instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentUtilityClient::ChromeContentUtilityClient()
: utility_process_running_elevated_(false) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extensions::InitExtensionsClient();
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW) || \
(BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BASIC_PRINTING) && defined(OS_WIN))
handlers_.push_back(base::MakeUnique<printing::PrintingHandler>());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 3,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::ShouldPlaceVerticalScrollbarOnLeft() const {
return GetLayoutBox()->ShouldPlaceBlockDirectionScrollbarOnLogicalLeft();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 8,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::drawEllipse(const IntRect& elipseRect)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
SkRect rect = elipseRect;
if (!isRectSkiaSafe(getCTM(), rect))
return;
SkPaint paint;
platformContext()->setupPaintForFilling(&paint);
platformContext()->canvas()->drawOval(rect, paint);
if (strokeStyle() != NoStroke) {
paint.reset();
platformContext()->setupPaintForStroking(&paint, &rect, 0);
platformContext()->canvas()->drawOval(rect, paint);
}
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 18,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfc_genl_se_connectivity(struct nfc_dev *dev, u8 se_idx)
{
struct nfc_se *se;
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_EVENT_SE_CONNECTIVITY);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
se = nfc_find_se(dev, se_idx);
if (!se)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX, dev->idx) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX, se_idx) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, NFC_ATTR_SE_TYPE, se->type))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char serial_s[16], uidstr[32];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
"skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
"invalid quotes", command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
command);
goto out;
}
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)cert->serial);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
"f", key_fp,
"F", ca_fp,
"k", keytext,
"K", catext,
"i", cert->key_id,
"s", serial_s,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_principal = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(ca_fp);
free(key_fp);
free(catext);
free(keytext);
return found_principal;
}
Commit Message: delay bailout for invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and Michał Sajdak; ok deraadt
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 23,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadContentSecurityPolicy(string16* error) {
const std::string& key = is_platform_app() ?
keys::kPlatformAppContentSecurityPolicy : keys::kContentSecurityPolicy;
if (manifest_->HasPath(key)) {
std::string content_security_policy;
if (!manifest_->GetString(key, &content_security_policy)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidContentSecurityPolicy);
return false;
}
if (!ContentSecurityPolicyIsLegal(content_security_policy)) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidContentSecurityPolicy);
return false;
}
if (manifest_version_ >= 2 &&
!ContentSecurityPolicyIsSecure(content_security_policy, GetType())) {
*error = ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInsecureContentSecurityPolicy);
return false;
}
content_security_policy_ = content_security_policy;
} else if (manifest_version_ >= 2) {
content_security_policy_ = is_platform_app() ?
kDefaultPlatformAppContentSecurityPolicy :
kDefaultContentSecurityPolicy;
CHECK(ContentSecurityPolicyIsSecure(content_security_policy_, GetType()));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nfs4_read_stateid_changed(struct rpc_task *task,
struct nfs_pgio_args *args)
{
if (!nfs4_error_stateid_expired(task->tk_status) ||
nfs4_stateid_is_current(&args->stateid,
args->context,
args->lock_context,
FMODE_READ))
return false;
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return true;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int stb_vorbis_get_sample_offset(stb_vorbis *f)
{
if (f->current_loc_valid)
return f->current_loc;
else
return -1;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ati_remote2_get_channel_mask(char *buffer,
const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
pr_debug("%s()\n", __func__);
return sprintf(buffer, "0x%04x", *(unsigned int *)kp->arg);
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _load_job_limits(void)
{
List steps;
ListIterator step_iter;
step_loc_t *stepd;
int fd;
job_mem_limits_t *job_limits_ptr;
slurmstepd_mem_info_t stepd_mem_info;
if (!job_limits_list)
job_limits_list = list_create(_job_limits_free);
job_limits_loaded = true;
steps = stepd_available(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name);
step_iter = list_iterator_create(steps);
while ((stepd = list_next(step_iter))) {
job_limits_ptr = list_find_first(job_limits_list,
_step_limits_match, stepd);
if (job_limits_ptr) /* already processed */
continue;
fd = stepd_connect(stepd->directory, stepd->nodename,
stepd->jobid, stepd->stepid,
&stepd->protocol_version);
if (fd == -1)
continue; /* step completed */
if (stepd_get_mem_limits(fd, stepd->protocol_version,
&stepd_mem_info) != SLURM_SUCCESS) {
error("Error reading step %u.%u memory limits from "
"slurmstepd",
stepd->jobid, stepd->stepid);
close(fd);
continue;
}
if ((stepd_mem_info.job_mem_limit
|| stepd_mem_info.step_mem_limit)) {
/* create entry for this job */
job_limits_ptr = xmalloc(sizeof(job_mem_limits_t));
job_limits_ptr->job_id = stepd->jobid;
job_limits_ptr->step_id = stepd->stepid;
job_limits_ptr->job_mem =
stepd_mem_info.job_mem_limit;
job_limits_ptr->step_mem =
stepd_mem_info.step_mem_limit;
#if _LIMIT_INFO
info("RecLim step:%u.%u job_mem:%u step_mem:%u",
job_limits_ptr->job_id, job_limits_ptr->step_id,
job_limits_ptr->job_mem,
job_limits_ptr->step_mem);
#endif
list_append(job_limits_list, job_limits_ptr);
}
close(fd);
}
list_iterator_destroy(step_iter);
FREE_NULL_LIST(steps);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 4,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_dump_huffman_table(const Jbig2HuffmanTable *table)
{
int i;
int table_size = (1 << table->log_table_size);
fprintf(stderr, "huffman table %p (log_table_size=%d, %d entries, entryies=%p):\n", table, table->log_table_size, table_size, table->entries);
for (i = 0; i < table_size; i++) {
fprintf(stderr, "%6d: PREFLEN=%d, RANGELEN=%d, ", i, table->entries[i].PREFLEN, table->entries[i].RANGELEN);
if (table->entries[i].flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISEXT) {
fprintf(stderr, "ext=%p", table->entries[i].u.ext_table);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "RANGELOW=%d", table->entries[i].u.RANGELOW);
}
if (table->entries[i].flags) {
int need_comma = 0;
fprintf(stderr, ", flags=0x%x(", table->entries[i].flags);
if (table->entries[i].flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISOOB) {
fprintf(stderr, "OOB");
need_comma = 1;
}
if (table->entries[i].flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISLOW) {
if (need_comma)
fprintf(stderr, ",");
fprintf(stderr, "LOW");
need_comma = 1;
}
if (table->entries[i].flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISEXT) {
if (need_comma)
fprintf(stderr, ",");
fprintf(stderr, "EXT");
}
fprintf(stderr, ")");
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPage(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(frame);
if (prerender::PrerenderHelper::IsPrerendering(render_view())) {
Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_CancelPrerenderForPrinting(routing_id()));
return;
}
if (!IsScriptInitiatedPrintAllowed(frame))
return;
IncrementScriptedPrintCount();
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_SCRIPTED);
} else {
Print(frame, WebNode());
}
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copy_verf(struct nfs4_client *target, nfs4_verifier *source)
{
memcpy(target->cl_verifier.data, source->data,
sizeof(target->cl_verifier.data));
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 14,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::LongLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_longLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::LongLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_isregexp(js_State *J, int idx)
{
js_Value *v = stackidx(J, idx);
return v->type == JS_TOBJECT && v->u.object->type == JS_CREGEXP;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_mark_fill_rectangle(gx_device * dev, int x, int y, int w, int h,
gx_color_index color, const gx_device_color *pdc,
bool devn)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_buf *buf = pdev->ctx->stack;
int i, j, k;
byte *dst_ptr;
byte src[PDF14_MAX_PLANES];
byte dst[PDF14_MAX_PLANES] = { 0 };
gs_blend_mode_t blend_mode = pdev->blend_mode;
bool additive = pdev->ctx->additive;
int rowstride = buf->rowstride;
int planestride = buf->planestride;
gs_graphics_type_tag_t curr_tag = GS_UNKNOWN_TAG; /* Quite compiler */
bool has_alpha_g = buf->has_alpha_g;
bool has_shape = buf->has_shape;
bool has_tags = buf->has_tags;
int num_chan = buf->n_chan;
int num_comp = num_chan - 1;
int shape_off = num_chan * planestride;
int alpha_g_off = shape_off + (has_shape ? planestride : 0);
int tag_off = alpha_g_off + (has_alpha_g ? planestride : 0);
bool overprint = pdev->overprint;
gx_color_index drawn_comps = pdev->drawn_comps;
gx_color_index comps;
byte shape = 0; /* Quiet compiler. */
byte src_alpha;
const gx_color_index mask = ((gx_color_index)1 << 8) - 1;
const int shift = 8;
int num_spots = buf->num_spots;
if (buf->data == NULL)
return 0;
/* NB: gx_color_index is 4 or 8 bytes */
#if 0
if (sizeof(color) <= sizeof(ulong))
if_debug8m('v', dev->memory,
"[v]pdf14_mark_fill_rectangle, (%d, %d), %d x %d color = %lx bm %d, nc %d, overprint %d\n",
x, y, w, h, (ulong)color, blend_mode, num_chan, overprint);
else
if_debug9m('v', dev->memory,
"[v]pdf14_mark_fill_rectangle, (%d, %d), %d x %d color = %08lx%08lx bm %d, nc %d, overprint %d\n",
x, y, w, h,
(ulong)(color >> 8*(sizeof(color) - sizeof(ulong))), (ulong)color,
blend_mode, num_chan, overprint);
#endif
/*
* Unpack the gx_color_index values. Complement the components for subtractive
* color spaces.
*/
if (has_tags) {
curr_tag = (color >> (num_comp*8)) & 0xff;
}
if (devn) {
if (additive) {
for (j = 0; j < (num_comp - num_spots); j++) {
src[j] = ((pdc->colors.devn.values[j]) >> shift & mask);
}
for (j = 0; j < num_spots; j++) {
src[j + num_comp - num_spots] =
255 - ((pdc->colors.devn.values[j + num_comp - num_spots]) >> shift & mask);
}
} else {
for (j = 0; j < num_comp; j++) {
src[j] = 255 - ((pdc->colors.devn.values[j]) >> shift & mask);
}
}
} else
pdev->pdf14_procs->unpack_color(num_comp, color, pdev, src);
src_alpha = src[num_comp] = (byte)floor (255 * pdev->alpha + 0.5);
if (has_shape)
shape = (byte)floor (255 * pdev->shape + 0.5);
/* Fit the mark into the bounds of the buffer */
if (x < buf->rect.p.x) {
w += x - buf->rect.p.x;
x = buf->rect.p.x;
}
if (y < buf->rect.p.y) {
h += y - buf->rect.p.y;
y = buf->rect.p.y;
}
if (x + w > buf->rect.q.x) w = buf->rect.q.x - x;
if (y + h > buf->rect.q.y) h = buf->rect.q.y - y;
/* Update the dirty rectangle with the mark */
if (x < buf->dirty.p.x) buf->dirty.p.x = x;
if (y < buf->dirty.p.y) buf->dirty.p.y = y;
if (x + w > buf->dirty.q.x) buf->dirty.q.x = x + w;
if (y + h > buf->dirty.q.y) buf->dirty.q.y = y + h;
dst_ptr = buf->data + (x - buf->rect.p.x) + (y - buf->rect.p.y) * rowstride;
src_alpha = 255-src_alpha;
shape = 255-shape;
if (!has_alpha_g)
alpha_g_off = 0;
if (!has_shape)
shape_off = 0;
if (!has_tags)
tag_off = 0;
rowstride -= w;
/* The num_comp == 1 && additive case is very common (mono output
* devices no spot support), so we optimise that specifically here. */
if (num_comp == 1 && additive && num_spots == 0) {
for (j = h; j > 0; --j) {
for (i = w; i > 0; --i) {
if (src[1] == 0) {
/* background empty, nothing to change */
} else if (dst_ptr[planestride] == 0) {
dst_ptr[0] = src[0];
dst_ptr[planestride] = src[1];
} else {
art_pdf_composite_pixel_alpha_8_fast_mono(dst_ptr, src,
blend_mode, pdev->blend_procs,
planestride, pdev);
}
if (alpha_g_off) {
int tmp = (255 - dst_ptr[alpha_g_off]) * src_alpha + 0x80;
dst_ptr[alpha_g_off] = 255 - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
}
if (shape_off) {
int tmp = (255 - dst_ptr[shape_off]) * shape + 0x80;
dst_ptr[shape_off] = 255 - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
}
if (tag_off) {
/* If alpha is 100% then set to pure path, else or */
if (dst_ptr[planestride] == 255) {
dst_ptr[tag_off] = curr_tag;
} else {
dst_ptr[tag_off] = ( dst_ptr[tag_off] |curr_tag ) & ~GS_UNTOUCHED_TAG;
}
}
++dst_ptr;
}
dst_ptr += rowstride;
}
} else {
for (j = h; j > 0; --j) {
for (i = w; i > 0; --i) {
/* If source alpha is zero avoid all of this */
if (src[num_comp] != 0) {
if (dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride] == 0) {
/* dest alpha is zero just use source. */
if (additive) {
/* Hybrid case */
for (k = 0; k < (num_comp - num_spots); k++) {
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = src[k];
}
for (k = 0; k < num_spots; k++) {
dst_ptr[(k + num_comp - num_spots) * planestride] =
255 - src[k + num_comp - num_spots];
}
} else {
/* Pure subtractive */
for (k = 0; k < num_comp; k++) {
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = 255 - src[k];
}
}
/* alpha */
dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride] = src[num_comp];
} else if (additive && num_spots == 0) {
/* Pure additive case, no spots */
art_pdf_composite_pixel_alpha_8_fast(dst_ptr, src,
num_comp, blend_mode, pdev->blend_procs, planestride,
pdev);
} else {
/* Complement subtractive planes */
if (!additive) {
/* Pure subtractive */
for (k = 0; k < num_comp; ++k)
dst[k] = 255 - dst_ptr[k * planestride];
} else {
/* Hybrid case, additive with subtractive spots */
for (k = 0; k < (num_comp - num_spots); k++) {
dst[k] = dst_ptr[k * planestride];
}
for (k = 0; k < num_spots; k++) {
dst[k + num_comp - num_spots] =
255 - dst_ptr[(k + num_comp - num_spots) * planestride];
}
}
dst[num_comp] = dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride];
/* If we have spots and a non_white preserving or a
non-separable, blend mode then we need special handling */
if (num_spots > 0 && !blend_valid_for_spot(blend_mode))
{
/* Split and do the spots with normal blend mode.
Blending functions assume alpha is last
component so do some movements here */
byte temp_spot_src = src[num_comp - num_spots];
byte temp_spot_dst = dst[num_comp - num_spots];
src[num_comp - num_spots] = src[num_comp];
dst[num_comp - num_spots] = dst[num_comp];
/* Blend process */
art_pdf_composite_pixel_alpha_8(dst, src,
num_comp - num_spots, blend_mode,
pdev->blend_procs, pdev);
/* Restore colorants that were blown away by alpha */
dst[num_comp - num_spots] = temp_spot_dst;
src[num_comp - num_spots] = temp_spot_src;
art_pdf_composite_pixel_alpha_8(&(dst[num_comp - num_spots]),
&(src[num_comp - num_spots]), num_spots,
BLEND_MODE_Normal, pdev->blend_procs, pdev);
} else {
art_pdf_composite_pixel_alpha_8(dst, src, num_comp, blend_mode,
pdev->blend_procs, pdev);
}
/* Until I see otherwise in AR or the spec, do not fool
with spot overprinting while we are in an RGB or Gray
blend color space. */
if (!additive && overprint) {
for (k = 0, comps = drawn_comps; comps != 0; ++k, comps >>= 1) {
if ((comps & 0x1) != 0) {
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = 255 - dst[k];
}
}
} else {
/* Post blend complement for subtractive */
if (!additive) {
/* Pure subtractive */
for (k = 0; k < num_comp; ++k)
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = 255 - dst[k];
} else {
/* Hybrid case, additive with subtractive spots */
for (k = 0; k < (num_comp - num_spots); k++) {
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = dst[k];
}
for (k = 0; k < num_spots; k++) {
dst_ptr[(k + num_comp - num_spots) * planestride] =
255 - dst[k + num_comp - num_spots];
}
}
}
/* The alpha channel */
dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride] = dst[num_comp];
}
}
if (alpha_g_off) {
int tmp = (255 - dst_ptr[alpha_g_off]) * src_alpha + 0x80;
dst_ptr[alpha_g_off] = 255 - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
}
if (shape_off) {
int tmp = (255 - dst_ptr[shape_off]) * shape + 0x80;
dst_ptr[shape_off] = 255 - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
}
if (tag_off) {
/* If alpha is 100% then set to pure path, else or */
if (dst[num_comp] == 255) {
dst_ptr[tag_off] = curr_tag;
} else {
dst_ptr[tag_off] = ( dst_ptr[tag_off] |curr_tag ) & ~GS_UNTOUCHED_TAG;
}
}
++dst_ptr;
}
dst_ptr += rowstride;
}
}
#if 0
/* #if RAW_DUMP */
/* Dump the current buffer to see what we have. */
if(global_index/10.0 == (int) (global_index/10.0) )
dump_raw_buffer(pdev->ctx->stack->rect.q.y-pdev->ctx->stack->rect.p.y,
pdev->ctx->stack->rect.q.x-pdev->ctx->stack->rect.p.x,
pdev->ctx->stack->n_planes,
pdev->ctx->stack->planestride, pdev->ctx->stack->rowstride,
"Draw_Rect",pdev->ctx->stack->data);
global_index++;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 5,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunClosureAfterCookiesCleared(const base::Closure& task,
uint32_t cookies_deleted) {
task.Run();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppendStringToBuffer(std::vector<uint8_t>* data,
const char* str,
size_t len) {
const base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> old_size = data->size();
data->resize((old_size + len).ValueOrDie());
memcpy(data->data() + old_size.ValueOrDie(), str, len);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PermissionsBubbleDialogDelegateView::CloseBubble() {
owner_ = nullptr;
GetWidget()->Close();
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ext2_quota_read(struct super_block *sb, int type, char *data,
size_t len, loff_t off)
{
struct inode *inode = sb_dqopt(sb)->files[type];
sector_t blk = off >> EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
int err = 0;
int offset = off & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
int tocopy;
size_t toread;
struct buffer_head tmp_bh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode);
if (off > i_size)
return 0;
if (off+len > i_size)
len = i_size-off;
toread = len;
while (toread > 0) {
tocopy = sb->s_blocksize - offset < toread ?
sb->s_blocksize - offset : toread;
tmp_bh.b_state = 0;
tmp_bh.b_size = sb->s_blocksize;
err = ext2_get_block(inode, blk, &tmp_bh, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!buffer_mapped(&tmp_bh)) /* A hole? */
memset(data, 0, tocopy);
else {
bh = sb_bread(sb, tmp_bh.b_blocknr);
if (!bh)
return -EIO;
memcpy(data, bh->b_data+offset, tocopy);
brelse(bh);
}
offset = 0;
toread -= tocopy;
data += tocopy;
blk++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 21,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *FLTGetMapserverExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode, layerObj *lp)
{
char *pszExpression = NULL;
const char *pszAttribute = NULL;
char szTmp[256];
char **tokens = NULL;
int nTokens = 0, i=0,bString=0;
if (!psFilterNode)
return NULL;
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_COMPARISON) {
if ( psFilterNode->psLeftNode && psFilterNode->psRightNode) {
if (FLTIsBinaryComparisonFilterType(psFilterNode->pszValue)) {
pszExpression = FLTGetBinaryComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue,
"PropertyIsBetween") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetIsBetweenComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue,
"PropertyIsLike") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetIsLikeComparisonExpression(psFilterNode);
}
}
} else if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_LOGICAL) {
if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "AND") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "OR") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetLogicalComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "NOT") == 0) {
pszExpression = FLTGetLogicalComparisonExpresssion(psFilterNode, lp);
}
} else if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_SPATIAL) {
/* TODO */
} else if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_FEATUREID) {
#if defined(USE_WMS_SVR) || defined (USE_WFS_SVR) || defined (USE_WCS_SVR) || defined(USE_SOS_SVR)
if (psFilterNode->pszValue) {
pszAttribute = msOWSLookupMetadata(&(lp->metadata), "OFG", "featureid");
if (pszAttribute) {
tokens = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->pszValue,',', &nTokens);
if (tokens && nTokens > 0) {
for (i=0; i<nTokens; i++) {
const char* pszId = tokens[i];
const char* pszDot = strchr(pszId, '.');
if( pszDot )
pszId = pszDot + 1;
if (i == 0) {
if(FLTIsNumeric(pszId) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
if (bString)
snprintf(szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), "('[%s]' = '%s')" , pszAttribute, pszId);
else
snprintf(szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), "([%s] = %s)" , pszAttribute, pszId);
if (pszExpression != NULL)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, " OR ");
else
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "(");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, szTmp);
}
msFreeCharArray(tokens, nTokens);
}
}
/*opening and closing brackets are needed for mapserver expressions*/
if (pszExpression)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, ")");
}
#else
msSetError(MS_MISCERR, "OWS support is not available.",
"FLTGetMapserverExpression()");
return(MS_FAILURE);
#endif
}
return pszExpression;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setWidth(unsigned width)
{
setAttribute(widthAttr, String::number(width));
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_usb_lock_shutdown(struct snd_usb_audio *chip)
{
int err;
atomic_inc(&chip->usage_count);
if (atomic_read(&chip->shutdown)) {
err = -EIO;
goto error;
}
err = snd_usb_autoresume(chip);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
return 0;
error:
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&chip->usage_count))
wake_up(&chip->shutdown_wait);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CommitInstant(TabContentsWrapper* preview_contents) {
TabContentsWrapper* tab_contents = instant_->tab_contents();
int index =
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetIndexOfTabContents(tab_contents);
DCHECK_NE(TabStripModel::kNoTab, index);
preview_contents->controller().CopyStateFromAndPrune(
&tab_contents->controller());
TabContentsWrapper* old_contents =
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->ReplaceTabContentsAt(
index, preview_contents);
instant_unload_handler_->RunUnloadListenersOrDestroy(old_contents, index);
GURL url = preview_contents->tab_contents()->GetURL();
if (profile_->GetExtensionService()->IsInstalledApp(url)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_OMNIBOX_INSTANT,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderMenuList::clientPaddingRight() const
{
if (style()->appearance() == MenulistPart || style()->appearance() == MenulistButtonPart) {
return endOfLinePadding;
}
return paddingRight() + m_innerBlock->paddingRight();
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf::SetOutputBufferFormat(
gfx::Size coded_size,
size_t buffer_size) {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!output_streamon_);
DCHECK(running_job_queue_.empty());
struct v4l2_format format;
memset(&format, 0, sizeof(format));
format.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
format.fmt.pix_mp.num_planes = kMaxJpegPlane;
format.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat = output_buffer_pixelformat_;
format.fmt.pix_mp.field = V4L2_FIELD_ANY;
format.fmt.pix_mp.plane_fmt[0].sizeimage = buffer_size;
format.fmt.pix_mp.width = coded_size.width();
format.fmt.pix_mp.height = coded_size.height();
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN_FALSE(VIDIOC_S_FMT, &format);
DCHECK_EQ(format.fmt.pix_mp.pixelformat, output_buffer_pixelformat_);
return true;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_translate_name_harness(request_rec *r)
{
return lua_request_rec_hook_harness(r, "translate_name", APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean attachCallback(WebKitWebInspector*, InspectorTest* test)
{
return test->attach();
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: begin_softmask(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr, softmask_save *save)
{
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_xobject *softmask = gstate->softmask;
fz_rect mask_bbox;
fz_matrix tos_save[2], save_ctm;
fz_matrix mask_matrix;
fz_colorspace *mask_colorspace;
save->softmask = softmask;
if (softmask == NULL)
return gstate;
save->page_resources = gstate->softmask_resources;
save->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
save_ctm = gstate->ctm;
pdf_xobject_bbox(ctx, softmask, &mask_bbox);
pdf_xobject_matrix(ctx, softmask, &mask_matrix);
pdf_tos_save(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
if (gstate->luminosity)
mask_bbox = fz_infinite_rect;
else
{
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &mask_matrix);
fz_transform_rect(&mask_bbox, &gstate->softmask_ctm);
}
gstate->softmask = NULL;
gstate->softmask_resources = NULL;
gstate->ctm = gstate->softmask_ctm;
mask_colorspace = pdf_xobject_colorspace(ctx, softmask);
if (gstate->luminosity && !mask_colorspace)
mask_colorspace = fz_device_gray(ctx);
fz_try(ctx)
{
fz_begin_mask(ctx, pr->dev, &mask_bbox, gstate->luminosity, mask_colorspace, gstate->softmask_bc, &gstate->fill.color_params);
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, pr, softmask, save->page_resources, &fz_identity, 1);
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, mask_colorspace);
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
/* FIXME: Ignore error - nasty, but if we throw from
* here the clip stack would be messed up. */
/* TODO: pass cookie here to increase the cookie error count */
}
fz_end_mask(ctx, pr->dev);
pdf_tos_restore(ctx, &pr->tos, tos_save);
gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->ctm = save_ctm;
return gstate;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 6,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstalledBubble::ShowInternal() {
BrowserView* browser_view = BrowserView::GetBrowserViewForBrowser(browser_);
views::View* reference_view = NULL;
if (type_ == APP) {
if (browser_view->IsTabStripVisible()) {
AbstractTabStripView* tabstrip = browser_view->tabstrip();
views::View* ntp_button = tabstrip->GetNewTabButton();
if (ntp_button && ntp_button->IsDrawn()) {
reference_view = ntp_button;
} else {
reference_view = tabstrip;
}
}
} else if (type_ == BROWSER_ACTION) {
BrowserActionsContainer* container =
browser_view->GetToolbarView()->browser_actions();
if (container->animating() &&
animation_wait_retries_++ < kAnimationWaitMaxRetry) {
MessageLoopForUI::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInstalledBubble::ShowInternal,
base::Unretained(this)),
kAnimationWaitTime);
return;
}
reference_view = container->GetBrowserActionView(
extension_->browser_action());
if (!reference_view || !reference_view->visible()) {
reference_view = container->chevron();
if (!reference_view || !reference_view->visible())
reference_view = NULL; // fall back to app menu below.
}
} else if (type_ == PAGE_ACTION) {
LocationBarView* location_bar_view = browser_view->GetLocationBarView();
location_bar_view->SetPreviewEnabledPageAction(extension_->page_action(),
true); // preview_enabled
reference_view = location_bar_view->GetPageActionView(
extension_->page_action());
DCHECK(reference_view);
} else if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
LocationBarView* location_bar_view = browser_view->GetLocationBarView();
reference_view = location_bar_view;
DCHECK(reference_view);
}
if (reference_view == NULL)
reference_view = browser_view->GetToolbarView()->app_menu();
set_anchor_view(reference_view);
set_arrow_location(type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD ? views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT :
views::BubbleBorder::TOP_RIGHT);
SetLayoutManager(new views::FillLayout());
AddChildView(
new InstalledBubbleContent(browser_, extension_, type_, &icon_, this));
browser::CreateViewsBubble(this);
StartFade(true);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShowDesktopNotification(
const DesktopNotificationHostMsg_Show_Params& params,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
bool worker) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::FromID(
render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (!rvh) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
RenderProcessHost* process = rvh->process();
DesktopNotificationService* service =
DesktopNotificationServiceFactory::GetForProfile(process->profile());
service->ShowDesktopNotification(
params, render_process_id, render_view_id,
worker ? DesktopNotificationService::WorkerNotification :
DesktopNotificationService::PageNotification);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API ut16 r_bin_java_calculate_class_access_value(const char *access_flags_str) {
return calculate_access_value (access_flags_str, CLASS_ACCESS_FLAGS);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool getNextLine(std::string* line)
{
line->clear();
if (m_index >= m_text.length())
return false;
size_t endOfLineIndex = m_text.find("\r\n", m_index);
if (endOfLineIndex == std::string::npos) {
*line = m_text.substr(m_index);
m_index = m_text.length();
} else {
*line = m_text.substr(m_index, endOfLineIndex - m_index);
m_index = endOfLineIndex + 2;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexParameterf(GLenum target,
GLenum pname,
GLfloat param) {
api()->glTexParameterfFn(target, pname, param);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VerifyPrintPreviewFailed(bool did_fail) {
bool print_preview_failed = (render_thread_.sink().GetUniqueMessageMatching(
PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed::ID) != NULL);
EXPECT_EQ(did_fail, print_preview_failed);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct sock *udp_v4_mcast_next(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
__be16 loc_port, __be32 loc_addr,
__be16 rmt_port, __be32 rmt_addr,
int dif)
{
struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
struct sock *s = sk;
unsigned short hnum = ntohs(loc_port);
sk_nulls_for_each_from(s, node) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(s);
if (!net_eq(sock_net(s), net) ||
udp_sk(s)->udp_port_hash != hnum ||
(inet->inet_daddr && inet->inet_daddr != rmt_addr) ||
(inet->inet_dport != rmt_port && inet->inet_dport) ||
(inet->inet_rcv_saddr &&
inet->inet_rcv_saddr != loc_addr) ||
ipv6_only_sock(s) ||
(s->sk_bound_dev_if && s->sk_bound_dev_if != dif))
continue;
if (!ip_mc_sf_allow(s, loc_addr, rmt_addr, dif))
continue;
goto found;
}
s = NULL;
found:
return s;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 15,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CursorShapeFromNative(gfx::NativeCursor native_cursor) {
switch (native_cursor.native_type()) {
case ui::kCursorNull:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorPointer:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorCross:
return XC_crosshair;
case ui::kCursorHand:
return XC_hand2;
case ui::kCursorIBeam:
return XC_xterm;
case ui::kCursorWait:
return XC_watch;
case ui::kCursorHelp:
return XC_question_arrow;
case ui::kCursorEastResize:
return XC_right_side;
case ui::kCursorNorthResize:
return XC_top_side;
case ui::kCursorNorthEastResize:
return XC_top_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorNorthWestResize:
return XC_top_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthResize:
return XC_bottom_side;
case ui::kCursorSouthEastResize:
return XC_bottom_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthWestResize:
return XC_bottom_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorWestResize:
return XC_left_side;
case ui::kCursorNorthSouthResize:
return XC_sb_v_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorEastWestResize:
return XC_sb_h_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorNorthEastSouthWestResize:
case ui::kCursorNorthWestSouthEastResize:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorColumnResize:
return XC_sb_h_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorRowResize:
return XC_sb_v_double_arrow;
case ui::kCursorMiddlePanning:
return XC_fleur;
case ui::kCursorEastPanning:
return XC_sb_right_arrow;
case ui::kCursorNorthPanning:
return XC_sb_up_arrow;
case ui::kCursorNorthEastPanning:
return XC_top_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorNorthWestPanning:
return XC_top_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthPanning:
return XC_sb_down_arrow;
case ui::kCursorSouthEastPanning:
return XC_bottom_right_corner;
case ui::kCursorSouthWestPanning:
return XC_bottom_left_corner;
case ui::kCursorWestPanning:
return XC_sb_left_arrow;
case ui::kCursorMove:
return XC_fleur;
case ui::kCursorVerticalText:
case ui::kCursorCell:
case ui::kCursorContextMenu:
case ui::kCursorAlias:
case ui::kCursorProgress:
case ui::kCursorNoDrop:
case ui::kCursorCopy:
case ui::kCursorNone:
case ui::kCursorNotAllowed:
case ui::kCursorZoomIn:
case ui::kCursorZoomOut:
case ui::kCursorGrab:
case ui::kCursorGrabbing:
return XC_left_ptr;
case ui::kCursorCustom:
NOTREACHED();
return XC_left_ptr;
}
NOTREACHED();
return XC_left_ptr;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int cma_user_data_offset(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
return cma_family(id_priv) == AF_IB ? 0 : sizeof(struct cma_hdr);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuProcessHost::software_rendering() {
return software_rendering_;
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arm_dma_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t handle,
size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir,
struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
if (!dma_get_attr(DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC, attrs))
__dma_page_dev_to_cpu(pfn_to_page(dma_to_pfn(dev, handle)),
handle & ~PAGE_MASK, size, dir);
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mount_args_check(int argc, char **argv, const char *action)
{
Eina_Bool opts = EINA_FALSE;
struct stat st;
const char *node;
char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (!strcmp(action, "mount"))
{
/* will ALWAYS be:
/path/to/mount -o nosuid,uid=XYZ,[utf8,] UUID=XXXX-XXXX[-XXXX-XXXX] /media/$devnode
*/
if (argc != 6) return EINA_FALSE;
if (argv[2][0] == '-')
{
/* disallow any -options other than -o */
if (strcmp(argv[2], "-o")) return EINA_FALSE;
opts = mountopts_check(argv[3]);
}
if (!opts) return EINA_FALSE;
if (!strncmp(argv[4], "UUID=", sizeof("UUID=") - 1))
{
if (!check_uuid(argv[4] + 5)) return EINA_FALSE;
}
else
{
if (strncmp(argv[4], "/dev/", 5)) return EINA_FALSE;
if (stat(argv[4], &st)) return EINA_FALSE;
}
node = strrchr(argv[5], '/');
if (!node) return EINA_FALSE;
if (!node[1]) return EINA_FALSE;
if (node - argv[5] != 6) return EINA_FALSE;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/dev%s", node);
if (stat(buf, &st)) return EINA_FALSE;
}
else if (!strcmp(action, "umount"))
{
/* will ALWAYS be:
/path/to/umount /dev/$devnode
*/
if (argc != 3) return EINA_FALSE;
if (strncmp(argv[2], "/dev/", 5)) return EINA_FALSE;
if (stat(argv[2], &st)) return EINA_FALSE;
node = strrchr(argv[2], '/');
if (!node) return EINA_FALSE;
if (!node[1]) return EINA_FALSE;
if (node - argv[2] != 4) return EINA_FALSE;
/* this is good, but it prevents umounting user-mounted removable media;
* need to figure out a better way...
*
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/media%s", node);
if (stat(buf, &st)) return EINA_FALSE;
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) return EINA_FALSE;
*/
}
else if (!strcmp(action, "eject"))
{
/* will ALWAYS be:
/path/to/eject /dev/$devnode
*/
if (argc != 3) return EINA_FALSE;
if (strncmp(argv[2], "/dev/", 5)) return EINA_FALSE;
if (stat(argv[2], &st)) return EINA_FALSE;
node = strrchr(argv[2], '/');
if (!node) return EINA_FALSE;
if (!node[1]) return EINA_FALSE;
if (node - argv[2] != 4) return EINA_FALSE;
}
else return EINA_FALSE;
return EINA_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::WasAutoplayInitiated() {
return autoplay_policy_->WasAutoplayInitiated();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_proc_readlink(struct path *path, char __user *buffer, int buflen)
{
char *tmp = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
char *pathname;
int len;
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
pathname = d_path(path, tmp, PAGE_SIZE);
len = PTR_ERR(pathname);
if (IS_ERR(pathname))
goto out;
len = tmp + PAGE_SIZE - 1 - pathname;
if (len > buflen)
len = buflen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, pathname, len))
len = -EFAULT;
out:
free_page((unsigned long)tmp);
return len;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) {
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on){
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1; pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1; pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) && ((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))){
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) && ((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))){
continue;
}
if ((res->pw==0)||(res->ph==0)) continue;
if ((trx0==trx1)||(try0==try1)) continue;
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix an integer overflow issue (#809)
Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of
pi.c.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 18,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::DisplayMeterTypesCombo(std::string & content_part)
{
char szTmp[200];
for (int ii = 0; ii < MTYPE_END; ii++)
{
sprintf(szTmp, "<option value=\"%d\">%s</option>\n", ii, Meter_Type_Desc((_eMeterType)ii));
content_part += szTmp;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 21,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void packet_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(refcount_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
pr_err("Attempt to release alive packet socket: %p\n", sk);
return;
}
sk_refcnt_debug_dec(sk);
}
Commit Message: packet: in packet_do_bind, test fanout with bind_lock held
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlSplitQName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name, xmlChar **prefix) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
xmlChar *buffer = NULL;
int len = 0;
int max = XML_MAX_NAMELEN;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
const xmlChar *cur = name;
int c;
if (prefix == NULL) return(NULL);
*prefix = NULL;
if (cur == NULL) return(NULL);
#ifndef XML_XML_NAMESPACE
/* xml: prefix is not really a namespace */
if ((cur[0] == 'x') && (cur[1] == 'm') &&
(cur[2] == 'l') && (cur[3] == ':'))
return(xmlStrdup(name));
#endif
/* nasty but well=formed */
if (cur[0] == ':')
return(xmlStrdup(name));
c = *cur++;
while ((c != 0) && (c != ':') && (len < max)) { /* tested bigname.xml */
buf[len++] = c;
c = *cur++;
}
if (len >= max) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge name, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while ((c != 0) && (c != ':')) { /* tested bigname.xml */
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlFree(buffer);
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
buffer[len++] = c;
c = *cur++;
}
buffer[len] = 0;
}
if ((c == ':') && (*cur == 0)) {
if (buffer != NULL)
xmlFree(buffer);
*prefix = NULL;
return(xmlStrdup(name));
}
if (buffer == NULL)
ret = xmlStrndup(buf, len);
else {
ret = buffer;
buffer = NULL;
max = XML_MAX_NAMELEN;
}
if (c == ':') {
c = *cur;
*prefix = ret;
if (c == 0) {
return(xmlStrndup(BAD_CAST "", 0));
}
len = 0;
/*
* Check that the first character is proper to start
* a new name
*/
if (!(((c >= 0x61) && (c <= 0x7A)) ||
((c >= 0x41) && (c <= 0x5A)) ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':'))) {
int l;
int first = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l);
if (!IS_LETTER(first) && (first != '_')) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_QNAME,
"Name %s is not XML Namespace compliant\n",
name);
}
}
cur++;
while ((c != 0) && (len < max)) { /* tested bigname2.xml */
buf[len++] = c;
c = *cur++;
}
if (len >= max) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge name, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (c != 0) { /* tested bigname2.xml */
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
buffer[len++] = c;
c = *cur++;
}
buffer[len] = 0;
}
if (buffer == NULL)
ret = xmlStrndup(buf, len);
else {
ret = buffer;
}
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 18,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hfs_decompress_lzvn_block(char* rawBuf, uint32_t len, char* uncBuf, uint64_t* uncLen)
{
if (len > 0 && rawBuf[0] != 0x06) {
*uncLen = lzvn_decode_buffer(uncBuf, COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE, rawBuf, len);
return 1; // apparently this can't fail
}
else {
return hfs_decompress_noncompressed_block(rawBuf, len, uncBuf, uncLen);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 22,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_fd_exec (fd_set *read_fds, fd_set *write_fds, fd_set *exception_fds)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FD];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (((HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
&& (FD_ISSET(HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), read_fds)))
|| ((HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
&& (FD_ISSET(HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), write_fds)))
|| ((HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION)
&& (FD_ISSET(HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), exception_fds)))))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, callback)) (ptr_hook->callback_data,
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd));
ptr_hook->running = 0;
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static future_t *start_up(void) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
command_credits = 1;
firmware_is_configured = false;
pthread_mutex_init(&commands_pending_response_lock, NULL);
period_ms_t startup_timeout_ms;
char timeout_prop[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (!property_get("bluetooth.enable_timeout_ms", timeout_prop, STRING_VALUE_OF(DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS))
|| (startup_timeout_ms = atoi(timeout_prop)) < 100)
startup_timeout_ms = DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_MS;
startup_timer = non_repeating_timer_new(startup_timeout_ms, startup_timer_expired, NULL);
if (!startup_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create startup timer.", __func__);
goto error;
}
non_repeating_timer_restart(startup_timer);
epilog_timer = non_repeating_timer_new(EPILOG_TIMEOUT_MS, epilog_timer_expired, NULL);
if (!epilog_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create epilog timer.", __func__);
goto error;
}
command_response_timer = non_repeating_timer_new(COMMAND_PENDING_TIMEOUT, command_timed_out, NULL);
if (!command_response_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create command response timer.", __func__);
goto error;
}
command_queue = fixed_queue_new(SIZE_MAX);
if (!command_queue) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create pending command queue.", __func__);
goto error;
}
packet_queue = fixed_queue_new(SIZE_MAX);
if (!packet_queue) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create pending packet queue.", __func__);
goto error;
}
thread = thread_new("hci_thread");
if (!thread) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create thread.", __func__);
goto error;
}
commands_pending_response = list_new(NULL);
if (!commands_pending_response) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create list for commands pending response.", __func__);
goto error;
}
memset(incoming_packets, 0, sizeof(incoming_packets));
packet_fragmenter->init(&packet_fragmenter_callbacks);
fixed_queue_register_dequeue(command_queue, thread_get_reactor(thread), event_command_ready, NULL);
fixed_queue_register_dequeue(packet_queue, thread_get_reactor(thread), event_packet_ready, NULL);
vendor->open(btif_local_bd_addr.address, &interface);
hal->init(&hal_callbacks, thread);
low_power_manager->init(thread);
vendor->set_callback(VENDOR_CONFIGURE_FIRMWARE, firmware_config_callback);
vendor->set_callback(VENDOR_CONFIGURE_SCO, sco_config_callback);
vendor->set_callback(VENDOR_DO_EPILOG, epilog_finished_callback);
if (!hci_inject->open(&interface)) {
}
int power_state = BT_VND_PWR_OFF;
#if (defined (BT_CLEAN_TURN_ON_DISABLED) && BT_CLEAN_TURN_ON_DISABLED == TRUE)
LOG_WARN("%s not turning off the chip before turning on.", __func__);
#else
vendor->send_command(VENDOR_CHIP_POWER_CONTROL, &power_state);
#endif
power_state = BT_VND_PWR_ON;
vendor->send_command(VENDOR_CHIP_POWER_CONTROL, &power_state);
startup_future = future_new();
LOG_DEBUG("%s starting async portion", __func__);
thread_post(thread, event_finish_startup, NULL);
return startup_future;
error:;
shut_down(); // returns NULL so no need to wait for it
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 28,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen;
int peeked;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
bool slow;
/*
* Check any passed addresses
*/
if (addr_len)
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
if (len > ulen)
len = ulen;
else if (len < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (len < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, len);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb,
sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (err)
goto out_free;
if (!peeked)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
}
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
err = len;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags))
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
if (noblock)
return -EAGAIN;
goto try_again;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 2,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromotingInstance::Disconnect() {
DCHECK(plugin_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
view_.reset();
LOG(INFO) << "Disconnecting from host.";
if (client_.get()) {
base::WaitableEvent done_event(true, false);
client_->Stop(base::Bind(&base::WaitableEvent::Signal,
base::Unretained(&done_event)));
done_event.Wait();
client_.reset();
}
mouse_input_filter_.set_input_stub(NULL);
host_connection_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int InputHandler::caretPosition() const
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return -1;
return selectionStart();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_OFPAT_RAW11_OUTPUT(const struct ofp11_action_output *oao,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct ofpact_output *output;
enum ofperr error;
output = ofpact_put_OUTPUT(out);
output->max_len = ntohs(oao->max_len);
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(oao->port, &output->port);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return ofpact_check_output_port(output->port, OFPP_MAX);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void DidReceiveDataForClient(const char* data, unsigned data_length) {
if (!data_length)
return;
raw_data_->Append(data, data_length);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageInfoUI::~PageInfoUI() {}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 12,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int hfsplus_cat_bin_cmp_key(const hfsplus_btree_key *k1,
const hfsplus_btree_key *k2)
{
__be32 k1p, k2p;
k1p = k1->cat.parent;
k2p = k2->cat.parent;
if (k1p != k2p)
return be32_to_cpu(k1p) < be32_to_cpu(k2p) ? -1 : 1;
return hfsplus_strcmp(&k1->cat.name, &k2->cat.name);
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct task_group *sched_create_group(struct task_group *parent)
{
struct task_group *tg;
unsigned long flags;
int i;
tg = kzalloc(sizeof(*tg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tg)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!alloc_fair_sched_group(tg, parent))
goto err;
if (!alloc_rt_sched_group(tg, parent))
goto err;
spin_lock_irqsave(&task_group_lock, flags);
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
register_fair_sched_group(tg, i);
register_rt_sched_group(tg, i);
}
list_add_rcu(&tg->list, &task_groups);
WARN_ON(!parent); /* root should already exist */
tg->parent = parent;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tg->children);
list_add_rcu(&tg->siblings, &parent->children);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&task_group_lock, flags);
return tg;
err:
free_sched_group(tg);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngineExports::RenderPDFPageToBitmap(
const void* pdf_buffer,
int pdf_buffer_size,
int page_number,
const RenderingSettings& settings,
void* bitmap_buffer) {
FPDF_DOCUMENT doc =
FPDF_LoadMemDocument(pdf_buffer, pdf_buffer_size, nullptr);
if (!doc)
return false;
FPDF_PAGE page = FPDF_LoadPage(doc, page_number);
if (!page) {
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc);
return false;
}
pp::Rect dest;
int rotate = CalculatePosition(page, settings, &dest);
FPDF_BITMAP bitmap =
FPDFBitmap_CreateEx(settings.bounds.width(), settings.bounds.height(),
FPDFBitmap_BGRA, bitmap_buffer,
settings.bounds.width() * 4);
FPDFBitmap_FillRect(bitmap, 0, 0, settings.bounds.width(),
settings.bounds.height(), 0xFFFFFFFF);
dest.set_point(dest.point() - settings.bounds.point());
FPDF_RenderPageBitmap(
bitmap, page, dest.x(), dest.y(), dest.width(), dest.height(), rotate,
FPDF_ANNOT | FPDF_PRINTING | FPDF_NO_CATCH);
FPDFBitmap_Destroy(bitmap);
FPDF_ClosePage(page);
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
const __be32 *ptr = (const __be32 *)(th + 1);
if (*ptr == htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16)
| (TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP)) {
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 1;
++ptr;
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsval = ntohl(*ptr);
++ptr;
if (*ptr)
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr = ntohl(*ptr) - tp->tsoffset;
else
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init udpv6_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = inet6_add_protocol(&udpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_UDP);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = inet6_register_protosw(&udpv6_protosw);
if (ret)
goto out_udpv6_protocol;
out:
return ret;
out_udpv6_protocol:
inet6_del_protocol(&udpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_UDP);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void r_bin_dwarf_dump_attr_value(const RBinDwarfAttrValue *val, FILE *f) {
size_t i;
if (!val || !f) {
return;
}
switch (val->form) {
case DW_FORM_addr:
fprintf (f, "0x%"PFMT64x"", val->encoding.address);
break;
case DW_FORM_block:
case DW_FORM_block1:
case DW_FORM_block2:
case DW_FORM_block4:
fprintf (f, "%"PFMT64u" byte block:", val->encoding.block.length);
for (i = 0; i < val->encoding.block.length; i++) {
fprintf (f, "%02x", val->encoding.block.data[i]);
}
break;
case DW_FORM_data1:
case DW_FORM_data2:
case DW_FORM_data4:
case DW_FORM_data8:
fprintf (f, "%"PFMT64u"", val->encoding.data);
if (val->name == DW_AT_language) {
fprintf (f, " (%s)", dwarf_langs[val->encoding.data]);
}
break;
case DW_FORM_strp:
fprintf (f, "(indirect string, offset: 0x%"PFMT64x"): ",
val->encoding.str_struct.offset);
case DW_FORM_string:
if (val->encoding.str_struct.string) {
fprintf (f, "%s", val->encoding.str_struct.string);
} else {
fprintf (f, "No string found");
}
break;
case DW_FORM_flag:
fprintf (f, "%u", val->encoding.flag);
break;
case DW_FORM_sdata:
fprintf (f, "%"PFMT64d"", val->encoding.sdata);
break;
case DW_FORM_udata:
fprintf (f, "%"PFMT64u"", val->encoding.data);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref_addr:
fprintf (f, "<0x%"PFMT64x">", val->encoding.reference);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref1:
case DW_FORM_ref2:
case DW_FORM_ref4:
case DW_FORM_ref8:
fprintf (f, "<0x%"PFMT64x">", val->encoding.reference);
break;
default:
fprintf (f, "Unknown attr value form %"PFMT64d"\n", val->form);
};
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Writef(SAVESTREAM* f, const char* frm, ...)
{
char Buffer[4096];
va_list args;
va_start(args, frm);
vsnprintf(Buffer, 4095, frm, args);
Buffer[4095] = 0;
WriteStr(f, Buffer);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 21,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mpeg4_decode_profile_level(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
s->avctx->profile = get_bits(gb, 4);
s->avctx->level = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (s->avctx->profile == 0 && s->avctx->level == 8) {
s->avctx->level = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check read profile before setting it
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_7.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 10,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Compositor::DidUpdateLayers() {
VLOG(3) << "After updating layers:\n"
<< "property trees:\n"
<< host_->property_trees()->ToString() << "\n"
<< "cc::Layers:\n"
<< host_->LayersAsString();
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 28,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rtadv_make_socket (vrf_id_t vrf_id)
{
int sock;
int ret;
struct icmp6_filter filter;
if ( zserv_privs.change (ZPRIVS_RAISE) )
zlog_err ("rtadv_make_socket: could not raise privs, %s",
safe_strerror (errno) );
sock = vrf_socket (AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, vrf_id);
if ( zserv_privs.change (ZPRIVS_LOWER) )
zlog_err ("rtadv_make_socket: could not lower privs, %s",
safe_strerror (errno) );
/* When we can't make ICMPV6 socket simply back. Router
advertisement feature will not be supported. */
if (sock < 0)
{
close (sock);
return -1;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_pktinfo (sock, 1);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_multicast_loop (sock, 0);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_unicast_hops (sock, 255);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_multicast_hops (sock, 255);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_hoplimit (sock, 1);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ICMP6_FILTER_SETBLOCKALL(&filter);
ICMP6_FILTER_SETPASS (ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT, &filter);
ICMP6_FILTER_SETPASS (ND_ROUTER_ADVERT, &filter);
ret = setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ICMP6_FILTER, &filter,
sizeof (struct icmp6_filter));
if (ret < 0)
{
zlog_info ("ICMP6_FILTER set fail: %s", safe_strerror (errno));
return ret;
}
return sock;
}
Commit Message: zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> strictFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.strictFunction");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(float, a, static_cast<float>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)->NumberValue()));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, b, V8int::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8int::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
RefPtr<bool> result = imp->strictFunction(str, a, b, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 13,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::didReceiveResourceTiming(Resource* resource, const ResourceTimingInfo& info)
{
ASSERT(m_client);
ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == this->resource());
ASSERT(m_async);
m_client->didReceiveResourceTiming(info);
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t support_device_change_show(struct device_driver *dd, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", support_device_change);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::VerifyDownloadComplete(
const base::Closure& continuation) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::FILE);
if (IsCancelled()) {
return;
}
SetProgress(kProgressComplete);
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE, continuation);
}
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntersectionObserverController* Document::intersectionObserverController()
{
return m_intersectionObserverController;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char intf_mem_inw(const struct si_sm_io *io,
unsigned int offset)
{
return (readw((io->addr)+(offset * io->regspacing)) >> io->regshift)
& 0xff;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID ixheaacd_cos_sin_mod(WORD32 *subband,
ia_sbr_qmf_filter_bank_struct *qmf_bank,
WORD16 *p_twiddle, WORD32 *p_dig_rev_tbl) {
WORD32 M = ixheaacd_shr32(qmf_bank->no_channels, 1);
const WORD16 *p_sin;
const WORD16 *p_sin_cos = &qmf_bank->cos_twiddle[0];
WORD32 subband_tmp[128];
ixheaacd_cos_sin_mod_loop1(subband, M, p_sin_cos, subband_tmp);
if (M == 32) {
ixheaacd_sbr_imdct_using_fft(
(const WORD32 *)p_twiddle, 32, subband_tmp, subband,
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl,
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl);
ixheaacd_sbr_imdct_using_fft(
(const WORD32 *)p_twiddle, 32, &subband_tmp[64], &subband[64],
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl,
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl);
} else {
ixheaacd_sbr_imdct_using_fft(
(const WORD32 *)p_twiddle, 16, subband_tmp, subband,
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl,
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl);
ixheaacd_sbr_imdct_using_fft(
(const WORD32 *)p_twiddle, 16, &subband_tmp[64], &subband[64],
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl,
(UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl, (UWORD8 *)p_dig_rev_tbl);
}
p_sin = &qmf_bank->alt_sin_twiddle[0];
ixheaacd_cos_sin_mod_loop2(subband, p_sin, M);
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 15,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool r_pkcs7_parse_digestalgorithmidentifier (RPKCS7DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers *dai, RASN1Object *object) {
ut32 i;
if (!dai && !object) {
return false;
}
if (object->list.length > 0) {
dai->elements = (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier **) calloc (object->list.length, sizeof (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier*));
if (!dai->elements) {
return false;
}
dai->length = object->list.length;
for (i = 0; i < dai->length; ++i) {
dai->elements[i] = (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier *) malloc (sizeof (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier));
if (dai->elements[i]) {
memset (dai->elements[i], 0, sizeof (RX509AlgorithmIdentifier));
r_x509_parse_algorithmidentifier (dai->elements[i], object->list.objects[i]);
}
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dm_resume(struct mapped_device *md)
{
int r;
struct dm_table *map = NULL;
retry:
r = -EINVAL;
mutex_lock_nested(&md->suspend_lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (!dm_suspended_md(md))
goto out;
if (dm_suspended_internally_md(md)) {
/* already internally suspended, wait for internal resume */
mutex_unlock(&md->suspend_lock);
r = wait_on_bit(&md->flags, DMF_SUSPENDED_INTERNALLY, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (r)
return r;
goto retry;
}
map = rcu_dereference_protected(md->map, lockdep_is_held(&md->suspend_lock));
if (!map || !dm_table_get_size(map))
goto out;
r = __dm_resume(md, map);
if (r)
goto out;
clear_bit(DMF_SUSPENDED, &md->flags);
out:
mutex_unlock(&md->suspend_lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 4,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void add_offset_pair(zval *result, char *str, int len, int offset, char *name)
{
zval *match_pair;
ALLOC_ZVAL(match_pair);
array_init(match_pair);
INIT_PZVAL(match_pair);
/* Add (match, offset) to the return value */
add_next_index_stringl(match_pair, str, len, 1);
add_next_index_long(match_pair, offset);
if (name) {
zval_add_ref(&match_pair);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(result), name, strlen(name)+1, &match_pair, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(result), &match_pair, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BackingStore* RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AllocBackingStore(
const gfx::Size& size) {
gint depth = gdk_visual_get_depth(gtk_widget_get_visual(view_.get()));
return new BackingStoreGtk(host_, size,
ui::GetVisualFromGtkWidget(view_.get()),
depth);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<MediaSource> OMXCodec::Create(
const sp<IOMX> &omx,
const sp<MetaData> &meta, bool createEncoder,
const sp<MediaSource> &source,
const char *matchComponentName,
uint32_t flags,
const sp<ANativeWindow> &nativeWindow) {
int32_t requiresSecureBuffers;
if (source->getFormat()->findInt32(
kKeyRequiresSecureBuffers,
&requiresSecureBuffers)
&& requiresSecureBuffers) {
flags |= kIgnoreCodecSpecificData;
flags |= kUseSecureInputBuffers;
}
const char *mime;
bool success = meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime);
CHECK(success);
Vector<CodecNameAndQuirks> matchingCodecs;
findMatchingCodecs(
mime, createEncoder, matchComponentName, flags, &matchingCodecs);
if (matchingCodecs.isEmpty()) {
ALOGV("No matching codecs! (mime: %s, createEncoder: %s, "
"matchComponentName: %s, flags: 0x%x)",
mime, createEncoder ? "true" : "false", matchComponentName, flags);
return NULL;
}
sp<OMXCodecObserver> observer = new OMXCodecObserver;
IOMX::node_id node = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < matchingCodecs.size(); ++i) {
const char *componentNameBase = matchingCodecs[i].mName.string();
uint32_t quirks = matchingCodecs[i].mQuirks;
const char *componentName = componentNameBase;
AString tmp;
if (flags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
tmp = componentNameBase;
tmp.append(".secure");
componentName = tmp.c_str();
}
if (createEncoder) {
sp<MediaSource> softwareCodec =
InstantiateSoftwareEncoder(componentName, source, meta);
if (softwareCodec != NULL) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated software codec '%s'", componentName);
return softwareCodec;
}
}
ALOGV("Attempting to allocate OMX node '%s'", componentName);
if (!createEncoder
&& (quirks & kOutputBuffersAreUnreadable)
&& (flags & kClientNeedsFramebuffer)) {
if (strncmp(componentName, "OMX.SEC.", 8)) {
ALOGW("Component '%s' does not give the client access to "
"the framebuffer contents. Skipping.",
componentName);
continue;
}
}
status_t err = omx->allocateNode(componentName, observer, &node);
if (err == OK) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated OMX node '%s'", componentName);
sp<OMXCodec> codec = new OMXCodec(
omx, node, quirks, flags,
createEncoder, mime, componentName,
source, nativeWindow);
observer->setCodec(codec);
err = codec->configureCodec(meta);
if (err == OK) {
return codec;
}
ALOGV("Failed to configure codec '%s'", componentName);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 15,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rmd320_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct rmd320_ctx *rctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
u32 i, index, padlen;
__le64 bits;
__le32 *dst = (__le32 *)out;
static const u8 padding[64] = { 0x80, };
bits = cpu_to_le64(rctx->byte_count << 3);
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64 */
index = rctx->byte_count & 0x3f;
padlen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((64+56) - index);
rmd320_update(desc, padding, padlen);
/* Append length */
rmd320_update(desc, (const u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits));
/* Store state in digest */
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
dst[i] = cpu_to_le32p(&rctx->state[i]);
/* Wipe context */
memset(rctx, 0, sizeof(*rctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::OpenInNewTab(const std::string& url) {
content::OpenURLParams params(
GURL(url), content::Referrer(), NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, false);
content::WebContents* inspected_web_contents = GetInspectedWebContents();
if (inspected_web_contents) {
inspected_web_contents->OpenURL(params);
} else {
chrome::HostDesktopType host_desktop_type;
if (browser_) {
host_desktop_type = browser_->host_desktop_type();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
host_desktop_type = chrome::GetActiveDesktop();
}
const BrowserList* browser_list =
BrowserList::GetInstance(host_desktop_type);
for (BrowserList::const_iterator it = browser_list->begin();
it != browser_list->end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->type() == Browser::TYPE_TABBED) {
(*it)->OpenURL(params);
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool fm10k_tx_desc_push(struct fm10k_ring *tx_ring,
struct fm10k_tx_desc *tx_desc, u16 i,
dma_addr_t dma, unsigned int size, u8 desc_flags)
{
/* set RS and INT for last frame in a cache line */
if ((++i & (FM10K_TXD_WB_FIFO_SIZE - 1)) == 0)
desc_flags |= FM10K_TXD_FLAG_RS | FM10K_TXD_FLAG_INT;
/* record values to descriptor */
tx_desc->buffer_addr = cpu_to_le64(dma);
tx_desc->flags = desc_flags;
tx_desc->buflen = cpu_to_le16(size);
/* return true if we just wrapped the ring */
return i == tx_ring->count;
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buf_pos_init(const buf_t *buf, buf_pos_t *out)
{
out->chunk = buf->head;
out->pos = 0;
out->chunk_pos = 0;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __tree_mod_log_oldest_root(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
struct extent_buffer *eb_root, u64 time_seq)
{
struct tree_mod_elem *tm;
struct tree_mod_elem *found = NULL;
u64 root_logical = eb_root->start;
int looped = 0;
if (!time_seq)
return NULL;
/*
* the very last operation that's logged for a root is the replacement
* operation (if it is replaced at all). this has the index of the *new*
* root, making it the very first operation that's logged for this root.
*/
while (1) {
tm = tree_mod_log_search_oldest(fs_info, root_logical,
time_seq);
if (!looped && !tm)
return NULL;
/*
* if there are no tree operation for the oldest root, we simply
* return it. this should only happen if that (old) root is at
* level 0.
*/
if (!tm)
break;
/*
* if there's an operation that's not a root replacement, we
* found the oldest version of our root. normally, we'll find a
* MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING operation here.
*/
if (tm->op != MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE)
break;
found = tm;
root_logical = tm->old_root.logical;
looped = 1;
}
/* if there's no old root to return, return what we found instead */
if (!found)
found = tm;
return found;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 10,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long Chapters::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) { // EditionEntry ID
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 26,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_send_asconf_add_ip(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addrs,
int addrcnt)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *laddr;
union sctp_addr *addr;
union sctp_addr saveaddr;
void *addr_buf;
struct sctp_af *af;
struct list_head *p;
int i;
int retval = 0;
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
return retval;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, addrs:%p, addrcnt:%d\n",
__func__, sk, addrs, addrcnt);
list_for_each_entry(asoc, &ep->asocs, asocs) {
if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable)
continue;
if (asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask & SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP)
continue;
if (!sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED))
continue;
/* Check if any address in the packed array of addresses is
* in the bind address list of the association. If so,
* do not send the asconf chunk to its peer, but continue with
* other associations.
*/
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
if (!af) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, addr))
break;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
if (i < addrcnt)
continue;
/* Use the first valid address in bind addr list of
* association as Address Parameter of ASCONF CHUNK.
*/
bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
p = bp->address_list.next;
laddr = list_entry(p, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
chunk = sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(asoc, &laddr->a, addrs,
addrcnt, SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP);
if (!chunk) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Add the new addresses to the bind address list with
* use_as_src set to 0.
*/
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->v4.sin_family);
memcpy(&saveaddr, addr, af->sockaddr_len);
retval = sctp_add_bind_addr(bp, &saveaddr,
sizeof(saveaddr),
SCTP_ADDR_NEW, GFP_ATOMIC);
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
if (asoc->src_out_of_asoc_ok) {
struct sctp_transport *trans;
list_for_each_entry(trans,
&asoc->peer.transport_addr_list, transports) {
/* Clear the source and route cache */
dst_release(trans->dst);
trans->cwnd = min(4*asoc->pathmtu, max_t(__u32,
2*asoc->pathmtu, 4380));
trans->ssthresh = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
trans->rto = asoc->rto_initial;
sctp_max_rto(asoc, trans);
trans->rtt = trans->srtt = trans->rttvar = 0;
sctp_transport_route(trans, NULL,
sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk));
}
}
retval = sctp_send_asconf(asoc, chunk);
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
Alexander Popov reported that an application may trigger a BUG_ON in
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf if the socket tx buffer is full, a thread is
waiting on it to queue more data and meanwhile another thread peels off
the association being used by the first thread.
This patch replaces the BUG_ON call with a proper error handling. It
will return -EPIPE to the original sendmsg call, similarly to what would
have been done if the association wasn't found in the first place.
Acked-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 22,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ApplySafeSearchPolicy(std::unique_ptr<base::Value> legacy_safe_search,
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> google_safe_search,
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> legacy_youtube,
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> youtube_restrict) {
PolicyMap policies;
SetPolicy(&policies, key::kForceSafeSearch, std::move(legacy_safe_search));
SetPolicy(&policies, key::kForceGoogleSafeSearch,
std::move(google_safe_search));
SetPolicy(&policies, key::kForceYouTubeSafetyMode,
std::move(legacy_youtube));
SetPolicy(&policies, key::kForceYouTubeRestrict,
std::move(youtube_restrict));
UpdateProviderPolicy(policies);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::checkForPaginationLogicalHeightChange(LayoutUnit& pageLogicalHeight, bool& pageLogicalHeightChanged, bool& hasSpecifiedPageLogicalHeight)
{
if (LayoutMultiColumnFlowThread* flowThread = multiColumnFlowThread()) {
LayoutUnit columnHeight;
if (hasDefiniteLogicalHeight() || isLayoutView()) {
LogicalExtentComputedValues computedValues;
computeLogicalHeight(LayoutUnit(), logicalTop(), computedValues);
columnHeight = computedValues.m_extent - borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight() - scrollbarLogicalHeight();
}
pageLogicalHeightChanged = columnHeight != flowThread->columnHeightAvailable();
flowThread->setColumnHeightAvailable(std::max(columnHeight, LayoutUnit()));
} else if (isLayoutFlowThread()) {
LayoutFlowThread* flowThread = toLayoutFlowThread(this);
pageLogicalHeight = flowThread->isPageLogicalHeightKnown() ? LayoutUnit(1) : LayoutUnit();
pageLogicalHeightChanged = flowThread->pageLogicalSizeChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 22,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct BodyCache *msg_cache_open(struct ImapData *idata)
{
char mailbox[PATH_MAX];
if (idata->bcache)
return idata->bcache;
imap_cachepath(idata, idata->mailbox, mailbox, sizeof(mailbox));
return mutt_bcache_open(&idata->conn->account, mailbox);
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_amf_read_number(GetByteContext *bc, double *val)
{
uint64_t read;
if (bytestream2_get_byte(bc) != AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
read = bytestream2_get_be64(bc);
*val = av_int2double(read);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void boundaryNodeChildrenChanged(RangeBoundaryPoint& boundary, ContainerNode* container)
{
if (!boundary.childBefore())
return;
if (boundary.container() != container)
return;
boundary.invalidateOffset();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fsmMkfifo(const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
int rc = mkfifo(path, (mode & 07777));
if (_fsm_debug) {
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, " %8s (%s, 0%04o) %s\n",
__func__, path, (unsigned)(mode & 07777),
(rc < 0 ? strerror(errno) : ""));
}
if (rc < 0)
rc = RPMERR_MKFIFO_FAILED;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 7,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nfs4_clear_cap_atomic_open_v1(struct nfs_server *server,
int err, struct nfs4_exception *exception)
{
if (err != -EINVAL)
return false;
if (!(server->caps & NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1))
return false;
server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1;
exception->retry = 1;
return true;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_check_str(const char *fname, const char *ext_str, int ext_len, int executable, int for_create) /* {{{ */
{
char test[51];
const char *pos;
if (ext_len >= 50) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (executable == 1) {
/* copy "." as well */
memcpy(test, ext_str - 1, ext_len + 1);
test[ext_len + 1] = '\0';
/* executable phars must contain ".phar" as a valid extension (phar://.pharmy/oops is invalid) */
/* (phar://hi/there/.phar/oops is also invalid) */
pos = strstr(test, ".phar");
if (pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create);
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* data phars need only contain a single non-"." to be valid */
if (!executable) {
pos = strstr(ext_str, ".phar");
if (!(pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) && *(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create);
}
} else {
if (*(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create);
}
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didAddMessageToConsole(
const WebConsoleMessage& message, const WebString& source_name,
unsigned source_line) {
logging::LogSeverity log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE;
switch (message.level) {
case WebConsoleMessage::LevelTip:
log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE;
break;
case WebConsoleMessage::LevelLog:
log_severity = logging::LOG_INFO;
break;
case WebConsoleMessage::LevelWarning:
log_severity = logging::LOG_WARNING;
break;
case WebConsoleMessage::LevelError:
log_severity = logging::LOG_ERROR;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_AddMessageToConsole(routing_id_,
static_cast<int32>(log_severity),
UTF16ToWideHack(message.text),
static_cast<int32>(source_line),
UTF16ToWideHack(source_name)));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_min_max_with_quirks(struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval,
int default_min, struct snd_kcontrol *kctl)
{
/* for failsafe */
cval->min = default_min;
cval->max = cval->min + 1;
cval->res = 1;
cval->dBmin = cval->dBmax = 0;
if (cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_BOOLEAN ||
cval->val_type == USB_MIXER_INV_BOOLEAN) {
cval->initialized = 1;
} else {
int minchn = 0;
if (cval->cmask) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CHANNELS; i++)
if (cval->cmask & (1 << i)) {
minchn = i + 1;
break;
}
}
if (get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_MAX, (cval->control << 8) | minchn, &cval->max) < 0 ||
get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_MIN, (cval->control << 8) | minchn, &cval->min) < 0) {
usb_audio_err(cval->head.mixer->chip,
"%d:%d: cannot get min/max values for control %d (id %d)\n",
cval->head.id, snd_usb_ctrl_intf(cval->head.mixer->chip),
cval->control, cval->head.id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_RES,
(cval->control << 8) | minchn,
&cval->res) < 0) {
cval->res = 1;
} else {
int last_valid_res = cval->res;
while (cval->res > 1) {
if (snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value(cval, UAC_SET_RES,
(cval->control << 8) | minchn,
cval->res / 2) < 0)
break;
cval->res /= 2;
}
if (get_ctl_value(cval, UAC_GET_RES,
(cval->control << 8) | minchn, &cval->res) < 0)
cval->res = last_valid_res;
}
if (cval->res == 0)
cval->res = 1;
/* Additional checks for the proper resolution
*
* Some devices report smaller resolutions than actually
* reacting. They don't return errors but simply clip
* to the lower aligned value.
*/
if (cval->min + cval->res < cval->max) {
int last_valid_res = cval->res;
int saved, test, check;
get_cur_mix_raw(cval, minchn, &saved);
for (;;) {
test = saved;
if (test < cval->max)
test += cval->res;
else
test -= cval->res;
if (test < cval->min || test > cval->max ||
snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, minchn, 0, test) ||
get_cur_mix_raw(cval, minchn, &check)) {
cval->res = last_valid_res;
break;
}
if (test == check)
break;
cval->res *= 2;
}
snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, minchn, 0, saved);
}
cval->initialized = 1;
}
if (kctl)
volume_control_quirks(cval, kctl);
/* USB descriptions contain the dB scale in 1/256 dB unit
* while ALSA TLV contains in 1/100 dB unit
*/
cval->dBmin = (convert_signed_value(cval, cval->min) * 100) / 256;
cval->dBmax = (convert_signed_value(cval, cval->max) * 100) / 256;
if (cval->dBmin > cval->dBmax) {
/* something is wrong; assume it's either from/to 0dB */
if (cval->dBmin < 0)
cval->dBmax = 0;
else if (cval->dBmin > 0)
cval->dBmin = 0;
if (cval->dBmin > cval->dBmax) {
/* totally crap, return an error */
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32 Read24(const uint8* p) {
return p[0] << 16 | p[1] << 8 | p[2];
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
/* Call helper to do the real work for both simulataneous and
* duplicate INIT chunk handling.
*/
return sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MockContentSettingsClient::allowRunningInsecureContent(
bool enabled_per_settings,
const blink::WebSecurityOrigin& context,
const blink::WebURL& url) {
return enabled_per_settings || flags_->running_insecure_content_allowed();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void GetBlobInfo(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
(void) memset(blob_info,0,sizeof(*blob_info));
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->quantum=(size_t) MagickMaxBlobExtent;
blob_info->properties.st_mtime=GetMagickTime();
blob_info->properties.st_ctime=blob_info->properties.st_mtime;
blob_info->debug=IsEventLogging();
blob_info->reference_count=1;
blob_info->semaphore=AllocateSemaphoreInfo();
blob_info->signature=MagickCoreSignature;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 19,231 |
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