instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::GetInstance() {
return ExtensionTtsPlatformImplLinux::GetInstance();
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::Print() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("PrintPreview"), profile_);
GetSelectedTabContents()->PrintPreview();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ar6000_init_profile_info(struct ar6_softc *ar)
{
ar->arSsidLen = 0;
A_MEMZERO(ar->arSsid, sizeof(ar->arSsid));
switch(fwmode) {
case HI_OPTION_FW_MODE_IBSS:
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode = ADHOC_NETWORK;
break;
case HI_OPTION_FW_MODE_BSS_STA:
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode = INFRA_NETWORK;
break;
case HI_OPTION_FW_MODE_AP:
ar->arNetworkType = ar->arNextMode = AP_NETWORK;
break;
}
ar->arDot11AuthMode = OPEN_AUTH;
ar->arAuthMode = NONE_AUTH;
ar->arPairwiseCrypto = NONE_CRYPT;
ar->arPairwiseCryptoLen = 0;
ar->arGroupCrypto = NONE_CRYPT;
ar->arGroupCryptoLen = 0;
A_MEMZERO(ar->arWepKeyList, sizeof(ar->arWepKeyList));
A_MEMZERO(ar->arReqBssid, sizeof(ar->arReqBssid));
A_MEMZERO(ar->arBssid, sizeof(ar->arBssid));
ar->arBssChannel = 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RegisterProperties(IBusPropList* ibus_prop_list) {
DLOG(INFO) << "RegisterProperties" << (ibus_prop_list ? "" : " (clear)");
ImePropertyList prop_list; // our representation.
if (ibus_prop_list) {
if (!FlattenPropertyList(ibus_prop_list, &prop_list)) {
RegisterProperties(NULL);
return;
}
}
register_ime_properties_(language_library_, prop_list);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 15,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_mknod(void *opaque)
{
int mode;
gid_t gid;
int32_t fid;
V9fsQID qid;
int err = 0;
int major, minor;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsString name;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsdddd", &fid, &name, &mode,
&major, &minor, &gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_mknod(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, mode, major, minor);
if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (!strcmp(".", name.data) || !strcmp("..", name.data)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
err = v9fs_co_mknod(pdu, fidp, &name, fidp->uid, gid,
makedev(major, minor), mode, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
stat_to_qid(&stbuf, &qid);
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_mknod_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 15,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void svcinfo_death(struct binder_state *bs, void *ptr)
{
struct svcinfo *si = (struct svcinfo* ) ptr;
ALOGI("service '%s' died\n", str8(si->name, si->len));
if (si->handle) {
binder_release(bs, si->handle);
si->handle = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void red_channel_client_restore_main_sender(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
spice_marshaller_reset(rcc->send_data.urgent.marshaller);
rcc->send_data.marshaller = rcc->send_data.main.marshaller;
rcc->send_data.header.data = rcc->send_data.main.header_data;
if (!rcc->is_mini_header) {
rcc->send_data.header.set_msg_serial(&rcc->send_data.header, rcc->send_data.serial);
}
rcc->send_data.item = rcc->send_data.main.item;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmcraid_reset_enable_ioa(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
u32 intrs;
pmcraid_reinit_buffers(pinstance);
intrs = pmcraid_read_interrupts(pinstance);
pmcraid_enable_interrupts(pinstance, PMCRAID_PCI_INTERRUPTS);
if (intrs & INTRS_TRANSITION_TO_OPERATIONAL) {
if (!pinstance->interrupt_mode) {
iowrite32(INTRS_TRANSITION_TO_OPERATIONAL,
pinstance->int_regs.
ioa_host_interrupt_mask_reg);
iowrite32(INTRS_TRANSITION_TO_OPERATIONAL,
pinstance->int_regs.ioa_host_interrupt_clr_reg);
}
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_epoll_wait(int epfd,
struct oabi_epoll_event __user *events,
int maxevents, int timeout)
{
struct epoll_event *kbuf;
mm_segment_t fs;
long ret, err, i;
if (maxevents <= 0 || maxevents > (INT_MAX/sizeof(struct epoll_event)))
return -EINVAL;
kbuf = kmalloc(sizeof(*kbuf) * maxevents, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_epoll_wait(epfd, kbuf, maxevents, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ret; i++) {
__put_user_error(kbuf[i].events, &events->events, err);
__put_user_error(kbuf[i].data, &events->data, err);
events++;
}
kfree(kbuf);
return err ? -EFAULT : ret;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::setHref(const AtomicString& value)
{
setAttribute(hrefAttr, value);
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 20,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_phy_reset_5703_4_5(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 reg32, phy9_orig;
int retries, do_phy_reset, err;
retries = 10;
do_phy_reset = 1;
do {
if (do_phy_reset) {
err = tg3_bmcr_reset(tp);
if (err)
return err;
do_phy_reset = 0;
}
/* Disable transmitter and interrupt. */
if (tg3_readphy(tp, MII_TG3_EXT_CTRL, ®32))
continue;
reg32 |= 0x3000;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_EXT_CTRL, reg32);
/* Set full-duplex, 1000 mbps. */
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR,
BMCR_FULLDPLX | BMCR_SPEED1000);
/* Set to master mode. */
if (tg3_readphy(tp, MII_CTRL1000, &phy9_orig))
continue;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_CTRL1000,
CTL1000_AS_MASTER | CTL1000_ENABLE_MASTER);
err = tg3_phy_toggle_auxctl_smdsp(tp, true);
if (err)
return err;
/* Block the PHY control access. */
tg3_phydsp_write(tp, 0x8005, 0x0800);
err = tg3_phy_write_and_check_testpat(tp, &do_phy_reset);
if (!err)
break;
} while (--retries);
err = tg3_phy_reset_chanpat(tp);
if (err)
return err;
tg3_phydsp_write(tp, 0x8005, 0x0000);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_DSP_ADDRESS, 0x8200);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_DSP_CONTROL, 0x0000);
tg3_phy_toggle_auxctl_smdsp(tp, false);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_CTRL1000, phy9_orig);
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_TG3_EXT_CTRL, ®32)) {
reg32 &= ~0x3000;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_EXT_CTRL, reg32);
} else if (!err)
err = -EBUSY;
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init sit_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
struct ip_tunnel *t;
int err;
sitn->tunnels[0] = sitn->tunnels_wc;
sitn->tunnels[1] = sitn->tunnels_l;
sitn->tunnels[2] = sitn->tunnels_r;
sitn->tunnels[3] = sitn->tunnels_r_l;
if (!net_has_fallback_tunnels(net))
return 0;
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct ip_tunnel), "sit0",
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ipip6_tunnel_setup);
if (!sitn->fb_tunnel_dev) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_alloc_dev;
}
dev_net_set(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, net);
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &sit_link_ops;
/* FB netdevice is special: we have one, and only one per netns.
* Allowing to move it to another netns is clearly unsafe.
*/
sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
err = register_netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
if (err)
goto err_reg_dev;
ipip6_tunnel_clone_6rd(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, sitn);
ipip6_fb_tunnel_init(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
t = netdev_priv(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
strcpy(t->parms.name, sitn->fb_tunnel_dev->name);
return 0;
err_reg_dev:
ipip6_dev_free(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
err_alloc_dev:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 1 | 25,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_RunIns( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
FT_ULong ins_counter = 0; /* executed instructions counter */
FT_ULong num_twilight_points;
FT_UShort i;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
FT_Byte opcode_pattern[1][2] = {
/* #8 TypeMan Talk Align */
{
0x06, /* SPVTL */
0x7D, /* RDTG */
},
};
FT_UShort opcode_patterns = 1;
FT_UShort opcode_pointer[1] = { 0 };
FT_UShort opcode_size[1] = { 1 };
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
exc->iup_called = FALSE;
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL
/*
* Toggle backward compatibility according to what font wants, except
* when
*
* 1) we have a `tricky' font that heavily relies on the interpreter to
* render glyphs correctly, for example DFKai-SB, or
* 2) FT_RENDER_MODE_MONO (i.e, monochome rendering) is requested.
*
* In those cases, backward compatibility needs to be turned off to get
* correct rendering. The rendering is then completely up to the
* font's programming.
*
*/
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL &&
exc->subpixel_hinting_lean &&
!FT_IS_TRICKY( &exc->face->root ) )
exc->backward_compatibility = !( exc->GS.instruct_control & 4 );
else
exc->backward_compatibility = FALSE;
exc->iupx_called = FALSE;
exc->iupy_called = FALSE;
#endif
/* We restrict the number of twilight points to a reasonable, */
/* heuristic value to avoid slow execution of malformed bytecode. */
num_twilight_points = FT_MAX( 30,
2 * ( exc->pts.n_points + exc->cvtSize ) );
if ( exc->twilight.n_points > num_twilight_points )
{
if ( num_twilight_points > 0xFFFFU )
num_twilight_points = 0xFFFFU;
FT_TRACE5(( "TT_RunIns: Resetting number of twilight points\n"
" from %d to the more reasonable value %d\n",
exc->twilight.n_points,
num_twilight_points ));
exc->twilight.n_points = (FT_UShort)num_twilight_points;
}
/* Set up loop detectors. We restrict the number of LOOPCALL loops */
/* and the number of JMPR, JROT, and JROF calls with a negative */
/* argument to values that depend on various parameters like the */
/* size of the CVT table or the number of points in the current */
/* glyph (if applicable). */
/* */
/* The idea is that in real-world bytecode you either iterate over */
/* all CVT entries (in the `prep' table), or over all points (or */
/* contours, in the `glyf' table) of a glyph, and such iterations */
/* don't happen very often. */
exc->loopcall_counter = 0;
exc->neg_jump_counter = 0;
/* The maximum values are heuristic. */
if ( exc->pts.n_points )
exc->loopcall_counter_max = FT_MAX( 50,
10 * exc->pts.n_points ) +
FT_MAX( 50,
exc->cvtSize / 10 );
else
exc->loopcall_counter_max = 300 + 8 * exc->cvtSize;
/* as a protection against an unreasonable number of CVT entries */
/* we assume at most 100 control values per glyph for the counter */
if ( exc->loopcall_counter_max >
100 * (FT_ULong)exc->face->root.num_glyphs )
exc->loopcall_counter_max = 100 * (FT_ULong)exc->face->root.num_glyphs;
FT_TRACE5(( "TT_RunIns: Limiting total number of loops in LOOPCALL"
" to %d\n", exc->loopcall_counter_max ));
exc->neg_jump_counter_max = exc->loopcall_counter_max;
FT_TRACE5(( "TT_RunIns: Limiting total number of backward jumps"
" to %d\n", exc->neg_jump_counter_max ));
/* set PPEM and CVT functions */
exc->tt_metrics.ratio = 0;
if ( exc->metrics.x_ppem != exc->metrics.y_ppem )
{
/* non-square pixels, use the stretched routines */
exc->func_cur_ppem = Current_Ppem_Stretched;
exc->func_read_cvt = Read_CVT_Stretched;
exc->func_write_cvt = Write_CVT_Stretched;
exc->func_move_cvt = Move_CVT_Stretched;
}
else
{
/* square pixels, use normal routines */
exc->func_cur_ppem = Current_Ppem;
exc->func_read_cvt = Read_CVT;
exc->func_write_cvt = Write_CVT;
exc->func_move_cvt = Move_CVT;
}
Compute_Funcs( exc );
Compute_Round( exc, (FT_Byte)exc->GS.round_state );
do
{
exc->opcode = exc->code[exc->IP];
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
{
FT_Long cnt = FT_MIN( 8, exc->top );
FT_Long n;
/* if tracing level is 7, show current code position */
/* and the first few stack elements also */
FT_TRACE6(( " " ));
FT_TRACE7(( "%06d ", exc->IP ));
FT_TRACE6(( opcode_name[exc->opcode] + 2 ));
FT_TRACE7(( "%*s", *opcode_name[exc->opcode] == 'A'
? 2
: 12 - ( *opcode_name[exc->opcode] - '0' ),
"#" ));
for ( n = 1; n <= cnt; n++ )
FT_TRACE7(( " %d", exc->stack[exc->top - n] ));
FT_TRACE6(( "\n" ));
}
#endif /* FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE */
if ( ( exc->length = opcode_length[exc->opcode] ) < 0 )
{
if ( exc->IP + 1 >= exc->codeSize )
goto LErrorCodeOverflow_;
exc->length = 2 - exc->length * exc->code[exc->IP + 1];
}
if ( exc->IP + exc->length > exc->codeSize )
goto LErrorCodeOverflow_;
/* First, let's check for empty stack and overflow */
exc->args = exc->top - ( Pop_Push_Count[exc->opcode] >> 4 );
/* `args' is the top of the stack once arguments have been popped. */
/* One can also interpret it as the index of the last argument. */
if ( exc->args < 0 )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Too_Few_Arguments );
goto LErrorLabel_;
}
/* push zeroes onto the stack */
for ( i = 0; i < Pop_Push_Count[exc->opcode] >> 4; i++ )
exc->stack[i] = 0;
exc->args = 0;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
if ( exc->opcode == 0x91 )
{
/* this is very special: GETVARIATION returns */
/* a variable number of arguments */
/* it is the job of the application to `activate' GX handling, */
/* this is, calling any of the GX API functions on the current */
/* font to select a variation instance */
if ( exc->face->blend )
exc->new_top = exc->args + exc->face->blend->num_axis;
}
else
#endif
exc->new_top = exc->args + ( Pop_Push_Count[exc->opcode] & 15 );
/* `new_top' is the new top of the stack, after the instruction's */
/* execution. `top' will be set to `new_top' after the `switch' */
/* statement. */
if ( exc->new_top > exc->stackSize )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Stack_Overflow );
goto LErrorLabel_;
}
exc->step_ins = TRUE;
exc->error = FT_Err_Ok;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY )
{
for ( i = 0; i < opcode_patterns; i++ )
{
if ( opcode_pointer[i] < opcode_size[i] &&
exc->opcode == opcode_pattern[i][opcode_pointer[i]] )
{
opcode_pointer[i] += 1;
if ( opcode_pointer[i] == opcode_size[i] )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "sph: opcode ptrn: %d, %s %s\n",
i,
exc->face->root.family_name,
exc->face->root.style_name ));
switch ( i )
{
case 0:
break;
}
opcode_pointer[i] = 0;
}
}
else
opcode_pointer[i] = 0;
}
}
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
{
FT_Long* args = exc->stack + exc->args;
FT_Byte opcode = exc->opcode;
switch ( opcode )
{
case 0x00: /* SVTCA y */
case 0x01: /* SVTCA x */
case 0x02: /* SPvTCA y */
case 0x03: /* SPvTCA x */
case 0x04: /* SFvTCA y */
case 0x05: /* SFvTCA x */
Ins_SxyTCA( exc );
break;
case 0x06: /* SPvTL // */
case 0x07: /* SPvTL + */
Ins_SPVTL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x08: /* SFvTL // */
case 0x09: /* SFvTL + */
Ins_SFVTL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x0A: /* SPvFS */
Ins_SPVFS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x0B: /* SFvFS */
Ins_SFVFS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x0C: /* GPv */
Ins_GPV( exc, args );
break;
case 0x0D: /* GFv */
Ins_GFV( exc, args );
break;
case 0x0E: /* SFvTPv */
Ins_SFVTPV( exc );
break;
case 0x0F: /* ISECT */
Ins_ISECT( exc, args );
break;
case 0x10: /* SRP0 */
Ins_SRP0( exc, args );
break;
case 0x11: /* SRP1 */
Ins_SRP1( exc, args );
break;
case 0x12: /* SRP2 */
Ins_SRP2( exc, args );
break;
case 0x13: /* SZP0 */
Ins_SZP0( exc, args );
break;
case 0x14: /* SZP1 */
Ins_SZP1( exc, args );
break;
case 0x15: /* SZP2 */
Ins_SZP2( exc, args );
break;
case 0x16: /* SZPS */
Ins_SZPS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x17: /* SLOOP */
Ins_SLOOP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x18: /* RTG */
Ins_RTG( exc );
break;
case 0x19: /* RTHG */
Ins_RTHG( exc );
break;
case 0x1A: /* SMD */
Ins_SMD( exc, args );
break;
case 0x1B: /* ELSE */
Ins_ELSE( exc );
break;
case 0x1C: /* JMPR */
Ins_JMPR( exc, args );
break;
case 0x1D: /* SCVTCI */
Ins_SCVTCI( exc, args );
break;
case 0x1E: /* SSWCI */
Ins_SSWCI( exc, args );
break;
case 0x1F: /* SSW */
Ins_SSW( exc, args );
break;
case 0x20: /* DUP */
Ins_DUP( args );
break;
case 0x21: /* POP */
Ins_POP();
break;
case 0x22: /* CLEAR */
Ins_CLEAR( exc );
break;
case 0x23: /* SWAP */
Ins_SWAP( args );
break;
case 0x24: /* DEPTH */
Ins_DEPTH( exc, args );
break;
case 0x25: /* CINDEX */
Ins_CINDEX( exc, args );
break;
case 0x26: /* MINDEX */
Ins_MINDEX( exc, args );
break;
case 0x27: /* ALIGNPTS */
Ins_ALIGNPTS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x28: /* RAW */
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
break;
case 0x29: /* UTP */
Ins_UTP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x2A: /* LOOPCALL */
Ins_LOOPCALL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x2B: /* CALL */
Ins_CALL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x2C: /* FDEF */
Ins_FDEF( exc, args );
break;
case 0x2D: /* ENDF */
Ins_ENDF( exc );
break;
case 0x2E: /* MDAP */
case 0x2F: /* MDAP */
Ins_MDAP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x30: /* IUP */
case 0x31: /* IUP */
Ins_IUP( exc );
break;
case 0x32: /* SHP */
case 0x33: /* SHP */
Ins_SHP( exc );
break;
case 0x34: /* SHC */
case 0x35: /* SHC */
Ins_SHC( exc, args );
break;
case 0x36: /* SHZ */
case 0x37: /* SHZ */
Ins_SHZ( exc, args );
break;
case 0x38: /* SHPIX */
Ins_SHPIX( exc, args );
break;
case 0x39: /* IP */
Ins_IP( exc );
break;
case 0x3A: /* MSIRP */
case 0x3B: /* MSIRP */
Ins_MSIRP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x3C: /* AlignRP */
Ins_ALIGNRP( exc );
break;
case 0x3D: /* RTDG */
Ins_RTDG( exc );
break;
case 0x3E: /* MIAP */
case 0x3F: /* MIAP */
Ins_MIAP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x40: /* NPUSHB */
Ins_NPUSHB( exc, args );
break;
case 0x41: /* NPUSHW */
Ins_NPUSHW( exc, args );
break;
case 0x42: /* WS */
Ins_WS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x43: /* RS */
Ins_RS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x44: /* WCVTP */
Ins_WCVTP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x45: /* RCVT */
Ins_RCVT( exc, args );
break;
case 0x46: /* GC */
case 0x47: /* GC */
Ins_GC( exc, args );
break;
case 0x48: /* SCFS */
Ins_SCFS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x49: /* MD */
case 0x4A: /* MD */
Ins_MD( exc, args );
break;
case 0x4B: /* MPPEM */
Ins_MPPEM( exc, args );
break;
case 0x4C: /* MPS */
Ins_MPS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x4D: /* FLIPON */
Ins_FLIPON( exc );
break;
case 0x4E: /* FLIPOFF */
Ins_FLIPOFF( exc );
break;
case 0x4F: /* DEBUG */
Ins_DEBUG( exc );
break;
case 0x50: /* LT */
Ins_LT( args );
break;
case 0x51: /* LTEQ */
Ins_LTEQ( args );
break;
case 0x52: /* GT */
Ins_GT( args );
break;
case 0x53: /* GTEQ */
Ins_GTEQ( args );
break;
case 0x54: /* EQ */
Ins_EQ( args );
break;
case 0x55: /* NEQ */
Ins_NEQ( args );
break;
case 0x56: /* ODD */
Ins_ODD( exc, args );
break;
case 0x57: /* EVEN */
Ins_EVEN( exc, args );
break;
case 0x58: /* IF */
Ins_IF( exc, args );
break;
case 0x59: /* EIF */
Ins_EIF();
break;
case 0x5A: /* AND */
Ins_AND( args );
break;
case 0x5B: /* OR */
Ins_OR( args );
break;
case 0x5C: /* NOT */
Ins_NOT( args );
break;
case 0x5D: /* DELTAP1 */
Ins_DELTAP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x5E: /* SDB */
Ins_SDB( exc, args );
break;
case 0x5F: /* SDS */
Ins_SDS( exc, args );
break;
case 0x60: /* ADD */
Ins_ADD( args );
break;
case 0x61: /* SUB */
Ins_SUB( args );
break;
case 0x62: /* DIV */
Ins_DIV( exc, args );
break;
case 0x63: /* MUL */
Ins_MUL( args );
break;
case 0x64: /* ABS */
Ins_ABS( args );
break;
case 0x65: /* NEG */
Ins_NEG( args );
break;
case 0x66: /* FLOOR */
Ins_FLOOR( args );
break;
case 0x67: /* CEILING */
Ins_CEILING( args );
break;
case 0x68: /* ROUND */
case 0x69: /* ROUND */
case 0x6A: /* ROUND */
case 0x6B: /* ROUND */
Ins_ROUND( exc, args );
break;
case 0x6C: /* NROUND */
case 0x6D: /* NROUND */
case 0x6E: /* NRRUND */
case 0x6F: /* NROUND */
Ins_NROUND( exc, args );
break;
case 0x70: /* WCVTF */
Ins_WCVTF( exc, args );
break;
case 0x71: /* DELTAP2 */
case 0x72: /* DELTAP3 */
Ins_DELTAP( exc, args );
break;
case 0x73: /* DELTAC0 */
case 0x74: /* DELTAC1 */
case 0x75: /* DELTAC2 */
Ins_DELTAC( exc, args );
break;
case 0x76: /* SROUND */
Ins_SROUND( exc, args );
break;
case 0x77: /* S45Round */
Ins_S45ROUND( exc, args );
break;
case 0x78: /* JROT */
Ins_JROT( exc, args );
break;
case 0x79: /* JROF */
Ins_JROF( exc, args );
break;
case 0x7A: /* ROFF */
Ins_ROFF( exc );
break;
case 0x7B: /* ???? */
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
break;
case 0x7C: /* RUTG */
Ins_RUTG( exc );
break;
case 0x7D: /* RDTG */
Ins_RDTG( exc );
break;
case 0x7E: /* SANGW */
Ins_SANGW();
break;
case 0x7F: /* AA */
Ins_AA();
break;
case 0x80: /* FLIPPT */
Ins_FLIPPT( exc );
break;
case 0x81: /* FLIPRGON */
Ins_FLIPRGON( exc, args );
break;
case 0x82: /* FLIPRGOFF */
Ins_FLIPRGOFF( exc, args );
break;
case 0x83: /* UNKNOWN */
case 0x84: /* UNKNOWN */
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
break;
case 0x85: /* SCANCTRL */
Ins_SCANCTRL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x86: /* SDPvTL */
case 0x87: /* SDPvTL */
Ins_SDPVTL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x88: /* GETINFO */
Ins_GETINFO( exc, args );
break;
case 0x89: /* IDEF */
Ins_IDEF( exc, args );
break;
case 0x8A: /* ROLL */
Ins_ROLL( args );
break;
case 0x8B: /* MAX */
Ins_MAX( args );
break;
case 0x8C: /* MIN */
Ins_MIN( args );
break;
case 0x8D: /* SCANTYPE */
Ins_SCANTYPE( exc, args );
break;
case 0x8E: /* INSTCTRL */
Ins_INSTCTRL( exc, args );
break;
case 0x8F: /* ADJUST */
case 0x90: /* ADJUST */
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
break;
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
case 0x91:
/* it is the job of the application to `activate' GX handling, */
/* this is, calling any of the GX API functions on the current */
/* font to select a variation instance */
if ( exc->face->blend )
Ins_GETVARIATION( exc, args );
else
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
break;
case 0x92:
/* there is at least one MS font (LaoUI.ttf version 5.01) that */
/* uses IDEFs for 0x91 and 0x92; for this reason we activate */
/* GETDATA for GX fonts only, similar to GETVARIATION */
if ( exc->face->blend )
Ins_GETDATA( args );
else
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
break;
#endif
default:
if ( opcode >= 0xE0 )
Ins_MIRP( exc, args );
else if ( opcode >= 0xC0 )
Ins_MDRP( exc, args );
else if ( opcode >= 0xB8 )
Ins_PUSHW( exc, args );
else if ( opcode >= 0xB0 )
Ins_PUSHB( exc, args );
else
Ins_UNKNOWN( exc );
}
}
if ( exc->error )
{
switch ( exc->error )
{
/* looking for redefined instructions */
case FT_ERR( Invalid_Opcode ):
{
TT_DefRecord* def = exc->IDefs;
TT_DefRecord* limit = def + exc->numIDefs;
for ( ; def < limit; def++ )
{
if ( def->active && exc->opcode == (FT_Byte)def->opc )
{
TT_CallRec* callrec;
if ( exc->callTop >= exc->callSize )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
goto LErrorLabel_;
}
callrec = &exc->callStack[exc->callTop];
callrec->Caller_Range = exc->curRange;
callrec->Caller_IP = exc->IP + 1;
callrec->Cur_Count = 1;
callrec->Def = def;
if ( Ins_Goto_CodeRange( exc,
def->range,
def->start ) == FAILURE )
goto LErrorLabel_;
goto LSuiteLabel_;
}
}
}
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Opcode );
goto LErrorLabel_;
#if 0
break; /* Unreachable code warning suppression. */
/* Leave to remind in case a later change the editor */
/* to consider break; */
#endif
default:
goto LErrorLabel_;
#if 0
break;
#endif
}
}
exc->top = exc->new_top;
if ( exc->step_ins )
exc->IP += exc->length;
/* increment instruction counter and check if we didn't */
/* run this program for too long (e.g. infinite loops). */
if ( ++ins_counter > TT_CONFIG_OPTION_MAX_RUNNABLE_OPCODES )
return FT_THROW( Execution_Too_Long );
LSuiteLabel_:
if ( exc->IP >= exc->codeSize )
{
if ( exc->callTop > 0 )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Code_Overflow );
goto LErrorLabel_;
}
else
goto LNo_Error_;
}
} while ( !exc->instruction_trap );
LNo_Error_:
FT_TRACE4(( " %d instruction%s executed\n",
ins_counter == 1 ? "" : "s",
ins_counter ));
return FT_Err_Ok;
LErrorCodeOverflow_:
exc->error = FT_THROW( Code_Overflow );
LErrorLabel_:
if ( exc->error && !exc->instruction_trap )
FT_TRACE1(( " The interpreter returned error 0x%x\n", exc->error ));
return exc->error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void root_add_used(struct btrfs_root *root, u32 size)
{
spin_lock(&root->accounting_lock);
btrfs_set_root_used(&root->root_item,
btrfs_root_used(&root->root_item) + size);
spin_unlock(&root->accounting_lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int build_feed_streams(void)
{
FFServerStream *stream, *feed;
int i, fd;
/* gather all streams */
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
feed = stream->feed;
if (!feed)
continue;
if (stream->is_feed) {
for(i=0;i<stream->nb_streams;i++)
stream->feed_streams[i] = i;
continue;
}
/* we handle a stream coming from a feed */
for(i=0;i<stream->nb_streams;i++)
stream->feed_streams[i] = add_av_stream(feed, stream->streams[i]);
}
/* create feed files if needed */
for(feed = config.first_feed; feed; feed = feed->next_feed) {
if (avio_check(feed->feed_filename, AVIO_FLAG_READ) > 0) {
AVFormatContext *s = NULL;
int matches = 0;
/* See if it matches */
if (avformat_open_input(&s, feed->feed_filename, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
http_log("Deleting feed file '%s' as it appears "
"to be corrupt\n",
feed->feed_filename);
goto drop;
}
/* set buffer size */
if (ffio_set_buf_size(s->pb, FFM_PACKET_SIZE) < 0) {
http_log("Failed to set buffer size\n");
avformat_close_input(&s);
goto bail;
}
/* Now see if it matches */
if (s->nb_streams != feed->nb_streams) {
http_log("Deleting feed file '%s' as stream counts "
"differ (%d != %d)\n",
feed->feed_filename, s->nb_streams, feed->nb_streams);
goto drop;
}
matches = 1;
for(i=0;i<s->nb_streams;i++) {
AVStream *ss;
LayeredAVStream *sf;
sf = feed->streams[i];
ss = s->streams[i];
if (sf->index != ss->index || sf->id != ss->id) {
http_log("Index & Id do not match for stream %d (%s)\n",
i, feed->feed_filename);
matches = 0;
break;
}
matches = check_codec_match (sf, ss, i);
if (!matches)
break;
}
drop:
if (s)
avformat_close_input(&s);
if (!matches) {
if (feed->readonly) {
http_log("Unable to delete read-only feed file '%s'\n",
feed->feed_filename);
goto bail;
}
unlink(feed->feed_filename);
}
}
if (avio_check(feed->feed_filename, AVIO_FLAG_WRITE) <= 0) {
AVFormatContext *s = avformat_alloc_context();
if (!s) {
http_log("Failed to allocate context\n");
goto bail;
}
if (feed->readonly) {
http_log("Unable to create feed file '%s' as it is "
"marked readonly\n",
feed->feed_filename);
avformat_free_context(s);
goto bail;
}
/* only write the header of the ffm file */
if (avio_open(&s->pb, feed->feed_filename, AVIO_FLAG_WRITE) < 0) {
http_log("Could not open output feed file '%s'\n",
feed->feed_filename);
avformat_free_context(s);
goto bail;
}
s->oformat = feed->fmt;
for (i = 0; i<feed->nb_streams; i++) {
AVStream *st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL); // FIXME free this
if (!st) {
http_log("Failed to allocate stream\n");
goto bail;
}
unlayer_stream(st, feed->streams[i]);
}
if (avformat_write_header(s, NULL) < 0) {
http_log("Container doesn't support the required parameters\n");
avio_closep(&s->pb);
s->streams = NULL;
s->nb_streams = 0;
avformat_free_context(s);
goto bail;
}
/* XXX: need better API */
av_freep(&s->priv_data);
avio_closep(&s->pb);
s->streams = NULL;
s->nb_streams = 0;
avformat_free_context(s);
}
/* get feed size and write index */
fd = open(feed->feed_filename, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
http_log("Could not open output feed file '%s'\n",
feed->feed_filename);
goto bail;
}
feed->feed_write_index = FFMAX(ffm_read_write_index(fd),
FFM_PACKET_SIZE);
feed->feed_size = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END);
/* ensure that we do not wrap before the end of file */
if (feed->feed_max_size && feed->feed_max_size < feed->feed_size)
feed->feed_max_size = feed->feed_size;
close(fd);
}
return 0;
bail:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setImportsController(HTMLImportsController* controller)
{
ASSERT(!m_importsController || !controller);
m_importsController = controller;
if (!m_importsController && !loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 11,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int multicast_join(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.imr_address = sin->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(MC_SSDP_GROUP);
if (setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq))) {
if (EADDRINUSE == errno)
return 0;
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed joining group %s: %s", MC_SSDP_GROUP, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::ShowSystemDialog() {
HandleShowSystemDialog(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getMimeTypeToDownloadContentMap() {
return {
{"application/octet-stream", DownloadContent::OCTET_STREAM},
{"binary/octet-stream", DownloadContent::OCTET_STREAM},
{"application/pdf", DownloadContent::PDF},
{"application/msword", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/"
"vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/rtf", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.text", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.document", DownloadContent::DOCUMENT},
{"application/vnd.ms-excel", DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet",
DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.spreadsheet",
DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.spreadsheet", DownloadContent::SPREADSHEET},
{"application/vns.ms-powerpoint", DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/"
"vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/vnd.google-apps.presentation",
DownloadContent::PRESENTATION},
{"application/zip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-gzip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-rar-compressed", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-tar", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-bzip", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-bzip2", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-7z-compressed", DownloadContent::ARCHIVE},
{"application/x-exe", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/java-archive", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/vnd.apple.installer+xml", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-csh", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-sh", DownloadContent::EXECUTABLE},
{"application/x-apple-diskimage", DownloadContent::DMG},
{"application/x-chrome-extension", DownloadContent::CRX},
{"application/xhtml+xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/javascript", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/json", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/typescript", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/vnd.mozilla.xul+xml", DownloadContent::WEB},
{"application/vnd.amazon.ebook", DownloadContent::EBOOK},
{"application/epub+zip", DownloadContent::EBOOK},
{"application/vnd.android.package-archive", DownloadContent::APK}};
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mcryptd_hash_update_enqueue(struct ahash_request *req)
{
return mcryptd_hash_enqueue(req, mcryptd_hash_update);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: L16toY(LogLuvState* sp, uint8* op, tmsize_t n)
{
int16* l16 = (int16*) sp->tbuf;
float* yp = (float*) op;
while (n-- > 0)
*yp++ = (float)LogL16toY(*l16++);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void phar_postprocess_ru_web(char *fname, int fname_len, char **entry, int *entry_len, char **ru, int *ru_len) /* {{{ */
{
char *e = *entry + 1, *u = NULL, *u1 = NULL, *saveu = NULL;
int e_len = *entry_len - 1, u_len = 0;
phar_archive_data *pphar;
/* we already know we can retrieve the phar if we reach here */
pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), fname, fname_len);
if (!pphar && PHAR_G(manifest_cached)) {
pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, fname, fname_len);
}
do {
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&(pphar->manifest), e, e_len)) {
if (u) {
u[0] = '/';
*ru = estrndup(u, u_len+1);
++u_len;
u[0] = '\0';
} else {
*ru = NULL;
}
*ru_len = u_len;
*entry_len = e_len + 1;
return;
}
if (u) {
u1 = strrchr(e, '/');
u[0] = '/';
saveu = u;
e_len += u_len + 1;
u = u1;
if (!u) {
return;
}
} else {
u = strrchr(e, '/');
if (!u) {
if (saveu) {
saveu[0] = '/';
}
return;
}
}
u[0] = '\0';
u_len = strlen(u + 1);
e_len -= u_len + 1;
if (e_len < 0) {
if (saveu) {
saveu[0] = '/';
}
return;
}
} while (1);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::pushParentElement(Element& parent)
{
const ContainerNode* parentsParent = parent.parentOrShadowHostElement();
if (!parentsParent || m_selectorFilter.parentStackIsEmpty())
m_selectorFilter.setupParentStack(parent);
else
m_selectorFilter.pushParent(parent);
m_styleTree.pushStyleCache(parent, parent.parentOrShadowHostNode());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DeprecatedVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->deprecatedVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltShallowCopyNsNode(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
xmlNodePtr invocNode,
xmlNodePtr insert,
xmlNsPtr ns)
{
/*
* TODO: Contrary to header comments, this is declared as int.
* be modified to return a node pointer, or NULL if any error
*/
xmlNsPtr tmpns;
if ((insert == NULL) || (insert->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return(NULL);
if (insert->children != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, invocNode,
"Namespace nodes must be added before "
"any child nodes are added to an element.\n");
return(NULL);
}
/*
* BIG NOTE: Xalan-J simply overwrites any ns-decls with
* an equal prefix. We definitively won't do that.
*
* MSXML 4.0 and the .NET ignores ns-decls for which an
* equal prefix is already in use.
*
* Saxon raises an error like:
* "net.sf.saxon.xpath.DynamicError: Cannot create two namespace
* nodes with the same name".
*
* NOTE: We'll currently follow MSXML here.
* REVISIT TODO: Check if it's better to follow Saxon here.
*/
if (ns->prefix == NULL) {
/*
* If we are adding ns-nodes to an element using e.g.
* <xsl:copy-of select="/foo/namespace::*">, then we need
* to ensure that we don't incorrectly declare a default
* namespace on an element in no namespace, which otherwise
* would move the element incorrectly into a namespace, if
* the node tree is serialized.
*/
if (insert->ns == NULL)
goto occupied;
} else if ((ns->prefix[0] == 'x') &&
xmlStrEqual(ns->prefix, BAD_CAST "xml"))
{
/*
* The XML namespace is built in.
*/
return(NULL);
}
if (insert->nsDef != NULL) {
tmpns = insert->nsDef;
do {
if ((tmpns->prefix == NULL) == (ns->prefix == NULL)) {
if ((tmpns->prefix == ns->prefix) ||
xmlStrEqual(tmpns->prefix, ns->prefix))
{
/*
* Same prefix.
*/
if (xmlStrEqual(tmpns->href, ns->href))
return(NULL);
goto occupied;
}
}
tmpns = tmpns->next;
} while (tmpns != NULL);
}
tmpns = xmlSearchNs(insert->doc, insert, ns->prefix);
if ((tmpns != NULL) && xmlStrEqual(tmpns->href, ns->href))
return(NULL);
/*
* Declare a new namespace.
* TODO: The problem (wrt efficiency) with this xmlNewNs() is
* that it will again search the already declared namespaces
* for a duplicate :-/
*/
return(xmlNewNs(insert, ns->href, ns->prefix));
occupied:
/*
* TODO: We could as well raise an error here (like Saxon does),
* or at least generate a warning.
*/
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleShowSystemDialog(const ListValue* /*args*/) {
ReportStats();
ReportUserActionHistogram(FALLBACK_TO_ADVANCED_SETTINGS_DIALOG);
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (!initiator_tab)
return;
printing::PrintViewManager* manager = initiator_tab->print_view_manager();
manager->set_observer(this);
manager->PrintForSystemDialogNow();
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnCancelPendingPreviewRequest();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::platformInitialize()
{
JSC::initializeThreading();
WTF::initializeMainThread();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qeth_realloc_buffer_pool(struct qeth_card *card, int bufcnt)
{
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "realcbp");
if ((card->state != CARD_STATE_DOWN) &&
(card->state != CARD_STATE_RECOVER))
return -EPERM;
/* TODO: steel/add buffers from/to a running card's buffer pool (?) */
qeth_clear_working_pool_list(card);
qeth_free_buffer_pool(card);
card->qdio.in_buf_pool.buf_count = bufcnt;
card->qdio.init_pool.buf_count = bufcnt;
return qeth_alloc_buffer_pool(card);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char * _php_pgsql_trim_message(const char *message, int *len)
{
register int i = strlen(message)-1;
if (i>1 && (message[i-1] == '\r' || message[i-1] == '\n') && message[i] == '.') {
--i;
}
while (i>0 && (message[i] == '\r' || message[i] == '\n')) {
--i;
}
++i;
if (len) {
*len = i;
}
return estrndup(message, i);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ax25_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev)
{
ax25_dev *ax25_dev;
ax25_cb *s;
if ((ax25_dev = ax25_dev_ax25dev(dev)) == NULL)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock);
again:
ax25_for_each(s, &ax25_list) {
if (s->ax25_dev == ax25_dev) {
s->ax25_dev = NULL;
spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock);
ax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH);
spin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock);
/* The entry could have been deleted from the
* list meanwhile and thus the next pointer is
* no longer valid. Play it safe and restart
* the scan. Forward progress is ensured
* because we set s->ax25_dev to NULL and we
* are never passed a NULL 'dev' argument.
*/
goto again;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock);
}
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLUniform2f(GLint location, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1) {
glUniform2i(location, v0, v1);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ___sys_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr __user *msg,
struct msghdr *msg_sys, unsigned int flags,
struct used_address *used_address)
{
struct compat_msghdr __user *msg_compat =
(struct compat_msghdr __user *)msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
unsigned char ctl[sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + 20]
__attribute__ ((aligned(sizeof(__kernel_size_t))));
/* 20 is size of ipv6_pktinfo */
unsigned char *ctl_buf = ctl;
int err, ctl_len, total_len;
err = -EFAULT;
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
if (get_compat_msghdr(msg_sys, msg_compat))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
err = copy_msghdr_from_user(msg_sys, msg);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_FASTIOV) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg_sys->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
iov = kmalloc(msg_sys->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
goto out;
}
/* This will also move the address data into kernel space */
if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) {
err = verify_compat_iovec(msg_sys, iov, &address, VERIFY_READ);
} else
err = verify_iovec(msg_sys, iov, &address, VERIFY_READ);
if (err < 0)
goto out_freeiov;
total_len = err;
err = -ENOBUFS;
if (msg_sys->msg_controllen > INT_MAX)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
if ((MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & flags) && ctl_len) {
err =
cmsghdr_from_user_compat_to_kern(msg_sys, sock->sk, ctl,
sizeof(ctl));
if (err)
goto out_freeiov;
ctl_buf = msg_sys->msg_control;
ctl_len = msg_sys->msg_controllen;
} else if (ctl_len) {
if (ctl_len > sizeof(ctl)) {
ctl_buf = sock_kmalloc(sock->sk, ctl_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ctl_buf == NULL)
goto out_freeiov;
}
err = -EFAULT;
/*
* Careful! Before this, msg_sys->msg_control contains a user pointer.
* Afterwards, it will be a kernel pointer. Thus the compiler-assisted
* checking falls down on this.
*/
if (copy_from_user(ctl_buf,
(void __user __force *)msg_sys->msg_control,
ctl_len))
goto out_freectl;
msg_sys->msg_control = ctl_buf;
}
msg_sys->msg_flags = flags;
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
msg_sys->msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and current destination address is same as
* previously succeeded address, omit asking LSM's decision.
* used_address->name_len is initialized to UINT_MAX so that the first
* destination address never matches.
*/
if (used_address && msg_sys->msg_name &&
used_address->name_len == msg_sys->msg_namelen &&
!memcmp(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len)) {
err = sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
goto out_freectl;
}
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg_sys, total_len);
/*
* If this is sendmmsg() and sending to current destination address was
* successful, remember it.
*/
if (used_address && err >= 0) {
used_address->name_len = msg_sys->msg_namelen;
if (msg_sys->msg_name)
memcpy(&used_address->name, msg_sys->msg_name,
used_address->name_len);
}
out_freectl:
if (ctl_buf != ctl)
sock_kfree_s(sock->sk, ctl_buf, ctl_len);
out_freeiov:
if (iov != iovstack)
kfree(iov);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvtap_dellink(struct net_device *dev,
struct list_head *head)
{
macvtap_del_queues(dev);
macvlan_dellink(dev, head);
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool push_deferred_smb_message(struct smb_request *req,
struct timeval request_time,
struct timeval timeout,
char *private_data, size_t priv_len)
{
struct timeval end_time;
if (req->unread_bytes) {
DEBUG(0,("push_deferred_smb_message: logic error ! "
"unread_bytes = %u\n",
(unsigned int)req->unread_bytes ));
smb_panic("push_deferred_smb_message: "
"logic error unread_bytes != 0" );
}
end_time = timeval_sum(&request_time, &timeout);
DEBUG(10,("push_deferred_open_smb_message: pushing message len %u mid %u "
"timeout time [%u.%06u]\n",
(unsigned int) smb_len(req->inbuf)+4, (unsigned int)req->mid,
(unsigned int)end_time.tv_sec,
(unsigned int)end_time.tv_usec));
return push_queued_message(req, request_time, end_time,
private_data, priv_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dm_internal_resume(struct mapped_device *md)
{
mutex_lock(&md->suspend_lock);
__dm_internal_resume(md);
mutex_unlock(&md->suspend_lock);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 7,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init dev_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&dev_proc_ops);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS get_timestamp (int reversed)
{
struct tm t;
char str[20];
int i;
str[19] = 0;
if (reversed)
for (i=19; i--; ) str[i] = fgetc(ifp);
else
fread (str, 19, 1, ifp);
memset (&t, 0, sizeof t);
if (sscanf (str, "%d:%d:%d %d:%d:%d", &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon,
&t.tm_mday, &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min, &t.tm_sec) != 6)
return;
t.tm_year -= 1900;
t.tm_mon -= 1;
t.tm_isdst = -1;
if (mktime(&t) > 0)
timestamp = mktime(&t);
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node::InsertionNotificationRequest HTMLIFrameElement::InsertedInto(
ContainerNode* insertion_point) {
InsertionNotificationRequest result =
HTMLFrameElementBase::InsertedInto(insertion_point);
if (insertion_point->IsInDocumentTree() && GetDocument().IsHTMLDocument())
ToHTMLDocument(GetDocument()).AddNamedItem(name_);
LogAddElementIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("iframe", srcAttr);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 12,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_METHOD(CURLFile, setMimeType)
{
curlfile_set_property("mime", INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcessingChangeGuard(InputHandler* inputHandler)
: m_inputHandler(inputHandler)
, m_savedProcessingChange(false)
{
ASSERT(m_inputHandler);
m_savedProcessingChange = m_inputHandler->processingChange();
m_inputHandler->setProcessingChange(true);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleLayerFlush()
{
if (!m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled)
return;
if (!m_layerFlushTimer.isActive())
m_layerFlushTimer.startOneShot(0);
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t __splice_from_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct splice_desc *sd,
splice_actor *actor)
{
int ret;
splice_from_pipe_begin(sd);
do {
cond_resched();
ret = splice_from_pipe_next(pipe, sd);
if (ret > 0)
ret = splice_from_pipe_feed(pipe, sd, actor);
} while (ret > 0);
splice_from_pipe_end(pipe, sd);
return sd->num_spliced ? sd->num_spliced : ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CreateSensorFusion(
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorFusionAlgorithm> fusion_algorithm,
const PlatformSensorProviderBase::CreateSensorCallback& callback,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider) {
scoped_refptr<Factory> factory(new Factory(std::move(mapping),
std::move(fusion_algorithm),
std::move(callback), provider));
factory->FetchSources();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 14,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init i8042_setup_aux(void)
{
int (*aux_enable)(void);
int error;
int i;
if (i8042_check_aux())
return -ENODEV;
if (i8042_nomux || i8042_check_mux()) {
error = i8042_create_aux_port(-1);
if (error)
goto err_free_ports;
aux_enable = i8042_enable_aux_port;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < I8042_NUM_MUX_PORTS; i++) {
error = i8042_create_aux_port(i);
if (error)
goto err_free_ports;
}
aux_enable = i8042_enable_mux_ports;
}
error = request_irq(I8042_AUX_IRQ, i8042_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED,
"i8042", i8042_platform_device);
if (error)
goto err_free_ports;
if (aux_enable())
goto err_free_irq;
i8042_aux_irq_registered = true;
return 0;
err_free_irq:
free_irq(I8042_AUX_IRQ, i8042_platform_device);
err_free_ports:
i8042_free_aux_ports();
return error;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_add_all_ciphers)
{
/*
* OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT is provided here to prevent at compile time
* pulling in all the ciphers during static linking
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AUTOALGINIT
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "OPENSSL_INIT: ossl_init_add_all_ciphers: "
"openssl_add_all_ciphers_int()\n");
# endif
openssl_add_all_ciphers_int();
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 15,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fiber_transfer(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
struct mrb_context *c = fiber_check(mrb, self);
mrb_value* a;
mrb_int len;
fiber_check_cfunc(mrb, mrb->c);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "*!", &a, &len);
if (c == mrb->root_c) {
mrb->c->status = MRB_FIBER_TRANSFERRED;
fiber_switch_context(mrb, c);
MARK_CONTEXT_MODIFY(c);
return fiber_result(mrb, a, len);
}
if (c == mrb->c) {
return fiber_result(mrb, a, len);
}
return fiber_switch(mrb, self, len, a, FALSE, FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static UPNP_INLINE void media_list_init(void)
{
int i;
const char *s = gEncodedMediaTypes;
struct document_type_t *doc_type;
for (i = 0; *s != '\0'; i++) {
doc_type = &gMediaTypeList[i];
doc_type->file_ext = s;
/* point to type. */
s += strlen(s) + 1;
doc_type->content_type = gMediaTypes[(int)*s];
/* point to subtype. */
s++;
doc_type->content_subtype = s;
/* next entry. */
s += strlen(s) + 1;
}
assert(i == NUM_MEDIA_TYPES);
}
Commit Message: Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by default
If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 26,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::stopLoading()
{
m_isComplete = true; // to avoid calling completed() in finishedParsing()
if (m_frame->document() && m_frame->document()->parsing()) {
finishedParsing();
m_frame->document()->setParsing(false);
}
if (Document* doc = m_frame->document()) {
doc->setReadyState(Document::Complete);
DatabaseManager::manager().stopDatabases(doc, 0);
}
m_frame->navigationScheduler()->cancel();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0) {
/* process the pairing complete */
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoSetEnableDCLayersCHROMIUM(
GLboolean enable) {
GLint current_framebuffer = 0;
api()->glGetIntegervFn(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING, ¤t_framebuffer);
if (current_framebuffer != 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebuffer must not be bound.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!surface_->SupportsDCLayers()) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"surface doesn't support SetDrawRectangle.");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!surface_->SetEnableDCLayers(!!enable)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "SetEnableDCLayers failed on surface.");
return error::kNoError;
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 27,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t lbs_debugfs_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int val = 0;
size_t pos = 0;
ssize_t res;
char *p;
int i;
struct debug_data *d;
unsigned long addr = get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
char *buf = (char *)addr;
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
p = buf;
d = file->private_data;
for (i = 0; i < num_of_items; i++) {
if (d[i].size == 1)
val = *((u8 *) d[i].addr);
else if (d[i].size == 2)
val = *((u16 *) d[i].addr);
else if (d[i].size == 4)
val = *((u32 *) d[i].addr);
else if (d[i].size == 8)
val = *((u64 *) d[i].addr);
pos += sprintf(p + pos, "%s=%d\n", d[i].name, val);
}
res = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, p, pos);
free_page(addr);
return res;
}
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(void *value, size_t size)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
if (user_ns == &init_user_ns)
return;
posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(user_ns, &init_user_ns, value, size);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 9,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buffer_read(struct display *dp, struct buffer *bp, png_bytep data,
png_size_t size)
{
struct buffer_list *last = bp->current;
size_t read_count = bp->read_count;
while (size > 0)
{
size_t avail;
if (last == NULL ||
(last == bp->last && read_count >= bp->end_count))
{
display_log(dp, USER_ERROR, "file truncated (%lu bytes)",
(unsigned long)size);
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
else if (read_count >= sizeof last->buffer)
{
/* Move to the next buffer: */
last = last->next;
read_count = 0;
bp->current = last; /* Avoid update outside the loop */
/* And do a sanity check (the EOF case is caught above) */
if (last == NULL)
{
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "damaged buffer list");
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
}
avail = (sizeof last->buffer) - read_count;
if (avail > size)
avail = size;
memcpy(data, last->buffer + read_count, avail);
read_count += avail;
size -= avail;
data += avail;
}
bp->read_count = read_count;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool cmd_seek(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
/* XXX: Check that seek is within bounds */
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextAutosizer* Document::GetTextAutosizer() {
if (!text_autosizer_)
text_autosizer_ = TextAutosizer::Create(this);
return text_autosizer_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 12,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ring_buffer_attach(struct perf_event *event,
struct ring_buffer *rb)
{
struct ring_buffer *old_rb = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
if (event->rb) {
/*
* Should be impossible, we set this when removing
* event->rb_entry and wait/clear when adding event->rb_entry.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->rcu_pending);
old_rb = event->rb;
spin_lock_irqsave(&old_rb->event_lock, flags);
list_del_rcu(&event->rb_entry);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&old_rb->event_lock, flags);
event->rcu_batches = get_state_synchronize_rcu();
event->rcu_pending = 1;
}
if (rb) {
if (event->rcu_pending) {
cond_synchronize_rcu(event->rcu_batches);
event->rcu_pending = 0;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&rb->event_lock, flags);
list_add_rcu(&event->rb_entry, &rb->event_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rb->event_lock, flags);
}
rcu_assign_pointer(event->rb, rb);
if (old_rb) {
ring_buffer_put(old_rb);
/*
* Since we detached before setting the new rb, so that we
* could attach the new rb, we could have missed a wakeup.
* Provide it now.
*/
wake_up_all(&event->waitq);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 19,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == a)
{
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
if (i == 0)
return 0;
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
p+=i;
l=i;
/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
renegotiation checks */
if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{
OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
}
else
{
OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
* I do this.
*/
l&=0xffff;
#endif
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
l2n3(l,d);
s->init_num=(int)l+4;
s->init_off=0;
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_ctcp_reply_to_nick (struct t_irc_server *server,
const char *command,
struct t_irc_channel *channel,
const char *nick, const char *ctcp,
const char *arguments)
{
struct t_hashtable *hashtable;
int number;
char hash_key[32];
const char *str_args;
char *str_args_color;
hashtable = irc_server_sendf (
server,
IRC_SERVER_SEND_OUTQ_PRIO_LOW | IRC_SERVER_SEND_RETURN_HASHTABLE,
NULL,
"NOTICE %s :\01%s%s%s\01",
nick, ctcp,
(arguments) ? " " : "",
(arguments) ? arguments : "");
if (hashtable)
{
if (weechat_config_boolean (irc_config_look_display_ctcp_reply))
{
number = 1;
while (1)
{
snprintf (hash_key, sizeof (hash_key), "args%d", number);
str_args = weechat_hashtable_get (hashtable, hash_key);
if (!str_args)
break;
str_args_color = irc_color_decode (str_args, 1);
if (!str_args_color)
break;
weechat_printf_date_tags (
irc_msgbuffer_get_target_buffer (
server, nick, NULL, "ctcp",
(channel) ? channel->buffer : NULL),
0,
irc_protocol_tags (
command,
"irc_ctcp,irc_ctcp_reply,self_msg,notify_none,"
"no_highlight",
NULL, NULL),
_("%sCTCP reply to %s%s%s: %s%s%s%s%s"),
weechat_prefix ("network"),
irc_nick_color_for_msg (server, 0, NULL, nick),
nick,
IRC_COLOR_RESET,
IRC_COLOR_CHAT_CHANNEL,
ctcp,
(str_args_color[0]) ? IRC_COLOR_RESET : "",
(str_args_color[0]) ? " " : "",
str_args_color);
free (str_args_color);
number++;
}
}
weechat_hashtable_free (hashtable);
}
}
Commit Message: irc: fix parsing of DCC filename
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Cues::Find(
long long time_ns,
const Track* pTrack,
const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const
{
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#endif
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 27,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnReadAvailableTypes(
ui::ClipboardType type,
std::vector<base::string16>* types,
bool* contains_filenames) {
GetClipboard()->ReadAvailableTypes(type, types, contains_filenames);
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NTSTATUS smb2cli_conn_dispatch_incoming(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_mem,
uint8_t *inbuf)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct smbXcli_req_state *state = NULL;
struct iovec *iov;
int i, num_iov;
NTSTATUS status;
bool defer = true;
struct smbXcli_session *last_session = NULL;
size_t inbuf_len = smb_len_tcp(inbuf);
status = smb2cli_inbuf_parse_compound(conn,
inbuf + NBT_HDR_SIZE,
inbuf_len,
tmp_mem,
&iov, &num_iov);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
for (i=0; i<num_iov; i+=4) {
uint8_t *inbuf_ref = NULL;
struct iovec *cur = &iov[i];
uint8_t *inhdr = (uint8_t *)cur[1].iov_base;
uint16_t opcode = SVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_OPCODE);
uint32_t flags = IVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_FLAGS);
uint64_t mid = BVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_MESSAGE_ID);
uint16_t req_opcode;
uint32_t req_flags;
uint16_t credits = SVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_CREDIT);
uint32_t new_credits;
struct smbXcli_session *session = NULL;
const DATA_BLOB *signing_key = NULL;
bool was_encrypted = false;
new_credits = conn->smb2.cur_credits;
new_credits += credits;
if (new_credits > UINT16_MAX) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
conn->smb2.cur_credits += credits;
req = smb2cli_conn_find_pending(conn, mid);
if (req == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
state = tevent_req_data(req, struct smbXcli_req_state);
req_opcode = SVAL(state->smb2.hdr, SMB2_HDR_OPCODE);
if (opcode != req_opcode) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
req_flags = SVAL(state->smb2.hdr, SMB2_HDR_FLAGS);
if (!(flags & SMB2_HDR_FLAG_REDIRECT)) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
status = NT_STATUS(IVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_STATUS));
if ((flags & SMB2_HDR_FLAG_ASYNC) &&
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, STATUS_PENDING)) {
uint64_t async_id = BVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_ASYNC_ID);
if (state->smb2.got_async) {
/* We only expect one STATUS_PENDING response */
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
state->smb2.got_async = true;
/*
* async interim responses are not signed,
* even if the SMB2_HDR_FLAG_SIGNED flag
* is set.
*/
state->smb2.cancel_flags = SMB2_HDR_FLAG_ASYNC;
state->smb2.cancel_mid = 0;
state->smb2.cancel_aid = async_id;
if (state->smb2.notify_async) {
tevent_req_defer_callback(req, state->ev);
tevent_req_notify_callback(req);
}
continue;
}
session = state->session;
if (req_flags & SMB2_HDR_FLAG_CHAINED) {
session = last_session;
}
last_session = session;
if (state->smb2.should_sign) {
if (!(flags & SMB2_HDR_FLAG_SIGNED)) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
if (flags & SMB2_HDR_FLAG_SIGNED) {
uint64_t uid = BVAL(inhdr, SMB2_HDR_SESSION_ID);
if (session == NULL) {
struct smbXcli_session *s;
s = state->conn->sessions;
for (; s; s = s->next) {
if (s->smb2->session_id != uid) {
continue;
}
session = s;
break;
}
}
if (session == NULL) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE;
}
last_session = session;
signing_key = &session->smb2_channel.signing_key;
}
if (opcode == SMB2_OP_SESSSETUP) {
/*
* We prefer the channel signing key, if it is
* already there.
*
* If we do not have a channel signing key yet,
* we try the main signing key, if it is not
* the final response.
*/
if (signing_key && signing_key->length == 0 &&
!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
signing_key = &session->smb2->signing_key;
}
if (signing_key && signing_key->length == 0) {
/*
* If we do not have a session key to
* verify the signature, we defer the
* signing check to the caller.
*
* The caller gets NT_STATUS_OK, it
* has to call
* smb2cli_session_set_session_key()
* or
* smb2cli_session_set_channel_key()
* which will check the signature
* with the channel signing key.
*/
signing_key = NULL;
}
}
if (cur[0].iov_len == SMB2_TF_HDR_SIZE) {
const uint8_t *tf = (const uint8_t *)cur[0].iov_base;
uint64_t uid = BVAL(tf, SMB2_TF_SESSION_ID);
/*
* If the response was encrypted in a SMB2_TRANSFORM
* pdu, which belongs to the correct session,
* we do not need to do signing checks
*
* It could be the session the response belongs to
* or the session that was used to encrypt the
* SMB2_TRANSFORM request.
*/
if ((session && session->smb2->session_id == uid) ||
(state->smb2.encryption_session_id == uid)) {
signing_key = NULL;
was_encrypted = true;
}
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED)) {
/*
* if the server returns NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED
* the response is not signed and we should
* propagate the NT_STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED
* status to the caller.
*/
state->smb2.signing_skipped = true;
signing_key = NULL;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
/*
* if the server returns
* NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
* the response might not be encrypted.
*/
if (state->smb2.should_encrypt && !was_encrypted) {
state->smb2.signing_skipped = true;
signing_key = NULL;
}
}
if (state->smb2.should_encrypt && !was_encrypted) {
if (!state->smb2.signing_skipped) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_FILE_CLOSED) ||
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
/*
* if the server returns
* NT_STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED
* NT_STATUS_FILE_CLOSED
* NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
* the response might not be signed
* as this happens before the signing checks.
*
* If server echos the signature (or all zeros)
* we should report the status from the server
* to the caller.
*/
if (signing_key) {
int cmp;
cmp = memcmp(inhdr+SMB2_HDR_SIGNATURE,
state->smb2.hdr+SMB2_HDR_SIGNATURE,
16);
if (cmp == 0) {
state->smb2.signing_skipped = true;
signing_key = NULL;
}
}
if (signing_key) {
int cmp;
static const uint8_t zeros[16];
cmp = memcmp(inhdr+SMB2_HDR_SIGNATURE,
zeros,
16);
if (cmp == 0) {
state->smb2.signing_skipped = true;
signing_key = NULL;
}
}
}
if (signing_key) {
status = smb2_signing_check_pdu(*signing_key,
state->conn->protocol,
&cur[1], 3);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/*
* If the signing check fails, we disconnect
* the connection.
*/
return status;
}
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED) &&
(session != NULL) && session->disconnect_expired)
{
/*
* this should be a short term hack
* until the upper layers have implemented
* re-authentication.
*/
return status;
}
smbXcli_req_unset_pending(req);
/*
* There might be more than one response
* we need to defer the notifications
*/
if ((num_iov == 5) && (talloc_array_length(conn->pending) == 0)) {
defer = false;
}
if (defer) {
tevent_req_defer_callback(req, state->ev);
}
/*
* Note: here we use talloc_reference() in a way
* that does not expose it to the caller.
*/
inbuf_ref = talloc_reference(state->smb2.recv_iov, inbuf);
if (tevent_req_nomem(inbuf_ref, req)) {
continue;
}
/* copy the related buffers */
state->smb2.recv_iov[0] = cur[1];
state->smb2.recv_iov[1] = cur[2];
state->smb2.recv_iov[2] = cur[3];
tevent_req_done(req);
}
if (defer) {
return NT_STATUS_RETRY;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainCreateLinux(virConnectPtr conn, const char *xmlDesc,
unsigned int flags)
{
return virDomainCreateXML(conn, xmlDesc, flags);
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 28,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::OnRegisteredForPolicy(
scoped_ptr<policy::CloudPolicyClient> client) {
SigninManager* signin = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (!client.get()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Policy registration failed";
ConfirmAndSignin();
return;
}
DCHECK(client->is_registered());
DVLOG(1) << "Policy registration succeeded: dm_token=" << client->dm_token();
DCHECK(!policy_client_);
policy_client_.swap(client);
EnsureBrowser();
content::WebContents* web_contents =
browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!web_contents) {
CancelSigninAndDelete();
return;
}
chrome::ShowProfileSigninConfirmationDialog(
browser_,
web_contents,
profile_,
signin->GetUsernameForAuthInProgress(),
new SigninDialogDelegate(weak_pointer_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionInstallPrompt::GetLocalizedExtensionForDisplay(
const base::DictionaryValue* manifest,
int flags,
const std::string& id,
const std::string& localized_name,
const std::string& localized_description,
std::string* error) {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> localized_manifest;
if (!localized_name.empty() || !localized_description.empty()) {
localized_manifest.reset(manifest->DeepCopy());
if (!localized_name.empty()) {
localized_manifest->SetString(extensions::manifest_keys::kName,
localized_name);
}
if (!localized_description.empty()) {
localized_manifest->SetString(extensions::manifest_keys::kDescription,
localized_description);
}
}
return Extension::Create(
base::FilePath(),
Manifest::INTERNAL,
localized_manifest.get() ? *localized_manifest.get() : *manifest,
flags,
id,
error);
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 12,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int peer_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s, void* extra)
{
freerdp_peer* client = (freerdp_peer*) extra;
rdpRdp* rdp = client->context->rdp;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL:
if (!rdp_server_accept_nego(rdp, s))
return -1;
if (rdp->nego->selected_protocol & PROTOCOL_NLA)
{
sspi_CopyAuthIdentity(&client->identity, &(rdp->nego->transport->credssp->identity));
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, TRUE);
credssp_free(rdp->nego->transport->credssp);
}
else
{
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, FALSE);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_connect_initial(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CONNECT:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_erect_domain_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ERECT_DOMAIN:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_attach_user_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_channel_join_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_keys(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
}
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS:
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_info(rdp, s))
return -1;
IFCALL(client->Capabilities, client);
if (!rdp_send_demand_active(rdp))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_server_accept_confirm_active(rdp, s))
{
/**
* During reactivation sequence the client might sent some input or channel data
* before receiving the Deactivate All PDU. We need to process them as usual.
*/
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return peer_recv_pdu(client, s);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
if (peer_recv_pdu(client, s) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 7,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::ConfirmInfoBarDelegate()
: InfoBarDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 8,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::OnNigoriDownloadRetry() {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), frontend_loop_);
if (!frontend_)
return;
frontend_->OnSyncConfigureRetry();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 14,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *new_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode;
spin_lock_prefetch(&inode_sb_list_lock);
inode = new_inode_pseudo(sb);
if (inode)
inode_sb_list_add(inode);
return inode;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char * phar_decompress_filter(phar_entry_info * entry, int return_unknown) /* {{{ */
{
php_uint32 flags;
if (entry->is_modified) {
flags = entry->old_flags;
} else {
flags = entry->flags;
}
switch (flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
case PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ:
return "zlib.inflate";
case PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
return "bzip2.decompress";
default:
return return_unknown ? "unknown" : NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_verify)
{
zval **key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int err;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
long keyresource = -1;
char * data; int data_len;
char * signature; int signature_len;
zval *method = NULL;
long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ssZ|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &signature_len, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 1, NULL, 0, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a public key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
EVP_VerifyInit (&md_ctx, mdtype);
EVP_VerifyUpdate (&md_ctx, data, data_len);
err = EVP_VerifyFinal (&md_ctx, (unsigned char *)signature, signature_len, pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
if (keyresource == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
RETURN_LONG(err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
BUG();
}
if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
{
Buffer m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_TERMINATE);
buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id);
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
buffer_clear(&m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) {
/* Remote end exited already */
if (errno == EPIPE) {
buffer_free(&m);
return;
}
fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
type = buffer_get_int(&m);
if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e);
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
buffer_free(&m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 28,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + offset + 3, tim.length - 3);
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 19,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb2_async_writev(struct cifs_writedata *wdata,
void (*release)(struct kref *kref))
{
int rc = -EACCES, flags = 0;
struct smb2_write_req *req = NULL;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(wdata->cfile->tlink);
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
struct kvec iov;
struct smb_rqst rqst;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_WRITE, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EAGAIN && wdata->credits) {
/* credits was reset by reconnect */
wdata->credits = 0;
/* reduce in_flight value since we won't send the req */
spin_lock(&server->req_lock);
server->in_flight--;
spin_unlock(&server->req_lock);
}
goto async_writev_out;
}
req->hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(wdata->cfile->pid);
req->PersistentFileId = wdata->cfile->fid.persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = wdata->cfile->fid.volatile_fid;
req->WriteChannelInfoOffset = 0;
req->WriteChannelInfoLength = 0;
req->Channel = 0;
req->Offset = cpu_to_le64(wdata->offset);
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
req->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(
offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer) - 4);
req->RemainingBytes = 0;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for Buffer */
iov.iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
iov.iov_base = req;
rqst.rq_iov = &iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rqst.rq_pages = wdata->pages;
rqst.rq_npages = wdata->nr_pages;
rqst.rq_pagesz = wdata->pagesz;
rqst.rq_tailsz = wdata->tailsz;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "async write at %llu %u bytes\n",
wdata->offset, wdata->bytes);
req->Length = cpu_to_le32(wdata->bytes);
inc_rfc1001_len(&req->hdr, wdata->bytes - 1 /* Buffer */);
if (wdata->credits) {
req->hdr.CreditCharge = cpu_to_le16(DIV_ROUND_UP(wdata->bytes,
SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE));
spin_lock(&server->req_lock);
server->credits += wdata->credits -
le16_to_cpu(req->hdr.CreditCharge);
spin_unlock(&server->req_lock);
wake_up(&server->request_q);
flags = CIFS_HAS_CREDITS;
}
kref_get(&wdata->refcount);
rc = cifs_call_async(server, &rqst, NULL, smb2_writev_callback, wdata,
flags);
if (rc) {
kref_put(&wdata->refcount, release);
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_WRITE_HE);
}
async_writev_out:
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 20,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void iwbmp_write_palette(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx)
{
int i,k;
iw_byte buf[4];
if(wctx->palentries<1) return;
buf[3] = 0; // Reserved field; always 0.
for(i=0;i<wctx->palentries;i++) {
if(i<wctx->pal->num_entries) {
if(wctx->pal->entry[i].a == 0) {
if(wctx->img->has_bkgdlabel) {
for(k=0;k<3;k++) {
buf[k] = (iw_byte)iw_color_get_int_sample(&wctx->img->bkgdlabel,2-k,255);
}
}
else {
buf[0] = 255;
buf[1] = 0;
buf[2] = 255;
}
}
else {
buf[0] = wctx->pal->entry[i].b;
buf[1] = wctx->pal->entry[i].g;
buf[2] = wctx->pal->entry[i].r;
}
}
else {
buf[0] = buf[1] = buf[2] = 0;
}
if(wctx->bmpversion==2)
iwbmp_write(wctx,buf,3); // v2 BMPs don't have the 'reserved' field.
else
iwbmp_write(wctx,buf,4);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 20,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void phar_manifest_copy_ctor(zval *zv) /* {{{ */
{
phar_entry_info *info = emalloc(sizeof(phar_entry_info));
memcpy(info, Z_PTR_P(zv), sizeof(phar_entry_info));
Z_PTR_P(zv) = info;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump_marks_helper(FILE *f,
uintmax_t base,
struct mark_set *m)
{
uintmax_t k;
if (m->shift) {
for (k = 0; k < 1024; k++) {
if (m->data.sets[k])
dump_marks_helper(f, base + (k << m->shift),
m->data.sets[k]);
}
} else {
for (k = 0; k < 1024; k++) {
if (m->data.marked[k])
fprintf(f, ":%" PRIuMAX " %s\n", base + k,
sha1_to_hex(m->data.marked[k]->idx.sha1));
}
}
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned short ud;
if (addr < TASK_SIZE_MAX)
return 0;
if (probe_kernel_address((unsigned short *)addr, ud))
return 0;
return ud == INSN_UD0 || ud == INSN_UD2;
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 17,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StateBase* writeArrayBuffer(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
ArrayBuffer* arrayBuffer = V8ArrayBuffer::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!arrayBuffer)
return 0;
if (arrayBuffer->isNeutered())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "An ArrayBuffer is neutered and could not be cloned.", next);
ASSERT(!m_transferredArrayBuffers.contains(value.As<v8::Object>()));
m_writer.writeArrayBuffer(*arrayBuffer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaRecorder::requestData(ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (state_ == State::kInactive) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The MediaRecorder's state is '" + StateToString(state_) + "'.");
return;
}
WriteData(nullptr /* data */, 0 /* length */, true /* lastInSlice */,
WTF::CurrentTimeMS());
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::dispatchFocusEvent(
Element* oldFocusedElement,
WebFocusType type,
InputDeviceCapabilities* sourceCapabilities) {
if (type != WebFocusTypePage)
m_wasFocusedByMouse = type == WebFocusTypeMouse;
HTMLElement::dispatchFocusEvent(oldFocusedElement, type, sourceCapabilities);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 23,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
unsigned long address)
{
__bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, SEGV_MAPERR);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *get_sum_page(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int segno)
{
return get_meta_page(sbi, GET_SUM_BLOCK(sbi, segno));
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 19,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TreeCache::TreeCache() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reportDeprecatedCall(const char* id, const String16& message)
{
if (checkAndSetPrivateFlagOnConsole(id, false))
return;
std::vector<v8::Local<v8::Value>> arguments(1, toV8String(m_isolate, message));
reportCall(ConsoleAPIType::kWarning, arguments);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 19,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: match_security(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *vol)
{
unsigned int secFlags;
if (vol->secFlg & (~(CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN | CIFSSEC_MUST_SEAL)))
secFlags = vol->secFlg;
else
secFlags = global_secflags | vol->secFlg;
switch (server->secType) {
case LANMAN:
if (!(secFlags & (CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN|CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT)))
return false;
break;
case NTLMv2:
if (!(secFlags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2))
return false;
break;
case NTLM:
if (!(secFlags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM))
return false;
break;
case Kerberos:
if (!(secFlags & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5))
return false;
break;
case RawNTLMSSP:
if (!(secFlags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP))
return false;
break;
default:
/* shouldn't happen */
return false;
}
/* now check if signing mode is acceptable */
if ((secFlags & CIFSSEC_MAY_SIGN) == 0 &&
(server->sec_mode & SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED))
return false;
else if (((secFlags & CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN) == CIFSSEC_MUST_SIGN) &&
(server->sec_mode &
(SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED|SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED)) == 0)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_pcm_hw_rule_noresample_func(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
struct snd_pcm_hw_rule *rule)
{
unsigned int base_rate = (unsigned int)(uintptr_t)rule->private;
struct snd_interval *rate;
rate = hw_param_interval(params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE);
return snd_interval_list(rate, 1, &base_rate, 0);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::contentsResized()
{
if (m_frame->isMainFrame() && m_frame->document()) {
if (TextAutosizer* textAutosizer = m_frame->document()->textAutosizer())
textAutosizer->updatePageInfoInAllFrames();
}
ScrollView::contentsResized();
setNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdatePendingWebUI(const GURL& dest_url,
int entry_bindings) {
WebUI::TypeID new_web_ui_type =
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->GetWebUIType(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), dest_url);
if (new_web_ui_type == pending_web_ui_type_ ||
(should_reuse_web_ui_ && new_web_ui_type == web_ui_type_)) {
return false;
}
ClearPendingWebUI();
if (new_web_ui_type != WebUI::kNoWebUI) {
if (new_web_ui_type == web_ui_type_) {
DCHECK(web_ui_);
should_reuse_web_ui_ = true;
} else {
pending_web_ui_ = delegate_->CreateWebUIForRenderFrameHost(dest_url);
DCHECK(pending_web_ui_);
pending_web_ui_type_ = new_web_ui_type;
if (entry_bindings != NavigationEntryImpl::kInvalidBindings &&
pending_web_ui_->GetBindings() != entry_bindings) {
RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("ProcessSwapBindingsMismatch_RVHM"));
ClearPendingWebUI();
}
}
}
DCHECK_EQ(!pending_web_ui_, pending_web_ui_type_ == WebUI::kNoWebUI);
if (pending_web_ui_ && !render_view_host_->GetProcess()->IsForGuestsOnly()) {
int new_bindings = pending_web_ui_->GetBindings();
if ((GetEnabledBindings() & new_bindings) != new_bindings) {
AllowBindings(new_bindings);
}
} else if (render_view_host_->is_active()) {
bool url_acceptable_for_webui =
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), dest_url);
if (!url_acceptable_for_webui) {
CHECK(!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings(
GetProcess()->GetID()));
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 27,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_coc(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *c,
uint8_t *properties)
{
int compno, ret;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
compno = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (compno >= s->ncomponents) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Invalid compno %d. There are %d components in the image.\n",
compno, s->ncomponents);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
c += compno;
c->csty = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if ((ret = get_cox(s, c)) < 0)
return ret;
properties[compno] |= HAD_COC;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: net::EmbeddedTestServer* preconnecting_test_server() {
return &preconnecting_test_server_;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_new_cmap(fz_context *ctx)
{
pdf_cmap *cmap = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, pdf_cmap);
FZ_INIT_STORABLE(cmap, 1, pdf_drop_cmap_imp);
return cmap;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 17,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DisconnectWindowLinux::Show(remoting::ChromotingHost* host,
const std::string& username) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Initial implementation of DisconnectWindow on Linux.
BUG=None
TEST=Manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88889 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 19,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnGetDocument(std::unique_ptr<dom::GetDocumentResult> result) {
devtools_client_->GetDOM()->QuerySelector(
dom::QuerySelectorParams::Builder()
.SetNodeId(result->GetRoot()->GetNodeId())
.SetSelector("<o_O>")
.Build(),
base::BindOnce(&HeadlessDevToolsMethodCallErrorTest::OnQuerySelector,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::MaybeCompleteUpdate() {
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
if (master_entries_completed_ != pending_master_entries_.size() ||
url_fetches_completed_ != url_file_list_.size()) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ != COMPLETED);
return;
}
switch (internal_state_) {
case NO_UPDATE:
if (master_entries_completed_ > 0) {
switch (stored_state_) {
case UNSTORED:
StoreGroupAndCache();
return;
case STORING:
return;
case STORED:
break;
}
} else {
bool times_changed = false;
if (!group_->first_evictable_error_time().is_null()) {
group_->set_first_evictable_error_time(base::Time());
times_changed = true;
}
if (doing_full_update_check_) {
group_->set_last_full_update_check_time(base::Time::Now());
times_changed = true;
}
if (times_changed)
storage_->StoreEvictionTimes(group_);
}
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_NO_UPDATE_EVENT);
DiscardDuplicateResponses();
internal_state_ = COMPLETED;
break;
case DOWNLOADING:
internal_state_ = REFETCH_MANIFEST;
FetchManifest(false);
break;
case REFETCH_MANIFEST:
DCHECK(stored_state_ == STORED);
NotifyAllFinalProgress();
if (update_type_ == CACHE_ATTEMPT)
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_CACHED_EVENT);
else
NotifyAllAssociatedHosts(APPCACHE_UPDATE_READY_EVENT);
DiscardDuplicateResponses();
internal_state_ = COMPLETED;
LogHistogramStats(UPDATE_OK, GURL());
break;
case CACHE_FAILURE:
NOTREACHED(); // See HandleCacheFailure
break;
default:
break;
}
if (internal_state_ == COMPLETED)
DeleteSoon();
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_trun_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov,
MOVTrack *track, int moof_size,
int first, int end)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
uint32_t flags = MOV_TRUN_DATA_OFFSET;
int i;
for (i = first; i < end; i++) {
if (get_cluster_duration(track, i) != track->default_duration)
flags |= MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_DURATION;
if (track->cluster[i].size != track->default_size)
flags |= MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_SIZE;
if (i > first && get_sample_flags(track, &track->cluster[i]) != track->default_sample_flags)
flags |= MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_FLAGS;
}
if (!(flags & MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_FLAGS) && track->entry > 0 &&
get_sample_flags(track, &track->cluster[0]) != track->default_sample_flags)
flags |= MOV_TRUN_FIRST_SAMPLE_FLAGS;
if (track->flags & MOV_TRACK_CTTS)
flags |= MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_CTS;
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "trun");
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_NEGATIVE_CTS_OFFSETS)
avio_w8(pb, 1); /* version */
else
avio_w8(pb, 0); /* version */
avio_wb24(pb, flags);
avio_wb32(pb, end - first); /* sample count */
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_OMIT_TFHD_OFFSET &&
!(mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DEFAULT_BASE_MOOF) &&
!mov->first_trun)
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Later tracks follow immediately after the previous one */
else
avio_wb32(pb, moof_size + 8 + track->data_offset +
track->cluster[first].pos); /* data offset */
if (flags & MOV_TRUN_FIRST_SAMPLE_FLAGS)
avio_wb32(pb, get_sample_flags(track, &track->cluster[first]));
for (i = first; i < end; i++) {
if (flags & MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_DURATION)
avio_wb32(pb, get_cluster_duration(track, i));
if (flags & MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_SIZE)
avio_wb32(pb, track->cluster[i].size);
if (flags & MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_FLAGS)
avio_wb32(pb, get_sample_flags(track, &track->cluster[i]));
if (flags & MOV_TRUN_SAMPLE_CTS)
avio_wb32(pb, track->cluster[i].cts);
}
mov->first_trun = 0;
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 10,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GotAllCookies() {
net::CookieList master_cookie_list;
for (const auto& pair : cookies_)
master_cookie_list.push_back(pair.second);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CookieRetriever::SendCookiesResponseOnUI, this,
master_cookie_list));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double GetFillAlpha(PolygonInfo *polygon_info,const double mid,
const MagickBooleanType fill,const FillRule fill_rule,const ssize_t x,
const ssize_t y,double *stroke_alpha)
{
double
alpha,
beta,
distance,
subpath_alpha;
PointInfo
delta;
register const PointInfo
*q;
register EdgeInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
j,
winding_number;
/*
Compute fill & stroke opacity for this (x,y) point.
*/
*stroke_alpha=0.0;
subpath_alpha=0.0;
p=polygon_info->edges;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; j++, p++)
{
if ((double) y <= (p->bounds.y1-mid-0.5))
break;
if ((double) y > (p->bounds.y2+mid+0.5))
{
(void) DestroyEdge(polygon_info,(size_t) j);
continue;
}
if (((double) x <= (p->bounds.x1-mid-0.5)) ||
((double) x > (p->bounds.x2+mid+0.5)))
continue;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMax((double) p->highwater,1.0);
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) p->number_points; i++)
{
if ((double) y <= (p->points[i-1].y-mid-0.5))
break;
if ((double) y > (p->points[i].y+mid+0.5))
continue;
if (p->scanline != (double) y)
{
p->scanline=(double) y;
p->highwater=(size_t) i;
}
/*
Compute distance between a point and an edge.
*/
q=p->points+i-1;
delta.x=(q+1)->x-q->x;
delta.y=(q+1)->y-q->y;
beta=delta.x*(x-q->x)+delta.y*(y-q->y);
if (beta < 0.0)
{
delta.x=(double) x-q->x;
delta.y=(double) y-q->y;
distance=delta.x*delta.x+delta.y*delta.y;
}
else
{
alpha=delta.x*delta.x+delta.y*delta.y;
if (beta > alpha)
{
delta.x=(double) x-(q+1)->x;
delta.y=(double) y-(q+1)->y;
distance=delta.x*delta.x+delta.y*delta.y;
}
else
{
alpha=1.0/alpha;
beta=delta.x*(y-q->y)-delta.y*(x-q->x);
distance=alpha*beta*beta;
}
}
/*
Compute stroke & subpath opacity.
*/
beta=0.0;
if (p->ghostline == MagickFalse)
{
alpha=mid+0.5;
if ((*stroke_alpha < 1.0) &&
(distance <= ((alpha+0.25)*(alpha+0.25))))
{
alpha=mid-0.5;
if (distance <= ((alpha+0.25)*(alpha+0.25)))
*stroke_alpha=1.0;
else
{
beta=1.0;
if (distance != 1.0)
beta=sqrt((double) distance);
alpha=beta-mid-0.5;
if (*stroke_alpha < ((alpha-0.25)*(alpha-0.25)))
*stroke_alpha=(alpha-0.25)*(alpha-0.25);
}
}
}
if ((fill == MagickFalse) || (distance > 1.0) || (subpath_alpha >= 1.0))
continue;
if (distance <= 0.0)
{
subpath_alpha=1.0;
continue;
}
if (distance > 1.0)
continue;
if (beta == 0.0)
{
beta=1.0;
if (distance != 1.0)
beta=sqrt(distance);
}
alpha=beta-1.0;
if (subpath_alpha < (alpha*alpha))
subpath_alpha=alpha*alpha;
}
}
/*
Compute fill opacity.
*/
if (fill == MagickFalse)
return(0.0);
if (subpath_alpha >= 1.0)
return(1.0);
/*
Determine winding number.
*/
winding_number=0;
p=polygon_info->edges;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; j++, p++)
{
if ((double) y <= p->bounds.y1)
break;
if (((double) y > p->bounds.y2) || ((double) x <= p->bounds.x1))
continue;
if ((double) x > p->bounds.x2)
{
winding_number+=p->direction ? 1 : -1;
continue;
}
i=(ssize_t) MagickMax((double) p->highwater,1.0);
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) p->number_points; i++)
if ((double) y <= p->points[i].y)
break;
q=p->points+i-1;
if ((((q+1)->x-q->x)*(y-q->y)) <= (((q+1)->y-q->y)*(x-q->x)))
winding_number+=p->direction ? 1 : -1;
}
if (fill_rule != NonZeroRule)
{
if ((MagickAbsoluteValue(winding_number) & 0x01) != 0)
return(1.0);
}
else
if (MagickAbsoluteValue(winding_number) != 0)
return(1.0);
return(subpath_alpha);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *find_hdr_value_end(char *s, const char *e)
{
int quoted, qdpair;
quoted = qdpair = 0;
#if defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(__i386__) || defined(__i486__) || defined(__i586__) || defined(__i686__) || \
defined(__ARM_ARCH_7A__)
/* speedup: skip everything not a comma nor a double quote */
for (; s <= e - sizeof(int); s += sizeof(int)) {
unsigned int c = *(int *)s; // comma
unsigned int q = c; // quote
c ^= 0x2c2c2c2c; // contains one zero on a comma
q ^= 0x22222222; // contains one zero on a quote
c = (c - 0x01010101) & ~c; // contains 0x80 below a comma
q = (q - 0x01010101) & ~q; // contains 0x80 below a quote
if ((c | q) & 0x80808080)
break; // found a comma or a quote
}
#endif
for (; s < e; s++) {
if (qdpair) qdpair = 0;
else if (quoted) {
if (*s == '\\') qdpair = 1;
else if (*s == '"') quoted = 0;
}
else if (*s == '"') quoted = 1;
else if (*s == ',') return s;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,857 |
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