instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaPlayerService::~MediaPlayerService()
{
ALOGV("MediaPlayerService destroyed");
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_raisesExceptionLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::RaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cma_set_compare_data(enum rdma_port_space ps, struct sockaddr *addr,
struct ib_cm_compare_data *compare)
{
struct cma_hdr *cma_data, *cma_mask;
__be32 ip4_addr;
struct in6_addr ip6_addr;
memset(compare, 0, sizeof *compare);
cma_data = (void *) compare->data;
cma_mask = (void *) compare->mask;
switch (addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
ip4_addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addr)->sin_addr.s_addr;
cma_set_ip_ver(cma_data, 4);
cma_set_ip_ver(cma_mask, 0xF);
if (!cma_any_addr(addr)) {
cma_data->dst_addr.ip4.addr = ip4_addr;
cma_mask->dst_addr.ip4.addr = htonl(~0);
}
break;
case AF_INET6:
ip6_addr = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addr)->sin6_addr;
cma_set_ip_ver(cma_data, 6);
cma_set_ip_ver(cma_mask, 0xF);
if (!cma_any_addr(addr)) {
cma_data->dst_addr.ip6 = ip6_addr;
memset(&cma_mask->dst_addr.ip6, 0xFF,
sizeof cma_mask->dst_addr.ip6);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int md_setup_cluster(struct mddev *mddev, int nodes)
{
int err;
err = request_module("md-cluster");
if (err) {
pr_err("md-cluster module not found.\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
spin_lock(&pers_lock);
if (!md_cluster_ops || !try_module_get(md_cluster_mod)) {
spin_unlock(&pers_lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
spin_unlock(&pers_lock);
return md_cluster_ops->join(mddev, nodes);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct compat_arpt_replace tmp;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.size >= INT_MAX / num_possible_cpus())
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries;
if (copy_from_user(loc_cpu_entry, user + sizeof(tmp), tmp.size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_newinfo;
}
ret = translate_compat_table(tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
tmp.underflow);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_newinfo;
duprintf("compat_do_replace: Translated table\n");
ret = __do_replace(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, newinfo,
tmp.num_counters, compat_ptr(tmp.counters));
if (ret)
goto free_newinfo_untrans;
return 0;
free_newinfo_untrans:
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo->size)
cleanup_entry(iter);
free_newinfo:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FoFiType1C::getFontMatrix(double *mat) {
int i;
if (topDict.firstOp == 0x0c1e && privateDicts[0].hasFontMatrix) {
if (topDict.hasFontMatrix) {
mat[0] = topDict.fontMatrix[0] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[0] +
topDict.fontMatrix[1] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[2];
mat[1] = topDict.fontMatrix[0] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[1] +
topDict.fontMatrix[1] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[3];
mat[2] = topDict.fontMatrix[2] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[0] +
topDict.fontMatrix[3] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[2];
mat[3] = topDict.fontMatrix[2] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[1] +
topDict.fontMatrix[3] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[3];
mat[4] = topDict.fontMatrix[4] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[0] +
topDict.fontMatrix[5] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[2];
mat[5] = topDict.fontMatrix[4] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[1] +
topDict.fontMatrix[5] * privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[3];
} else {
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
mat[i] = privateDicts[0].fontMatrix[i];
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
mat[i] = topDict.fontMatrix[i];
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tcp_twsk_unique(struct sock *sk, struct sock *sktw, void *twp)
{
const struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk(sktw);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
/* With PAWS, it is safe from the viewpoint
of data integrity. Even without PAWS it is safe provided sequence
spaces do not overlap i.e. at data rates <= 80Mbit/sec.
Actually, the idea is close to VJ's one, only timestamp cache is
held not per host, but per port pair and TW bucket is used as state
holder.
If TW bucket has been already destroyed we fall back to VJ's scheme
and use initial timestamp retrieved from peer table.
*/
if (tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp &&
(!twp || (sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse &&
get_seconds() - tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp > 1))) {
tp->write_seq = tcptw->tw_snd_nxt + 65535 + 2;
if (tp->write_seq == 0)
tp->write_seq = 1;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
sock_hold(sktw);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 1,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateQuotaPermissionContext() {
return new ChromeQuotaPermissionContext();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: luks_unlock_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
UnlockEncryptionData *data = user_data;
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
luks_unlock_start_waiting_for_cleartext_device (unlock_encryption_data_ref (data));
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error unlocking device: cryptsetup exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
if (data->hook_func != NULL)
{
data->hook_func (data->context, NULL, data->hook_user_data);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int insert_cert(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
int writable,
const char *label
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
struct sc_pkcs15_cert_info cert_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object cert_obj;
unsigned char cert[20];
int r;
memset(&cert_info, 0, sizeof(cert_info));
cert_info.id.len = 1;
cert_info.id.value[0] = id;
cert_info.authority = 0;
sc_format_path(path, &cert_info.path);
memset(&cert_obj, 0, sizeof(cert_obj));
strlcpy(cert_obj.label, label, sizeof(cert_obj.label));
cert_obj.flags = writable ? SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_MODIFIABLE : 0;
if(sc_select_file(card, &cert_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n", path);
return 1;
}
if(sc_read_binary(card, 0, cert, sizeof(cert), 0)<0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"ReadBinary(%s) failed\n", path);
return 2;
}
if(cert[0]!=0x30 || cert[1]!=0x82){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Invalid Cert: %02X:%02X:...\n", cert[0], cert[1]);
return 3;
}
/* some certificates are prefixed by an OID */
if(cert[4]==0x06 && cert[5]<10 && cert[6+cert[5]]==0x30 && cert[7+cert[5]]==0x82){
cert_info.path.index=6+cert[5];
cert_info.path.count=(cert[8+cert[5]]<<8) + cert[9+cert[5]] + 4;
} else {
cert_info.path.index=0;
cert_info.path.count=(cert[2]<<8) + cert[3] + 4;
}
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_x509_cert(p15card, &cert_obj, &cert_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_x509_cert(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK, Index=%d, Count=%d\n", path, cert_info.path.index, cert_info.path.count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int read_partition_size(VP8D_COMP *pbi,
const unsigned char *cx_size)
{
unsigned char temp[3];
if (pbi->decrypt_cb)
{
pbi->decrypt_cb(pbi->decrypt_state, cx_size, temp, 3);
cx_size = temp;
}
return cx_size[0] + (cx_size[1] << 8) + (cx_size[2] << 16);
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageRotateBilinear(gdImagePtr src, const float degrees, const int bgColor)
{
float _angle = (float)((- degrees / 180.0f) * M_PI);
const unsigned int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const unsigned int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
unsigned int new_width = abs((int)(src_w*cos(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*sin(_angle) + 0.5f));
unsigned int new_height = abs((int)(src_w*sin(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*cos(_angle) + 0.5f));
const gdFixed f_0_5 = gd_ftofx(0.5f);
const gdFixed f_H = gd_itofx(src_h/2);
const gdFixed f_W = gd_itofx(src_w/2);
const gdFixed f_cos = gd_ftofx(cos(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_sin = gd_ftofx(sin(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_1 = gd_itofx(1);
unsigned int i;
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
gdImagePtr dst;
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i = 0; i < new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j=0; j < new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx((int)i - (int)new_height / 2);
const gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx((int)j - (int)new_width / 2);
const gdFixed f_m = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_sin) + gd_mulfx(f_i,f_cos) + f_0_5 + f_H;
const gdFixed f_n = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_cos) - gd_mulfx(f_i,f_sin) + f_0_5 + f_W;
const unsigned int m = gd_fxtoi(f_m);
const unsigned int n = gd_fxtoi(f_n);
if ((m > 0) && (m < src_h - 1) && (n > 0) && (n < src_w - 1)) {
const gdFixed f_f = f_m - gd_itofx(m);
const gdFixed f_g = f_n - gd_itofx(n);
const gdFixed f_w1 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w2 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_g);
const gdFixed f_w3 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w4 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_g);
if (n < src_w - 1) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m;
}
if (m < src_h - 1) {
src_offset_x = n;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
if (!((n >= src_w - 1) || (m >= src_h - 1))) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
{
const int pixel1 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x];
register int pixel2, pixel3, pixel4;
if (src_offset_y + 1 >= src_h) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else if (src_offset_x + 1 >= src_w) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else {
pixel2 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x + 1];
pixel3 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x];
pixel4 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x + 1];
}
{
const gdFixed f_r1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_r2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_r3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_r4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_g1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_g2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_g3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_g4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_b1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_b2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_b3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_b4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_a1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_a2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_a3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_a4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_red = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_r1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_r2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_r3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_r4);
const gdFixed f_green = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_g1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_g2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_g3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_g4);
const gdFixed f_blue = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_b1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_b2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_b3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_b4);
const gdFixed f_alpha = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_a1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_a2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_a3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_a4);
const unsigned char red = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_red), 0, 255);
const unsigned char green = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_green), 0, 255);
const unsigned char blue = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_blue), 0, 255);
const unsigned char alpha = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_alpha), 0, 127);
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = gdTrueColorAlpha(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
}
} else {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = bgColor;
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 17,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
u8 *dt = NULL;
if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
if (slen >= (2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
dt = key + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;
reset_prng_context(prng, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, seed, dt);
if (prng->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionsAPIClient* ExtensionsAPIClient::Get() { return g_instance; }
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void signal_handler(int signum)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char msg[64];
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "caught signal: ");
switch (signum)
{
case SIGABRT:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "abort");
break;
case SIGFPE:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "floating point exception");
break;
case SIGILL:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "illegal instruction");
break;
case SIGINT:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "interrupt");
break;
case SIGSEGV:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "invalid memory access");
break;
case SIGTERM:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "termination request");
break;
default:
pos = safecat(msg, sizeof msg, pos, "unknown ");
pos = safecatn(msg, sizeof msg, pos, signum);
break;
}
store_log(&pm.this, NULL/*png_structp*/, msg, 1/*error*/);
/* And finally throw an exception so we can keep going, unless this is
* SIGTERM in which case stop now.
*/
if (signum != SIGTERM)
{
struct exception_context *the_exception_context =
&pm.this.exception_context;
Throw &pm.this;
}
else
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void user_space_stream_notifier(php_stream_context *context, int notifycode, int severity,
char *xmsg, int xcode, size_t bytes_sofar, size_t bytes_max, void * ptr TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *callback = (zval*)context->notifier->ptr;
zval *retval = NULL;
zval zvs[6];
zval *ps[6];
zval **ptps[6];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
INIT_ZVAL(zvs[i]);
ps[i] = &zvs[i];
ptps[i] = &ps[i];
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ps[i]);
}
ZVAL_LONG(ps[0], notifycode);
ZVAL_LONG(ps[1], severity);
if (xmsg) {
ZVAL_STRING(ps[2], xmsg, 1);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(ps[2]);
}
ZVAL_LONG(ps[3], xcode);
ZVAL_LONG(ps[4], bytes_sofar);
ZVAL_LONG(ps[5], bytes_max);
if (FAILURE == call_user_function_ex(EG(function_table), NULL, callback, &retval, 6, ptps, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "failed to call user notifier");
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ps[i]);
}
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 16,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CancelHandwriting(int n_strokes) {
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_cancel_hand_writing(context, n_strokes);
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 5,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_header (Buffer *buffer, guint32 serial_offset, guint32 reply_serial_offset, guint32 hello_serial)
{
guint32 array_len, header_len;
guint32 offset, end_offset;
guint8 header_type;
guint32 reply_serial_pos = 0;
const char *signature;
g_autoptr(Header) header = g_new0 (Header, 1);
header->buffer = buffer_ref (buffer);
if (buffer->size < 16)
return NULL;
if (buffer->data[3] != 1) /* Protocol version */
return NULL;
if (buffer->data[0] == 'B')
header->big_endian = TRUE;
else if (buffer->data[0] == 'l')
header->big_endian = FALSE;
else
return NULL;
header->type = buffer->data[1];
header->flags = buffer->data[2];
header->length = read_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[4]);
header->serial = read_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[8]);
if (header->serial == 0)
return NULL;
array_len = read_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[12]);
header_len = align_by_8 (12 + 4 + array_len);
g_assert (buffer->size >= header_len); /* We should have verified this when reading in the message */
if (header_len > buffer->size)
return NULL;
offset = 12 + 4;
end_offset = offset + array_len;
while (offset < end_offset)
{
offset = align_by_8 (offset); /* Structs must be 8 byte aligned */
if (offset >= end_offset)
return NULL;
header_type = buffer->data[offset++];
if (offset >= end_offset)
return NULL;
signature = get_signature (buffer, &offset, end_offset);
if (signature == NULL)
return NULL;
switch (header_type)
{
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_INVALID:
return NULL;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_PATH:
if (strcmp (signature, "o") != 0)
return NULL;
header->path = get_string (buffer, header, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->path == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_INTERFACE:
if (strcmp (signature, "s") != 0)
return NULL;
header->interface = get_string (buffer, header, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->interface == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_MEMBER:
if (strcmp (signature, "s") != 0)
return NULL;
header->member = get_string (buffer, header, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->member == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_ERROR_NAME:
if (strcmp (signature, "s") != 0)
return NULL;
header->error_name = get_string (buffer, header, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->error_name == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_REPLY_SERIAL:
if (offset + 4 > end_offset)
return NULL;
header->has_reply_serial = TRUE;
reply_serial_pos = offset;
header->reply_serial = read_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[offset]);
offset += 4;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_DESTINATION:
if (strcmp (signature, "s") != 0)
return NULL;
header->destination = get_string (buffer, header, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->destination == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_SENDER:
if (strcmp (signature, "s") != 0)
return NULL;
header->sender = get_string (buffer, header, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->sender == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_SIGNATURE:
if (strcmp (signature, "g") != 0)
return NULL;
header->signature = get_signature (buffer, &offset, end_offset);
if (header->signature == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FIELD_NUM_UNIX_FDS:
if (offset + 4 > end_offset)
return NULL;
header->unix_fds = read_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[offset]);
offset += 4;
break;
default:
/* Unknown header field, for safety, fail parse */
return NULL;
}
}
switch (header->type)
{
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_METHOD_CALL:
if (header->path == NULL || header->member == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_METHOD_RETURN:
if (!header->has_reply_serial)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_ERROR:
if (header->error_name == NULL || !header->has_reply_serial)
return NULL;
break;
case G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL:
if (header->path == NULL ||
header->interface == NULL ||
header->member == NULL)
return NULL;
if (strcmp (header->path, "/org/freedesktop/DBus/Local") == 0 ||
strcmp (header->interface, "org.freedesktop.DBus.Local") == 0)
return NULL;
break;
default:
/* Unknown message type, for safety, fail parse */
return NULL;
}
if (serial_offset > 0)
{
header->serial += serial_offset;
write_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[8], header->serial);
}
if (reply_serial_offset > 0 &&
header->has_reply_serial &&
header->reply_serial > hello_serial + reply_serial_offset)
write_uint32 (header, &buffer->data[reply_serial_pos], header->reply_serial - reply_serial_offset);
return g_steal_pointer (&header);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 25,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8ValueConverter* V8ValueConverter::create() {
return new V8ValueConverterImpl();
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wdm_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = wdm_find_device(intf);
int rv;
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev, "wdm%d_resume\n", intf->minor);
clear_bit(WDM_SUSPENDING, &desc->flags);
rv = recover_from_urb_loss(desc);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: list_update_cgroup_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_event_context *ctx, bool add)
{
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
if (!is_cgroup_event(event))
return;
if (add && ctx->nr_cgroups++)
return;
else if (!add && --ctx->nr_cgroups)
return;
/*
* Because cgroup events are always per-cpu events,
* this will always be called from the right CPU.
*/
cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
/*
* cpuctx->cgrp is NULL until a cgroup event is sched in or
* ctx->nr_cgroup == 0 .
*/
if (add && perf_cgroup_from_task(current, ctx) == event->cgrp)
cpuctx->cgrp = event->cgrp;
else if (!add)
cpuctx->cgrp = NULL;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 25,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxyConfig::AreProxiesBypassed(
const net::ProxyRetryInfoMap& retry_map,
const net::ProxyConfig::ProxyRules& proxy_rules,
bool is_https,
base::TimeDelta* min_retry_delay) const {
if (proxy_rules.type != net::ProxyConfig::ProxyRules::Type::PROXY_LIST_PER_SCHEME)
return false;
if (is_https)
return false;
const net::ProxyList* proxies =
proxy_rules.MapUrlSchemeToProxyList(url::kHttpScheme);
if (!proxies)
return false;
base::TimeDelta min_delay = base::TimeDelta::Max();
bool bypassed = false;
for (const net::ProxyServer& proxy : proxies->GetAll()) {
if (!proxy.is_valid() || proxy.is_direct())
continue;
base::TimeDelta delay;
if (FindConfiguredDataReductionProxy(proxy)) {
if (!IsProxyBypassed(retry_map, proxy, &delay))
return false;
if (delay < min_delay)
min_delay = delay;
bypassed = true;
}
}
if (min_retry_delay && bypassed)
*min_retry_delay = min_delay;
return bypassed;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ctor_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
if (s->ctor) {
int n = sprint_symbol(buf, (unsigned long)s->ctor);
return n + sprintf(buf + n, "\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sdp_disc_server_rsp(tCONN_CB* p_ccb, BT_HDR* p_msg) {
uint8_t *p, rsp_pdu;
bool invalid_pdu = true;
#if (SDP_DEBUG_RAW == TRUE)
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("sdp_disc_server_rsp disc_state:%d", p_ccb->disc_state);
#endif
/* stop inactivity timer when we receive a response */
alarm_cancel(p_ccb->sdp_conn_timer);
/* Got a reply!! Check what we got back */
p = (uint8_t*)(p_msg + 1) + p_msg->offset;
uint8_t* p_end = p + p_msg->len;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT8(rsp_pdu, p);
p_msg->len--;
switch (rsp_pdu) {
case SDP_PDU_SERVICE_SEARCH_RSP:
if (p_ccb->disc_state == SDP_DISC_WAIT_HANDLES) {
process_service_search_rsp(p_ccb, p, p_end);
invalid_pdu = false;
}
break;
case SDP_PDU_SERVICE_ATTR_RSP:
if (p_ccb->disc_state == SDP_DISC_WAIT_ATTR) {
process_service_attr_rsp(p_ccb, p, p_end);
invalid_pdu = false;
}
break;
case SDP_PDU_SERVICE_SEARCH_ATTR_RSP:
if (p_ccb->disc_state == SDP_DISC_WAIT_SEARCH_ATTR) {
process_service_search_attr_rsp(p_ccb, p, p_end);
invalid_pdu = false;
}
break;
}
if (invalid_pdu) {
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("SDP - Unexp. PDU: %d in state: %d", rsp_pdu,
p_ccb->disc_state);
sdp_disconnect(p_ccb, SDP_GENERIC_ERROR);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix copy length calculation in sdp_copy_raw_data
Test: compilation
Bug: 110216176
Change-Id: Ic4a19c9f0fe8cd592bc6c25dcec7b1da49ff7459
(cherry picked from commit 23aa15743397b345f3d948289fe90efa2a2e2b3e)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 20,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, recoverFromCorruption)
{
spl_heap_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "") == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
intern->heap->flags = intern->heap->flags & ~SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED;
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vrend_decode_clear(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, int length)
{
union pipe_color_union color;
double depth;
unsigned stencil, buffers;
int i;
if (length != VIRGL_OBJ_CLEAR_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
buffers = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_CLEAR_BUFFERS);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
color.ui[i] = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_CLEAR_COLOR_0 + i);
depth = *(double *)(uint64_t *)get_buf_ptr(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_CLEAR_DEPTH_0);
stencil = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_CLEAR_STENCIL);
vrend_clear(ctx->grctx, buffers, &color, depth, stencil);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 16,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_pg_vec(struct pgv *pg_vec, unsigned int order,
unsigned int len)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (likely(pg_vec[i].buffer)) {
if (is_vmalloc_addr(pg_vec[i].buffer))
vfree(pg_vec[i].buffer);
else
free_pages((unsigned long)pg_vec[i].buffer,
order);
pg_vec[i].buffer = NULL;
}
}
kfree(pg_vec);
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
if (inode_permission(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ) < 0)
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShelfLayoutManager::OnChildWindowVisibilityChanged(aura::Window* child,
bool visible) {
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev)
{
return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) ||
!reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev));
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::VisitPersistentRoots(Visitor* visitor) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->InAtomicMarkingPause());
TRACE_EVENT0("blink_gc", "ThreadHeap::visitPersistentRoots");
thread_state_->VisitPersistents(visitor);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoInvalidateSubFramebuffer(
GLenum target,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLenum* attachments,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
if (count < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "count cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLenum> attachments_copy(attachments, attachments + count);
if (IsEmulatedFramebufferBound(target)) {
if (!ModifyAttachmentsForEmulatedFramebuffer(&attachments_copy)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Invalid attachment.");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
api()->glInvalidateSubFramebufferFn(target, count, attachments_copy.data(), x,
y, width, height);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline blink::WebGestureEvent CreateScrollEndForWrapping(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& gesture_event) {
DCHECK(gesture_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollUpdate);
blink::WebGestureEvent wrap_gesture_scroll_end(
blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollEnd, gesture_event.GetModifiers(),
gesture_event.TimeStampSeconds());
wrap_gesture_scroll_end.source_device = gesture_event.source_device;
wrap_gesture_scroll_end.resending_plugin_id =
gesture_event.resending_plugin_id;
wrap_gesture_scroll_end.data.scroll_end.delta_units =
gesture_event.data.scroll_update.delta_units;
return wrap_gesture_scroll_end;
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: msg_fifo_flush (struct msg_fifo *fifo)
{
struct msg *op;
struct msg *next;
for (op = fifo->head; op; op = next)
{
next = op->next;
msg_free (op);
}
fifo->head = fifo->tail = NULL;
fifo->count = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlXPtrGetArity(xmlNodePtr cur) {
int i;
if (cur == NULL)
return(-1);
cur = cur->children;
for (i = 0;cur != NULL;cur = cur->next) {
if ((cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
i++;
}
}
return(i);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int http_request_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct session *sess = s->sess;
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn->req;
int ret;
DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%d analysers=%02x\n",
now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
s,
req,
req->rex, req->wex,
req->flags,
req->buf->i,
req->analysers);
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
return 0;
if ((req->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
((req->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (req->to_forward || req->buf->o))) {
/* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
* wake the other side up.
*/
msg->err_state = msg->msg_state;
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
http_resync_states(s);
return 1;
}
/* Note that we don't have to send 100-continue back because we don't
* need the data to complete our job, and it's up to the server to
* decide whether to return 100, 417 or anything else in return of
* an "Expect: 100-continue" header.
*/
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_BODY) {
msg->msg_state = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
? HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE
: HTTP_MSG_DATA);
/* TODO/filters: when http-buffer-request option is set or if a
* rule on url_param exists, the first chunk size could be
* already parsed. In that case, msg->next is after the chunk
* size (including the CRLF after the size). So this case should
* be handled to */
}
/* Some post-connect processing might want us to refrain from starting to
* forward data. Currently, the only reason for this is "balance url_param"
* whichs need to parse/process the request after we've enabled forwarding.
*/
if (unlikely(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN)) {
if (!(s->res.flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)) {
channel_auto_connect(req);
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_CONNECT;
channel_dont_close(req); /* don't fail on early shutr */
goto waiting;
}
msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN;
}
/* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
channel_auto_close(req);
if (req->to_forward) {
/* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
goto missing_data_or_waiting;
}
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
ret = ((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
? http_msg_forward_chunked_body(s, msg)
: http_msg_forward_body(s, msg));
if (!ret)
goto missing_data_or_waiting;
if (ret < 0)
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
/* we don't want to forward closes on DONE except in tunnel mode. */
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN)
channel_dont_close(req);
http_resync_states(s);
if (!(req->analysers & an_bit)) {
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
/* request errors are most likely due to the
* server aborting the transfer. */
goto aborted_xfer;
}
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(sess->fe, &sess->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, msg->err_state, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
return 1;
}
/* If "option abortonclose" is set on the backend, we want to monitor
* the client's connection and forward any shutdown notification to the
* server, which will decide whether to close or to go on processing the
* request. We only do that in tunnel mode, and not in other modes since
* it can be abused to exhaust source ports. */
if ((s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE) && !(s->si[0].flags & SI_FL_CLEAN_ABRT)) {
channel_auto_read(req);
if ((req->flags & (CF_SHUTR|CF_READ_NULL)) &&
((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN))
s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
channel_auto_close(req);
}
else if (s->txn->meth == HTTP_METH_POST) {
/* POST requests may require to read extra CRLF sent by broken
* browsers and which could cause an RST to be sent upon close
* on some systems (eg: Linux). */
channel_auto_read(req);
}
return 0;
missing_data_or_waiting:
/* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end */
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ENDING && req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_CLICL;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
}
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts, 1);
if (objt_server(s->target))
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts, 1);
goto return_bad_req_stats_ok;
}
waiting:
/* waiting for the last bits to leave the buffer */
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW)
goto aborted_xfer;
/* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse remaining
* chunks even if the client has closed, so we don't want to set CF_DONTCLOSE.
* And when content-length is used, we never want to let the possible
* shutdown be forwarded to the other side, as the state machine will
* take care of it once the client responds. It's also important to
* prevent TIME_WAITs from accumulating on the backend side, and for
* HTTP/2 where the last frame comes with a shutdown.
*/
if (msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK|HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN))
channel_dont_close(req);
/* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
* what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
* system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
* modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
* this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
* flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
* additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
req->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
return 0;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.failed_req, 1);
if (sess->listener->counters)
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->listener->counters->failed_req, 1);
return_bad_req_stats_ok:
txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
if (txn->status) {
/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
} else {
txn->status = 400;
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
}
req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
}
return 0;
aborted_xfer:
txn->req.err_state = txn->req.msg_state;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
if (txn->status) {
/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, NULL);
} else {
txn->status = 502;
http_reply_and_close(s, txn->status, http_error_message(s));
}
req->analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&sess->fe->fe_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts, 1);
if (objt_server(s->target))
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts, 1);
if (!(s->flags & SF_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SF_ERR_SRVCL;
if (!(s->flags & SF_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SF_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SF_FINST_D;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 7,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RegisterURLReplacingHandler(net::EmbeddedTestServer* test_server,
const std::string& match_path,
const base::FilePath& template_file) {
test_server->RegisterRequestHandler(base::Bind(
[](net::EmbeddedTestServer* test_server, const std::string& match_path,
const base::FilePath& template_file,
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request)
-> std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> {
GURL url = test_server->GetURL(request.relative_url);
if (url.path() != match_path)
return nullptr;
std::string contents;
CHECK(base::ReadFileToString(template_file, &contents));
GURL url_base = url.GetWithoutFilename();
base::ReplaceSubstringsAfterOffset(&contents, 0, "${URL_PLACEHOLDER}",
url_base.spec());
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(contents);
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
return response;
},
base::Unretained(test_server), match_path, template_file));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,308
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *cJSON_PrintUnformatted( cJSON *item )
{
return print_value( item, 0, 0 );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 1,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo::IdentityInfo()
: identity_status(PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_UNKNOWN),
safe_browsing_status(PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_NONE),
connection_status(PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNKNOWN),
show_ssl_decision_revoke_button(false),
show_change_password_buttons(false) {}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 1
| 9,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PlatformFontSkia::InitFromDetails(sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface,
const std::string& font_family,
int font_size_pixels,
int style,
Font::Weight weight,
const FontRenderParams& render_params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("fonts", "PlatformFontSkia::InitFromDetails");
DCHECK_GT(font_size_pixels, 0);
font_family_ = font_family;
bool success = true;
typeface_ = typeface ? std::move(typeface)
: CreateSkTypeface(style & Font::ITALIC, weight,
&font_family_, &success);
if (!success) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not find any font: " << font_family << ", "
<< kFallbackFontFamilyName << ". Falling back to the default";
InitFromPlatformFont(g_default_font.Get().get());
return;
}
font_size_pixels_ = font_size_pixels;
style_ = style;
weight_ = weight;
device_scale_factor_ = GetFontRenderParamsDeviceScaleFactor();
font_render_params_ = render_params;
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862
| 0
| 10,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netif_receive_skb_internal(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
net_timestamp_check(netdev_tstamp_prequeue, skb);
if (skb_defer_rx_timestamp(skb))
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
rcu_read_lock();
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
if (static_key_false(&rps_needed)) {
struct rps_dev_flow voidflow, *rflow = &voidflow;
int cpu = get_rps_cpu(skb->dev, skb, &rflow);
if (cpu >= 0) {
ret = enqueue_to_backlog(skb, cpu, &rflow->last_qtail);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
}
#endif
ret = __netif_receive_skb(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 16,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::DisableOverlay() {
overlay_enabled_ = false;
if (overlay_mode_ == OverlayMode::kUseContentVideoView) {
surface_created_cb_.Cancel();
} else if (overlay_mode_ == OverlayMode::kUseAndroidOverlay) {
token_available_cb_.Cancel();
overlay_routing_token_is_pending_ = false;
overlay_routing_token_ = OverlayInfo::RoutingToken();
}
if (decoder_requires_restart_for_overlay_)
ScheduleRestart();
else
MaybeSendOverlayInfoToDecoder();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 27,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AtomicString PerformanceNavigationTiming::type() const {
DocumentLoader* loader = GetDocumentLoader();
if (GetFrame() && loader)
return GetNavigationType(loader->GetNavigationType(),
GetFrame()->GetDocument());
return "navigate";
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Eina_Bool ewk_frame_feed_mouse_down(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const Evas_Event_Mouse_Down* downEvent)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(downEvent, false);
WebCore::FrameView* view = smartData->frame->view();
DBG("ewkFrame=%p, view=%p, button=%d, pos=%d,%d",
ewkFrame, view, downEvent->button, downEvent->canvas.x, downEvent->canvas.y);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(view, false);
Evas_Coord x, y;
evas_object_geometry_get(smartData->view, &x, &y, 0, 0);
WebCore::PlatformMouseEvent event(downEvent, WebCore::IntPoint(x, y));
return smartData->frame->eventHandler()->handleMousePressEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dtdCreate(const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *ms) {
DTD *p = (DTD *)ms->malloc_fcn(sizeof(DTD));
if (p == NULL)
return p;
poolInit(&(p->pool), ms);
poolInit(&(p->entityValuePool), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->generalEntities), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->elementTypes), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->attributeIds), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->prefixes), ms);
#ifdef XML_DTD
p->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
hashTableInit(&(p->paramEntities), ms);
#endif /* XML_DTD */
p->defaultPrefix.name = NULL;
p->defaultPrefix.binding = NULL;
p->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
p->scaffIndex = NULL;
p->scaffold = NULL;
p->scaffLevel = 0;
p->scaffSize = 0;
p->scaffCount = 0;
p->contentStringLen = 0;
p->keepProcessing = XML_TRUE;
p->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_FALSE;
p->standalone = XML_FALSE;
return p;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 9,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateFormatTime (const exsltDateValDatePtr dt)
{
xmlChar buf[100], *cur = buf;
if ((dt == NULL) || !VALID_TIME(dt))
return NULL;
FORMAT_TIME(dt, cur);
if (dt->tz_flag || (dt->tzo != 0)) {
FORMAT_TZ(dt->tzo, cur);
}
*cur = 0;
return xmlStrdup(buf);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void runTest()
{
webkit_support::PostDelayedTask(CCLayerTreeHostTest::onBeginTest, static_cast<void*>(this), 0);
webkit_support::PostDelayedTask(CCLayerTreeHostTest::testTimeout, static_cast<void*>(this), 5000);
webkit_support::RunMessageLoop();
m_running = false;
bool timedOut = m_timedOut; // Save whether we're timed out in case RunAllPendingMessages has the timeout.
webkit_support::RunAllPendingMessages();
ASSERT(!m_layerTreeHost.get());
m_client.clear();
if (timedOut) {
FAIL() << "Test timed out";
return;
}
afterTest();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 23,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimulateNavigation() {
content::RenderFrameHost* rfh = web_contents()->GetMainFrame();
std::unique_ptr<content::NavigationHandle> navigation_handle =
content::NavigationHandle::CreateNavigationHandleForTesting(
GURL(), rfh, true);
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,362
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_reg_umr_seg(struct mlx5_wqe_umr_ctrl_seg *umr,
struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr, bool umr_inline)
{
int size = mr->ndescs * mr->desc_size;
memset(umr, 0, sizeof(*umr));
umr->flags = MLX5_UMR_CHECK_NOT_FREE;
if (umr_inline)
umr->flags |= MLX5_UMR_INLINE;
umr->xlt_octowords = cpu_to_be16(get_xlt_octo(size));
umr->mkey_mask = frwr_mkey_mask();
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_block(struct inode *inode, void *addr, unsigned int block,
struct ubifs_data_node *dn)
{
struct ubifs_info *c = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
int err, len, out_len;
union ubifs_key key;
unsigned int dlen;
data_key_init(c, &key, inode->i_ino, block);
err = ubifs_tnc_lookup(c, &key, dn);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOENT)
/* Not found, so it must be a hole */
memset(addr, 0, UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE);
return err;
}
ubifs_assert(le64_to_cpu(dn->ch.sqnum) >
ubifs_inode(inode)->creat_sqnum);
len = le32_to_cpu(dn->size);
if (len <= 0 || len > UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE)
goto dump;
dlen = le32_to_cpu(dn->ch.len) - UBIFS_DATA_NODE_SZ;
out_len = UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE;
err = ubifs_decompress(&dn->data, dlen, addr, &out_len,
le16_to_cpu(dn->compr_type));
if (err || len != out_len)
goto dump;
/*
* Data length can be less than a full block, even for blocks that are
* not the last in the file (e.g., as a result of making a hole and
* appending data). Ensure that the remainder is zeroed out.
*/
if (len < UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE)
memset(addr + len, 0, UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE - len);
return 0;
dump:
ubifs_err("bad data node (block %u, inode %lu)",
block, inode->i_ino);
ubifs_dump_node(c, dn);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit pf_exit(void)
{
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
unregister_blkdev(major, name);
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
if (pf->present)
del_gendisk(pf->disk);
blk_cleanup_queue(pf->disk->queue);
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&pf->tag_set);
put_disk(pf->disk);
if (pf->present)
pi_release(pf->pi);
}
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 4,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst,
const struct bpf_func_state *src)
{
if (!src->stack)
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dst->allocated_stack < src->allocated_stack)) {
/* internal bug, make state invalid to reject the program */
memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst));
return -EFAULT;
}
memcpy(dst->stack, src->stack,
sizeof(*src->stack) * (src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 20,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VaapiPicture* VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::PictureById(
int32_t picture_buffer_id) {
Pictures::iterator it = pictures_.find(picture_buffer_id);
if (it == pictures_.end()) {
VLOGF(4) << "Picture id " << picture_buffer_id << " does not exist";
return NULL;
}
return it->second.get();
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guard_learned_bridge_identity(const tor_addr_port_t *addrport,
const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest)
{
guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_by_name("bridges",
GS_TYPE_BRIDGE,
0);
if (!gs)
return;
entry_guard_t *g = get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(gs, addrport);
if (!g)
return;
int make_persistent = 0;
if (tor_digest_is_zero(g->identity)) {
memcpy(g->identity, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
make_persistent = 1;
} else if (tor_memeq(g->identity, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* Nothing to see here; we learned something we already knew. */
if (BUG(! g->is_persistent))
make_persistent = 1;
} else {
char old_id[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
base16_encode(old_id, sizeof(old_id), g->identity, sizeof(g->identity));
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We 'learned' an identity %s for a bridge at %s:%d, but "
"we already knew a different one (%s). Ignoring the new info as "
"possibly bogus.",
hex_str((const char *)rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addrport->addr), addrport->port,
old_id);
return; // redundant, but let's be clear: we're not making this persistent.
}
if (make_persistent) {
g->is_persistent = 1;
entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(gs);
}
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static loff_t block_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct inode *bd_inode = file->f_mapping->host;
loff_t retval;
mutex_lock(&bd_inode->i_mutex);
retval = fixed_size_llseek(file, offset, whence, i_size_read(bd_inode));
mutex_unlock(&bd_inode->i_mutex);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url) {
int enabled_bindings = render_frame_host->GetEnabledBindings();
bool is_allowed_in_web_ui_renderer =
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()
->navigator()
->GetController()
->GetBrowserContext(),
url);
if ((enabled_bindings & BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) &&
!is_allowed_in_web_ui_renderer) {
GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(url);
CHECK(0);
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 2,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebRTCTransportImpl::SendRTCPPacket(int channel, const void* data,
int len) {
return network_->ReceivedRTCPPacket(channel, data, len);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void crc32_init(void)
{
int i,j;
uint32 s;
for(i=0; i < 256; i++) {
for (s=(uint32) i << 24, j=0; j < 8; ++j)
s = (s << 1) ^ (s >= (1U<<31) ? CRC32_POLY : 0);
crc_table[i] = s;
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_seq_device_new(struct snd_card *card, int device, const char *id,
int argsize, struct snd_seq_device **result)
{
struct snd_seq_device *dev;
int err;
static struct snd_device_ops dops = {
.dev_free = snd_seq_device_dev_free,
.dev_register = snd_seq_device_dev_register,
.dev_disconnect = snd_seq_device_dev_disconnect,
};
if (result)
*result = NULL;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!id))
return -EINVAL;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev) + argsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
/* set up device info */
dev->card = card;
dev->device = device;
dev->id = id;
dev->argsize = argsize;
device_initialize(&dev->dev);
dev->dev.parent = &card->card_dev;
dev->dev.bus = &snd_seq_bus_type;
dev->dev.release = snd_seq_dev_release;
dev_set_name(&dev->dev, "%s-%d-%d", dev->id, card->number, device);
/* add this device to the list */
err = snd_device_new(card, SNDRV_DEV_SEQUENCER, dev, &dops);
if (err < 0) {
put_device(&dev->dev);
return err;
}
if (result)
*result = dev;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_set_mac(struct net_device *netdev, void *p)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct sockaddr *addr = p;
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(addr->sa_data))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (netif_running(netdev))
return -EBUSY;
memcpy(netdev->dev_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
memcpy(adapter->hw.mac_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
atl2_set_mac_addr(&adapter->hw);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OpenChannelToExtensionOnUIThread(
int source_process_id, int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->message_service()->
OpenChannelToExtension(
source_process_id, source_routing_id, receiver_port_id,
source_extension_id, target_extension_id, channel_name);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_recv_NotifyData(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
int error;
uint64_t id;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint64(message, &id)) < 0)
return error;
if (sizeof(void *) == 4 && ((uint32_t)(id >> 32)) != 0) {
npw_printf("ERROR: 64-bit viewers in 32-bit wrappers are not supported\n");
abort();
}
*((void **)p_value) = (void *)(uintptr_t)id;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void * CAPSTONE_API cs_winkernel_calloc(size_t n, size_t size)
{
size_t total = n * size;
void *new_ptr = cs_winkernel_malloc(total);
if (!new_ptr) {
return NULL;
}
return RtlFillMemory(new_ptr, total, 0);
}
Commit Message: provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions (#870)
* provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions
* fix some style issues.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 3,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evutil_socket_finished_connecting_(evutil_socket_t fd)
{
int e;
ev_socklen_t elen = sizeof(e);
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, (void*)&e, &elen) < 0)
return -1;
if (e) {
if (EVUTIL_ERR_CONNECT_RETRIABLE(e))
return 0;
EVUTIL_SET_SOCKET_ERROR(e);
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int luaD_rawrunprotected (lua_State *L, Pfunc f, void *ud) {
struct lua_longjmp lj;
lj.status = 0;
lj.previous = L->errorJmp; /* chain new error handler */
L->errorJmp = &lj;
LUAI_TRY(L, &lj,
(*f)(L, ud);
);
L->errorJmp = lj.previous; /* restore old error handler */
return lj.status;
}
Commit Message: disable loading lua bytecode
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 17,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserLauncherItemController::IsOpen() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WindowMaximizedObserver::Observe(
int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK_EQ(chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_WINDOW_MAXIMIZED, type);
if (automation_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_, reply_message_.release())
.SendSuccess(NULL);
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::open() {
DCHECK(!ImportLoader());
if (frame_) {
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->IsParsing()) {
if (parser->IsExecutingScript())
return;
if (!parser->WasCreatedByScript() && parser->HasInsertionPoint())
return;
}
}
if (frame_->Loader().HasProvisionalNavigation()) {
frame_->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
if (frame_->Client() &&
frame_->GetSettings()->GetBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
frame_->Client()->AbortClientNavigation();
}
}
}
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
ResetTreeScope();
if (frame_)
frame_->Selection().Clear();
ImplicitOpen(kForceSynchronousParsing);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser())
parser->SetWasCreatedByScript(true);
if (frame_)
frame_->Loader().DidExplicitOpen();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 8,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TranslateInfoBarDelegate::~TranslateInfoBarDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 20,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::flowAwarePaddingAfter() const
{
switch (transformedWritingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
return paddingBottom();
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
return paddingTop();
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
return paddingRight();
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
return paddingLeft();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return paddingTop();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params)
{
EC_GROUP *ret = NULL;
int tmp = 0;
if (params == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return NULL;
}
if (params->type == 0) { /* the curve is given by an OID */
tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve);
if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP,
EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
} else if (params->type == 1) { /* the parameters are given by a
* ECPARAMETERS structure */
ret = ec_asn1_parameters2group(params->value.parameters);
if (!ret) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return NULL;
}
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, 0x0);
} else if (params->type == 2) { /* implicitlyCA */
return NULL;
} else {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n;
int j;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
} else {
ERR_clear_error();
}
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
* digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
/*
* For extended master secret we've already digested cached
* records.
*/
if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
} else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signbuf[64];
int i;
size_t sigsize = 64;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
}
s2n(j, p);
n = j + 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 26,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static SQLITE_NOINLINE void *createAggContext(sqlite3_context *p, int nByte){
Mem *pMem = p->pMem;
assert( (pMem->flags & MEM_Agg)==0 );
if( nByte<=0 ){
sqlite3VdbeMemSetNull(pMem);
pMem->z = 0;
}else{
sqlite3VdbeMemClearAndResize(pMem, nByte);
pMem->flags = MEM_Agg;
pMem->u.pDef = p->pFunc;
if( pMem->z ){
memset(pMem->z, 0, nByte);
}
}
return (void*)pMem->z;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: alloc_ofp_port(struct ofproto *ofproto, const char *netdev_name)
{
uint16_t port_idx;
port_idx = simap_get(&ofproto->ofp_requests, netdev_name);
port_idx = port_idx ? port_idx : UINT16_MAX;
if (port_idx >= ofproto->max_ports
|| ofport_get_usage(ofproto, u16_to_ofp(port_idx)) == LLONG_MAX) {
uint16_t lru_ofport = 0, end_port_no = ofproto->alloc_port_no;
long long int last_used_at, lru = LLONG_MAX;
/* Search for a free OpenFlow port number. We try not to
* immediately reuse them to prevent problems due to old
* flows.
*
* We limit the automatically assigned port numbers to the lower half
* of the port range, to reserve the upper half for assignment by
* controllers. */
for (;;) {
if (++ofproto->alloc_port_no >= MIN(ofproto->max_ports, 32768)) {
ofproto->alloc_port_no = 1;
}
last_used_at = ofport_get_usage(ofproto,
u16_to_ofp(ofproto->alloc_port_no));
if (!last_used_at) {
port_idx = ofproto->alloc_port_no;
break;
} else if ( last_used_at < time_msec() - 60*60*1000) {
/* If the port with ofport 'ofproto->alloc_port_no' was deleted
* more than an hour ago, consider it usable. */
ofport_remove_usage(ofproto,
u16_to_ofp(ofproto->alloc_port_no));
port_idx = ofproto->alloc_port_no;
break;
} else if (last_used_at < lru) {
lru = last_used_at;
lru_ofport = ofproto->alloc_port_no;
}
if (ofproto->alloc_port_no == end_port_no) {
if (lru_ofport) {
port_idx = lru_ofport;
break;
}
return OFPP_NONE;
}
}
}
ofport_set_usage(ofproto, u16_to_ofp(port_idx), LLONG_MAX);
return u16_to_ofp(port_idx);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 4,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::containingBlockLogicalHeightForPositioned(const RenderBoxModelObject* containingBlock, bool checkForPerpendicularWritingMode) const
{
if (checkForPerpendicularWritingMode && containingBlock->isHorizontalWritingMode() != isHorizontalWritingMode())
return containingBlockLogicalWidthForPositioned(containingBlock, false);
if (style()->position() == FixedPosition && containingBlock->isRenderView()) {
const RenderView* view = toRenderView(containingBlock);
if (FrameView* frameView = view->frameView()) {
LayoutRect viewportRect = frameView->viewportConstrainedVisibleContentRect();
return containingBlock->isHorizontalWritingMode() ? viewportRect.height() : viewportRect.width();
}
}
if (containingBlock->isBox()) {
const RenderBlock* cb = containingBlock->isRenderBlock() ?
toRenderBlock(containingBlock) : containingBlock->containingBlock();
return cb->clientLogicalHeight();
}
ASSERT(containingBlock->isRenderInline() && containingBlock->isInFlowPositioned());
const RenderInline* flow = toRenderInline(containingBlock);
InlineFlowBox* first = flow->firstLineBox();
InlineFlowBox* last = flow->lastLineBox();
if (!first || !last)
return 0;
LayoutUnit heightResult;
LayoutRect boundingBox = flow->linesBoundingBox();
if (containingBlock->isHorizontalWritingMode())
heightResult = boundingBox.height();
else
heightResult = boundingBox.width();
heightResult -= (containingBlock->borderBefore() + containingBlock->borderAfter());
return heightResult;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::SetNeedsUpdateLayers() {
proxy_->SetNeedsUpdateLayers();
NotifySwapPromiseMonitorsOfSetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ReflectedNameAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->GetNameAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aead_null_givdecrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return crypto_aead_decrypt(&req->areq);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 13,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_check_throttle(struct iperf_stream *sp, struct timeval *nowP)
{
double seconds;
uint64_t bits_per_second;
if (sp->test->done)
return;
seconds = timeval_diff(&sp->result->start_time, nowP);
bits_per_second = sp->result->bytes_sent * 8 / seconds;
if (bits_per_second < sp->test->settings->rate) {
sp->green_light = 1;
FD_SET(sp->socket, &sp->test->write_set);
} else {
sp->green_light = 0;
FD_CLR(sp->socket, &sp->test->write_set);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddSystemStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"systemPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_SYSTEM},
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
{"backgroundAppsLabel", IDS_SETTINGS_SYSTEM_BACKGROUND_APPS_LABEL},
#endif
{"hardwareAccelerationLabel",
IDS_SETTINGS_SYSTEM_HARDWARE_ACCELERATION_LABEL},
{"proxySettingsLabel", IDS_SETTINGS_SYSTEM_PROXY_SETTINGS_LABEL},
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
SystemHandler::AddLoadTimeData(html_source);
}
Commit Message: [md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int errwrite_nomem(const char *str, int len)
{
return errwrite(mem_err_print, str, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_set_default_gray(fz_context *ctx, fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, fz_colorspace *cs)
{
if (cs->n == 1)
{
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, default_cs->gray);
default_cs->gray = fz_keep_colorspace(ctx, cs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfilingService::OnProfilingServiceRequest(
service_manager::ServiceContextRefFactory* ref_factory,
mojom::ProfilingServiceRequest request) {
binding_set_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 16,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long nested_read_cr4(struct vmcs12 *fields)
{
return (fields->guest_cr4 & ~fields->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
(fields->cr4_read_shadow & fields->cr4_guest_host_mask);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err strk_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_SubTrackBox *ptr = (GF_SubTrackBox *)s;
if (ptr->info) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *)ptr->info);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->info->size;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 19,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qeth_setup_channel(struct qeth_channel *channel)
{
int cnt;
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "setupch");
for (cnt = 0; cnt < QETH_CMD_BUFFER_NO; cnt++) {
channel->iob[cnt].data =
kzalloc(QETH_BUFSIZE, GFP_DMA|GFP_KERNEL);
if (channel->iob[cnt].data == NULL)
break;
channel->iob[cnt].state = BUF_STATE_FREE;
channel->iob[cnt].channel = channel;
channel->iob[cnt].callback = qeth_send_control_data_cb;
channel->iob[cnt].rc = 0;
}
if (cnt < QETH_CMD_BUFFER_NO) {
while (cnt-- > 0)
kfree(channel->iob[cnt].data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
channel->buf_no = 0;
channel->io_buf_no = 0;
atomic_set(&channel->irq_pending, 0);
spin_lock_init(&channel->iob_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&channel->wait_q);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long gfn_to_hva_many(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
gfn_t *nr_pages)
{
if (!slot || slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID)
return bad_hva();
if (nr_pages)
*nr_pages = slot->npages - (gfn - slot->base_gfn);
return gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_init_video_decoder(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl,
ih264d_init_ip_t *ps_init_ip,
ih264d_init_op_t *ps_init_op)
{
dec_struct_t * ps_dec;
iv_mem_rec_t *memtab;
UWORD8 *pu1_extra_mem_base,*pu1_mem_base;
memtab = ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.pv_mem_rec_location;
dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle = memtab[MEM_REC_CODEC].pv_base;
ps_dec = dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle;
memset(ps_dec, 0, sizeof(dec_struct_t));
if(ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_size
> offsetof(ih264d_init_ip_t, i4_level))
{
ps_dec->u4_level_at_init = ps_init_ip->i4_level;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u4_level_at_init = H264_LEVEL_3_1;
}
if(ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_size
> offsetof(ih264d_init_ip_t, u4_num_ref_frames))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init = ps_init_ip->u4_num_ref_frames;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init = H264_MAX_REF_PICS;
}
if(ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_size
> offsetof(ih264d_init_ip_t, u4_num_reorder_frames))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init =
ps_init_ip->u4_num_reorder_frames;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init = H264_MAX_REF_PICS;
}
if(ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_size
> offsetof(ih264d_init_ip_t, u4_num_extra_disp_buf))
{
ps_dec->u4_num_extra_disp_bufs_at_init =
ps_init_ip->u4_num_extra_disp_buf;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u4_num_extra_disp_bufs_at_init = 0;
}
if(ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_size
> offsetof(ih264d_init_ip_t, u4_share_disp_buf))
{
#ifndef LOGO_EN
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = ps_init_ip->u4_share_disp_buf;
#else
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
#endif
}
else
{
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
}
if((ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.e_output_format != IV_YUV_420P)
&& (ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.e_output_format
!= IV_YUV_420SP_UV)
&& (ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.e_output_format
!= IV_YUV_420SP_VU))
{
ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf = 0;
}
if((ps_dec->u4_level_at_init < MIN_LEVEL_SUPPORTED)
|| (ps_dec->u4_level_at_init > MAX_LEVEL_SUPPORTED))
{
ps_init_op->s_ivd_init_op_t.u4_error_code |= ERROR_LEVEL_UNSUPPORTED;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init > H264_MAX_REF_PICS)
{
ps_init_op->s_ivd_init_op_t.u4_error_code |= ERROR_NUM_REF;
ps_dec->u4_num_ref_frames_at_init = H264_MAX_REF_PICS;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init > H264_MAX_REF_PICS)
{
ps_init_op->s_ivd_init_op_t.u4_error_code |= ERROR_NUM_REF;
ps_dec->u4_num_reorder_frames_at_init = H264_MAX_REF_PICS;
}
if(ps_dec->u4_num_extra_disp_bufs_at_init > H264_MAX_REF_PICS)
{
ps_init_op->s_ivd_init_op_t.u4_error_code |= ERROR_NUM_REF;
ps_dec->u4_num_extra_disp_bufs_at_init = 0;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
ps_dec->u4_num_extra_disp_bufs_at_init = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_disp_bufs_requested = 1;
ps_dec->u4_width_at_init = ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_frm_max_wd;
ps_dec->u4_height_at_init = ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.u4_frm_max_ht;
ps_dec->u4_width_at_init = ALIGN16(ps_dec->u4_width_at_init);
ps_dec->u4_height_at_init = ALIGN32(ps_dec->u4_height_at_init);
ps_dec->pv_dec_thread_handle = memtab[MEM_REC_THREAD_HANDLE].pv_base;
pu1_mem_base = memtab[MEM_REC_THREAD_HANDLE].pv_base;
ps_dec->pv_bs_deblk_thread_handle = pu1_mem_base
+ ithread_get_handle_size();
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used = 0;
pu1_extra_mem_base = memtab[MEM_REC_EXTRA_MEM].pv_base;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status = (dec_err_status_t *)(pu1_extra_mem_base + ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used);
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used += (((sizeof(dec_err_status_t) + 127) >> 7) << 7);
ps_dec->ps_mem_tab = memtab[MEM_REC_BACKUP].pv_base;
memcpy(ps_dec->ps_mem_tab, memtab, sizeof(iv_mem_rec_t) * MEM_REC_CNT);
ps_dec->ps_pps = memtab[MEM_REC_PPS].pv_base;
ps_dec->ps_sps = memtab[MEM_REC_SPS].pv_base;
ps_dec->ps_sei = (sei *)(pu1_extra_mem_base + ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used);
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used += sizeof(sei);
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr = memtab[MEM_REC_DPB_MGR].pv_base;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds = (dpb_commands_t *)(pu1_extra_mem_base + ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used);
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used += sizeof(dpb_commands_t);
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm = (dec_bit_stream_t *)(pu1_extra_mem_base + ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used);
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used += sizeof(dec_bit_stream_t);
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice =(dec_slice_params_t *) (pu1_extra_mem_base + ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used);
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used += sizeof(dec_slice_params_t);
ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps = (void *)(pu1_extra_mem_base + ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used);
ps_dec->u4_extra_mem_used += MAX(sizeof(dec_seq_params_t),
sizeof(dec_pic_params_t));
ps_dec->ps_pred_pkd = memtab[MEM_REC_PRED_INFO_PKD].pv_base;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
ps_dec->pv_dec_out = (void *)ps_init_op;
ps_dec->pv_dec_in = (void *)ps_init_ip;
ps_dec->u1_chroma_format =
(UWORD8)(ps_init_ip->s_ivd_init_ip_t.e_output_format);
ih264d_init_decoder(ps_dec);
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 4,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify_either(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ABORT chunk has a valid length.
* Since this is an ABORT chunk, we have to discard it
* because of the following text:
* RFC 2960, Section 3.3.7
* If an endpoint receives an ABORT with a format error or for an
* association that doesn't exist, it MUST silently discard it.
* Because the length is "invalid", we can't really discard just
* as we do not know its true length. So, to be safe, discard the
* packet.
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_abort_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* ADD-IP: Special case for ABORT chunks
* F4) One special consideration is that ABORT Chunks arriving
* destined to the IP address being deleted MUST be
* ignored (see Section 5.3.1 for further details).
*/
if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL ==
sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest))
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
return __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_replay_iv_consistency (const struct key_type *kt, bool packet_id, bool use_iv)
{
if (cfb_ofb_mode (kt) && !(packet_id && use_iv))
msg (M_FATAL, "--no-replay or --no-iv cannot be used with a CFB or OFB mode cipher");
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 17,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleVertexAttribPointer(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::VertexAttribPointer& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::VertexAttribPointer*>(cmd_data);
GLuint indx = c.indx;
GLint size = c.size;
GLenum type = c.type;
GLboolean normalized = static_cast<GLboolean>(c.normalized);
GLsizei stride = c.stride;
GLsizei offset = c.offset;
if (!state_.bound_array_buffer.get() ||
state_.bound_array_buffer->IsDeleted()) {
if (offset != 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glVertexAttribPointer", "offset != 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
const void* ptr = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(offset);
if (!validators_->vertex_attrib_type.IsValid(type)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glVertexAttribPointer", type, "type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (size < 1 || size > 4) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttribPointer", "size GL_INVALID_VALUE");
return error::kNoError;
}
if ((type == GL_INT_2_10_10_10_REV || type == GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV)
&& size != 4) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glVertexAttribPointer", "size != 4");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (indx >= group_->max_vertex_attribs()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttribPointer", "index out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (stride < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttribPointer", "stride < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (stride > 255) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttribPointer", "stride > 255");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (offset < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttribPointer", "offset < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei type_size = GLES2Util::GetGLTypeSizeForBuffers(type);
DCHECK(GLES2Util::IsPOT(type_size));
if (offset & (type_size - 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glVertexAttribPointer", "offset not valid for type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (stride & (type_size - 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glVertexAttribPointer", "stride not valid for type");
return error::kNoError;
}
state_.vertex_attrib_manager->UpdateAttribBaseTypeAndMask(
indx, SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT);
GLsizei group_size = GLES2Util::GetGroupSizeForBufferType(size, type);
state_.vertex_attrib_manager
->SetAttribInfo(indx,
state_.bound_array_buffer.get(),
size,
type,
normalized,
stride,
stride != 0 ? stride : group_size,
offset,
GL_FALSE);
if (type != GL_FIXED || gl_version_info().SupportsFixedType()) {
api()->glVertexAttribPointerFn(indx, size, type, normalized, stride, ptr);
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node)
{
/* XXXX Oh hm. What if some day in the future there are link handshake
* versions that aren't 3 but which are ed25519 */
if (! node_get_ed25519_id(node))
return 0;
if (node->ri) {
const char *protos = node->ri->protocol_list;
if (protos == NULL)
return 0;
return protocol_list_supports_protocol(protos, PRT_LINKAUTH, 3);
}
if (node->rs) {
return node->rs->supports_ed25519_link_handshake;
}
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *jas_malloc(size_t size)
{
void *result;
JAS_DBGLOG(101, ("jas_malloc called with %zu\n", size));
result = malloc(size);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_malloc(%zu) -> %p\n", size, result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 14,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadCoreServiceImpl::SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> new_delegate) {
manager_delegate_.swap(new_delegate);
DownloadManager* dm = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_);
dm->SetDelegate(manager_delegate_.get());
manager_delegate_->SetDownloadManager(dm);
if (new_delegate)
new_delegate->Shutdown();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 4,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcpTest22 (void)
{
StreamTcpThread stt;
struct in_addr addr;
char os_policy_name[10] = "windows";
const char *ip_addr;
TcpStream stream;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
IPV4Hdr ipv4h;
int ret = 0;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset(&ipv4h, 0, sizeof(ipv4h));
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
SCHInfoCleanResources();
/* Load the config string in to parser */
ConfCreateContextBackup();
ConfInit();
ConfYamlLoadString(dummy_conf_string1, strlen(dummy_conf_string1));
/* Get the IP address as string and add it to Host info tree for lookups */
ip_addr = StreamTcpParseOSPolicy(os_policy_name);
SCHInfoAddHostOSInfo(os_policy_name, ip_addr, -1);
p->dst.family = AF_INET;
p->ip4h = &ipv4h;
addr.s_addr = inet_addr("123.231.2.1");
p->dst.address.address_un_data32[0] = addr.s_addr;
StreamTcpSetOSPolicy(&stream, p);
if (stream.os_policy != OS_POLICY_DEFAULT) {
printf("expected os_policy: %"PRIu8" but received %"PRIu8"\n",
(uint8_t)OS_POLICY_DEFAULT, stream.os_policy);
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
ConfDeInit();
ConfRestoreContextBackup();
SCFree(p);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::setNeedsLayout()
{
FrameView* view = m_mainFrame->view();
ASSERT(view);
view->setNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
}
kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::didReceiveServerRedirectForProvisionalLoad(
WebFrame* frame) {
if (frame->parent())
return;
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->provisionalDataSource();
if (!data_source) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
std::vector<GURL> redirects;
GetRedirectChain(data_source, &redirects);
if (redirects.size() >= 2) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidRedirectProvisionalLoad(routing_id_, page_id_,
redirects[redirects.size() - 2], redirects.back()));
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int map_from_unicode(unsigned code, enum entity_charset charset, unsigned *res)
{
unsigned char found;
const uni_to_enc *table;
size_t table_size;
switch (charset) {
case cs_8859_1:
/* identity mapping of code points to unicode */
if (code > 0xFF) {
return FAILURE;
}
*res = code;
break;
case cs_8859_5:
if (code <= 0xA0 || code == 0xAD /* soft hyphen */) {
*res = code;
} else if (code == 0x2116) {
*res = 0xF0; /* numero sign */
} else if (code == 0xA7) {
*res = 0xFD; /* section sign */
} else if (code >= 0x0401 && code <= 0x044F) {
if (code == 0x040D || code == 0x0450 || code == 0x045D)
return FAILURE;
*res = code - 0x360;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_8859_15:
if (code < 0xA4 || (code > 0xBE && code <= 0xFF)) {
*res = code;
} else { /* between A4 and 0xBE */
found = unimap_bsearch(unimap_iso885915,
code, sizeof(unimap_iso885915) / sizeof(*unimap_iso885915));
if (found)
*res = found;
else
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_cp1252:
if (code <= 0x7F || (code >= 0xA0 && code <= 0xFF)) {
*res = code;
} else {
found = unimap_bsearch(unimap_win1252,
code, sizeof(unimap_win1252) / sizeof(*unimap_win1252));
if (found)
*res = found;
else
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_macroman:
if (code == 0x7F)
return FAILURE;
table = unimap_macroman;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_macroman) / sizeof(*unimap_macroman);
goto table_over_7F;
case cs_cp1251:
table = unimap_win1251;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_win1251) / sizeof(*unimap_win1251);
goto table_over_7F;
case cs_koi8r:
table = unimap_koi8r;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_koi8r) / sizeof(*unimap_koi8r);
goto table_over_7F;
case cs_cp866:
table = unimap_cp866;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_cp866) / sizeof(*unimap_cp866);
table_over_7F:
if (code <= 0x7F) {
*res = code;
} else {
found = unimap_bsearch(table, code, table_size);
if (found)
*res = found;
else
return FAILURE;
}
break;
/* from here on, only map the possible characters in the ASCII range.
* to improve support here, it's a matter of building the unicode mappings.
* See <http://www.unicode.org/Public/6.0.0/ucd/Unihan.zip> */
case cs_sjis:
case cs_eucjp:
/* we interpret 0x5C as the Yen symbol. This is not universal.
* See <http://www.w3.org/Submission/japanese-xml/#ambiguity_of_yen> */
if (code >= 0x20 && code <= 0x7D) {
if (code == 0x5C)
return FAILURE;
*res = code;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_big5:
case cs_big5hkscs:
case cs_gb2312:
if (code >= 0x20 && code <= 0x7D) {
*res = code;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
break;
default:
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 24,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutPoint RenderBlockFlow::flipFloatForWritingModeForChild(const FloatingObject* child, const LayoutPoint& point) const
{
if (!style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
return point;
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
return LayoutPoint(point.x(), point.y() + height() - child->renderer()->height() - 2 * yPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(child));
return LayoutPoint(point.x() + width() - child->renderer()->width() - 2 * xPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(child), point.y());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,915
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.