instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionService::UpdateExtension(
const std::string& id,
const FilePath& extension_path,
const GURL& download_url,
CrxInstaller** out_crx_installer) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
PendingExtensionInfo pending_extension_info;
bool is_pending_extension = pending_extension_manager_.GetById(
id, &pending_extension_info);
const Extension* extension =
GetExtensionByIdInternal(id, true, true, false);
if (!is_pending_extension && !extension) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Will not update extension " << id
<< " because it is not installed or pending";
if (!BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableFunction(
extension_file_util::DeleteFile, extension_path, false)))
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
ExtensionInstallUI* client =
(!is_pending_extension || pending_extension_info.install_silently()) ?
NULL : new ExtensionInstallUI(profile_);
scoped_refptr<CrxInstaller> installer(MakeCrxInstaller(client));
installer->set_expected_id(id);
if (is_pending_extension)
installer->set_install_source(pending_extension_info.install_source());
else if (extension)
installer->set_install_source(extension->location());
installer->set_delete_source(true);
installer->set_original_url(download_url);
installer->set_install_cause(extension_misc::INSTALL_CAUSE_UPDATE);
installer->InstallCrx(extension_path);
if (out_crx_installer)
*out_crx_installer = installer;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void locationWithCallWithAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::locationWithCallWithAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum ovl_path_type ovl_path_real(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
{
enum ovl_path_type type = ovl_path_type(dentry);
if (type == OVL_PATH_LOWER)
ovl_path_lower(dentry, path);
else
ovl_path_upper(dentry, path);
return type;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSFloat64Array::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSFloat64Array* castedThis = jsCast<JSFloat64Array*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSFloat64Array::s_info);
Float64Array* impl = static_cast<Float64Array*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
Float32Array* array(toFloat32Array(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->foo(array)));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 18,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: safeputchar(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char c)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, (c < 0x80 && ND_ISPRINT(c)) ? "%c" : "\\0x%02x", c));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrame::SetInheritedEffectiveTouchAction(TouchAction touch_action) {
if (inherited_effective_touch_action_ == touch_action)
return;
inherited_effective_touch_action_ = touch_action;
if (GetDocument()->documentElement()) {
GetDocument()->documentElement()->SetNeedsStyleRecalc(
kSubtreeStyleChange,
StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(
StyleChangeReason::kInheritedStyleChangeFromParentFrame));
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 14,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bond_info_query(struct net_device *bond_dev, struct ifbond *info)
{
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
info->bond_mode = bond->params.mode;
info->miimon = bond->params.miimon;
read_lock(&bond->lock);
info->num_slaves = bond->slave_cnt;
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kill_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
{
struct address_space *mapping = bdev->bd_inode->i_mapping;
if (mapping->nrpages == 0 && mapping->nrshadows == 0)
return;
invalidate_bh_lrus();
truncate_inode_pages(mapping, 0);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_RUTG( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.round_state = TT_Round_Up_To_Grid;
CUR.func_round = (TRound_Function)Round_Up_To_Grid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 20,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
list[i] = NULL;
}
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 1 | 20,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlockOn(State state) {
block_on_ |= state;
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lo_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
{
struct loop_device *lo;
int err = 0;
mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
if (!lo) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto out;
}
atomic_inc(&lo->lo_refcnt);
out:
mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __acquires(ping_table.lock)
{
struct ping_iter_state *state = seq->private;
state->bucket = 0;
state->family = family;
read_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock);
return *pos ? ping_get_idx(seq, *pos-1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
Commit Message: ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::SetZoomLevel(double zoom_level) {
page_zoom_level_ = zoom_level;
webview()->SetZoomLevel(zoom_level);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnZoomLevelChanged();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 22,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CL_OldGame(void)
{
if(cl_oldGameSet)
{
cl_oldGameSet = qfalse;
Cvar_Set2("fs_game", cl_oldGame, qtrue);
FS_ConditionalRestart(clc.checksumFeed, qfalse);
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __show_smap(struct seq_file *m, const struct mem_size_stats *mss)
{
SEQ_PUT_DEC("Rss: ", mss->resident);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nPss: ", mss->pss >> PSS_SHIFT);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nShared_Clean: ", mss->shared_clean);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nShared_Dirty: ", mss->shared_dirty);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nPrivate_Clean: ", mss->private_clean);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nPrivate_Dirty: ", mss->private_dirty);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nReferenced: ", mss->referenced);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nAnonymous: ", mss->anonymous);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nLazyFree: ", mss->lazyfree);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nAnonHugePages: ", mss->anonymous_thp);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nShmemPmdMapped: ", mss->shmem_thp);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nShared_Hugetlb: ", mss->shared_hugetlb);
seq_put_decimal_ull_width(m, " kB\nPrivate_Hugetlb: ",
mss->private_hugetlb >> 10, 7);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nSwap: ", mss->swap);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nSwapPss: ",
mss->swap_pss >> PSS_SHIFT);
SEQ_PUT_DEC(" kB\nLocked: ",
mss->pss_locked >> PSS_SHIFT);
seq_puts(m, " kB\n");
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t oom_score_adj_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
int oom_score_adj = OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN;
unsigned long flags;
size_t len;
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
oom_score_adj = task->signal->oom_score_adj;
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
put_task_struct(task);
len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d\n", oom_score_adj);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::enforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readPointer(uintptr_t *pArg) const
{
status_t ret;
binder_uintptr_t ptr;
ret = readAligned(&ptr);
if (!ret)
*pArg = ptr;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& effective_site_url) {
const Extension* extension = ExtensionRegistry::Get(browser_context)
->enabled_extensions()
.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(effective_site_url);
if (!extension)
return false;
if (extension->id() == kWebStoreAppId)
return true;
if (extension->is_hosted_app())
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnAfterCutOrCopy(ui::ClipboardType clipboard_type) {
ui::Clipboard* cb = ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread();
base::string16 selected_text;
cb->ReadText(clipboard_type, &selected_text);
GURL url;
bool write_url = false;
model()->AdjustTextForCopy(GetSelectedRange().GetMin(), &selected_text, &url,
&write_url);
if (IsSelectAll())
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1M(OmniboxEditModel::kCutOrCopyAllTextHistogram, 1);
ui::ScopedClipboardWriter scoped_clipboard_writer(clipboard_type);
scoped_clipboard_writer.WriteText(selected_text);
if (write_url &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kOmniboxCanCopyHyperlinksToClipboard)) {
scoped_clipboard_writer.WriteHyperlink(selected_text, url.spec());
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::ResourceType GetResourceTypeFromMimeType(
const std::string& mime_type,
content::ResourceType fallback) {
if (mime_type.empty()) {
return fallback;
} else if (blink::IsSupportedImageMimeType(mime_type)) {
return content::ResourceType::kImage;
} else if (blink::IsSupportedJavascriptMimeType(mime_type)) {
return content::ResourceType::kScript;
} else if (net::MatchesMimeType("text/css", mime_type)) {
return content::ResourceType::kStylesheet;
} else {
bool found =
std::any_of(std::begin(kFontMimeTypes), std::end(kFontMimeTypes),
[&mime_type](const std::string& mime) {
return net::MatchesMimeType(mime, mime_type);
});
if (found)
return content::ResourceType::kFontResource;
}
return fallback;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sctp_association *sctp_lookup_association(const union sctp_addr *laddr,
const union sctp_addr *paddr,
struct sctp_transport **transportp)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
sctp_local_bh_disable();
asoc = __sctp_lookup_association(laddr, paddr, transportp);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
return asoc;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Fix another socket race during accept/peeloff
There is a race between sctp_rcv() and sctp_accept() where we
have moved the association from the listening socket to the
accepted socket, but sctp_rcv() processing cached the old
socket and continues to use it.
The easy solution is to check for the socket mismatch once we've
grabed the socket lock. If we hit a mis-match, that means
that were are currently holding the lock on the listening socket,
but the association is refrencing a newly accepted socket. We need
to drop the lock on the old socket and grab the lock on the new one.
A more proper solution might be to create accepted sockets when
the new association is established, similar to TCP. That would
eliminate the race for 1-to-1 style sockets, but it would still
existing for 1-to-many sockets where a user wished to peeloff an
association. For now, we'll live with this easy solution as
it addresses the problem.
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,
struct ctl_table_header *head, struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct ctl_table_root *root = head->root;
struct inode *inode;
struct proc_inode *ei;
inode = new_inode(sb);
if (!inode)
goto out;
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
sysctl_head_get(head);
ei = PROC_I(inode);
ei->sysctl = head;
ei->sysctl_entry = table;
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
inode->i_mode = table->mode;
if (!S_ISDIR(table->mode)) {
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
inode->i_op = &proc_sys_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_sys_file_operations;
} else {
inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
inode->i_op = &proc_sys_dir_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_sys_dir_file_operations;
if (is_empty_dir(head))
make_empty_dir_inode(inode);
}
if (root->set_ownership)
root->set_ownership(head, table, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);
out:
return inode;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLuint GetBufferServiceID(gl::GLApi* api,
GLuint client_id,
PassthroughResources* resources,
bool create_if_missing) {
return GetServiceID(client_id, &resources->buffer_id_map, create_if_missing,
[api]() {
GLuint service_id = 0;
api->glGenBuffersARBFn(1, &service_id);
return service_id;
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 5,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void r_pkcs7_free_attributes (RPKCS7Attributes* attributes) {
ut32 i;
if (attributes) {
for (i = 0; i < attributes->length; ++i) {
r_pkcs7_free_attribute (attributes->elements[i]);
}
R_FREE (attributes->elements);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 6,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usb_clear_halt(struct usb_device *dev, int pipe)
{
int result;
int endp = usb_pipeendpoint(pipe);
if (usb_pipein(pipe))
endp |= USB_DIR_IN;
/* we don't care if it wasn't halted first. in fact some devices
* (like some ibmcam model 1 units) seem to expect hosts to make
* this request for iso endpoints, which can't halt!
*/
result = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0),
USB_REQ_CLEAR_FEATURE, USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT,
USB_ENDPOINT_HALT, endp, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
/* don't un-halt or force to DATA0 except on success */
if (result < 0)
return result;
/* NOTE: seems like Microsoft and Apple don't bother verifying
* the clear "took", so some devices could lock up if you check...
* such as the Hagiwara FlashGate DUAL. So we won't bother.
*
* NOTE: make sure the logic here doesn't diverge much from
* the copy in usb-storage, for as long as we need two copies.
*/
usb_reset_endpoint(dev, endp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 8,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SSLManager::DidChangeSSLInternalState() {
UpdateEntry(
NavigationEntryImpl::FromNavigationEntry(controller_->GetActiveEntry()));
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_ecb_crypt_128bit(&twofish_dec, desc, dst, src, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataEntry* GDataDirectory::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc->is_folder());
GDataDirectory* dir = new GDataDirectory(parent, directory_service);
dir->title_ = UTF16ToUTF8(doc->title());
dir->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
dir->file_info_.last_modified = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.last_accessed = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.creation_time = doc->published_time();
dir->resource_id_ = doc->resource_id();
dir->content_url_ = doc->content_url();
dir->deleted_ = doc->deleted();
const Link* edit_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::EDIT);
DCHECK(edit_link) << "No edit link for dir " << dir->title_;
if (edit_link)
dir->edit_url_ = edit_link->href();
const Link* parent_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::PARENT);
if (parent_link)
dir->parent_resource_id_ = ExtractResourceId(parent_link->href());
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
dir->upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
return dir;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 10,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opfimul(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xda;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xde;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 19,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_emulate_cpuid(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 20,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Automation::MouseDrag(int tab_id,
const gfx::Point& start,
const gfx::Point& end,
Error** error) {
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendMouseDragJSONRequest(automation(), windex, tab_index, start.x(),
start.y(), end.x(), end.y(), &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void DisassociateBlob(Image *image)
{
BlobInfo
*magick_restrict blob_info,
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
clone;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->blob != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
assert(image->blob->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
blob_info=image->blob;
clone=MagickFalse;
LockSemaphoreInfo(blob_info->semaphore);
assert(blob_info->reference_count >= 0);
if (blob_info->reference_count > 1)
clone=MagickTrue;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(blob_info->semaphore);
if (clone == MagickFalse)
return;
clone_info=CloneBlobInfo(blob_info);
DestroyBlob(image);
image->blob=clone_info;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect GetWindowRect(GdkWindow* window) {
gint width = gdk_window_get_width(window);
gint height = gdk_window_get_height(window);
return gfx::Rect(width, height);
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx,
Vmxnet3PktStatus status)
{
size_t tot_len = net_tx_pkt_get_total_len(s->tx_pkt);
struct UPT1_TxStats *stats = &s->txq_descr[qidx].txq_stats;
switch (status) {
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK:
switch (net_tx_pkt_get_packet_type(s->tx_pkt)) {
case ETH_PKT_BCAST:
stats->bcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->bcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_MCAST:
stats->mcastPktsTxOK++;
stats->mcastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_UCAST:
stats->ucastPktsTxOK++;
stats->ucastBytesTxOK += tot_len;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (s->offload_mode == VMXNET3_OM_TSO) {
/*
* According to VMWARE headers this statistic is a number
* of packets after segmentation but since we don't have
* this information in QEMU model, the best we can do is to
* provide number of non-segmented packets
*/
stats->TSOPktsTxOK++;
stats->TSOBytesTxOK += tot_len;
}
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_DISCARD:
stats->pktsTxDiscard++;
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR:
stats->pktsTxError++;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
struct sk_buff_head *hitlist)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sk_buff *next;
spin_lock(&x->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb_queue_walk_safe(&x->sk_receive_queue, skb, next) {
/* Do we have file descriptors ? */
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp) {
bool hit = false;
/* Process the descriptors of this socket */
int nfd = UNIXCB(skb).fp->count;
struct file **fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp->fp;
while (nfd--) {
/* Get the socket the fd matches if it indeed does so */
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(*fp++);
if (sk) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
/* Ignore non-candidates, they could
* have been added to the queues after
* starting the garbage collection
*/
if (test_bit(UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE, &u->gc_flags)) {
hit = true;
func(u);
}
}
}
if (hit && hitlist != NULL) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &x->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(hitlist, skb);
}
}
}
spin_unlock(&x->sk_receive_queue.lock);
}
Commit Message: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
{
if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
s->d1->mtu =
s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
}
/* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
s->d1->mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
/*
* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
* (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
*/
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
/* Set to min mtu */
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
} else
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_entry_comparator(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
const struct list_entry *e1 = (struct list_entry *)p1;
const struct list_entry *e2 = (struct list_entry *)p2;
return bsearch_compare_mbox(e1->name, e2->name);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int srpt_refresh_port(struct srpt_port *sport)
{
struct ib_mad_reg_req reg_req;
struct ib_port_modify port_modify;
struct ib_port_attr port_attr;
int ret;
memset(&port_modify, 0, sizeof port_modify);
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = 0;
ret = ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
if (ret)
goto err_mod_port;
ret = ib_query_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, &port_attr);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
sport->sm_lid = port_attr.sm_lid;
sport->lid = port_attr.lid;
ret = ib_query_gid(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &sport->gid,
NULL);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
if (!sport->mad_agent) {
memset(®_req, 0, sizeof reg_req);
reg_req.mgmt_class = IB_MGMT_CLASS_DEVICE_MGMT;
reg_req.mgmt_class_version = IB_MGMT_BASE_VERSION;
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_GET, reg_req.method_mask);
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_SET, reg_req.method_mask);
sport->mad_agent = ib_register_mad_agent(sport->sdev->device,
sport->port,
IB_QPT_GSI,
®_req, 0,
srpt_mad_send_handler,
srpt_mad_recv_handler,
sport, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sport->mad_agent)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sport->mad_agent);
sport->mad_agent = NULL;
goto err_query_port;
}
}
return 0;
err_query_port:
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = 0;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
err_mod_port:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 23,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmp_stop(const void *a, const void *b)
{
const struct stop *astop = a;
const struct stop *bstop = b;
float diff = astop->offset - bstop->offset;
if (diff < 0)
return -1;
if (diff > 0)
return 1;
return astop->index - bstop->index;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlData::OnRedirect(const RedirectCB& cb) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
redirect_callbacks_.push_back(cb);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 16,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int megasas_setup_inquiry(uint8_t *cdb, int pg, int len)
{
memset(cdb, 0, 6);
cdb[0] = INQUIRY;
if (pg > 0) {
cdb[1] = 0x1;
cdb[2] = pg;
}
cdb[3] = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
cdb[4] = (len & 0xff);
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bit_or(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
VarBit *arg1 = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
VarBit *arg2 = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(1);
VarBit *result;
int len,
bitlen1,
bitlen2,
i;
bits8 *p1,
*p2,
*r;
bits8 mask;
bitlen1 = VARBITLEN(arg1);
bitlen2 = VARBITLEN(arg2);
if (bitlen1 != bitlen2)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
errmsg("cannot OR bit strings of different sizes")));
len = VARSIZE(arg1);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = bitlen1;
p1 = VARBITS(arg1);
p2 = VARBITS(arg2);
r = VARBITS(result);
for (i = 0; i < VARBITBYTES(arg1); i++)
*r++ = *p1++ | *p2++;
/* Pad the result */
mask = BITMASK << VARBITPAD(result);
if (mask)
{
r--;
*r &= mask;
}
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _getpid() {
fprint_str(stderr, "_getpid is not implemented\n");
return 42;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in multipart handling
Close cesanta/dev#6974
PUBLISHED_FROM=4d4e4a46eceba10aec8dacb7f8f58bd078c92307
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket()
{
size_t bufPos, bufLen;
XMP_IO* fileRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_Int64 fileLen = fileRef->Length();
XMP_PacketInfo & packetInfo = this->packetInfo;
XMPScanner scanner ( fileLen );
enum { kBufferSize = 64*1024 };
XMP_Uns8 buffer [kBufferSize];
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
const bool checkAbort = (abortProc != 0);
fileRef->Rewind(); // Seek back to the beginning of the file.
for ( bufPos = 0; bufPos < (size_t)fileLen; bufPos += bufLen )
{
if ( checkAbort && abortProc(abortArg) )
{
XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket - User abort", kXMPErr_UserAbort );
}
bufLen = fileRef->Read ( buffer, kBufferSize );
if ( bufLen == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket: Read failure", kXMPErr_ExternalFailure );
scanner.Scan ( buffer, bufPos, bufLen );
}
int snipCount = scanner.GetSnipCount();
XMPScanner::SnipInfoVector snips ( snipCount );
scanner.Report ( snips );
bool lastfound=false;
for ( int i = 0; i < snipCount; ++i )
{
if ( snips[i].fState == XMPScanner::eValidPacketSnip )
{
if (!lastfound)
{
if ( snips[i].fLength > 0x7FFFFFFF ) XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket: Oversize packet", kXMPErr_BadXMP );
packetInfo.offset = snips[i].fOffset;
packetInfo.length = (XMP_Int32)snips[i].fLength;
packetInfo.charForm = snips[i].fCharForm;
packetInfo.writeable = (snips[i].fAccess == 'w');
firstPacketInfo=packetInfo;
lastPacketInfo=packetInfo;
lastfound=true;
}
else
{
lastPacketInfo.offset = snips[i].fOffset;
lastPacketInfo.length = (XMP_Int32)snips[i].fLength;
lastPacketInfo.charForm = snips[i].fCharForm;
lastPacketInfo.writeable = (snips[i].fAccess == 'w');
packetInfo=lastPacketInfo;
}
}
}
return lastfound;
} // PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 26,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err piff_pssh_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_PIFFProtectionSystemHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_PIFFProtectionSystemHeaderBox*) a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "PIFFProtectionSystemHeaderBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "SystemID=\"");
dump_data_hex(trace, (char *) ptr->SystemID, 16);
fprintf(trace, "\" PrivateData=\"");
dump_data_hex(trace, (char *) ptr->private_data, ptr->private_data_size);
fprintf(trace, "\">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("PIFFProtectionSystemHeaderBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheHost::PrepareForTransfer() {
DCHECK(!associated_cache());
DCHECK(!is_selection_pending());
DCHECK(!group_being_updated_.get());
host_id_ = kAppCacheNoHostId;
frontend_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLInputElement::~HTMLInputElement()
{
setForm(0);
if (isRadioButton())
document()->formController()->checkedRadioButtons().removeButton(this);
if (m_hasTouchEventHandler)
document()->didRemoveEventTargetNode(this);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jspSoftKill() {
jsvUnLock(execInfo.hiddenRoot);
execInfo.hiddenRoot = 0;
jsvUnLock(execInfo.root);
execInfo.root = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int key_notify_sa_expire(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *out_skb;
struct sadb_msg *out_hdr;
int hard;
int hsc;
hard = c->data.hard;
if (hard)
hsc = 2;
else
hsc = 1;
out_skb = pfkey_xfrm_state2msg_expire(x, hsc);
if (IS_ERR(out_skb))
return PTR_ERR(out_skb);
out_hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) out_skb->data;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_EXPIRE;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_satype = pfkey_proto2satype(x->id.proto);
out_hdr->sadb_msg_errno = 0;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_seq = 0;
out_hdr->sadb_msg_pid = 0;
pfkey_broadcast(out_skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int interrupt_read(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u8 * value,
void *data)
{
*value = (u8) dev->irq;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sas_revalidate_domain(struct work_struct *work)
{
int res = 0;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = port->ha;
struct domain_device *ddev = port->port_dev;
/* prevent revalidation from finding sata links in recovery */
mutex_lock(&ha->disco_mutex);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_ATA_EH_ACTIVE, &ha->state)) {
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATION DEFERRED on port %d, pid:%d\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current));
goto out;
}
clear_bit(DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN, &port->disc.pending);
SAS_DPRINTK("REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d\n", port->id,
task_pid_nr(current));
if (ddev && (ddev->dev_type == SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE ||
ddev->dev_type == SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE))
res = sas_ex_revalidate_domain(ddev);
SAS_DPRINTK("done REVALIDATING DOMAIN on port %d, pid:%d, res 0x%x\n",
port->id, task_pid_nr(current), res);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ha->disco_mutex);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 10,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aiff_command (SF_PRIVATE * psf, int command, void * UNUSED (data), int UNUSED (datasize))
{ AIFF_PRIVATE *paiff ;
if ((paiff = psf->container_data) == NULL)
return SFE_INTERNAL ;
switch (command)
{ case SFC_SET_CHANNEL_MAP_INFO :
paiff->chanmap_tag = aiff_caf_find_channel_layout_tag (psf->channel_map, psf->sf.channels) ;
return (paiff->chanmap_tag != 0) ;
default :
break ;
} ;
return 0 ;
} /* aiff_command */
Commit Message: src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Rect PDFiumEngine::GetPageContentsRect(int index) {
return GetScreenRect(pages_[index]->rect());
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tar_sparse_init (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
memset (file, 0, sizeof *file);
if (!sparse_select_optab (file))
return false;
if (file->optab->init)
return file->optab->init (file);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 2,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadDirectoryCheckOrder(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 dircount)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFReadDirectoryCheckOrder";
uint16 m;
uint16 n;
TIFFDirEntry* o;
m=0;
for (n=0, o=dir; n<dircount; n++, o++)
{
if (o->tdir_tag<m)
{
TIFFWarningExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,
"Invalid TIFF directory; tags are not sorted in ascending order");
break;
}
m=o->tdir_tag+1;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_find_handle(
unsigned int cmd,
xfs_fsop_handlereq_t *hreq)
{
int hsize;
xfs_handle_t handle;
struct inode *inode;
struct fd f = {NULL};
struct path path;
int error;
struct xfs_inode *ip;
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FD_TO_HANDLE) {
f = fdget(hreq->fd);
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
inode = file_inode(f.file);
} else {
error = user_lpath((const char __user *)hreq->path, &path);
if (error)
return error;
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
}
ip = XFS_I(inode);
/*
* We can only generate handles for inodes residing on a XFS filesystem,
* and only for regular files, directories or symbolic links.
*/
error = -EINVAL;
if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != XFS_SB_MAGIC)
goto out_put;
error = -EBADF;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) &&
!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
goto out_put;
memcpy(&handle.ha_fsid, ip->i_mount->m_fixedfsid, sizeof(xfs_fsid_t));
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_PATH_TO_FSHANDLE) {
/*
* This handle only contains an fsid, zero the rest.
*/
memset(&handle.ha_fid, 0, sizeof(handle.ha_fid));
hsize = sizeof(xfs_fsid_t);
} else {
handle.ha_fid.fid_len = sizeof(xfs_fid_t) -
sizeof(handle.ha_fid.fid_len);
handle.ha_fid.fid_pad = 0;
handle.ha_fid.fid_gen = ip->i_d.di_gen;
handle.ha_fid.fid_ino = ip->i_ino;
hsize = XFS_HSIZE(handle);
}
error = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(hreq->ohandle, &handle, hsize) ||
copy_to_user(hreq->ohandlen, &hsize, sizeof(__s32)))
goto out_put;
error = 0;
out_put:
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FD_TO_HANDLE)
fdput(f);
else
path_put(&path);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetEnabledFlags(const PrefService* prefs, std::set<std::string>* result) {
const ListValue* enabled_experiments = prefs->GetList(
prefs::kEnabledLabsExperiments);
if (!enabled_experiments)
return;
for (ListValue::const_iterator it = enabled_experiments->begin();
it != enabled_experiments->end();
++it) {
std::string experiment_name;
if (!(*it)->GetAsString(&experiment_name)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Invalid entry in " << prefs::kEnabledLabsExperiments;
continue;
}
result->insert(experiment_name);
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 20,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct fwnet_partial_datagram *fwnet_pd_new(struct net_device *net,
struct fwnet_peer *peer, u16 datagram_label, unsigned dg_size,
void *frag_buf, unsigned frag_off, unsigned frag_len)
{
struct fwnet_partial_datagram *new;
struct fwnet_fragment_info *fi;
new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new)
goto fail;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->fi_list);
fi = fwnet_frag_new(new, frag_off, frag_len);
if (fi == NULL)
goto fail_w_new;
new->datagram_label = datagram_label;
new->datagram_size = dg_size;
new->skb = dev_alloc_skb(dg_size + LL_RESERVED_SPACE(net));
if (new->skb == NULL)
goto fail_w_fi;
skb_reserve(new->skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(net));
new->pbuf = skb_put(new->skb, dg_size);
memcpy(new->pbuf + frag_off, frag_buf, frag_len);
list_add_tail(&new->pd_link, &peer->pd_list);
return new;
fail_w_fi:
kfree(fi);
fail_w_new:
kfree(new);
fail:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLDocument::removeExtraNamedItem(const AtomicString& name)
{
removeItemFromMap(m_extraNamedItemCounts, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sysapi_condor_arch(void)
{
if( ! arch_inited ) {
init_arch();
}
return arch;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 2,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_register_device_ops(struct kvm_device_ops *ops, u32 type)
{
if (type >= ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_device_ops_table))
return -ENOSPC;
if (kvm_device_ops_table[type] != NULL)
return -EEXIST;
kvm_device_ops_table[type] = ops;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateOutOfFlowContext() {
if (!object_.IsBoxModelObject() && !properties_)
return;
if (object_.IsLayoutBlock())
context_.paint_offset_for_float = context_.current.paint_offset;
if (object_.CanContainAbsolutePositionObjects()) {
context_.absolute_position = context_.current;
}
if (object_.IsLayoutView()) {
const auto* initial_fixed_transform = context_.fixed_position.transform;
const auto* initial_fixed_scroll = context_.fixed_position.scroll;
context_.fixed_position = context_.current;
context_.fixed_position.fixed_position_children_fixed_to_root = true;
context_.fixed_position.transform = initial_fixed_transform;
context_.fixed_position.scroll = initial_fixed_scroll;
} else if (object_.CanContainFixedPositionObjects()) {
context_.fixed_position = context_.current;
context_.fixed_position.fixed_position_children_fixed_to_root = false;
} else if (properties_ && properties_->CssClip()) {
auto* css_clip = properties_->CssClip();
if (context_.fixed_position.clip == css_clip->Parent()) {
context_.fixed_position.clip = css_clip;
} else {
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateCssClipFixedPosition(
context_.fixed_position.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{css_clip->LocalTransformSpace(),
css_clip->ClipRect()}));
}
if (properties_->CssClipFixedPosition())
context_.fixed_position.clip = properties_->CssClipFixedPosition();
return;
}
}
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate() && properties_)
OnClear(properties_->ClearCssClipFixedPosition());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 11,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void put_tty_queue(unsigned char c, struct n_tty_data *ldata)
{
*read_buf_addr(ldata, ldata->read_head) = c;
ldata->read_head++;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 13,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port)
{
u_int i;
if (port == 0)
for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++)
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]);
else
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned getBitsPerSample() const {
return mStreamInfo.bits_per_sample;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_fpexc_mode(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long adr)
{
unsigned int val;
if (tsk->thread.fpexc_mode & PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE)
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_SPE)) {
/*
* When the sticky exception bits are set
* directly by userspace, it must call prctl
* with PR_GET_FPEXC (with PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE
* in the existing prctl settings) or
* PR_SET_FPEXC (with PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE in
* the bits being set). <fenv.h> functions
* saving and restoring the whole
* floating-point environment need to do so
* anyway to restore the prctl settings from
* the saved environment.
*/
tsk->thread.spefscr_last = mfspr(SPRN_SPEFSCR);
val = tsk->thread.fpexc_mode;
} else
return -EINVAL;
#else
return -EINVAL;
#endif
else
val = __unpack_fe01(tsk->thread.fpexc_mode);
return put_user(val, (unsigned int __user *) adr);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tecmp0 (const void *_a, const void *_b)
{
struct tree_entry *a = *((struct tree_entry**)_a);
struct tree_entry *b = *((struct tree_entry**)_b);
return base_name_compare(
a->name->str_dat, a->name->str_len, a->versions[0].mode,
b->name->str_dat, b->name->str_len, b->versions[0].mode);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Jpeg2000TgtNode *ff_jpeg2000_tag_tree_init(int w, int h)
{
int pw = w, ph = h;
Jpeg2000TgtNode *res, *t, *t2;
int32_t tt_size;
tt_size = tag_tree_size(w, h);
t = res = av_mallocz_array(tt_size, sizeof(*t));
if (!res)
return NULL;
while (w > 1 || h > 1) {
int i, j;
pw = w;
ph = h;
w = (w + 1) >> 1;
h = (h + 1) >> 1;
t2 = t + pw * ph;
for (i = 0; i < ph; i++)
for (j = 0; j < pw; j++)
t[i * pw + j].parent = &t2[(i >> 1) * w + (j >> 1)];
t = t2;
}
t[0].parent = NULL;
return res;
}
Commit Message: jpeg2000: fix dereferencing invalid pointers
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RegisterURLReplacingHandler(net::EmbeddedTestServer* test_server,
const std::string& match_path,
const base::FilePath& template_file) {
test_server->RegisterRequestHandler(base::Bind(
[](net::EmbeddedTestServer* test_server, const std::string& match_path,
const base::FilePath& template_file,
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request)
-> std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> {
GURL url = test_server->GetURL(request.relative_url);
if (url.path() != match_path)
return nullptr;
std::string contents;
CHECK(base::ReadFileToString(template_file, &contents));
GURL url_base = url.GetWithoutFilename();
base::ReplaceSubstringsAfterOffset(&contents, 0, "${URL_PLACEHOLDER}",
url_base.spec());
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(contents);
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
return response;
},
base::Unretained(test_server), match_path, template_file));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_commit(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_commit *commit)
{
gen_boot_verifier(&commit->co_verf, SVC_NET(rqstp));
return nfsd_commit(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, commit->co_offset,
commit->co_count);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 16,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_attr_strange(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *data, u_int length, u_short attr_code)
{
u_short len_data;
switch(attr_code)
{
case ARAP_PASS:
if (length != 16)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: length %u != 16", length));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "User_challenge ("));
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],8);
len_data = 8;
PRINT_HEX(len_data, data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") User_resp("));
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],8);
len_data = 8;
PRINT_HEX(len_data, data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
break;
case ARAP_FEATURES:
if (length != 14)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: length %u != 14", length));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],1);
if (*data)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "User can change password"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "User cannot change password"));
data++;
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Min password length: %d", *data));
data++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", created at: "));
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],4);
len_data = 4;
PRINT_HEX(len_data, data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", expires in: "));
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],4);
len_data = 4;
PRINT_HEX(len_data, data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Current Time: "));
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],4);
len_data = 4;
PRINT_HEX(len_data, data);
break;
case ARAP_CHALLENGE_RESP:
if (length < 8)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: length %u != 8", length));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(data[0],8);
len_data = 8;
PRINT_HEX(len_data, data);
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13032/RADIUS: Check whether a byte exists before testing its value.
Reverse the test in a for loop to test the length before testing whether
we have a null byte.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Clean up other length tests while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void open_modern(void) {
struct addrinfo hints;
struct addrinfo* ai = NULL;
struct sock_flags;
int e;
memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_ADDRCONFIG;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
e = getaddrinfo(modern_listen, NBD_DEFAULT_PORT, &hints, &ai);
if(e != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(e));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if((modernsock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol))<0) {
err("socket: %m");
}
dosockopts(modernsock);
if(bind(modernsock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen)) {
err("bind: %m");
}
if(listen(modernsock, 10) <0) {
err("listen: %m");
}
freeaddrinfo(ai);
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline ssize_t RandomX(RandomInfo *random_info,const size_t columns)
{
return((ssize_t) (columns*GetPseudoRandomValue(random_info)));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void *alloc_smp_req(int size)
{
u8 *p = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (p)
p[0] = SMP_REQUEST;
return p;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 9,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void urlStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueString(info, imp->getURLAttribute(HTMLNames::urlstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockAutofillClient(MockSyncService* sync_service)
: sync_service_(sync_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "init mpck client";
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_iterate_sb_cpu(perf_iterate_f output, void *data)
{
struct pmu_event_list *pel = this_cpu_ptr(&pmu_sb_events);
struct perf_event *event;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &pel->list, sb_list) {
/*
* Skip events that are not fully formed yet; ensure that
* if we observe event->ctx, both event and ctx will be
* complete enough. See perf_install_in_context().
*/
if (!smp_load_acquire(&event->ctx))
continue;
if (event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
continue;
if (!event_filter_match(event))
continue;
output(event, data);
}
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL GetWindowOpenURL() {
return ui_test_utils::GetTestUrl(
base::FilePath(kTestDir),
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("window_open.html")));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuChannel::OnWillGpuSwitchOccur(bool is_creating_context,
gfx::GpuPreference gpu_preference,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuChannel::OnWillGpuSwitchOccur");
bool will_switch_occur = false;
if (gpu_preference == gfx::PreferDiscreteGpu &&
gfx::GLContext::SupportsDualGpus()) {
if (is_creating_context) {
will_switch_occur = !num_contexts_preferring_discrete_gpu_;
} else {
will_switch_occur = (num_contexts_preferring_discrete_gpu_ == 1);
}
}
GpuChannelMsg_WillGpuSwitchOccur::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message,
will_switch_occur);
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void send_message(struct ifsock *ifs, char *type, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
int s;
size_t i, len, note = 0;
ssize_t num;
char host[NI_MAXHOST];
char buf[MAX_PKT_SIZE];
struct sockaddr dest;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname));
s = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&ifs->addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), host, sizeof(host), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
if (s) {
logit(LOG_WARNING, "Failed getnameinfo(): %s", gai_strerror(s));
return;
}
if (ifs->addr.sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY))
return;
if (ifs->out == -1)
return;
if (!strcmp(type, SSDP_ST_ALL))
type = NULL;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
if (sin)
compose_response(type, host, buf, sizeof(buf));
else
compose_notify(type, host, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (!sin) {
note = 1;
compose_addr((struct sockaddr_in *)&dest, MC_SSDP_GROUP, MC_SSDP_PORT);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&dest;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending %s from %s ...", !note ? "reply" : "notify", host);
num = sendto(ifs->out, buf, strlen(buf), 0, sin, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
if (num < 0)
logit(LOG_WARNING, "Failed sending SSDP %s, type: %s: %s", !note ? "reply" : "notify", type, strerror(errno));
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_fopen (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{
psf->error = 0 ;
psf->file.handle = psf_open_handle (&psf->file) ;
if (psf->file.handle == NULL)
psf_log_syserr (psf, GetLastError ()) ;
return psf->error ;
} /* psf_fopen */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpk_compute_crycks(sc_card_t *card, sc_apdu_t *apdu,
u8 *crycks1)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
u8 in[8], out[8], block[64];
unsigned int len = 0, i;
int r = SC_SUCCESS, outl;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
/* Fill block with 0x00 and then with the data. */
memset(block, 0x00, sizeof(block));
block[len++] = apdu->cla;
block[len++] = apdu->ins;
block[len++] = apdu->p1;
block[len++] = apdu->p2;
block[len++] = apdu->lc + 3;
if ((i = apdu->datalen) + len > sizeof(block))
i = sizeof(block) - len;
memcpy(block+len, apdu->data, i);
len += i;
/* Set IV */
memset(in, 0x00, 8);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede_cbc(), NULL, priv->key, in);
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &outl, &block[i], 8)) {
r = SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
break;
}
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
memcpy((u8 *) (apdu->data + apdu->datalen), out + 5, 3);
apdu->datalen += 3;
apdu->lc += 3;
apdu->le += 3;
if (crycks1)
memcpy(crycks1, out, 3);
sc_mem_clear(in, sizeof(in));
sc_mem_clear(out, sizeof(out));
sc_mem_clear(block, sizeof(block));
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CloseDevToolsWindow() {
Browser* browser = window_->browser();
browser->tab_strip_model()->CloseAllTabs();
BrowserClosedObserver close_observer(browser);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::addLayerHitTestRects(LayerHitTestRects& layerRects, const RenderLayer* currentLayer, const LayoutPoint& layerOffset, const LayoutRect& containerRect) const
{
LayoutPoint adjustedLayerOffset = layerOffset + locationOffset();
RenderBoxModelObject::addLayerHitTestRects(layerRects, currentLayer, adjustedLayerOffset, containerRect);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArthurOutputDev::drawImageMask(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height, GBool invert,
GBool inlineImg)
{
qDebug() << "drawImageMask";
#if 0
unsigned char *buffer;
unsigned char *dest;
cairo_surface_t *image;
cairo_pattern_t *pattern;
int x, y;
ImageStream *imgStr;
Guchar *pix;
double *ctm;
cairo_matrix_t matrix;
int invert_bit;
int row_stride;
row_stride = (width + 3) & ~3;
buffer = (unsigned char *) malloc (height * row_stride);
if (buffer == NULL) {
error(-1, "Unable to allocate memory for image.");
return;
}
/* TODO: Do we want to cache these? */
imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width, 1, 1);
imgStr->reset();
invert_bit = invert ? 1 : 0;
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
pix = imgStr->getLine();
dest = buffer + y * row_stride;
for (x = 0; x < width; x++) {
if (pix[x] ^ invert_bit)
*dest++ = 0;
else
*dest++ = 255;
}
}
image = cairo_image_surface_create_for_data (buffer, CAIRO_FORMAT_A8,
width, height, row_stride);
if (image == NULL)
return;
pattern = cairo_pattern_create_for_surface (image);
if (pattern == NULL)
return;
ctm = state->getCTM();
LOG (printf ("drawImageMask %dx%d, matrix: %f, %f, %f, %f, %f, %f\n",
width, height, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3], ctm[4], ctm[5]));
matrix.xx = ctm[0] / width;
matrix.xy = -ctm[2] / height;
matrix.yx = ctm[1] / width;
matrix.yy = -ctm[3] / height;
matrix.x0 = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
matrix.y0 = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
cairo_matrix_invert (&matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_matrix (pattern, &matrix);
cairo_pattern_set_filter (pattern, CAIRO_FILTER_BEST);
/* FIXME: Doesn't the image mask support any colorspace? */
cairo_set_source_rgb (cairo, fill_color.r, fill_color.g, fill_color.b);
cairo_mask (cairo, pattern);
cairo_pattern_destroy (pattern);
cairo_surface_destroy (image);
free (buffer);
delete imgStr;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didClearWindowObject(WebFrame* frame) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidClearWindowObject(frame));
GURL frame_url = frame->document().url();
if (BindingsPolicy::is_web_ui_enabled(enabled_bindings_) &&
(frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) ||
frame_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kDataScheme))) {
GetWebUIBindings()->set_message_sender(this);
GetWebUIBindings()->set_routing_id(routing_id_);
GetWebUIBindings()->BindToJavascript(frame, "chrome");
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int create_or_die(const char *filename, int user_core_fd)
{
int fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (fd >= 0)
{
IGNORE_RESULT(fchown(fd, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid));
return fd;
}
int sv_errno = errno;
if (dd)
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
close(user_core_fd);
errno = sv_errno;
perror_msg_and_die("Can't open '%s'", filename);
}
Commit Message: ccpp: save abrt core files only to new files
Prior this commit abrt-hook-ccpp saved a core file generated by a
process running a program whose name starts with "abrt" in
DUMP_LOCATION/$(basename program)-coredump. If the file was a symlink,
the hook followed and wrote core file to the symlink's target.
Addresses CVE-2015-5287
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 11,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::UMACommitReport(
FrameMsg_UILoadMetricsReportType::Value report_type,
const base::TimeTicks& ui_timestamp) {
if (report_type == FrameMsg_UILoadMetricsReportType::REPORT_LINK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_TIMES("Navigation.UI_OnCommitProvisionalLoad.Link",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - ui_timestamp,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(10),
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(10), 100);
} else if (report_type == FrameMsg_UILoadMetricsReportType::REPORT_INTENT) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_TIMES("Navigation.UI_OnCommitProvisionalLoad.Intent",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - ui_timestamp,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(10),
base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(10), 100);
}
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ath_tid_has_buffered(struct ath_atx_tid *tid)
{
return !skb_queue_empty(&tid->buf_q) || !skb_queue_empty(&tid->retry_q);
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 21,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct task_struct *find_lock_task_mm(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct task_struct *t;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_thread(p, t) {
task_lock(t);
if (likely(t->mm))
goto found;
task_unlock(t);
}
t = NULL;
found:
rcu_read_unlock();
return t;
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 22,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual const ImePropertyList& current_ime_properties() const {
return current_ime_properties_;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 15,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_get_writestateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_write *write)
{
get_stateid(cstate, &write->wr_stateid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 25,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pdf_xref_store_unsaved_signature(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *field, pdf_signer *signer)
{
pdf_xref *xref = &doc->xref_sections[0];
pdf_unsaved_sig *unsaved_sig;
/* Record details within the document structure so that contents
* and byte_range can be updated with their correct values at
* saving time */
unsaved_sig = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, pdf_unsaved_sig);
unsaved_sig->field = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, field);
unsaved_sig->signer = pdf_keep_signer(ctx, signer);
unsaved_sig->next = NULL;
if (xref->unsaved_sigs_end == NULL)
xref->unsaved_sigs_end = &xref->unsaved_sigs;
*xref->unsaved_sigs_end = unsaved_sig;
xref->unsaved_sigs_end = &unsaved_sig->next;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl_transform_free( ssl_transform *transform )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate );
inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate );
#endif
memset( transform, 0, sizeof( ssl_transform ) );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t o2nm_cluster_idle_timeout_ms_show(struct config_item *item,
char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%u\n", to_o2nm_cluster(item)->cl_idle_timeout_ms);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputHandler::InputHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Input::Metainfo::domainName),
host_(nullptr),
input_queued_(false),
page_scale_factor_(1.0),
last_id_(0),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void seqiv_geniv(struct seqiv_ctx *ctx, u8 *info, u64 seq,
unsigned int ivsize)
{
unsigned int len = ivsize;
if (ivsize > sizeof(u64)) {
memset(info, 0, ivsize - sizeof(u64));
len = sizeof(u64);
}
seq = cpu_to_be64(seq);
memcpy(info + ivsize - len, &seq, len);
crypto_xor(info, ctx->salt, ivsize);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,196 |
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