instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __bsg_read(char __user *buf, size_t count, struct bsg_device *bd,
const struct iovec *iov, ssize_t *bytes_read)
{
struct bsg_command *bc;
int nr_commands, ret;
if (count % sizeof(struct sg_io_v4))
return -EINVAL;
ret = 0;
nr_commands = count / sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
while (nr_commands) {
bc = bsg_get_done_cmd(bd);
if (IS_ERR(bc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bc);
break;
}
/*
* this is the only case where we need to copy data back
* after completing the request. so do that here,
* bsg_complete_work() cannot do that for us
*/
ret = blk_complete_sgv4_hdr_rq(bc->rq, &bc->hdr, bc->bio,
bc->bidi_bio);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &bc->hdr, sizeof(bc->hdr)))
ret = -EFAULT;
bsg_free_command(bc);
if (ret)
break;
buf += sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
*bytes_read += sizeof(struct sg_io_v4);
nr_commands--;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::ElementDidMoveToNewDocument() {
if (delay_until_do_update_from_element_) {
delay_until_do_update_from_element_->DocumentChanged(
element_->GetDocument());
}
if (delay_until_image_notify_finished_) {
delay_until_image_notify_finished_->DocumentChanged(
element_->GetDocument());
}
ClearFailedLoadURL();
ClearImage();
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ixheaacd_norm_qmf_in_buf_4(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 qmf_band_idx) {
WORD32 i;
FLOAT32 *in_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[0][2 * qmf_band_idx];
FLOAT32 *norm_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->norm_qmf_in_buf[0][2 * qmf_band_idx];
for (; qmf_band_idx <= ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[3]; qmf_band_idx++) {
for (i = 0; i < ptr_hbe_txposer->hbe_qmf_in_len; i++) {
FLOAT32 mag_scaling_fac = 0.0f;
FLOAT32 x_r, x_i, temp;
FLOAT64 base = 1e-17;
x_r = in_buf[0];
x_i = in_buf[1];
temp = x_r * x_r;
base = base + temp;
temp = x_i * x_i;
base = base + temp;
temp = (FLOAT32)sqrt(sqrt(base));
mag_scaling_fac = temp * (FLOAT32)(sqrt(temp));
mag_scaling_fac = 1 / mag_scaling_fac;
x_r *= mag_scaling_fac;
x_i *= mag_scaling_fac;
norm_buf[0] = x_r;
norm_buf[1] = x_i;
in_buf += 128;
norm_buf += 128;
}
in_buf -= (128 * (ptr_hbe_txposer->hbe_qmf_in_len) - 2);
norm_buf -= (128 * (ptr_hbe_txposer->hbe_qmf_in_len) - 2);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 17,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::UsvStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_usvStringMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::UsvStringMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_run_callback(const RunFromHostProxyCallback& run_callback) {
run_callback_ = run_callback;
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ArrayBufferViewMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_arrayBufferViewMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::ArrayBufferViewMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long vma_compute_subtree_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long max, prev_end, subtree_gap;
/*
* Note: in the rare case of a VM_GROWSDOWN above a VM_GROWSUP, we
* allow two stack_guard_gaps between them here, and when choosing
* an unmapped area; whereas when expanding we only require one.
* That's a little inconsistent, but keeps the code here simpler.
*/
max = vm_start_gap(vma);
if (vma->vm_prev) {
prev_end = vm_end_gap(vma->vm_prev);
if (max > prev_end)
max -= prev_end;
else
max = 0;
}
if (vma->vm_rb.rb_left) {
subtree_gap = rb_entry(vma->vm_rb.rb_left,
struct vm_area_struct, vm_rb)->rb_subtree_gap;
if (subtree_gap > max)
max = subtree_gap;
}
if (vma->vm_rb.rb_right) {
subtree_gap = rb_entry(vma->vm_rb.rb_right,
struct vm_area_struct, vm_rb)->rb_subtree_gap;
if (subtree_gap > max)
max = subtree_gap;
}
return max;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qeth_default_setadapterparms_cb(struct qeth_card *card,
struct qeth_reply *reply, unsigned long data)
{
struct qeth_ipa_cmd *cmd;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 4, "defadpcb");
cmd = (struct qeth_ipa_cmd *) data;
if (cmd->hdr.return_code == 0)
cmd->hdr.return_code =
cmd->data.setadapterparms.hdr.return_code;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::SetFocusToLocationBar(bool select_all) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!force_location_bar_focus_ && !IsActive())
return;
#endif
LocationBarView* location_bar = GetLocationBarView();
if (location_bar->IsLocationEntryFocusableInRootView()) {
location_bar->FocusLocation(select_all);
} else {
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = GetFocusManager();
DCHECK(focus_manager);
focus_manager->ClearFocus();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterTIMImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIM");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::SetGpuControlClient(GpuControlClient* client) {
CheckLock();
gpu_control_client_ = client;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 10,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::ShouldRouteMessageEvent(
RenderFrameHost* target_rfh,
SiteInstance* source_site_instance) const {
return GetBrowserPluginGuest() || GetBrowserPluginEmbedder();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
{
request_resource(&iomem_resource, &video_ram_resource);
reserve_standard_io_resources();
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_writepages_fill(struct page *page,
struct writeback_control *wbc, void *_data)
{
struct fuse_fill_wb_data *data = _data;
struct fuse_req *req = data->req;
struct inode *inode = data->inode;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct page *tmp_page;
bool is_writeback;
int err;
if (!data->ff) {
err = -EIO;
data->ff = fuse_write_file_get(fc, get_fuse_inode(inode));
if (!data->ff)
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Being under writeback is unlikely but possible. For example direct
* read to an mmaped fuse file will set the page dirty twice; once when
* the pages are faulted with get_user_pages(), and then after the read
* completed.
*/
is_writeback = fuse_page_is_writeback(inode, page->index);
if (req && req->num_pages &&
(is_writeback || req->num_pages == FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ ||
(req->num_pages + 1) * PAGE_CACHE_SIZE > fc->max_write ||
data->orig_pages[req->num_pages - 1]->index + 1 != page->index)) {
fuse_writepages_send(data);
data->req = NULL;
}
err = -ENOMEM;
tmp_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOFS | __GFP_HIGHMEM);
if (!tmp_page)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* The page must not be redirtied until the writeout is completed
* (i.e. userspace has sent a reply to the write request). Otherwise
* there could be more than one temporary page instance for each real
* page.
*
* This is ensured by holding the page lock in page_mkwrite() while
* checking fuse_page_is_writeback(). We already hold the page lock
* since clear_page_dirty_for_io() and keep it held until we add the
* request to the fi->writepages list and increment req->num_pages.
* After this fuse_page_is_writeback() will indicate that the page is
* under writeback, so we can release the page lock.
*/
if (data->req == NULL) {
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
err = -ENOMEM;
req = fuse_request_alloc_nofs(FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ);
if (!req) {
__free_page(tmp_page);
goto out_unlock;
}
fuse_write_fill(req, data->ff, page_offset(page), 0);
req->misc.write.in.write_flags |= FUSE_WRITE_CACHE;
req->misc.write.next = NULL;
req->in.argpages = 1;
__set_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags);
req->num_pages = 0;
req->end = fuse_writepage_end;
req->inode = inode;
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
list_add(&req->writepages_entry, &fi->writepages);
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
data->req = req;
}
set_page_writeback(page);
copy_highpage(tmp_page, page);
req->pages[req->num_pages] = tmp_page;
req->page_descs[req->num_pages].offset = 0;
req->page_descs[req->num_pages].length = PAGE_SIZE;
inc_wb_stat(&inode_to_bdi(inode)->wb, WB_WRITEBACK);
inc_zone_page_state(tmp_page, NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP);
err = 0;
if (is_writeback && fuse_writepage_in_flight(req, page)) {
end_page_writeback(page);
data->req = NULL;
goto out_unlock;
}
data->orig_pages[req->num_pages] = page;
/*
* Protected by fc->lock against concurrent access by
* fuse_page_is_writeback().
*/
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
req->num_pages++;
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
out_unlock:
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
{
vm_flags_t vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
int write = (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE);
int foreign = (gup_flags & FOLL_REMOTE);
if (vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
return -EFAULT;
if (write) {
if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We used to let the write,force case do COW in a
* VM_MAYWRITE VM_SHARED !VM_WRITE vma, so ptrace could
* set a breakpoint in a read-only mapping of an
* executable, without corrupting the file (yet only
* when that file had been opened for writing!).
* Anon pages in shared mappings are surprising: now
* just reject it.
*/
if (!is_cow_mapping(vm_flags))
return -EFAULT;
}
} else if (!(vm_flags & VM_READ)) {
if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Is there actually any vma we can reach here which does not
* have VM_MAYREAD set?
*/
if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD))
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* gups are always data accesses, not instruction
* fetches, so execute=false here
*/
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, false, foreign))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 4,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void read_bandwidth_file(pid_t pid) {
assert(ifbw == NULL);
char *fname;
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/%d-bandwidth", RUN_FIREJAIL_BANDWIDTH_DIR, (int) pid) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "r");
if (fp) {
char buf[1024];
while (fgets(buf, 1024,fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
if (strlen(buf) == 0)
continue;
IFBW *ifbw_new = malloc(sizeof(IFBW));
if (!ifbw_new)
errExit("malloc");
memset(ifbw_new, 0, sizeof(IFBW));
ifbw_new->txt = strdup(buf);
if (!ifbw_new->txt)
errExit("strdup");
ifbw_add(ifbw_new);
}
fclose(fp);
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 6,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dst_entry* dccp_v4_route_skb(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4 = {
.flowi4_oif = skb_rtable(skb)->rt_iif,
.daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
.saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr,
.flowi4_tos = RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
.flowi4_proto = sk->sk_protocol,
.fl4_sport = dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_dport,
.fl4_dport = dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_sport,
};
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return NULL;
}
return &rt->dst;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *register_map_to_storage_hook(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char *file,
const char *function)
{
return register_named_file_function_hook("map_to_storage", cmd, _cfg,
file, function, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_inc_and_copy_stateid(stateid_t *dst, struct nfs4_stid *stid)
{
stateid_t *src = &stid->sc_stateid;
spin_lock(&stid->sc_lock);
if (unlikely(++src->si_generation == 0))
src->si_generation = 1;
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
spin_unlock(&stid->sc_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 29,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 Experiment::DescriptionForChoice(int index) const {
DCHECK(type == Experiment::MULTI_VALUE ||
type == Experiment::ENABLE_DISABLE_VALUE);
DCHECK_LT(index, num_choices);
int description_id;
if (type == Experiment::ENABLE_DISABLE_VALUE) {
const int kEnableDisableDescriptionIds[] = {
IDS_GENERIC_EXPERIMENT_CHOICE_DEFAULT,
IDS_GENERIC_EXPERIMENT_CHOICE_ENABLED,
IDS_GENERIC_EXPERIMENT_CHOICE_DISABLED,
};
description_id = kEnableDisableDescriptionIds[index];
} else {
description_id = choices[index].description_id;
}
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(description_id);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: snmp_rfcv3_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->enable_snmp_rfcv3 = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::paintFillLayer(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const Color& c, const FillLayer* fillLayer, const LayoutRect& rect,
BackgroundBleedAvoidance bleedAvoidance, CompositeOperator op, RenderObject* backgroundObject)
{
paintFillLayerExtended(paintInfo, c, fillLayer, rect, bleedAvoidance, 0, LayoutSize(), op, backgroundObject);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::latency () const
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (mTrack == 0) return 0;
return mTrack->latency();
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setAlertDialog(QQmlComponent* alertDialog)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (d->alertDialog == alertDialog)
return;
d->alertDialog = alertDialog;
emit alertDialogChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::DeleteEntryOnError(AudioEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
SendErrorMessage(entry->stream_id);
CloseAndDeleteStream(entry);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void digi_wakeup_write_lock(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct digi_port *priv =
container_of(work, struct digi_port, dp_wakeup_work);
struct usb_serial_port *port = priv->dp_port;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->dp_port_lock, flags);
tty_port_tty_wakeup(&port->port);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->dp_port_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<Target::TargetInfo> CreateInfo(DevToolsAgentHost* host) {
std::unique_ptr<Target::TargetInfo> target_info =
Target::TargetInfo::Create()
.SetTargetId(host->GetId())
.SetTitle(host->GetTitle())
.SetUrl(host->GetURL().spec())
.SetType(host->GetType())
.SetAttached(host->IsAttached())
.Build();
if (!host->GetOpenerId().empty())
target_info->SetOpenerId(host->GetOpenerId());
return target_info;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmykbasecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int base, int *stage, int *cont, int *stack_depth)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
float CMYK[4], Gray, RGB[3];
int i;
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
if (pcs->id == cs_DeviceGray_id) {
/* UGLY hack. Its possible for the graphics library to change the
* colour space to DeviceGray (setcachedevice), but this does not
* change the PostScript space. It can't, because the graphics library
* doesn't know about the PostScript objects. If we get a current*
* operation before the space has been restored, the colour space in
* the graphics library and the PostScript stored space won't match.
* If that happens then we need to pretend the PS colour space was
* DeviceGray
*/
return(graybasecolor(i_ctx_p, space, base, stage, cont, stack_depth));
}
*cont = 0;
*stage = 0;
check_op(4);
op -= 3;
for (i=0;i<4;i++) {
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer)) {
if (r_has_type(op, t_real)) {
CMYK[i] = op->value.realval;
} else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
} else
CMYK[i] = (float)op->value.intval;
if (CMYK[i] < 0 || CMYK[i] > 1)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
op++;
}
switch (base) {
case 0:
pop(3);
op = osp;
Gray = (0.3 * CMYK[0]) + (0.59 * CMYK[1]) + (0.11 * CMYK[2]) + CMYK[3];
if (Gray > 1.0)
Gray = 0;
else
Gray = 1.0 - Gray;
make_real(op, Gray);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
pop(1);
op = osp;
RGB[0] = 1.0 - (CMYK[0] + CMYK[3]);
if (RGB[0] < 0)
RGB[0] = 0;
RGB[1] = 1.0 - (CMYK[1] + CMYK[3]);
if (RGB[1] < 0)
RGB[1] = 0;
RGB[2] = 1.0 - (CMYK[2] + CMYK[3]);
if (RGB[2] < 0)
RGB[2] = 0;
if (base == 1)
rgb2hsb((float *)&RGB);
make_real(&op[-2], RGB[0]);
make_real(&op[-1], RGB[1]);
make_real(op, RGB[2]);
break;
case 3:
op = osp;
make_real(&op[-3], CMYK[0]);
make_real(&op[-2], CMYK[1]);
make_real(&op[-1], CMYK[2]);
make_real(op, CMYK[3]);
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
{
fd_set *setp;
int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
free(setp);
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
}
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
}
free(setp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::PurgeAndSuspend() {
GetRendererInterface()->ProcessPurgeAndSuspend();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::ImageSkia AppListControllerDelegateWin::GetWindowIcon() {
gfx::ImageSkia* resource = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().
GetImageSkiaNamed(chrome::GetAppListIconResourceId());
return *resource;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __pmd_error(const char *file, int line, pmd_t pmd)
{
printk("%s:%d: bad pmd %08llx.\n", file, line, (long long)pmd_val(pmd));
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS imacon_full_load_raw()
{
int row, col;
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col++)
read_shorts (image[row*width+col], 3);
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 8,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCreateReadWriteFile(
int child_id, const base::FilePath& file) {
GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, CREATE_READ_WRITE_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: magic_compile(struct magic_set *ms, const char *magicfile)
{
if (ms == NULL)
return -1;
return file_apprentice(ms, magicfile, FILE_COMPILE);
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcCreateGlyphCursor(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
int res;
REQUEST(xCreateGlyphCursorReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCreateGlyphCursorReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->cid, client);
res = AllocGlyphCursor(stuff->source, stuff->sourceChar,
stuff->mask, stuff->maskChar,
stuff->foreRed, stuff->foreGreen, stuff->foreBlue,
stuff->backRed, stuff->backGreen, stuff->backBlue,
&pCursor, client, stuff->cid);
if (res != Success)
return res;
if (AddResource(stuff->cid, RT_CURSOR, (void *) pCursor))
return Success;
return BadAlloc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 18,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::InitializeUserMediaClient() {
if (!RenderThreadImpl::current()) // Will be NULL during unit tests.
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableWebRTC))
return;
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
DCHECK(!web_user_media_client_);
web_user_media_client_ = new UserMediaClientImpl(
this,
RenderThreadImpl::current()->GetPeerConnectionDependencyFactory(),
make_scoped_ptr(new MediaStreamDispatcher(this)).Pass());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + file_pstring_length_size(m);
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
if (len >= sizeof(p->s))
len = sizeof(p->s) - 1;
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mark_page_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(memslot, gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_display_variant)
{
get_icu_disp_value_src_php( LOC_VARIANT_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 13,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY AcquireCredentialsHandleA(SEC_CHAR* pszPrincipal, SEC_CHAR* pszPackage,
ULONG fCredentialUse, void* pvLogonID, void* pAuthData, SEC_GET_KEY_FN pGetKeyFn,
void* pvGetKeyArgument, PCredHandle phCredential, PTimeStamp ptsExpiry)
{
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(pszPackage);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->AcquireCredentialsHandleA == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->AcquireCredentialsHandleA(pszPrincipal, pszPackage, fCredentialUse,
pvLogonID, pAuthData, pGetKeyFn, pvGetKeyArgument, phCredential, ptsExpiry);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while (y < height)
{
int c = getc(IN);
if (c) {
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = c1;
}
}
else {
c = getc(IN);
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
++y;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
}
else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
}
else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
}
else /* 03 .. 255 */
{
int j;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++)
{
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
*pix = c1;
}
if ((OPJ_UINT32)c & 1U) { /* skip padding byte */
getc(IN);
}
}
}
}/* while() */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bindText(
sqlite3_stmt *pStmt, /* The statement to bind against */
int i, /* Index of the parameter to bind */
const void *zData, /* Pointer to the data to be bound */
int nData, /* Number of bytes of data to be bound */
void (*xDel)(void*), /* Destructor for the data */
u8 encoding /* Encoding for the data */
){
Vdbe *p = (Vdbe *)pStmt;
Mem *pVar;
int rc;
rc = vdbeUnbind(p, i);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
if( zData!=0 ){
pVar = &p->aVar[i-1];
rc = sqlite3VdbeMemSetStr(pVar, zData, nData, encoding, xDel);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && encoding!=0 ){
rc = sqlite3VdbeChangeEncoding(pVar, ENC(p->db));
}
if( rc ){
sqlite3Error(p->db, rc);
rc = sqlite3ApiExit(p->db, rc);
}
}
sqlite3_mutex_leave(p->db->mutex);
}else if( xDel!=SQLITE_STATIC && xDel!=SQLITE_TRANSIENT ){
xDel((void*)zData);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_can_close(bool value) { can_close_ = value; }
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_hl_tmr_hdlr(TIMER_LIST_ENT *tle)
{
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
UINT8 i,j;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s timer_in_use=%d", __FUNCTION__, tle->in_use );
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
for (j=0; j< BTA_HL_NUM_MCLS; j++)
{
p_mcb =BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(i,j);
if (p_mcb->cch_timer_active)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%app_idx=%d, mcl_idx=%d mcl-connected=%d",
i, j, p_mcb->is_connected);
p_mcb->cch_timer_active = FALSE;
if (p_mcb->is_connected)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Idle timeout Close CCH app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d mcl_handle=%d",
i ,j, p_mcb->mcl_handle);
BTA_HlCchClose(p_mcb->mcl_handle);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("CCH idle timeout But CCH not connected app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d ",i,j);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
int64 frame_id,
bool is_main_frame,
const GURL& url,
PageTransition transition_type,
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
BrowserPluginMsg_LoadCommit_Params params;
params.url = url;
params.is_top_level = is_main_frame;
params.process_id = render_view_host->GetProcess()->GetID();
params.current_entry_index =
web_contents()->GetController().GetCurrentEntryIndex();
params.entry_count =
web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount();
SendMessageToEmbedder(
new BrowserPluginMsg_LoadCommit(embedder_routing_id(),
instance_id(),
params));
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BrowserPlugin.Guest.DidNavigate"));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mem_free(void *data) {
RBinMem *mem = (RBinMem *)data;
if (mem && mem->mirrors) {
mem->mirrors->free = mem_free;
r_list_free (mem->mirrors);
mem->mirrors = NULL;
}
free (mem);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const Mem *columnNullValue(void){
/* Even though the Mem structure contains an element
** of type i64, on certain architectures (x86) with certain compiler
** switches (-Os), gcc may align this Mem object on a 4-byte boundary
** instead of an 8-byte one. This all works fine, except that when
** running with SQLITE_DEBUG defined the SQLite code sometimes assert()s
** that a Mem structure is located on an 8-byte boundary. To prevent
** these assert()s from failing, when building with SQLITE_DEBUG defined
** using gcc, we force nullMem to be 8-byte aligned using the magical
** __attribute__((aligned(8))) macro. */
static const Mem nullMem
#if defined(SQLITE_DEBUG) && defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((aligned(8)))
#endif
= {
/* .u = */ {0},
/* .flags = */ (u16)MEM_Null,
/* .enc = */ (u8)0,
/* .eSubtype = */ (u8)0,
/* .n = */ (int)0,
/* .z = */ (char*)0,
/* .zMalloc = */ (char*)0,
/* .szMalloc = */ (int)0,
/* .uTemp = */ (u32)0,
/* .db = */ (sqlite3*)0,
/* .xDel = */ (void(*)(void*))0,
#ifdef SQLITE_DEBUG
/* .pScopyFrom = */ (Mem*)0,
/* .pFiller = */ (void*)0,
#endif
};
return &nullMem;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apply_vma_lock_flags(unsigned long start, size_t len,
vm_flags_t flags)
{
unsigned long nstart, end, tmp;
struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
int error;
VM_BUG_ON(offset_in_page(start));
VM_BUG_ON(len != PAGE_ALIGN(len));
end = start + len;
if (end < start)
return -EINVAL;
if (end == start)
return 0;
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
return -ENOMEM;
prev = vma->vm_prev;
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
vm_flags_t newflags = vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED_CLEAR_MASK;
newflags |= flags;
/* Here we know that vma->vm_start <= nstart < vma->vm_end. */
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (tmp > end)
tmp = end;
error = mlock_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
if (error)
break;
nstart = tmp;
if (nstart < prev->vm_end)
nstart = prev->vm_end;
if (nstart >= end)
break;
vma = prev->vm_next;
if (!vma || vma->vm_start != nstart) {
error = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495678405-54569-1-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GraphicBuffer::GraphicBuffer(uint32_t w, uint32_t h,
PixelFormat reqFormat, uint32_t reqUsage)
: BASE(), mOwner(ownData), mBufferMapper(GraphicBufferMapper::get()),
mInitCheck(NO_ERROR), mId(getUniqueId())
{
width =
height =
stride =
format =
usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
mInitCheck = initSize(w, h, reqFormat, reqUsage);
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sched_domains_numa_masks_set(unsigned int cpu)
{
int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < sched_domains_numa_levels; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nr_node_ids; j++) {
if (node_distance(j, node) <= sched_domains_numa_distance[i])
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, sched_domains_numa_masks[i][j]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::initCheck() const {
if (mSignalledError) {
if (mFlacStreamEncoder == NULL) {
ALOGE("initCheck() failed due to NULL encoder");
} else if (mInputBufferPcm32 == NULL) {
ALOGE("initCheck() failed due to error allocating internal input buffer");
}
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
} else {
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::initCheck();
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
{
int extdatalen=0;
unsigned char *orig = buf;
unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
int using_ecc = 0;
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
int i;
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
{
SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
{
using_ecc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
#endif
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return orig;
ret+=2;
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
unsigned long size_str;
long lenmax;
/* check for enough space.
4 for the servername type and entension length
2 for servernamelist length
1 for the hostname type
2 for hostname length
+ hostname length
*/
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
|| (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
return NULL;
/* extension type and length */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
s2n(size_str+5,ret);
/* length of servername list */
s2n(size_str+3,ret);
/* hostname type, length and hostname */
*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
s2n(size_str,ret);
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
ret+=size_str;
}
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate)
{
int el;
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
{ /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
/* check for enough space.
4 for the srp type type and entension length
1 for the srp user identity
+ srp user identity length
*/
if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
/* fill in the extension */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
s2n(login_len+1,ret);
(*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
ret+=login_len;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (using_ecc)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
const unsigned char *plist;
size_t plistlen;
size_t i;
unsigned char *etmp;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
if (plistlen > 255)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
*(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
ret+=plistlen;
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
if (plistlen > 65532)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
etmp = ret + 4;
/* Copy curve ID if supported */
for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
{
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
{
*etmp++ = plist[0];
*etmp++ = plist[1];
}
}
plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
/* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
* elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
* http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
* resolves this to two bytes.
*/
s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
s2n(plistlen, ret);
ret+=plistlen;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (tls_use_ticket(s))
{
int ticklen;
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
{
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return NULL;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
}
else
ticklen = 0;
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
goto skip_ext;
/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
* rest for ticket
*/
if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
s2n(ticklen,ret);
if (ticklen)
{
memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
ret += ticklen;
}
}
skip_ext:
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
size_t salglen;
const unsigned char *salg;
unsigned char *etmp;
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
etmp = ret;
/* Skip over lengths for now */
ret += 4;
salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
/* Fill in lengths */
s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
s2n(salglen, etmp);
ret += salglen;
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
{
size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
return NULL;
if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
s2n(col + 2, ret);
s2n(col, ret);
memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
ret += col;
}
#endif
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
{
int i;
long extlen, idlen, itmp;
OCSP_RESPID *id;
idlen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
{
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
if (itmp <= 0)
return NULL;
idlen += itmp + 2;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
{
extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
if (extlen < 0)
return NULL;
}
else
extlen = 0;
if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
return NULL;
s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
s2n(idlen, ret);
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
{
/* save position of id len */
unsigned char *q = ret;
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
/* skip over id len */
ret += 2;
itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
/* write id len */
s2n(itmp, q);
}
s2n(extlen, ret);
if (extlen > 0)
i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension */
if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
{
/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
* support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
}
#endif
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
{
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
}
if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
{
int el;
ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
ret += el;
}
/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
{
size_t i;
custom_cli_ext_record* record;
for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
{
const unsigned char* out = NULL;
unsigned short outlen = 0;
record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
/* NULL callback sends empty extension */
/* -1 from callback omits extension */
if (record->fn1)
{
int cb_retval = 0;
cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
&out, &outlen, al,
record->arg);
if (cb_retval == 0)
return NULL; /* error */
if (cb_retval == -1)
continue; /* skip this extension */
}
if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
return NULL;
s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
s2n(outlen, ret);
memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
ret += outlen;
}
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
#endif
/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
*
* NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
* extensions it MUST always appear last.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
{
int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
* includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
* the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
*/
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
hlen -= 5;
if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
{
hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
if (hlen >= 4)
hlen -= 4;
else
hlen = 0;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
s2n(hlen, ret);
memset(ret, 0, hlen);
ret += hlen;
}
}
if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
return orig;
s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_disable_class(char *class_name, uint class_name_length TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry **disabled_class;
zend_str_tolower(class_name, class_name_length);
if (zend_hash_find(CG(class_table), class_name, class_name_length+1, (void **)&disabled_class)==FAILURE) {
return FAILURE;
}
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY_INIT_METHODS((**disabled_class), disabled_class_new, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
(*disabled_class)->create_object = display_disabled_class;
zend_hash_clean(&((*disabled_class)->function_table));
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionPrefs* ExtensionService::extension_prefs() {
return extension_prefs_;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int try_to_free_swap(struct page *page)
{
VM_BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
if (!PageSwapCache(page))
return 0;
if (PageWriteback(page))
return 0;
if (page_swapcount(page))
return 0;
/*
* Once hibernation has begun to create its image of memory,
* there's a danger that one of the calls to try_to_free_swap()
* - most probably a call from __try_to_reclaim_swap() while
* hibernation is allocating its own swap pages for the image,
* but conceivably even a call from memory reclaim - will free
* the swap from a page which has already been recorded in the
* image as a clean swapcache page, and then reuse its swap for
* another page of the image. On waking from hibernation, the
* original page might be freed under memory pressure, then
* later read back in from swap, now with the wrong data.
*
* Hibration suspends storage while it is writing the image
* to disk so check that here.
*/
if (pm_suspended_storage())
return 0;
delete_from_swap_cache(page);
SetPageDirty(page);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Downmix_foldFrom5Point1(int16_t *pSrc, int16_t*pDst, size_t numFrames, bool accumulate) {
int32_t lt, rt, centerPlusLfeContrib; // samples in Q19.12 format
if (accumulate) {
while (numFrames) {
centerPlusLfeContrib = (pSrc[2] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12)
+ (pSrc[3] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12);
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[4] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[5] << 12);
pDst[0] = clamp16(pDst[0] + (lt >> 13));
pDst[1] = clamp16(pDst[1] + (rt >> 13));
pSrc += 6;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
} else { // same code as above but without adding and clamping pDst[i] to itself
while (numFrames) {
centerPlusLfeContrib = (pSrc[2] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12)
+ (pSrc[3] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12);
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[4] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[5] << 12);
pDst[0] = clamp16(lt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pDst[1] = clamp16(rt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pSrc += 6;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
}
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::AddAutoplayFlags(const url::Origin& origin,
const int32_t flags) {
if (autoplay_flags_.first == origin) {
autoplay_flags_.second |= flags;
} else {
autoplay_flags_ = std::make_pair(origin, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_name_owner_changed_signal (GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *sender_name,
const gchar *object_path,
const gchar *interface_name,
const gchar *signal_name,
GVariant *parameters,
gpointer user_data)
{
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *authority = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY (user_data);
const gchar *name;
const gchar *old_owner;
const gchar *new_owner;
g_variant_get (parameters,
"(&s&s&s)",
&name,
&old_owner,
&new_owner);
polkit_backend_interactive_authority_system_bus_name_owner_changed (authority,
name,
old_owner,
new_owner);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hugetlb_register_all_nodes(void) { }
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RegisterMojoInterfaces() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&InstalledAppProviderImplDefault::Create));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
PermissionManager* permission_manager =
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext()->GetPermissionManager();
if (delegate_) {
auto* geolocation_context = delegate_->GetGeolocationContext();
if (geolocation_context && permission_manager) {
geolocation_service_.reset(new GeolocationServiceImpl(
geolocation_context, permission_manager, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&GeolocationServiceImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(geolocation_service_.get())));
}
}
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::WakeLock>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindWakeLockRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebNfc)) {
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::NFC>(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindNFCRequest, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#endif
if (!permission_service_context_)
permission_service_context_.reset(new PermissionServiceContext(this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PermissionServiceContext::CreateService,
base::Unretained(permission_service_context_.get())));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindPresentationServiceRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaSessionServiceImpl::Create, base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface<media::mojom::Renderer>(
base::Bind(&content::CreateMediaPlayerRenderer, GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(), delegate_));
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(
base::IgnoreResult(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService),
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateUsbDeviceManager, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateUsbChooserService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface<media::mojom::InterfaceFactory>(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindMediaInterfaceFactoryRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&WebSocketManager::CreateWebSocket,
process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&SharedWorkerConnectorImpl::Create,
process_->GetID(), routing_id_));
registry_->AddInterface<device::mojom::VRService>(base::Bind(
&WebvrServiceProvider::BindWebvrService, base::Unretained(this)));
if (RenderFrameAudioInputStreamFactory::UseMojoFactories()) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioInputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
if (RendererAudioOutputStreamFactoryContextImpl::UseMojoFactories()) {
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateAudioOutputStreamFactory,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
if (resource_coordinator::IsResourceCoordinatorEnabled()) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CreateFrameResourceCoordinator, base::Unretained(this)));
}
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()) {
MediaStreamManager* media_stream_manager =
BrowserMainLoop::GetInstance()->media_stream_manager();
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&MediaDevicesDispatcherHost::Create, GetProcess()->GetID(),
GetRoutingID(),
base::Unretained(media_stream_manager)),
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO));
}
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&RemoterFactoryImpl::Bind,
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID()));
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_MEDIA_REMOTING)
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(
&KeyboardLockServiceImpl::CreateMojoService, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::Bind(&ImageCaptureImpl::Create));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebAuth)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::BindAuthenticatorRequest,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (permission_manager) {
sensor_provider_proxy_.reset(
new SensorProviderProxyImpl(permission_manager, this));
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&SensorProviderProxyImpl::Bind,
base::Unretained(sensor_provider_proxy_.get())));
}
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&media::MediaMetricsProvider::Create,
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()
? nullptr
: GetSiteInstance()
->GetBrowserContext()
->GetVideoDecodePerfHistory()));
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking)) {
registry_->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&InputInjectorImpl::Create, weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
registry_->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(GetRestrictedCookieManager, base::Unretained(this)));
registry_->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&QuotaDispatcherHost::CreateForFrame, GetProcess(), routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void log_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(ratelimit, 5 * HZ, 5);
if (__ratelimit(&ratelimit)) {
printk("Kernel unaligned access at TPC[%lx] %pS\n",
regs->tpc, (void *) regs->tpc);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: string16 PluginServiceImpl::GetPluginDisplayNameByPath(const FilePath& path) {
string16 plugin_name = path.LossyDisplayName();
webkit::WebPluginInfo info;
if (PluginService::GetInstance()->GetPluginInfoByPath(path, &info) &&
!info.name.empty()) {
plugin_name = info.name;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
const std::string kPluginExtension = ".plugin";
if (EndsWith(plugin_name, ASCIIToUTF16(kPluginExtension), true))
plugin_name.erase(plugin_name.length() - kPluginExtension.length());
#endif // OS_MACOSX
}
return plugin_name;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 16,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::UpdateImageState(ImageResourceContent* new_image_content) {
image_content_ = new_image_content;
if (!new_image_content) {
image_resource_for_image_document_ = nullptr;
image_complete_ = true;
} else {
image_complete_ = false;
}
delay_until_image_notify_finished_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::Var GetSelectedText(bool html) {
if (ppp_selection_ != NULL) {
PP_Var var = ppp_selection_->GetSelectedText(plugin_->pp_instance(),
PP_FromBool(html));
return pp::Var(pp::PASS_REF, var);
}
return pp::Var();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AwWebPreferencesPopulater* AwMainDelegate::CreateWebPreferencesPopulater() {
return new AwWebPreferencesPopulaterImpl();
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_weight_vector( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_TokenRec design_tokens[T1_MAX_MM_DESIGNS];
FT_Int num_designs;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Blend blend = face->blend;
T1_Token token;
FT_Int n;
FT_Byte* old_cursor;
FT_Byte* old_limit;
T1_ToTokenArray( parser, design_tokens,
T1_MAX_MM_DESIGNS, &num_designs );
if ( num_designs < 0 )
{
error = FT_ERR( Ignore );
goto Exit;
}
if ( num_designs == 0 || num_designs > T1_MAX_MM_DESIGNS )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_weight_vector:"
" incorrect number of designs: %d\n",
num_designs ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
if ( !blend || !blend->num_designs )
{
error = t1_allocate_blend( face, num_designs, 0 );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
blend = face->blend;
}
else if ( blend->num_designs != (FT_UInt)num_designs )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_weight_vector:"
" /BlendDesignPosition and /WeightVector have\n"
" "
" different number of elements\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
old_cursor = parser->root.cursor;
old_limit = parser->root.limit;
for ( n = 0; n < num_designs; n++ )
{
token = design_tokens + n;
parser->root.cursor = token->start;
parser->root.limit = token->limit;
blend->default_weight_vector[n] =
blend->weight_vector[n] = T1_ToFixed( parser, 0 );
}
parser->root.cursor = old_cursor;
parser->root.limit = old_limit;
Exit:
parser->root.error = error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: prot_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length)
{
unsigned long i;
int pt_op;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t))) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from ptserver/ptint.xg
*/
pt_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pt"));
if (is_ubik(pt_op)) {
ubik_print(ndo, bp);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " call %s", tok2str(pt_req, "op#%d", pt_op)));
/*
* Decode some of the arguments to the PT calls
*/
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
switch (pt_op) {
case 500: /* I New User */
STROUT(PRNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " oldid"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 501: /* Where is it */
case 506: /* Delete */
case 508: /* Get CPS */
case 512: /* List entry */
case 514: /* List elements */
case 517: /* List owned */
case 518: /* Get CPS2 */
case 519: /* Get host CPS */
case 530: /* List super groups */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 502: /* Dump entry */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pos"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 503: /* Add to group */
case 507: /* Remove from group */
case 515: /* Is a member of? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " uid"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gid"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 504: /* Name to ID */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
/*
* Who designed this chicken-shit protocol?
*
* Each character is stored as a 32-bit
* integer!
*/
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
VECOUT(PRNAMEMAX);
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 505: /* Id to name */
{
unsigned long j;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ids:"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
i = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
INTOUT();
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 509: /* New entry */
STROUT(PRNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flag"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " oid"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 511: /* Set max */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gflag"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 513: /* Change entry */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id"));
INTOUT();
STROUT(PRNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " oldid"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newid"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 520: /* Update entry */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " id"));
INTOUT();
STROUT(PRNAMEMAX);
break;
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|pt]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_interrupt_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vmcs_clear_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int drm_mode_addfb(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_fb_cmd *r = data;
struct drm_mode_config *config = &dev->mode_config;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb;
int ret = 0;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
if ((config->min_width > r->width) || (r->width > config->max_width)) {
DRM_ERROR("mode new framebuffer width not within limits\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((config->min_height > r->height) || (r->height > config->max_height)) {
DRM_ERROR("mode new framebuffer height not within limits\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
/* TODO check buffer is sufficiently large */
/* TODO setup destructor callback */
fb = dev->mode_config.funcs->fb_create(dev, file_priv, r);
if (IS_ERR(fb)) {
DRM_ERROR("could not create framebuffer\n");
ret = PTR_ERR(fb);
goto out;
}
r->fb_id = fb->base.id;
list_add(&fb->filp_head, &file_priv->fbs);
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("[FB:%d]\n", fb->base.id);
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mailimf_minus_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
return mailimf_unstrict_char_parse(message, length, indx, '-');
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 23,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int itacns_add_data_files(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
{
const size_t array_size =
sizeof(itacns_data_files)/sizeof(itacns_data_files[0]);
unsigned int i;
int rv;
sc_pkcs15_data_t *p15_personaldata = NULL;
sc_pkcs15_data_info_t dinfo;
struct sc_pkcs15_object *objs[32];
struct sc_pkcs15_data_info *cinfo;
for(i=0; i < array_size; i++) {
sc_path_t path;
sc_pkcs15_data_info_t data;
sc_pkcs15_object_t obj;
if (itacns_data_files[i].cie_only &&
p15card->card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_ITACNS_CIE_V2)
continue;
sc_format_path(itacns_data_files[i].path, &path);
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
strlcpy(data.app_label, itacns_data_files[i].label,
sizeof(data.app_label));
strlcpy(obj.label, itacns_data_files[i].label,
sizeof(obj.label));
data.path = path;
rv = sc_pkcs15emu_add_data_object(p15card, &obj, &data);
SC_TEST_RET(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, rv,
"Could not add data file");
}
/*
* If we got this far, we can read the Personal Data file and glean
* the user's full name. Thus we can use it to put together a
* user-friendlier card name.
*/
memset(&dinfo, 0, sizeof(dinfo));
strcpy(dinfo.app_label, "EF_DatiPersonali");
/* Find EF_DatiPersonali */
rv = sc_pkcs15_get_objects(p15card, SC_PKCS15_TYPE_DATA_OBJECT,
objs, 32);
if(rv < 0) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Data enumeration failed");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
for(i=0; i<32; i++) {
cinfo = (struct sc_pkcs15_data_info *) objs[i]->data;
if(!strcmp("EF_DatiPersonali", objs[i]->label))
break;
}
if(i>=32) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not find EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
rv = sc_pkcs15_read_data_object(p15card, cinfo, &p15_personaldata);
if (rv) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not read EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
}
{
char fullname[160];
if(get_name_from_EF_DatiPersonali(p15_personaldata->data,
fullname, sizeof(fullname))) {
sc_debug(p15card->card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Could not parse EF_DatiPersonali: "
"keeping generic card name");
sc_pkcs15_free_data_object(p15_personaldata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
set_string(&p15card->tokeninfo->label, fullname);
}
sc_pkcs15_free_data_object(p15_personaldata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 11,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: point_inside(Point *p, int npts, Point *plist)
{
double x0,
y0;
double prev_x,
prev_y;
int i = 0;
double x,
y;
int cross,
total_cross = 0;
if (npts <= 0)
return 0;
/* compute first polygon point relative to single point */
x0 = plist[0].x - p->x;
y0 = plist[0].y - p->y;
prev_x = x0;
prev_y = y0;
/* loop over polygon points and aggregate total_cross */
for (i = 1; i < npts; i++)
{
/* compute next polygon point relative to single point */
x = plist[i].x - p->x;
y = plist[i].y - p->y;
/* compute previous to current point crossing */
if ((cross = lseg_crossing(x, y, prev_x, prev_y)) == POINT_ON_POLYGON)
return 2;
total_cross += cross;
prev_x = x;
prev_y = y;
}
/* now do the first point */
if ((cross = lseg_crossing(x0, y0, prev_x, prev_y)) == POINT_ON_POLYGON)
return 2;
total_cross += cross;
if (total_cross != 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void h2o_http2_conn_register_stream(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, h2o_http2_stream_t *stream)
{
khiter_t iter;
int r;
if (!h2o_http2_stream_is_push(stream->stream_id) && conn->pull_stream_ids.max_open < stream->stream_id)
conn->pull_stream_ids.max_open = stream->stream_id;
iter = kh_put(h2o_http2_stream_t, conn->streams, stream->stream_id, &r);
assert(iter != kh_end(conn->streams));
kh_val(conn->streams, iter) = stream;
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int InputMethodController::TextInputFlags() const {
Element* element = GetDocument().FocusedElement();
if (!element)
return kWebTextInputFlagNone;
int flags = 0;
const AtomicString& autocomplete =
element->getAttribute(HTMLNames::autocompleteAttr);
if (autocomplete == "on")
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocompleteOn;
else if (autocomplete == "off")
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocompleteOff;
const AtomicString& autocorrect =
element->getAttribute(HTMLNames::autocorrectAttr);
if (autocorrect == "on")
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocorrectOn;
else if (autocorrect == "off")
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocorrectOff;
SpellcheckAttributeState spellcheck = element->GetSpellcheckAttributeState();
if (spellcheck == kSpellcheckAttributeTrue)
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagSpellcheckOn;
else if (spellcheck == kSpellcheckAttributeFalse)
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagSpellcheckOff;
if (IsTextControlElement(element)) {
TextControlElement* text_control = ToTextControlElement(element);
if (text_control->SupportsAutocapitalize()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, none, ("none"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, characters, ("characters"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, words, ("words"));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, sentences, ("sentences"));
const AtomicString& autocapitalize = text_control->autocapitalize();
if (autocapitalize == none)
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocapitalizeNone;
else if (autocapitalize == characters)
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocapitalizeCharacters;
else if (autocapitalize == words)
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocapitalizeWords;
else if (autocapitalize == sentences)
flags |= kWebTextInputFlagAutocapitalizeSentences;
else
NOTREACHED();
}
}
return flags;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void overloadedMethodC1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("overloadedMethodC", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Dictionary, dictionaryArg, Dictionary(info[0], info.GetIsolate()));
if (!dictionaryArg.isUndefinedOrNull() && !dictionaryArg.isObject()) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("overloadedMethodC", "TestObject", "parameter 1 ('dictionaryArg') is not an object."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
imp->overloadedMethodC(dictionaryArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
else
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_rollover *rollover = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
case PACKET_FANOUT_QM:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
err = -EALREADY;
if (po->fanout)
goto out;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rollover)
goto out;
atomic_long_set(&rollover->num, 0);
atomic_long_set(&rollover->num_huge, 0);
atomic_long_set(&rollover->num_failed, 0);
po->rollover = rollover;
}
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_UNIQUEID) {
if (id != 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!fanout_find_new_id(sk, &id)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* ephemeral flag for the first socket in the group: drop it */
flags &= ~(PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_UNIQUEID >> 8);
}
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
refcount_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
fanout_init_data(match);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
if (po->running &&
match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (refcount_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
refcount_set(&match->sk_ref, refcount_read(&match->sk_ref) + 1);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
if (err && !refcount_read(&match->sk_ref)) {
list_del(&match->list);
kfree(match);
}
out:
if (err && rollover) {
kfree(rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppol2tp *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppol2tp *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct l2tp_session *session = NULL;
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct l2tp_session_cfg cfg = { 0, };
int error = 0;
u32 tunnel_id, peer_tunnel_id;
u32 session_id, peer_session_id;
int ver = 2;
int fd;
lock_sock(sk);
error = -EINVAL;
if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_OL2TP)
goto end;
/* Check for already bound sockets */
error = -EBUSY;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED)
goto end;
/* We don't supporting rebinding anyway */
error = -EALREADY;
if (sk->sk_user_data)
goto end; /* socket is already attached */
/* Get params from socket address. Handle L2TPv2 and L2TPv3.
* This is nasty because there are different sockaddr_pppol2tp
* structs for L2TPv2, L2TPv3, over IPv4 and IPv6. We use
* the sockaddr size to determine which structure the caller
* is using.
*/
peer_tunnel_id = 0;
if (sockaddr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tp)) {
fd = sp->pppol2tp.fd;
tunnel_id = sp->pppol2tp.s_tunnel;
peer_tunnel_id = sp->pppol2tp.d_tunnel;
session_id = sp->pppol2tp.s_session;
peer_session_id = sp->pppol2tp.d_session;
} else if (sockaddr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3)) {
struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3 *sp3 =
(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3 *) sp;
ver = 3;
fd = sp3->pppol2tp.fd;
tunnel_id = sp3->pppol2tp.s_tunnel;
peer_tunnel_id = sp3->pppol2tp.d_tunnel;
session_id = sp3->pppol2tp.s_session;
peer_session_id = sp3->pppol2tp.d_session;
} else if (sockaddr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpin6)) {
struct sockaddr_pppol2tpin6 *sp6 =
(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpin6 *) sp;
fd = sp6->pppol2tp.fd;
tunnel_id = sp6->pppol2tp.s_tunnel;
peer_tunnel_id = sp6->pppol2tp.d_tunnel;
session_id = sp6->pppol2tp.s_session;
peer_session_id = sp6->pppol2tp.d_session;
} else if (sockaddr_len == sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3in6)) {
struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3in6 *sp6 =
(struct sockaddr_pppol2tpv3in6 *) sp;
ver = 3;
fd = sp6->pppol2tp.fd;
tunnel_id = sp6->pppol2tp.s_tunnel;
peer_tunnel_id = sp6->pppol2tp.d_tunnel;
session_id = sp6->pppol2tp.s_session;
peer_session_id = sp6->pppol2tp.d_session;
} else {
error = -EINVAL;
goto end; /* bad socket address */
}
/* Don't bind if tunnel_id is 0 */
error = -EINVAL;
if (tunnel_id == 0)
goto end;
tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find(sock_net(sk), tunnel_id);
/* Special case: create tunnel context if session_id and
* peer_session_id is 0. Otherwise look up tunnel using supplied
* tunnel id.
*/
if ((session_id == 0) && (peer_session_id == 0)) {
if (tunnel == NULL) {
struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg tcfg = {
.encap = L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP,
.debug = 0,
};
error = l2tp_tunnel_create(sock_net(sk), fd, ver, tunnel_id, peer_tunnel_id, &tcfg, &tunnel);
if (error < 0)
goto end;
}
} else {
/* Error if we can't find the tunnel */
error = -ENOENT;
if (tunnel == NULL)
goto end;
/* Error if socket is not prepped */
if (tunnel->sock == NULL)
goto end;
}
if (tunnel->recv_payload_hook == NULL)
tunnel->recv_payload_hook = pppol2tp_recv_payload_hook;
if (tunnel->peer_tunnel_id == 0)
tunnel->peer_tunnel_id = peer_tunnel_id;
/* Create session if it doesn't already exist. We handle the
* case where a session was previously created by the netlink
* interface by checking that the session doesn't already have
* a socket and its tunnel socket are what we expect. If any
* of those checks fail, return EEXIST to the caller.
*/
session = l2tp_session_find(sock_net(sk), tunnel, session_id);
if (session == NULL) {
/* Default MTU must allow space for UDP/L2TP/PPP
* headers.
*/
cfg.mtu = cfg.mru = 1500 - PPPOL2TP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
/* Allocate and initialize a new session context. */
session = l2tp_session_create(sizeof(struct pppol2tp_session),
tunnel, session_id,
peer_session_id, &cfg);
if (session == NULL) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto end;
}
} else {
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
error = -EEXIST;
if (ps->sock != NULL)
goto end;
/* consistency checks */
if (ps->tunnel_sock != tunnel->sock)
goto end;
}
/* Associate session with its PPPoL2TP socket */
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
ps->owner = current->pid;
ps->sock = sk;
ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
session->recv_skb = pppol2tp_recv;
session->session_close = pppol2tp_session_close;
#if defined(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS) || defined(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS_MODULE)
session->show = pppol2tp_show;
#endif
/* We need to know each time a skb is dropped from the reorder
* queue.
*/
session->ref = pppol2tp_session_sock_hold;
session->deref = pppol2tp_session_sock_put;
/* If PMTU discovery was enabled, use the MTU that was discovered */
dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst != NULL) {
u32 pmtu = dst_mtu(__sk_dst_get(sk));
if (pmtu != 0)
session->mtu = session->mru = pmtu -
PPPOL2TP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
dst_release(dst);
}
/* Special case: if source & dest session_id == 0x0000, this
* socket is being created to manage the tunnel. Just set up
* the internal context for use by ioctl() and sockopt()
* handlers.
*/
if ((session->session_id == 0) &&
(session->peer_session_id == 0)) {
error = 0;
goto out_no_ppp;
}
/* The only header we need to worry about is the L2TP
* header. This size is different depending on whether
* sequence numbers are enabled for the data channel.
*/
po->chan.hdrlen = PPPOL2TP_L2TP_HDR_SIZE_NOSEQ;
po->chan.private = sk;
po->chan.ops = &pppol2tp_chan_ops;
po->chan.mtu = session->mtu;
error = ppp_register_net_channel(sock_net(sk), &po->chan);
if (error)
goto end;
out_no_ppp:
/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
sk->sk_user_data = session;
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL, "%s: created\n",
session->name);
end:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hidp_process_data(struct hidp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned char param)
{
int done_with_skb = 1;
BT_DBG("session %p skb %p len %d param 0x%02x", session, skb, skb->len, param);
switch (param) {
case HIDP_DATA_RTYPE_INPUT:
hidp_set_timer(session);
if (session->input)
hidp_input_report(session, skb);
if (session->hid)
hid_input_report(session->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, skb->data, skb->len, 0);
break;
case HIDP_DATA_RTYPE_OTHER:
case HIDP_DATA_RTYPE_OUPUT:
case HIDP_DATA_RTYPE_FEATURE:
break;
default:
__hidp_send_ctrl_message(session,
HIDP_TRANS_HANDSHAKE | HIDP_HSHK_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER, NULL, 0);
}
if (test_bit(HIDP_WAITING_FOR_RETURN, &session->flags) &&
param == session->waiting_report_type) {
if (session->waiting_report_number < 0 ||
session->waiting_report_number == skb->data[0]) {
/* hidp_get_raw_report() is waiting on this report. */
session->report_return = skb;
done_with_skb = 0;
clear_bit(HIDP_WAITING_FOR_RETURN, &session->flags);
wake_up_interruptible(&session->report_queue);
}
}
return done_with_skb;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_buckets_for_insert_bucket(const struct ofgroup *ofgroup,
struct ofgroup *new_ofgroup,
uint32_t command_bucket_id)
{
struct ofputil_bucket *last = NULL;
if (command_bucket_id <= OFPG15_BUCKET_MAX) {
/* Check here to ensure that a bucket corresponding to
* command_bucket_id exists in the old bucket list.
*
* The subsequent search of below of new_ofgroup covers
* both buckets in the old bucket list and buckets added
* by the insert buckets group mod message this function processes. */
if (!ofputil_bucket_find(&ofgroup->buckets, command_bucket_id)) {
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_UNKNOWN_BUCKET;
}
if (!ovs_list_is_empty(&new_ofgroup->buckets)) {
last = ofputil_bucket_list_back(&new_ofgroup->buckets);
}
}
ofputil_bucket_clone_list(CONST_CAST(struct ovs_list *,
&new_ofgroup->buckets),
&ofgroup->buckets, NULL);
if (ofputil_bucket_check_duplicate_id(&new_ofgroup->buckets)) {
VLOG_INFO_RL(&rl, "Duplicate bucket id");
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BUCKET_EXISTS;
}
/* Rearrange list according to command_bucket_id */
if (command_bucket_id == OFPG15_BUCKET_LAST) {
if (!ovs_list_is_empty(&ofgroup->buckets)) {
struct ofputil_bucket *new_first;
const struct ofputil_bucket *first;
first = ofputil_bucket_list_front(&ofgroup->buckets);
new_first = ofputil_bucket_find(&new_ofgroup->buckets,
first->bucket_id);
ovs_list_splice(new_ofgroup->buckets.next, &new_first->list_node,
CONST_CAST(struct ovs_list *,
&new_ofgroup->buckets));
}
} else if (command_bucket_id <= OFPG15_BUCKET_MAX && last) {
struct ofputil_bucket *after;
/* Presence of bucket is checked above so after should never be NULL */
after = ofputil_bucket_find(&new_ofgroup->buckets, command_bucket_id);
ovs_list_splice(after->list_node.next, new_ofgroup->buckets.next,
last->list_node.next);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 25,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _gcry_register_pk_ecc_progress (void (*cb) (void *, const char *,
int, int, int),
void *cb_data)
{
progress_cb = cb;
progress_cb_data = cb_data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 28,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __set_item(struct pppoe_net *pn, struct pppox_sock *po)
{
int hash = hash_item(po->pppoe_pa.sid, po->pppoe_pa.remote);
struct pppox_sock *ret;
ret = pn->hash_table[hash];
while (ret) {
if (cmp_2_addr(&ret->pppoe_pa, &po->pppoe_pa) &&
ret->pppoe_ifindex == po->pppoe_ifindex)
return -EALREADY;
ret = ret->next;
}
po->next = pn->hash_table[hash];
pn->hash_table[hash] = po;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::removeShare(Smb4KShare *share)
{
Q_ASSERT(share);
bool removed = false;
if (share)
{
mutex.lock();
int index = p->sharesList.indexOf(share);
if (index != -1)
{
delete p->sharesList.takeAt(index);
removed = true;
}
else
{
Smb4KShare *s = findShare(share->unc(), share->workgroupName());
if (s)
{
index = p->sharesList.indexOf(s);
if (index != -1)
{
delete p->sharesList.takeAt(index);
removed = true;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
}
delete share;
}
mutex.unlock();
}
else
{
}
return removed;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GpuCommandBufferStub::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
FastSetActiveURL(active_url_, active_url_hash_);
if (decoder_.get() &&
message.type() != GpuCommandBufferMsg_Echo::ID &&
message.type() != GpuCommandBufferMsg_RetireSyncPoint::ID &&
message.type() != GpuCommandBufferMsg_WaitSyncPoint::ID) {
if (!MakeCurrent())
return false;
}
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(GpuCommandBufferStub, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_Initialize,
OnInitialize);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetGetBuffer,
OnSetGetBuffer);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetSharedStateBuffer,
OnSetSharedStateBuffer);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetParent,
OnSetParent);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_Echo, OnEcho);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetState, OnGetState);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetStateFast,
OnGetStateFast);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_AsyncFlush, OnAsyncFlush);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_Rescheduled, OnRescheduled);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateTransferBuffer,
OnCreateTransferBuffer);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer,
OnRegisterTransferBuffer);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_DestroyTransferBuffer,
OnDestroyTransferBuffer);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer,
OnGetTransferBuffer);
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateVideoDecoder,
OnCreateVideoDecoder)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_DestroyVideoDecoder,
OnDestroyVideoDecoder)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetSurfaceVisible,
OnSetSurfaceVisible)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_DiscardBackbuffer,
OnDiscardBackbuffer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_EnsureBackbuffer,
OnEnsureBackbuffer)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_RetireSyncPoint,
OnRetireSyncPoint)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_WaitSyncPoint,
OnWaitSyncPoint)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SignalSyncPoint,
OnSignalSyncPoint)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuCommandBufferMsg_SendClientManagedMemoryStats,
OnReceivedClientManagedMemoryStats)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(
GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetClientHasMemoryAllocationChangedCallback,
OnSetClientHasMemoryAllocationChangedCallback)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
ScheduleDelayedWork(kHandleMoreWorkPeriodMs);
DCHECK(handled);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __might_sleep(const char *file, int line, int preempt_offset)
{
static unsigned long prev_jiffy; /* ratelimiting */
rcu_sleep_check(); /* WARN_ON_ONCE() by default, no rate limit reqd. */
if ((preempt_count_equals(preempt_offset) && !irqs_disabled()) ||
system_state != SYSTEM_RUNNING || oops_in_progress)
return;
if (time_before(jiffies, prev_jiffy + HZ) && prev_jiffy)
return;
prev_jiffy = jiffies;
printk(KERN_ERR
"BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at %s:%d\n",
file, line);
printk(KERN_ERR
"in_atomic(): %d, irqs_disabled(): %d, pid: %d, name: %s\n",
in_atomic(), irqs_disabled(),
current->pid, current->comm);
debug_show_held_locks(current);
if (irqs_disabled())
print_irqtrace_events(current);
dump_stack();
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vrend_clear(struct vrend_context *ctx,
unsigned buffers,
const union pipe_color_union *color,
double depth, unsigned stencil)
{
GLbitfield bits = 0;
if (ctx->in_error)
return;
if (ctx->ctx_switch_pending)
vrend_finish_context_switch(ctx);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
vrend_update_frontface_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->stencil_state_dirty)
vrend_update_stencil_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->scissor_state_dirty)
vrend_update_scissor_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->viewport_state_dirty)
vrend_update_viewport_state(ctx);
vrend_use_program(ctx, 0);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs && ctx->sub->surf[0] && vrend_format_is_emulated_alpha(ctx->sub->surf[0]->format)) {
glClearColor(color->f[3], 0.0, 0.0, 0.0);
} else {
glClearColor(color->f[0], color->f[1], color->f[2], color->f[3]);
}
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH) {
/* gallium clears don't respect depth mask */
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
glClearDepth(depth);
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
glClearStencil(stencil);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
uint32_t mask = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i])
mask |= (1 << i);
}
if (mask != (buffers >> 2)) {
mask = buffers >> 2;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
if (i < PIPE_MAX_COLOR_BUFS && ctx->sub->surf[i] && util_format_is_pure_uint(ctx->sub->surf[i] && ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferuiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLuint *)color);
else if (i < PIPE_MAX_COLOR_BUFS && ctx->sub->surf[i] && util_format_is_pure_sint(ctx->sub->surf[i] && ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLint *)color);
else
glClearBufferfv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLfloat *)color);
}
}
else
bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
if (bits)
glClear(bits);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
if (!ctx->sub->dsa_state.depth.writemask)
glDepthMask(GL_FALSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 25,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static future_t *start_up(void) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
command_credits = 1;
firmware_is_configured = false;
pthread_mutex_init(&commands_pending_response_lock, NULL);
period_ms_t startup_timeout_ms;
char timeout_prop[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (!property_get("bluetooth.enable_timeout_ms", timeout_prop, STRING_VALUE_OF(DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS))
|| (startup_timeout_ms = atoi(timeout_prop)) < 100)
startup_timeout_ms = DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS;
startup_timer = non_repeating_timer_new(startup_timeout_ms, startup_timer_expired, NULL);
if (!startup_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create startup timer.", __func__);
goto error;
}
non_repeating_timer_restart(startup_timer);
epilog_timer = non_repeating_timer_new(EPILOG_TIMEOUT_MS, epilog_timer_expired, NULL);
if (!epilog_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create epilog timer.", __func__);
goto error;
}
command_response_timer = non_repeating_timer_new(COMMAND_PENDING_TIMEOUT, command_timed_out, NULL);
if (!command_response_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create command response timer.", __func__);
goto error;
}
command_queue = fixed_queue_new(SIZE_MAX);
if (!command_queue) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create pending command queue.", __func__);
goto error;
}
packet_queue = fixed_queue_new(SIZE_MAX);
if (!packet_queue) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create pending packet queue.", __func__);
goto error;
}
thread = thread_new("hci_thread");
if (!thread) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create thread.", __func__);
goto error;
}
commands_pending_response = list_new(NULL);
if (!commands_pending_response) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create list for commands pending response.", __func__);
goto error;
}
memset(incoming_packets, 0, sizeof(incoming_packets));
packet_fragmenter->init(&packet_fragmenter_callbacks);
fixed_queue_register_dequeue(command_queue, thread_get_reactor(thread), event_command_ready, NULL);
fixed_queue_register_dequeue(packet_queue, thread_get_reactor(thread), event_packet_ready, NULL);
vendor->open(btif_local_bd_addr.address, &interface);
hal->init(&hal_callbacks, thread);
low_power_manager->init(thread);
vendor->set_callback(VENDOR_CONFIGURE_FIRMWARE, firmware_config_callback);
vendor->set_callback(VENDOR_CONFIGURE_SCO, sco_config_callback);
vendor->set_callback(VENDOR_DO_EPILOG, epilog_finished_callback);
if (!hci_inject->open(&interface)) {
}
int power_state = BT_VND_PWR_OFF;
#if (defined (BT_CLEAN_TURN_ON_DISABLED) && BT_CLEAN_TURN_ON_DISABLED == TRUE)
LOG_WARN("%s not turning off the chip before turning on.", __func__);
#else
vendor->send_command(VENDOR_CHIP_POWER_CONTROL, &power_state);
#endif
power_state = BT_VND_PWR_ON;
vendor->send_command(VENDOR_CHIP_POWER_CONTROL, &power_state);
startup_future = future_new();
LOG_DEBUG("%s starting async portion", __func__);
thread_post(thread, event_finish_startup, NULL);
return startup_future;
error:;
shut_down(); // returns NULL so no need to wait for it
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 22,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetSanitizedEnabledFlagsForCurrentPlatform(
FlagsStorage* flags_storage, std::set<std::string>* result) {
GetSanitizedEnabledFlags(flags_storage, result);
std::set<std::string> platform_experiments;
int current_platform = GetCurrentPlatform();
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_experiments; ++i) {
if (experiments[i].supported_platforms & current_platform)
AddInternalName(experiments[i], &platform_experiments);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (experiments[i].supported_platforms & kOsCrOSOwnerOnly)
AddInternalName(experiments[i], &platform_experiments);
#endif
}
std::set<std::string> new_enabled_experiments =
base::STLSetIntersection<std::set<std::string> >(
platform_experiments, *result);
result->swap(new_enabled_experiments);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 24,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_parse_matrix_transform(xps_document *doc, fz_xml *root, fz_matrix *matrix)
{
char *transform;
*matrix = fz_identity;
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(root), "MatrixTransform"))
{
transform = fz_xml_att(root, "Matrix");
if (transform)
xps_parse_render_transform(doc, transform, matrix);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::computeBlockDirectionMargins(RenderBlock* containingBlock)
{
if (isTableCell()) {
setMarginBefore(0);
setMarginAfter(0);
return;
}
int cw = containingBlockLogicalWidthForContent();
RenderStyle* containingBlockStyle = containingBlock->style();
containingBlock->setMarginBeforeForChild(this, style()->marginBeforeUsing(containingBlockStyle).calcMinValue(cw));
containingBlock->setMarginAfterForChild(this, style()->marginAfterUsing(containingBlockStyle).calcMinValue(cw));
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void conditionalLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "conditionalLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setConditionalLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexParameteriv(
GLenum target,
GLenum pname,
const volatile GLint* params) {
std::array<GLint, 1> params_copy{{params[0]}};
api()->glTexParameterivRobustANGLEFn(target, pname,
static_cast<GLsizei>(params_copy.size()),
params_copy.data());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: stf_status ikev2parent_inI2outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
{
struct state *st = md->st;
/* struct connection *c = st->st_connection; */
/*
* the initiator sent us an encrypted payload. We need to calculate
* our g^xy, and skeyseed values, and then decrypt the payload.
*/
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log(
"ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2"));
/* verify that there is in fact an encrypted payload */
if (!md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E]) {
libreswan_log("R2 state should receive an encrypted payload");
reset_globals();
return STF_FATAL;
}
/* now. we need to go calculate the g^xy */
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = alloc_thing(
struct dh_continuation,
"ikev2_inI2outR2 KE");
stf_status e;
dh->md = md;
set_suspended(st, dh->md);
pcrc_init(&dh->dh_pcrc);
dh->dh_pcrc.pcrc_func = ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue;
e = start_dh_v2(&dh->dh_pcrc, st, st->st_import, RESPONDER,
st->st_oakley.groupnum);
if (e != STF_SUSPEND && e != STF_INLINE) {
loglog(RC_CRYPTOFAILED, "system too busy");
delete_state(st);
}
reset_globals();
return e;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 7,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret, mt;
unsigned long len = 0;
int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt);
PACKET pkt;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
cb = get_callback(s);
if (s->server) {
transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message;
} else {
transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message;
}
if (st->read_state_first_init) {
s->first_packet = 1;
st->read_state_first_init = 0;
}
while (1) {
switch (st->read_state) {
case READ_STATE_HEADER:
/* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
*/
ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
} else {
ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
if (s->server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
/*
* Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
* to that state if so
*/
if (!transition(s, mt)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY;
/* Fall through */
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
ret = process_message(s, &pkt);
/* Discard the packet data */
s->init_num = 0;
switch (ret) {
case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
default:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
}
break;
case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
switch (st->read_state_work) {
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
}
break;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 5,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewTest::SimulateElementRightClick(const std::string& element_id) {
gfx::Rect bounds = GetElementBounds(element_id);
if (bounds.IsEmpty())
return false;
SimulatePointRightClick(bounds.CenterPoint());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::writeValue(
ScriptState* scriptState,
const DOMArrayPiece& value) {
if (!getGatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!getGatt()->device()->isValidCharacteristic(
m_characteristic->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::CreateDOMException(
BluetoothRemoteGATTUtils::ExceptionType::kInvalidCharacteristic));
}
if (value.byteLength() > 512)
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState, DOMException::create(InvalidModificationError,
"Value can't exceed 512 bytes."));
Vector<uint8_t> valueVector;
valueVector.append(value.bytes(), value.byteLength());
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
getGatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
service->RemoteCharacteristicWriteValue(
m_characteristic->instance_id, valueVector,
convertToBaseCallback(WTF::bind(
&BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::WriteValueCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), wrapPersistent(resolver), valueVector)));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long inet_wait_for_connect(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
/* Basic assumption: if someone sets sk->sk_err, he _must_
* change state of the socket from TCP_SYN_*.
* Connect() does not allow to get error notifications
* without closing the socket.
*/
while ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_SYN_SENT | TCPF_SYN_RECV)) {
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
if (signal_pending(current) || !timeo)
break;
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return timeo;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGResourceMarker::calcViewport()
{
if (!selfNeedsLayout())
return;
SVGMarkerElement* marker = toSVGMarkerElement(element());
ASSERT(marker);
SVGLengthContext lengthContext(marker);
float w = marker->markerWidth()->currentValue()->value(lengthContext);
float h = marker->markerHeight()->currentValue()->value(lengthContext);
m_viewport = FloatRect(0, 0, w, h);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_header(struct index_header *dest, const void *buffer)
{
const struct index_header *source = buffer;
dest->signature = ntohl(source->signature);
if (dest->signature != INDEX_HEADER_SIG)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect header signature");
dest->version = ntohl(source->version);
if (dest->version < INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_LB ||
dest->version > INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_UB)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect header version");
dest->entry_count = ntohl(source->entry_count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: fix out-of-bounds read with invalid index entry prefix length
The index format in version 4 has prefix-compressed entries, where every
index entry can compress its path by using a path prefix of the previous
entry. Since implmenting support for this index format version in commit
5625d86b9 (index: support index v4, 2016-05-17), though, we do not
correctly verify that the prefix length that we want to reuse is
actually smaller or equal to the amount of characters than the length of
the previous index entry's path. This can lead to a an integer underflow
and subsequently to an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by verifying that the prefix is actually smaller than the
previous entry's path length.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 18,123
|
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