instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void local_flush_tlb_one(unsigned long asid, unsigned long page)
{
unsigned long long match, pteh=0, lpage;
unsigned long tlb;
/*
* Sign-extend based on neff.
*/
lpage = neff_sign_extend(page);
match = (asid << PTEH_ASID_SHIFT) | PTEH_VALID;
match |= lpage;
for_each_itlb_entry(tlb) {
asm volatile ("getcfg %1, 0, %0"
: "=r" (pteh)
: "r" (tlb) );
if (pteh == match) {
__flush_tlb_slot(tlb);
break;
}
}
for_each_dtlb_entry(tlb) {
asm volatile ("getcfg %1, 0, %0"
: "=r" (pteh)
: "r" (tlb) );
if (pteh == match) {
__flush_tlb_slot(tlb);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_csr_get_public_key)
{
zval * zcsr;
zend_bool use_shortnames = 1;
zend_resource *csr_resource;
X509_REQ * csr;
EVP_PKEY *tpubkey;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z|b", &zcsr, &use_shortnames) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
csr = php_openssl_csr_from_zval(zcsr, 0, &csr_resource);
if (csr == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
/* Due to changes in OpenSSL 1.1 related to locking when decoding CSR,
* the pub key is not changed after assigning. It means if we pass
* a private key, it will be returned including the private part.
* If we duplicate it, then we get just the public part which is
* the same behavior as for OpenSSL 1.0 */
csr = X509_REQ_dup(csr);
#endif
/* Retrieve the public key from the CSR */
tpubkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(csr);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
/* We need to free the CSR as it was duplicated */
X509_REQ_free(csr);
#endif
if (tpubkey == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_RES(zend_register_resource(tpubkey, le_key));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 29,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void perf_event_print_debug(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
u64 pcr, pic;
int cpu;
if (!sparc_pmu)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
cpu = smp_processor_id();
pcr = pcr_ops->read();
read_pic(pic);
pr_info("\n");
pr_info("CPU#%d: PCR[%016llx] PIC[%016llx]\n",
cpu, pcr, pic);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::condor_job_refresh_proxy(const char *schedd_name, PROC_ID job_id,
const char *proxy_file)
{
static const char* command = "CONDOR_JOB_REFRESH_PROXY";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!schedd_name) schedd_name=NULLSTRING;
if (!proxy_file) proxy_file=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(schedd_name) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(proxy_file) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d.%d %s", esc1, job_id.cluster, job_id.proc,
esc2);
free(esc1);
free(esc2);
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = 1;
if ( result->argv[1][0] == 'S' ) {
rc = 0;
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[2];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 20,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_pcm_hw_constraint_mask(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime, snd_pcm_hw_param_t var,
u_int32_t mask)
{
struct snd_pcm_hw_constraints *constrs = &runtime->hw_constraints;
struct snd_mask *maskp = constrs_mask(constrs, var);
*maskp->bits &= mask;
memset(maskp->bits + 1, 0, (SNDRV_MASK_MAX-32) / 8); /* clear rest */
if (*maskp->bits == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateHTMLImageElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
const char* function_name,
HTMLImageElement* image,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!image || !image->CachedImage()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "no image");
return false;
}
const KURL& url = image->CachedImage()->GetResponse().Url();
if (url.IsNull() || url.IsEmpty() || !url.IsValid()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "invalid image");
return false;
}
if (WouldTaintOrigin(image, security_origin)) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError("The cross-origin image at " +
url.ElidedString() +
" may not be loaded.");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify WebGL error message
The WebGL exception message text contains the full URL of a blocked
cross-origin resource. It should instead contain only a generic notice.
Bug: 799847
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I3a7f00462a4643c41882f2ee7e7767e6d631557e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/854986
Reviewed-by: Brandon Jones <bajones@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528458}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 5,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void camellia_do_decrypt(const u32 *subkey, u32 *io, unsigned i)
{
u32 il, ir, t0, t1; /* temporary variables */
/* pre whitening but absorb kw2 */
io[0] ^= SUBKEY_L(i);
io[1] ^= SUBKEY_R(i);
/* main iteration */
#define ROUNDS(i) ({ \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[0], io[1], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 7), SUBKEY_R(i + 7), \
io[2], io[3], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 6), SUBKEY_R(i + 6), \
io[0], io[1], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[0], io[1], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 5), SUBKEY_R(i + 5), \
io[2], io[3], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 4), SUBKEY_R(i + 4), \
io[0], io[1], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[0], io[1], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 3), SUBKEY_R(i + 3), \
io[2], io[3], il, ir); \
CAMELLIA_ROUNDSM(io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 2), SUBKEY_R(i + 2), \
io[0], io[1], il, ir); \
})
#define FLS(i) ({ \
CAMELLIA_FLS(io[0], io[1], io[2], io[3], \
SUBKEY_L(i + 1), SUBKEY_R(i + 1), \
SUBKEY_L(i + 0), SUBKEY_R(i + 0), \
t0, t1, il, ir); \
})
if (i == 32) {
ROUNDS(24);
FLS(24);
}
ROUNDS(16);
FLS(16);
ROUNDS(8);
FLS(8);
ROUNDS(0);
#undef ROUNDS
#undef FLS
/* post whitening but kw4 */
io[2] ^= SUBKEY_L(0);
io[3] ^= SUBKEY_R(0);
/* NB: 0,1 should be swapped with 2,3 by caller! */
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DeviceTokenFetcher::HandleRegisterResponse(
const em::DeviceRegisterResponse& response) {
if (response.has_device_management_token()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kMetricToken, kMetricTokenFetchOK,
kMetricTokenSize);
data_store_->SetDeviceToken(response.device_management_token(), false);
SetState(STATE_TOKEN_AVAILABLE);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kMetricToken, kMetricTokenFetchBadResponse,
kMetricTokenSize);
SetState(STATE_ERROR);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnOpenURL(const FrameHostMsg_OpenURL_Params& params) {
GURL validated_url(params.url);
GetProcess()->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (params.is_history_navigation_in_new_child) {
if (frame_tree_node_->navigator()->NavigateNewChildFrame(this,
validated_url))
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::OpenURL", "url",
validated_url.possibly_invalid_spec());
bool kForceNewProcessForNewContents = true;
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->RequestOpenURL(
this, validated_url, params.uses_post, params.resource_request_body,
params.extra_headers, params.referrer, params.disposition,
kForceNewProcessForNewContents, params.should_replace_current_entry,
params.user_gesture);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 6,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_sequence_done(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp)
{
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cs = &resp->cstate;
if (nfsd4_has_session(cs)) {
if (cs->status != nfserr_replay_cache) {
nfsd4_store_cache_entry(resp);
cs->slot->sl_flags &= ~NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE;
}
/* Drop session reference that was taken in nfsd4_sequence() */
nfsd4_put_session(cs->session);
} else if (cs->clp)
put_client_renew(cs->clp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 58
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_add_renderer(SpiceServer *s, const char *name)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (!red_dispatcher_add_renderer(name)) {
return -1;
}
default_renderer = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isDisabledFormControl() const {
if (fastHasAttribute(disabledAttr))
return true;
if (m_ancestorDisabledState == AncestorDisabledStateUnknown)
updateAncestorDisabledState();
return m_ancestorDisabledState == AncestorDisabledStateDisabled;
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021
| 0
| 9,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: generate_std (RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned int nbits, unsigned long use_e,
int transient_key)
{
gcry_mpi_t p, q; /* the two primes */
gcry_mpi_t d; /* the private key */
gcry_mpi_t u;
gcry_mpi_t t1, t2;
gcry_mpi_t n; /* the public key */
gcry_mpi_t e; /* the exponent */
gcry_mpi_t phi; /* helper: (p-1)(q-1) */
gcry_mpi_t g;
gcry_mpi_t f;
gcry_random_level_t random_level;
if (fips_mode ())
{
if (nbits < 1024)
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
if (transient_key)
return GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE;
}
/* The random quality depends on the transient_key flag. */
random_level = transient_key ? GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM : GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM;
/* Make sure that nbits is even so that we generate p, q of equal size. */
if ( (nbits&1) )
nbits++;
if (use_e == 1) /* Alias for a secure value */
use_e = 65537; /* as demanded by Sphinx. */
/* Public exponent:
In general we use 41 as this is quite fast and more secure than the
commonly used 17. Benchmarking the RSA verify function
with a 1024 bit key yields (2001-11-08):
e=17 0.54 ms
e=41 0.75 ms
e=257 0.95 ms
e=65537 1.80 ms
*/
e = mpi_alloc( (32+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
if (!use_e)
mpi_set_ui (e, 41); /* This is a reasonable secure and fast value */
else
{
use_e |= 1; /* make sure this is odd */
mpi_set_ui (e, use_e);
}
n = mpi_new (nbits);
p = q = NULL;
do
{
/* select two (very secret) primes */
if (p)
_gcry_mpi_release (p);
if (q)
_gcry_mpi_release (q);
if (use_e)
{ /* Do an extra test to ensure that the given exponent is
suitable. */
p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level,
check_exponent, e);
q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level,
check_exponent, e);
}
else
{ /* We check the exponent later. */
p = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level, NULL, NULL);
q = _gcry_generate_secret_prime (nbits/2, random_level, NULL, NULL);
}
if (mpi_cmp (p, q) > 0 ) /* p shall be smaller than q (for calc of u)*/
mpi_swap(p,q);
/* calculate the modulus */
mpi_mul( n, p, q );
}
while ( mpi_get_nbits(n) != nbits );
/* calculate Euler totient: phi = (p-1)(q-1) */
t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
t2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
phi = mpi_snew ( nbits );
g = mpi_snew ( nbits );
f = mpi_snew ( nbits );
mpi_sub_ui( t1, p, 1 );
mpi_sub_ui( t2, q, 1 );
mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
mpi_gcd (g, t1, t2);
mpi_fdiv_q(f, phi, g);
while (!mpi_gcd(t1, e, phi)) /* (while gcd is not 1) */
{
if (use_e)
BUG (); /* The prime generator already made sure that we
never can get to here. */
mpi_add_ui (e, e, 2);
}
/* calculate the secret key d = e^-1 mod phi */
d = mpi_snew ( nbits );
mpi_invm (d, e, f );
/* calculate the inverse of p and q (used for chinese remainder theorem)*/
u = mpi_snew ( nbits );
mpi_invm(u, p, q );
if( DBG_CIPHER )
{
log_mpidump(" p= ", p );
log_mpidump(" q= ", q );
log_mpidump("phi= ", phi );
log_mpidump(" g= ", g );
log_mpidump(" f= ", f );
log_mpidump(" n= ", n );
log_mpidump(" e= ", e );
log_mpidump(" d= ", d );
log_mpidump(" u= ", u );
}
_gcry_mpi_release (t1);
_gcry_mpi_release (t2);
_gcry_mpi_release (phi);
_gcry_mpi_release (f);
_gcry_mpi_release (g);
sk->n = n;
sk->e = e;
sk->p = p;
sk->q = q;
sk->d = d;
sk->u = u;
/* Now we can test our keys. */
if (test_keys (sk, nbits - 64))
{
_gcry_mpi_release (sk->n); sk->n = NULL;
_gcry_mpi_release (sk->e); sk->e = NULL;
_gcry_mpi_release (sk->p); sk->p = NULL;
_gcry_mpi_release (sk->q); sk->q = NULL;
_gcry_mpi_release (sk->d); sk->d = NULL;
_gcry_mpi_release (sk->u); sk->u = NULL;
fips_signal_error ("self-test after key generation failed");
return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 19,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rds_free_mr(struct rds_sock *rs, char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct rds_free_mr_args args;
struct rds_mr *mr;
unsigned long flags;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct rds_free_mr_args))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&args, (struct rds_free_mr_args __user *)optval,
sizeof(struct rds_free_mr_args)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Special case - a null cookie means flush all unused MRs */
if (args.cookie == 0) {
if (!rs->rs_transport || !rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs)
return -EINVAL;
rs->rs_transport->flush_mrs();
return 0;
}
/* Look up the MR given its R_key and remove it from the rbtree
* so nobody else finds it.
* This should also prevent races with rds_rdma_unuse.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
mr = rds_mr_tree_walk(&rs->rs_rdma_keys, rds_rdma_cookie_key(args.cookie), NULL);
if (mr) {
rb_erase(&mr->r_rb_node, &rs->rs_rdma_keys);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mr->r_rb_node);
if (args.flags & RDS_RDMA_INVALIDATE)
mr->r_invalidate = 1;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
if (!mr)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* call rds_destroy_mr() ourselves so that we're sure it's done by the time
* we return. If we let rds_mr_put() do it it might not happen until
* someone else drops their ref.
*/
rds_destroy_mr(mr);
rds_mr_put(mr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 29,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int rv;
rv = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);
if (rv == 0)
return 0;
if (task_pid(current) == proc_pid(inode))
rv = 0;
return rv;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hstore_lt(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int res = DatumGetInt32(DirectFunctionCall2(hstore_cmp,
PG_GETARG_DATUM(0),
PG_GETARG_DATUM(1)));
PG_RETURN_BOOL(res < 0);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
if (current->mm == kvm->mm) {
/*
* Free memory regions allocated on behalf of userspace,
* unless the the memory map has changed due to process exit
* or fd copying.
*/
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region mem;
memset(&mem, 0, sizeof(mem));
mem.slot = APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT;
kvm_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem);
mem.slot = IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT;
kvm_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem);
mem.slot = TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT;
kvm_set_memory_region(kvm, &mem);
}
kvm_iommu_unmap_guest(kvm);
kfree(kvm->arch.vpic);
kfree(kvm->arch.vioapic);
kvm_free_vcpus(kvm);
if (kvm->arch.apic_access_page)
put_page(kvm->arch.apic_access_page);
kfree(rcu_dereference_check(kvm->arch.apic_map, 1));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Bool gf_sys_get_rti_os(u32 refresh_time_ms, GF_SystemRTInfo *rti, u32 flags)
{
u32 entry_time;
u64 process_u_k_time;
u32 u_k_time, idle_time;
#if 0
char szProc[100];
#endif
char line[2048];
FILE *f;
assert(sys_init);
entry_time = gf_sys_clock();
if (last_update_time && (entry_time - last_update_time < refresh_time_ms)) {
memcpy(rti, &the_rti, sizeof(GF_SystemRTInfo));
return 0;
}
u_k_time = idle_time = 0;
f = gf_fopen("/proc/stat", "r");
if (f) {
u32 k_time, nice_time, u_time;
if (fgets(line, 128, f) != NULL) {
if (sscanf(line, "cpu %u %u %u %u\n", &u_time, &k_time, &nice_time, &idle_time) == 4) {
u_k_time = u_time + k_time + nice_time;
}
}
gf_fclose(f);
}
process_u_k_time = 0;
the_rti.process_memory = 0;
/*FIXME? under LinuxThreads this will only fetch stats for the calling thread, we would have to enumerate /proc to get
the complete CPU usage of all therads of the process...*/
#if 0
sprintf(szProc, "/proc/%d/stat", the_rti.pid);
f = gf_fopen(szProc, "r");
if (f) {
fflush(f);
if (fgets(line, 2048, f) != NULL) {
char state;
char *start;
long cutime, cstime, priority, nice, itrealvalue, rss;
int exit_signal, processor;
unsigned long flags, minflt, cminflt, majflt, cmajflt, utime, stime,starttime, vsize, rlim, startcode, endcode, startstack, kstkesp, kstkeip, signal, blocked, sigignore, sigcatch, wchan, nswap, cnswap, rem;
int ppid, pgrp ,session, tty_nr, tty_pgrp, res;
start = strchr(line, ')');
if (start) start += 2;
else {
start = strchr(line, ' ');
start++;
}
res = sscanf(start,"%c %d %d %d %d %d %lu %lu %lu %lu \
%lu %lu %lu %ld %ld %ld %ld %ld %ld %lu \
%lu %ld %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu \
%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %d %d",
&state, &ppid, &pgrp, &session, &tty_nr, &tty_pgrp, &flags, &minflt, &cminflt, &majflt,
&cmajflt, &utime, &stime, &cutime, &cstime, &priority, &nice, &itrealvalue, &rem, &starttime,
&vsize, &rss, &rlim, &startcode, &endcode, &startstack, &kstkesp, &kstkeip, &signal, &blocked,
&sigignore, &sigcatch, &wchan, &nswap, &cnswap, &exit_signal, &processor);
if (res) process_u_k_time = (u64) (cutime + cstime);
else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] PROC %s parse error\n", szProc));
}
} else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] error reading pid/stat\n\n", szProc));
}
gf_fclose(f);
} else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] cannot open %s\n", szProc));
}
sprintf(szProc, "/proc/%d/status", the_rti.pid);
f = gf_fopen(szProc, "r");
if (f) {
while (fgets(line, 1024, f) != NULL) {
if (!strnicmp(line, "VmSize:", 7)) {
sscanf(line, "VmSize: %"LLD" kB", &the_rti.process_memory);
the_rti.process_memory *= 1024;
}
}
gf_fclose(f);
} else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] cannot open %s\n", szProc));
}
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_IPHONE
the_rti.physical_memory = the_rti.physical_memory_avail = 0;
f = gf_fopen("/proc/meminfo", "r");
if (f) {
while (fgets(line, 1024, f) != NULL) {
if (!strnicmp(line, "MemTotal:", 9)) {
sscanf(line, "MemTotal: "LLU" kB", &the_rti.physical_memory);
the_rti.physical_memory *= 1024;
} else if (!strnicmp(line, "MemFree:", 8)) {
sscanf(line, "MemFree: "LLU" kB", &the_rti.physical_memory_avail);
the_rti.physical_memory_avail *= 1024;
break;
}
}
gf_fclose(f);
} else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CORE, ("[RTI] cannot open /proc/meminfo\n"));
}
#endif
the_rti.sampling_instant = last_update_time;
if (last_update_time) {
the_rti.sampling_period_duration = (entry_time - last_update_time);
the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = (u32) (process_u_k_time - last_process_k_u_time) * 10;
/*oops, we have no choice but to assume 100% cpu usage during this period*/
if (!u_k_time) {
the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.sampling_period_duration;
u_k_time = (u32) (last_cpu_u_k_time + the_rti.sampling_period_duration);
the_rti.cpu_idle_time = 0;
the_rti.total_cpu_usage = 100;
if (!the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff) the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff;
the_rti.process_cpu_usage = (u32) ( 100 * the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff / the_rti.sampling_period_duration);
} else {
u64 samp_sys_time;
/*move to ms (/proc/stat gives times in 100 ms unit*/
the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff = (u32) (u_k_time - last_cpu_u_k_time)*10;
/*we're not that accurate....*/
if (the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff > the_rti.sampling_period_duration)
the_rti.sampling_period_duration = the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff;
if (!idle_time) idle_time = (the_rti.sampling_period_duration - the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff)/10;
samp_sys_time = u_k_time - last_cpu_u_k_time;
the_rti.cpu_idle_time = (u32) (idle_time - last_cpu_idle_time);
the_rti.total_cpu_usage = (u32) ( 100 * samp_sys_time / (the_rti.cpu_idle_time + samp_sys_time ) );
/*move to ms (/proc/stat gives times in 100 ms unit*/
the_rti.cpu_idle_time *= 10;
if (!the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff) the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff = the_rti.total_cpu_time_diff;
the_rti.process_cpu_usage = (u32) ( 100 * the_rti.process_cpu_time_diff / (the_rti.cpu_idle_time + 10*samp_sys_time ) );
}
} else {
mem_at_startup = the_rti.physical_memory_avail;
}
the_rti.process_memory = mem_at_startup - the_rti.physical_memory_avail;
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
the_rti.gpac_memory = gpac_allocated_memory;
#endif
last_process_k_u_time = process_u_k_time;
last_cpu_idle_time = idle_time;
last_cpu_u_k_time = u_k_time;
last_update_time = entry_time;
memcpy(rti, &the_rti, sizeof(GF_SystemRTInfo));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_encode(const opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
J2K_T2_MODE p_t2_mode )
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* to store w, h, dx and dy fro all components and resolutions*/
OPJ_UINT32 * l_tmp_data;
OPJ_UINT32 ** l_tmp_ptr;
/* encoding prameters to set*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0,l_tx1,l_ty0,l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min,l_dy_min;
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
OPJ_UINT32 l_step_p , l_step_c , l_step_r , l_step_l ;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_stride;
/* pointers*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *l_tccp = 00;
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_comp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
OPJ_UINT32 * l_encoding_value_ptr = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no];
l_bound = l_tcp->numpocs+1;
l_data_stride = 4 * OPJ_J2K_MAXRLVLS;
l_tmp_data = (OPJ_UINT32*)opj_malloc(
l_data_stride * p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (! l_tmp_data) {
return 00;
}
l_tmp_ptr = (OPJ_UINT32**)opj_malloc(
p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32 *));
if (! l_tmp_ptr) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
return 00;
}
/* memory allocation for pi*/
l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image,p_cp,p_tile_no);
if (!l_pi) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
return 00;
}
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_data;
/* update pointer array*/
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
l_tmp_ptr[compno] = l_encoding_value_ptr;
l_encoding_value_ptr += l_data_stride;
}
/* get encoding parameters*/
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters(p_image,p_cp,p_tile_no,&l_tx0,&l_tx1,&l_ty0,&l_ty1,&l_dx_min,&l_dy_min,&l_max_prec,&l_max_res,l_tmp_ptr);
/* step calculations*/
l_step_p = 1;
l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;
l_step_r = p_image->numcomps * l_step_c;
l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;
/* set values for first packet iterator*/
l_pi->tp_on = (OPJ_BYTE)p_cp->m_specific_param.m_enc.m_tp_on;
l_current_pi = l_pi;
/* memory allocation for include*/
l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(l_tcp->numlayers * l_step_l, sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
if (!l_current_pi->include) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_bound);
return 00;
}
/* special treatment for the first packet iterator*/
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;
l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for (compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
++l_current_pi;
for (pino = 1 ; pino<l_bound ; ++pino ) {
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;
l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for (compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
/* special treatment*/
l_current_pi->include = (l_current_pi-1)->include;
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
l_tmp_data = 00;
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
l_tmp_ptr = 00;
if (l_tcp->POC && (OPJ_IS_CINEMA(p_cp->rsiz) || p_t2_mode == FINAL_PASS)) {
opj_pi_update_encode_poc_and_final(p_cp,p_tile_no,l_tx0,l_tx1,l_ty0,l_ty1,l_max_prec,l_max_res,l_dx_min,l_dy_min);
}
else {
opj_pi_update_encode_not_poc(p_cp,p_image->numcomps,p_tile_no,l_tx0,l_tx1,l_ty0,l_ty1,l_max_prec,l_max_res,l_dx_min,l_dy_min);
}
return l_pi;
}
Commit Message: Fix an integer overflow issue (#809)
Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of
pi.c.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_get_nick_index (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
int i;
if (!server->nick)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < server->nicks_count; i++)
{
if (strcmp (server->nick, server->nicks_array[i]) == 0)
{
return i;
}
}
/* nick not found */
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static X509_STORE * setup_verify(zval * calist TSRMLS_DC)
{
X509_STORE *store;
X509_LOOKUP * dir_lookup, * file_lookup;
HashPosition pos;
int ndirs = 0, nfiles = 0;
store = X509_STORE_new();
if (store == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (calist && (Z_TYPE_P(calist) == IS_ARRAY)) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(calist), &pos);
for (;; zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(calist), &pos)) {
zval ** item;
struct stat sb;
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(calist), (void**)&item, &pos) == FAILURE) {
break;
}
convert_to_string_ex(item);
if (VCWD_STAT(Z_STRVAL_PP(item), &sb) == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unable to stat %s", Z_STRVAL_PP(item));
continue;
}
if ((sb.st_mode & S_IFREG) == S_IFREG) {
file_lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
if (file_lookup == NULL || !X509_LOOKUP_load_file(file_lookup, Z_STRVAL_PP(item), X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error loading file %s", Z_STRVAL_PP(item));
} else {
nfiles++;
}
file_lookup = NULL;
} else {
dir_lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
if (dir_lookup == NULL || !X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(dir_lookup, Z_STRVAL_PP(item), X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error loading directory %s", Z_STRVAL_PP(item));
} else {
ndirs++;
}
dir_lookup = NULL;
}
}
}
if (nfiles == 0) {
file_lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
if (file_lookup) {
X509_LOOKUP_load_file(file_lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
}
}
if (ndirs == 0) {
dir_lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
if (dir_lookup) {
X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(dir_lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);
}
}
return store;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 21,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
if (hash_alg == 0)
return NULL;
if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
return NULL;
return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSwappedOut() {
if (!is_waiting_for_swapout_ack_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END0("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::SwapOut", this);
if (swapout_event_monitor_timeout_)
swapout_event_monitor_timeout_->Stop();
ClearAllWebUI();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() && !render_view_host_->is_active())
render_view_host_->set_is_swapped_out(true);
bool deleted =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->DeleteFromPendingList(this);
CHECK(deleted);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void t2p_read_tiff_size(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input){
uint64* sbc=NULL;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT) || defined (OJPEG_SUPPORT)
unsigned char* jpt=NULL;
tstrip_t i=0;
tstrip_t stripcount=0;
#endif
uint64 k = 0;
if(t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4 ){
TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc);
if (sbc[0] != (uint64)(tmsize_t)sbc[0]) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
t2p->tiff_datasize=(tmsize_t)sbc[0];
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP){
TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc);
if (sbc[0] != (uint64)(tmsize_t)sbc[0]) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
t2p->tiff_datasize=(tmsize_t)sbc[0];
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG){
if(!TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Input file %s missing field: TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
k = checkAdd64(k, sbc[i], t2p);
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGIFOFFSET, &(t2p->tiff_dataoffset))){
if(t2p->tiff_dataoffset != 0){
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGIFBYTECOUNT, &(t2p->tiff_datasize))!=0){
if((uint64)t2p->tiff_datasize < k) {
TIFFWarning(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Input file %s has short JPEG interchange file byte count",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength=t2p->tiff_datasize;
k = checkAdd64(k, t2p->tiff_datasize, t2p);
k = checkAdd64(k, 6, t2p);
k = checkAdd64(k, stripcount, t2p);
k = checkAdd64(k, stripcount, t2p);
t2p->tiff_datasize = (tsize_t) k;
if ((uint64) t2p->tiff_datasize != k) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
return;
}
return;
}else {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Input file %s missing field: TIFFTAG_JPEGIFBYTECOUNT",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
}
}
k = checkAdd64(k, stripcount, t2p);
k = checkAdd64(k, stripcount, t2p);
k = checkAdd64(k, 2048, t2p);
t2p->tiff_datasize = (tsize_t) k;
if ((uint64) t2p->tiff_datasize != k) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
uint32 count = 0;
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0 ){
if(count > 4){
k += count;
k -= 2; /* don't use EOI of header */
}
} else {
k = 2; /* SOI for first strip */
}
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
if(!TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Input file %s missing field: TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
k = checkAdd64(k, sbc[i], t2p);
k -=2; /* don't use EOI of strip */
k +=2; /* add space for restart marker */
}
k = checkAdd64(k, 2, t2p); /* use EOI of last strip */
k = checkAdd64(k, 6, t2p); /* for DRI marker of first strip */
t2p->tiff_datasize = (tsize_t) k;
if ((uint64) t2p->tiff_datasize != k) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
return;
}
#endif
(void) 0;
}
k = checkMultiply64(TIFFScanlineSize(input), t2p->tiff_length, t2p);
if(t2p->tiff_planar==PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE){
k = checkMultiply64(k, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel, t2p);
}
if (k == 0) {
/* Assume we had overflow inside TIFFScanlineSize */
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
t2p->tiff_datasize = (tsize_t) k;
if ((uint64) t2p->tiff_datasize != k) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
}
return;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stdpr(struct printparam* pp, char *buf, int inbuf){
if((pp->inbuf + inbuf > 1024) || !buf) {
socksend(pp->cp->clisock, (unsigned char *)pp->buf, pp->inbuf, conf.timeouts[STRING_S]);
pp->inbuf = 0;
if(!buf) return;
}
if(inbuf >= 1000){
socksend(pp->cp->clisock, (unsigned char *)buf, inbuf, conf.timeouts[STRING_S]);
}
else {
memcpy(pp->buf + pp->inbuf, buf, inbuf);
pp->inbuf += inbuf;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: out-of-bounds write and few more bugs in 'admin' configuration upload
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 2,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(const struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx = NULL;
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
unsigned long flags;
if (ci == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
/*
* We first try getting the ctx from a free list because in
* the common case the ctx will have an allocated and
* initialized crypto tfm, so it's probably a worthwhile
* optimization. For the bounce page, we first try getting it
* from the kernel allocator because that's just about as fast
* as getting it from a list and because a cache of free pages
* should generally be a "last resort" option for a filesystem
* to be able to do its job.
*/
spin_lock_irqsave(&fscrypt_ctx_lock, flags);
ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&fscrypt_free_ctxs,
struct fscrypt_ctx, free_list);
if (ctx)
list_del(&ctx->free_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fscrypt_ctx_lock, flags);
if (!ctx) {
ctx = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, gfp_flags);
if (!ctx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ctx->flags |= FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL;
} else {
ctx->flags &= ~FS_CTX_REQUIRES_FREE_ENCRYPT_FL;
}
ctx->flags &= ~FS_CTX_HAS_BOUNCE_BUFFER_FL;
return ctx;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String AXObject::recursiveTextAlternative(const AXObject& axObj,
bool inAriaLabelledByTraversal,
AXObjectSet& visited) {
if (visited.contains(&axObj) && !inAriaLabelledByTraversal)
return String();
AXNameFrom tmpNameFrom;
return axObj.textAlternative(true, inAriaLabelledByTraversal, visited,
tmpNameFrom, nullptr, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 11,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jpc_streamlist_t *jpc_streamlist_create()
{
jpc_streamlist_t *streamlist;
int i;
if (!(streamlist = jas_malloc(sizeof(jpc_streamlist_t)))) {
return 0;
}
streamlist->numstreams = 0;
streamlist->maxstreams = 100;
if (!(streamlist->streams = jas_alloc2(streamlist->maxstreams,
sizeof(jas_stream_t *)))) {
jas_free(streamlist);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < streamlist->maxstreams; ++i) {
streamlist->streams[i] = 0;
}
return streamlist;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 22,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int DetectRunInspectRuleHeader(
const Packet *p,
const Flow *f,
const Signature *s,
const uint32_t sflags,
const uint8_t s_proto_flags)
{
/* check if this signature has a requirement for flowvars of some type
* and if so, if we actually have any in the flow. If not, the sig
* can't match and we skip it. */
if ((p->flags & PKT_HAS_FLOW) && (sflags & SIG_FLAG_REQUIRE_FLOWVAR)) {
DEBUG_VALIDATE_BUG_ON(f == NULL);
int m = f->flowvar ? 1 : 0;
/* no flowvars? skip this sig */
if (m == 0) {
SCLogDebug("skipping sig as the flow has no flowvars and sig "
"has SIG_FLAG_REQUIRE_FLOWVAR flag set.");
return 0;
}
}
if ((s_proto_flags & DETECT_PROTO_IPV4) && !PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ip version didn't match");
return 0;
}
if ((s_proto_flags & DETECT_PROTO_IPV6) && !PKT_IS_IPV6(p)) {
SCLogDebug("ip version didn't match");
return 0;
}
if (DetectProtoContainsProto(&s->proto, IP_GET_IPPROTO(p)) == 0) {
SCLogDebug("proto didn't match");
return 0;
}
/* check the source & dst port in the sig */
if (p->proto == IPPROTO_TCP || p->proto == IPPROTO_UDP || p->proto == IPPROTO_SCTP) {
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_DP_ANY)) {
if (p->flags & PKT_IS_FRAGMENT)
return 0;
DetectPort *dport = DetectPortLookupGroup(s->dp,p->dp);
if (dport == NULL) {
SCLogDebug("dport didn't match.");
return 0;
}
}
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_SP_ANY)) {
if (p->flags & PKT_IS_FRAGMENT)
return 0;
DetectPort *sport = DetectPortLookupGroup(s->sp,p->sp);
if (sport == NULL) {
SCLogDebug("sport didn't match.");
return 0;
}
}
} else if ((sflags & (SIG_FLAG_DP_ANY|SIG_FLAG_SP_ANY)) != (SIG_FLAG_DP_ANY|SIG_FLAG_SP_ANY)) {
SCLogDebug("port-less protocol and sig needs ports");
return 0;
}
/* check the destination address */
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_DST_ANY)) {
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
if (DetectAddressMatchIPv4(s->addr_dst_match4, s->addr_dst_match4_cnt, &p->dst) == 0)
return 0;
} else if (PKT_IS_IPV6(p)) {
if (DetectAddressMatchIPv6(s->addr_dst_match6, s->addr_dst_match6_cnt, &p->dst) == 0)
return 0;
}
}
/* check the source address */
if (!(sflags & SIG_FLAG_SRC_ANY)) {
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
if (DetectAddressMatchIPv4(s->addr_src_match4, s->addr_src_match4_cnt, &p->src) == 0)
return 0;
} else if (PKT_IS_IPV6(p)) {
if (DetectAddressMatchIPv6(s->addr_src_match6, s->addr_src_match6_cnt, &p->src) == 0)
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: stream: fix false negative on bad RST
If a bad RST was received the stream inspection would not happen
for that packet, but it would still move the 'raw progress' tracker
forward. Following good packets would then fail to detect anything
before the 'raw progress' position.
Bug #2770
Reported-by: Alexey Vishnyakov
CWE ID: CWE-347
| 0
| 21,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::DevicesUpdated(
const std::string& source,
const base::ListValue& targets) {
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.devicesUpdated", &targets, NULL,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum nl_mmap_status netlink_get_status(const struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr)
{
smp_rmb();
flush_dcache_page(pgvec_to_page(hdr));
return hdr->nm_status;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsDriveAppSyncId(const std::string& sync_id) {
return StartsWithASCII(sync_id, kDriveAppSyncIdPrefix, true);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int crypto_unregister_algs(struct crypto_alg *algs, int count)
{
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
ret = crypto_unregister_alg(&algs[i]);
if (ret)
pr_err("Failed to unregister %s %s: %d\n",
algs[i].cra_driver_name, algs[i].cra_name, ret);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XID GetX11WindowFromGtkWidget(GtkWidget* widget) {
return GDK_WINDOW_XID(gtk_widget_get_window(widget));
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void server_connect_init(SERVER_REC *server)
{
const char *str;
g_return_if_fail(server != NULL);
MODULE_DATA_INIT(server);
server->type = module_get_uniq_id("SERVER", 0);
server_ref(server);
server->nick = g_strdup(server->connrec->nick);
if (server->connrec->username == NULL || *server->connrec->username == '\0') {
g_free_not_null(server->connrec->username);
str = g_get_user_name();
if (*str == '\0') str = "unknown";
server->connrec->username = g_strdup(str);
}
if (server->connrec->realname == NULL || *server->connrec->realname == '\0') {
g_free_not_null(server->connrec->realname);
str = g_get_real_name();
if (*str == '\0') str = server->connrec->username;
server->connrec->realname = g_strdup(str);
}
server->tag = server_create_tag(server->connrec);
server->connect_tag = -1;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool SplashFTFont::makeGlyph(int c, int xFrac, int yFrac,
SplashGlyphBitmap *bitmap, int x0, int y0, SplashClip *clip, SplashClipResult *clipRes) {
SplashFTFontFile *ff;
FT_Vector offset;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
FT_UInt gid;
int rowSize;
Guchar *p, *q;
int i;
ff = (SplashFTFontFile *)fontFile;
ff->face->size = sizeObj;
offset.x = (FT_Pos)(int)((SplashCoord)xFrac * splashFontFractionMul * 64);
offset.y = 0;
FT_Set_Transform(ff->face, &matrix, &offset);
slot = ff->face->glyph;
if (ff->codeToGID && c < ff->codeToGIDLen) {
gid = (FT_UInt)ff->codeToGID[c];
} else {
gid = (FT_UInt)c;
}
if (ff->trueType && gid == 0) {
return gFalse;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP : FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#else
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_HINTING | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP
: FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#endif
FT_Glyph_Metrics *glyphMetrics = &(ff->face->glyph->metrics);
bitmap->x = splashRound(-glyphMetrics->horiBearingX / 64.0);
bitmap->y = splashRound(glyphMetrics->horiBearingY / 64.0);
bitmap->w = splashRound(glyphMetrics->width / 64.0);
bitmap->h = splashRound(glyphMetrics->height / 64.0);
*clipRes = clip->testRect(x0 - bitmap->x,
y0 - bitmap->y,
x0 - bitmap->x + bitmap->w,
y0 - bitmap->y + bitmap->h);
if (*clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
bitmap->freeData = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
if (FT_Render_Glyph(slot, aa ? ft_render_mode_normal
: ft_render_mode_mono)) {
return gFalse;
}
bitmap->x = -slot->bitmap_left;
bitmap->y = slot->bitmap_top;
bitmap->w = slot->bitmap.width;
bitmap->h = slot->bitmap.rows;
bitmap->aa = aa;
if (aa) {
rowSize = bitmap->w;
} else {
rowSize = (bitmap->w + 7) >> 3;
}
bitmap->data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(rowSize * bitmap->h);
bitmap->freeData = gTrue;
for (i = 0, p = bitmap->data, q = slot->bitmap.buffer;
i < bitmap->h;
++i, p += rowSize, q += slot->bitmap.pitch) {
memcpy(p, q, rowSize);
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 25,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TemplateURL::ShowInDefaultList(
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data) const {
return data_.show_in_default_list &&
url_ref_->SupportsReplacement(search_terms_data);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_sign)
{
zval *key, *signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned int siglen;
zend_string *sigbuf;
zend_resource *keyresource = NULL;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
zval *method = NULL;
zend_long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
sigbuf = zend_string_alloc(siglen, 0);
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md_ctx != NULL &&
EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, mdtype) &&
EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, data, data_len) &&
EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, (unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf), &siglen, pkey)) {
zval_dtor(signature);
ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf)[siglen] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(sigbuf) = siglen;
ZVAL_NEW_STR(signature, sigbuf);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
efree(sigbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
if (keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 26,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::OnStoreReset() {
for (const auto& identifier : PushMessagingAppIdentifier::GetAll(profile_)) {
RecordUnsubscribeReason(
content::mojom::PushUnregistrationReason::GCM_STORE_RESET);
ClearPushSubscriptionId(profile_, identifier.origin(),
identifier.service_worker_registration_id(),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
}
PushMessagingAppIdentifier::DeleteAllFromPrefs(profile_);
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int file_remove_privs(struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
int kill;
int error = 0;
/* Fast path for nothing security related */
if (IS_NOSEC(inode))
return 0;
kill = dentry_needs_remove_privs(dentry);
if (kill < 0)
return kill;
if (kill)
error = __remove_privs(dentry, kill);
if (!error)
inode_has_no_xattr(inode);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 20,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmd_ls(void *data, const char *input) { // "ls"
RCore *core = (RCore *)data;
const char *arg = strchr (input, ' ');
if (arg) {
arg = r_str_trim_ro (arg + 1);
}
switch (*input) {
case '?': // "l?"
eprintf ("Usage: l[es] # ls to list files, le[ss] to less a file\n");
break;
case 'e': // "le"
if (arg) {
r_core_cmdf (core, "cat %s~..", arg);
} else {
eprintf ("Usage: less [file]\n");
}
break;
default: // "ls"
if (!arg) {
arg = "";
}
if (r_fs_check (core->fs, arg)) {
r_core_cmdf (core, "md %s", arg);
} else {
char *res = r_syscmd_ls (arg);
if (res) {
r_cons_print (res);
free (res);
}
}
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 1,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ppp *ppp_create_interface(struct net *net, int unit,
struct file *file, int *retp)
{
struct ppp *ppp;
struct ppp_net *pn;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
int i;
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct ppp), "", NET_NAME_ENUM, ppp_setup);
if (!dev)
goto out1;
pn = ppp_pernet(net);
ppp = netdev_priv(dev);
ppp->dev = dev;
ppp->mru = PPP_MRU;
init_ppp_file(&ppp->file, INTERFACE);
ppp->file.hdrlen = PPP_HDRLEN - 2; /* don't count proto bytes */
ppp->owner = file;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_NP; ++i)
ppp->npmode[i] = NPMODE_PASS;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ppp->channels);
spin_lock_init(&ppp->rlock);
spin_lock_init(&ppp->wlock);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK
ppp->minseq = -1;
skb_queue_head_init(&ppp->mrq);
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_FILTER
ppp->pass_filter = NULL;
ppp->active_filter = NULL;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_FILTER */
/*
* drum roll: don't forget to set
* the net device is belong to
*/
dev_net_set(dev, net);
rtnl_lock();
mutex_lock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex);
if (unit < 0) {
unit = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp);
if (unit < 0) {
ret = unit;
goto out2;
}
} else {
ret = -EEXIST;
if (unit_find(&pn->units_idr, unit))
goto out2; /* unit already exists */
/*
* if caller need a specified unit number
* lets try to satisfy him, otherwise --
* he should better ask us for new unit number
*
* NOTE: yes I know that returning EEXIST it's not
* fair but at least pppd will ask us to allocate
* new unit in this case so user is happy :)
*/
unit = unit_set(&pn->units_idr, ppp, unit);
if (unit < 0)
goto out2;
}
/* Initialize the new ppp unit */
ppp->file.index = unit;
sprintf(dev->name, "ppp%d", unit);
ret = register_netdevice(dev);
if (ret != 0) {
unit_put(&pn->units_idr, unit);
netdev_err(ppp->dev, "PPP: couldn't register device %s (%d)\n",
dev->name, ret);
goto out2;
}
ppp->ppp_net = net;
atomic_inc(&ppp_unit_count);
mutex_unlock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex);
rtnl_unlock();
*retp = 0;
return ppp;
out2:
mutex_unlock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex);
rtnl_unlock();
free_netdev(dev);
out1:
*retp = ret;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 10,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remote_socket_shutdown(asocket* s) {
D("entered remote_socket_shutdown RS(%d) CLOSE fd=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->fd,
s->peer ? s->peer->fd : -1);
apacket* p = get_apacket();
p->msg.command = A_CLSE;
if (s->peer) {
p->msg.arg0 = s->peer->id;
}
p->msg.arg1 = s->id;
send_packet(p, s->transport);
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanRequestURL(
int child_id, const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false; // Can't request invalid URLs.
const std::string& scheme = url.scheme();
if (IsPseudoScheme(scheme))
return url.IsAboutBlank() || url == kAboutSrcDocURL;
if (url.SchemeIsBlob() || url.SchemeIsFileSystem()) {
if (IsMalformedBlobUrl(url))
return false;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
return origin.unique() || CanRequestURL(child_id, GURL(origin.Serialize()));
}
if (IsWebSafeScheme(scheme))
return true;
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return false;
if (state->second->CanRequestURL(url))
return true;
}
return !GetContentClient()->browser()->IsHandledURL(url) &&
!net::URLRequest::IsHandledURL(url);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MSLUnparsedEntityDeclaration(void *context,const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *public_id,const xmlChar *system_id,const xmlChar *notation)
{
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
/*
What to do when an unparsed entity declaration is parsed.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" SAX.unparsedEntityDecl(%s, %s, %s, %s)",name,
public_id != (const xmlChar *) NULL ? (const char *) public_id : "none",
system_id != (const xmlChar *) NULL ? (const char *) system_id : "none",
notation);
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
(void) xmlAddDocEntity(msl_info->document,name,
XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY,public_id,system_id,notation);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 13,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bdrv_round_to_clusters(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t sector_num, int nb_sectors,
int64_t *cluster_sector_num,
int *cluster_nb_sectors)
{
BlockDriverInfo bdi;
if (bdrv_get_info(bs, &bdi) < 0 || bdi.cluster_size == 0) {
*cluster_sector_num = sector_num;
*cluster_nb_sectors = nb_sectors;
} else {
int64_t c = bdi.cluster_size / BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE;
*cluster_sector_num = QEMU_ALIGN_DOWN(sector_num, c);
*cluster_nb_sectors = QEMU_ALIGN_UP(sector_num - *cluster_sector_num +
nb_sectors, c);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 2,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool kvm_arch_intc_initialized(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MPIC
if (kvm->arch.mpic)
return true;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
if (kvm->arch.xics || kvm->arch.xive)
return true;
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 15,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_child_status(h2_session *session, int status, const char *msg)
{
/* Assume that we also change code/msg when something really happened and
* avoid updating the scoreboard in between */
if (session->last_status_code != status
|| session->last_status_msg != msg) {
apr_snprintf(session->status, sizeof(session->status),
"%s, streams: %d/%d/%d/%d/%d (open/recv/resp/push/rst)",
msg? msg : "-",
(int)session->open_streams,
(int)session->remote.emitted_count,
(int)session->responses_submitted,
(int)session->pushes_submitted,
(int)session->pushes_reset + session->streams_reset);
ap_update_child_status_descr(session->c->sbh, status, session->status);
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Source::parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationOffsets(
off64_t offset, off64_t /* size */) {
ALOGV("parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationOffsets");
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(offset, &version, sizeof(version)) != 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset++;
uint32_t flags;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt24(offset, &flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset += 3;
uint32_t entrycount;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &entrycount)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
offset += 4;
if (entrycount == 0) {
return OK;
}
if (entrycount > UINT32_MAX / 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (entrycount > mCurrentSampleInfoOffsetsAllocSize) {
uint64_t *newPtr = (uint64_t *)realloc(mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets, entrycount * 8);
if (newPtr == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets = newPtr;
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsetsAllocSize = entrycount;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsetCount = entrycount;
if (mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets == NULL) {
return OK;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < entrycount; i++) {
if (version == 0) {
uint32_t tmp;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets[i] = tmp;
offset += 4;
} else {
uint64_t tmp;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(offset, &tmp)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets[i] = tmp;
offset += 8;
}
}
off64_t drmoffset = mCurrentSampleInfoOffsets[0]; // from moof
drmoffset += mCurrentMoofOffset;
int ivlength;
CHECK(mFormat->findInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, &ivlength));
if (ivlength != 0 && ivlength != 8 && ivlength != 16) {
ALOGW("unsupported IV length: %d", ivlength);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mCurrentSampleInfoCount; i++) {
if (i >= mCurrentSamples.size()) {
ALOGW("too few samples");
break;
}
Sample *smpl = &mCurrentSamples.editItemAt(i);
memset(smpl->iv, 0, 16);
if (mDataSource->readAt(drmoffset, smpl->iv, ivlength) != ivlength) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += ivlength;
int32_t smplinfosize = mCurrentDefaultSampleInfoSize;
if (smplinfosize == 0) {
smplinfosize = mCurrentSampleInfoSizes[i];
}
if (smplinfosize > ivlength) {
uint16_t numsubsamples;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt16(drmoffset, &numsubsamples)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += 2;
for (size_t j = 0; j < numsubsamples; j++) {
uint16_t numclear;
uint32_t numencrypted;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt16(drmoffset, &numclear)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += 2;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(drmoffset, &numencrypted)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
drmoffset += 4;
smpl->clearsizes.add(numclear);
smpl->encryptedsizes.add(numencrypted);
}
} else {
smpl->clearsizes.add(0);
smpl->encryptedsizes.add(smpl->size);
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::open(const String& method, const KURL& url, bool async, const String& user, ExceptionState& es)
{
KURL urlWithCredentials(url);
urlWithCredentials.setUser(user);
open(method, urlWithCredentials, async, es);
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EC_PRE_COMP *EC_ec_pre_comp_dup(EC_PRE_COMP *pre)
{
int i;
if (pre != NULL)
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&pre->references, 1, &i, pre->lock);
return pre;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 2,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* cJSON_strdup( const char* str )
{
size_t len;
char* copy;
len = strlen( str ) + 1;
if ( ! ( copy = (char*) cJSON_malloc( len ) ) )
return 0;
memcpy( copy, str, len );
return copy;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 27,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ipv6_icmp_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int err,
__be16 port, u32 info, u8 *payload)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct icmp6hdr *icmph = icmp6_hdr(skb);
struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
if (!np->recverr)
return;
skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
serr->ee.ee_errno = err;
serr->ee.ee_origin = SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP6;
serr->ee.ee_type = icmph->icmp6_type;
serr->ee.ee_code = icmph->icmp6_code;
serr->ee.ee_pad = 0;
serr->ee.ee_info = info;
serr->ee.ee_data = 0;
serr->addr_offset = (u8 *)&(((struct ipv6hdr *)(icmph + 1))->daddr) -
skb_network_header(skb);
serr->port = port;
__skb_pull(skb, payload - skb->data);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
if (sock_queue_err_skb(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
next_download_id_(0),
download_prefs_(new DownloadPrefs(profile)) {
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void locationWithExceptionAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::locationWithExceptionAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::DidAnimateForInputOnCompositorThread() {
TRACE_EVENT0(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("renderer.scheduler"),
"RendererSchedulerImpl::DidAnimateForInputOnCompositorThread");
base::AutoLock lock(any_thread_lock_);
any_thread().fling_compositor_escalation_deadline =
helper_.NowTicks() +
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kFlingEscalationLimitMillis);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int futex_wait(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset, int clockrt)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
struct restart_block *restart;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q q;
int ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
q.pi_state = NULL;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = NULL;
q.requeue_pi_key = NULL;
if (abs_time) {
to = &timeout;
hrtimer_init_on_stack(&to->timer, clockrt ? CLOCK_REALTIME :
CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
hrtimer_init_sleeper(to, current);
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&to->timer, *abs_time,
current->timer_slack_ns);
}
retry:
/* Prepare to wait on uaddr. */
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, fshared, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* queue_me and wait for wakeup, timeout, or a signal. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
/* If we were woken (and unqueued), we succeeded, whatever. */
ret = 0;
if (!unqueue_me(&q))
goto out_put_key;
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
if (to && !to->task)
goto out_put_key;
/*
* We expect signal_pending(current), but we might be the
* victim of a spurious wakeup as well.
*/
if (!signal_pending(current)) {
put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key);
goto retry;
}
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!abs_time)
goto out_put_key;
restart = ¤t_thread_info()->restart_block;
restart->fn = futex_wait_restart;
restart->futex.uaddr = (u32 *)uaddr;
restart->futex.val = val;
restart->futex.time = abs_time->tv64;
restart->futex.bitset = bitset;
restart->futex.flags = FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT;
if (fshared)
restart->futex.flags |= FLAGS_SHARED;
if (clockrt)
restart->futex.flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
ret = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
out_put_key:
put_futex_key(fshared, &q.key);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 18,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabManagerTest() : scoped_set_tick_clock_for_testing_(&test_clock_) {
test_clock_.Advance(kShortDelay);
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kSiteCharacteristicsDatabase);
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: i915_gem_execbuffer_flush(struct drm_device *dev,
uint32_t invalidate_domains,
uint32_t flush_domains,
uint32_t flush_rings)
{
drm_i915_private_t *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
int i, ret;
if (flush_domains & I915_GEM_DOMAIN_CPU)
intel_gtt_chipset_flush();
if (flush_domains & I915_GEM_DOMAIN_GTT)
wmb();
if ((flush_domains | invalidate_domains) & I915_GEM_GPU_DOMAINS) {
for (i = 0; i < I915_NUM_RINGS; i++)
if (flush_rings & (1 << i)) {
ret = i915_gem_flush_ring(&dev_priv->ring[i],
invalidate_domains,
flush_domains);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bmpmask32toimage(const OPJ_UINT8* pData, OPJ_UINT32 stride, opj_image_t* image, OPJ_UINT32 redMask, OPJ_UINT32 greenMask, OPJ_UINT32 blueMask, OPJ_UINT32 alphaMask)
{
int index;
OPJ_UINT32 width, height;
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
const OPJ_UINT8 *pSrc = NULL;
OPJ_BOOL hasAlpha;
OPJ_UINT32 redShift, redPrec;
OPJ_UINT32 greenShift, greenPrec;
OPJ_UINT32 blueShift, bluePrec;
OPJ_UINT32 alphaShift, alphaPrec;
width = image->comps[0].w;
height = image->comps[0].h;
hasAlpha = image->numcomps > 3U;
bmp_mask_get_shift_and_prec(redMask, &redShift, &redPrec);
bmp_mask_get_shift_and_prec(greenMask, &greenShift, &greenPrec);
bmp_mask_get_shift_and_prec(blueMask, &blueShift, &bluePrec);
bmp_mask_get_shift_and_prec(alphaMask, &alphaShift, &alphaPrec);
image->comps[0].bpp = redPrec;
image->comps[0].prec = redPrec;
image->comps[1].bpp = greenPrec;
image->comps[1].prec = greenPrec;
image->comps[2].bpp = bluePrec;
image->comps[2].prec = bluePrec;
if (hasAlpha) {
image->comps[3].bpp = alphaPrec;
image->comps[3].prec = alphaPrec;
}
index = 0;
pSrc = pData + (height - 1U) * stride;
for(y = 0; y < height; y++)
{
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
OPJ_UINT32 value = 0U;
value |= ((OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[4*x+0]) << 0;
value |= ((OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[4*x+1]) << 8;
value |= ((OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[4*x+2]) << 16;
value |= ((OPJ_UINT32)pSrc[4*x+3]) << 24;
image->comps[0].data[index] = (OPJ_INT32)((value & redMask) >> redShift); /* R */
image->comps[1].data[index] = (OPJ_INT32)((value & greenMask) >> greenShift); /* G */
image->comps[2].data[index] = (OPJ_INT32)((value & blueMask) >> blueShift); /* B */
if (hasAlpha) {
image->comps[3].data[index] = (OPJ_INT32)((value & alphaMask) >> alphaShift); /* A */
}
index++;
}
pSrc -= stride;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_get_signature(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL)
return(info_ptr->signature);
else
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_listen(struct uncurl_conn *ucc, char *bind_ip4, uint16_t port)
{
int32_t e;
ucc->port = port;
e = net_listen(&ucc->net, bind_ip4, ucc->port, &ucc->nopts);
if (e != UNCURL_OK) return e;
return UNCURL_OK;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352
| 0
| 2,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pgx_getsgnd(jas_stream_t *in, bool *sgnd)
{
int c;
do {
if ((c = pgx_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
} while (isspace(c));
#if 0
if (c == '+') {
*sgnd = false;
} else if (c == '-') {
*sgnd = true;
} else {
*sgnd = false;
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, c)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
}
while ((c = pgx_getc(in)) != EOF && !isspace(c)) {
;
}
if (c == EOF) {
goto error;
}
#else
if (c == '+' || c == '-') {
*sgnd = (c == '-');
while ((c = pgx_getc(in)) != EOF && !isspace(c)) {
;
}
if (c == EOF) {
goto error;
}
} else {
*sgnd = false;
if (jas_stream_ungetc(in, c)) {
goto error;
}
}
#endif
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 5,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: point_swap_cond (mpi_point_t d, mpi_point_t s, unsigned long swap,
mpi_ec_t ctx)
{
mpi_swap_cond (d->x, s->x, swap);
if (ctx->model != MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY)
mpi_swap_cond (d->y, s->y, swap);
mpi_swap_cond (d->z, s->z, swap);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 7,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_moof_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov, int tracks,
int64_t mdat_size)
{
AVIOContext *avio_buf;
int ret, moof_size;
if ((ret = ffio_open_null_buf(&avio_buf)) < 0)
return ret;
mov_write_moof_tag_internal(avio_buf, mov, tracks, 0);
moof_size = ffio_close_null_buf(avio_buf);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DASH && !(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX))
mov_write_sidx_tags(pb, mov, tracks, moof_size + 8 + mdat_size);
if (mov->write_prft > MOV_PRFT_NONE && mov->write_prft < MOV_PRFT_NB)
mov_write_prft_tag(pb, mov, tracks);
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX ||
!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_SKIP_TRAILER) ||
mov->ism_lookahead) {
if ((ret = mov_add_tfra_entries(pb, mov, tracks, moof_size + 8 + mdat_size)) < 0)
return ret;
if (!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_GLOBAL_SIDX) &&
mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_SKIP_TRAILER) {
mov_prune_frag_info(mov, tracks, mov->ism_lookahead + 1);
}
}
return mov_write_moof_tag_internal(pb, mov, tracks, moof_size);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 2,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_image_block(Gif_Reader *grr, uint8_t *buffer, int *bit_pos_store,
int *bit_len_store, int bits_needed)
{
int bit_position = *bit_pos_store;
int bit_length = *bit_len_store;
uint8_t block_len;
while (bit_position + bits_needed > bit_length) {
/* Read in the next data block. */
if (bit_position >= 8) {
/* Need to shift down the upper, unused part of 'buffer' */
int i = bit_position / 8;
buffer[0] = buffer[i];
buffer[1] = buffer[i+1];
bit_position -= i * 8;
bit_length -= i * 8;
}
block_len = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\nimage_block(%d) ", block_len));
if (block_len == 0) return 0;
gifgetblock(buffer + bit_length / 8, block_len, grr);
bit_length += block_len * 8;
}
*bit_pos_store = bit_position;
*bit_len_store = bit_length;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 11,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int add_to_pagemap(unsigned long addr, u64 pfn,
struct pagemapread *pm)
{
pm->buffer[pm->pos++] = pfn;
if (pm->pos >= pm->len)
return PM_END_OF_BUFFER;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateAddDurationFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *ret, *xstr, *ystr;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
ystr = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt))
return;
xstr = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlFree(ystr);
return;
}
ret = exsltDateAddDuration(xstr, ystr);
xmlFree(ystr);
xmlFree(xstr);
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::scheduleEvent(Event* event) {
#if LOG_MEDIA_EVENTS
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "scheduleEvent(" << (void*)this << ")"
<< " - scheduling '" << event->type() << "'";
#endif
m_asyncEventQueue->enqueueEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(const GURL& url) {
return url.SchemeIs(url::kFtpScheme) || url.SchemeIs(url::kGopherScheme);
}
Commit Message: Use an opaque URL rather than an empty URL for request's site for cookies.
Apparently this makes a big difference to the cookie settings backend.
Bug: 881715
Change-Id: Id87fa0c6a858bae6a3f8fff4d6af3f974b00d5e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1212846
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#589512}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gdi_Bitmap_Free(rdpContext* context, rdpBitmap* bitmap)
{
gdiBitmap* gdi_bitmap = (gdiBitmap*) bitmap;
if (gdi_bitmap)
{
if (gdi_bitmap->hdc)
gdi_SelectObject(gdi_bitmap->hdc, (HGDIOBJECT) gdi_bitmap->org_bitmap);
gdi_DeleteObject((HGDIOBJECT) gdi_bitmap->bitmap);
gdi_DeleteDC(gdi_bitmap->hdc);
_aligned_free(bitmap->data);
}
free(bitmap);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_net_set_link_status(NetClientState *nc)
{
VirtIONet *n = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
uint16_t old_status = n->status;
if (nc->link_down)
n->status &= ~VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP;
else
n->status |= VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP;
if (n->status != old_status)
virtio_notify_config(vdev);
virtio_net_set_status(vdev, vdev->status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Handle<v8::String> propertyName = v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute");
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (!imp->isValueDirty()) {
v8::Handle<v8::Value> jsValue = V8HiddenValue::getHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), propertyName);
if (!jsValue.IsEmpty()) {
v8SetReturnValue(info, jsValue);
return;
}
}
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::GetterContext, "cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
ScriptValue jsValue = imp->cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute(exceptionState);
if (UNLIKELY(exceptionState.throwIfNeeded()))
return;
V8HiddenValue::setHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), propertyName, jsValue.v8Value());
v8SetReturnValue(info, jsValue.v8Value());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_gs_BM(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *blendmode)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
gstate->blendmode = fz_lookup_blendmode(blendmode);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 8,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sasl_capability_visible(void)
{
if (!SASL_SERVER || !find_server(SASL_SERVER, NULL))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix AUTHENTICATE bug
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 24,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WindowedLoadStopObserver::Observe(
int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (--remaining_notification_count_ == 0)
WindowedNotificationObserver::Observe(type, source, details);
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, setMetadata)
{
char *error;
zval *metadata;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "z", &metadata) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->arc.archive) TSRMLS_CC)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata);
phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata = NULL;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata);
ZVAL_ZVAL(phar_obj->arc.archive->metadata, metadata, 1, 0);
phar_obj->arc.archive->is_modified = 1;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int protocol_version(VncState *vs, uint8_t *version, size_t len)
{
char local[13];
memcpy(local, version, 12);
local[12] = 0;
if (sscanf(local, "RFB %03d.%03d\n", &vs->major, &vs->minor) != 2) {
VNC_DEBUG("Malformed protocol version %s\n", local);
vnc_client_error(vs);
return 0;
}
VNC_DEBUG("Client request protocol version %d.%d\n", vs->major, vs->minor);
if (vs->major != 3 ||
(vs->minor != 3 &&
vs->minor != 4 &&
vs->minor != 5 &&
vs->minor != 7 &&
vs->minor != 8)) {
VNC_DEBUG("Unsupported client version\n");
vnc_write_u32(vs, VNC_AUTH_INVALID);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_client_error(vs);
return 0;
}
/* Some broken clients report v3.4 or v3.5, which spec requires to be treated
* as equivalent to v3.3 by servers
*/
if (vs->minor == 4 || vs->minor == 5)
vs->minor = 3;
if (vs->minor == 3) {
if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_NONE) {
VNC_DEBUG("Tell client auth none\n");
vnc_write_u32(vs, vs->auth);
vnc_flush(vs);
start_client_init(vs);
} else if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_VNC) {
VNC_DEBUG("Tell client VNC auth\n");
vnc_write_u32(vs, vs->auth);
vnc_flush(vs);
start_auth_vnc(vs);
} else {
VNC_DEBUG("Unsupported auth %d for protocol 3.3\n", vs->auth);
vnc_write_u32(vs, VNC_AUTH_INVALID);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_client_error(vs);
}
} else {
VNC_DEBUG("Telling client we support auth %d\n", vs->auth);
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* num auth */
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->auth);
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth, 1);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::addOverflowFromFloats()
{
if (!m_floatingObjects)
return;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
const FloatingObject& floatingObject = *it->get();
if (floatingObject.isDirectlyContained())
addOverflowFromChild(floatingObject.layoutObject(), LayoutSize(xPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject), yPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject)));
}
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 14,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Mac_Read_POST_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* pfb_data;
int i, type, flags;
FT_Long len;
FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
FT_Long rlen, temp;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index != 0 )
return error;
/* Find the length of all the POST resources, concatenated. Assume */
/* worst case (each resource in its own section). */
pfb_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_len += temp + 6;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_data[0] = 0x80;
pfb_data[1] = 1; /* Ascii section */
pfb_data[2] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[3] = 0;
pfb_data[4] = 0;
pfb_data[5] = 0;
pfb_pos = 6;
pfb_lenpos = 2;
len = 0;
type = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) )
goto Exit;
FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n",
i, offsets[i], rlen, flags ));
/* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2. */
/* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */
if ( rlen > 2 )
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type )
len += rlen;
else
{
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */
break;
if ( pfb_pos + 6 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
type = flags >> 8;
len = rlen;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = (FT_Byte)type;
pfb_lenpos = pfb_pos;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
}
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
pfb_pos += rlen;
}
if ( pfb_pos + 2 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 3;
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
return open_face_from_buffer( library,
pfb_data,
pfb_pos,
face_index,
"type1",
aface );
Exit2:
FT_FREE( pfb_data );
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 19,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double LocalDOMWindow::scrollY() const {
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return 0;
LocalFrameView* view = GetFrame()->View();
if (!view)
return 0;
document()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
double viewport_y =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset().Height();
return AdjustForAbsoluteZoom::AdjustScroll(viewport_y,
GetFrame()->PageZoomFactor());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::GetRawTemplate()
{
V8BindingPerIsolateData* data = V8BindingPerIsolateData::current();
V8BindingPerIsolateData::TemplateMap::iterator result = data->rawTemplateMap().find(&info);
if (result != data->rawTemplateMap().end())
return result->second;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> templ = createRawTemplate();
data->rawTemplateMap().add(&info, templ);
return templ;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext3_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb;
struct ext3_sb_info *sbi = EXT3_SB(sb);
struct ext3_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%lu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT3_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (!uid_eq(sbi->s_resuid, make_kuid(&init_user_ns, EXT3_DEF_RESUID)) ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT3_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u",
from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbi->s_resuid));
}
if (!gid_eq(sbi->s_resgid, make_kgid(&init_user_ns, EXT3_DEF_RESGID)) ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT3_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u",
from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbi->s_resgid));
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
int def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (def_errors == EXT3_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT3_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT))
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC))
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT3_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
(def_mount_opts & EXT3_DEFM_XATTR_USER)) {
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT3_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT3_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (!test_opt(sb, RESERVATION))
seq_puts(seq, ",noreservation");
if (sbi->s_commit_interval) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
/*
* Always display barrier state so it's clear what the status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
seq_printf(seq, ",data=%s", data_mode_string(test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS)));
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
ext3_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: count_more_files_callback (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
DirectoryCountState *state;
NautilusDirectory *directory;
GError *error;
GList *files;
state = user_data;
directory = state->directory;
if (g_cancellable_is_cancelled (state->cancellable))
{
/* Operation was cancelled. Bail out */
async_job_end (directory, "directory count");
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
directory_count_state_free (state);
return;
}
g_assert (directory->details->count_in_progress != NULL);
g_assert (directory->details->count_in_progress == state);
error = NULL;
files = g_file_enumerator_next_files_finish (state->enumerator,
res, &error);
state->file_count += count_non_skipped_files (files);
if (files == NULL)
{
count_children_done (directory, state->count_file,
TRUE, state->file_count);
directory_count_state_free (state);
}
else
{
g_file_enumerator_next_files_async (state->enumerator,
DIRECTORY_LOAD_ITEMS_PER_CALLBACK,
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT,
state->cancellable,
count_more_files_callback,
state);
}
g_list_free_full (files, g_object_unref);
if (error)
{
g_error_free (error);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InspectorAgentRegistry::InspectorAgentRegistry(InstrumentingAgents* instrumentingAgents, InspectorCompositeState* inspectorState)
: m_instrumentingAgents(instrumentingAgents)
, m_inspectorState(inspectorState)
{
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int re_yyget_column (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
if (! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER)
return 0;
return yycolumn;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 13,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void intel_pmu_disable_all(void)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
if (test_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_BTS, cpuc->active_mask))
intel_pmu_disable_bts();
intel_pmu_pebs_disable_all();
intel_pmu_lbr_disable_all();
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsRenderFrameLive() {
bool is_live = GetProcess()->HasConnection() && render_frame_created_;
DCHECK(!is_live || render_view_host_->IsRenderViewLive());
return is_live;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 7,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::OverrideRequestContextForURL(
const GURL& url, const content::ResourceContext& context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
ProfileIOData* io_data =
reinterpret_cast<ProfileIOData*>(context.GetUserData(NULL));
return io_data->extensions_request_context();
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionInstallPrompt::ReviewPermissions(
Delegate* delegate,
const Extension* extension,
const std::vector<base::FilePath>& retained_file_paths,
const std::vector<base::string16>& retained_device_messages) {
DCHECK(ui_loop_ == base::MessageLoop::current());
extension_ = extension;
prompt_ = new Prompt(POST_INSTALL_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT);
prompt_->set_retained_files(retained_file_paths);
prompt_->set_retained_device_messages(retained_device_messages);
delegate_ = delegate;
LoadImageIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 19,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegateWin::ViewClosing() {
AppListController::GetInstance()->AppListClosing();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::ResourceDispatcherHostCreated() {
return g_browser_process->ResourceDispatcherHostCreated();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewWin::EditDropTarget::OnDragLeave(IDataObject* data_object) {
ResetDropHighlights();
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jboolean cancelBondNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj, jbyteArray address) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jbyte *addr;
jboolean result;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return JNI_FALSE;
addr = env->GetByteArrayElements(address, NULL);
if (addr == NULL) {
jniThrowIOException(env, EINVAL);
return JNI_FALSE;
}
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->cancel_bond((bt_bdaddr_t *)addr);
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(address, addr, 0);
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PreconnectManagerTest::~PreconnectManagerTest() {
VerifyAndClearExpectations();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
format,
magick[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
Quantum
index;
QuantumAny
pixel;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
extent,
imageListLength,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
QuantumAny
max_value;
/*
Write PNM file header.
*/
packet_size=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image_info->magick,MagickPathExtent);
max_value=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
switch (magick[1])
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
format='7';
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
format='F';
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
format='f';
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
format='6';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='3';
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"P%c\n",format);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Write comments to file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p);
if ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r'))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (format != '7')
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
char
type[MagickPathExtent];
/*
PAM header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"WIDTH %.20g\nHEIGHT %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_type=GetQuantumType(image,exception);
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
packet_size=4;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"CMYK",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
packet_size=1;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"GRAYSCALE",MagickPathExtent);
if (IdentifyImageMonochrome(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"BLACKANDWHITE",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
packet_size=3;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"RGB",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
packet_size++;
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"_ALPHA",MagickPathExtent);
}
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"DEPTH %.20g\nMAXVAL %.20g\n",(double) packet_size,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"TUPLTYPE %s\nENDHDR\n",type);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
/*
Convert runextent encoded to PNM raster pixels.
*/
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0) ?
'0' : '1');
*q++=' ';
if ((q-pixels+1) >= (ssize_t) sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '2':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToChar(index));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(index));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(index));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+2) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '3':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+2) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
image->depth=1;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '5':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,GrayQuantum);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 8)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),
max_value);
}
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,
p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),
max_value);
}
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p)),
max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
}
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '6':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PAM.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,
p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,image->endian == LSBEndian ? "-1.0\n" :
"1.0\n");
image->depth=32;
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1613
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 16,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ImportArrayTIFF_Byte ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_Uns8 * binPtr = (XMP_Uns8*)tagInfo.dataPtr;
xmp->DeleteProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp ); // ! Don't keep appending, create a new array.
for ( size_t i = 0; i < tagInfo.count; ++i, ++binPtr ) {
XMP_Uns8 binValue = *binPtr;
char strValue[20];
snprintf ( strValue, sizeof(strValue), "%hu", (XMP_Uns16)binValue ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(strValue) is safe.
xmp->AppendArrayItem ( xmpNS, xmpProp, kXMP_PropArrayIsOrdered, strValue );
}
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportArrayTIFF_Byte
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Quantum ApplyFunction(Quantum pixel,const MagickFunction function,
const size_t number_parameters,const double *parameters,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickRealType
result;
register ssize_t
i;
(void) exception;
result=0.0;
switch (function)
{
case PolynomialFunction:
{
/*
* Polynomial
* Parameters: polynomial constants, highest to lowest order
* For example: c0*x^3 + c1*x^2 + c2*x + c3
*/
result=0.0;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_parameters; i++)
result=result*QuantumScale*pixel + parameters[i];
result*=QuantumRange;
break;
}
case SinusoidFunction:
{
/* Sinusoid Function
* Parameters: Freq, Phase, Ampl, bias
*/
double freq,phase,ampl,bias;
freq = ( number_parameters >= 1 ) ? parameters[0] : 1.0;
phase = ( number_parameters >= 2 ) ? parameters[1] : 0.0;
ampl = ( number_parameters >= 3 ) ? parameters[2] : 0.5;
bias = ( number_parameters >= 4 ) ? parameters[3] : 0.5;
result=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*(ampl*sin((double) (2.0*MagickPI*
(freq*QuantumScale*pixel + phase/360.0) )) + bias ) );
break;
}
case ArcsinFunction:
{
/* Arcsin Function (peged at range limits for invalid results)
* Parameters: Width, Center, Range, Bias
*/
double width,range,center,bias;
width = ( number_parameters >= 1 ) ? parameters[0] : 1.0;
center = ( number_parameters >= 2 ) ? parameters[1] : 0.5;
range = ( number_parameters >= 3 ) ? parameters[2] : 1.0;
bias = ( number_parameters >= 4 ) ? parameters[3] : 0.5;
result = 2.0/width*(QuantumScale*pixel - center);
if ( result <= -1.0 )
result = bias - range/2.0;
else if ( result >= 1.0 )
result = bias + range/2.0;
else
result=(MagickRealType) (range/MagickPI*asin((double) result)+bias);
result *= QuantumRange;
break;
}
case ArctanFunction:
{
/* Arctan Function
* Parameters: Slope, Center, Range, Bias
*/
double slope,range,center,bias;
slope = ( number_parameters >= 1 ) ? parameters[0] : 1.0;
center = ( number_parameters >= 2 ) ? parameters[1] : 0.5;
range = ( number_parameters >= 3 ) ? parameters[2] : 1.0;
bias = ( number_parameters >= 4 ) ? parameters[3] : 0.5;
result=(MagickRealType) (MagickPI*slope*(QuantumScale*pixel-center));
result=(MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*(range/MagickPI*atan((double)
result) + bias ) );
break;
}
case UndefinedFunction:
break;
}
return(ClampToQuantum(result));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::ForceExitPresent() {
if (display_) {
display_->ExitPresent();
}
StopPresenting();
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,701
|
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