instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::setAudioAttributes(const audio_attributes_t * attributes) {
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (attributes == NULL) {
free(mAttributes);
mAttributes = NULL;
} else {
if (mAttributes == NULL) {
mAttributes = (audio_attributes_t *) calloc(1, sizeof(audio_attributes_t));
}
memcpy(mAttributes, attributes, sizeof(audio_attributes_t));
mStreamType = audio_attributes_to_stream_type(attributes);
}
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sas_scsi_clear_queue_I_T(struct list_head *error_q,
struct domain_device *dev)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, error_q, eh_entry) {
struct domain_device *x = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
if (x == dev)
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = new DictionaryValue();
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t SiteInstanceImpl::GetId() {
return id_;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 22,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int PNMComment(Image *image,CommentInfo *comment_info)
{
int
c;
register char
*p;
/*
Read comment.
*/
p=comment_info->comment+strlen(comment_info->comment);
for (c='#'; (c != EOF) && (c != (int) '\n') && (c != (int) '\r'); p++)
{
if ((size_t) (p-comment_info->comment+1) >= comment_info->extent)
{
comment_info->extent<<=1;
comment_info->comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
comment_info->comment,comment_info->extent,
sizeof(*comment_info->comment));
if (comment_info->comment == (char *) NULL)
return(-1);
p=comment_info->comment+strlen(comment_info->comment);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c != EOF)
{
*p=(char) c;
*(p+1)='\0';
}
}
return(c);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLLinkElement::SheetLoaded() {
DCHECK(GetLinkStyle());
return GetLinkStyle()->SheetLoaded();
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 1,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsWebContentsObserver::FlushMetricsOnAppEnterBackground() {
if (committed_load_)
committed_load_->FlushMetricsOnAppEnterBackground();
for (const auto& kv : provisional_loads_) {
kv.second->FlushMetricsOnAppEnterBackground();
}
for (const auto& tracker : aborted_provisional_loads_) {
tracker->FlushMetricsOnAppEnterBackground();
}
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 15,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_get_service_list(const smartlist_t* substitute_service_list)
{
/* It is safe to cast away the const here, because
* rend_get_service_list_mutable does not actually modify the list */
return rend_get_service_list_mutable((smartlist_t*)substitute_service_list);
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 17,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
uint32_t lifetime;
size_t ticket_len;
unsigned char *ticket;
const unsigned char *msg;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* struct {
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
* } NewSessionTicket;
*
* 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint
* 4 . 5 ticket_len (n)
* 6 . 5+n ticket content
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
}
msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
lifetime = ( msg[0] << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", ticket_len ) );
/* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
/*
* Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
* to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
*/
if( ticket_len == 0 )
return( 0 );
mbedtls_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len );
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
/*
* RFC 5077 section 3.4:
* "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
* discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) );
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kgdb_set_hw_break(unsigned long addr, int len, enum kgdb_bptype bptype)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < HBP_NUM; i++)
if (!breakinfo[i].enabled)
break;
if (i == HBP_NUM)
return -1;
switch (bptype) {
case BP_HARDWARE_BREAKPOINT:
len = 1;
breakinfo[i].type = X86_BREAKPOINT_EXECUTE;
break;
case BP_WRITE_WATCHPOINT:
breakinfo[i].type = X86_BREAKPOINT_WRITE;
break;
case BP_ACCESS_WATCHPOINT:
breakinfo[i].type = X86_BREAKPOINT_RW;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
switch (len) {
case 1:
breakinfo[i].len = X86_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1;
break;
case 2:
breakinfo[i].len = X86_BREAKPOINT_LEN_2;
break;
case 4:
breakinfo[i].len = X86_BREAKPOINT_LEN_4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case 8:
breakinfo[i].len = X86_BREAKPOINT_LEN_8;
break;
#endif
default:
return -1;
}
breakinfo[i].addr = addr;
if (hw_break_reserve_slot(i)) {
breakinfo[i].addr = 0;
return -1;
}
breakinfo[i].enabled = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 23,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t userfaultfd_ctx_read(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, int no_wait,
struct uffd_msg *msg)
{
ssize_t ret;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *uwq;
/*
* Handling fork event requires sleeping operations, so
* we drop the event_wqh lock, then do these ops, then
* lock it back and wake up the waiter. While the lock is
* dropped the ewq may go away so we keep track of it
* carefully.
*/
LIST_HEAD(fork_event);
struct userfaultfd_ctx *fork_nctx = NULL;
/* always take the fd_wqh lock before the fault_pending_wqh lock */
spin_lock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->fd_wqh, &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
uwq = find_userfault(ctx);
if (uwq) {
/*
* Use a seqcount to repeat the lockless check
* in wake_userfault() to avoid missing
* wakeups because during the refile both
* waitqueue could become empty if this is the
* only userfault.
*/
write_seqcount_begin(&ctx->refile_seq);
/*
* The fault_pending_wqh.lock prevents the uwq
* to disappear from under us.
*
* Refile this userfault from
* fault_pending_wqh to fault_wqh, it's not
* pending anymore after we read it.
*
* Use list_del() by hand (as
* userfaultfd_wake_function also uses
* list_del_init() by hand) to be sure nobody
* changes __remove_wait_queue() to use
* list_del_init() in turn breaking the
* !list_empty_careful() check in
* handle_userfault(). The uwq->wq.head list
* must never be empty at any time during the
* refile, or the waitqueue could disappear
* from under us. The "wait_queue_head_t"
* parameter of __remove_wait_queue() is unused
* anyway.
*/
list_del(&uwq->wq.entry);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->fault_wqh, &uwq->wq);
write_seqcount_end(&ctx->refile_seq);
/* careful to always initialize msg if ret == 0 */
*msg = uwq->msg;
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
uwq = find_userfault_evt(ctx);
if (uwq) {
*msg = uwq->msg;
if (uwq->msg.event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
fork_nctx = (struct userfaultfd_ctx *)
(unsigned long)
uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1;
list_move(&uwq->wq.entry, &fork_event);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
userfaultfd_event_complete(ctx, uwq);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (no_wait) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
schedule();
spin_lock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
}
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->fd_wqh, &wait);
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
spin_unlock(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
if (!ret && msg->event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
ret = resolve_userfault_fork(ctx, fork_nctx, msg);
if (!ret) {
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
if (!list_empty(&fork_event)) {
uwq = list_first_entry(&fork_event,
typeof(*uwq),
wq.entry);
list_del(&uwq->wq.entry);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &uwq->wq);
userfaultfd_event_complete(ctx, uwq);
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: non-cooperative: fix fork use after free
When reading the event from the uffd, we put it on a temporary
fork_event list to detect if we can still access it after releasing and
retaking the event_wqh.lock.
If fork aborts and removes the event from the fork_event all is fine as
long as we're still in the userfault read context and fork_event head is
still alive.
We've to put the event allocated in the fork kernel stack, back from
fork_event list-head to the event_wqh head, before returning from
userfaultfd_ctx_read, because the fork_event head lifetime is limited to
the userfaultfd_ctx_read stack lifetime.
Forgetting to move the event back to its event_wqh place then results in
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &ewq->wq); in
userfaultfd_event_wait_completion to remove it from a head that has been
already freed from the reader stack.
This could only happen if resolve_userfault_fork failed (for example if
there are no file descriptors available to allocate the fork uffd). If
it succeeded it was put back correctly.
Furthermore, after find_userfault_evt receives a fork event, the forked
userfault context in fork_nctx and uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1 can
be released by the fork thread as soon as the event_wqh.lock is
released. Taking a reference on the fork_nctx before dropping the lock
prevents an use after free in resolve_userfault_fork().
If the fork side aborted and it already released everything, we still
try to succeed resolve_userfault_fork(), if possible.
Fixes: 893e26e61d04eac9 ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: Add fork() event")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170920180413.26713-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 8,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: av_cold void ff_idctdsp_init(IDCTDSPContext *c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
const unsigned high_bit_depth = avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8;
if (avctx->lowres==1) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct4_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct4_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct4;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==2) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct2_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct2_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct2;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==3) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct1_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct1_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct1;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10 || avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
/* 10-bit MPEG-4 Simple Studio Profile requires a higher precision IDCT
However, it only uses idct_put */
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4 && avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO)
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int32_10bit;
else {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_10bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_10bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_10bit;
}
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12) {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_12bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_12bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_12bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_INT) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_LIBMPEG2;
#if CONFIG_FAANIDCT
} else if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_FAAN) {
c->idct_put = ff_faanidct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_faanidct_add;
c->idct = ff_faanidct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
#endif /* CONFIG_FAANIDCT */
} else { // accurate/default
/* Be sure FF_IDCT_NONE will select this one, since it uses FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE */
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_8bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_8bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_8bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
}
}
}
c->put_pixels_clamped = ff_put_pixels_clamped_c;
c->put_signed_pixels_clamped = put_signed_pixels_clamped_c;
c->add_pixels_clamped = ff_add_pixels_clamped_c;
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_XVID)
ff_xvid_idct_init(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_AARCH64)
ff_idctdsp_init_aarch64(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ALPHA)
ff_idctdsp_init_alpha(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ARM)
ff_idctdsp_init_arm(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_PPC)
ff_idctdsp_init_ppc(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_X86)
ff_idctdsp_init_x86(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_MIPS)
ff_idctdsp_init_mips(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
ff_init_scantable_permutation(c->idct_permutation,
c->perm_type);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 21,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
return 0;
}
/* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
* members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
* initial values.
*/
drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 18,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_bin_header(conn *c, uint16_t err, uint8_t hdr_len, uint16_t key_len, uint32_t body_len) {
protocol_binary_response_header* header;
assert(c);
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
/* This should never run out of memory because iov and msg lists
* have minimum sizes big enough to hold an error response.
*/
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory adding binary header");
return;
}
header = (protocol_binary_response_header *)c->wbuf;
header->response.magic = (uint8_t)PROTOCOL_BINARY_RES;
header->response.opcode = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
header->response.keylen = (uint16_t)htons(key_len);
header->response.extlen = (uint8_t)hdr_len;
header->response.datatype = (uint8_t)PROTOCOL_BINARY_RAW_BYTES;
header->response.status = (uint16_t)htons(err);
header->response.bodylen = htonl(body_len);
header->response.opaque = c->opaque;
header->response.cas = htonll(c->cas);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, ">%d Writing bin response:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(header->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n>%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", header->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
add_iov(c, c->wbuf, sizeof(header->response));
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 21,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floatAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::floatAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_disconnect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_disconnect cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_disconnect(ctx->cm_id);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 7,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_key_callback(void *c, struct key_params *params)
{
struct nlattr *key;
struct get_key_cookie *cookie = c;
if (params->key)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_DATA,
params->key_len, params->key);
if (params->seq)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ,
params->seq_len, params->seq);
if (params->cipher)
NLA_PUT_U32(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_CIPHER,
params->cipher);
key = nla_nest_start(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY);
if (!key)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (params->key)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_DATA,
params->key_len, params->key);
if (params->seq)
NLA_PUT(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_SEQ,
params->seq_len, params->seq);
if (params->cipher)
NLA_PUT_U32(cookie->msg, NL80211_KEY_CIPHER,
params->cipher);
NLA_PUT_U8(cookie->msg, NL80211_ATTR_KEY_IDX, cookie->idx);
nla_nest_end(cookie->msg, key);
return;
nla_put_failure:
cookie->error = 1;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8WindowShell::clearForNavigation()
{
if (m_context.isEmpty())
return;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
m_document.clear();
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = m_context.newLocal(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(context);
clearDocumentProperty();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> windowWrapper = m_global.newLocal(m_isolate)->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8Window::GetTemplate(m_isolate, worldTypeInMainThread(m_isolate)));
ASSERT(!windowWrapper.IsEmpty());
windowWrapper->TurnOnAccessCheck();
context->DetachGlobal();
disposeContext();
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: short CLASS guess_byte_order (int words)
{
uchar test[4][2];
int t=2, msb;
double diff, sum[2] = {0,0};
fread (test[0], 2, 2, ifp);
for (words-=2; words--; ) {
fread (test[t], 2, 1, ifp);
for (msb=0; msb < 2; msb++) {
diff = (test[t^2][msb] << 8 | test[t^2][!msb])
- (test[t ][msb] << 8 | test[t ][!msb]);
sum[msb] += diff*diff;
}
t = (t+1) & 3;
}
return sum[0] < sum[1] ? 0x4d4d : 0x4949;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_size_done( FT_Size ttsize ) /* TT_Size */
{
TT_Size size = (TT_Size)ttsize;
#ifdef TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
tt_size_done_bytecode( ttsize );
#endif
size->ttmetrics.valid = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 1,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessWebContentsImpl::~HeadlessWebContentsImpl() {
agent_host_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (render_process_host_)
render_process_host_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (begin_frame_control_enabled_) {
ui::Compositor* compositor = browser()->PlatformGetCompositor(this);
DCHECK(compositor);
compositor->SetExternalBeginFrameClient(nullptr);
}
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 14,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getauthkeys(
const char *keyfile
)
{
int len;
len = strlen(keyfile);
if (!len)
return;
#ifndef SYS_WINNT
key_file_name = erealloc(key_file_name, len + 1);
memcpy(key_file_name, keyfile, len + 1);
#else
key_file_name = erealloc(key_file_name, _MAX_PATH);
if (len + 1 > _MAX_PATH)
return;
if (!ExpandEnvironmentStrings(keyfile, key_file_name,
_MAX_PATH)) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"ExpandEnvironmentStrings(KEY_FILE) failed: %m");
strncpy(key_file_name, keyfile, _MAX_PATH);
}
#endif /* SYS_WINNT */
authreadkeys(key_file_name);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *ex) {
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
unsigned int depth;
int merge_done = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_hdr == NULL);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
if (ex > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh))
merge_done = ext4_ext_try_to_merge_right(inode, path, ex - 1);
if (!merge_done)
(void) ext4_ext_try_to_merge_right(inode, path, ex);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(handle, inode, path);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mknod, const char __user *, filename, int, mode, unsigned, dev)
{
return sys_mknodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, dev);
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int swevent_hlist_get(struct perf_event *event)
{
int err;
int cpu, failed_cpu;
if (event->cpu != -1)
return swevent_hlist_get_cpu(event, event->cpu);
get_online_cpus();
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
err = swevent_hlist_get_cpu(event, cpu);
if (err) {
failed_cpu = cpu;
goto fail;
}
}
put_online_cpus();
return 0;
fail:
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (cpu == failed_cpu)
break;
swevent_hlist_put_cpu(event, cpu);
}
put_online_cpus();
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Copy() {
Send(new ViewMsg_Copy(GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Copy"));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int UDPSocketLibevent::SendTo(IOBuffer* buf,
int buf_len,
const IPEndPoint& address,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
return SendToOrWrite(buf, buf_len, &address, callback);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 17,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::enableTracing(const String& categoryFilter)
{
m_client->enableTracing(categoryFilter);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qcow2_set_key(BlockDriverState *bs, const char *key)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
uint8_t keybuf[16];
int len, i;
memset(keybuf, 0, 16);
len = strlen(key);
if (len > 16)
len = 16;
/* XXX: we could compress the chars to 7 bits to increase
entropy */
for(i = 0;i < len;i++) {
keybuf[i] = key[i];
}
s->crypt_method = s->crypt_method_header;
if (AES_set_encrypt_key(keybuf, 128, &s->aes_encrypt_key) != 0)
return -1;
if (AES_set_decrypt_key(keybuf, 128, &s->aes_decrypt_key) != 0)
return -1;
#if 0
/* test */
{
uint8_t in[16];
uint8_t out[16];
uint8_t tmp[16];
for(i=0;i<16;i++)
in[i] = i;
AES_encrypt(in, tmp, &s->aes_encrypt_key);
AES_decrypt(tmp, out, &s->aes_decrypt_key);
for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
printf(" %02x", tmp[i]);
printf("\n");
for(i = 0; i < 16; i++)
printf(" %02x", out[i]);
printf("\n");
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 3,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > UINT32_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTimeToSample = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
if (!mTimeToSample)
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 27,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::UpgradeDraggedFileSystemPermissions(
const std::string& file_system_url) {
CHECK(web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme));
file_helper_->UpgradeDraggedFileSystemPermissions(
file_system_url,
base::Bind(&DevToolsWindow::FileSystemAdded, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::Bind(&DevToolsWindow::ShowDevToolsConfirmInfoBar,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
struct timespec now;
unsigned long timo;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
char xbuf[16];
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = key->type,
.index_key.description = key->description,
.cred = m->file->f_cred,
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.raw_data = key,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
* skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
*/
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
}
}
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
now = current_kernel_time();
rcu_read_lock();
/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
if (key->expiry == 0) {
memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
} else {
timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
if (timo < 60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo);
else if (timo < 60*60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60);
else if (timo < 60*60*24)
sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60));
else if (timo < 60*60*24*7)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24));
else
sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
}
#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
(test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
key->serial,
showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
key->type->name);
#undef showflag
if (key->type->describe)
key->type->describe(key, m);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 24,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupItemView::RefreshStyle() {
SetBackground(CreateBackground());
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckIfSuggestedPathExists(
int32 download_id,
const FilePath& unverified_path,
bool should_prompt,
bool is_forced_path,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const FilePath& default_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
FilePath target_path(unverified_path);
file_util::CreateDirectory(default_path);
FilePath dir = target_path.DirName();
FilePath filename = target_path.BaseName();
if (!file_util::PathIsWritable(dir)) {
VLOG(1) << "Unable to write to directory \"" << dir.value() << "\"";
should_prompt = true;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DOCUMENTS, &dir);
target_path = dir.Append(filename);
}
bool should_uniquify =
(!is_forced_path &&
(danger_type == content::DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS ||
should_prompt));
bool should_overwrite =
(should_uniquify || is_forced_path);
bool should_create_marker = (should_uniquify && !should_prompt);
if (should_uniquify) {
int uniquifier =
download_util::GetUniquePathNumberWithCrDownload(target_path);
if (uniquifier > 0) {
target_path = target_path.InsertBeforeExtensionASCII(
StringPrintf(" (%d)", uniquifier));
} else if (uniquifier == -1) {
VLOG(1) << "Unable to find a unique path for suggested path \""
<< target_path.value() << "\"";
should_prompt = true;
}
}
if (should_create_marker)
file_util::WriteFile(download_util::GetCrDownloadPath(target_path), "", 0);
DownloadItem::TargetDisposition disposition;
if (should_prompt)
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT;
else if (should_overwrite)
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE;
else
disposition = DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_UNIQUIFY;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathExistenceAvailable,
this, download_id, target_path, disposition, danger_type));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 17,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: directory_count_state_free (DirectoryCountState *state)
{
if (state->enumerator)
{
if (!g_file_enumerator_is_closed (state->enumerator))
{
g_file_enumerator_close_async (state->enumerator,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
g_object_unref (state->enumerator);
}
g_object_unref (state->cancellable);
nautilus_directory_unref (state->directory);
g_free (state);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *get_xattr_acl(const char *fname, int is_access_acl, size_t *len_p)
{
const char *name = is_access_acl ? XACC_ACL_ATTR : XDEF_ACL_ATTR;
*len_p = 0; /* no extra data alloc needed from get_xattr_data() */
return get_xattr_data(fname, name, len_p, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 22,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OggSource::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
*out = NULL;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
status_t err = mExtractor->mImpl->seekToTime(seekTimeUs);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
MediaBuffer *packet;
status_t err = mExtractor->mImpl->readNextPacket(&packet);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
#if 0
int64_t timeUs;
if (packet->meta_data()->findInt64(kKeyTime, &timeUs)) {
ALOGI("found time = %lld us", timeUs);
} else {
ALOGI("NO time");
}
#endif
packet->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
*out = packet;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 2,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 merge_value(u32 val, u32 new_val, u32 new_val_mask,
int offset)
{
if (offset >= 0) {
new_val_mask <<= (offset * 8);
new_val <<= (offset * 8);
} else {
new_val_mask >>= (offset * -8);
new_val >>= (offset * -8);
}
val = (val & ~new_val_mask) | (new_val & new_val_mask);
return val;
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
int flag)
{
struct super_block *sb = old->mnt.mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt;
int err;
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(old->mnt_devname);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flag & (CL_SLAVE | CL_PRIVATE | CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE))
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0; /* not a peer of original */
else
mnt->mnt_group_id = old->mnt_group_id;
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) && !mnt->mnt_group_id) {
err = mnt_alloc_group_id(mnt);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED);
/* Don't allow unprivileged users to change mount flags */
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
/* Don't allow unprivileged users to reveal what is under a mount */
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
lock_mount_hash();
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &sb->s_mounts);
unlock_mount_hash();
if ((flag & CL_SLAVE) ||
((flag & CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE) && IS_MNT_SHARED(old))) {
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave_list);
mnt->mnt_master = old;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
} else if (!(flag & CL_PRIVATE)) {
if ((flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED) || IS_MNT_SHARED(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_share, &old->mnt_share);
if (IS_MNT_SLAVE(old))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &old->mnt_slave);
mnt->mnt_master = old->mnt_master;
}
if (flag & CL_MAKE_SHARED)
set_mnt_shared(mnt);
/* stick the duplicate mount on the same expiry list
* as the original if that was on one */
if (flag & CL_EXPIRE) {
if (!list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
list_add(&mnt->mnt_expire, &old->mnt_expire);
}
return mnt;
out_free:
mnt_free_id(mnt);
free_vfsmnt(mnt);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.
Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int config_input(AVFilterLink *inlink)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
int plane;
/** full an array with the number of bytes that the video
* data occupies per line for each plane of the input video */
for (plane = 0; plane < 4; plane++) {
s->line_size[plane] = av_image_get_linesize(inlink->format, inlink->w,
plane);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void iput_final(struct inode *inode)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
const struct super_operations *op = inode->i_sb->s_op;
int drop;
WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW);
if (op->drop_inode)
drop = op->drop_inode(inode);
else
drop = generic_drop_inode(inode);
if (!drop && (sb->s_flags & MS_ACTIVE)) {
inode->i_state |= I_REFERENCED;
inode_add_lru(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return;
}
if (!drop) {
inode->i_state |= I_WILL_FREE;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
write_inode_now(inode, 1);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW);
inode->i_state &= ~I_WILL_FREE;
}
inode->i_state |= I_FREEING;
if (!list_empty(&inode->i_lru))
inode_lru_list_del(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
evict(inode);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const string16& WebContentsImpl::GetLoadStateHost() const {
return load_state_host_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::StartHangMonitorTimeout(base::TimeDelta delay) {
if (hang_monitor_timeout_)
hang_monitor_timeout_->Start(delay);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS foveon_load_raw()
{
struct decode *dindex;
short diff[1024];
unsigned bitbuf=0;
int pred[3], fixed, row, col, bit=-1, c, i;
fixed = get4();
read_shorts ((ushort *) diff, 1024);
if (!fixed) foveon_decoder (1024, 0);
for (row=0; row < height; row++) {
memset (pred, 0, sizeof pred);
if (!bit && !fixed && atoi(model+2) < 14) get4();
for (col=bit=0; col < width; col++) {
if (fixed) {
bitbuf = get4();
FORC3 pred[2-c] += diff[bitbuf >> c*10 & 0x3ff];
}
else FORC3 {
for (dindex=first_decode; dindex->branch[0]; ) {
if ((bit = (bit-1) & 31) == 31)
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
bitbuf = (bitbuf << 8) + fgetc(ifp);
dindex = dindex->branch[bitbuf >> bit & 1];
}
pred[c] += diff[dindex->leaf];
if (pred[c] >> 16 && ~pred[c] >> 16) derror();
}
FORC3 image[row*width+col][c] = pred[c];
}
}
if (document_mode)
for (i=0; i < height*width*4; i++)
if ((short) image[0][i] < 0) image[0][i] = 0;
foveon_load_camf();
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lzss_current_pointer(struct lzss *lzss)
{
return lzss_pointer_for_position(lzss, lzss->position);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int network_config_add_listen (const oconfig_item_t *ci) /* {{{ */
{
sockent_t *se;
int status;
int i;
if ((ci->values_num < 1) || (ci->values_num > 2)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING)
|| ((ci->values_num > 1) && (ci->values[1].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING)))
{
ERROR ("network plugin: The `%s' config option needs "
"one or two string arguments.", ci->key);
return (-1);
}
se = sockent_create (SOCKENT_TYPE_SERVER);
if (se == NULL)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: sockent_create failed.");
return (-1);
}
se->node = strdup (ci->values[0].value.string);
if (ci->values_num >= 2)
se->service = strdup (ci->values[1].value.string);
for (i = 0; i < ci->children_num; i++)
{
oconfig_item_t *child = ci->children + i;
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
if (strcasecmp ("AuthFile", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_string (child, &se->data.server.auth_file);
else if (strcasecmp ("SecurityLevel", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_security_level (child,
&se->data.server.security_level);
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
if (strcasecmp ("Interface", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_interface (child,
&se->interface);
else
{
WARNING ("network plugin: Option `%s' is not allowed here.",
child->key);
}
}
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
if ((se->data.server.security_level > SECURITY_LEVEL_NONE)
&& (se->data.server.auth_file == NULL))
{
ERROR ("network plugin: A security level higher than `none' was "
"requested, but no AuthFile option was given. Cowardly refusing to "
"open this socket!");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
status = sockent_init_crypto (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_listen: sockent_init_crypto() failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
status = sockent_server_listen (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_server: sockent_server_listen failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
status = sockent_add (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_listen: sockent_add failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_add_listen */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: message_send_groupchat(const char *const roomjid, const char *const msg, const char *const oob_url)
{
xmpp_ctx_t * const ctx = connection_get_ctx();
char *id = create_unique_id("muc");
xmpp_stanza_t *message = xmpp_message_new(ctx, STANZA_TYPE_GROUPCHAT, roomjid, id);
xmpp_message_set_body(message, msg);
free(id);
if (oob_url) {
stanza_attach_x_oob_url(ctx, message, oob_url);
}
_send_message_stanza(message);
xmpp_stanza_release(message);
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 24,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_proc_getdeviceinfo(struct nfs_server *server,
struct pnfs_device *pdev,
struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server,
_nfs4_proc_getdeviceinfo(server, pdev, cred),
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AwContents::OnDraw(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jobject canvas,
jboolean is_hardware_accelerated,
jint scroll_x,
jint scroll_y,
jint visible_left,
jint visible_top,
jint visible_right,
jint visible_bottom) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
gfx::Vector2d scroll(scroll_x, scroll_y);
browser_view_renderer_.PrepareToDraw(
scroll, gfx::Rect(visible_left, visible_top, visible_right - visible_left,
visible_bottom - visible_top));
if (is_hardware_accelerated && browser_view_renderer_.attached_to_window() &&
!g_force_auxiliary_bitmap_rendering) {
return browser_view_renderer_.OnDrawHardware();
}
gfx::Size view_size = browser_view_renderer_.size();
if (view_size.IsEmpty()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("android_webview", "EarlyOut_EmptySize",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<SoftwareCanvasHolder> canvas_holder = SoftwareCanvasHolder::Create(
canvas, scroll, view_size, g_force_auxiliary_bitmap_rendering);
if (!canvas_holder || !canvas_holder->GetCanvas()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("android_webview", "EarlyOut_NoSoftwareCanvas",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
return false;
}
return browser_view_renderer_.OnDrawSoftware(canvas_holder->GetCanvas());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_image_filter_emboss(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
PHP_GD_SINGLE_RES
if (gdImageEmboss(im_src) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 8,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetEndNamespaceDeclHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_EndNamespaceDeclHandler end) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler = end;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 11,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseStartTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar **pref,
const xmlChar **URI, int *tlen) {
const xmlChar *localname;
const xmlChar *prefix;
const xmlChar *attname;
const xmlChar *aprefix;
const xmlChar *nsname;
xmlChar *attvalue;
const xmlChar **atts = ctxt->atts;
int maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
int nratts, nbatts, nbdef, inputid;
int i, j, nbNs, attval;
unsigned long cur;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if (RAW != '<') return(NULL);
NEXT1;
/*
* NOTE: it is crucial with the SAX2 API to never call SHRINK beyond that
* point since the attribute values may be stored as pointers to
* the buffer and calling SHRINK would destroy them !
* The Shrinking is only possible once the full set of attribute
* callbacks have been done.
*/
SHRINK;
cur = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
inputid = ctxt->input->id;
nbatts = 0;
nratts = 0;
nbdef = 0;
nbNs = 0;
attval = 0;
/* Forget any namespaces added during an earlier parse of this element. */
ctxt->nsNr = nsNr;
localname = xmlParseQName(ctxt, &prefix);
if (localname == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"StartTag: invalid element name\n");
return(NULL);
}
*tlen = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base - cur;
/*
* Now parse the attributes, it ends up with the ending
*
* (S Attribute)* S?
*/
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
while (((RAW != '>') &&
((RAW != '/') || (NXT(1) != '>')) &&
(IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW))) && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
const xmlChar *q = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
int len = -1, alloc = 0;
attname = xmlParseAttribute2(ctxt, prefix, localname,
&aprefix, &attvalue, &len, &alloc);
if ((attname == NULL) || (attvalue == NULL))
goto next_attr;
if (len < 0) len = xmlStrlen(attvalue);
if ((attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) && (aprefix == NULL)) {
const xmlChar *URL = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, attvalue, len);
xmlURIPtr uri;
if (URL == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, "dictionary allocation failure");
if ((attvalue != NULL) && (alloc != 0))
xmlFree(attvalue);
return(NULL);
}
if (*URL != 0) {
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URL);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI,
"xmlns: '%s' is not a valid URI\n",
URL, NULL, NULL);
} else {
if (uri->scheme == NULL) {
xmlNsWarn(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI_RELATIVE,
"xmlns: URI %s is not absolute\n",
URL, NULL, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
if (URL == ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
if (attname != ctxt->str_xml) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace URI cannot be the default namespace\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
goto next_attr;
}
if ((len == 29) &&
(xmlStrEqual(URL,
BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/"))) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"reuse of the xmlns namespace name is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto next_attr;
}
}
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == NULL)
break;
if (j <= nbNs)
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, NULL, attname);
else
if (nsPush(ctxt, NULL, URL) > 0) nbNs++;
} else if (aprefix == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
const xmlChar *URL = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, attvalue, len);
xmlURIPtr uri;
if (attname == ctxt->str_xml) {
if (URL != ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace prefix mapped to wrong URI\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* Do not keep a namespace definition node
*/
goto next_attr;
}
if (URL == ctxt->str_xml_ns) {
if (attname != ctxt->str_xml) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xml namespace URI mapped to wrong prefix\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
goto next_attr;
}
if (attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"redefinition of the xmlns prefix is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto next_attr;
}
if ((len == 29) &&
(xmlStrEqual(URL,
BAD_CAST "http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/"))) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"reuse of the xmlns namespace name is forbidden\n",
NULL, NULL, NULL);
goto next_attr;
}
if ((URL == NULL) || (URL[0] == 0)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_XML_NAMESPACE,
"xmlns:%s: Empty XML namespace is not allowed\n",
attname, NULL, NULL);
goto next_attr;
} else {
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URL);
if (uri == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI,
"xmlns:%s: '%s' is not a valid URI\n",
attname, URL, NULL);
} else {
if ((ctxt->pedantic) && (uri->scheme == NULL)) {
xmlNsWarn(ctxt, XML_WAR_NS_URI_RELATIVE,
"xmlns:%s: URI %s is not absolute\n",
attname, URL, NULL);
}
xmlFreeURI(uri);
}
}
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == attname)
break;
if (j <= nbNs)
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, aprefix, attname);
else
if (nsPush(ctxt, attname, URL) > 0) nbNs++;
} else {
/*
* Add the pair to atts
*/
if ((atts == NULL) || (nbatts + 5 > maxatts)) {
if (xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(ctxt, nbatts + 5) < 0) {
goto next_attr;
}
maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
atts = ctxt->atts;
}
ctxt->attallocs[nratts++] = alloc;
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = aprefix;
/*
* The namespace URI field is used temporarily to point at the
* base of the current input buffer for non-alloced attributes.
* When the input buffer is reallocated, all the pointers become
* invalid, but they can be reconstructed later.
*/
if (alloc)
atts[nbatts++] = NULL;
else
atts[nbatts++] = ctxt->input->base;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
attvalue += len;
atts[nbatts++] = attvalue;
/*
* tag if some deallocation is needed
*/
if (alloc != 0) attval = 1;
attvalue = NULL; /* moved into atts */
}
next_attr:
if ((attvalue != NULL) && (alloc != 0)) {
xmlFree(attvalue);
attvalue = NULL;
}
GROW
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
break;
if ((RAW == '>') || (((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>'))))
break;
if (SKIP_BLANKS == 0) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"attributes construct error\n");
break;
}
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (q == CUR_PTR) &&
(attname == NULL) && (attvalue == NULL)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseStartTag: problem parsing attributes\n");
break;
}
GROW;
}
if (ctxt->input->id != inputid) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Unexpected change of input\n");
localname = NULL;
goto done;
}
/* Reconstruct attribute value pointers. */
for (i = 0, j = 0; j < nratts; i += 5, j++) {
if (atts[i+2] != NULL) {
/*
* Arithmetic on dangling pointers is technically undefined
* behavior, but well...
*/
ptrdiff_t offset = ctxt->input->base - atts[i+2];
atts[i+2] = NULL; /* Reset repurposed namespace URI */
atts[i+3] += offset; /* value */
atts[i+4] += offset; /* valuend */
}
}
/*
* The attributes defaulting
*/
if (ctxt->attsDefault != NULL) {
xmlDefAttrsPtr defaults;
defaults = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->attsDefault, localname, prefix);
if (defaults != NULL) {
for (i = 0;i < defaults->nbAttrs;i++) {
attname = defaults->values[5 * i];
aprefix = defaults->values[5 * i + 1];
/*
* special work for namespaces defaulted defs
*/
if ((attname == ctxt->str_xmlns) && (aprefix == NULL)) {
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == NULL)
break;
if (j <= nbNs) continue;
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, NULL);
if (nsname != defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) {
if (nsPush(ctxt, NULL,
defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) > 0)
nbNs++;
}
} else if (aprefix == ctxt->str_xmlns) {
/*
* check that it's not a defined namespace
*/
for (j = 1;j <= nbNs;j++)
if (ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * j] == attname)
break;
if (j <= nbNs) continue;
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, attname);
if (nsname != defaults->values[2]) {
if (nsPush(ctxt, attname,
defaults->values[5 * i + 2]) > 0)
nbNs++;
}
} else {
/*
* check that it's not a defined attribute
*/
for (j = 0;j < nbatts;j+=5) {
if ((attname == atts[j]) && (aprefix == atts[j+1]))
break;
}
if (j < nbatts) continue;
if ((atts == NULL) || (nbatts + 5 > maxatts)) {
if (xmlCtxtGrowAttrs(ctxt, nbatts + 5) < 0) {
return(NULL);
}
maxatts = ctxt->maxatts;
atts = ctxt->atts;
}
atts[nbatts++] = attname;
atts[nbatts++] = aprefix;
if (aprefix == NULL)
atts[nbatts++] = NULL;
else
atts[nbatts++] = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, aprefix);
atts[nbatts++] = defaults->values[5 * i + 2];
atts[nbatts++] = defaults->values[5 * i + 3];
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) &&
(defaults->values[5 * i + 4] != NULL)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_STANDALONE_DEFAULTED,
"standalone: attribute %s on %s defaulted from external subset\n",
attname, localname);
}
nbdef++;
}
}
}
}
/*
* The attributes checkings
*/
for (i = 0; i < nbatts;i += 5) {
/*
* The default namespace does not apply to attribute names.
*/
if (atts[i + 1] != NULL) {
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, atts[i + 1]);
if (nsname == NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_UNDEFINED_NAMESPACE,
"Namespace prefix %s for %s on %s is not defined\n",
atts[i + 1], atts[i], localname);
}
atts[i + 2] = nsname;
} else
nsname = NULL;
/*
* [ WFC: Unique Att Spec ]
* No attribute name may appear more than once in the same
* start-tag or empty-element tag.
* As extended by the Namespace in XML REC.
*/
for (j = 0; j < i;j += 5) {
if (atts[i] == atts[j]) {
if (atts[i+1] == atts[j+1]) {
xmlErrAttributeDup(ctxt, atts[i+1], atts[i]);
break;
}
if ((nsname != NULL) && (atts[j + 2] == nsname)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_REDEFINED,
"Namespaced Attribute %s in '%s' redefined\n",
atts[i], nsname, NULL);
break;
}
}
}
}
nsname = xmlGetNamespace(ctxt, prefix);
if ((prefix != NULL) && (nsname == NULL)) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_UNDEFINED_NAMESPACE,
"Namespace prefix %s on %s is not defined\n",
prefix, localname, NULL);
}
*pref = prefix;
*URI = nsname;
/*
* SAX: Start of Element !
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->startElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (nbNs > 0)
ctxt->sax->startElementNs(ctxt->userData, localname, prefix,
nsname, nbNs, &ctxt->nsTab[ctxt->nsNr - 2 * nbNs],
nbatts / 5, nbdef, atts);
else
ctxt->sax->startElementNs(ctxt->userData, localname, prefix,
nsname, 0, NULL, nbatts / 5, nbdef, atts);
}
done:
/*
* Free up attribute allocated strings if needed
*/
if (attval != 0) {
for (i = 3,j = 0; j < nratts;i += 5,j++)
if ((ctxt->attallocs[j] != 0) && (atts[i] != NULL))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) atts[i]);
}
return(localname);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 29,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, hasChildren)
{
zval *object = getThis(), **entry;
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
HashTable *aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_array_object_verify_pos(intern, aht TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(aht, (void **) &entry, &intern->pos) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_BOOL(Z_TYPE_PP(entry) == IS_ARRAY || (Z_TYPE_PP(entry) == IS_OBJECT && (intern->ar_flags & SPL_ARRAY_CHILD_ARRAYS_ONLY) == 0));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_v6_seq_dump_addr(struct seq_file *seq, union sctp_addr *addr)
{
seq_printf(seq, "%pI6 ", &addr->v6.sin6_addr);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 16,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _xfs_buf_map_pages(
xfs_buf_t *bp,
uint flags)
{
ASSERT(bp->b_flags & _XBF_PAGES);
if (bp->b_page_count == 1) {
/* A single page buffer is always mappable */
bp->b_addr = page_address(bp->b_pages[0]) + bp->b_offset;
} else if (flags & XBF_UNMAPPED) {
bp->b_addr = NULL;
} else {
int retried = 0;
do {
bp->b_addr = vm_map_ram(bp->b_pages, bp->b_page_count,
-1, PAGE_KERNEL);
if (bp->b_addr)
break;
vm_unmap_aliases();
} while (retried++ <= 1);
if (!bp->b_addr)
return -ENOMEM;
bp->b_addr += bp->b_offset;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FilePath GDataCache::GetCacheDirectoryPath(
CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type) const {
DCHECK_LE(0, sub_dir_type);
DCHECK_GT(NUM_CACHE_TYPES, sub_dir_type);
return cache_paths_[sub_dir_type];
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *expand_home(const char *path, const char* homedir) {
assert(path);
assert(homedir);
char *new_name = NULL;
if (strncmp(path, "${HOME}", 7) == 0) {
if (asprintf(&new_name, "%s%s", homedir, path + 7) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
return new_name;
}
else if (*path == '~') {
if (asprintf(&new_name, "%s%s", homedir, path + 1) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
return new_name;
}
return strdup(path);
}
Commit Message: replace copy_file with copy_file_as_user
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 28,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
{
vfree(to_kvm_vmx(kvm));
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mptsas_scsi_uninit(PCIDevice *dev)
{
MPTSASState *s = MPT_SAS(dev);
qemu_bh_delete(s->request_bh);
msi_uninit(dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 19,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_os_create_cache(char *name, u16 size, u16 depth, acpi_cache_t ** cache)
{
*cache = kmem_cache_create(name, size, 0, 0, NULL);
if (*cache == NULL)
return AE_ERROR;
else
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bin_mem(RCore *r, int mode) {
RList *mem = NULL;
if (!r) return false;
if (!IS_MODE_JSON(mode)) {
if (!(IS_MODE_RAD (mode) || IS_MODE_SET (mode))) {
r_cons_println ("[Memory]\n");
}
}
if (!(mem = r_bin_get_mem (r->bin))) {
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print("[]");
}
return false;
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_print ("[");
bin_mem_print (mem, 7, 0, R_CORE_BIN_JSON);
r_cons_println ("]");
return true;
} else if (!(IS_MODE_RAD (mode) || IS_MODE_SET (mode))) {
bin_mem_print (mem, 7, 0, mode);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mboxlist_changequota(const mbentry_t *mbentry, void *rock)
{
int r = 0;
struct mailbox *mailbox = NULL;
const char *root = (const char *) rock;
int res;
quota_t quota_usage[QUOTA_NUMRESOURCES];
assert(root);
r = mailbox_open_iwl(mbentry->name, &mailbox);
if (r) goto done;
mailbox_get_usage(mailbox, quota_usage);
if (mailbox->quotaroot) {
quota_t quota_diff[QUOTA_NUMRESOURCES];
if (strlen(mailbox->quotaroot) >= strlen(root)) {
/* Part of a child quota root - skip */
goto done;
}
/* remove usage from the old quotaroot */
for (res = 0; res < QUOTA_NUMRESOURCES ; res++) {
quota_diff[res] = -quota_usage[res];
}
r = quota_update_useds(mailbox->quotaroot, quota_diff,
mailbox->name);
}
/* update (or set) the quotaroot */
r = mailbox_set_quotaroot(mailbox, root);
if (r) goto done;
/* update the new quota root */
r = quota_update_useds(root, quota_usage, mailbox->name);
done:
mailbox_close(&mailbox);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "LOSTQUOTA: unable to change quota root for %s to %s: %s",
mbentry->name, root, error_message(r));
}
/* Note, we're a callback, and it's not a huge tragedy if we
* fail, so we don't ever return a failure */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *file_path(struct file *filp, char *buf, int buflen)
{
return d_path(&filp->f_path, buf, buflen);
}
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 3,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NP_Shutdown(void)
{
if (g_plugin_NP_Shutdown == NULL)
return NPERR_INVALID_FUNCTABLE_ERROR;
D(bugiI("NP_Shutdown\n"));
NPError ret = g_plugin_NP_Shutdown();
D(bugiD("NP_Shutdown done\n"));
if (NPN_HAS_FEATURE(NPRUNTIME_SCRIPTING))
npobject_bridge_destroy();
gtk_main_quit();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_csk_listen_stop(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct request_sock *acc_req;
struct request_sock *req;
inet_csk_delete_keepalive_timer(sk);
/* make all the listen_opt local to us */
acc_req = reqsk_queue_yank_acceptq(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue);
/* Following specs, it would be better either to send FIN
* (and enter FIN-WAIT-1, it is normal close)
* or to send active reset (abort).
* Certainly, it is pretty dangerous while synflood, but it is
* bad justification for our negligence 8)
* To be honest, we are not able to make either
* of the variants now. --ANK
*/
reqsk_queue_destroy(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue);
while ((req = acc_req) != NULL) {
struct sock *child = req->sk;
acc_req = req->dl_next;
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(child);
WARN_ON(sock_owned_by_user(child));
sock_hold(child);
sk->sk_prot->disconnect(child, O_NONBLOCK);
sock_orphan(child);
percpu_counter_inc(sk->sk_prot->orphan_count);
inet_csk_destroy_sock(child);
bh_unlock_sock(child);
local_bh_enable();
sock_put(child);
sk_acceptq_removed(sk);
__reqsk_free(req);
}
WARN_ON(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 8,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileSystemCancellableOperationImpl(
OperationID id,
FileSystemManagerImpl* file_system_manager_impl)
: id_(id), file_system_manager_impl_(file_system_manager_impl) {}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 8,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_qtdemux_move_stream (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, QtDemuxStream * str,
guint32 index)
{
/* no change needed */
if (index == str->sample_index)
return;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "moving to sample %u of %u", index,
str->n_samples);
/* position changed, we have a discont */
str->sample_index = index;
/* Each time we move in the stream we store the position where we are
* starting from */
str->from_sample = index;
str->discont = TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void calc_load_account_idle(struct rq *this_rq)
{
long delta;
delta = calc_load_fold_active(this_rq);
if (delta)
atomic_long_add(delta, &calc_load_tasks_idle);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_rpcap_ifaddr (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset, int hf_id,
proto_item *parent_item)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
gchar ipaddr[MAX_ADDR_STR_LEN];
guint32 ipv4;
guint16 af;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_id, tvb, offset, 128, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_ifaddr);
af = tvb_get_ntohs (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_if_af, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
if (af == COMMON_AF_INET) {
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_if_port, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
ipv4 = tvb_get_ipv4 (tvb, offset);
ip_to_str_buf((guint8 *)&ipv4, ipaddr, MAX_ADDR_STR_LEN);
proto_item_append_text (ti, ": %s", ipaddr);
if (parent_item) {
proto_item_append_text (parent_item, ": %s", ipaddr);
}
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_if_ip, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_if_padding, tvb, offset, 120, ENC_NA);
offset += 120;
} else {
ti = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_if_unknown, tvb, offset, 126, ENC_NA);
if (af != COMMON_AF_UNSPEC) {
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_if_unknown,
"Unknown address family: %d", af);
}
offset += 126;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_siocwandev(struct net *net, struct compat_ifreq __user *uifr32)
{
compat_uptr_t uptr32;
struct ifreq ifr;
void __user *saved;
int err;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, uifr32, sizeof(struct compat_ifreq)))
return -EFAULT;
if (get_user(uptr32, &uifr32->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu))
return -EFAULT;
saved = ifr.ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.raw_hdlc;
ifr.ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.raw_hdlc = compat_ptr(uptr32);
err = dev_ioctl(net, SIOCWANDEV, &ifr, NULL);
if (!err) {
ifr.ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.raw_hdlc = saved;
if (copy_to_user(uifr32, &ifr, sizeof(struct compat_ifreq)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 24,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct kvm_memory_slot *kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
return __gfn_to_memslot(kvm_vcpu_memslots(vcpu), gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_DissectRequest(struct sess *sp)
{
struct http_conn *htc;
struct http *hp;
uint16_t retval;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp, SESS_MAGIC);
htc = sp->htc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
hp = sp->http;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
retval = http_splitline(sp->wrk, sp->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_REQ, HTTP_HDR_URL, HTTP_HDR_PROTO);
if (retval != 0) {
WSPR(sp, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->rxbuf);
return (retval);
}
http_ProtoVer(hp);
retval = htc_request_check_host_hdr(hp);
if (retval != 0) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (retval);
}
return (retval);
}
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted = sk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 13,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_details)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
BIO *out;
unsigned int pbio_len;
char *pbio;
zend_long ktype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &key) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((pkey = (EVP_PKEY *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(key), "OpenSSL key", le_key)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
pbio_len = BIO_get_mem_data(out, &pbio);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "bits", EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "key", pbio, pbio_len);
/*TODO: Use the real values once the openssl constants are used
* See the enum at the top of this file
*/
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
{
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA;
if (rsa != NULL) {
zval z_rsa;
const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
array_init(&z_rsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, d);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, iqmp);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "rsa", &z_rsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
{
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA;
if (dsa != NULL) {
zval z_dsa;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dsa", &z_dsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
{
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH;
if (dh != NULL) {
zval z_dh;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dh);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dh", &z_dh);
}
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC;
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey) != NULL) {
zval ec;
const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
int nid;
char *crv_sn;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
char oir_buf[80];
ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey));
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(ec_group);
if (nid == NID_undef) {
break;
}
array_init(&ec);
crv_sn = (char*) OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (crv_sn != NULL) {
add_assoc_string(&ec, "curve_name", crv_sn);
}
obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
if (obj != NULL) {
int oir_len = OBJ_obj2txt(oir_buf, sizeof(oir_buf), obj, 1);
add_assoc_stringl(&ec, "curve_oid", (char*)oir_buf, oir_len);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "ec", &ec);
}
break;
#endif
default:
ktype = -1;
break;
}
add_assoc_long(return_value, "type", ktype);
BIO_free(out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 18,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::UpdateMouseLockRegion() {
RECT window_rect =
display::Screen::GetScreen()
->DIPToScreenRectInWindow(window_, window_->GetBoundsInScreen())
.ToRECT();
::ClipCursor(&window_rect);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 27,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline v8::Local<v8::Boolean> v8Boolean(bool value, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
return value ? v8::True(isolate) : v8::False(isolate);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 28,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveFlagsSwitches(base::CommandLine::SwitchMap* switch_list) {
FlagsStateSingleton::GetFlagsState()->RemoveFlagsSwitches(switch_list);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SetLengthImpl(Isolate* isolate, Handle<JSArray> array,
uint32_t length,
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store) {
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary> dict =
Handle<SeededNumberDictionary>::cast(backing_store);
int capacity = dict->Capacity();
uint32_t old_length = 0;
CHECK(array->length()->ToArrayLength(&old_length));
if (length < old_length) {
if (dict->requires_slow_elements()) {
for (int entry = 0; entry < capacity; entry++) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
Object* index = dict->KeyAt(entry);
if (index->IsNumber()) {
uint32_t number = static_cast<uint32_t>(index->Number());
if (length <= number && number < old_length) {
PropertyDetails details = dict->DetailsAt(entry);
if (!details.IsConfigurable()) length = number + 1;
}
}
}
}
if (length == 0) {
JSObject::ResetElements(array);
} else {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
int removed_entries = 0;
Handle<Object> the_hole_value = isolate->factory()->the_hole_value();
for (int entry = 0; entry < capacity; entry++) {
Object* index = dict->KeyAt(entry);
if (index->IsNumber()) {
uint32_t number = static_cast<uint32_t>(index->Number());
if (length <= number && number < old_length) {
dict->SetEntry(entry, the_hole_value, the_hole_value);
removed_entries++;
}
}
}
dict->ElementsRemoved(removed_entries);
}
}
Handle<Object> length_obj = isolate->factory()->NewNumberFromUint(length);
array->set_length(*length_obj);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 28,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dbpageOpen(sqlite3_vtab *pVTab, sqlite3_vtab_cursor **ppCursor){
DbpageCursor *pCsr;
pCsr = (DbpageCursor *)sqlite3_malloc64(sizeof(DbpageCursor));
if( pCsr==0 ){
return SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
}else{
memset(pCsr, 0, sizeof(DbpageCursor));
pCsr->base.pVtab = pVTab;
pCsr->pgno = -1;
}
*ppCursor = (sqlite3_vtab_cursor *)pCsr;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 17,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::updateCompositedSelectionBoundsIfNeeded()
{
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::compositedSelectionUpdatesEnabled())
return;
Page* page = frame().page();
ASSERT(page);
LocalFrame* frame = toLocalFrame(page->focusController().focusedOrMainFrame());
if (!frame || !frame->selection().isCaretOrRange()) {
page->chrome().client().clearCompositedSelectionBounds();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 28,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t RenderViewImpl::GetSessionStorageNamespaceId() {
CHECK(session_storage_namespace_id_ != kInvalidSessionStorageNamespaceId);
return session_storage_namespace_id_;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline struct page *get_valid_first_slab(struct kmem_cache_node *n,
struct page *page, bool pfmemalloc)
{
if (!page)
return NULL;
if (pfmemalloc)
return page;
if (!PageSlabPfmemalloc(page))
return page;
/* No need to keep pfmemalloc slab if we have enough free objects */
if (n->free_objects > n->free_limit) {
ClearPageSlabPfmemalloc(page);
return page;
}
/* Move pfmemalloc slab to the end of list to speed up next search */
list_del(&page->lru);
if (!page->active) {
list_add_tail(&page->lru, &n->slabs_free);
n->free_slabs++;
} else
list_add_tail(&page->lru, &n->slabs_partial);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->slabs_partial, lru) {
if (!PageSlabPfmemalloc(page))
return page;
}
n->free_touched = 1;
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->slabs_free, lru) {
if (!PageSlabPfmemalloc(page)) {
n->free_slabs--;
return page;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
{
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
* too long
*/
if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
return -1;
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (!senc)
return -1;
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
/* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
return -1;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
* from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
* We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
* and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
* as their sessions. */
l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
p += len;
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
p += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
s2n(len - 6, p);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
Commit Message: Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix.
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 9,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ValidateRangeChecksum(const HistogramBase& histogram,
uint32_t range_checksum) {
const Histogram& casted_histogram =
static_cast<const Histogram&>(histogram);
return casted_histogram.bucket_ranges()->checksum() == range_checksum;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 14,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: brcmf_cfg80211_del_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
u8 key_idx, bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_wsec_key *key;
s32 err;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "key index (%d)\n", key_idx);
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif))
return -EIO;
if (key_idx >= BRCMF_MAX_DEFAULT_KEYS) {
/* we ignore this key index in this case */
return -EINVAL;
}
key = &ifp->vif->profile.key[key_idx];
if (key->algo == CRYPTO_ALGO_OFF) {
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Ignore clearing of (never configured) key\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
key->index = (u32)key_idx;
key->flags = BRCMF_PRIMARY_KEY;
/* Clear the key/index */
err = send_key_to_dongle(ifp, key);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CC_DUP_WARN(ScanEnv *env, OnigCodePoint from ARG_UNUSED, OnigCodePoint to ARG_UNUSED)
{
if (onig_warn == onig_null_warn || !RTEST(ruby_verbose)) return ;
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_DUP) &&
!(env->warnings_flag & ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_DUP)) {
#ifdef WARN_ALL_CC_DUP
onig_syntax_warn(env, "character class has duplicated range: %04x-%04x", from, to);
#else
env->warnings_flag |= ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_DUP;
onig_syntax_warn(env, "character class has duplicated range");
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 2,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::didChangeSettings(WebSettings* webSettings)
{
Settings* coreSettings = m_page->settings();
m_page->setGroupName(webSettings->pageGroupName());
coreSettings->setXSSAuditorEnabled(webSettings->xssAuditorEnabled());
coreSettings->setLoadsImagesAutomatically(webSettings->loadsImagesAutomatically());
coreSettings->setShouldDrawBorderWhileLoadingImages(webSettings->shouldDrawBorderWhileLoadingImages());
coreSettings->setScriptEnabled(webSettings->isJavaScriptEnabled());
coreSettings->setPrivateBrowsingEnabled(webSettings->isPrivateBrowsingEnabled());
coreSettings->setDeviceSupportsMouse(webSettings->deviceSupportsMouse());
coreSettings->setDefaultFixedFontSize(webSettings->defaultFixedFontSize());
coreSettings->setDefaultFontSize(webSettings->defaultFontSize());
coreSettings->setMinimumLogicalFontSize(webSettings->minimumFontSize());
if (!webSettings->serifFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setSerifFontFamily(String(webSettings->serifFontFamily()));
if (!webSettings->fixedFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setFixedFontFamily(String(webSettings->fixedFontFamily()));
if (!webSettings->sansSerifFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setSansSerifFontFamily(String(webSettings->sansSerifFontFamily()));
if (!webSettings->standardFontFamily().empty())
coreSettings->setStandardFontFamily(String(webSettings->standardFontFamily()));
coreSettings->setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(webSettings->canJavaScriptOpenWindowsAutomatically());
coreSettings->setAllowScriptsToCloseWindows(webSettings->canJavaScriptOpenWindowsAutomatically()); // Why are we using the same value as setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically()?
coreSettings->setPluginsEnabled(webSettings->arePluginsEnabled());
coreSettings->setDefaultTextEncodingName(webSettings->defaultTextEncodingName());
coreSettings->setDownloadableBinaryFontsEnabled(webSettings->downloadableBinaryFontsEnabled());
coreSettings->setSpatialNavigationEnabled(m_webSettings->isSpatialNavigationEnabled());
coreSettings->setAsynchronousSpellCheckingEnabled(m_webSettings->isAsynchronousSpellCheckingEnabled());
BlackBerry::Platform::String stylesheetURL = webSettings->userStyleSheetLocation();
if (!stylesheetURL.empty())
coreSettings->setUserStyleSheetLocation(KURL(KURL(), stylesheetURL));
coreSettings->setFirstScheduledLayoutDelay(webSettings->firstScheduledLayoutDelay());
coreSettings->setUseCache(webSettings->useWebKitCache());
coreSettings->setCookieEnabled(webSettings->areCookiesEnabled());
#if ENABLE(SQL_DATABASE)
static bool dbinit = false;
if (!dbinit && !webSettings->databasePath().empty()) {
dbinit = true;
DatabaseManager::initialize(webSettings->databasePath());
}
static bool acinit = false;
if (!acinit && !webSettings->appCachePath().empty()) {
acinit = true;
cacheStorage().setCacheDirectory(webSettings->appCachePath());
}
coreSettings->setLocalStorageDatabasePath(webSettings->localStoragePath());
Database::setIsAvailable(webSettings->isDatabasesEnabled());
DatabaseSync::setIsAvailable(webSettings->isDatabasesEnabled());
coreSettings->setLocalStorageEnabled(webSettings->isLocalStorageEnabled());
coreSettings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(webSettings->isAppCacheEnabled());
m_page->group().groupSettings()->setLocalStorageQuotaBytes(webSettings->localStorageQuota());
coreSettings->setSessionStorageQuota(webSettings->sessionStorageQuota());
coreSettings->setUsesPageCache(webSettings->maximumPagesInCache());
coreSettings->setFrameFlatteningEnabled(webSettings->isFrameFlatteningEnabled());
#endif
#if ENABLE(INDEXED_DATABASE)
m_page->group().groupSettings()->setIndexedDBDatabasePath(webSettings->indexedDataBasePath());
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEB_SOCKETS)
WebSocket::setIsAvailable(webSettings->areWebSocketsEnabled());
#endif
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
coreSettings->setFullScreenEnabled(true);
#endif
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
coreSettings->setTextReflowEnabled(webSettings->textReflowMode() == WebSettings::TextReflowEnabled);
#endif
coreSettings->setShouldUseFirstScheduledLayoutDelay(webSettings->isEmailMode());
coreSettings->setProcessHTTPEquiv(!webSettings->isEmailMode());
coreSettings->setShouldUseCrossOriginProtocolCheck(!webSettings->allowCrossSiteRequests());
coreSettings->setWebSecurityEnabled(!webSettings->allowCrossSiteRequests());
cookieManager().setPrivateMode(webSettings->isPrivateBrowsingEnabled());
CredentialStorage::setPrivateMode(webSettings->isPrivateBrowsingEnabled());
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()) {
Color backgroundColor(webSettings->backgroundColor());
m_mainFrame->view()->updateBackgroundRecursively(backgroundColor, backgroundColor.hasAlpha());
Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->dispatchMessage(
createMethodCallMessage(&WebPagePrivate::setCompositorBackgroundColor, this, backgroundColor));
}
if (m_backingStore) {
m_backingStore->d->setWebPageBackgroundColor(m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()
? m_mainFrame->view()->documentBackgroundColor()
: webSettings->backgroundColor());
}
m_page->setDeviceScaleFactor(webSettings->devicePixelRatio());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destroy_server_connect(SERVER_CONNECT_REC *conn)
{
IRC_SERVER_CONNECT_REC *ircconn;
ircconn = IRC_SERVER_CONNECT(conn);
if (ircconn == NULL)
return;
g_free_not_null(ircconn->usermode);
g_free_not_null(ircconn->alternate_nick);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 19,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetPageSizeAndContentRect(bool rotated,
bool is_src_page_landscape,
pp::Size* page_size,
pp::Rect* content_rect) {
bool is_dst_page_landscape = page_size->width() > page_size->height();
bool page_orientation_mismatched = is_src_page_landscape !=
is_dst_page_landscape;
bool rotate_dst_page = rotated ^ page_orientation_mismatched;
if (rotate_dst_page) {
page_size->SetSize(page_size->height(), page_size->width());
content_rect->SetRect(content_rect->y(), content_rect->x(),
content_rect->height(), content_rect->width());
}
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::getPopupMenuInfo(PopupContainer* popupContainer,
WebPopupMenuInfo* info)
{
const Vector<PopupItem*>& inputItems = popupContainer->popupData();
WebVector<WebMenuItemInfo> outputItems(inputItems.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < inputItems.size(); ++i) {
const PopupItem& inputItem = *inputItems[i];
WebMenuItemInfo& outputItem = outputItems[i];
outputItem.label = inputItem.label;
outputItem.enabled = inputItem.enabled;
if (inputItem.textDirection == WebCore::RTL)
outputItem.textDirection = WebTextDirectionRightToLeft;
else
outputItem.textDirection = WebTextDirectionLeftToRight;
outputItem.hasTextDirectionOverride = inputItem.hasTextDirectionOverride;
switch (inputItem.type) {
case PopupItem::TypeOption:
outputItem.type = WebMenuItemInfo::Option;
break;
case PopupItem::TypeGroup:
outputItem.type = WebMenuItemInfo::Group;
break;
case PopupItem::TypeSeparator:
outputItem.type = WebMenuItemInfo::Separator;
break;
default:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
info->itemHeight = popupContainer->menuItemHeight();
info->itemFontSize = popupContainer->menuItemFontSize();
info->selectedIndex = popupContainer->selectedIndex();
info->items.swap(outputItems);
info->rightAligned = popupContainer->menuStyle().textDirection() == RTL;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError(
media::AudioInputController* controller,
int error_code) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError(error_code="
<< error_code << ")";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupByController(controller);
if (!entry)
return;
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init blowfish_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const siginfo_t *from)
{
int err;
if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE, to, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
if (from->si_code < 0)
return __copy_to_user(to, from, sizeof(siginfo_t))
? -EFAULT : 0;
/*
* If you change siginfo_t structure, please be sure
* this code is fixed accordingly.
* Please remember to update the signalfd_copyinfo() function
* inside fs/signalfd.c too, in case siginfo_t changes.
* It should never copy any pad contained in the structure
* to avoid security leaks, but must copy the generic
* 3 ints plus the relevant union member.
*/
err = __put_user(from->si_signo, &to->si_signo);
err |= __put_user(from->si_errno, &to->si_errno);
err |= __put_user((short)from->si_code, &to->si_code);
switch (from->si_code & __SI_MASK) {
case __SI_KILL:
err |= __put_user(from->si_pid, &to->si_pid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_uid, &to->si_uid);
break;
case __SI_TIMER:
err |= __put_user(from->si_tid, &to->si_tid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_overrun, &to->si_overrun);
err |= __put_user(from->si_ptr, &to->si_ptr);
break;
case __SI_POLL:
err |= __put_user(from->si_band, &to->si_band);
err |= __put_user(from->si_fd, &to->si_fd);
break;
case __SI_FAULT:
err |= __put_user(from->si_addr, &to->si_addr);
#ifdef __ARCH_SI_TRAPNO
err |= __put_user(from->si_trapno, &to->si_trapno);
#endif
#ifdef BUS_MCEERR_AO
/*
* Other callers might not initialize the si_lsb field,
* so check explicitly for the right codes here.
*/
if (from->si_signo == SIGBUS &&
(from->si_code == BUS_MCEERR_AR || from->si_code == BUS_MCEERR_AO))
err |= __put_user(from->si_addr_lsb, &to->si_addr_lsb);
#endif
#ifdef SEGV_BNDERR
if (from->si_signo == SIGSEGV && from->si_code == SEGV_BNDERR) {
err |= __put_user(from->si_lower, &to->si_lower);
err |= __put_user(from->si_upper, &to->si_upper);
}
#endif
#ifdef SEGV_PKUERR
if (from->si_signo == SIGSEGV && from->si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
err |= __put_user(from->si_pkey, &to->si_pkey);
#endif
break;
case __SI_CHLD:
err |= __put_user(from->si_pid, &to->si_pid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_uid, &to->si_uid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_status, &to->si_status);
err |= __put_user(from->si_utime, &to->si_utime);
err |= __put_user(from->si_stime, &to->si_stime);
break;
case __SI_RT: /* This is not generated by the kernel as of now. */
case __SI_MESGQ: /* But this is */
err |= __put_user(from->si_pid, &to->si_pid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_uid, &to->si_uid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_ptr, &to->si_ptr);
break;
#ifdef __ARCH_SIGSYS
case __SI_SYS:
err |= __put_user(from->si_call_addr, &to->si_call_addr);
err |= __put_user(from->si_syscall, &to->si_syscall);
err |= __put_user(from->si_arch, &to->si_arch);
break;
#endif
default: /* this is just in case for now ... */
err |= __put_user(from->si_pid, &to->si_pid);
err |= __put_user(from->si_uid, &to->si_uid);
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BlinkTestRunner::NavigationEntryCount() {
return GetLocalSessionHistoryLength(render_view());
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendMouseLockLost() {
Send(new ViewMsg_MouseLockLost(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_lookup(struct fuse* fuse, struct fuse_handler* handler,
const struct fuse_in_header *hdr, const char* name)
{
struct node* parent_node;
char parent_path[PATH_MAX];
char child_path[PATH_MAX];
const char* actual_name;
pthread_mutex_lock(&fuse->global->lock);
parent_node = lookup_node_and_path_by_id_locked(fuse, hdr->nodeid,
parent_path, sizeof(parent_path));
TRACE("[%d] LOOKUP %s @ %"PRIx64" (%s)\n", handler->token, name, hdr->nodeid,
parent_node ? parent_node->name : "?");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
if (!parent_node || !(actual_name = find_file_within(parent_path, name,
child_path, sizeof(child_path), 1))) {
return -ENOENT;
}
if (!check_caller_access_to_name(fuse, hdr, parent_node, name, R_OK)) {
return -EACCES;
}
return fuse_reply_entry(fuse, hdr->unique, parent_node, name, actual_name, child_path);
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnFileFeatureExtractionDone() {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::CheckWhitelists, this));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::StartTimeout, this));
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err edts_AddBox(GF_Box *s, GF_Box *a)
{
GF_EditBox *ptr = (GF_EditBox *)s;
if (a->type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ELST) {
if (ptr->editList) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
ptr->editList = (GF_EditListBox *)a;
return GF_OK;
} else {
return gf_isom_box_add_default(s, a);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dn_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
if ((DN_SK(sk)->state != DN_O) || (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
goto out;
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
err = 0;
dn_rehash_sock(sk);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::InitializeDevicePolicy() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.reset();
device_data_store_.reset();
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDevicePolicy)) {
device_data_store_.reset(CloudPolicyDataStore::CreateForDevicePolicies());
chromeos::CryptohomeLibrary* cryptohome = NULL;
if (chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get()->EnsureLoaded())
cryptohome = chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get()->GetCryptohomeLibrary();
install_attributes_.reset(new EnterpriseInstallAttributes(cryptohome));
DevicePolicyCache* device_policy_cache =
new DevicePolicyCache(device_data_store_.get(),
install_attributes_.get());
managed_cloud_provider_->AppendCache(device_policy_cache);
recommended_cloud_provider_->AppendCache(device_policy_cache);
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.reset(new CloudPolicySubsystem(
device_data_store_.get(),
device_policy_cache));
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(
&BrowserPolicyConnector::InitializeDevicePolicySubsystem));
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,662 |
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