instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qeth_check_qdio_errors(struct qeth_card *card, struct qdio_buffer *buf,
unsigned int qdio_error, const char *dbftext)
{
if (qdio_error) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, dbftext);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " F15=%02X",
buf->element[15].sflags);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " F14=%02X",
buf->element[14].sflags);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, " qerr=%X", qdio_error);
if ((buf->element[15].sflags) == 0x12) {
card->stats.rx_dropped++;
return 0;
} else
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::DeleteEntriesForCache(int64_t cache_id) {
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] = "DELETE FROM Entries WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
return statement.Run();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::addListenerTypeIfNeeded(const AtomicString& eventType)
{
if (eventType == EventTypeNames::DOMSubtreeModified) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DOMSubtreeModifiedEvent);
addMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(DOMSUBTREEMODIFIED_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeInserted) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DOMNodeInsertedEvent);
addMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(DOMNODEINSERTED_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeRemoved) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DOMNodeRemovedEvent);
addMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(DOMNODEREMOVED_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeRemovedFromDocument) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DOMNodeRemovedFromDocumentEvent);
addMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(DOMNODEREMOVEDFROMDOCUMENT_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::DOMNodeInsertedIntoDocument) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DOMNodeInsertedIntoDocumentEvent);
addMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(DOMNODEINSERTEDINTODOCUMENT_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::DOMCharacterDataModified) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DOMCharacterDataModifiedEvent);
addMutationEventListenerTypeIfEnabled(DOMCHARACTERDATAMODIFIED_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::overflowchanged) {
addListenerType(OVERFLOWCHANGED_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::webkitAnimationStart || (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssAnimationUnprefixedEnabled() && eventType == EventTypeNames::animationstart)) {
addListenerType(ANIMATIONSTART_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::webkitAnimationEnd || (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssAnimationUnprefixedEnabled() && eventType == EventTypeNames::animationend)) {
addListenerType(ANIMATIONEND_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::webkitAnimationIteration || (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::cssAnimationUnprefixedEnabled() && eventType == EventTypeNames::animationiteration)) {
addListenerType(ANIMATIONITERATION_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::webkitTransitionEnd || eventType == EventTypeNames::transitionend) {
addListenerType(TRANSITIONEND_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::beforeload) {
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::BeforeLoadEvent);
addListenerType(BEFORELOAD_LISTENER);
} else if (eventType == EventTypeNames::scroll) {
addListenerType(SCROLL_LISTENER);
}
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_INI_MH(phar_ini_modify_handler) /* {{{ */
{
zend_bool old, ini;
if (entry->name_length == 14) {
old = PHAR_G(readonly_orig);
} else {
old = PHAR_G(require_hash_orig);
}
if (new_value_length == 2 && !strcasecmp("on", new_value)) {
ini = (zend_bool) 1;
}
else if (new_value_length == 3 && !strcasecmp("yes", new_value)) {
ini = (zend_bool) 1;
}
else if (new_value_length == 4 && !strcasecmp("true", new_value)) {
ini = (zend_bool) 1;
}
else {
ini = (zend_bool) atoi(new_value);
}
/* do not allow unsetting in runtime */
if (stage == ZEND_INI_STAGE_STARTUP) {
if (entry->name_length == 14) {
PHAR_G(readonly_orig) = ini;
} else {
PHAR_G(require_hash_orig) = ini;
}
} else if (old && !ini) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (entry->name_length == 14) {
PHAR_G(readonly) = ini;
if (PHAR_GLOBALS->request_init && PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map.arBuckets) {
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), phar_set_writeable_bit, (void *)&ini TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
PHAR_G(require_hash) = ini;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}}*/
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compat_user_backtrace(struct compat_frame_tail __user *tail,
struct perf_callchain_entry *entry)
{
struct compat_frame_tail buftail;
unsigned long err;
/* Also check accessibility of one struct frame_tail beyond */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, tail, sizeof(buftail)))
return NULL;
pagefault_disable();
err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
pagefault_enable();
if (err)
return NULL;
perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
/*
* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
* (towards higher addresses).
*/
if (tail + 1 >= (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)
compat_ptr(buftail.fp))
return NULL;
return (struct compat_frame_tail __user *)compat_ptr(buftail.fp) - 1;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
char *path,
u16 orig_sclass,
u32 *sid)
{
int len;
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
int rc, cmp = 0;
while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
if (cmp <= 0)
break;
}
rc = -ENOENT;
if (!genfs || cmp)
goto out;
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
(strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
break;
}
rc = -ENOENT;
if (!c)
goto out;
if (!c->sid[0]) {
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
*sid = c->sid[0];
rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PostProfileInit() {
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser) &&
!parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginPassword)) {
g_browser_process->browser_policy_connector()->SetUserPolicyTokenService(
profile()->GetTokenService());
}
if (!parameters().ui_task)
OptionallyRunChromeOSLoginManager(parsed_command_line(), profile());
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PostProfileInit();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateBlendEquation(const char* function_name,
GLenum mode) {
switch (mode) {
case GL_FUNC_ADD:
case GL_FUNC_SUBTRACT:
case GL_FUNC_REVERSE_SUBTRACT:
return true;
case GL_MIN_EXT:
case GL_MAX_EXT:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTBlendMinMaxName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher())
return true;
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid mode");
return false;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid mode");
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usbnet_get_endpoints(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
{
int tmp;
struct usb_host_interface *alt = NULL;
struct usb_host_endpoint *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
struct usb_host_endpoint *status = NULL;
for (tmp = 0; tmp < intf->num_altsetting; tmp++) {
unsigned ep;
in = out = status = NULL;
alt = intf->altsetting + tmp;
/* take the first altsetting with in-bulk + out-bulk;
* remember any status endpoint, just in case;
* ignore other endpoints and altsettings.
*/
for (ep = 0; ep < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) {
struct usb_host_endpoint *e;
int intr = 0;
e = alt->endpoint + ep;
switch (e->desc.bmAttributes) {
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
if (!usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc))
continue;
intr = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK:
break;
default:
continue;
}
if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc)) {
if (!intr && !in)
in = e;
else if (intr && !status)
status = e;
} else {
if (!out)
out = e;
}
}
if (in && out)
break;
}
if (!alt || !in || !out)
return -EINVAL;
if (alt->desc.bAlternateSetting != 0 ||
!(dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_NO_SETINT)) {
tmp = usb_set_interface (dev->udev, alt->desc.bInterfaceNumber,
alt->desc.bAlternateSetting);
if (tmp < 0)
return tmp;
}
dev->in = usb_rcvbulkpipe (dev->udev,
in->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
dev->out = usb_sndbulkpipe (dev->udev,
out->desc.bEndpointAddress & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
dev->status = status;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(str_rot13)
{
zend_string *arg;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S", &arg) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(arg) == 0) {
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING();
} else {
RETURN_STR(php_strtr_ex(arg, rot13_from, rot13_to, 52));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnAddMessageToConsole(
int32 level,
const string16& message,
int32 line_no,
const string16& source_id) {
if (delegate_->AddMessageToConsole(level, message, line_no, source_id))
return;
int32 resolved_level =
(enabled_bindings_ & BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ? level : 0;
if (resolved_level >= ::logging::GetMinLogLevel()) {
logging::LogMessage("CONSOLE", line_no, resolved_level).stream() << "\"" <<
message << "\", source: " << source_id << " (" << line_no << ")";
}
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 77 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wait_on_pipe(struct trace_iterator *iter, int full)
{
/* Iterators are static, they should be filled or empty */
if (trace_buffer_iter(iter, iter->cpu_file))
return 0;
return ring_buffer_wait(iter->trace_buffer->buffer, iter->cpu_file,
full);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_chpass3_arg(XDR *xdrs, chpass3_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_principal(xdrs, &objp->princ)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_krb5_boolean(xdrs, &objp->keepold)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_array(xdrs, (caddr_t *)&objp->ks_tuple,
(unsigned int*)&objp->n_ks_tuple, ~0,
sizeof(krb5_key_salt_tuple),
xdr_krb5_key_salt_tuple)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->pass)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableBleedingEdgeFastPaths(bool enable)
{
ASSERT(enable);
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setBleedingEdgeFastPathsEnabled(enable);
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setSubpixelFontScalingEnabled(enable || RuntimeEnabledFeatures::subpixelFontScalingEnabled());
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setWebAnimationsAPIEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 2,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcbnl_notify(struct net_device *dev, int event, int cmd,
u32 seq, u32 portid, int dcbx_ver)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
const struct dcbnl_rtnl_ops *ops = dev->dcbnl_ops;
int err;
if (!ops)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = dcbnl_newmsg(event, cmd, portid, seq, 0, &nlh);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
if (dcbx_ver == DCB_CAP_DCBX_VER_IEEE)
err = dcbnl_ieee_fill(skb, dev);
else
err = dcbnl_cee_fill(skb, dev);
if (err < 0) {
/* Report error to broadcast listeners */
nlmsg_free(skb);
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_DCB, err);
} else {
/* End nlmsg and notify broadcast listeners */
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_DCB, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_ext_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t last_block;
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
/*
* finish any pending end_io work so we won't run the risk of
* converting any truncated blocks to initialized later
*/
ext4_flush_completed_IO(inode);
/*
* probably first extent we're gonna free will be last in block
*/
err = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, err);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return;
if (inode->i_size & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
/*
* TODO: optimization is possible here.
* Probably we need not scan at all,
* because page truncation is enough.
*/
/* we have to know where to truncate from in crash case */
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
last_block = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1)
>> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
err = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, last_block);
/* In a multi-transaction truncate, we only make the final
* transaction synchronous.
*/
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_delete_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_addr(struct inet6_dev *idev, const struct in6_addr *addr,
int plen, int scope)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
ifp = ipv6_add_addr(idev, addr, NULL, plen,
scope, IFA_F_PERMANENT,
INFINITY_LIFE_TIME, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME);
if (!IS_ERR(ifp)) {
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ifp->flags &= ~IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
ipv6_ifa_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, ifp);
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OnStartDownload(DownloadItem* download, TabContents* tab) {
if (!window())
return;
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (download->is_extension_install()) {
ExtensionService* service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
if (service && service->IsDownloadFromGallery(download->url(),
download->referrer_url())) {
return;
}
}
std::string arg = download->full_path().DirName().value();
FileBrowseUI::OpenPopup(profile_,
arg,
FileBrowseUI::kPopupWidth,
FileBrowseUI::kPopupHeight);
#else
window()->GetDownloadShelf()->AddDownload(new DownloadItemModel(download));
if (download->total_bytes() <= 0)
return;
if (download->is_extension_install() &&
!ExtensionService::IsDownloadFromMiniGallery(download->url()))
return;
TabContents* current_tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (platform_util::IsVisible(current_tab->GetNativeView()) &&
ui::Animation::ShouldRenderRichAnimation()) {
DownloadStartedAnimation::Show(current_tab);
}
#endif
if (tab->controller().IsInitialNavigation() &&
GetConstrainingContents(tab) == tab && tab_count() > 1) {
CloseContents(tab);
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAMRNBEncoder::initPorts() {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = 0;
def.eDir = OMX_DirInput;
def.nBufferCountMin = kNumBuffers;
def.nBufferCountActual = def.nBufferCountMin;
def.nBufferSize = kNumSamplesPerFrame * sizeof(int16_t);
def.bEnabled = OMX_TRUE;
def.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
def.eDomain = OMX_PortDomainAudio;
def.bBuffersContiguous = OMX_FALSE;
def.nBufferAlignment = 1;
def.format.audio.cMIMEType = const_cast<char *>("audio/raw");
def.format.audio.pNativeRender = NULL;
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_FALSE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM;
addPort(def);
def.nPortIndex = 1;
def.eDir = OMX_DirOutput;
def.nBufferCountMin = kNumBuffers;
def.nBufferCountActual = def.nBufferCountMin;
def.nBufferSize = 8192;
def.bEnabled = OMX_TRUE;
def.bPopulated = OMX_FALSE;
def.eDomain = OMX_PortDomainAudio;
def.bBuffersContiguous = OMX_FALSE;
def.nBufferAlignment = 2;
def.format.audio.cMIMEType = const_cast<char *>("audio/3gpp");
def.format.audio.pNativeRender = NULL;
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_FALSE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR;
addPort(def);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ViewSource(TabContentsWrapper* contents,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& content_state) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ViewSource"), profile_);
DCHECK(contents);
TabContentsWrapper* view_source_contents = contents->Clone();
view_source_contents->controller().PruneAllButActive();
NavigationEntry* active_entry =
view_source_contents->controller().GetActiveEntry();
if (!active_entry)
return;
GURL view_source_url = GURL(chrome::kViewSourceScheme + std::string(":") +
url.spec());
active_entry->set_virtual_url(view_source_url);
active_entry->set_content_state(
webkit_glue::RemoveScrollOffsetFromHistoryState(content_state));
active_entry->set_title(string16());
if (CanSupportWindowFeature(FEATURE_TABSTRIP)) {
int index = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->
GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
int add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE |
TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_GROUP;
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->InsertTabContentsAt(index + 1,
view_source_contents,
add_types);
} else {
Browser* browser = Browser::CreateForType(TYPE_NORMAL, profile_);
BrowserWindow* new_window = browser->window();
new_window->SetBounds(gfx::Rect(new_window->GetRestoredBounds().origin(),
window()->GetRestoredBounds().size()));
browser->window()->Show();
browser->AddTab(view_source_contents, PageTransition::LINK);
}
if (profile_->HasSessionService()) {
SessionService* session_service = profile_->GetSessionService();
if (session_service)
session_service->TabRestored(&view_source_contents->controller(), false);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_emit_inst_arg_uint8(
RE_EMIT_CONTEXT* emit_context,
uint8_t opcode,
uint8_t argument,
uint8_t** instruction_addr,
uint8_t** argument_addr,
int* code_size)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&opcode,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) instruction_addr));
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
emit_context->arena,
&argument,
sizeof(uint8_t),
(void**) argument_addr));
*code_size = 2 * sizeof(uint8_t);
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int raw_bcast_from_client_config_ifindex(struct dhcp_packet *packet, uint32_t src_nip)
{
return udhcp_send_raw_packet(packet,
/*src*/ src_nip, CLIENT_PORT,
/*dst*/ INADDR_BROADCAST, SERVER_PORT, MAC_BCAST_ADDR,
client_config.ifindex);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t BackendImpl::DumpMemoryStats(
base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump* pmd,
const std::string& parent_absolute_name) const {
return 0u;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_user_ckpt_msr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long msr)
{
task->thread.ckpt_regs.msr &= ~MSR_DEBUGCHANGE;
task->thread.ckpt_regs.msr |= msr & MSR_DEBUGCHANGE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::configureStreamsLocked() {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
if (mStatus != STATUS_UNCONFIGURED && mStatus != STATUS_CONFIGURED) {
CLOGE("Not idle");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mNeedConfig) {
ALOGV("%s: Skipping config, no stream changes", __FUNCTION__);
return OK;
}
if (mOutputStreams.size() == 0) {
addDummyStreamLocked();
} else {
tryRemoveDummyStreamLocked();
}
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Starting stream configuration", __FUNCTION__, mId);
camera3_stream_configuration config;
config.operation_mode = mIsConstrainedHighSpeedConfiguration ?
CAMERA3_STREAM_CONFIGURATION_CONSTRAINED_HIGH_SPEED_MODE :
CAMERA3_STREAM_CONFIGURATION_NORMAL_MODE;
config.num_streams = (mInputStream != NULL) + mOutputStreams.size();
Vector<camera3_stream_t*> streams;
streams.setCapacity(config.num_streams);
if (mInputStream != NULL) {
camera3_stream_t *inputStream;
inputStream = mInputStream->startConfiguration();
if (inputStream == NULL) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't start input stream configuration");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
streams.add(inputStream);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mOutputStreams.size(); i++) {
if (mOutputStreams[i].get() ==
static_cast<Camera3StreamInterface*>(mInputStream.get())) {
config.num_streams--;
continue;
}
camera3_stream_t *outputStream;
outputStream = mOutputStreams.editValueAt(i)->startConfiguration();
if (outputStream == NULL) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't start output stream configuration");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
streams.add(outputStream);
}
config.streams = streams.editArray();
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->configure_streams");
res = mHal3Device->ops->configure_streams(mHal3Device, &config);
ATRACE_END();
if (res == BAD_VALUE) {
if (mInputStream != NULL && mInputStream->isConfiguring()) {
res = mInputStream->cancelConfiguration();
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't cancel configuring input stream %d: %s (%d)",
mInputStream->getId(), strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mOutputStreams.size(); i++) {
sp<Camera3OutputStreamInterface> outputStream =
mOutputStreams.editValueAt(i);
if (outputStream->isConfiguring()) {
res = outputStream->cancelConfiguration();
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L(
"Can't cancel configuring output stream %d: %s (%d)",
outputStream->getId(), strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
}
internalUpdateStatusLocked(STATUS_UNCONFIGURED);
mNeedConfig = true;
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Stream configuration failed", __FUNCTION__, mId);
return BAD_VALUE;
} else if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Unable to configure streams with HAL: %s (%d)",
strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
if (mInputStream != NULL && mInputStream->isConfiguring()) {
res = mInputStream->finishConfiguration(mHal3Device);
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't finish configuring input stream %d: %s (%d)",
mInputStream->getId(), strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mOutputStreams.size(); i++) {
sp<Camera3OutputStreamInterface> outputStream =
mOutputStreams.editValueAt(i);
if (outputStream->isConfiguring()) {
res = outputStream->finishConfiguration(mHal3Device);
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't finish configuring output stream %d: %s (%d)",
outputStream->getId(), strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
}
mRequestThread->configurationComplete();
if (mIsConstrainedHighSpeedConfiguration) {
pid_t requestThreadTid = mRequestThread->getTid();
res = requestPriority(getpid(), requestThreadTid,
kConstrainedHighSpeedThreadPriority, true);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGW("Can't set realtime priority for request processing thread: %s (%d)",
strerror(-res), res);
} else {
ALOGD("Set real time priority for request queue thread (tid %d)", requestThreadTid);
}
} else {
}
mNeedConfig = false;
internalUpdateStatusLocked((mDummyStreamId == NO_STREAM) ?
STATUS_CONFIGURED : STATUS_UNCONFIGURED);
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Stream configuration complete", __FUNCTION__, mId);
mDeletedStreams.clear();
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXLayoutObject::addImageMapChildren() {
LayoutBoxModelObject* cssBox = getLayoutBoxModelObject();
if (!cssBox || !cssBox->isLayoutImage())
return;
HTMLMapElement* map = toLayoutImage(cssBox)->imageMap();
if (!map)
return;
for (HTMLAreaElement& area :
Traversal<HTMLAreaElement>::descendantsOf(*map)) {
AXObject* obj = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(&area);
if (obj) {
AXImageMapLink* areaObject = toAXImageMapLink(obj);
areaObject->setParent(this);
ASSERT(areaObject->axObjectID() != 0);
if (!areaObject->accessibilityIsIgnored())
m_children.push_back(areaObject);
else
axObjectCache().remove(areaObject->axObjectID());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 11,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltFuncShutdown (xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar *URI ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
exsltFuncData *data) {
if (data->result != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(data->result);
xmlFree(data);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainMigrateSetCompressionCache(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned long long cacheSize,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "cacheSize=%llu, flags=%x", cacheSize, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainMigrateSetCompressionCache) {
if (conn->driver->domainMigrateSetCompressionCache(domain, cacheSize,
flags) < 0)
goto error;
return 0;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 29,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String FileReaderLoader::StringResult() {
DCHECK_NE(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
DCHECK_NE(read_type_, kReadByClient);
if (!raw_data_ || (error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK) ||
is_raw_data_converted_) {
return string_result_;
}
switch (read_type_) {
case kReadAsArrayBuffer:
return string_result_;
case kReadAsBinaryString:
SetStringResult(raw_data_->ToString());
break;
case kReadAsText:
SetStringResult(ConvertToText());
break;
case kReadAsDataURL:
if (finished_loading_)
SetStringResult(ConvertToDataURL());
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
if (finished_loading_) {
DCHECK(is_raw_data_converted_);
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(
-1 * static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
}
return string_result_;
}
Commit Message: FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <adamk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dispatchSmsWrite (Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
RIL_SMS_WriteArgs args;
int32_t t;
status_t status;
RLOGD("dispatchSmsWrite");
memset (&args, 0, sizeof(args));
status = p.readInt32(&t);
args.status = (int)t;
args.pdu = strdupReadString(p);
if (status != NO_ERROR || args.pdu == NULL) {
goto invalid;
}
args.smsc = strdupReadString(p);
startRequest;
appendPrintBuf("%s%d,%s,smsc=%s", printBuf, args.status,
(char*)args.pdu, (char*)args.smsc);
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, &args, sizeof(args), pRI, pRI->socket_id);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memsetString (args.pdu);
#endif
free (args.pdu);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args));
#endif
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::Close() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
DVLOG(1) << "Closing data pipe consumer " << pipe_id_;
return CloseNoLock();
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void armv7pmu_write_counter(int idx, u32 value)
{
if (idx == ARMV7_CYCLE_COUNTER)
asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c9, c13, 0" : : "r" (value));
else if ((idx >= ARMV7_COUNTER0) && (idx <= ARMV7_COUNTER_LAST)) {
if (armv7_pmnc_select_counter(idx) == idx)
asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c9, c13, 2"
: : "r" (value));
} else
pr_err("CPU%u writing wrong counter %d\n",
smp_processor_id(), idx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *__l2tp_ip_bind_lookup(struct net *net, __be32 laddr, int dif, u32 tunnel_id)
{
struct hlist_node *node;
struct sock *sk;
sk_for_each_bound(sk, node, &l2tp_ip_bind_table) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct l2tp_ip_sock *l2tp = l2tp_ip_sk(sk);
if (l2tp == NULL)
continue;
if ((l2tp->conn_id == tunnel_id) &&
net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) &&
!(inet->inet_rcv_saddr && inet->inet_rcv_saddr != laddr) &&
!(sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif))
goto found;
}
sk = NULL;
found:
return sk;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jslFunctionCharAsString(unsigned char ch, char *str, size_t len) {
if (ch >= LEX_TOKEN_START) {
jslTokenAsString(ch, str, len);
} else {
str[0] = (char)ch;
str[1] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit michael_mic_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
/*
* Because the kvm_regs structure is a mix of 32, 64 and
* 128bit fields, we index it as if it was a 32bit
* array. Hence below, nr_regs is the number of entries, and
* off the index in the "array".
*/
__u32 __user *uaddr = (__u32 __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr;
struct kvm_regs *regs = vcpu_gp_regs(vcpu);
int nr_regs = sizeof(*regs) / sizeof(__u32);
u32 off;
/* Our ID is an index into the kvm_regs struct. */
off = core_reg_offset_from_id(reg->id);
if (off >= nr_regs ||
(off + (KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id) / sizeof(__u32))) >= nr_regs)
return -ENOENT;
if (validate_core_offset(reg))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(uaddr, ((u32 *)regs) + off, KVM_REG_SIZE(reg->id)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Sanitize PSTATE.M when being set from userspace
Not all execution modes are valid for a guest, and some of them
depend on what the HW actually supports. Let's verify that what
userspace provides is compatible with both the VM settings and
the HW capabilities.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 0d854a60b1d7 ("arm64: KVM: enable initialization of a 32bit vcpu")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NTPResourceCache::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED == type ||
chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED == type) {
new_tab_incognito_html_ = NULL;
new_tab_html_ = NULL;
new_tab_incognito_css_ = NULL;
new_tab_css_ = NULL;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_zip_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object * intern = (ze_zip_object *) object;
int i;
if (!intern) {
return;
}
if (intern->za) {
if (zip_close(intern->za) != 0) {
_zip_free(intern->za);
}
intern->za = NULL;
}
if (intern->buffers_cnt>0) {
for (i=0; i<intern->buffers_cnt; i++) {
efree(intern->buffers[i]);
}
efree(intern->buffers);
}
intern->za = NULL;
#if (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && PHP_MINOR_VERSION == 1 && PHP_RELEASE_VERSION > 2) || (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION == 5 && PHP_MINOR_VERSION > 1) || (PHP_MAJOR_VERSION > 5)
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->zo TSRMLS_CC);
#else
if (intern->zo.guards) {
zend_hash_destroy(intern->zo.guards);
FREE_HASHTABLE(intern->zo.guards);
}
if (intern->zo.properties) {
zend_hash_destroy(intern->zo.properties);
FREE_HASHTABLE(intern->zo.properties);
}
#endif
if (intern->filename) {
efree(intern->filename);
}
efree(intern);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputConnectionImpl::StartStateUpdateTimer() {
state_update_timer_.Start(
FROM_HERE, kStateUpdateTimeout,
base::BindOnce(&InputConnectionImpl::UpdateTextInputState,
base::Unretained(this),
true /* is_input_state_update_requested */));
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegateWin::OnShowExtensionPrompt() {
AppListController::GetInstance()->set_can_close(false);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int imagetobmp(opj_image_t * image, const char *outfile) {
int w, h;
int i, pad;
FILE *fdest = NULL;
int adjustR, adjustG, adjustB;
if (image->comps[0].prec < 8) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported number of components: %d\n", image->comps[0].prec);
return 1;
}
if (image->numcomps >= 3 && image->comps[0].dx == image->comps[1].dx
&& image->comps[1].dx == image->comps[2].dx
&& image->comps[0].dy == image->comps[1].dy
&& image->comps[1].dy == image->comps[2].dy
&& image->comps[0].prec == image->comps[1].prec
&& image->comps[1].prec == image->comps[2].prec) {
/* -->> -->> -->> -->>
24 bits color
<<-- <<-- <<-- <<-- */
fdest = fopen(outfile, "wb");
if (!fdest) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR -> failed to open %s for writing\n", outfile);
return 1;
}
w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
fprintf(fdest, "BM");
/* FILE HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c",
(OPJ_UINT8) (h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2) + 54) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (54) & 0xff, ((54) >> 8) & 0xff,((54) >> 16) & 0xff, ((54) >> 24) & 0xff);
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (40) & 0xff, ((40) >> 8) & 0xff, ((40) >> 16) & 0xff, ((40) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((w) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((h) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (1) & 0xff, ((1) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (24) & 0xff, ((24) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (3 * h * w + 3 * h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w * 3 + 3 * h * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
if (image->comps[0].prec > 8) {
adjustR = (int)image->comps[0].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 0 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[0].prec);
}
else
adjustR = 0;
if (image->comps[1].prec > 8) {
adjustG = (int)image->comps[1].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 1 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[1].prec);
}
else
adjustG = 0;
if (image->comps[2].prec > 8) {
adjustB = (int)image->comps[2].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 2 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[2].prec);
}
else
adjustB = 0;
for (i = 0; i < w * h; i++) {
OPJ_UINT8 rc, gc, bc;
int r, g, b;
r = image->comps[0].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
r += (image->comps[0].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[0].prec - 1) : 0);
r = ((r >> adjustR)+((r >> (adjustR-1))%2));
if(r > 255) r = 255; else if(r < 0) r = 0;
rc = (OPJ_UINT8)r;
g = image->comps[1].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
g += (image->comps[1].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[1].prec - 1) : 0);
g = ((g >> adjustG)+((g >> (adjustG-1))%2));
if(g > 255) g = 255; else if(g < 0) g = 0;
gc = (OPJ_UINT8)g;
b = image->comps[2].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
b += (image->comps[2].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[2].prec - 1) : 0);
b = ((b >> adjustB)+((b >> (adjustB-1))%2));
if(b > 255) b = 255; else if(b < 0) b = 0;
bc = (OPJ_UINT8)b;
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c", bc, gc, rc);
if ((i + 1) % w == 0) {
for (pad = ((3 * w) % 4) ? (4 - (3 * w) % 4) : 0; pad > 0; pad--) /* ADD */
fprintf(fdest, "%c", 0);
}
}
fclose(fdest);
} else { /* Gray-scale */
/* -->> -->> -->> -->>
8 bits non code (Gray scale)
<<-- <<-- <<-- <<-- */
fdest = fopen(outfile, "wb");
if (!fdest) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR -> failed to open %s for writing\n", outfile);
return 1;
}
w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
fprintf(fdest, "BM");
/* FILE HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + 54 + 1024 + w * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (54 + 1024) & 0xff, ((54 + 1024) >> 8) & 0xff,
((54 + 1024) >> 16) & 0xff,
((54 + 1024) >> 24) & 0xff);
/* INFO HEADER */
/* ------------- */
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (40) & 0xff, ((40) >> 8) & 0xff, ((40) >> 16) & 0xff, ((40) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((w) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((w) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) ((h) & 0xff),
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (1) & 0xff, ((1) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c", (8) & 0xff, ((8) >> 8) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (0) & 0xff, ((0) >> 8) & 0xff, ((0) >> 16) & 0xff, ((0) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (OPJ_UINT8) (h * w + h * (w % 2)) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 8) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 16) & 0xff,
(OPJ_UINT8) ((h * w + h * (w % 2)) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (7834) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 8) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 16) & 0xff, ((7834) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (256) & 0xff, ((256) >> 8) & 0xff, ((256) >> 16) & 0xff, ((256) >> 24) & 0xff);
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", (256) & 0xff, ((256) >> 8) & 0xff, ((256) >> 16) & 0xff, ((256) >> 24) & 0xff);
if (image->comps[0].prec > 8) {
adjustR = (int)image->comps[0].prec - 8;
printf("BMP CONVERSION: Truncating component 0 from %d bits to 8 bits\n", image->comps[0].prec);
}else
adjustR = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
fprintf(fdest, "%c%c%c%c", i, i, i, 0);
}
for (i = 0; i < w * h; i++) {
int r;
r = image->comps[0].data[w * h - ((i) / (w) + 1) * w + (i) % (w)];
r += (image->comps[0].sgnd ? 1 << (image->comps[0].prec - 1) : 0);
r = ((r >> adjustR)+((r >> (adjustR-1))%2));
if(r > 255) r = 255; else if(r < 0) r = 0;
fprintf(fdest, "%c", (OPJ_UINT8)r);
if ((i + 1) % w == 0) {
for (pad = (w % 4) ? (4 - w % 4) : 0; pad > 0; pad--) /* ADD */
fprintf(fdest, "%c", 0);
}
}
fclose(fdest);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 23,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
{
u64 guest_efer;
u64 ignore_bits;
guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
/*
* NX is emulated; LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless
* outside long mode
*/
ignore_bits = EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
#endif
guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
/* On ept, can't emulate nx, and must switch nx atomically */
if (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX)) {
guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER, guest_efer, host_efer);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BaseRenderingContext2D::GetUsage() {
return usage_counters_;
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 25,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionImpl() : v8::Extension(kClassName, kScript) {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestActiveDOMObjectConstructor::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
return getStaticValueSlot<JSTestActiveDOMObjectConstructor, JSDOMWrapper>(exec, &JSTestActiveDOMObjectConstructorTable, jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObjectConstructor*>(cell), propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
int len = 0;
xmlParserInputState state;
const xmlChar *in;
int nbchar = 0, ccol;
int inputid;
/*
* Check that there is a comment right here.
*/
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '!') ||
(NXT(2) != '-') || (NXT(3) != '-')) return;
state = ctxt->instate;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_COMMENT;
inputid = ctxt->input->id;
SKIP(4);
SHRINK;
GROW;
/*
* Accelerated common case where input don't need to be
* modified before passing it to the handler.
*/
in = ctxt->input->cur;
do {
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
}
get_more:
ccol = ctxt->input->col;
while (((*in > '-') && (*in <= 0x7F)) ||
((*in >= 0x20) && (*in < '-')) ||
(*in == 0x09)) {
in++;
ccol++;
}
ctxt->input->col = ccol;
if (*in == 0xA) {
do {
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
in++;
} while (*in == 0xA);
goto get_more;
}
nbchar = in - ctxt->input->cur;
/*
* save current set of data
*/
if (nbchar > 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->comment != NULL)) {
if (buf == NULL) {
if ((*in == '-') && (in[1] == '-'))
size = nbchar + 1;
else
size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE + nbchar;
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
len = 0;
} else if (len + nbchar + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *new_buf;
size += len + nbchar + XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
new_buf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf,
size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (new_buf == NULL) {
xmlFree (buf);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
buf = new_buf;
}
memcpy(&buf[len], ctxt->input->cur, nbchar);
len += nbchar;
buf[len] = 0;
}
}
ctxt->input->cur = in;
if (*in == 0xA) {
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
}
if (*in == 0xD) {
in++;
if (*in == 0xA) {
ctxt->input->cur = in;
in++;
ctxt->input->line++; ctxt->input->col = 1;
continue; /* while */
}
in--;
}
SHRINK;
GROW;
in = ctxt->input->cur;
if (*in == '-') {
if (in[1] == '-') {
if (in[2] == '>') {
if (ctxt->input->id != inputid) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"comment doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
SKIP(3);
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->comment != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (buf != NULL)
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, buf);
else
ctxt->sax->comment(ctxt->userData, BAD_CAST "");
}
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFree(buf);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
if (buf != NULL)
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n<!--%.50s\n",
buf);
else
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"Comment not terminated \n", NULL);
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
}
in++;
ctxt->input->col++;
goto get_more;
}
} while (((*in >= 0x20) && (*in <= 0x7F)) || (*in == 0x09));
xmlParseCommentComplex(ctxt, buf, len, size);
ctxt->instate = state;
return;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 27,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mmu_free_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_pte_list_desc_cache,
pte_list_desc_cache);
mmu_free_memory_cache_page(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache);
mmu_free_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache,
mmu_page_header_cache);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::OnMessage(
PresentationConnectionMessage message,
const OnMessageCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
if (message.is_binary()) {
source_connection_->didReceiveBinaryMessage(&(message.data->front()),
message.data->size());
} else {
source_connection_->didReceiveTextMessage(
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(*(message.message)));
}
callback.Run(true);
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PSOutputDev::clip(GfxState *state) {
doPath(state->getPath());
writePS("W\n");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_set_usecmap(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, pdf_cmap *usecmap)
{
int i;
pdf_drop_cmap(ctx, cmap->usecmap);
cmap->usecmap = pdf_keep_cmap(ctx, usecmap);
if (cmap->codespace_len == 0)
{
cmap->codespace_len = usecmap->codespace_len;
for (i = 0; i < usecmap->codespace_len; i++)
cmap->codespace[i] = usecmap->codespace[i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseCtxtExternalEntity(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctx, const xmlChar *URL,
const xmlChar *ID, xmlNodePtr *lst) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlDocPtr newDoc;
xmlNodePtr newRoot;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr oldsax = NULL;
int ret = 0;
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
if (ctx == NULL) return(-1);
if (((ctx->depth > 40) && ((ctx->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) ||
(ctx->depth > 1024)) {
return(XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP);
}
if (lst != NULL)
*lst = NULL;
if ((URL == NULL) && (ID == NULL))
return(-1);
if (ctx->myDoc == NULL) /* @@ relax but check for dereferences */
return(-1);
ctxt = xmlCreateEntityParserCtxtInternal(URL, ID, NULL, ctx);
if (ctxt == NULL) {
return(-1);
}
oldsax = ctxt->sax;
ctxt->sax = ctx->sax;
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
newDoc = xmlNewDoc(BAD_CAST "1.0");
if (newDoc == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(-1);
}
newDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
if (ctx->myDoc->dict) {
newDoc->dict = ctx->myDoc->dict;
xmlDictReference(newDoc->dict);
}
if (ctx->myDoc != NULL) {
newDoc->intSubset = ctx->myDoc->intSubset;
newDoc->extSubset = ctx->myDoc->extSubset;
}
if (ctx->myDoc->URL != NULL) {
newDoc->URL = xmlStrdup(ctx->myDoc->URL);
}
newRoot = xmlNewDocNode(newDoc, NULL, BAD_CAST "pseudoroot", NULL);
if (newRoot == NULL) {
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
return(-1);
}
xmlAddChild((xmlNodePtr) newDoc, newRoot);
nodePush(ctxt, newDoc->children);
if (ctx->myDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = newDoc;
} else {
ctxt->myDoc = ctx->myDoc;
newDoc->children->doc = ctx->myDoc;
}
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
*/
GROW
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4) {
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
/*
* Parse a possible text declaration first
*/
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
/*
* An XML-1.0 document can't reference an entity not XML-1.0
*/
if ((xmlStrEqual(ctx->version, BAD_CAST "1.0")) &&
(!xmlStrEqual(ctxt->input->version, BAD_CAST "1.0"))) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_VERSION_MISMATCH,
"Version mismatch between document and entity\n");
}
}
/*
* If the user provided its own SAX callbacks then reuse the
* useData callback field, otherwise the expected setup in a
* DOM builder is to have userData == ctxt
*/
if (ctx->userData == ctx)
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
else
ctxt->userData = ctx->userData;
/*
* Doing validity checking on chunk doesn't make sense
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
ctxt->validate = ctx->validate;
ctxt->valid = ctx->valid;
ctxt->loadsubset = ctx->loadsubset;
ctxt->depth = ctx->depth + 1;
ctxt->replaceEntities = ctx->replaceEntities;
if (ctxt->validate) {
ctxt->vctxt.error = ctx->vctxt.error;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = ctx->vctxt.warning;
} else {
ctxt->vctxt.error = NULL;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = NULL;
}
ctxt->vctxt.nodeTab = NULL;
ctxt->vctxt.nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->vctxt.nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->vctxt.node = NULL;
if (ctxt->dict != NULL) xmlDictFree(ctxt->dict);
ctxt->dict = ctx->dict;
ctxt->str_xml = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, BAD_CAST "xml", 3);
ctxt->str_xmlns = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, BAD_CAST "xmlns", 5);
ctxt->str_xml_ns = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, XML_XML_NAMESPACE, 36);
ctxt->dictNames = ctx->dictNames;
ctxt->attsDefault = ctx->attsDefault;
ctxt->attsSpecial = ctx->attsSpecial;
ctxt->linenumbers = ctx->linenumbers;
xmlParseContent(ctxt);
ctx->validate = ctxt->validate;
ctx->valid = ctxt->valid;
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED, NULL);
} else if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EXTRA_CONTENT, NULL);
}
if (ctxt->node != newDoc->children) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED, NULL);
}
if (!ctxt->wellFormed) {
if (ctxt->errNo == 0)
ret = 1;
else
ret = ctxt->errNo;
} else {
if (lst != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
/*
* Return the newly created nodeset after unlinking it from
* they pseudo parent.
*/
cur = newDoc->children->children;
*lst = cur;
while (cur != NULL) {
cur->parent = NULL;
cur = cur->next;
}
newDoc->children->children = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
}
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
ctxt->dict = NULL;
ctxt->attsDefault = NULL;
ctxt->attsSpecial = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 26,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ucma_context *ucma_alloc_ctx(struct ucma_file *file)
{
struct ucma_context *ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return NULL;
INIT_WORK(&ctx->close_work, ucma_close_id);
atomic_set(&ctx->ref, 1);
init_completion(&ctx->comp);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->mc_list);
ctx->file = file;
mutex_lock(&mut);
ctx->id = idr_alloc(&ctx_idr, ctx, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (ctx->id < 0)
goto error;
list_add_tail(&ctx->list, &file->ctx_list);
return ctx;
error:
kfree(ctx);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ZeroSuggestProvider::AddProviderInfo(ProvidersInfo* provider_info) const {
BaseSearchProvider::AddProviderInfo(provider_info);
if (!results_.suggest_results.empty() ||
!results_.navigation_results.empty() ||
!most_visited_urls_.empty())
provider_info->back().set_times_returned_results_in_session(1);
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::Chunk(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> transform,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> clip,
scoped_refptr<const EffectPaintPropertyNode> effect) {
return Chunk(client,
PropertyTreeState(transform.get(), clip.get(), effect.get()));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 19,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnSetWebKitSharedTimersSuspended(bool suspend) {
if (suspend_webkit_shared_timer_) {
EnsureWebKitInitialized();
if (suspend) {
webkit_platform_support_->SuspendSharedTimer();
} else {
webkit_platform_support_->ResumeSharedTimer();
}
webkit_shared_timer_suspended_ = suspend;
}
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 29,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static time_t gf_mktime_utc(struct tm *tm)
{
return timegm(tm);
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType sixel_encode_impl(unsigned char *pixels, size_t width,size_t height,
unsigned char *palette, size_t ncolors, int keycolor,
sixel_output_t *context)
{
#define RelinquishNodesAndMap \
while ((np = context->node_free) != NULL) { \
context->node_free = np->next; \
np=(sixel_node_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(np); \
} \
map = (unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(map)
int x, y, i, n, c;
int left, right;
int pix;
size_t len;
unsigned char *map;
sixel_node_t *np, *tp, top;
int nwrite;
context->pos = 0;
if (ncolors < 1) {
return (MagickFalse);
}
len = ncolors * width;
context->active_palette = (-1);
if ((map = (unsigned char *)AcquireQuantumMemory(len, sizeof(unsigned char))) == NULL) {
return (MagickFalse);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(map, 0, len);
if (context->has_8bit_control) {
nwrite = sprintf((char *)context->buffer, "\x90" "0;0;0" "q");
} else {
nwrite = sprintf((char *)context->buffer, "\x1bP" "0;0;0" "q");
}
if (nwrite <= 0) {
return (MagickFalse);
}
sixel_advance(context, nwrite);
nwrite = sprintf((char *)context->buffer + context->pos, "\"1;1;%d;%d", (int) width, (int) height);
if (nwrite <= 0) {
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return (MagickFalse);
}
sixel_advance(context, nwrite);
if (ncolors != 2 || keycolor == -1) {
for (n = 0; n < (ssize_t) ncolors; n++) {
/* DECGCI Graphics Color Introducer # Pc ; Pu; Px; Py; Pz */
nwrite = sprintf((char *)context->buffer + context->pos, "#%d;2;%d;%d;%d",
n,
(palette[n * 3 + 0] * 100 + 127) / 255,
(palette[n * 3 + 1] * 100 + 127) / 255,
(palette[n * 3 + 2] * 100 + 127) / 255);
if (nwrite <= 0) {
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return (MagickFalse);
}
sixel_advance(context, nwrite);
if (nwrite <= 0) {
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return (MagickFalse);
}
}
}
for (y = i = 0; y < (ssize_t) height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) width; x++) {
pix = pixels[y * width + x];
if (pix >= 0 && pix < (ssize_t) ncolors && pix != keycolor) {
map[pix * width + x] |= (1 << i);
}
}
if (++i < 6 && (y + 1) < (ssize_t) height) {
continue;
}
for (c = 0; c < (ssize_t) ncolors; c++) {
for (left = 0; left < (ssize_t) width; left++) {
if (*(map + c * width + left) == 0) {
continue;
}
for (right = left + 1; right < (ssize_t) width; right++) {
if (*(map + c * width + right) != 0) {
continue;
}
for (n = 1; (right + n) < (ssize_t) width; n++) {
if (*(map + c * width + right + n) != 0) {
break;
}
}
if (n >= 10 || right + n >= (ssize_t) width) {
break;
}
right = right + n - 1;
}
if ((np = context->node_free) != NULL) {
context->node_free = np->next;
} else if ((np = (sixel_node_t *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(sixel_node_t))) == NULL) {
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return (MagickFalse);
}
np->color = c;
np->left = left;
np->right = right;
np->map = map + c * width;
top.next = context->node_top;
tp = ⊤
while (tp->next != NULL) {
if (np->left < tp->next->left) {
break;
}
if (np->left == tp->next->left && np->right > tp->next->right) {
break;
}
tp = tp->next;
}
np->next = tp->next;
tp->next = np;
context->node_top = top.next;
left = right - 1;
}
}
for (x = 0; (np = context->node_top) != NULL;) {
if (x > np->left) {
/* DECGCR Graphics Carriage Return */
context->buffer[context->pos] = '$';
sixel_advance(context, 1);
x = 0;
}
x = sixel_put_node(context, x, np, (int) ncolors, keycolor);
sixel_node_del(context, np);
np = context->node_top;
while (np != NULL) {
if (np->left < x) {
np = np->next;
continue;
}
x = sixel_put_node(context, x, np, (int) ncolors, keycolor);
sixel_node_del(context, np);
np = context->node_top;
}
}
/* DECGNL Graphics Next Line */
context->buffer[context->pos] = '-';
sixel_advance(context, 1);
if (nwrite <= 0) {
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return (MagickFalse);
}
i = 0;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(map, 0, len);
}
if (context->has_8bit_control) {
context->buffer[context->pos] = 0x9c;
sixel_advance(context, 1);
} else {
context->buffer[context->pos] = 0x1b;
context->buffer[context->pos + 1] = '\\';
sixel_advance(context, 2);
}
if (nwrite <= 0) {
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return (MagickFalse);
}
/* flush buffer */
if (context->pos > 0) {
(void) WriteBlob(context->image,context->pos,context->buffer);
}
RelinquishNodesAndMap;
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String AXNodeObject::placeholderFromNativeAttribute() const {
Node* node = getNode();
if (!node || !isTextControlElement(node))
return String();
return toTextControlElement(node)->strippedPlaceholder();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 18,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMBC_find_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
SMBCCTX *context,
const char *server,
const char *share,
char **pp_workgroup,
char **pp_username,
char **pp_password)
{
SMBCSRV *srv;
int auth_called = 0;
if (!pp_workgroup || !pp_username || !pp_password) {
return NULL;
}
check_server_cache:
srv = smbc_getFunctionGetCachedServer(context)(context,
server, share,
*pp_workgroup,
*pp_username);
if (!auth_called && !srv && (!*pp_username || !(*pp_username)[0] ||
!*pp_password || !(*pp_password)[0])) {
SMBC_call_auth_fn(ctx, context, server, share,
pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password);
/*
* However, smbc_auth_fn may have picked up info relating to
* an existing connection, so try for an existing connection
* again ...
*/
auth_called = 1;
goto check_server_cache;
}
if (srv) {
if (smbc_getFunctionCheckServer(context)(context, srv)) {
/*
* This server is no good anymore
* Try to remove it and check for more possible
* servers in the cache
*/
if (smbc_getFunctionRemoveUnusedServer(context)(context,
srv)) {
/*
* We could not remove the server completely,
* remove it from the cache so we will not get
* it again. It will be removed when the last
* file/dir is closed.
*/
smbc_getFunctionRemoveCachedServer(context)(context,
srv);
}
/*
* Maybe there are more cached connections to this
* server
*/
goto check_server_cache;
}
return srv;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cifs_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
loff_t offset = (loff_t)page->index << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
int rc = -EACCES;
unsigned int xid;
xid = get_xid();
if (file->private_data == NULL) {
rc = -EBADF;
free_xid(xid);
return rc;
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "readpage %p at offset %d 0x%x\n",
page, (int)offset, (int)offset);
rc = cifs_readpage_worker(file, page, &offset);
free_xid(xid);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CSPSourceList::addSourceSelf()
{
m_allowSelf = true;
}
Commit Message: Disallow CSP source * matching of data:, blob:, and filesystem: URLs
The CSP spec specifically excludes matching of data:, blob:, and
filesystem: URLs with the source '*' wildcard. This adds checks to make
sure that doesn't happen, along with tests.
BUG=534570
R=mkwst@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1361763005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#350950}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::~RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost() {
RenderFrameDevToolsArray::iterator it =
std::find(g_agent_host_instances.Get().begin(),
g_agent_host_instances.Get().end(), this);
if (it != g_agent_host_instances.Get().end())
g_agent_host_instances.Get().erase(it);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool ehci_periodic_enabled(EHCIState *s)
{
return ehci_enabled(s) && (s->usbcmd & USBCMD_PSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 17,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *) arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case HCIGETDEVLIST:
return hci_get_dev_list(argp);
case HCIGETDEVINFO:
return hci_get_dev_info(argp);
case HCIGETCONNLIST:
return hci_get_conn_list(argp);
case HCIDEVUP:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
return hci_dev_open(arg);
case HCIDEVDOWN:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
return hci_dev_close(arg);
case HCIDEVRESET:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
return hci_dev_reset(arg);
case HCIDEVRESTAT:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
return hci_dev_reset_stat(arg);
case HCISETSCAN:
case HCISETAUTH:
case HCISETENCRYPT:
case HCISETPTYPE:
case HCISETLINKPOL:
case HCISETLINKMODE:
case HCISETACLMTU:
case HCISETSCOMTU:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
return hci_dev_cmd(cmd, argp);
case HCIINQUIRY:
return hci_inquiry(argp);
default:
lock_sock(sk);
err = hci_sock_bound_ioctl(sk, cmd, arg);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetFloatParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum pname) {
GLfloat value = 0;
if (!isContextLost())
ContextGL()->GetFloatv(pname, &value);
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::OnBrowserRemoved(Browser* browser) {
if (browser == browser_)
browser_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline __be64 *metapointer(unsigned int height, const struct metapath *mp)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = mp->mp_bh[height];
unsigned int head_size = (height > 0) ?
sizeof(struct gfs2_meta_header) : sizeof(struct gfs2_dinode);
return ((__be64 *)(bh->b_data + head_size)) + mp->mp_list[height];
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: invalidate_cached_quoted_dollar_at ()
{
dispose_words (cached_quoted_dollar_at);
cached_quoted_dollar_at = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterIPLImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("IPL");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadIPLImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteIPLImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsIPL;
entry->adjoin=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("IPL Image Sequence");
entry->module=ConstantString("IPL");
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 13,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_call_operator_verbose(op_proc_t op_proc, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
int code;
#ifndef SHOW_STACK_DEPTHS
if_debug1m('!', imemory, "[!]operator %s\n", op_get_name_string(op_proc));
#else
if_debug3m('!', imemory, "[!][es=%d os=%d]operator %s\n",
esp-i_ctx_p->exec_stack.stack.bot,
osp-i_ctx_p->op_stack.stack.bot,
op_get_name_string(op_proc));
#endif
code = do_call_operator(op_proc, i_ctx_p);
#if defined(SHOW_STACK_DEPTHS)
if_debug2m('!', imemory, "[!][es=%d os=%d]\n",
esp-i_ctx_p->exec_stack.stack.bot,
osp-i_ctx_p->op_stack.stack.bot);
#endif
if (gs_debug_c(gs_debug_flag_validate_clumps))
ivalidate_clean_spaces(i_ctx_p);
return code; /* A good place for a conditional breakpoint. */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_create_facilities(unsigned char *buffer, struct rose_sock *rose)
{
unsigned char *p = buffer + 1;
char *callsign;
char buf[11];
int len, nb;
/* National Facilities */
if (rose->rand != 0 || rose->source_ndigis == 1 || rose->dest_ndigis == 1) {
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL;
if (rose->rand != 0) {
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_RAND;
*p++ = (rose->rand >> 8) & 0xFF;
*p++ = (rose->rand >> 0) & 0xFF;
}
/* Sent before older facilities */
if ((rose->source_ndigis > 0) || (rose->dest_ndigis > 0)) {
int maxdigi = 0;
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS;
*p++ = AX25_ADDR_LEN * (rose->source_ndigis + rose->dest_ndigis);
for (nb = 0 ; nb < rose->source_ndigis ; nb++) {
if (++maxdigi >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
break;
memcpy(p, &rose->source_digis[nb], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p[6] |= AX25_HBIT;
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
for (nb = 0 ; nb < rose->dest_ndigis ; nb++) {
if (++maxdigi >= ROSE_MAX_DIGIS)
break;
memcpy(p, &rose->dest_digis[nb], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p[6] &= ~AX25_HBIT;
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
}
/* For compatibility */
if (rose->source_ndigis > 0) {
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI;
*p++ = AX25_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, &rose->source_digis[0], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
/* For compatibility */
if (rose->dest_ndigis > 0) {
*p++ = FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI;
*p++ = AX25_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, &rose->dest_digis[0], AX25_ADDR_LEN);
p += AX25_ADDR_LEN;
}
}
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = FAC_CCITT;
*p++ = FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP;
callsign = ax2asc(buf, &rose->dest_call);
*p++ = strlen(callsign) + 10;
*p++ = (strlen(callsign) + 9) * 2; /* ??? */
*p++ = 0x47; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x11;
*p++ = ROSE_ADDR_LEN * 2;
memcpy(p, &rose->dest_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
p += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, callsign, strlen(callsign));
p += strlen(callsign);
*p++ = FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP;
callsign = ax2asc(buf, &rose->source_call);
*p++ = strlen(callsign) + 10;
*p++ = (strlen(callsign) + 9) * 2; /* ??? */
*p++ = 0x47; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0x11;
*p++ = ROSE_ADDR_LEN * 2;
memcpy(p, &rose->source_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
p += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
memcpy(p, callsign, strlen(callsign));
p += strlen(callsign);
len = p - buffer;
buffer[0] = len - 1;
return len;
}
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLDelegate() {
PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::SetTestDelegate(this);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit dm_exit(void)
{
int i = ARRAY_SIZE(_exits);
while (i--)
_exits[i]();
/*
* Should be empty by this point.
*/
idr_destroy(&_minor_idr);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return -1;
}
return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 19,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::DidMoveToNewDocument(Document& old_document) {
if (ImageLoader())
ImageLoader()->ElementDidMoveToNewDocument();
if (type() == InputTypeNames::radio)
GetTreeScope().GetRadioButtonGroupScope().RemoveButton(this);
TextControlElement::DidMoveToNewDocument(old_document);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostManager::SetIsLoading(bool is_loading) {
render_view_host_->SetIsLoading(is_loading);
if (pending_render_view_host_)
pending_render_view_host_->SetIsLoading(is_loading);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect ChunkToLayerMapper::MapUsingGeometryMapper(
const FloatRect& rect) const {
FloatClipRect visual_rect(rect);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(chunk_state_, layer_state_,
visual_rect);
if (visual_rect.Rect().IsEmpty())
return IntRect();
visual_rect.Rect().Move(-layer_offset_.x(), -layer_offset_.y());
visual_rect.Rect().Inflate(outset_for_raster_effects_);
AdjustVisualRectBySubpixelOffset(visual_rect.Rect());
return EnclosingIntRect(visual_rect.Rect());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_serial_info(struct acm *acm,
struct serial_struct __user *newinfo)
{
struct serial_struct new_serial;
unsigned int closing_wait, close_delay;
int retval = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&new_serial, newinfo, sizeof(new_serial)))
return -EFAULT;
close_delay = new_serial.close_delay * 10;
closing_wait = new_serial.closing_wait == ASYNC_CLOSING_WAIT_NONE ?
ASYNC_CLOSING_WAIT_NONE : new_serial.closing_wait * 10;
mutex_lock(&acm->port.mutex);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
if ((close_delay != acm->port.close_delay) ||
(closing_wait != acm->port.closing_wait))
retval = -EPERM;
else
retval = -EOPNOTSUPP;
} else {
acm->port.close_delay = close_delay;
acm->port.closing_wait = closing_wait;
}
mutex_unlock(&acm->port.mutex);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(int) gdImageColorResolveAlpha (gdImagePtr im, int r, int g, int b, int a)
{
int c;
int ct = -1;
int op = -1;
long rd, gd, bd, ad, dist;
long mindist = 4 * 255 * 255; /* init to max poss dist */
if (im->trueColor) {
return gdTrueColorAlpha (r, g, b, a);
}
for (c = 0; c < im->colorsTotal; c++) {
if (im->open[c]) {
op = c; /* Save open slot */
continue; /* Color not in use */
}
if (c == im->transparent) {
/* don't ever resolve to the color that has
* been designated as the transparent color */
continue;
}
rd = (long) (im->red[c] - r);
gd = (long) (im->green[c] - g);
bd = (long) (im->blue[c] - b);
ad = (long) (im->alpha[c] - a);
dist = rd * rd + gd * gd + bd * bd + ad * ad;
if (dist < mindist) {
if (dist == 0) {
return c; /* Return exact match color */
}
mindist = dist;
ct = c;
}
}
/* no exact match. We now know closest, but first try to allocate exact */
if (op == -1) {
op = im->colorsTotal;
if (op == gdMaxColors) {
/* No room for more colors */
return ct; /* Return closest available color */
}
im->colorsTotal++;
}
im->red[op] = r;
im->green[op] = g;
im->blue[op] = b;
im->alpha[op] = a;
im->open[op] = 0;
return op; /* Return newly allocated color */
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int virtcons_restore(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct ports_device *portdev;
struct port *port;
int ret;
portdev = vdev->priv;
ret = init_vqs(portdev);
if (ret)
return ret;
virtio_device_ready(portdev->vdev);
if (use_multiport(portdev))
fill_queue(portdev->c_ivq, &portdev->c_ivq_lock);
list_for_each_entry(port, &portdev->ports, list) {
port->in_vq = portdev->in_vqs[port->id];
port->out_vq = portdev->out_vqs[port->id];
fill_queue(port->in_vq, &port->inbuf_lock);
/* Get port open/close status on the host */
send_control_msg(port, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY, 1);
/*
* If a port was open at the time of suspending, we
* have to let the host know that it's still open.
*/
if (port->guest_connected)
send_control_msg(port, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_OPEN, 1);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_addr_filters_apply(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_addr_filters_head *ifh = perf_event_addr_filters(event);
struct task_struct *task = READ_ONCE(event->ctx->task);
struct perf_addr_filter *filter;
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
unsigned int count = 0;
unsigned long flags;
/*
* We may observe TASK_TOMBSTONE, which means that the event tear-down
* will stop on the parent's child_mutex that our caller is also holding
*/
if (task == TASK_TOMBSTONE)
return;
if (!ifh->nr_file_filters)
return;
mm = get_task_mm(event->ctx->task);
if (!mm)
goto restart;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ifh->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(filter, &ifh->list, entry) {
event->addr_filters_offs[count] = 0;
/*
* Adjust base offset if the filter is associated to a binary
* that needs to be mapped:
*/
if (filter->inode)
event->addr_filters_offs[count] =
perf_addr_filter_apply(filter, mm);
count++;
}
event->addr_filters_gen++;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ifh->lock, flags);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
restart:
perf_event_stop(event, 1);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker(ExecState* exec)
{
JSWorkerConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSWorkerConstructor*>(exec->callee());
if (!exec->argumentCount())
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
UString scriptURL = exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec);
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
DOMWindow* window = asJSDOMWindow(exec->lexicalGlobalObject())->impl();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Worker> worker = Worker::create(window->document(), ustringToString(scriptURL), ec);
if (ec) {
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(JSValue());
}
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), worker.release())));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 15,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ffs_free(struct usb_function *f)
{
kfree(ffs_func_from_usb(f));
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wbinvd_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
kvm_emulate_wbinvd(&svm->vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockDownloadController::MockDownloadController()
: approve_file_access_request_(true) {
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 22,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void start_bandwidth_timer(struct hrtimer *period_timer, ktime_t period)
{
unsigned long delta;
ktime_t soft, hard, now;
for (;;) {
if (hrtimer_active(period_timer))
break;
now = hrtimer_cb_get_time(period_timer);
hrtimer_forward(period_timer, now, period);
soft = hrtimer_get_softexpires(period_timer);
hard = hrtimer_get_expires(period_timer);
delta = ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(hard, soft));
__hrtimer_start_range_ns(period_timer, soft, delta,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int port_fops_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
{
struct port *port;
unsigned int ret;
port = filp->private_data;
poll_wait(filp, &port->waitqueue, wait);
if (!port->guest_connected) {
/* Port got unplugged */
return POLLHUP;
}
ret = 0;
if (!will_read_block(port))
ret |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (!will_write_block(port))
ret |= POLLOUT;
if (!port->host_connected)
ret |= POLLHUP;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t fremovexattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename,
const char *name)
{
char *proc_path = g_strdup_printf("/proc/self/fd/%d/%s", dirfd, filename);
int ret;
ret = lremovexattr(proc_path, name);
g_free(proc_path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 18,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vhost_scsi_do_plug(struct vhost_scsi_tpg *tpg,
struct se_lun *lun, bool plug)
{
struct vhost_scsi *vs = tpg->vhost_scsi;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
u32 reason;
if (!vs)
return;
mutex_lock(&vs->dev.mutex);
if (plug)
reason = VIRTIO_SCSI_EVT_RESET_RESCAN;
else
reason = VIRTIO_SCSI_EVT_RESET_REMOVED;
vq = &vs->vqs[VHOST_SCSI_VQ_EVT].vq;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
if (vhost_has_feature(vq, VIRTIO_SCSI_F_HOTPLUG))
vhost_scsi_send_evt(vs, tpg, lun,
VIRTIO_SCSI_T_TRANSPORT_RESET, reason);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&vs->dev.mutex);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::loadString(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& string, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& baseURL, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& mimeType, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& failingURL)
{
d->loadString(string, baseURL, mimeType, failingURL);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ElementsAccessor::InitializeOncePerProcess() {
static ElementsAccessor* accessor_array[] = {
#define ACCESSOR_ARRAY(Class, Kind, Store) new Class(#Kind),
ELEMENTS_LIST(ACCESSOR_ARRAY)
#undef ACCESSOR_ARRAY
};
STATIC_ASSERT((sizeof(accessor_array) / sizeof(*accessor_array)) ==
kElementsKindCount);
elements_accessors_ = accessor_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 12,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::CheckForHistoryFilesRemoval() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
for (const auto& it : downloads_) {
DownloadItemImpl* item = it.second.get();
CheckForFileRemoval(item);
}
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<AccessibilityTextMarker> AccessibilityUIElement::startTextMarkerForTextMarkerRange(AccessibilityTextMarkerRange* range)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetOnReceivedData(
const base::Callback<void(SocketStreamEvent*)>& callback) {
on_received_data_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ath_lookup_legacy(struct ath_buf *bf)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info;
struct ieee80211_tx_rate *rates;
int i;
skb = bf->bf_mpdu;
tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
rates = tx_info->control.rates;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if (!rates[i].count || rates[i].idx < 0)
break;
if (!(rates[i].flags & IEEE80211_TX_RC_MCS))
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 17,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
int n = 0; /* number of results */
defaultoptions(&h);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
/* stack space for item + next position */
luaL_checkstack(L, 2, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res); n++;
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f); n++;
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d); n++;
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (n == 0 || !lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format 'c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1); n--;
luaL_argcheck(L, size <= ld && pos <= ld - size,
2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size); n++;
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1); n++;
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1); /* next position */
return n + 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 9,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaStreamManager::DoesMediaDeviceIDMatchHMAC(
const std::string& salt,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
const std::string& device_guid,
const std::string& raw_unique_id) {
DCHECK(!raw_unique_id.empty());
std::string guid_from_raw_device_id =
GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(salt, security_origin, raw_unique_id);
return guid_from_raw_device_id == device_guid;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_cod_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_cod_t *cod = &ms->parms.cod;
assert(cod->numlyrs > 0 && cod->compparms.numdlvls <= 32);
assert(cod->compparms.numdlvls == cod->compparms.numrlvls - 1);
if (jpc_putuint8(out, cod->compparms.csty) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, cod->prg) ||
jpc_putuint16(out, cod->numlyrs) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, cod->mctrans)) {
return -1;
}
if (jpc_cox_putcompparms(ms, cstate, out,
(cod->csty & JPC_COX_PRT) != 0, &cod->compparms)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 20,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport double InterpretLocaleValue(const char *magick_restrict string,
char **magick_restrict sentinal)
{
char
*q;
double
value;
if ((*string == '0') && ((string[1] | 0x20)=='x'))
value=(double) strtoul(string,&q,16);
else
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT) && defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_STRTOD_L)
locale_t
locale;
locale=AcquireCLocale();
if (locale == (locale_t) NULL)
value=strtod(string,&q);
else
value=strtod_l(string,&q,locale);
#else
value=strtod(string,&q);
#endif
}
if (sentinal != (char **) NULL)
*sentinal=q;
return(value);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::AddExtraInitParams(
views::Widget::InitParams* params) {
params->opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params->shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 25,974 |
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