instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API void r_bin_iobind(RBin *bin, RIO *io) {
r_io_bind (io, &bin->iob);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebRuntimeFeatures::IsSlimmingPaintV2Enabled() {
return RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled();
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 21,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
sp<ABuffer> codec = getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, true /* limit */);
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset, codec->data(), codec->size());
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 25,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TIFFWarnings(const char *module,const char *format,va_list warning)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent];
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
(void) vsnprintf(message,MagickPathExtent,format,warning);
#else
(void) vsprintf(message,format,warning);
#endif
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(message,".",MagickPathExtent);
exception=(ExceptionInfo *) GetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception);
if (exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderWarning,
message,"`%s'",module);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void task_numa_find_cpu(struct task_numa_env *env,
long taskimp, long groupimp)
{
long src_load, dst_load, load;
bool maymove = false;
int cpu;
load = task_h_load(env->p);
dst_load = env->dst_stats.load + load;
src_load = env->src_stats.load - load;
/*
* If the improvement from just moving env->p direction is better
* than swapping tasks around, check if a move is possible.
*/
maymove = !load_too_imbalanced(src_load, dst_load, env);
for_each_cpu(cpu, cpumask_of_node(env->dst_nid)) {
/* Skip this CPU if the source task cannot migrate */
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &env->p->cpus_allowed))
continue;
env->dst_cpu = cpu;
task_numa_compare(env, taskimp, groupimp, maymove);
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 25,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateFocusAppearanceLater() {
if (!update_focus_appearance_timer_.IsActive())
update_focus_appearance_timer_.StartOneShot(TimeDelta(), FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _c2s_signal_usr1(int signum)
{
set_debug_flag(0);
}
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 23,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::setStyleAffectedByEmpty()
{
ensureElementRareData()->setStyleAffectedByEmpty(true);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_face_free_sbit( TT_Face face )
{
FT_Stream stream = face->root.stream;
FT_FRAME_RELEASE( face->sbit_table );
face->sbit_table_size = 0;
face->sbit_table_type = TT_SBIT_TABLE_TYPE_NONE;
face->sbit_num_strikes = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Framebuffer* GetBoundReadFramebuffer() const {
GLenum target = GetReadFramebufferTarget();
return GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(target);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv(
GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
GLenum pname,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* params) {
GLenum updated_attachment = attachment;
if (IsEmulatedFramebufferBound(target)) {
if (!ModifyAttachmentForEmulatedFramebuffer(&updated_attachment)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Invalid attachment.");
*length = 0;
return error::kNoError;
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_OBJECT_NAME:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_LEVEL:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_FACE:
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_LAYER:
InsertError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "Invalid parameter name.");
*length = 0;
return error::kNoError;
}
}
CheckErrorCallbackState();
GLint* scratch_params = GetTypedScratchMemory<GLint>(bufsize);
api()->glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameterivRobustANGLEFn(
target, updated_attachment, pname, bufsize, length, scratch_params);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
DCHECK(*length == 0);
return error::kNoError;
}
error::Error error = PatchGetFramebufferAttachmentParameter(
target, updated_attachment, pname, *length, scratch_params);
if (error != error::kNoError) {
*length = 0;
return error;
}
DCHECK(*length < bufsize);
std::copy(scratch_params, scratch_params + *length, params);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ps_files_cleanup_dir(const char *dirname, int maxlifetime TSRMLS_DC)
{
DIR *dir;
char dentry[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *entry = (struct dirent *) &dentry;
struct stat sbuf;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
time_t now;
int nrdels = 0;
size_t dirname_len;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "ps_files_cleanup_dir: opendir(%s) failed: %s (%d)", dirname, strerror(errno), errno);
return (0);
}
time(&now);
return (nrdels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xmlSHRINK (xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlParserInputShrink(ctxt->input);
if (*ctxt->input->cur == 0)
xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 26,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mountpoint_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path)
{
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
/* If we're in rcuwalk, drop out of it to handle last component */
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL)) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (unlikely(nd->last_type != LAST_NORM)) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
goto out;
dentry = dget(nd->path.dentry);
goto done;
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
dentry = d_lookup(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
/*
* No cached dentry. Mounted dentries are pinned in the cache,
* so that means that this dentry is probably a symlink or the
* path doesn't actually point to a mounted dentry.
*/
dentry = d_alloc(dir, &nd->last);
if (!dentry) {
error = -ENOMEM;
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
dentry = lookup_real(dir->d_inode, dentry, nd->flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto out;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
done:
if (!dentry->d_inode || d_is_negative(dentry)) {
error = -ENOENT;
dput(dentry);
goto out;
}
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = mntget(nd->path.mnt);
if (should_follow_link(dentry, nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
return 1;
follow_mount(path);
error = 0;
out:
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 1 | 10,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int php_stream_xmlIO_close(void *context)
{
TSRMLS_FETCH();
return php_stream_close((php_stream*)context);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct packet_fanout *f;
struct net *net;
union tpacket_req_u req_u;
if (!sk)
return 0;
net = sock_net(sk);
po = pkt_sk(sk);
mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
sk_del_node_init_rcu(sk);
mutex_unlock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
preempt_disable();
sock_prot_inuse_add(net, sk->sk_prot, -1);
preempt_enable();
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
if (po->prot_hook.dev) {
dev_put(po->prot_hook.dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
packet_flush_mclist(sk);
if (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) {
memset(&req_u, 0, sizeof(req_u));
packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 1, 0);
}
if (po->tx_ring.pg_vec) {
memset(&req_u, 0, sizeof(req_u));
packet_set_ring(sk, &req_u, 1, 1);
}
f = fanout_release(sk);
synchronize_net();
if (f) {
fanout_release_data(f);
kfree(f);
}
/*
* Now the socket is dead. No more input will appear.
*/
sock_orphan(sk);
sock->sk = NULL;
/* Purge queues */
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
packet_free_pending(po);
sk_refcnt_debug_release(sk);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 22,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_timer_free_system(struct snd_timer *timer)
{
kfree(timer->private_data);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckEac3(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 6);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 6 < buffer_size) {
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 6);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 16) == kAc3SyncWord);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 2) != 3);
reader.SkipBits(3);
int frame_size = (ReadBits(&reader, 11) + 1) * 2;
RCHECK(frame_size >= 7);
reader.SkipBits(2 + 2 + 3 + 1);
int bit_stream_id = ReadBits(&reader, 5);
RCHECK(bit_stream_id >= 11 && bit_stream_id <= 16);
offset += frame_size;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::OnRecognitionError(
int session_id,
const blink::mojom::SpeechRecognitionError& error) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!SessionExists(session_id))
return;
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* delegate_listener = GetDelegateListener())
delegate_listener->OnRecognitionError(session_id, error);
if (SpeechRecognitionEventListener* listener = GetListener(session_id))
listener->OnRecognitionError(session_id, error);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 12,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int closeUnixFile(sqlite3_file *id){
unixFile *pFile = (unixFile*)id;
#if SQLITE_MAX_MMAP_SIZE>0
unixUnmapfile(pFile);
#endif
if( pFile->h>=0 ){
robust_close(pFile, pFile->h, __LINE__);
pFile->h = -1;
}
#if OS_VXWORKS
if( pFile->pId ){
if( pFile->ctrlFlags & UNIXFILE_DELETE ){
osUnlink(pFile->pId->zCanonicalName);
}
vxworksReleaseFileId(pFile->pId);
pFile->pId = 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef SQLITE_UNLINK_AFTER_CLOSE
if( pFile->ctrlFlags & UNIXFILE_DELETE ){
osUnlink(pFile->zPath);
sqlite3_free(*(char**)&pFile->zPath);
pFile->zPath = 0;
}
#endif
OSTRACE(("CLOSE %-3d\n", pFile->h));
OpenCounter(-1);
sqlite3_free(pFile->pUnused);
memset(pFile, 0, sizeof(unixFile));
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r)
{
switch (r) {
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
logit("Connection closed by %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
logit("Connection to %.200s timed out", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
logit("Disconnected from %.200s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
logit("Connection reset by %.200s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
fatal("Unable to negotiate with %.200s: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
fatal("%s%sConnection to %.200s: %s",
tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_err(r));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxShadingPattern::GfxShadingPattern(GfxShading *shadingA, double *matrixA):
GfxPattern(2)
{
int i;
shading = shadingA;
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
matrix[i] = matrixA[i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Color Document::ThemeColor() const {
auto root_element = documentElement();
if (!root_element)
return Color();
for (HTMLMetaElement& meta_element :
Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::DescendantsOf(*root_element)) {
Color color = Color::kTransparent;
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(meta_element.GetName(), "theme-color") &&
CSSParser::ParseColor(
color, meta_element.Content().GetString().StripWhiteSpace(), true))
return color;
}
return Color();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 21,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InsertText(const base::string16& text) {
keyboard::KeyboardController* controller = KeyboardController::GetInstance();
if (!controller)
return false;
ui::InputMethod* input_method = controller->proxy()->GetInputMethod();
if (!input_method)
return false;
ui::TextInputClient* tic = input_method->GetTextInputClient();
if (!tic || tic->GetTextInputType() == ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE)
return false;
tic->InsertText(text);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlGetNamespace(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix) {
int i;
if (prefix == ctxt->str_xml) return(ctxt->str_xml_ns);
for (i = ctxt->nsNr - 2;i >= 0;i-=2)
if (ctxt->nsTab[i] == prefix) {
if ((prefix == NULL) && (*ctxt->nsTab[i + 1] == 0))
return(NULL);
return(ctxt->nsTab[i + 1]);
}
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 26,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *connect_to_host(Ssh ssh, const char *host, int port,
char **realhost, int nodelay, int keepalive)
{
static const struct plug_function_table fn_table = {
ssh_socket_log,
ssh_closing,
ssh_receive,
ssh_sent,
NULL
};
SockAddr addr;
const char *err;
char *loghost;
int addressfamily, sshprot;
ssh_hostport_setup(host, port, ssh->conf,
&ssh->savedhost, &ssh->savedport, &loghost);
ssh->fn = &fn_table; /* make 'ssh' usable as a Plug */
/*
* Try connection-sharing, in case that means we don't open a
* socket after all. ssh_connection_sharing_init will connect to a
* previously established upstream if it can, and failing that,
* establish a listening socket for _us_ to be the upstream. In
* the latter case it will return NULL just as if it had done
* nothing, because here we only need to care if we're a
* downstream and need to do our connection setup differently.
*/
ssh->connshare = NULL;
ssh->attempting_connshare = TRUE; /* affects socket logging behaviour */
ssh->s = ssh_connection_sharing_init(ssh->savedhost, ssh->savedport,
ssh->conf, ssh, &ssh->connshare);
ssh->attempting_connshare = FALSE;
if (ssh->s != NULL) {
/*
* We are a downstream.
*/
ssh->bare_connection = TRUE;
ssh->do_ssh_init = do_ssh_connection_init;
ssh->fullhostname = NULL;
*realhost = dupstr(host); /* best we can do */
} else {
/*
* We're not a downstream, so open a normal socket.
*/
ssh->do_ssh_init = do_ssh_init;
/*
* Try to find host.
*/
addressfamily = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_addressfamily);
addr = name_lookup(host, port, realhost, ssh->conf, addressfamily,
ssh->frontend, "SSH connection");
if ((err = sk_addr_error(addr)) != NULL) {
sk_addr_free(addr);
return err;
}
ssh->fullhostname = dupstr(*realhost); /* save in case of GSSAPI */
ssh->s = new_connection(addr, *realhost, port,
0, 1, nodelay, keepalive,
(Plug) ssh, ssh->conf);
if ((err = sk_socket_error(ssh->s)) != NULL) {
ssh->s = NULL;
notify_remote_exit(ssh->frontend);
return err;
}
}
/*
* The SSH version number is always fixed (since we no longer support
* fallback between versions), so set it now, and if it's SSH-2,
* send the version string now too.
*/
sshprot = conf_get_int(ssh->conf, CONF_sshprot);
assert(sshprot == 0 || sshprot == 3);
if (sshprot == 0)
/* SSH-1 only */
ssh->version = 1;
if (sshprot == 3 && !ssh->bare_connection) {
/* SSH-2 only */
ssh->version = 2;
ssh_send_verstring(ssh, "SSH-", NULL);
}
/*
* loghost, if configured, overrides realhost.
*/
if (*loghost) {
sfree(*realhost);
*realhost = dupstr(loghost);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata frame_metadata = {};
int already_uploaded_id = -1;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata* frame_metadata_ptr = nullptr;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalCanvasFeaturesEnabled()) {
already_uploaded_id = texture->GetLastUploadedVideoFrameId();
frame_metadata_ptr = &frame_metadata;
}
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->ClearLastUploadedFrame();
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
}
}
scoped_refptr<Image> image =
VideoFrameToImage(video, already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 13,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_sched_delayed(struct work_struct *work)
{
mutex_lock(&perf_sched_mutex);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&perf_sched_count))
static_branch_disable(&perf_sched_events);
mutex_unlock(&perf_sched_mutex);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBox::includeVerticalScrollbarSize() const
{
return hasOverflowClip() && !layer()->hasOverlayScrollbars()
&& (style()->overflowY() == OSCROLL || style()->overflowY() == OAUTO);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: saml2md::EntityDescriptor* DynamicMetadataProvider::resolve(const saml2md::MetadataProvider::Criteria& criteria) const
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
xmltooling::NDC("resolve");
#endif
Category& log=Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT ".MetadataProvider.Dynamic");
string name;
if (criteria.entityID_ascii) {
name = criteria.entityID_ascii;
}
else if (criteria.entityID_unicode) {
auto_ptr_char temp(criteria.entityID_unicode);
name = temp.get();
}
else if (criteria.artifact) {
if (m_subst.empty() && (m_regex.empty() || m_match.empty()))
throw saml2md::MetadataException("Unable to resolve metadata dynamically from an artifact.");
name = "{sha1}" + criteria.artifact->getSource();
}
if (!m_subst.empty()) {
string name2(name);
if (!m_hashed.empty()) {
name2 = SecurityHelper::doHash(m_hashed.c_str(), name.c_str(), name.length());
}
name2 = boost::replace_first_copy(m_subst, "$entityID",
m_encoded ? XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getURLEncoder()->encode(name2.c_str()) : name2);
log.info("transformed location from (%s) to (%s)", name.c_str(), name2.c_str());
name = name2;
}
else if (!m_match.empty() && !m_regex.empty()) {
try {
RegularExpression exp(m_match.c_str());
XMLCh* temp = exp.replace(name.c_str(), m_regex.c_str());
if (temp) {
auto_ptr_char narrow(temp);
XMLString::release(&temp);
if (name != narrow.get()) {
log.info("transformed location from (%s) to (%s)", name.c_str(), narrow.get());
name = narrow.get();
}
}
}
catch (XMLException& ex) {
auto_ptr_char msg(ex.getMessage());
log.error("caught error applying regular expression: %s", msg.get());
}
}
if (XMLString::startsWithI(name.c_str(), "file://")) {
MetadataProvider::Criteria baseCriteria(name.c_str());
return saml2md::DynamicMetadataProvider::resolve(baseCriteria);
}
const MetadataProviderCriteria* mpc = dynamic_cast<const MetadataProviderCriteria*>(&criteria);
if (!mpc)
throw saml2md::MetadataException("Dynamic MetadataProvider requires Shibboleth-aware lookup criteria, check calling code.");
const PropertySet* relyingParty;
if (criteria.artifact)
relyingParty = mpc->application.getRelyingParty((XMLCh*)nullptr);
else if (criteria.entityID_unicode)
relyingParty = mpc->application.getRelyingParty(criteria.entityID_unicode);
else {
auto_ptr_XMLCh temp2(name.c_str());
relyingParty = mpc->application.getRelyingParty(temp2.get());
}
SOAPTransport::Address addr(relyingParty->getString("entityID").second, name.c_str(), name.c_str());
const char* pch = strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':');
if (!pch)
throw IOException("location was not a URL.");
string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, pch-addr.m_endpoint);
boost::scoped_ptr<SOAPTransport> transport;
try {
transport.reset(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
}
catch (exception& ex) {
log.error("exception while building transport object to resolve URL: %s", ex.what());
throw IOException("Unable to resolve entityID with a known transport protocol.");
}
transport->setVerifyHost(m_verifyHost);
if (m_trust.get() && m_dummyCR.get() && !transport->setTrustEngine(m_trust.get(), m_dummyCR.get()))
throw IOException("Unable to install X509TrustEngine into transport object.");
Locker credlocker(nullptr, false);
CredentialResolver* credResolver = nullptr;
pair<bool,const char*> authType=relyingParty->getString("authType");
if (!authType.first || !strcmp(authType.second,"TLS")) {
credResolver = mpc->application.getCredentialResolver();
if (credResolver)
credlocker.assign(credResolver);
if (credResolver) {
CredentialCriteria cc;
cc.setUsage(Credential::TLS_CREDENTIAL);
authType = relyingParty->getString("keyName");
if (authType.first)
cc.getKeyNames().insert(authType.second);
const Credential* cred = credResolver->resolve(&cc);
cc.getKeyNames().clear();
if (cred) {
if (!transport->setCredential(cred))
log.error("failed to load Credential into metadata resolver");
}
else {
log.error("no TLS credential supplied");
}
}
else {
log.error("no CredentialResolver available for TLS");
}
}
else {
SOAPTransport::transport_auth_t type=SOAPTransport::transport_auth_none;
pair<bool,const char*> username=relyingParty->getString("authUsername");
pair<bool,const char*> password=relyingParty->getString("authPassword");
if (!username.first || !password.first)
log.error("transport authType (%s) specified but authUsername or authPassword was missing", authType.second);
else if (!strcmp(authType.second,"basic"))
type = SOAPTransport::transport_auth_basic;
else if (!strcmp(authType.second,"digest"))
type = SOAPTransport::transport_auth_digest;
else if (!strcmp(authType.second,"ntlm"))
type = SOAPTransport::transport_auth_ntlm;
else if (!strcmp(authType.second,"gss"))
type = SOAPTransport::transport_auth_gss;
else if (strcmp(authType.second,"none"))
log.error("unknown authType (%s) specified for RelyingParty", authType.second);
if (type > SOAPTransport::transport_auth_none) {
if (transport->setAuth(type,username.second,password.second))
log.debug("configured for transport authentication (method=%s, username=%s)", authType.second, username.second);
else
log.error("failed to configure transport authentication (method=%s)", authType.second);
}
}
pair<bool,unsigned int> timeout = relyingParty->getUnsignedInt("connectTimeout");
transport->setConnectTimeout(timeout.first ? timeout.second : 10);
timeout = relyingParty->getUnsignedInt("timeout");
transport->setTimeout(timeout.first ? timeout.second : 20);
mpc->application.getServiceProvider().setTransportOptions(*transport);
HTTPSOAPTransport* http = dynamic_cast<HTTPSOAPTransport*>(transport.get());
if (http) {
pair<bool,bool> flag = relyingParty->getBool("chunkedEncoding");
http->useChunkedEncoding(flag.first && flag.second);
http->setRequestHeader("Xerces-C", XERCES_FULLVERSIONDOT);
http->setRequestHeader("XML-Security-C", XSEC_FULLVERSIONDOT);
http->setRequestHeader("OpenSAML-C", gOpenSAMLDotVersionStr);
http->setRequestHeader(PACKAGE_NAME, PACKAGE_VERSION);
}
try {
transport->send();
istream& msg = transport->receive();
DOMDocument* doc=nullptr;
StreamInputSource src(msg, "DynamicMetadataProvider");
Wrapper4InputSource dsrc(&src,false);
if (m_validate)
doc=XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getValidatingParser().parse(dsrc);
else
doc=XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getParser().parse(dsrc);
XercesJanitor<DOMDocument> docjanitor(doc);
if (!doc->getDocumentElement() || !XMLHelper::isNodeNamed(doc->getDocumentElement(),
samlconstants::SAML20MD_NS, saml2md::EntityDescriptor::LOCAL_NAME)) {
throw saml2md::MetadataException("Root of metadata instance was not an EntityDescriptor");
}
auto_ptr<XMLObject> xmlObject(XMLObjectBuilder::buildOneFromElement(doc->getDocumentElement(), true));
docjanitor.release();
saml2md::EntityDescriptor* entity = dynamic_cast<saml2md::EntityDescriptor*>(xmlObject.get());
if (!entity) {
throw saml2md::MetadataException(
"Root of metadata instance not recognized: $1", params(1,xmlObject->getElementQName().toString().c_str())
);
}
xmlObject.release();
return entity;
}
catch (XMLException& e) {
auto_ptr_char msg(e.getMessage());
log.error("Xerces error while resolving location (%s): %s", name.c_str(), msg.get());
throw saml2md::MetadataException(msg.get());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347 | 0 | 29,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ifblock * compiler_create_ifelseblock(struct condition *conds, struct block *blk, struct block *elseblk)
{
struct ifblock *ifblk;
SAFE_CALLOC(ifblk, 1, sizeof(struct ifblock));
/* associate the pointers */
ifblk->conds = conds;
ifblk->blk = blk;
ifblk->elseblk = elseblk;
return ifblk;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ne2000_asic_ioport_writel(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val)
{
NE2000State *s = opaque;
#ifdef DEBUG_NE2000
printf("NE2000: asic writel val=0x%04x\n", val);
#endif
if (s->rcnt == 0)
return;
/* 32 bit access */
ne2000_mem_writel(s, s->rsar, val);
ne2000_dma_update(s, 4);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ShellWindowViews::GetWindowTitle() const {
return GetTitle();
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 28,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::MaybeCreateBackgroundContents(
content::SiteInstance* source_site_instance,
content::RenderFrameHost* opener,
const GURL& opener_url,
int32_t route_id,
int32_t main_frame_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_widget_route_id,
const std::string& frame_name,
const GURL& target_url,
const std::string& partition_id,
content::SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
extensions::ExtensionService* extensions_service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service();
if (!opener_url.is_valid() || frame_name.empty() || !extensions_service ||
!extensions_service->is_ready())
return false;
const Extension* extension = extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)
->enabled_extensions()
.GetHostedAppByURL(opener_url);
if (!extension)
return false;
BackgroundContentsService* service =
BackgroundContentsServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return false;
extensions::ProcessMap* process_map = extensions::ProcessMap::Get(profile_);
if (!source_site_instance->GetProcess() ||
!process_map->Contains(extension->id(),
source_site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID())) {
return false;
}
bool allow_js_access = extensions::BackgroundInfo::AllowJSAccess(extension);
BackgroundContents* existing =
service->GetAppBackgroundContents(extension->id());
if (existing) {
if (!allow_js_access)
return true;
delete existing;
}
BackgroundContents* contents = nullptr;
if (allow_js_access) {
contents = service->CreateBackgroundContents(
source_site_instance, opener, route_id, main_frame_route_id,
main_frame_widget_route_id, profile_, frame_name, extension->id(),
partition_id, session_storage_namespace);
} else {
contents = service->CreateBackgroundContents(
content::SiteInstance::Create(
source_site_instance->GetBrowserContext()),
nullptr, MSG_ROUTING_NONE, MSG_ROUTING_NONE, MSG_ROUTING_NONE, profile_,
frame_name, extension->id(), partition_id, session_storage_namespace);
if (contents) {
contents->web_contents()->GetController().LoadURL(
target_url, content::Referrer(), ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
std::string()); // No extra headers.
}
}
return contents != NULL;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ip6t_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
unsigned int *size, struct xt_counters *counters,
unsigned int i)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct compat_ip6t_entry __user *ce;
u_int16_t target_offset, next_offset;
compat_uint_t origsize;
const struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
int ret = 0;
origsize = *size;
ce = *dstptr;
if (copy_to_user(ce, e, sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) != 0 ||
copy_to_user(&ce->counters, &counters[i],
sizeof(counters[i])) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
*dstptr += sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
*size -= sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = xt_compat_match_to_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
}
target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
t = ip6t_get_target(e);
ret = xt_compat_target_to_user(t, dstptr, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
next_offset = e->next_offset - (origsize - *size);
if (put_user(target_offset, &ce->target_offset) != 0 ||
put_user(next_offset, &ce->next_offset) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 12,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_openssl_load_rand_file(const char * file, int *egdsocket, int *seeded) /* {{{ */
{
char buffer[MAXPATHLEN];
*egdsocket = 0;
*seeded = 0;
if (file == NULL) {
file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
#ifdef HAVE_RAND_EGD
} else if (RAND_egd(file) > 0) {
/* if the given filename is an EGD socket, don't
* write anything back to it */
*egdsocket = 1;
return SUCCESS;
#endif
}
if (file == NULL || !RAND_load_file(file, -1)) {
if (RAND_status() == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "unable to load random state; not enough random data!");
return FAILURE;
}
return FAILURE;
}
*seeded = 1;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 3,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WallpaperManagerBase::GetLoggedInUserWallpaperInfo(WallpaperInfo* info) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsLoggedInAsStub()) {
info->location = current_user_wallpaper_info_.location = "";
info->layout = current_user_wallpaper_info_.layout =
WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER_CROPPED;
info->type = current_user_wallpaper_info_.type = DEFAULT;
info->date = current_user_wallpaper_info_.date =
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight();
return true;
}
return GetUserWallpaperInfo(
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetActiveUser()->GetAccountId(), info);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnReloadLoFiImages() {
previews_state_ = PREVIEWS_NO_TRANSFORM;
GetWebFrame()->ReloadLoFiImages();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int checkrangeab(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *labdict)
{
int code = 0, i;
float value[4];
ref *tempref, valref;
code = dict_find_string(labdict, "Range", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
if (!r_is_array(tempref))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (r_size(tempref) != 4)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
for (i=0;i<4;i++) {
code = array_get(imemory, tempref, i, &valref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (r_has_type(&valref, t_integer))
value[i] = (float)valref.value.intval;
else if (r_has_type(&valref, t_real))
value[i] = (float)valref.value.realval;
else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
if (value[1] < value[0] || value[3] < value[2] )
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 12,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebSocketJob::RetryPendingIO() {
int result = TrySpdyStream();
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
CompleteIO(result);
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_dax_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
int result;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(vma->vm_file)->i_sb;
bool write = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (write) {
sb_start_pagefault(sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
handle = ext4_journal_start_sb(sb, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(sb));
}
if (IS_ERR(handle))
result = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
else
result = __dax_fault(vma, vmf, ext4_get_block_dax,
ext4_end_io_unwritten);
if (write) {
if (!IS_ERR(handle))
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
sb_end_pagefault(sb);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 17,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ip_rt_redirect(__be32 old_gw, __be32 daddr, __be32 new_gw,
__be32 saddr, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
struct inet_peer *peer;
struct net *net;
if (!in_dev)
return;
net = dev_net(dev);
if (new_gw == old_gw || !IN_DEV_RX_REDIRECTS(in_dev) ||
ipv4_is_multicast(new_gw) || ipv4_is_lbcast(new_gw) ||
ipv4_is_zeronet(new_gw))
goto reject_redirect;
if (!IN_DEV_SHARED_MEDIA(in_dev)) {
if (!inet_addr_onlink(in_dev, new_gw, old_gw))
goto reject_redirect;
if (IN_DEV_SEC_REDIRECTS(in_dev) && ip_fib_check_default(new_gw, dev))
goto reject_redirect;
} else {
if (inet_addr_type(net, new_gw) != RTN_UNICAST)
goto reject_redirect;
}
peer = inet_getpeer_v4(daddr, 1);
if (peer) {
peer->redirect_learned.a4 = new_gw;
inet_putpeer(peer);
atomic_inc(&__rt_peer_genid);
}
return;
reject_redirect:
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev) && net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_INFO "Redirect from %pI4 on %s about %pI4 ignored.\n"
" Advised path = %pI4 -> %pI4\n",
&old_gw, dev->name, &new_gw,
&saddr, &daddr);
#endif
;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void a2dp_stream_common_init(struct a2dp_stream_common *common)
{
pthread_mutexattr_t lock_attr;
FNLOG();
pthread_mutexattr_init(&lock_attr);
pthread_mutexattr_settype(&lock_attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_RECURSIVE);
pthread_mutex_init(&common->lock, &lock_attr);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
common->audio_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
common->state = AUDIO_A2DP_STATE_STOPPED;
/* manages max capacity of socket pipe */
common->buffer_sz = AUDIO_STREAM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SZ;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_array_info(struct mddev *mddev, void __user *arg)
{
mdu_array_info_t info;
int nr,working,insync,failed,spare;
struct md_rdev *rdev;
nr = working = insync = failed = spare = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev) {
nr++;
if (test_bit(Faulty, &rdev->flags))
failed++;
else {
working++;
if (test_bit(In_sync, &rdev->flags))
insync++;
else
spare++;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
info.major_version = mddev->major_version;
info.minor_version = mddev->minor_version;
info.patch_version = MD_PATCHLEVEL_VERSION;
info.ctime = mddev->ctime;
info.level = mddev->level;
info.size = mddev->dev_sectors / 2;
if (info.size != mddev->dev_sectors / 2) /* overflow */
info.size = -1;
info.nr_disks = nr;
info.raid_disks = mddev->raid_disks;
info.md_minor = mddev->md_minor;
info.not_persistent= !mddev->persistent;
info.utime = mddev->utime;
info.state = 0;
if (mddev->in_sync)
info.state = (1<<MD_SB_CLEAN);
if (mddev->bitmap && mddev->bitmap_info.offset)
info.state |= (1<<MD_SB_BITMAP_PRESENT);
if (mddev_is_clustered(mddev))
info.state |= (1<<MD_SB_CLUSTERED);
info.active_disks = insync;
info.working_disks = working;
info.failed_disks = failed;
info.spare_disks = spare;
info.layout = mddev->layout;
info.chunk_size = mddev->chunk_sectors << 9;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfc_genl_start_poll(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nfc_dev *dev;
int rc;
u32 idx;
u32 im_protocols = 0, tm_protocols = 0;
pr_debug("Poll start\n");
if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX] ||
((!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_IM_PROTOCOLS] &&
!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_PROTOCOLS]) &&
!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TM_PROTOCOLS]))
return -EINVAL;
idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
if (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TM_PROTOCOLS])
tm_protocols = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TM_PROTOCOLS]);
if (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_IM_PROTOCOLS])
im_protocols = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_IM_PROTOCOLS]);
else if (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_PROTOCOLS])
im_protocols = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_PROTOCOLS]);
dev = nfc_get_device(idx);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
mutex_lock(&dev->genl_data.genl_data_mutex);
rc = nfc_start_poll(dev, im_protocols, tm_protocols);
if (!rc)
dev->genl_data.poll_req_portid = info->snd_portid;
mutex_unlock(&dev->genl_data.genl_data_mutex);
nfc_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 15,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidPreviewPage(int page_number,
int preview_request_id) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, 0);
base::FundamentalValue number(page_number);
StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction(
"onDidPreviewPage", number, ui_identifier, request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 26,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_report_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_dump_info *info)
{
struct sk_buff *in_skb = info->in_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb = info->out_skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg;
int err = 0;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, info->nlmsg_seq,
CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG, sizeof(*ualg), info->nlmsg_flags);
if (!nlh) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
ualg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
err = crypto_report_one(alg, ualg, skb);
if (err) {
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
goto out;
}
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 26,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t1_init_params(int open_name_prefix)
{
report_start_file(open_name_prefix,cur_file_name);
t1_lenIV = 4;
t1_dr = 55665;
t1_er = 55665;
t1_in_eexec = 0;
t1_cs = false;
t1_scan = true;
t1_synthetic = false;
t1_eexec_encrypt = false;
t1_block_length = 0;
t1_check_pfa();
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_search_right(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t *logical, ext4_fsblk_t *phys,
struct ext4_extent **ret_ex)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *ix;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_fsblk_t block;
int depth; /* Note, NOT eh_depth; depth from top of tree */
int ee_len;
if (unlikely(path == NULL)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "path == NULL *logical %d!", *logical);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
depth = path->p_depth;
*phys = 0;
if (depth == 0 && path->p_ext == NULL)
return 0;
/* usually extent in the path covers blocks smaller
* then *logical, but it can be that extent is the
* first one in the file */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
if (*logical < le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)) {
if (unlikely(EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr) != ex)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"first_extent(path[%d].p_hdr) != ex",
depth);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
while (--depth >= 0) {
ix = path[depth].p_idx;
if (unlikely(ix != EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path[depth].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"ix != EXT_FIRST_INDEX *logical %d!",
*logical);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
}
goto found_extent;
}
if (unlikely(*logical < (le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ee_len))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"logical %d < ee_block %d + ee_len %d!",
*logical, le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block), ee_len);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (ex != EXT_LAST_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
/* next allocated block in this leaf */
ex++;
goto found_extent;
}
/* go up and search for index to the right */
while (--depth >= 0) {
ix = path[depth].p_idx;
if (ix != EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[depth].p_hdr))
goto got_index;
}
/* we've gone up to the root and found no index to the right */
return 0;
got_index:
/* we've found index to the right, let's
* follow it and find the closest allocated
* block to the right */
ix++;
block = ext4_idx_pblock(ix);
while (++depth < path->p_depth) {
/* subtract from p_depth to get proper eh_depth */
bh = read_extent_tree_block(inode, block,
path->p_depth - depth, 0);
if (IS_ERR(bh))
return PTR_ERR(bh);
eh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
ix = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh);
block = ext4_idx_pblock(ix);
put_bh(bh);
}
bh = read_extent_tree_block(inode, block, path->p_depth - depth, 0);
if (IS_ERR(bh))
return PTR_ERR(bh);
eh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh);
found_extent:
*logical = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
*phys = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
*ret_ex = ex;
if (bh)
put_bh(bh);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *php_libxml_streams_IO_open_wrapper(const char *filename, const char *mode, const int read_only)
{
php_stream_statbuf ssbuf;
php_stream_context *context = NULL;
php_stream_wrapper *wrapper = NULL;
char *resolved_path, *path_to_open = NULL;
void *ret_val = NULL;
int isescaped=0;
xmlURI *uri;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
uri = xmlParseURI(filename);
if (uri && (uri->scheme == NULL ||
(xmlStrncmp(BAD_CAST uri->scheme, BAD_CAST "file", 4) == 0))) {
resolved_path = xmlURIUnescapeString(filename, 0, NULL);
isescaped = 1;
} else {
resolved_path = (char *)filename;
}
if (uri) {
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
if (resolved_path == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* logic copied from _php_stream_stat, but we only want to fail
if the wrapper supports stat, otherwise, figure it out from
the open. This logic is only to support hiding warnings
that the streams layer puts out at times, but for libxml we
may try to open files that don't exist, but it is not a failure
in xml processing (eg. DTD files) */
wrapper = php_stream_locate_url_wrapper(resolved_path, &path_to_open, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (wrapper && read_only && wrapper->wops->url_stat) {
if (wrapper->wops->url_stat(wrapper, path_to_open, PHP_STREAM_URL_STAT_QUIET, &ssbuf, NULL TSRMLS_CC) == -1) {
if (isescaped) {
xmlFree(resolved_path);
}
return NULL;
}
}
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(LIBXML(stream_context), 0);
ret_val = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(path_to_open, (char *)mode, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, context);
if (isescaped) {
xmlFree(resolved_path);
}
return ret_val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::ExtensionSubtestsAreSkipped() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(NDEBUG)
LOG(WARNING) << "Workaround for 177163, prematurely returning";
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AnimatedPropertyType EmptyValue() { return kAnimatedUnknown; }
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 2,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintDialogGtk::InitPrintSettings(const PageRanges& page_ranges) {
PrintSettings settings;
printing::PrintSettingsInitializerGtk::InitPrintSettings(
gtk_settings_, page_setup_, page_ranges, false, &settings);
context_->InitWithSettings(settings);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Cache DestroyPixelCache(Cache cache)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
cache_info->filename);
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
cache_info->reference_count--;
if (cache_info->reference_count != 0)
{
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
return((Cache) NULL);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
if (cache_info->debug != MagickFalse)
{
char
message[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MaxTextExtent,"destroy %s",
cache_info->filename);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",message);
}
RelinquishPixelCachePixels(cache_info);
if (cache_info->server_info != (DistributeCacheInfo *) NULL)
cache_info->server_info=DestroyDistributeCacheInfo((DistributeCacheInfo *)
cache_info->server_info);
if (cache_info->nexus_info != (NexusInfo **) NULL)
cache_info->nexus_info=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(cache_info->nexus_info,
cache_info->number_threads);
if (cache_info->random_info != (RandomInfo *) NULL)
cache_info->random_info=DestroyRandomInfo(cache_info->random_info);
if (cache_info->file_semaphore != (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
DestroySemaphoreInfo(&cache_info->file_semaphore);
if (cache_info->semaphore != (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
DestroySemaphoreInfo(&cache_info->semaphore);
cache_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(cache_info);
cache=(Cache) NULL;
return(cache);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_decode_generic_template0(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2GenericRegionParams *params, Jbig2ArithState *as, Jbig2Image *image, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
const int GBW = image->width;
const int GBH = image->height;
const int rowstride = image->stride;
int x, y;
byte *gbreg_line = (byte *) image->data;
/* todo: currently we only handle the nominal gbat location */
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
printf("P4\n%d %d\n", GBW, GBH);
#endif
if (GBW <= 0)
return 0;
for (y = 0; y < GBH; y++) {
uint32_t CONTEXT;
uint32_t line_m1;
uint32_t line_m2;
int padded_width = (GBW + 7) & -8;
line_m1 = (y >= 1) ? gbreg_line[-rowstride] : 0;
line_m2 = (y >= 2) ? gbreg_line[-(rowstride << 1)] << 6 : 0;
CONTEXT = (line_m1 & 0x7f0) | (line_m2 & 0xf800);
/* 6.2.5.7 3d */
for (x = 0; x < padded_width; x += 8) {
byte result = 0;
int x_minor;
int minor_width = GBW - x > 8 ? 8 : GBW - x;
if (y >= 1)
line_m1 = (line_m1 << 8) | (x + 8 < GBW ? gbreg_line[-rowstride + (x >> 3) + 1] : 0);
if (y >= 2)
line_m2 = (line_m2 << 8) | (x + 8 < GBW ? gbreg_line[-(rowstride << 1) + (x >> 3) + 1] << 6 : 0);
/* This is the speed-critical inner loop. */
for (x_minor = 0; x_minor < minor_width; x_minor++) {
bool bit;
bit = jbig2_arith_decode(as, &GB_stats[CONTEXT]);
if (bit < 0)
return -1;
result |= bit << (7 - x_minor);
CONTEXT = ((CONTEXT & 0x7bf7) << 1) | bit | ((line_m1 >> (7 - x_minor)) & 0x10) | ((line_m2 >> (7 - x_minor)) & 0x800);
}
gbreg_line[x >> 3] = result;
}
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
fwrite(gbreg_line, 1, rowstride, stdout);
#endif
gbreg_line += rowstride;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t get_tlm(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, int n)
{
uint8_t Stlm, ST, SP, tile_tlm, i;
bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g); /* Ztlm: skipped */
Stlm = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
ST = (Stlm >> 4) & 0x03;
SP = (Stlm >> 6) & 0x01;
tile_tlm = (n - 4) / ((SP + 1) * 2 + ST);
for (i = 0; i < tile_tlm; i++) {
switch (ST) {
case 0:
break;
case 1:
bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
break;
case 2:
bytestream2_get_be16(&s->g);
break;
case 3:
bytestream2_get_be32(&s->g);
break;
}
if (SP == 0) {
bytestream2_get_be16(&s->g);
} else {
bytestream2_get_be32(&s->g);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::globus_gram_client_job_status(const char * job_contact,
int * job_status,
int * failure_code)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_JOB_STATUS";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(job_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 4) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
*failure_code = atoi(result->argv[2]);
if ( rc == 0 ) {
*job_status = atoi(result->argv[3]);
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 25,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sync_api::HttpPostProviderFactory* MakeHttpBridgeFactory(
const scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter>& getter) {
return new HttpBridgeFactory(getter);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Chapters::Edition::Edition()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 10,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t curl_read(char *data, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *ctx)
{
php_curl *ch = (php_curl *)ctx;
php_curl_read *t = ch->handlers->read;
int length = 0;
switch (t->method) {
case PHP_CURL_DIRECT:
if (t->fp) {
length = fread(data, size, nmemb, t->fp);
}
break;
case PHP_CURL_USER: {
zval argv[3];
zval retval;
int error;
zend_fcall_info fci;
ZVAL_RES(&argv[0], ch->res);
Z_ADDREF(argv[0]);
if (t->res) {
ZVAL_RES(&argv[1], t->res);
Z_ADDREF(argv[1]);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(&argv[1]);
}
ZVAL_LONG(&argv[2], (int)size * nmemb);
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&fci.function_name, &t->func_name);
fci.object = NULL;
fci.retval = &retval;
fci.param_count = 3;
fci.params = argv;
fci.no_separation = 0;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
ch->in_callback = 1;
error = zend_call_function(&fci, &t->fci_cache);
ch->in_callback = 0;
if (error == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Cannot call the CURLOPT_READFUNCTION");
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070c01 /* 7.12.1 */
length = CURL_READFUNC_ABORT;
#endif
} else if (!Z_ISUNDEF(retval)) {
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 1);
if (Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
length = MIN((int) (size * nmemb), Z_STRLEN(retval));
memcpy(data, Z_STRVAL(retval), length);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[1]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[2]);
break;
}
}
return length;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxEditModel::GetDataForURLExport(GURL* url,
base::string16* title,
gfx::Image* favicon) {
*url = CurrentMatch(NULL).destination_url;
if (*url == delegate_->GetURL()) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = controller_->GetWebContents();
*title = web_contents->GetTitle();
*favicon = FaviconTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents)->GetFavicon();
}
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~TestFieldTrialObserver() {
FieldTrialList::RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 2,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_path_absolute(const char *path) /* I - Input path */
{
/*
* Check for a leading slash...
*/
if (path[0] != '/')
return (0);
/*
* Check for "<" or quotes in the path and reject since this is probably
* someone trying to inject HTML...
*/
if (strchr(path, '<') != NULL || strchr(path, '\"') != NULL || strchr(path, '\'') != NULL)
return (0);
/*
* Check for "/.." in the path...
*/
while ((path = strstr(path, "/..")) != NULL)
{
if (!path[3] || path[3] == '/')
return (0);
path ++;
}
/*
* If we haven't found any relative paths, return 1 indicating an
* absolute path...
*/
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 24,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DetachOffloadGPU(ScreenPtr slave)
{
assert(slave->isGPU);
assert(slave->is_offload_slave);
slave->is_offload_slave = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* LoadManifestFile(const std::string& filename,
std::string* error) {
FilePath path;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_TEST_DATA, &path);
path = path.AppendASCII("extensions")
.AppendASCII("manifest_tests")
.AppendASCII(filename.c_str());
EXPECT_TRUE(file_util::PathExists(path));
JSONFileValueSerializer serializer(path);
return static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(serializer.Deserialize(NULL, error));
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_svm_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_init_shadow_mmu(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.mmu);
vcpu->arch.mmu.set_cr3 = nested_svm_set_tdp_cr3;
vcpu->arch.mmu.get_cr3 = nested_svm_get_tdp_cr3;
vcpu->arch.mmu.get_pdptr = nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr;
vcpu->arch.mmu.inject_page_fault = nested_svm_inject_npf_exit;
vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level = get_npt_level();
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size,
const gles2::CreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM& c) {
if (!feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_stream_texture) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glOpenStreamTextureCHROMIUM", ""
"not supported.");
return error::kNoError;
}
uint32 client_id = c.client_id;
typedef gles2::CreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
*result = GL_ZERO;
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glCreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM", ""
"bad texture id.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (info->IsStreamTexture()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM", ""
"is already a stream texture.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (info->target() && info->target() != GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM", ""
"is already bound to incompatible target.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!stream_texture_manager_)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
GLuint object_id = stream_texture_manager_->CreateStreamTexture(
info->service_id(), client_id);
if (object_id) {
info->SetStreamTexture(true);
} else {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
"glCreateStreamTextureCHROMIUM", ""
"failed to create platform texture.");
}
*result = object_id;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::ExtractSmartClipData(WebRect rect_in_viewport,
WebString& clip_text,
WebString& clip_html,
WebRect& clip_rect) {
SmartClipData clip_data = SmartClip(GetFrame()).DataForRect(rect_in_viewport);
clip_text = clip_data.ClipData();
clip_rect = clip_data.RectInViewport();
WebPoint start_point(rect_in_viewport.x, rect_in_viewport.y);
WebPoint end_point(rect_in_viewport.x + rect_in_viewport.width,
rect_in_viewport.y + rect_in_viewport.height);
clip_html = CreateMarkupInRect(
GetFrame(), GetFrame()->View()->ViewportToFrame(start_point),
GetFrame()->View()->ViewportToFrame(end_point));
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnRequestResourceInternal(
ResourceRequesterInfo* requester_info,
int routing_id,
int request_id,
bool is_sync_load,
const network::ResourceRequest& request_data,
uint32_t url_loader_options,
network::mojom::URLLoaderRequest mojo_request,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientPtr url_loader_client,
const net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag& traffic_annotation) {
DCHECK(requester_info->IsRenderer() ||
requester_info->IsNavigationPreload() ||
requester_info->IsCertificateFetcherForSignedExchange());
BeginRequest(requester_info, request_id, request_data, is_sync_load,
routing_id, url_loader_options, std::move(mojo_request),
std::move(url_loader_client), traffic_annotation);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 26,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_lrgn (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, EAS_I32 size, EAS_U16 artIndex, EAS_U32 numRegions)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 endChunk;
EAS_U16 regionCount;
/* seek to start of chunk */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* read to end of chunk */
regionCount = 0;
endChunk = pos + size;
while (pos < endChunk)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the next chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((temp == CHUNK_RGN) || (temp == CHUNK_RGN2))
{
if (regionCount == numRegions)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS region count exceeded cRegions value in insh, extra region ignored\n"); */ }
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
if ((result = Parse_rgn(pDLSData, chunkPos + 12, size, artIndex)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
regionCount++;
}
}
/* set a flag in the last region */
if ((pDLSData->pDLS != NULL) && (regionCount > 0))
pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSRegions[pDLSData->regionCount - 1].wtRegion.region.keyGroupAndFlags |= REGION_FLAG_LAST_REGION;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::Redo() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->Redo();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Redo"));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void svc_rdma_cleanup(void)
{
dprintk("SVCRDMA Module Removed, deregister RPC RDMA transport\n");
destroy_workqueue(svc_rdma_wq);
if (svcrdma_table_header) {
unregister_sysctl_table(svcrdma_table_header);
svcrdma_table_header = NULL;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL)
svc_unreg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_bc_class);
#endif
svc_unreg_xprt_class(&svc_rdma_class);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 25,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_index_write_tree_to(
git_oid *oid, git_index *index, git_repository *repo)
{
assert(oid && index && repo);
return git_tree__write_index(oid, index, repo);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 28,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_update_dynamic_rev(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_REV)
return;
ext4_warning(sb,
"updating to rev %d because of new feature flag, "
"running e2fsck is recommended",
EXT4_DYNAMIC_REV);
es->s_first_ino = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO);
es->s_inode_size = cpu_to_le16(EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE);
es->s_rev_level = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_DYNAMIC_REV);
/* leave es->s_feature_*compat flags alone */
/* es->s_uuid will be set by e2fsck if empty */
/*
* The rest of the superblock fields should be zero, and if not it
* means they are likely already in use, so leave them alone. We
* can leave it up to e2fsck to clean up any inconsistencies there.
*/
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FTC_SNode_Free( FTC_SNode snode,
FTC_Cache cache )
{
ftc_snode_free( FTC_NODE( snode ), cache );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_str_rsrc (SF_PRIVATE *psf, SD2_RSRC * rsrc)
{ char name [32], value [32] ;
int k, str_offset, rsrc_id, data_offset = 0, data_len = 0 ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "Finding parameters :\n") ;
str_offset = rsrc->string_offset ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " Offset RsrcId dlen slen Value\n") ;
for (k = 0 ; data_offset + data_len < rsrc->rsrc_len ; k++)
{ int slen ;
slen = read_rsrc_char (rsrc, str_offset) ;
read_rsrc_str (rsrc, str_offset + 1, name, SF_MIN (SIGNED_SIZEOF (name), slen + 1)) ;
str_offset += slen + 1 ;
rsrc_id = read_rsrc_short (rsrc, rsrc->item_offset + k * 12) ;
data_offset = rsrc->data_offset + read_rsrc_int (rsrc, rsrc->item_offset + k * 12 + 4) ;
if (data_offset < 0 || data_offset > rsrc->rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Exiting parser on data offset of %d.\n", data_offset) ;
break ;
} ;
data_len = read_rsrc_int (rsrc, data_offset) ;
if (data_len < 0 || data_len > rsrc->rsrc_len)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Exiting parser on data length of %d.\n", data_len) ;
break ;
} ;
slen = read_rsrc_char (rsrc, data_offset + 4) ;
read_rsrc_str (rsrc, data_offset + 5, value, SF_MIN (SIGNED_SIZEOF (value), slen + 1)) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " 0x%04x %4d %4d %3d '%s'\n", data_offset, rsrc_id, data_len, slen, value) ;
if (rsrc_id == 1000 && rsrc->sample_size == 0)
rsrc->sample_size = strtol (value, NULL, 10) ;
else if (rsrc_id == 1001 && rsrc->sample_rate == 0)
rsrc->sample_rate = strtol (value, NULL, 10) ;
else if (rsrc_id == 1002 && rsrc->channels == 0)
rsrc->channels = strtol (value, NULL, 10) ;
} ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "Found Parameters :\n") ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " sample-size : %d\n", rsrc->sample_size) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " sample-rate : %d\n", rsrc->sample_rate) ;
psf_log_printf (psf, " channels : %d\n", rsrc->channels) ;
if (rsrc->sample_rate <= 4 && rsrc->sample_size > 4)
{ int temp ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "Geez!! Looks like sample rate and sample size got switched.\nCorrecting this screw up.\n") ;
temp = rsrc->sample_rate ;
rsrc->sample_rate = rsrc->sample_size ;
rsrc->sample_size = temp ;
} ;
if (rsrc->sample_rate < 0)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad sample rate (%d)\n", rsrc->sample_rate) ;
return SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
} ;
if (rsrc->channels < 0)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad channel count (%d)\n", rsrc->channels) ;
return SFE_SD2_BAD_RSRC ;
} ;
psf->sf.samplerate = rsrc->sample_rate ;
psf->sf.channels = rsrc->channels ;
psf->bytewidth = rsrc->sample_size ;
switch (rsrc->sample_size)
{ case 1 :
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_SD2 | SF_FORMAT_PCM_S8 ;
break ;
case 2 :
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_SD2 | SF_FORMAT_PCM_16 ;
break ;
case 3 :
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_SD2 | SF_FORMAT_PCM_24 ;
break ;
case 4 :
psf->sf.format = SF_FORMAT_SD2 | SF_FORMAT_PCM_32 ;
break ;
default :
psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad sample size (%d)\n", rsrc->sample_size) ;
return SFE_SD2_BAD_SAMPLE_SIZE ;
} ;
psf_log_printf (psf, "ok\n") ;
return 0 ;
} /* parse_str_rsrc */
Commit Message: src/sd2.c : Fix two potential buffer read overflows.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/93
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
struct pi_desc old, new;
unsigned int dest;
unsigned long flags;
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP))
return;
do {
old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->cpu);
if (x2apic_enabled())
new.ndst = dest;
else
new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
/* Allow posting non-urgent interrupts */
new.sn = 0;
/* set 'NV' to 'notification vector' */
new.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
} while (cmpxchg(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
new.control) != old.control);
if(vcpu->pre_pcpu != -1) {
spin_lock_irqsave(
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
list_del(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
vcpu->pre_pcpu = -1;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zswapcolors(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p)
{
ref_colorspace tmp_cs;
ref tmp_pat;
tmp_cs = istate->colorspace[0];
istate->colorspace[0] = istate->colorspace[1];
istate->colorspace[1] = tmp_cs;
tmp_pat = istate->pattern[0];
istate->pattern[0] = istate->pattern[1];
istate->pattern[1] = tmp_pat;
return gs_swapcolors(igs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 14,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_test_interrupt(struct tg3 *tp)
{
struct tg3_napi *tnapi = &tp->napi[0];
struct net_device *dev = tp->dev;
int err, i, intr_ok = 0;
u32 val;
if (!netif_running(dev))
return -ENODEV;
tg3_disable_ints(tp);
free_irq(tnapi->irq_vec, tnapi);
/*
* Turn off MSI one shot mode. Otherwise this test has no
* observable way to know whether the interrupt was delivered.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS)) {
val = tr32(MSGINT_MODE) | MSGINT_MODE_ONE_SHOT_DISABLE;
tw32(MSGINT_MODE, val);
}
err = request_irq(tnapi->irq_vec, tg3_test_isr,
IRQF_SHARED, dev->name, tnapi);
if (err)
return err;
tnapi->hw_status->status &= ~SD_STATUS_UPDATED;
tg3_enable_ints(tp);
tw32_f(HOSTCC_MODE, tp->coalesce_mode | HOSTCC_MODE_ENABLE |
tnapi->coal_now);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
u32 int_mbox, misc_host_ctrl;
int_mbox = tr32_mailbox(tnapi->int_mbox);
misc_host_ctrl = tr32(TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL);
if ((int_mbox != 0) ||
(misc_host_ctrl & MISC_HOST_CTRL_MASK_PCI_INT)) {
intr_ok = 1;
break;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS) &&
tnapi->hw_status->status_tag != tnapi->last_tag)
tw32_mailbox_f(tnapi->int_mbox, tnapi->last_tag << 24);
msleep(10);
}
tg3_disable_ints(tp);
free_irq(tnapi->irq_vec, tnapi);
err = tg3_request_irq(tp, 0);
if (err)
return err;
if (intr_ok) {
/* Reenable MSI one shot mode. */
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS) && tg3_flag(tp, 1SHOT_MSI)) {
val = tr32(MSGINT_MODE) & ~MSGINT_MODE_ONE_SHOT_DISABLE;
tw32(MSGINT_MODE, val);
}
return 0;
}
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ia64_patch_imm64 (u64 insn_addr, u64 val)
{
/* The assembler may generate offset pointing to either slot 1
or slot 2 for a long (2-slot) instruction, occupying slots 1
and 2. */
insn_addr &= -16UL;
ia64_patch(insn_addr + 2,
0x01fffefe000UL, ( ((val & 0x8000000000000000UL) >> 27) /* bit 63 -> 36 */
| ((val & 0x0000000000200000UL) << 0) /* bit 21 -> 21 */
| ((val & 0x00000000001f0000UL) << 6) /* bit 16 -> 22 */
| ((val & 0x000000000000ff80UL) << 20) /* bit 7 -> 27 */
| ((val & 0x000000000000007fUL) << 13) /* bit 0 -> 13 */));
ia64_patch(insn_addr + 1, 0x1ffffffffffUL, val >> 22);
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t write_null(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return count;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 17,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _fep_dispatch_control_message (Fep *fep, FepControlMessage *message)
{
static const struct
{
int command;
void (*handler) (Fep *fep,
FepControlMessage *request);
} handlers[] =
{
{ FEP_CONTROL_SET_CURSOR_TEXT, command_set_cursor_text },
{ FEP_CONTROL_SET_STATUS_TEXT, command_set_status_text },
{ FEP_CONTROL_SEND_TEXT, command_send_text },
{ FEP_CONTROL_SEND_DATA, command_send_data },
{ FEP_CONTROL_FORWARD_KEY_EVENT, command_forward_key_event }
};
int i;
for (i = 0;
i < SIZEOF (handlers) && handlers[i].command != message->command;
i++)
;
if (i == SIZEOF (handlers))
{
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
"no handler defined for %d", message->command);
return -1;
}
handlers[i].handler (fep, message);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't use abstract Unix domain sockets
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_parse_key_old(struct genl_info *info, struct key_parse *k)
{
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DATA]) {
k->p.key = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DATA]);
k->p.key_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DATA]);
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ]) {
k->p.seq = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ]);
k->p.seq_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ]);
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_IDX])
k->idx = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_IDX]);
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_CIPHER])
k->p.cipher = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_CIPHER]);
k->def = !!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DEFAULT];
k->defmgmt = !!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DEFAULT_MGMT];
if (k->def) {
k->def_uni = true;
k->def_multi = true;
}
if (k->defmgmt)
k->def_multi = true;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_TYPE]) {
k->type = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_TYPE]);
if (k->type < 0 || k->type >= NUM_NL80211_KEYTYPES)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES]) {
struct nlattr *kdt[NUM_NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES];
int err = nla_parse_nested(
kdt, NUM_NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES - 1,
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPES],
nl80211_key_default_policy);
if (err)
return err;
k->def_uni = kdt[NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPE_UNICAST];
k->def_multi = kdt[NL80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TYPE_MULTICAST];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string utf16ToUtf8(const StringPiece16& utf16) {
ssize_t utf8Length = utf16_to_utf8_length(utf16.data(), utf16.length());
if (utf8Length <= 0) {
return {};
}
std::string utf8;
utf8.resize(utf8Length);
utf16_to_utf8(utf16.data(), utf16.length(), &*utf8.begin());
return utf8;
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 28,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetUniformfv(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::GetUniformfv& c) {
GLuint program = c.program;
GLint location = c.location;
GLuint service_id;
Error error;
typedef gles2::GetUniformfv::Result Result;
Result* result;
GLenum result_type;
if (GetUniformSetup(
program, location, c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset,
&error, &service_id, reinterpret_cast<void**>(&result), &result_type)) {
if (result_type == GL_BOOL || result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC2 ||
result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC3 || result_type == GL_BOOL_VEC4) {
GLsizei num_values = result->GetNumResults();
scoped_array<GLint> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
glGetUniformiv(service_id, location, temp.get());
GLfloat* dst = result->GetData();
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
dst[ii] = (temp[ii] != 0);
}
} else {
glGetUniformfv(service_id, location, result->GetData());
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned int flags, int nosec)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV];
struct iovec *iov = iovstack;
unsigned long cmsg_ptr;
int total_len, len;
ssize_t err;
/* kernel mode address */
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
/* user mode address pointers */
struct sockaddr __user *uaddr;
int __user *uaddr_len = COMPAT_NAMELEN(msg);
msg_sys->msg_name = &addr;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags)
err = get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat, &uaddr, &iov);
else
err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg, &uaddr, &iov);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
cmsg_ptr = (unsigned long)msg_sys->msg_control;
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags & (MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT);
/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
msg_sys->msg_namelen = 0;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = (nosec ? sock_recvmsg_nosec : sock_recvmsg)(sock, msg_sys,
total_len, flags);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
len = err;
if (uaddr != NULL) {
err = move_addr_to_user(&addr,
msg_sys->msg_namelen, uaddr,
uaddr_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = __put_user((msg_sys->msg_flags & ~MSG_CMSG_COMPAT),
COMPAT_FLAGS(msg));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags)
err = __put_user((unsigned long)msg_sys->msg_control - cmsg_ptr,
&msg_compat->msg_controllen);
else
err = __put_user((unsigned long)msg_sys->msg_control - cmsg_ptr,
&msg->msg_controllen);
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
err = len;
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
kfree(iov);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p backlog %d", sk, backlog);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel) {
bdaddr_t *src = &rfcomm_pi(sk)->src;
u8 channel;
err = -EINVAL;
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
for (channel = 1; channel < 31; channel++)
if (!__rfcomm_get_listen_sock_by_addr(channel, src)) {
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = channel;
err = 0;
break;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (err < 0)
goto done;
}
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WallpaperManagerBase::GetWallpaperFromCache(const AccountId& account_id,
gfx::ImageSkia* image) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
CustomWallpaperMap::const_iterator it = wallpaper_cache_.find(account_id);
if (it != wallpaper_cache_.end() && !(*it).second.second.isNull()) {
*image = (*it).second.second;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: safe_delay_show(struct mddev *mddev, char *page)
{
int msec = (mddev->safemode_delay*1000)/HZ;
return sprintf(page, "%d.%03d\n", msec/1000, msec%1000);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PPB_ImageData_Impl::Init(PP_ImageDataFormat format,
int width, int height,
bool init_to_zero) {
if (!IsImageDataFormatSupported(format))
return false; // Only support this one format for now.
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return false;
if (static_cast<int64>(width) * static_cast<int64>(height) * 4 >=
std::numeric_limits<int32>::max())
return false; // Prevent overflow of signed 32-bit ints.
format_ = format;
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
return backend_->Init(this, format, width, height, init_to_zero);
}
Commit Message: Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 3,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
{
int err = 0;
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(scm->pid);
if (scm->cred)
UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
if (scm->fp && send_fds)
err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
skb->destructor = unix_destruct_scm;
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 14,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void swap_free(swp_entry_t entry)
{
struct swap_info_struct *p;
p = swap_info_get(entry);
if (p) {
swap_entry_free(p, entry, 1);
spin_unlock(&swap_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadingPredictorPreconnectTest::SetUp() {
LoadingPredictorTest::SetUp();
auto mock_preconnect_manager =
std::make_unique<StrictMock<MockPreconnectManager>>(
predictor_->GetWeakPtr(), profile_.get());
mock_preconnect_manager_ = mock_preconnect_manager.get();
predictor_->set_mock_preconnect_manager(std::move(mock_preconnect_manager));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::SetTabStripModel(
TabStripModel* tab_strip_model) {
tab_strip_model_ = tab_strip_model;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_cpu(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int __user *epc;
unsigned long old_epc;
unsigned int opcode;
unsigned int cpid;
int status;
unsigned long __maybe_unused flags;
die_if_kernel("do_cpu invoked from kernel context!", regs);
cpid = (regs->cp0_cause >> CAUSEB_CE) & 3;
switch (cpid) {
case 0:
epc = (unsigned int __user *)exception_epc(regs);
old_epc = regs->cp0_epc;
opcode = 0;
status = -1;
if (unlikely(compute_return_epc(regs) < 0))
return;
if (unlikely(get_user(opcode, epc) < 0))
status = SIGSEGV;
if (!cpu_has_llsc && status < 0)
status = simulate_llsc(regs, opcode);
if (status < 0)
status = simulate_rdhwr(regs, opcode);
if (status < 0)
status = SIGILL;
if (unlikely(status > 0)) {
regs->cp0_epc = old_epc; /* Undo skip-over. */
force_sig(status, current);
}
return;
case 1:
if (used_math()) /* Using the FPU again. */
own_fpu(1);
else { /* First time FPU user. */
init_fpu();
set_used_math();
}
if (!raw_cpu_has_fpu) {
int sig;
void __user *fault_addr = NULL;
sig = fpu_emulator_cop1Handler(regs,
¤t->thread.fpu,
0, &fault_addr);
if (!process_fpemu_return(sig, fault_addr))
mt_ase_fp_affinity();
}
return;
case 2:
raw_notifier_call_chain(&cu2_chain, CU2_EXCEPTION, regs);
return;
case 3:
break;
}
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldHighlightFields() {
std::string group_name =
base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName(kFillOnAccountSelectFieldTrialName);
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableFillOnAccountSelect) ||
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableFillOnAccountSelect)) {
return true;
}
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableFillOnAccountSelectNoHighlighting)) {
return false;
}
return group_name !=
kFillOnAccountSelectFieldTrialEnabledWithNoHighlightGroup;
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct attr *bgp_attr_aggregate_intern(struct bgp *bgp, uint8_t origin,
struct aspath *aspath,
struct community *community,
struct ecommunity *ecommunity,
struct lcommunity *lcommunity,
int as_set, uint8_t atomic_aggregate)
{
struct attr attr;
struct attr *new;
memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(struct attr));
/* Origin attribute. */
attr.origin = origin;
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN);
/* AS path attribute. */
if (aspath)
attr.aspath = aspath_intern(aspath);
else
attr.aspath = aspath_empty();
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH);
/* Next hop attribute. */
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP);
if (community) {
uint32_t gshut = COMMUNITY_GSHUT;
/* If we are not shutting down ourselves and we are
* aggregating a route that contains the GSHUT community we
* need to remove that community when creating the aggregate */
if (!bgp_flag_check(bgp, BGP_FLAG_GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN)
&& community_include(community, gshut)) {
community_del_val(community, &gshut);
}
attr.community = community;
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
}
if (ecommunity) {
attr.ecommunity = ecommunity;
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
}
if (lcommunity) {
attr.lcommunity = lcommunity;
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES);
}
if (bgp_flag_check(bgp, BGP_FLAG_GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN)) {
bgp_attr_add_gshut_community(&attr);
}
attr.label_index = BGP_INVALID_LABEL_INDEX;
attr.label = MPLS_INVALID_LABEL;
attr.weight = BGP_ATTR_DEFAULT_WEIGHT;
attr.mp_nexthop_len = IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN;
if (!as_set || atomic_aggregate)
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE);
attr.flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR);
if (CHECK_FLAG(bgp->config, BGP_CONFIG_CONFEDERATION))
attr.aggregator_as = bgp->confed_id;
else
attr.aggregator_as = bgp->as;
attr.aggregator_addr = bgp->router_id;
attr.label_index = BGP_INVALID_LABEL_INDEX;
attr.label = MPLS_INVALID_LABEL;
new = bgp_attr_intern(&attr);
aspath_unintern(&new->aspath);
return new;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: modifier_current_encoding(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, color_encoding *ce)
{
if (pm->current_encoding != 0)
*ce = *pm->current_encoding;
else
memset(ce, 0, sizeof *ce);
ce->gamma = pm->current_gamma;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 25,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int svc_rdma_xdr_decode_req(struct xdr_buf *rq_arg)
{
__be32 *p, *end, *rdma_argp;
unsigned int hdr_len;
/* Verify that there's enough bytes for header + something */
if (rq_arg->len <= RPCRDMA_HDRLEN_ERR)
goto out_short;
rdma_argp = rq_arg->head[0].iov_base;
if (*(rdma_argp + 1) != rpcrdma_version)
goto out_version;
switch (*(rdma_argp + 3)) {
case rdma_msg:
case rdma_nomsg:
break;
case rdma_done:
goto out_drop;
case rdma_error:
goto out_drop;
default:
goto out_proc;
}
end = (__be32 *)((unsigned long)rdma_argp + rq_arg->len);
p = xdr_check_read_list(rdma_argp + 4, end);
if (!p)
goto out_inval;
p = xdr_check_write_list(p, end);
if (!p)
goto out_inval;
p = xdr_check_reply_chunk(p, end);
if (!p)
goto out_inval;
if (p > end)
goto out_inval;
rq_arg->head[0].iov_base = p;
hdr_len = (unsigned long)p - (unsigned long)rdma_argp;
rq_arg->head[0].iov_len -= hdr_len;
return hdr_len;
out_short:
dprintk("svcrdma: header too short = %d\n", rq_arg->len);
return -EINVAL;
out_version:
dprintk("svcrdma: bad xprt version: %u\n",
be32_to_cpup(rdma_argp + 1));
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
out_drop:
dprintk("svcrdma: dropping RDMA_DONE/ERROR message\n");
return 0;
out_proc:
dprintk("svcrdma: bad rdma procedure (%u)\n",
be32_to_cpup(rdma_argp + 3));
return -EINVAL;
out_inval:
dprintk("svcrdma: failed to parse transport header\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 17,153 |
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