_protocols.push_back(protocol.GetUnsigned());
}
response.SetPinProtocols(std::move(supported_pin_protocols));
}
return base::Optional<AuthenticatorGetInfoResponse>(std::move(response));
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 1 | 26,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_control_selector_name(guint8 entity_id, guint8 control_sel, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
const gchar *control_name = NULL;
value_string_ext *selectors = NULL;
selectors = get_control_selector_values(entity_id, usb_conv_info);
if (selectors)
control_name = try_val_to_str_ext(control_sel, selectors);
return control_name;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
size_t n;
int ret;
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
size_t newbufsize;
size_t newpos;
assert(buf);
assert(cnt >= 0);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
newpos = m->pos_ + cnt;
if (newpos > m->bufsize_ && m->growable_) {
newbufsize = m->bufsize_;
while (newbufsize < newpos) {
if (!jas_safe_size_mul(newbufsize, 2, &newbufsize)) {
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("new buffer size would cause overflow\n"));
return -1;
}
}
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_write resizing from %d to %zu\n", m->bufsize_,
newbufsize));
assert(newbufsize > 0);
if (mem_resize(m, newbufsize)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
/* The current position is beyond the end of the file, so
pad the file to the current position with zeros. */
n = JAS_MIN(m->pos_, m->bufsize_) - m->len_;
if (n > 0) {
memset(&m->buf_[m->len_], 0, n);
m->len_ += n;
}
if (m->pos_ != m->len_) {
/* The buffer is not big enough. */
return 0;
}
}
n = m->bufsize_ - m->pos_;
ret = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
if (ret > 0) {
memcpy(&m->buf_[m->pos_], buf, ret);
m->pos_ += ret;
}
if (m->pos_ > m->len_) {
m->len_ = m->pos_;
}
assert(ret == cnt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 28,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::RunScriptsAtDocumentReady(bool document_is_empty) {
base::WeakPtr<RenderFrameImpl> weak_self = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
GetContentClient()->renderer()->RunScriptsAtDocumentEnd(this);
if (!weak_self.get())
return;
if (!document_is_empty)
return;
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentLoader(
frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
int http_status_code = internal_data->http_status_code();
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->HasErrorPage(http_status_code)) {
WebDocumentLoader* document_loader = frame_->GetDocumentLoader();
WebURL unreachable_url = frame_->GetDocument().Url();
std::string error_html;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->PrepareErrorPageForHttpStatusError(
this, document_loader->GetRequest(), unreachable_url, http_status_code,
&error_html);
LoadNavigationErrorPage(document_loader,
WebURLError(net::ERR_FAILED, unreachable_url),
error_html, true /* replace_current_item */,
false /* inherit_document_state */);
if (!weak_self)
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderFrameHostImpl::GetEnabledBindings() {
return enabled_bindings_;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadDPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*client_name;
Display
*display;
float
pixels_per_point;
Image
*image;
int
sans,
status;
Pixmap
pixmap;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register size_t
pixel;
Screen
*screen;
ssize_t
x,
y;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*dps_image;
XRectangle
page,
bits_per_pixel;
XResourceInfo
resource_info;
XrmDatabase
resource_database;
XStandardColormap
*map_info;
XVisualInfo
*visual_info;
/*
Open X server connection.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
display=XOpenDisplay(image_info->server_name);
if (display == (Display *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
/*
Set our forgiving exception handler.
*/
(void) XSetErrorHandler(XError);
/*
Open image file.
*/
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
/*
Get user defaults from X resource database.
*/
client_name=GetClientName();
resource_database=XGetResourceDatabase(display,client_name);
XGetResourceInfo(image_info,resource_database,client_name,&resource_info);
/*
Allocate standard colormap.
*/
map_info=XAllocStandardColormap();
visual_info=(XVisualInfo *) NULL;
if (map_info == (XStandardColormap *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToCreateStandardColormap")
else
{
/*
Initialize visual info.
*/
(void) CloneString(&resource_info.visual_type,"default");
visual_info=XBestVisualInfo(display,map_info,&resource_info);
map_info->colormap=(Colormap) NULL;
}
if ((map_info == (XStandardColormap *) NULL) ||
(visual_info == (XVisualInfo *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Create a pixmap the appropriate size for the image.
*/
screen=ScreenOfDisplay(display,visual_info->screen);
pixels_per_point=XDPSPixelsPerPoint(screen);
if ((image->x_resolution != 0.0) && (image->y_resolution != 0.0))
pixels_per_point=MagickMin(image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution)/
DefaultResolution;
status=XDPSCreatePixmapForEPSF((DPSContext) NULL,screen,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),visual_info->depth,pixels_per_point,&pixmap,
&bits_per_pixel,&page);
if ((status == dps_status_failure) || (status == dps_status_no_extension))
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Rasterize the file into the pixmap.
*/
status=XDPSImageFileIntoDrawable((DPSContext) NULL,screen,pixmap,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),(int) bits_per_pixel.height,visual_info->depth,
&page,-page.x,-page.y,pixels_per_point,MagickTrue,MagickFalse,MagickTrue,
&sans);
if (status != dps_status_success)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize DPS X image.
*/
dps_image=XGetImage(display,pixmap,0,0,bits_per_pixel.width,
bits_per_pixel.height,AllPlanes,ZPixmap);
(void) XFreePixmap(display,pixmap);
if (dps_image == (XImage *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Get the colormap colors.
*/
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory(visual_info->colormap_size,
sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XDestroyImage(dps_image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((visual_info->klass != DirectColor) && (visual_info->klass != TrueColor))
for (i=0; i < visual_info->colormap_size; i++)
{
colors[i].pixel=(size_t) i;
colors[i].pad=0;
}
else
{
size_t
blue,
blue_bit,
green,
green_bit,
red,
red_bit;
/*
DirectColor or TrueColor visual.
*/
red=0;
green=0;
blue=0;
red_bit=visual_info->red_mask & (~(visual_info->red_mask)+1);
green_bit=visual_info->green_mask & (~(visual_info->green_mask)+1);
blue_bit=visual_info->blue_mask & (~(visual_info->blue_mask)+1);
for (i=0; i < visual_info->colormap_size; i++)
{
colors[i].pixel=red | green | blue;
colors[i].pad=0;
red+=red_bit;
if (red > visual_info->red_mask)
red=0;
green+=green_bit;
if (green > visual_info->green_mask)
green=0;
blue+=blue_bit;
if (blue > visual_info->blue_mask)
blue=0;
}
}
(void) XQueryColors(display,XDefaultColormap(display,visual_info->screen),
colors,visual_info->colormap_size);
/*
Convert X image to MIFF format.
*/
if ((visual_info->klass != TrueColor) && (visual_info->klass != DirectColor))
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->columns=(size_t) dps_image->width;
image->rows=(size_t) dps_image->height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color,
index;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=visual_info->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=visual_info->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=visual_info->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((visual_info->colormap_size > 0) &&
(visual_info->klass == DirectColor))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(dps_image,x,y);
index=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[index].red));
index=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[index].green));
index=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[index].blue));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(dps_image,x,y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
color=(color*65535L)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
color=(color*65535L)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
color));
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
color=(color*65535L)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
color));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,(size_t) visual_info->colormap_size) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
XDestroyImage(dps_image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[colors[i].pixel].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].red);
image->colormap[colors[i].pixel].green=
ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].green);
image->colormap[colors[i].pixel].blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].blue);
}
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(unsigned short)
XGetPixel(dps_image,x,y));
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
XDestroyImage(dps_image);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
/*
Rasterize matte image.
*/
status=XDPSCreatePixmapForEPSF((DPSContext) NULL,screen,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),1,pixels_per_point,&pixmap,&bits_per_pixel,&page);
if ((status != dps_status_failure) && (status != dps_status_no_extension))
{
status=XDPSImageFileIntoDrawable((DPSContext) NULL,screen,pixmap,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),(int) bits_per_pixel.height,1,&page,-page.x,
-page.y,pixels_per_point,MagickTrue,MagickTrue,MagickTrue,&sans);
if (status == dps_status_success)
{
XImage
*matte_image;
/*
Initialize image matte.
*/
matte_image=XGetImage(display,pixmap,0,0,bits_per_pixel.width,
bits_per_pixel.height,AllPlanes,ZPixmap);
(void) XFreePixmap(display,pixmap);
if (matte_image != (XImage *) NULL)
{
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (XGetPixel(matte_image,x,y) == 0)
SetPixelOpacity(q,TransparentOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
XDestroyImage(matte_image);
}
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 2,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean reload_notify(gpointer data)
{
MenuCache* cache = (MenuCache*)data;
GSList* l;
MENU_CACHE_LOCK;
/* we have it referenced and there is no source removal so no check */
for( l = cache->notifiers; l; l = l->next )
{
CacheReloadNotifier* n = (CacheReloadNotifier*)l->data;
if(n->func)
n->func( cache, n->user_data );
}
MENU_CACHE_UNLOCK;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
int err;
err = fuse_writepage_locked(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int setup_allrouters_membership(struct Interface *iface)
{
struct ipv6_mreq mreq;
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.ipv6mr_interface = iface->if_index;
/* ipv6-allrouters: ff02::2 */
mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr.s6_addr32[0] = htonl(0xFF020000);
mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr.s6_addr32[3] = htonl(0x2);
if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) < 0)
{
/* linux-2.6.12-bk4 returns error with HUP signal but keep listening */
if (errno != EADDRINUSE)
{
flog(LOG_ERR, "can't join ipv6-allrouters on %s", iface->Name);
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: set_interface_var() doesn't check interface name and blindly does
fopen(path "/" ifname, "w") on it. As "ifname" is an untrusted input, it
should be checked for ".." and/or "/" in it. Otherwise, an infected
unprivileged daemon may overwrite contents of file named "mtu",
"hoplimit", etc. in arbitrary location with arbitrary 32-bit value in
decimal representation ("%d"). If an attacker has a local account or
may create arbitrary symlinks with these names in any location (e.g.
/tmp), any file may be overwritten with a decimal value.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 7,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int kvmppc_get_vsr_data(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int rs, u64 *val)
{
u32 dword_offset, word_offset;
union kvmppc_one_reg reg;
int vsx_offset = 0;
int copy_type = vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_copy_type;
int result = 0;
switch (copy_type) {
case KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_DWORD:
vsx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vsr_dword_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
if (vsx_offset == -1) {
result = -1;
break;
}
if (!vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_tx_sx_enabled) {
*val = VCPU_VSX_FPR(vcpu, rs, vsx_offset);
} else {
reg.vval = VCPU_VSX_VR(vcpu, rs);
*val = reg.vsxval[vsx_offset];
}
break;
case KVMPPC_VSX_COPY_WORD:
vsx_offset =
kvmppc_get_vsr_word_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
if (vsx_offset == -1) {
result = -1;
break;
}
if (!vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_tx_sx_enabled) {
dword_offset = vsx_offset / 2;
word_offset = vsx_offset % 2;
reg.vsxval[0] = VCPU_VSX_FPR(vcpu, rs, dword_offset);
*val = reg.vsx32val[word_offset];
} else {
reg.vval = VCPU_VSX_VR(vcpu, rs);
*val = reg.vsx32val[vsx_offset];
}
break;
default:
result = -1;
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 21,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::ClosePage() {
is_waiting_for_unload_ack_ = true;
StartHangMonitorTimeout(TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kUnloadTimeoutMS));
if (IsRenderViewLive()) {
increment_in_flight_event_count();
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_VIEW_HOST_WILL_CLOSE_RENDER_VIEW,
Source<RenderViewHost>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
Send(new ViewMsg_ClosePage(GetRoutingID()));
} else {
ClosePageIgnoringUnloadEvents();
}
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiDsClearImplicitReturn (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState)
{
ACPI_FUNCTION_NAME (DsClearImplicitReturn);
/*
* Slack must be enabled for this feature
*/
if (!AcpiGbl_EnableInterpreterSlack)
{
return;
}
if (WalkState->ImplicitReturnObj)
{
/*
* Delete any "stale" implicit return. However, in
* complex statements, the implicit return value can be
* bubbled up several levels.
*/
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Removing reference on stale implicit return obj %p\n",
WalkState->ImplicitReturnObj));
AcpiUtRemoveReference (WalkState->ImplicitReturnObj);
WalkState->ImplicitReturnObj = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<CSSValue> CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::valueForCustomFilterParameter(const CustomFilterParameter* parameter) const
{
ASSERT(parameter);
switch (parameter->parameterType()) {
case CustomFilterParameter::NUMBER:
return valueForCustomFilterNumberParameter(static_cast<const CustomFilterNumberParameter*>(parameter));
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data(struct address_space *mapping,
struct inode *inode, loff_t pos,
unsigned len, struct page *mmap_page,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc)
{
int ret, written = 0;
loff_t end = pos + len;
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_dinode *di = NULL;
trace_ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data((unsigned long long)oi->ip_blkno,
len, (unsigned long long)pos,
oi->ip_dyn_features);
/*
* Handle inodes which already have inline data 1st.
*/
if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) {
if (mmap_page == NULL &&
ocfs2_size_fits_inline_data(wc->w_di_bh, end))
goto do_inline_write;
/*
* The write won't fit - we have to give this inode an
* inline extent list now.
*/
ret = ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents(inode, wc->w_di_bh);
if (ret)
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check whether the inode can accept inline data.
*/
if (oi->ip_clusters != 0 || i_size_read(inode) != 0)
return 0;
/*
* Check whether the write can fit.
*/
di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)wc->w_di_bh->b_data;
if (mmap_page ||
end > ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(inode->i_sb, di))
return 0;
do_inline_write:
ret = ocfs2_write_begin_inline(mapping, inode, wc);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* This signals to the caller that the data can be written
* inline.
*/
written = 1;
out:
return written ? written : ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 26,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::UnregisterAecDumpConsumerOnUIThread(int id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
auto it =
std::find(aec_dump_consumers_.begin(), aec_dump_consumers_.end(), id);
if (it != aec_dump_consumers_.end())
aec_dump_consumers_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 9,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Wait() {
if (received_notification_)
return;
waiting_ = true;
base::RunLoop run_loop;
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 27,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ctr_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
struct crypto_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
struct crypto_ctr_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
if (IS_ERR(cipher))
return PTR_ERR(cipher);
ctx->child = cipher;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileBrowserPrivateGetDriveEntryPropertiesFunction::RunAsync() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
using api::file_browser_private::GetDriveEntryProperties::Params;
const scoped_ptr<Params> params(Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
properties_list_.resize(params->file_urls.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < params->file_urls.size(); i++) {
const GURL url = GURL(params->file_urls[i]);
const base::FilePath local_path = file_manager::util::GetLocalPathFromURL(
render_view_host(), GetProfile(), url);
properties_list_[i] = make_linked_ptr(new DriveEntryProperties);
SingleDriveEntryPropertiesGetter::Start(
local_path,
properties_list_[i],
GetProfile(),
base::Bind(&FileBrowserPrivateGetDriveEntryPropertiesFunction::
CompleteGetFileProperties,
this));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void inet_del_ifa(struct in_device *in_dev, struct in_ifaddr **ifap,
int destroy)
{
__inet_del_ifa(in_dev, ifap, destroy, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_qop_t qop_req,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count)
{
return gss_get_mic_iov_length(minor_status, context_handle, qop_req, iov,
iov_count);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 2,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltCryptoCryptoApiCreateHash (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt,
HCRYPTPROV hCryptProv, ALG_ID algorithm,
const char *msg, unsigned int msglen,
char *dest, unsigned int destlen)
{
HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
DWORD dwHashLen = destlen;
if (!CryptCreateHash (hCryptProv, algorithm, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
exsltCryptoCryptoApiReportError (ctxt, __LINE__);
return 0;
}
if (!CryptHashData (hHash, (const BYTE *) msg, msglen, 0)) {
exsltCryptoCryptoApiReportError (ctxt, __LINE__);
goto fail;
}
if (!CryptGetHashParam (hHash, HP_HASHVAL, dest, &dwHashLen, 0)) {
exsltCryptoCryptoApiReportError (ctxt, __LINE__);
goto fail;
}
fail:
return hHash;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int macvlan_port_create(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct macvlan_port *port;
unsigned int i;
int err;
if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER || dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)
return -EINVAL;
port = kzalloc(sizeof(*port), GFP_KERNEL);
if (port == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
port->passthru = false;
port->dev = dev;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&port->vlans);
for (i = 0; i < MACVLAN_HASH_SIZE; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&port->vlan_hash[i]);
err = netdev_rx_handler_register(dev, macvlan_handle_frame, port);
if (err)
kfree(port);
else
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_MACVLAN_PORT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509),type,(char *)data,md,len));
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 18,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long vhost_dev_set_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
struct task_struct *worker;
int err;
/* Is there an owner already? */
if (vhost_dev_has_owner(dev)) {
err = -EBUSY;
goto err_mm;
}
/* No owner, become one */
dev->mm = get_task_mm(current);
worker = kthread_create(vhost_worker, dev, "vhost-%d", current->pid);
if (IS_ERR(worker)) {
err = PTR_ERR(worker);
goto err_worker;
}
dev->worker = worker;
wake_up_process(worker); /* avoid contributing to loadavg */
err = vhost_attach_cgroups(dev);
if (err)
goto err_cgroup;
err = vhost_dev_alloc_iovecs(dev);
if (err)
goto err_cgroup;
return 0;
err_cgroup:
kthread_stop(worker);
dev->worker = NULL;
err_worker:
if (dev->mm)
mmput(dev->mm);
dev->mm = NULL;
err_mm:
return err;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::AddAndReportPolicyFromHeaderValue(
const String& header,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderType type,
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSource source) {
wtf_size_t previous_policy_count = policies_.size();
AddPolicyFromHeaderValue(header, type, source);
WebVector<WebContentSecurityPolicy> policies(policies_.size() -
previous_policy_count);
for (wtf_size_t i = previous_policy_count; i < policies_.size(); ++i) {
policies[i - previous_policy_count] =
policies_[i]->ExposeForNavigationalChecks();
}
if (GetDocument() && GetDocument()->GetFrame()) {
GetDocument()->GetFrame()->Client()->DidAddContentSecurityPolicies(
policies);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GamepadProvider::Pause() {
{
base::AutoLock lock(is_paused_lock_);
is_paused_ = true;
}
base::MessageLoop* polling_loop = polling_thread_->message_loop();
polling_loop->task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GamepadProvider::SendPauseHint, Unretained(this), true));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 4,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_set_read_callback(struct archive *_a,
archive_read_callback *client_reader)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC, ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW,
"archive_read_set_read_callback");
a->client.reader = client_reader;
return ARCHIVE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestNamedConstructor::derefObject(void* object)
{
static_cast<TestNamedConstructor*>(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileSystemOperation::DoOpenFile(const OpenFileCallback& callback,
int file_flags) {
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpen(
&operation_context_, src_util_, src_path_, file_flags,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidOpenFile,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfs41_check_op_ordering(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *args)
{
struct nfsd4_op *op = &args->ops[0];
/* These ordering requirements don't apply to NFSv4.0: */
if (args->minorversion == 0)
return nfs_ok;
/* This is weird, but OK, not our problem: */
if (args->opcnt == 0)
return nfs_ok;
if (op->status == nfserr_op_illegal)
return nfs_ok;
if (!(nfsd4_ops[op->opnum].op_flags & ALLOWED_AS_FIRST_OP))
return nfserr_op_not_in_session;
if (op->opnum == OP_SEQUENCE)
return nfs_ok;
if (args->opcnt != 1)
return nfserr_not_only_op;
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 3,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetDeviceFormatsInUse() {
const base::Callback<void(const media::VideoCaptureFormats&)>
callback = base::Bind(
&VideoCaptureImplTest::OnDeviceFormatsInUse,
base::Unretained(this));
video_capture_impl_->GetDeviceFormatsInUse(callback);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 3,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetHasHorizontalScrollbar(
bool has_horizontal_scrollbar) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PlatformGraphicsContext* GraphicsContext::platformContext() const
{
ASSERT(!paintingDisabled());
return m_data;
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 15,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cached_NPN_GetIntIdentifier(int32_t intid)
{
NPIdentifier ident;
if (!use_npidentifier_cache())
ident = invoke_NPN_GetIntIdentifier(intid);
#if USE_NPIDENTIFIER_CACHE
else if (!npidentifier_cache_has_int(intid, &ident)) {
ident = invoke_NPN_GetIntIdentifier(intid);
npidentifier_cache_reserve(1);
npidentifier_cache_add_int(ident, intid);
}
#endif
return ident;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clock_settime, const clockid_t, which_clock,
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, tp)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = clockid_to_kclock(which_clock);
struct timespec64 new_tp;
if (!kc || !kc->clock_set)
return -EINVAL;
if (get_timespec64(&new_tp, tp))
return -EFAULT;
return kc->clock_set(which_clock, &new_tp);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 10,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_core_note(struct magic_set *ms, unsigned char *nbuf, uint32_t type,
int swap, uint32_t namesz, uint32_t descsz,
size_t noff, size_t doff, int *flags, size_t size, int clazz)
{
#ifdef ELFCORE
int os_style = -1;
/*
* Sigh. The 2.0.36 kernel in Debian 2.1, at
* least, doesn't correctly implement name
* sections, in core dumps, as specified by
* the "Program Linking" section of "UNIX(R) System
* V Release 4 Programmer's Guide: ANSI C and
* Programming Support Tools", because my copy
* clearly says "The first 'namesz' bytes in 'name'
* contain a *null-terminated* [emphasis mine]
* character representation of the entry's owner
* or originator", but the 2.0.36 kernel code
* doesn't include the terminating null in the
* name....
*/
if ((namesz == 4 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE", 4) == 0) ||
(namesz == 5 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "CORE") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_SVR4;
}
if ((namesz == 8 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "FreeBSD") == 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_FREEBSD;
}
if ((namesz >= 11 && strncmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD-CORE", 11)
== 0)) {
os_style = OS_STYLE_NETBSD;
}
if (os_style != -1 && (*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE) == 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s-style", os_style_names[os_style])
== -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE_STYLE;
}
switch (os_style) {
case OS_STYLE_NETBSD:
if (type == NT_NETBSD_CORE_PROCINFO) {
char sbuf[512];
uint32_t signo;
/*
* Extract the program name. It is at
* offset 0x7c, and is up to 32-bytes,
* including the terminating NUL.
*/
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.31s'",
file_printable(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf),
(const char *)&nbuf[doff + 0x7c])) == -1)
return 1;
/*
* Extract the signal number. It is at
* offset 0x08.
*/
(void)memcpy(&signo, &nbuf[doff + 0x08],
sizeof(signo));
if (file_printf(ms, " (signal %u)",
elf_getu32(swap, signo)) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
if (type == NT_PRPSINFO && *flags & FLAGS_IS_CORE) {
size_t i, j;
unsigned char c;
/*
* Extract the program name. We assume
* it to be 16 characters (that's what it
* is in SunOS 5.x and Linux).
*
* Unfortunately, it's at a different offset
* in various OSes, so try multiple offsets.
* If the characters aren't all printable,
* reject it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NOFFSETS; i++) {
unsigned char *cname, *cp;
size_t reloffset = prpsoffsets(i);
size_t noffset = doff + reloffset;
size_t k;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++, noffset++,
reloffset++) {
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the buffer; if
* we are, just give up.
*/
if (noffset >= size)
goto tryanother;
/*
* Make sure we're not past
* the end of the contents;
* if we are, this obviously
* isn't the right offset.
*/
if (reloffset >= descsz)
goto tryanother;
c = nbuf[noffset];
if (c == '\0') {
/*
* A '\0' at the
* beginning is
* obviously wrong.
* Any other '\0'
* means we're done.
*/
if (j == 0)
goto tryanother;
else
break;
} else {
/*
* A nonprintable
* character is also
* wrong.
*/
if (!isprint(c) || isquote(c))
goto tryanother;
}
}
/*
* Well, that worked.
*/
/*
* Try next offsets, in case this match is
* in the middle of a string.
*/
for (k = i + 1 ; k < NOFFSETS; k++) {
size_t no;
int adjust = 1;
if (prpsoffsets(k) >= prpsoffsets(i))
continue;
for (no = doff + prpsoffsets(k);
no < doff + prpsoffsets(i); no++)
adjust = adjust
&& isprint(nbuf[no]);
if (adjust)
i = k;
}
cname = (unsigned char *)
&nbuf[doff + prpsoffsets(i)];
for (cp = cname; *cp && isprint(*cp); cp++)
continue;
/*
* Linux apparently appends a space at the end
* of the command line: remove it.
*/
while (cp > cname && isspace(cp[-1]))
cp--;
if (file_printf(ms, ", from '%.*s'",
(int)(cp - cname), cname) == -1)
return 1;
*flags |= FLAGS_DID_CORE;
return 1;
tryanother:
;
}
}
break;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous
commit.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int patternalternatespace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, ref **r, int *CIESubst)
{
ref tref;
int code;
if (!r_has_type(*r, t_name)) {
if (r_is_array(*r)) {
if (r_size(*r) > 1) {
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &tref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
ref_assign(*r, &tref);
} else
*r = 0;
} else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
} else
*r = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 17,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iakerb_acceptor_step(iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx,
int initialContextToken,
const gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data request = empty_data(), reply = empty_data();
krb5_data realm = empty_data();
OM_uint32 tmp;
int tcp_only, use_master;
krb5_ui_4 kdc_code;
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
if (ctx->count >= IAKERB_MAX_HOPS) {
code = KRB5_KDC_UNREACH;
goto cleanup;
}
code = iakerb_parse_token(ctx, initialContextToken, input_token, &realm,
NULL, &request);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
if (realm.length == 0 || request.length == 0) {
code = KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
goto cleanup;
}
code = iakerb_save_token(ctx, input_token);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
for (tcp_only = 0; tcp_only <= 1; tcp_only++) {
use_master = 0;
code = krb5_sendto_kdc(ctx->k5c, &request, &realm,
&reply, &use_master, tcp_only);
if (code == 0 && krb5_is_krb_error(&reply)) {
krb5_error *error;
code = decode_krb5_error(&reply, &error);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
kdc_code = error->error;
krb5_free_error(ctx->k5c, error);
if (kdc_code == KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG) {
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5c, &reply);
reply = empty_data();
continue;
}
}
break;
}
if (code == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH || code == KRB5_REALM_UNKNOWN) {
krb5_error error;
memset(&error, 0, sizeof(error));
if (code == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH)
error.error = KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NO_RESPONSE;
else if (code == KRB5_REALM_UNKNOWN)
error.error = KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NOT_FOUND;
code = krb5_mk_error(ctx->k5c, &error, &reply);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
code = iakerb_make_token(ctx, &realm, NULL, &reply, 0, output_token);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
code = iakerb_save_token(ctx, output_token);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
ctx->count++;
cleanup:
if (code != 0)
gss_release_buffer(&tmp, output_token);
/* request is a pointer into input_token, no need to free */
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5c, &realm);
krb5_free_data_contents(ctx->k5c, &reply);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sync_helper(struct ImapData *idata, int right, int flag, const char *name)
{
int count = 0;
int rc;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
if (!idata->ctx)
return -1;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->ctx->rights, right))
return 0;
if (right == MUTT_ACL_WRITE && !imap_has_flag(&idata->flags, name))
return 0;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "+FLAGS.SILENT (%s)", name);
rc = imap_exec_msgset(idata, "UID STORE", buf, flag, 1, 0);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
count += rc;
buf[0] = '-';
rc = imap_exec_msgset(idata, "UID STORE", buf, flag, 1, 1);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
count += rc;
return count;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 16,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2PartPtr (int size, void *data, int srcx, int srcy, int w,
int h)
{
_noLibzError();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _rsvg_io_acquire_data (const char *href,
const char *base_uri,
char **mime_type,
gsize *len,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
char *data;
gsize llen;
if (!(href && *href)) {
g_set_error_literal (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_FAILED,
"Invalid URI");
return NULL;
}
if (!len)
len = &llen;
if (strncmp (href, "data:", 5) == 0)
return rsvg_acquire_data_data (href, NULL, mime_type, len, error);
if ((data = rsvg_acquire_file_data (href, base_uri, mime_type, len, cancellable, NULL)))
return data;
if ((data = rsvg_acquire_gvfs_data (href, base_uri, mime_type, len, cancellable, error)))
return data;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible credentials leaking reported by Alex Birsan.
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::OnLifecycleUnitStateChanged(
LifecycleUnitState last_state,
LifecycleUnitStateChangeReason reason) {
DCHECK(IsValidStateChange(last_state, GetState(), reason))
<< "Cannot transition TabLifecycleUnit state from " << last_state
<< " to " << GetState() << " with reason " << reason;
const bool was_discarded = IsDiscardedOrPendingDiscard(last_state);
const bool is_discarded = IsDiscardedOrPendingDiscard(GetState());
if (was_discarded != is_discarded) {
for (auto& observer : *observers_)
observer.OnDiscardedStateChange(GetWebContents(), is_discarded);
}
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_send_survey(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 pid, u32 seq,
int flags, struct net_device *dev,
struct survey_info *survey)
{
void *hdr;
struct nlattr *infoattr;
/* Survey without a channel doesn't make sense */
if (!survey->channel)
return -EINVAL;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, pid, seq, flags,
NL80211_CMD_NEW_SURVEY_RESULTS);
if (!hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex);
infoattr = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_SURVEY_INFO);
if (!infoattr)
goto nla_put_failure;
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_FREQUENCY,
survey->channel->center_freq);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_NOISE_DBM)
NLA_PUT_U8(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_NOISE,
survey->noise);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_IN_USE)
NLA_PUT_FLAG(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_IN_USE);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME)
NLA_PUT_U64(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME,
survey->channel_time);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_BUSY)
NLA_PUT_U64(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_BUSY,
survey->channel_time_busy);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_EXT_BUSY)
NLA_PUT_U64(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_EXT_BUSY,
survey->channel_time_ext_busy);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_RX)
NLA_PUT_U64(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_RX,
survey->channel_time_rx);
if (survey->filled & SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_TX)
NLA_PUT_U64(msg, NL80211_SURVEY_INFO_CHANNEL_TIME_TX,
survey->channel_time_tx);
nla_nest_end(msg, infoattr);
return genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_num_712(unsigned char *p, char value)
{
*((char *)p) = value;
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 13,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void flush_delayed_fput(void)
{
delayed_fput(NULL);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 12,684 |
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