instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_obj_protected_methods(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_bool recur = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "|b", &recur);
return mrb_obj_methods(mrb, recur, self, NOEX_PROTECTED); /* protected attribute not define */
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 28,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnProcessLaunchFailed(int error_code) {
int process_launch_error_code = error_code;
base::debug::Alias(&process_launch_error_code);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_SANDBOXED)
RecordAppContainerStatus(error_code, crashed_before_);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
RecordProcessCrash();
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_signed_pixels_clamped_c(const int16_t *block,
uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
int line_size)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
if (*block < -128)
*pixels = 0;
else if (*block > 127)
*pixels = 255;
else
*pixels = (uint8_t)(*block + 128);
block++;
pixels++;
}
pixels += (line_size - 8);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendKeyToPageAndWait(ui::KeyboardCode key) {
test_delegate_.Reset();
content::SimulateKeyPress(
GetWebContents(), key, false, false, false, false);
test_delegate_.Wait();
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bid_keycmp(const char *p, const char *key, ssize_t len)
{
int match_len = 0;
while (len > 0 && *p && *key) {
if (*p == *key) {
--len;
++p;
++key;
++match_len;
continue;
}
return (0);/* Not match */
}
if (*key != '\0')
return (0);/* Not match */
/* A following character should be specified characters */
if (p[0] == '=' || p[0] == ' ' || p[0] == '\t' ||
p[0] == '\n' || p[0] == '\r' ||
(p[0] == '\\' && (p[1] == '\n' || p[1] == '\r')))
return (match_len);
return (0);/* Not match */
}
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XmlReader::XmlReader() : reader_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 19,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_secret_key( RSA_secret_key *sk )
{
int rc;
gcry_mpi_t temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->p)*2 );
mpi_mul(temp, sk->p, sk->q );
rc = mpi_cmp( temp, sk->n );
mpi_free(temp);
return !rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 25,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXRenderReq *req;
ClientPtr client= cl->client;
int left, cmdlen, error;
int commandsDone;
CARD16 opcode;
__GLXrenderHeader *hdr;
__GLXcontext *glxc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
req = (xGLXRenderReq *) pc;
if (client->swapped) {
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->contextTag);
}
glxc = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error);
if (!glxc) {
return error;
}
commandsDone = 0;
pc += sz_xGLXRenderReq;
left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderReq;
while (left > 0) {
__GLXrenderSizeData entry;
int extra;
__GLXdispatchRenderProcPtr proc;
int err;
/*
** Verify that the header length and the overall length agree.
** Also, each command must be word aligned.
*/
hdr = (__GLXrenderHeader *) pc;
if (client->swapped) {
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&hdr->length);
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&hdr->opcode);
}
cmdlen = hdr->length;
opcode = hdr->opcode;
/*
** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data.
*/
err = __glXGetProtocolSizeData(& Render_dispatch_info, opcode, & entry);
proc = (__GLXdispatchRenderProcPtr)
__glXGetProtocolDecodeFunction(& Render_dispatch_info,
opcode, client->swapped);
if ((err < 0) || (proc == NULL)) {
client->errorValue = commandsDone;
return __glXError(GLXBadRenderRequest);
}
if (entry.varsize) {
/* variable size command */
extra = (*entry.varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE,
client->swapped);
if (extra < 0) {
extra = 0;
}
if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + extra)) {
return BadLength;
}
} else {
/* constant size command */
if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes)) {
return BadLength;
}
}
if (left < cmdlen) {
return BadLength;
}
/*
** Skip over the header and execute the command. We allow the
** caller to trash the command memory. This is useful especially
** for things that require double alignment - they can just shift
** the data towards lower memory (trashing the header) by 4 bytes
** and achieve the required alignment.
*/
(*proc)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE);
pc += cmdlen;
left -= cmdlen;
commandsDone++;
}
__GLX_NOTE_UNFLUSHED_CMDS(glxc);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE_WRAPPERS(WebGLRenderingContextBase) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(context_group_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_array_buffer_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(renderbuffer_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(framebuffer_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(current_program_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_vertex_array_object_);
for (auto& unit : texture_units_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture2d_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture_cube_map_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture3d_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit.texture2d_array_binding_);
}
for (auto tracker : extensions_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(tracker);
}
CanvasRenderingContext::TraceWrappers(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host && observer_.IsObserving(widget_host))
observer_.Remove(widget_host);
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host)
observer_.Add(widget_host);
if (video_consumer_ && frame_host) {
video_consumer_->SetFrameSinkId(
frame_host->GetRenderWidgetHost()->GetFrameSinkId());
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void apply_filter(APEContext *ctx, APEFilter *f,
int32_t *data0, int32_t *data1,
int count, int order, int fracbits)
{
do_apply_filter(ctx, ctx->fileversion, &f[0], data0, count, order, fracbits);
if (data1)
do_apply_filter(ctx, ctx->fileversion, &f[1], data1, count, order, fracbits);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usbip_dump_usb_ctrlrequest(struct usb_ctrlrequest *cmd)
{
if (!cmd) {
pr_debug(" : null pointer\n");
return;
}
pr_debug(" ");
pr_debug("bRequestType(%02X) bRequest(%02X) wValue(%04X) wIndex(%04X) wLength(%04X) ",
cmd->bRequestType, cmd->bRequest,
cmd->wValue, cmd->wIndex, cmd->wLength);
pr_debug("\n ");
if ((cmd->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_MASK) == USB_TYPE_STANDARD) {
pr_debug("STANDARD ");
switch (cmd->bRequest) {
case USB_REQ_GET_STATUS:
pr_debug("GET_STATUS\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE:
pr_debug("CLEAR_FEAT\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE:
pr_debug("SET_FEAT\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_SET_ADDRESS:
pr_debug("SET_ADDRRS\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR:
pr_debug("GET_DESCRI\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_SET_DESCRIPTOR:
pr_debug("SET_DESCRI\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_GET_CONFIGURATION:
pr_debug("GET_CONFIG\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION:
pr_debug("SET_CONFIG\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_GET_INTERFACE:
pr_debug("GET_INTERF\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_SET_INTERFACE:
pr_debug("SET_INTERF\n");
break;
case USB_REQ_SYNCH_FRAME:
pr_debug("SYNC_FRAME\n");
break;
default:
pr_debug("REQ(%02X)\n", cmd->bRequest);
break;
}
usbip_dump_request_type(cmd->bRequestType);
} else if ((cmd->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_MASK) == USB_TYPE_CLASS) {
pr_debug("CLASS\n");
} else if ((cmd->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_MASK) == USB_TYPE_VENDOR) {
pr_debug("VENDOR\n");
} else if ((cmd->bRequestType & USB_TYPE_MASK) == USB_TYPE_RESERVED) {
pr_debug("RESERVED\n");
}
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: confirm_empty_trash (CommonJob *job)
{
char *prompt;
int response;
/* Just Say Yes if the preference says not to confirm. */
if (!should_confirm_trash ())
{
return TRUE;
}
prompt = f (_("Empty all items from Trash?"));
response = run_warning (job,
prompt,
f (_("All items in the Trash will be permanently deleted.")),
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL, _("Empty _Trash"),
NULL);
return (response == 1);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EVP_PKEY * php_openssl_evp_from_zval(
zval * val, int public_key, char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_len,
int makeresource, zend_resource **resourceval)
{
EVP_PKEY * key = NULL;
X509 * cert = NULL;
int free_cert = 0;
zend_resource *cert_res = NULL;
char * filename = NULL;
zval tmp;
ZVAL_NULL(&tmp);
#define TMP_CLEAN \
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {\
zval_dtor(&tmp); \
} \
return NULL;
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = NULL;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval * zphrase;
/* get passphrase */
if ((zphrase = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(val), 1)) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "key array must be of the form array(0 => key, 1 => phrase)");
return NULL;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(zphrase) == IS_STRING) {
passphrase = Z_STRVAL_P(zphrase);
passphrase_len = Z_STRLEN_P(zphrase);
} else {
ZVAL_COPY(&tmp, zphrase);
convert_to_string(&tmp);
passphrase = Z_STRVAL(tmp);
passphrase_len = Z_STRLEN(tmp);
}
/* now set val to be the key param and continue */
if ((val = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(val), 0)) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "key array must be of the form array(0 => key, 1 => phrase)");
TMP_CLEAN;
}
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_RESOURCE) {
void * what;
zend_resource * res = Z_RES_P(val);
what = zend_fetch_resource2(res, "OpenSSL X.509/key", le_x509, le_key);
if (!what) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (resourceval) {
*resourceval = res;
Z_ADDREF_P(val);
}
if (res->type == le_x509) {
/* extract key from cert, depending on public_key param */
cert = (X509*)what;
free_cert = 0;
} else if (res->type == le_key) {
int is_priv;
is_priv = php_openssl_is_private_key((EVP_PKEY*)what);
/* check whether it is actually a private key if requested */
if (!public_key && !is_priv) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param is a public key");
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (public_key && is_priv) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Don't know how to get public key from this private key");
TMP_CLEAN;
} else {
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(&tmp);
}
/* got the key - return it */
return (EVP_PKEY*)what;
}
} else {
/* other types could be used here - eg: file pointers and read in the data from them */
TMP_CLEAN;
}
} else {
/* force it to be a string and check if it refers to a file */
/* passing non string values leaks, object uses toString, it returns NULL
* See bug38255.phpt
*/
if (!(Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_STRING || Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_OBJECT)) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
convert_to_string_ex(val);
if (Z_STRLEN_P(val) > 7 && memcmp(Z_STRVAL_P(val), "file://", sizeof("file://") - 1) == 0) {
filename = Z_STRVAL_P(val) + (sizeof("file://") - 1);
}
/* it's an X509 file/cert of some kind, and we need to extract the data from that */
if (public_key) {
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(val, 0, &cert_res);
free_cert = (cert_res == NULL);
/* actual extraction done later */
if (!cert) {
/* not a X509 certificate, try to retrieve public key */
BIO* in;
if (filename) {
in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
} else {
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_P(val), (int)Z_STRLEN_P(val));
}
if (in == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
TMP_CLEAN;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(in, NULL,NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(in);
}
} else {
/* we want the private key */
BIO *in;
if (filename) {
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename)) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
in = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
} else {
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(Z_STRVAL_P(val), (int)Z_STRLEN_P(val));
}
if (in == NULL) {
TMP_CLEAN;
}
if (passphrase == NULL) {
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
} else {
struct php_openssl_pem_password password;
password.key = passphrase;
password.len = passphrase_len;
key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, php_openssl_pem_password_cb, &password);
}
BIO_free(in);
}
}
if (key == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
if (public_key && cert) {
/* extract public key from X509 cert */
key = (EVP_PKEY *) X509_get_pubkey(cert);
if (key == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
}
}
if (free_cert && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
if (key && makeresource && resourceval) {
*resourceval = zend_register_resource(key, le_key);
}
if (Z_TYPE(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(&tmp);
}
return key;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 9,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<protocol::Page::Frame> InspectorPageAgent::BuildObjectForFrame(
LocalFrame* frame) {
DocumentLoader* loader = frame->Loader().GetDocumentLoader();
KURL url = loader->GetRequest().Url();
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Page::Frame> frame_object =
protocol::Page::Frame::create()
.setId(IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame))
.setLoaderId(IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader))
.setUrl(UrlWithoutFragment(url).GetString())
.setMimeType(frame->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()->MimeType())
.setSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::Create(url)->ToRawString())
.build();
Frame* parent_frame = frame->Tree().Parent();
if (parent_frame && parent_frame->IsLocalFrame()) {
frame_object->setParentId(
IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(ToLocalFrame(parent_frame)));
}
if (frame->DeprecatedLocalOwner()) {
AtomicString name = frame->DeprecatedLocalOwner()->GetNameAttribute();
if (name.IsEmpty())
name = frame->DeprecatedLocalOwner()->getAttribute(HTMLNames::idAttr);
frame_object->setName(name);
}
if (loader && !loader->UnreachableURL().IsEmpty())
frame_object->setUnreachableUrl(loader->UnreachableURL().GetString());
return frame_object;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rsp_increment(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int inc)
{
masked_increment(reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP), stack_mask(ctxt), inc);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MultibufferDataSource::Preload preload() { return data_source_->preload_; }
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 22,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiNsExecModuleCodeList (
void)
{
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *Prev;
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *Next;
ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO *Info;
UINT32 MethodCount = 0;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsExecModuleCodeList);
/* Exit now if the list is empty */
Next = AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList;
if (!Next)
{
return_VOID;
}
/* Allocate the evaluation information block */
Info = ACPI_ALLOCATE (sizeof (ACPI_EVALUATE_INFO));
if (!Info)
{
return_VOID;
}
/* Walk the list, executing each "method" */
while (Next)
{
Prev = Next;
Next = Next->Method.Mutex;
/* Clear the link field and execute the method */
Prev->Method.Mutex = NULL;
AcpiNsExecModuleCode (Prev, Info);
MethodCount++;
/* Delete the (temporary) method object */
AcpiUtRemoveReference (Prev);
}
ACPI_INFO ((
"Executed %u blocks of module-level executable AML code",
MethodCount));
ACPI_FREE (Info);
AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList = NULL;
return_VOID;
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in nseval.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.464168] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.467022] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.469376] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.471647] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.477997] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.482706] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.487503] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.492136] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_SB._INI] (Node ffff88021710a618), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.497683] ACPI: Interpreter enabled
>[ 0.499385] ACPI: (supports S0)
>[ 0.501151] ACPI: Using IOAPIC for interrupt routing
>[ 0.503342] ACPI Error: Null stack entry at ffff880215c0aad8 (20170303/exresop-174)
>[ 0.506522] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, While resolving operands for [OpcodeName unavailable] (20170303/dswexec-461)
>[ 0.510463] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\DBG] (Node ffff88021710ab40), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.514477] ACPI Error: Method parse/execution failed [\_PIC] (Node ffff88021710ab18), AE_AML_INTERNAL (20170303/psparse-543)
>[ 0.518867] ACPI Exception: AE_AML_INTERNAL, Evaluating _PIC (20170303/bus-991)
>[ 0.522384] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.524597] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.526795] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.529668] Call Trace:
>[ 0.530811] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.532240] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.533905] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.535497] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.537237] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.538701] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.540008] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.541593] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.543008] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.546202] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.547513] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.548817] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.550587] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.551716] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.553744] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.555038] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found AcpiNsEvaluate() function
only removes Info->ReturnObject in AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE case. But, when errors
occur, the status value is not AE_CTRL_RETURN_VALUE, and Info->ReturnObject is
also not null. Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 22,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_tsfb_synthesize2(jpc_tsfb_t *tsfb, int *a, int xstart, int ystart,
int width, int height, int stride, int numlvls)
{
if (numlvls > 0) {
if (jpc_tsfb_synthesize2(tsfb, a, JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(xstart, 1),
JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(ystart, 1), JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(xstart + width,
1) - JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(xstart, 1), JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(ystart +
height, 1) - JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(ystart, 1), stride, numlvls -
1)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (width > 0 && height > 0) {
if ((*tsfb->qmfb->synthesize)(a, xstart, ystart, width, height, stride)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 20,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 10,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenSystemOptionsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenSystemOptionsDialog"));
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kSystemOptionsSubPage);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Decoder::SetLevelInfo(uint32_t client_id,
int level,
unsigned internal_format,
unsigned width,
unsigned height,
unsigned depth,
unsigned format,
unsigned type,
const gfx::Rect& cleared_rect) {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
HTMLCanvasElement* canvas,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"a buffer is bound to PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
WebGLRenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(execution_context, target, level,
xoffset, yoffset, format, type,
canvas, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Conic_To( RAS_ARGS Long cx,
Long cy,
Long x,
Long y )
{
Long y1, y2, y3, x3, ymin, ymax;
TStates state_bez;
ras.arc = ras.arcs;
ras.arc[2].x = ras.lastX;
ras.arc[2].y = ras.lastY;
ras.arc[1].x = cx;
ras.arc[1].y = cy;
ras.arc[0].x = x;
ras.arc[0].y = y;
do
{
y1 = ras.arc[2].y;
y2 = ras.arc[1].y;
y3 = ras.arc[0].y;
x3 = ras.arc[0].x;
/* first, categorize the Bezier arc */
if ( y1 <= y3 )
{
ymin = y1;
ymax = y3;
}
else
{
ymin = y3;
ymax = y1;
}
if ( y2 < ymin || y2 > ymax )
{
/* this arc has no given direction, split it! */
Split_Conic( ras.arc );
ras.arc += 2;
}
else if ( y1 == y3 )
{
/* this arc is flat, ignore it and pop it from the Bezier stack */
ras.arc -= 2;
}
else
{
/* the arc is y-monotonous, either ascending or descending */
/* detect a change of direction */
state_bez = y1 < y3 ? Ascending_State : Descending_State;
if ( ras.state != state_bez )
{
Bool o = state_bez == Ascending_State ? IS_BOTTOM_OVERSHOOT( y1 )
: IS_TOP_OVERSHOOT( y1 );
/* finalize current profile if any */
if ( ras.state != Unknown_State &&
End_Profile( RAS_VARS o ) )
goto Fail;
/* create a new profile */
if ( New_Profile( RAS_VARS state_bez, o ) )
goto Fail;
}
/* now call the appropriate routine */
if ( state_bez == Ascending_State )
{
if ( Bezier_Up( RAS_VARS 2, Split_Conic, ras.minY, ras.maxY ) )
goto Fail;
}
else
if ( Bezier_Down( RAS_VARS 2, Split_Conic, ras.minY, ras.maxY ) )
goto Fail;
}
} while ( ras.arc >= ras.arcs );
ras.lastX = x3;
ras.lastY = y3;
return SUCCESS;
Fail:
return FAILURE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void record_recent_commit(struct commit *commit, void *data)
{
sha1_array_append(&recent_objects, commit->object.oid.hash);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::SetBackgrounded(bool backgrounded) {
backgrounded_ = backgrounded;
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() || child_process_launcher_->IsStarting())
return;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (GetModuleHandle(L"cbstext.dll"))
return;
#endif // OS_WIN
child_process_launcher_->SetProcessBackgrounded(backgrounded);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: layer_replace_tiles(int layer, int old_index, int new_index)
{
int layer_h;
int layer_w;
struct map_tile* tile;
int i_x, i_y;
layer_w = s_map->layers[layer].width;
layer_h = s_map->layers[layer].height;
for (i_x = 0; i_x < layer_w; ++i_x) for (i_y = 0; i_y < layer_h; ++i_y) {
tile = &s_map->layers[layer].tilemap[i_x + i_y * layer_w];
if (tile->tile_index == old_index)
tile->tile_index = new_index;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 11,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sched_rt_global_constraints(void)
{
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&rt_constraints_mutex);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
ret = __rt_schedulable(NULL, 0, 0);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
mutex_unlock(&rt_constraints_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL Element::baseURI() const
{
const AtomicString& baseAttribute = getAttribute(baseAttr);
KURL base(KURL(), baseAttribute);
if (!base.protocol().isEmpty())
return base;
ContainerNode* parent = parentNode();
if (!parent)
return base;
const KURL& parentBase = parent->baseURI();
if (parentBase.isNull())
return base;
return KURL(parentBase, baseAttribute);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init logi_dj_init(void)
{
int retval;
dbg_hid("Logitech-DJ:%s\n", __func__);
retval = hid_register_driver(&logi_djreceiver_driver);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = hid_register_driver(&logi_djdevice_driver);
if (retval)
hid_unregister_driver(&logi_djreceiver_driver);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGraphicsContext3D* RenderViewImpl::CreateGraphicsContext3D(
const WebGraphicsContext3D::Attributes& attributes) {
if (!webview())
return NULL;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) {
return webkit::gpu::WebGraphicsContext3DInProcessImpl::CreateForWebView(
attributes, true);
} else {
GURL url;
if (webview()->mainFrame())
url = GURL(webview()->mainFrame()->document().url());
else
url = GURL("chrome://gpu/RenderViewImpl::CreateGraphicsContext3D");
scoped_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl> context(
new WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl(
surface_id(),
url,
RenderThreadImpl::current(),
AsWeakPtr()));
if (!context->Initialize(
attributes,
false /* bind generates resources */,
CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_WEBGRAPHICSCONTEXT3DCOMMANDBUFFERIMPL_INITIALIZE))
return NULL;
return context.release();
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MockRenderProcess::HasInitializedMediaLibrary() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t CameraDeviceClient::initialize(camera_module_t *module)
{
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
res = Camera2ClientBase::initialize(module);
if (res != OK) {
return res;
}
String8 threadName;
mFrameProcessor = new FrameProcessorBase(mDevice);
threadName = String8::format("CDU-%d-FrameProc", mCameraId);
mFrameProcessor->run(threadName.string());
mFrameProcessor->registerListener(FRAME_PROCESSOR_LISTENER_MIN_ID,
FRAME_PROCESSOR_LISTENER_MAX_ID,
/*listener*/this,
/*quirkSendPartials*/true);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ikev2_padup_pre_encrypt(struct msg_digest *md,
pb_stream *e_pbs_cipher)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
struct state *pst = st;
if (st->st_clonedfrom != 0)
pst = state_with_serialno(st->st_clonedfrom);
/* pads things up to message size boundary */
{
size_t blocksize = pst->st_oakley.encrypter->enc_blocksize;
char *b = alloca(blocksize);
unsigned int i;
size_t padding = pad_up(pbs_offset(e_pbs_cipher), blocksize);
if (padding == 0)
padding = blocksize;
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
b[i] = i;
out_raw(b, padding, e_pbs_cipher, "padding and length");
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void n_tty_check_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY) {
if (chars_in_buffer(tty) > TTY_THRESHOLD_UNTHROTTLE)
return;
n_tty_kick_worker(tty);
tty_wakeup(tty->link);
return;
}
/* If there is enough space in the read buffer now, let the
* low-level driver know. We use chars_in_buffer() to
* check the buffer, as it now knows about canonical mode.
* Otherwise, if the driver is throttled and the line is
* longer than TTY_THRESHOLD_UNTHROTTLE in canonical mode,
* we won't get any more characters.
*/
while (1) {
int unthrottled;
tty_set_flow_change(tty, TTY_UNTHROTTLE_SAFE);
if (chars_in_buffer(tty) > TTY_THRESHOLD_UNTHROTTLE)
break;
n_tty_kick_worker(tty);
unthrottled = tty_unthrottle_safe(tty);
if (!unthrottled)
break;
}
__tty_set_flow_change(tty, 0);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 5,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_message(GHashTable *problem_info, char *message)
{
gchar *key, *value;
value = strchr(message, '=');
if (value)
{
key = g_ascii_strdown(message, value - message); /* result is malloced */
value++;
if (key_value_ok(key, value))
{
if (strcmp(key, FILENAME_UID) == 0)
{
error_msg("Ignoring value of %s, will be determined later",
FILENAME_UID);
}
else
{
g_hash_table_insert(problem_info, key, xstrdup(value));
/* Compat, delete when FILENAME_ANALYZER is replaced by FILENAME_TYPE: */
if (strcmp(key, FILENAME_TYPE) == 0)
g_hash_table_insert(problem_info, xstrdup(FILENAME_ANALYZER), xstrdup(value));
/* Prevent freeing key later: */
key = NULL;
}
}
else
{
/* should use error_msg_and_die() here? */
error_msg("Invalid key or value format: %s", message);
}
free(key);
}
else
{
/* should use error_msg_and_die() here? */
error_msg("Invalid message format: '%s'", message);
}
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cdc_parse_cdc_header(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header *hdr,
struct usb_interface *intf,
u8 *buffer,
int buflen)
{
/* duplicates are ignored */
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_header = NULL;
/* duplicates are not tolerated */
struct usb_cdc_header_desc *header = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *ether = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *detail = NULL;
struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *desc = NULL;
unsigned int elength;
int cnt = 0;
memset(hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct usb_cdc_parsed_header));
hdr->phonet_magic_present = false;
while (buflen > 0) {
elength = buffer[0];
if (!elength) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage byte\n");
elength = 1;
goto next_desc;
}
if (buffer[1] != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "skipping garbage\n");
goto next_desc;
}
switch (buffer[2]) {
case USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE: /* we've found it */
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_union_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (union_header) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "More than one union descriptor, skipping ...\n");
goto next_desc;
}
union_header = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_COUNTRY_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_country_functional_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_country_functional_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_HEADER_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_header_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (header)
return -EINVAL;
header = (struct usb_cdc_header_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ACM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_acm_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_acm_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_ETHERNET_TYPE:
if (elength != sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ether_desc))
goto next_desc;
if (ether)
return -EINVAL;
ether = (struct usb_cdc_ether_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_CALL_MANAGEMENT_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor =
(struct usb_cdc_call_mgmt_descriptor *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_DMM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_dmm_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_dmm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (desc)
return -EINVAL;
desc = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MDLM_DETAIL_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *))
goto next_desc;
if (detail)
return -EINVAL;
detail = (struct usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_NCM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ncm_desc = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc))
goto next_desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_desc = (struct usb_cdc_mbim_desc *)buffer;
break;
case USB_CDC_MBIM_EXTENDED_TYPE:
if (elength < sizeof(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc))
break;
hdr->usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc =
(struct usb_cdc_mbim_extended_desc *)buffer;
break;
case CDC_PHONET_MAGIC_NUMBER:
hdr->phonet_magic_present = true;
break;
default:
/*
* there are LOTS more CDC descriptors that
* could legitimately be found here.
*/
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Ignoring descriptor: type %02x, length %ud\n",
buffer[2], elength);
goto next_desc;
}
cnt++;
next_desc:
buflen -= elength;
buffer += elength;
}
hdr->usb_cdc_union_desc = union_header;
hdr->usb_cdc_header_desc = header;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_detail_desc = detail;
hdr->usb_cdc_mdlm_desc = desc;
hdr->usb_cdc_ether_desc = ether;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 19,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int svc_can_find(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "find";
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parsePCPOption(uint8_t* pcp_buf, int remain, pcp_info_t *pcp_msg_info)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
char third_addr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
#endif /* DEBUG */
unsigned short option_length;
/* Do centralized option sanity checks here. */
if (remain < (int)PCP_OPTION_HDR_SIZE) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
option_length = READNU16(pcp_buf + 2) + 4; /* len */
if (remain < option_length) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
switch (pcp_buf[0]) { /* code */
case PCP_OPTION_3RD_PARTY:
if (option_length != PCP_3RD_PARTY_OPTION_SIZE) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP OPTION: \t Third party\n");
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "Third PARTY IP: \t %s\n", inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
pcp_buf + 4, third_addr, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN));
#endif
if (pcp_msg_info->thirdp_ip ) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "PCP: THIRD PARTY OPTION was already present. \n");
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
} else {
pcp_msg_info->thirdp_ip = (struct in6_addr *)(pcp_buf + 4);
pcp_msg_info->mapped_ip = (struct in6_addr *)(pcp_buf + 4);
}
break;
case PCP_OPTION_PREF_FAIL:
if (option_length != PCP_PREFER_FAIL_OPTION_SIZE) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP OPTION: \t Prefer failure \n");
#endif
if (pcp_msg_info->opcode != PCP_OPCODE_MAP) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP: Unsupported OPTION for given OPCODE.\n");
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_REQUEST;
}
if (pcp_msg_info->pfailure_present != 0 ) {
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP: PREFER FAILURE OPTION was already present.\n");
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
} else {
pcp_msg_info->pfailure_present = 1;
}
break;
case PCP_OPTION_FILTER:
/* TODO fully implement filter */
if (option_length != PCP_FILTER_OPTION_SIZE) {
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP OPTION: \t Filter\n");
#endif
if (pcp_msg_info->opcode != PCP_OPCODE_MAP) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "PCP: Unsupported OPTION for given OPCODE.\n");
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
break;
#ifdef PCP_FLOWP
case PCP_OPTION_FLOW_PRIORITY:
#ifdef DEBUG
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "PCP OPTION: \t Flow priority\n");
#endif
if (option_length != PCP_FLOW_PRIORITY_OPTION_SIZE) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "PCP: Error processing DSCP. sizeof %d and remaining %d. flow len %d \n",
PCP_FLOW_PRIORITY_OPTION_SIZE, remain, READNU16(pcp_buf + 2));
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_MALFORMED_OPTION;
return 0;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DSCP UP: \t %d\n", pcp_buf[4]);
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DSCP DOWN: \t %d\n", pcp_buf[5]);
#endif
pcp_msg_info->dscp_up = pcp_buf[4];
pcp_msg_info->dscp_down = pcp_buf[5];
pcp_msg_info->flowp_present = 1;
break;
#endif
default:
if (pcp_buf[0] < 128) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "PCP: Unrecognized mandatory PCP OPTION: %d \n", (int)pcp_buf[0]);
/* Mandatory to understand */
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_UNSUPP_OPTION;
remain = 0;
break;
}
/* TODO - log optional not understood options? */
break;
}
return option_length;
}
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 25,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask,
unsigned long bitmap_size)
{
unsigned long nr_compat_longs;
/* align bitmap up to nearest compat_long_t boundary */
bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG);
nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, umask, bitmap_size / 8))
return -EFAULT;
user_access_begin();
while (nr_compat_longs > 1) {
unsigned long m = *mask++;
unsafe_put_user((compat_ulong_t)m, umask++, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(m >> BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG, umask++, Efault);
nr_compat_longs -= 2;
}
if (nr_compat_longs)
unsafe_put_user((compat_ulong_t)*mask, umask++, Efault);
user_access_end();
return 0;
Efault:
user_access_end();
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0) {
/* process the pairing complete */
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::setToolTip(const String& tooltipText, TextDirection dir)
{
if (!m_webView->client())
return;
WebTextDirection textDirection = (dir == RTL) ?
WebTextDirectionRightToLeft :
WebTextDirectionLeftToRight;
m_webView->client()->setToolTipText(
tooltipText, textDirection);
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fwnet_init_dev(struct net_device *net)
{
net->header_ops = &fwnet_header_ops;
net->netdev_ops = &fwnet_netdev_ops;
net->watchdog_timeo = 2 * HZ;
net->flags = IFF_BROADCAST | IFF_MULTICAST;
net->features = NETIF_F_HIGHDMA;
net->addr_len = FWNET_ALEN;
net->hard_header_len = FWNET_HLEN;
net->type = ARPHRD_IEEE1394;
net->tx_queue_len = FWNET_TX_QUEUE_LEN;
net->ethtool_ops = &fwnet_ethtool_ops;
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoadState MockNetworkTransaction::GetLoadState() const {
if (data_cursor_)
return LOAD_STATE_READING_RESPONSE;
return LOAD_STATE_IDLE;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ismode_w(const wchar_t *start, const wchar_t *end, int *permset)
{
const wchar_t *p;
if (start >= end)
return (0);
p = start;
*permset = 0;
while (p < end) {
switch (*p++) {
case L'r': case L'R':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_READ;
break;
case L'w': case L'W':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_WRITE;
break;
case L'x': case L'X':
*permset |= ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_EXECUTE;
break;
case L'-':
break;
default:
return (0);
}
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 28,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bgp_attr_finish(void)
{
aspath_finish();
attrhash_finish();
community_finish();
ecommunity_finish();
lcommunity_finish();
cluster_finish();
transit_finish();
encap_finish();
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::TestingObserver::OnGoingAway() {
observer_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 17,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: release_ocsp_certlist (struct ocsp_certlist_s *cl)
{
while (cl)
{
struct ocsp_certlist_s *tmp = cl->next;
ksba_cert_release (cl->cert);
xfree (cl);
cl = tmp;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t GetURLLoaderOptions(bool is_main_frame) {
uint32_t options = network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionNone;
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionSniffMimeType;
if (is_main_frame) {
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionSendSSLInfoWithResponse;
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionSendSSLInfoForCertificateError;
}
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
options |= network::mojom::kURLLoadOptionPauseOnResponseStarted;
}
return options;
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UpdatedExtensionPermissionsInfo::Reason reason() const { return reason_; }
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 16,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataRootDirectory::ToProto(GDataRootDirectoryProto* proto) const {
GDataDirectory::ToProto(proto->mutable_gdata_directory());
proto->set_largest_changestamp(largest_changestamp_);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestGetCacheState(const std::string& resource_id, const std::string& md5,
base::PlatformFileError expected_error,
int expected_cache_state, GDataFile* expected_file) {
expected_error_ = expected_error;
expected_cache_state_ = expected_cache_state;
file_system_->GetCacheState(resource_id, md5,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystemTest::VerifyGetCacheState,
base::Unretained(this)));
RunAllPendingForIO();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void beginNewOverlapTestingContext()
{
m_overlapStack.append(OverlapMapContainer());
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::ThrowUnrecoverableError() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
trans.GetWrappedTrans()->OnUnrecoverableError(
FROM_HERE, "Simulating unrecoverable error for testing purposes.");
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 21,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void preproc_build_firejail_dir(void) {
struct stat s;
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_BASEDIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_BASEDIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_NETWORK_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_NETWORK_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_BANDWIDTH_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_BANDWIDTH_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_NAME_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_NAME_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_PROFILE_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_PROFILE_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_X11_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_X11_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_APPIMAGE_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_APPIMAGE_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_FIREJAIL_LIB_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_FIREJAIL_LIB_DIR, 0755);
}
if (stat(RUN_MNT_DIR, &s)) {
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_MNT_DIR, 0755);
}
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_RO_FILE, S_IRUSR);
create_empty_dir_as_root(RUN_RO_DIR, S_IRUSR);
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dict_param_write(iparam_list * plist, const ref * pkey, const ref * pvalue)
{
int code =
dict_put(&((dict_param_list *) plist)->dict, pkey, pvalue, NULL);
return min(code, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 19,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* xfrmMsgTypeToString(uint16_t msg) {
switch (msg) {
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_DELSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_UPDSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWAE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETAE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_REPORT)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSADINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
XFRM_MSG_TRANS(XFRM_MSG_MAPPING)
default:
return "XFRM_MSG UNKNOWN";
}
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 9,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintController::BeginFrame(const void* frame) {
frame_first_paints_.push_back(FrameFirstPaint(frame));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jintArray android_net_wifi_getValidChannels(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls,
jint iface, jint band) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("getting valid channels %p", handle);
static const int MaxChannels = 64;
wifi_channel channels[64];
int num_channels = 0;
wifi_error result = hal_fn.wifi_get_valid_channels(handle, band, MaxChannels,
channels, &num_channels);
if (result == WIFI_SUCCESS) {
JNIObject<jintArray> channelArray = helper.newIntArray(num_channels);
if (channelArray == NULL) {
ALOGE("failed to allocate channel list");
return NULL;
}
helper.setIntArrayRegion(channelArray, 0, num_channels, channels);
return channelArray.detach();
} else {
ALOGE("failed to get channel list : %d", result);
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_ethtool_get_rxfh_indir(struct net_device *net_dev,
struct ethtool_rxfh_indir *indir)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
size_t copy_size =
min_t(size_t, indir->size, ARRAY_SIZE(efx->rx_indir_table));
if (efx_nic_rev(efx) < EFX_REV_FALCON_B0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
indir->size = ARRAY_SIZE(efx->rx_indir_table);
memcpy(indir->ring_index, efx->rx_indir_table,
copy_size * sizeof(indir->ring_index[0]));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 50 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "reflectReflectedNameAttributeTestAttribute");
TestInterfaceImplementation* cpp_value = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
if (!cpp_value) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'TestInterface'.");
return;
}
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kReflectedNameAttributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err cprt_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_CopyrightBox *ptr = (GF_CopyrightBox *)s;
ptr->size += 2;
if (ptr->notice)
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->notice) + 1;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_secinfo_no_name(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_secinfo_res *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putrootfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_secinfo(xdr, res);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OPENSSL_cleanup(void)
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *currhandler, *lasthandler;
CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL key;
/* If we've not been inited then no need to deinit */
if (!base_inited)
return;
/* Might be explicitly called and also by atexit */
if (stopped)
return;
stopped = 1;
/*
* Thread stop may not get automatically called by the thread library for
* the very last thread in some situations, so call it directly.
*/
ossl_init_thread_stop(ossl_init_get_thread_local(0));
currhandler = stop_handlers;
while (currhandler != NULL) {
currhandler->handler();
lasthandler = currhandler;
currhandler = currhandler->next;
OPENSSL_free(lasthandler);
}
stop_handlers = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(init_lock);
init_lock = NULL;
/*
* We assume we are single-threaded for this function, i.e. no race
* conditions for the various "*_inited" vars below.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (zlib_inited) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"comp_zlib_cleanup_int()\n");
#endif
comp_zlib_cleanup_int();
}
#endif
if (async_inited) {
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"async_deinit()\n");
# endif
async_deinit();
}
if (load_crypto_strings_inited) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"err_free_strings_int()\n");
#endif
err_free_strings_int();
}
key = destructor_key.value;
destructor_key.sane = -1;
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&key);
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"rand_cleanup_int()\n");
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"conf_modules_free_int()\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"engine_cleanup_int()\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int()\n");
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"bio_sock_cleanup_int()\n");
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"bio_cleanup()\n");
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"evp_cleanup_int()\n");
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"obj_cleanup_int()\n");
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_cleanup: "
"err_cleanup()\n");
#endif
/*
* Note that cleanup order is important:
* - rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so
* must be called before engine_cleanup_int()
* - ENGINEs use CRYPTO_EX_DATA and therefore, must be cleaned up
* before the ex data handlers are wiped in CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data().
* - conf_modules_free_int() can end up in ENGINE code so must be called
* before engine_cleanup_int()
* - ENGINEs and additional EVP algorithms might use added OIDs names so
* obj_cleanup_int() must be called last
*/
rand_cleanup_int();
rand_drbg_cleanup_int();
conf_modules_free_int();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
engine_cleanup_int();
#endif
ossl_store_cleanup_int();
crypto_cleanup_all_ex_data_int();
bio_cleanup();
evp_cleanup_int();
obj_cleanup_int();
err_cleanup();
CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done();
base_inited = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 26,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chmd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys, struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mschmd_header *chm, int entire)
{
unsigned int section, name_len, x, errors, num_chunks;
unsigned char buf[0x54], *chunk = NULL, *name, *p, *end;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *link = NULL;
off_t offset, length;
int num_entries;
/* initialise pointers */
chm->files = NULL;
chm->sysfiles = NULL;
chm->chunk_cache = NULL;
chm->sec0.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec0.base.id = 0;
chm->sec1.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec1.base.id = 1;
chm->sec1.content = NULL;
chm->sec1.control = NULL;
chm->sec1.spaninfo = NULL;
chm->sec1.rtable = NULL;
/* read the first header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhead_SIZEOF) != chmhead_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check ITSF signature */
if (EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Signature]) != 0x46535449) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* check both header GUIDs */
if (memcmp(&buf[chmhead_GUID1], &guids[0], 32L) != 0) {
D(("incorrect GUIDs"))
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
chm->version = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Version]);
chm->timestamp = EndGetM32(&buf[chmhead_Timestamp]);
chm->language = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_LanguageID]);
if (chm->version > 3) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; CHM version > 3");
}
/* read the header section table */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhst3_SIZEOF) != chmhst3_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* chmhst3_OffsetCS0 does not exist in version 1 or 2 CHM files.
* The offset will be corrected later, once HS1 is read.
*/
if (read_off64(&offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS0], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->dir_offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS1], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->sec0.offset, &buf[chmhst3_OffsetCS0], sys, fh))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 0 */
if (sys->seek(fh, offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 0 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs0_SIZEOF) != chmhs0_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
if (read_off64(&chm->length, &buf[chmhs0_FileLen], sys, fh)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 1 */
if (sys->seek(fh, chm->dir_offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 1 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs1_SIZEOF) != chmhs1_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
chm->dir_offset = sys->tell(fh);
chm->chunk_size = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_ChunkSize]);
chm->density = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Density]);
chm->depth = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Depth]);
chm->index_root = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_IndexRoot]);
chm->num_chunks = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_NumChunks]);
chm->first_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_FirstPMGL]);
chm->last_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_LastPMGL]);
if (chm->version < 3) {
/* versions before 3 don't have chmhst3_OffsetCS0 */
chm->sec0.offset = chm->dir_offset + (chm->chunk_size * chm->num_chunks);
}
/* check if content offset or file size is wrong */
if (chm->sec0.offset > chm->length) {
D(("content section begins after file has ended"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* ensure there are chunks and that chunk size is
* large enough for signature and num_entries */
if (chm->chunk_size < (pmgl_Entries + 2)) {
D(("chunk size not large enough"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->num_chunks == 0) {
D(("no chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* The chunk_cache data structure is not great; large values for num_chunks
* or num_chunks*chunk_size can exhaust all memory. Until a better chunk
* cache is implemented, put arbitrary limits on num_chunks and chunk size.
*/
if (chm->num_chunks > 100000) {
D(("more than 100,000 chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if ((off_t)chm->chunk_size * (off_t)chm->num_chunks > chm->length) {
D(("chunks larger than entire file"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* common sense checks on header section 1 fields */
if ((chm->chunk_size & (chm->chunk_size - 1)) != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; chunk size is not a power of two");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; first PMGL chunk is not zero");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl > chm->last_pmgl) {
D(("first pmgl chunk is after last pmgl chunk"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->index_root != 0xFFFFFFFF && chm->index_root >= chm->num_chunks) {
D(("index_root outside valid range"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* if we are doing a quick read, stop here! */
if (!entire) {
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
/* seek to the first PMGL chunk, and reduce the number of chunks to read */
if ((x = chm->first_pmgl) != 0) {
if (sys->seek(fh,(off_t) (x * chm->chunk_size), MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
}
num_chunks = chm->last_pmgl - x + 1;
if (!(chunk = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)chm->chunk_size))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* read and process all chunks from FirstPMGL to LastPMGL */
errors = 0;
while (num_chunks--) {
/* read next chunk */
if (sys->read(fh, chunk, (int)chm->chunk_size) != (int)chm->chunk_size) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* process only directory (PMGL) chunks */
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_Signature]) != 0x4C474D50) continue;
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) < 2) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too small");
}
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) >
((int)chm->chunk_size - pmgl_Entries))
{
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too large");
}
p = &chunk[pmgl_Entries];
end = &chunk[chm->chunk_size - 2];
num_entries = EndGetI16(end);
while (num_entries--) {
READ_ENCINT(name_len);
if (name_len > (unsigned int) (end - p)) goto chunk_end;
name = p; p += name_len;
READ_ENCINT(section);
READ_ENCINT(offset);
READ_ENCINT(length);
/* ignore blank or one-char (e.g. "/") filenames we'd return as blank */
if (name_len < 2 || !name[0] || !name[1]) continue;
/* empty files and directory names are stored as a file entry at
* offset 0 with length 0. We want to keep empty files, but not
* directory names, which end with a "/" */
if ((offset == 0) && (length == 0)) {
if ((name_len > 0) && (name[name_len-1] == '/')) continue;
}
if (section > 1) {
sys->message(fh, "invalid section number '%u'.", section);
continue;
}
if (!(fi = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(struct mschmd_file) + name_len + 1))) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
fi->next = NULL;
fi->filename = (char *) &fi[1];
fi->section = ((section == 0) ? (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec0)
: (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec1));
fi->offset = offset;
fi->length = length;
sys->copy(name, fi->filename, (size_t) name_len);
fi->filename[name_len] = '\0';
if (name[0] == ':' && name[1] == ':') {
/* system file */
if (memcmp(&name[2], &content_name[2], 31L) == 0) {
if (memcmp(&name[33], &content_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.content = fi;
}
else if (memcmp(&name[33], &control_name[33], 11L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.control = fi;
}
else if (memcmp(&name[33], &spaninfo_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.spaninfo = fi;
}
else if (memcmp(&name[33], &rtable_name[33], 72L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.rtable = fi;
}
}
fi->next = chm->sysfiles;
chm->sysfiles = fi;
}
else {
/* normal file */
if (link) link->next = fi; else chm->files = fi;
link = fi;
}
}
/* this is reached either when num_entries runs out, or if
* reading data from the chunk reached a premature end of chunk */
chunk_end:
if (num_entries >= 0) {
D(("chunk ended before all entries could be read"))
errors++;
}
}
sys->free(chunk);
return (errors > 0) ? MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT : MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 17,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netlink_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (nlk->cb) {
if (nlk->cb->done)
nlk->cb->done(nlk->cb);
netlink_destroy_callback(nlk->cb);
}
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Freeing alive netlink socket %p\n", sk);
return;
}
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(nlk_sk(sk)->groups);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 15,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NP_GetMIMEDescription(void)
{
if (g_plugin_NP_GetMIMEDescription == NULL)
return NULL;
D(bugiI("NP_GetMIMEDescription\n"));
char *str = g_plugin_NP_GetMIMEDescription();
D(bugiD("NP_GetMIMEDescription return: %s\n", str ? str : "<empty>"));
return str;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cgm_dbus_disconnect(void)
{
if (cgroup_manager) {
dbus_connection_flush(cgroup_manager->connection);
dbus_connection_close(cgroup_manager->connection);
nih_free(cgroup_manager);
}
cgroup_manager = NULL;
cgm_unlock();
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 12,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err twrp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TextWrapBox*p = (GF_TextWrapBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TextWrapBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "wrap_flag=\"%s\">\n", p->wrap_flag ? ( (p->wrap_flag>1) ? "Reserved" : "Automatic" ) : "No Wrap");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TextWrapBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::storageBlockingStateDidChange()
{
if (Settings* settings = this->settings())
securityOrigin()->setStorageBlockingPolicy(settings->storageBlockingPolicy());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kmem_cache *bio_find_or_create_slab(unsigned int extra_size)
{
unsigned int sz = sizeof(struct bio) + extra_size;
struct kmem_cache *slab = NULL;
struct bio_slab *bslab, *new_bio_slabs;
unsigned int new_bio_slab_max;
unsigned int i, entry = -1;
mutex_lock(&bio_slab_lock);
i = 0;
while (i < bio_slab_nr) {
bslab = &bio_slabs[i];
if (!bslab->slab && entry == -1)
entry = i;
else if (bslab->slab_size == sz) {
slab = bslab->slab;
bslab->slab_ref++;
break;
}
i++;
}
if (slab)
goto out_unlock;
if (bio_slab_nr == bio_slab_max && entry == -1) {
new_bio_slab_max = bio_slab_max << 1;
new_bio_slabs = krealloc(bio_slabs,
new_bio_slab_max * sizeof(struct bio_slab),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_bio_slabs)
goto out_unlock;
bio_slab_max = new_bio_slab_max;
bio_slabs = new_bio_slabs;
}
if (entry == -1)
entry = bio_slab_nr++;
bslab = &bio_slabs[entry];
snprintf(bslab->name, sizeof(bslab->name), "bio-%d", entry);
slab = kmem_cache_create(bslab->name, sz, ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, NULL);
if (!slab)
goto out_unlock;
bslab->slab = slab;
bslab->slab_ref = 1;
bslab->slab_size = sz;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&bio_slab_lock);
return slab;
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 9,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sgetmask)
{
/* SMP safe */
return current->blocked.sig[0];
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::PaintUnavailablePage(int page_index,
const pp::Rect& dirty,
pp::ImageData* image_data) {
int start_x, start_y, size_x, size_y;
GetPDFiumRect(page_index, dirty, &start_x, &start_y, &size_x, &size_y);
FPDF_BITMAP bitmap = CreateBitmap(dirty, image_data);
FPDFBitmap_FillRect(bitmap, start_x, start_y, size_x, size_y,
kPendingPageColor);
pp::Rect loading_text_in_screen(
pages_[page_index]->rect().width() / 2,
pages_[page_index]->rect().y() + kLoadingTextVerticalOffset, 0, 0);
loading_text_in_screen = GetScreenRect(loading_text_in_screen);
FPDFBitmap_Destroy(bitmap);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_openssl_make_REQ(struct php_x509_request * req, X509_REQ * csr, zval * dn, zval * attribs)
{
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) * dn_sk, *attr_sk = NULL;
char * str, *dn_sect, *attr_sect;
dn_sect = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "distinguished_name");
if (dn_sect == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
return FAILURE;
}
dn_sk = CONF_get_section(req->req_config, dn_sect);
if (dn_sk == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
return FAILURE;
}
attr_sect = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "attributes");
if (attr_sect == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
attr_sk = NULL;
} else {
attr_sk = CONF_get_section(req->req_config, attr_sect);
if (attr_sk == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* setup the version number: version 1 */
if (X509_REQ_set_version(csr, 0L)) {
int i, nid;
char * type;
CONF_VALUE * v;
X509_NAME * subj;
zval * item;
zend_string * strindex = NULL;
subj = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(csr);
/* apply values from the dn hash */
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(dn), strindex, item) {
if (strindex) {
int nid;
convert_to_string_ex(item);
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ZSTR_VAL(strindex));
if (nid != NID_undef) {
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(subj, nid, MBSTRING_UTF8,
(unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(item), -1, -1, 0))
{
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,
"dn: add_entry_by_NID %d -> %s (failed; check error"
" queue and value of string_mask OpenSSL option "
"if illegal characters are reported)",
nid, Z_STRVAL_P(item));
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "dn: %s is not a recognized name", ZSTR_VAL(strindex));
}
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
/* Finally apply defaults from config file */
for(i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) {
size_t len;
char buffer[200 + 1]; /*200 + \0 !*/
v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i);
type = v->name;
len = strlen(type);
if (len < sizeof("_default")) {
continue;
}
len -= sizeof("_default") - 1;
if (strcmp("_default", type + len) != 0) {
continue;
}
if (len > 200) {
len = 200;
}
memcpy(buffer, type, len);
buffer[len] = '\0';
type = buffer;
/* Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple
* instances */
for (str = type; *str; str++) {
if (*str == ':' || *str == ',' || *str == '.') {
str++;
if (*str) {
type = str;
}
break;
}
}
/* if it is already set, skip this */
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(type);
if (X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subj, nid, -1) >= 0) {
continue;
}
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subj, type, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char*)v->value, -1, -1, 0)) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "add_entry_by_txt %s -> %s (failed)", type, v->value);
return FAILURE;
}
if (!X509_NAME_entry_count(subj)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "no objects specified in config file");
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (attribs) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(attribs), strindex, item) {
int nid;
if (NULL == strindex) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "dn: numeric fild names are not supported");
continue;
}
convert_to_string_ex(item);
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(ZSTR_VAL(strindex));
if (nid != NID_undef) {
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(subj, nid, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_P(item), -1, -1, 0)) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "attribs: add_entry_by_NID %d -> %s (failed)", nid, Z_STRVAL_P(item));
return FAILURE;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "dn: %s is not a recognized name", ZSTR_VAL(strindex));
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(attr_sk); i++) {
v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(attr_sk, i);
/* if it is already set, skip this */
nid = OBJ_txt2nid(v->name);
if (X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(csr, nid, -1) >= 0) {
continue;
}
if (!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(csr, v->name, MBSTRING_UTF8, (unsigned char*)v->value, -1)) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,
"add1_attr_by_txt %s -> %s (failed; check error queue "
"and value of string_mask OpenSSL option if illegal "
"characters are reported)",
v->name, v->value);
return FAILURE;
}
}
}
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
if (!X509_REQ_set_pubkey(csr, req->priv_key)) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 19,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::parameterizedAttributeNames()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::StackAtTop() {
XRaiseWindow(xdisplay_, xwindow_);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int build_sadinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
u32 portid, u32 seq, u32 flags)
{
struct xfrmk_sadinfo si;
struct xfrmu_sadhinfo sh;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
u32 *f;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, XFRM_MSG_NEWSADINFO, sizeof(u32), 0);
if (nlh == NULL) /* shouldn't really happen ... */
return -EMSGSIZE;
f = nlmsg_data(nlh);
*f = flags;
xfrm_sad_getinfo(net, &si);
sh.sadhmcnt = si.sadhmcnt;
sh.sadhcnt = si.sadhcnt;
err = nla_put_u32(skb, XFRMA_SAD_CNT, si.sadcnt);
if (!err)
err = nla_put(skb, XFRMA_SAD_HINFO, sizeof(sh), &sh);
if (err) {
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return err;
}
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreBrowserStart() {
metrics()->StartExternalMetrics();
g_browser_process->oom_priority_manager()->Start();
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreBrowserStart();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI void php_var_export_ex(zval *struc, int level, smart_str *buf) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *myht;
char *tmp_str;
size_t tmp_len;
zend_string *ztmp, *ztmp2;
zend_ulong index;
zend_string *key;
zval *val;
again:
switch (Z_TYPE_P(struc)) {
case IS_FALSE:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "false", 5);
break;
case IS_TRUE:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "true", 4);
break;
case IS_NULL:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
break;
case IS_LONG:
smart_str_append_long(buf, Z_LVAL_P(struc));
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
tmp_len = spprintf(&tmp_str, 0,"%.*H", PG(serialize_precision), Z_DVAL_P(struc));
smart_str_appendl(buf, tmp_str, tmp_len);
/* Without a decimal point, PHP treats a number literal as an int.
* This check even works for scientific notation, because the
* mantissa always contains a decimal point.
* We need to check for finiteness, because INF, -INF and NAN
* must not have a decimal point added.
*/
if (zend_finite(Z_DVAL_P(struc)) && NULL == strchr(tmp_str, '.')) {
smart_str_appendl(buf, ".0", 2);
}
efree(tmp_str);
break;
case IS_STRING:
ztmp = php_addcslashes(Z_STR_P(struc), 0, "'\\", 2);
ztmp2 = php_str_to_str(ZSTR_VAL(ztmp), ZSTR_LEN(ztmp), "\0", 1, "' . \"\\0\" . '", 12);
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\'');
smart_str_append(buf, ztmp2);
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\'');
zend_string_free(ztmp);
zend_string_free(ztmp2);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
myht = Z_ARRVAL_P(struc);
if (ZEND_HASH_APPLY_PROTECTION(myht) && myht->u.v.nApplyCount++ > 0) {
myht->u.v.nApplyCount--;
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
zend_error(E_WARNING, "var_export does not handle circular references");
return;
}
if (level > 1) {
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\n');
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_appendl(buf, "array (\n", 8);
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_KEY_VAL_IND(myht, index, key, val) {
php_array_element_export(val, index, key, level, buf);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
if (ZEND_HASH_APPLY_PROTECTION(myht)) {
myht->u.v.nApplyCount--;
}
if (level > 1) {
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_appendc(buf, ')');
break;
case IS_OBJECT:
myht = Z_OBJPROP_P(struc);
if (myht) {
if (myht->u.v.nApplyCount > 0) {
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
zend_error(E_WARNING, "var_export does not handle circular references");
return;
} else {
myht->u.v.nApplyCount++;
}
}
if (level > 1) {
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\n');
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_append(buf, Z_OBJCE_P(struc)->name);
smart_str_appendl(buf, "::__set_state(array(\n", 21);
if (myht) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_KEY_VAL_IND(myht, index, key, val) {
php_object_element_export(val, index, key, level, buf);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
myht->u.v.nApplyCount--;
}
if (level > 1) {
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_appendl(buf, "))", 2);
break;
case IS_REFERENCE:
struc = Z_REFVAL_P(struc);
goto again;
break;
default:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
break;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Complete the fix of bug #70172 for PHP 7
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nlm_do_async_call(struct nlm_rqst *req, u32 proc, struct rpc_message *msg, const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops)
{
struct rpc_task *task;
task = __nlm_async_call(req, proc, msg, tk_ops);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RequestNavigation(FrameTreeNode* node, const GURL& url) {
return RequestNavigationWithParameters(node, url, Referrer(),
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 22,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long state,
void *ndev)
{
struct net_device *dev = ndev;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
if (state != NETDEV_CHANGENAME)
return 0;
if (!dev->ieee80211_ptr || !dev->ieee80211_ptr->wiphy)
return 0;
if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->wiphy->privid != mac80211_wiphy_privid)
return 0;
sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
memcpy(sdata->name, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
ieee80211_debugfs_rename_netdev(sdata);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 1 | 5,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bmpr_convert_row_24(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx,const iw_byte *src, size_t row)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<rctx->width;i++) {
rctx->img->pixels[row*rctx->img->bpr + i*3 + 0] = src[i*3+2];
rctx->img->pixels[row*rctx->img->bpr + i*3 + 1] = src[i*3+1];
rctx->img->pixels[row*rctx->img->bpr + i*3 + 2] = src[i*3+0];
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 27,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DataReductionProxySettings::GetProxyRequestHeaders() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return proxy_request_headers_;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cxusb_dualdig4_rev2_tuner_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dib0700_adapter_state *st = adap->priv;
struct i2c_adapter *tun_i2c;
/*
* No need to call dvb7000p_attach here, as it was called
* already, as frontend_attach method is called first, and
* tuner_attach is only called on sucess.
*/
tun_i2c = st->dib7000p_ops.get_i2c_master(adap->fe_adap[0].fe,
DIBX000_I2C_INTERFACE_TUNER, 1);
if (dvb_attach(dib0070_attach, adap->fe_adap[0].fe, tun_i2c,
&dib7070p_dib0070_config) == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
st->set_param_save = adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.tuner_ops.set_params;
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.tuner_ops.set_params = dib7070_set_param_override;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: emit_string(const char *str, FILE *out)
/* Print a string with spaces replaced by '_' and non-printing characters by
* an octal escape.
*/
{
for (; *str; ++str)
if (isgraph(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc(*str, out);
else if (isspace(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc('_', out);
else
fprintf(out, "\\%.3o", *str);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 26,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_set_blend_color(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct pipe_blend_color *color)
{
ctx->sub->blend_color = *color;
glBlendColor(color->color[0], color->color[1], color->color[2],
color->color[3]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 29,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_HdrIs(const struct http *hp, const char *hdr, const char *val)
{
char *p;
if (!http_GetHdr(hp, hdr, &p))
return (0);
AN(p);
if (!strcasecmp(p, val))
return (1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID: | 0 | 801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendIO::OnExternalCacheHit(const std::string& key) {
operation_ = OP_ON_EXTERNAL_CACHE_HIT;
key_ = key;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_crg_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_crg_t *crg = &ms->parms.crg;
int compno;
jpc_crgcomp_t *comp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
for (compno = 0, comp = crg->comps; compno < crg->numcomps; ++compno,
++comp) {
if (jpc_putuint16(out, comp->hoff) ||
jpc_putuint16(out, comp->voff)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 11,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadProtectionService::DownloadCheckResult verdict() const {
return verdict_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skcipher_walk_virt(struct skcipher_walk *walk,
struct skcipher_request *req, bool atomic)
{
int err;
walk->flags &= ~SKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS;
err = skcipher_walk_skcipher(walk, req);
walk->flags &= atomic ? ~SKCIPHER_WALK_SLEEP : ~0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MakeMultipleHitCacheAndGroup(const GURL& manifest_url, int id) {
MakeCacheAndGroup(manifest_url, id, id, true);
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record;
entry_record.cache_id = id;
entry_record.url = kEntryUrl;
entry_record.flags = AppCacheEntry::EXPLICIT;
entry_record.response_id = id;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertEntry(&entry_record));
cache_->AddEntry(entry_record.url, AppCacheEntry(entry_record.flags,
entry_record.response_id));
entry_record.cache_id = id;
entry_record.url = manifest_url;
entry_record.flags = AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST;
entry_record.response_id = id + kManifestEntryIdOffset;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertEntry(&entry_record));
cache_->AddEntry(entry_record.url, AppCacheEntry(entry_record.flags,
entry_record.response_id));
entry_record.cache_id = id;
entry_record.url = kEntryUrl2;
entry_record.flags = AppCacheEntry::FALLBACK;
entry_record.response_id = id + kFallbackEntryIdOffset;
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertEntry(&entry_record));
cache_->AddEntry(entry_record.url, AppCacheEntry(entry_record.flags,
entry_record.response_id));
AppCacheDatabase::NamespaceRecord fallback_namespace_record;
fallback_namespace_record.cache_id = id;
fallback_namespace_record.namespace_.target_url = entry_record.url;
fallback_namespace_record.namespace_.namespace_url = kFallbackNamespace;
fallback_namespace_record.origin = url::Origin::Create(manifest_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(database()->InsertNamespace(&fallback_namespace_record));
cache_->fallback_namespaces_.push_back(AppCacheNamespace(
APPCACHE_FALLBACK_NAMESPACE, kFallbackNamespace, kEntryUrl2, false));
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *FLTGetIsBetweenComparisonCommonExpresssion(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode, layerObj *lp)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char **aszBounds = NULL;
int nBounds = 0;
int bString=0;
int bDateTime = 0;
char *pszExpression=NULL, *pszTmpEscaped;
if (!psFilterNode || !(strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "PropertyIsBetween") == 0))
return NULL;
if (psFilterNode->psLeftNode == NULL || psFilterNode->psRightNode == NULL )
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Get the bounds value which are stored like boundmin;boundmax */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
aszBounds = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, ';', &nBounds);
if (nBounds != 2) {
msFreeCharArray(aszBounds, nBounds);
return NULL;
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* check if the value is a numeric value or alphanumeric. If it */
/* is alphanumeric, add quotes around attribute and values. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
bString = 0;
if (aszBounds[0]) {
const char* pszType;
snprintf(szBuffer, bufferSize, "%s_type", psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue);
pszType = msOWSLookupMetadata(&(lp->metadata), "OFG", szBuffer);
if (pszType != NULL && (strcasecmp(pszType, "Character") == 0))
bString = 1;
else if (pszType != NULL && (strcasecmp(pszType, "Date") == 0))
bDateTime = 1;
else if (FLTIsNumeric(aszBounds[0]) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
if (!bString && !bDateTime) {
if (aszBounds[1]) {
if (FLTIsNumeric(aszBounds[1]) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* build expresssion. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* attribute */
if (bString)
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", "(\"[");
else
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", "([");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue);
if (bString)
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", "]\" ");
else
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", "] ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", " >= ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
if (bString) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "\"");
}
else if (bDateTime) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "`");
}
pszTmpEscaped = msStringEscape(aszBounds[0]);
snprintf(szBuffer, bufferSize, "%s", pszTmpEscaped);
if(pszTmpEscaped != aszBounds[0] ) msFree(pszTmpEscaped);
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
if (bString) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "\"");
}
else if (bDateTime) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "`");
}
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", " AND ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
if (bString)
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", " \"[");
else
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", " [");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
/* attribute */
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue);
if (bString)
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", "]\" ");
else
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", "] ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", " <= ");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
if (bString) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "\"");
}
else if (bDateTime) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "`");
}
pszTmpEscaped = msStringEscape(aszBounds[1]);
snprintf(szBuffer, bufferSize, "%s", pszTmpEscaped);
if (pszTmpEscaped != aszBounds[1]) msFree(pszTmpEscaped);
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
if (bString) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "\"");
}
else if (bDateTime) {
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "`");
}
sprintf(szBuffer, "%s", ")");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szBuffer);
msFreeCharArray(aszBounds, nBounds);
return pszExpression;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init_opl3 (void)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "YM3812 and OPL-3 driver Copyright (C) by Hannu Savolainen, Rob Hooft 1993-1996\n");
if (io != -1) /* User loading pure OPL3 module */
{
if (!opl3_detect(io))
{
return -ENODEV;
}
me = opl3_init(io, THIS_MODULE);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewWin::ClosePopup() {
model_->StopAutocomplete();
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfsd_break_one_deleg(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
/*
* We're assuming the state code never drops its reference
* without first removing the lease. Since we're in this lease
* callback (and since the lease code is serialized by the kernel
* lock) we know the server hasn't removed the lease yet, we know
* it's safe to take a reference.
*/
atomic_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
nfsd4_run_cb(&dp->dl_recall);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 11,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_image_encode(jas_image_t *image, jas_stream_t *out, int fmt, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_fmtinfo_t *fmtinfo;
if (!(fmtinfo = jas_image_lookupfmtbyid(fmt))) {
return -1;
}
return (fmtinfo->ops.encode) ? (*fmtinfo->ops.encode)(image, out,
optstr) : (-1);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,093 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.