instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_apr_md5(lua_State *L)
{
const char *buffer;
char *result;
size_t len;
request_rec *r;
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
buffer = lua_tolstring(L, 2, &len);
result = ap_md5_binary(r->pool, (const unsigned char *)buffer, len);
lua_pushstring(L, result);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_delegreturn(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_delegreturn *dr)
{
return nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &dr->dr_stateid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 7,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gup_huge_pgd(pgd_t orig, pgd_t *pgdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write,
struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
int refs;
struct page *head, *page;
if (!pgd_access_permitted(orig, write))
return 0;
BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_devmap(orig));
refs = 0;
page = pgd_page(orig) + ((addr & ~PGDIR_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
head = compound_head(pgd_page(orig));
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pgd_val(orig) != pgd_val(*pgdp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
SetPageReferenced(head);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 27,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandleRequestPinLoginState(const base::ListValue* args) {
AllowJavascript();
chromeos::quick_unlock::PinBackend::GetInstance()->HasLoginSupport(
base::BindOnce(&PeopleHandler::OnPinLoginAvailable,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~NavigationControllerHistoryTest() {
STLDeleteElements(&windows_);
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fd_columns(int fd) {
struct winsize ws = {};
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0)
return -errno;
if (ws.ws_col <= 0)
return -EIO;
return ws.ws_col;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 27,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bmpr_convert_row_2(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx,const iw_byte *src, size_t row)
{
int i;
int pal_index;
for(i=0;i<rctx->width;i++) {
pal_index = (src[i/4]>>(2*(3-i%4)))&0x03;
rctx->img->pixels[row*rctx->img->bpr + i*3 + 0] = rctx->palette.entry[pal_index].r;
rctx->img->pixels[row*rctx->img->bpr + i*3 + 1] = rctx->palette.entry[pal_index].g;
rctx->img->pixels[row*rctx->img->bpr + i*3 + 2] = rctx->palette.entry[pal_index].b;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 1,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parseattrstat(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp, int verbose, int v3)
{
int er;
dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er);
if (dp == NULL)
return (0);
if (er)
return (1);
return (parsefattr(ndo, dp, verbose, v3) != NULL);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void serve_err(SERVER* serve, const char* msg) {
g_message("Export of %s on port %d failed:", serve->exportname,
serve->port);
err(msg);
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct fuse_file *fuse_write_file_get(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct fuse_inode *fi)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = __fuse_write_file_get(fc, fi);
WARN_ON(!ff);
return ff;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::AddAdditionalValueStoreCaches(
content::BrowserContext* context,
const scoped_refptr<ValueStoreFactory>& factory,
const scoped_refptr<base::ObserverListThreadSafe<SettingsObserver>>&
observers,
std::map<settings_namespace::Namespace, ValueStoreCache*>* caches) {
(*caches)[settings_namespace::SYNC] =
new SyncValueStoreCache(factory, observers, context->GetPath());
(*caches)[settings_namespace::MANAGED] =
new ManagedValueStoreCache(context, factory, observers);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ensure_database (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor *monitor,
GError **error)
{
gboolean ret = FALSE;
if (monitor->database != NULL)
{
struct stat statbuf;
if (stat (CKDB_PATH, &statbuf) != 0)
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
g_io_error_from_errno (errno),
"Error statting file " CKDB_PATH " to check timestamp: %s",
strerror (errno));
goto out;
}
if (statbuf.st_mtime == monitor->database_mtime)
{
ret = TRUE;
goto out;
}
}
ret = reload_database (monitor, error);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZSTD_compressSequences_internal(seqStore_t* seqStorePtr,
ZSTD_entropyCTables_t const* prevEntropy,
ZSTD_entropyCTables_t* nextEntropy,
ZSTD_CCtx_params const* cctxParams,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
void* workspace, size_t wkspSize,
const int bmi2)
{
const int longOffsets = cctxParams->cParams.windowLog > STREAM_ACCUMULATOR_MIN;
ZSTD_strategy const strategy = cctxParams->cParams.strategy;
U32 count[MaxSeq+1];
FSE_CTable* CTable_LitLength = nextEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable;
FSE_CTable* CTable_OffsetBits = nextEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable;
FSE_CTable* CTable_MatchLength = nextEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable;
U32 LLtype, Offtype, MLtype; /* compressed, raw or rle */
const seqDef* const sequences = seqStorePtr->sequencesStart;
const BYTE* const ofCodeTable = seqStorePtr->ofCode;
const BYTE* const llCodeTable = seqStorePtr->llCode;
const BYTE* const mlCodeTable = seqStorePtr->mlCode;
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE*)dst;
BYTE* const oend = ostart + dstCapacity;
BYTE* op = ostart;
size_t const nbSeq = seqStorePtr->sequences - seqStorePtr->sequencesStart;
BYTE* seqHead;
BYTE* lastNCount = NULL;
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE >= (1<<MAX(MLFSELog,LLFSELog)));
/* Compress literals */
{ const BYTE* const literals = seqStorePtr->litStart;
size_t const litSize = seqStorePtr->lit - literals;
int const disableLiteralCompression = (cctxParams->cParams.strategy == ZSTD_fast) && (cctxParams->cParams.targetLength > 0);
size_t const cSize = ZSTD_compressLiterals(
&prevEntropy->huf, &nextEntropy->huf,
cctxParams->cParams.strategy, disableLiteralCompression,
op, dstCapacity,
literals, litSize,
workspace, wkspSize,
bmi2);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize))
return cSize;
assert(cSize <= dstCapacity);
op += cSize;
}
/* Sequences Header */
if ((oend-op) < 3 /*max nbSeq Size*/ + 1 /*seqHead*/) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
if (nbSeq < 0x7F)
*op++ = (BYTE)nbSeq;
else if (nbSeq < LONGNBSEQ)
op[0] = (BYTE)((nbSeq>>8) + 0x80), op[1] = (BYTE)nbSeq, op+=2;
else
op[0]=0xFF, MEM_writeLE16(op+1, (U16)(nbSeq - LONGNBSEQ)), op+=3;
if (nbSeq==0) {
/* Copy the old tables over as if we repeated them */
memcpy(&nextEntropy->fse, &prevEntropy->fse, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse));
return op - ostart;
}
/* seqHead : flags for FSE encoding type */
seqHead = op++;
/* convert length/distances into codes */
ZSTD_seqToCodes(seqStorePtr);
/* build CTable for Literal Lengths */
{ U32 max = MaxLL;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, llCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building LL table");
nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode;
LLtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, LLFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable, LL_defaultNorm, LL_defaultNormLog, ZSTD_defaultAllowed, strategy);
assert(set_basic < set_compressed && set_rle < set_compressed);
assert(!(LLtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.litlength_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_LitLength, LLFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)LLtype,
count, max, llCodeTable, nbSeq, LL_defaultNorm, LL_defaultNormLog, MaxLL,
prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.litlengthCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (LLtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
/* build CTable for Offsets */
{ U32 max = MaxOff;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, ofCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
/* We can only use the basic table if max <= DefaultMaxOff, otherwise the offsets are too large */
ZSTD_defaultPolicy_e const defaultPolicy = (max <= DefaultMaxOff) ? ZSTD_defaultAllowed : ZSTD_defaultDisallowed;
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building OF table");
nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode;
Offtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, OffFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable, OF_defaultNorm, OF_defaultNormLog, defaultPolicy, strategy);
assert(!(Offtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.offcode_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_OffsetBits, OffFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)Offtype,
count, max, ofCodeTable, nbSeq, OF_defaultNorm, OF_defaultNormLog, DefaultMaxOff,
prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.offcodeCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (Offtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
/* build CTable for MatchLengths */
{ U32 max = MaxML;
size_t const mostFrequent = HIST_countFast_wksp(count, &max, mlCodeTable, nbSeq, workspace, wkspSize); /* can't fail */
DEBUGLOG(5, "Building ML table");
nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode = prevEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode;
MLtype = ZSTD_selectEncodingType(&nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode, count, max, mostFrequent, nbSeq, MLFSELog, prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable, ML_defaultNorm, ML_defaultNormLog, ZSTD_defaultAllowed, strategy);
assert(!(MLtype < set_compressed && nextEntropy->fse.matchlength_repeatMode != FSE_repeat_none)); /* We don't copy tables */
{ size_t const countSize = ZSTD_buildCTable(op, oend - op, CTable_MatchLength, MLFSELog, (symbolEncodingType_e)MLtype,
count, max, mlCodeTable, nbSeq, ML_defaultNorm, ML_defaultNormLog, MaxML,
prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable, sizeof(prevEntropy->fse.matchlengthCTable),
workspace, wkspSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(countSize)) return countSize;
if (MLtype == set_compressed)
lastNCount = op;
op += countSize;
} }
*seqHead = (BYTE)((LLtype<<6) + (Offtype<<4) + (MLtype<<2));
{ size_t const bitstreamSize = ZSTD_encodeSequences(
op, oend - op,
CTable_MatchLength, mlCodeTable,
CTable_OffsetBits, ofCodeTable,
CTable_LitLength, llCodeTable,
sequences, nbSeq,
longOffsets, bmi2);
if (ZSTD_isError(bitstreamSize)) return bitstreamSize;
op += bitstreamSize;
/* zstd versions <= 1.3.4 mistakenly report corruption when
* FSE_readNCount() recieves a buffer < 4 bytes.
* Fixed by https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1146.
* This can happen when the last set_compressed table present is 2
* bytes and the bitstream is only one byte.
* In this exceedingly rare case, we will simply emit an uncompressed
* block, since it isn't worth optimizing.
*/
if (lastNCount && (op - lastNCount) < 4) {
/* NCountSize >= 2 && bitstreamSize > 0 ==> lastCountSize == 3 */
assert(op - lastNCount == 3);
DEBUGLOG(5, "Avoiding bug in zstd decoder in versions <= 1.3.4 by "
"emitting an uncompressed block.");
return 0;
}
}
return op - ostart;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 3,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_fill_rule_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int event,
u32 flags, int family,
const struct nft_table *table,
const struct nft_chain *chain,
const struct nft_rule *rule)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg;
const struct nft_expr *expr, *next;
struct nlattr *list;
const struct nft_rule *prule;
int type = event | NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, type, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg),
flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
nfmsg->nfgen_family = family;
nfmsg->version = NFNETLINK_V0;
nfmsg->res_id = htons(net->nft.base_seq & 0xffff);
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_RULE_TABLE, table->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_RULE_CHAIN, chain->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_RULE_HANDLE, cpu_to_be64(rule->handle)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if ((event != NFT_MSG_DELRULE) && (rule->list.prev != &chain->rules)) {
prule = list_entry(rule->list.prev, struct nft_rule, list);
if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_RULE_POSITION,
cpu_to_be64(prule->handle)))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
list = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_RULE_EXPRESSIONS);
if (list == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nft_rule_for_each_expr(expr, next, rule) {
struct nlattr *elem = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_LIST_ELEM);
if (elem == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nf_tables_fill_expr_info(skb, expr) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, elem);
}
nla_nest_end(skb, list);
if (rule->ulen &&
nla_put(skb, NFTA_RULE_USERDATA, rule->ulen, nft_userdata(rule)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_trim(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 29,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~HttpNetworkTransactionTest() {
ClientSocketPoolManager::set_max_sockets_per_pool(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL, old_max_pool_sockets_);
ClientSocketPoolManager::set_max_sockets_per_group(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL, old_max_group_sockets_);
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 4,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int put_compat_itimerval(struct compat_itimerval __user *o, const struct itimerval *i)
{
struct compat_itimerval v32;
v32.it_interval.tv_sec = i->it_interval.tv_sec;
v32.it_interval.tv_usec = i->it_interval.tv_usec;
v32.it_value.tv_sec = i->it_value.tv_sec;
v32.it_value.tv_usec = i->it_value.tv_usec;
return copy_to_user(o, &v32, sizeof(struct compat_itimerval)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 28,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_fd (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, int fd, int flag_read,
int flag_write, int flag_exception,
t_hook_callback_fd *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_fd *new_hook_fd;
if ((fd < 0) || hook_search_fd (fd) || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_fd = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_fd));
if (!new_hook_fd)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_FD, HOOK_PRIORITY_DEFAULT,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_fd;
new_hook_fd->callback = callback;
new_hook_fd->fd = fd;
new_hook_fd->flags = 0;
new_hook_fd->error = 0;
if (flag_read)
new_hook_fd->flags |= HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ;
if (flag_write)
new_hook_fd->flags |= HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE;
if (flag_exception)
new_hook_fd->flags |= HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION;
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator(WebPage* webPage)
: LayerTreeHost(webPage)
, m_notifyAfterScheduledLayerFlush(false)
, m_isValid(true)
, m_waitingForUIProcess(true)
, m_isSuspended(false)
, m_contentsScale(1)
, m_shouldSendScrollPositionUpdate(true)
, m_shouldSyncFrame(false)
, m_shouldSyncRootLayer(true)
, m_layerFlushTimer(this, &LayerTreeCoordinator::layerFlushTimerFired)
, m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled(true)
, m_forceRepaintAsyncCallbackID(0)
{
m_rootLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
CoordinatedGraphicsLayer* webRootLayer = toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get());
webRootLayer->setRootLayer(true);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_rootLayer->setName("LayerTreeCoordinator root layer");
#endif
m_rootLayer->setDrawsContent(false);
m_rootLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_layerTreeContext.webLayerID = toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(webRootLayer)->id();
m_nonCompositedContentLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get())->setCoordinatedGraphicsLayerClient(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setName("LayerTreeCoordinator non-composited content");
#endif
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setDrawsContent(true);
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_rootLayer->addChild(m_nonCompositedContentLayer.get());
if (m_webPage->hasPageOverlay())
createPageOverlayLayer();
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 23,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: group_remove_rule(struct ofgroup *group, struct rule *rule)
{
rule_collection_remove(&group->rules, rule);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 10,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sc_card_driver * sc_get_driver(void)
{
if (iso_ops == NULL)
iso_ops = sc_get_iso7816_driver()->ops;
asepcos_ops = *iso_ops;
asepcos_ops.match_card = asepcos_match_card;
asepcos_ops.init = asepcos_init;
asepcos_ops.select_file = asepcos_select_file;
asepcos_ops.set_security_env = asepcos_set_security_env;
asepcos_ops.decipher = asepcos_decipher;
asepcos_ops.compute_signature = asepcos_compute_signature;
asepcos_ops.create_file = asepcos_create_file;
asepcos_ops.delete_file = asepcos_delete_file;
asepcos_ops.list_files = asepcos_list_files;
asepcos_ops.card_ctl = asepcos_card_ctl;
asepcos_ops.pin_cmd = asepcos_pin_cmd;
asepcos_ops.card_reader_lock_obtained = asepcos_card_reader_lock_obtained;
return &asepcos_drv;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Con_ClearNotify( void ) {
int i;
for ( i = 0 ; i < NUM_CON_TIMES ; i++ ) {
con.times[i] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 26,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void extent_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int rc)
{
struct extent_crypt_result *ecr = req->data;
if (rc == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
ecr->rc = rc;
complete(&ecr->completion);
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sm_adaptive_routing(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
uint32_t enable=0;
if (argc == 1) {
enable = atol(argv[0]);
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_SET_ADAPTIVE_ROUTING, mgr, sizeof(enable), (void*)&enable, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_adaptive_routing: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent SM Adaptive Routing control to local SM instance\n");
}
} else if (argc == 0) {
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_GET_ADAPTIVE_ROUTING, mgr, sizeof(enable), (void*)&enable, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_adaptive_routing: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("SM Adaptive Routing is %s\n", enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 25,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcXFixesChangeCursorByName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pSource;
Atom name;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesChangeCursorByNameReq);
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesChangeCursorByNameReq, stuff->nbytes);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pSource, stuff->source, client,
DixReadAccess | DixGetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
name = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, FALSE);
if (name)
ReplaceCursor(pSource, TestForCursorName, &name);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::IsPrintingEnabled() {
bool result = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_IsPrintingEnabled(routing_id(), &result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniformMatrix3fv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
api()->glUniformMatrix3fvFn(location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnVideoMemoryUsageStatsReceived(
const GPUVideoMemoryUsageStats& video_memory_usage_stats) {
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateVideoMemoryUsageStats(
video_memory_usage_stats);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ffs_epfile_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ffs_epfile *epfile = inode->i_private;
ENTER();
if (WARN_ON(epfile->ffs->state != FFS_ACTIVE))
return -ENODEV;
file->private_data = epfile;
ffs_data_opened(epfile->ffs);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 17,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::SetFirstPartyCookieAndRequestorOrigin(
ResourceRequest& out_request) {
if (out_request.SiteForCookies().IsNull())
out_request.SetSiteForCookies(GetSiteForCookies());
if (!out_request.RequestorOrigin())
out_request.SetRequestorOrigin(GetSecurityOrigin());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init blk_scsi_ioctl_init(void)
{
blk_set_cmd_filter_defaults(&blk_default_cmd_filter);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void js_rot3pop2(js_State *J)
{
/* A B C -> C */
STACK[TOP-3] = STACK[TOP-1];
TOP -= 2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_info_linux_md_component (Device *device)
{
if (g_strcmp0 (device->priv->id_type, "linux_raid_member") == 0)
{
const gchar *md_comp_level;
gint md_comp_num_raid_devices;
const gchar *md_comp_uuid;
const gchar *md_comp_home_host;
const gchar *md_comp_name;
const gchar *md_comp_version;
gchar *md_name;
gchar *s;
int md_comp_position;
md_comp_position = -1;
device_set_device_is_linux_md_component (device, TRUE);
/* linux_md_component_holder and linux_md_component_state */
if (device->priv->holders_objpath->len == 1)
{
Device *holder;
gchar **state_tokens;
device_set_linux_md_component_holder (device, device->priv->holders_objpath->pdata[0]);
state_tokens = NULL;
holder = daemon_local_find_by_object_path (device->priv->daemon, device->priv->holders_objpath->pdata[0]);
if (holder != NULL && holder->priv->device_is_linux_md)
{
gchar *dev_name;
gchar *md_dev_path;
gchar *state_contents;
gchar *slot_contents;
gint slot_number;
gchar *endp;
dev_name = g_path_get_basename (device->priv->native_path);
md_dev_path = g_strdup_printf ("%s/md/dev-%s", holder->priv->native_path, dev_name);
state_contents = sysfs_get_string (md_dev_path, "state");
g_strstrip (state_contents);
state_tokens = g_strsplit (state_contents, ",", 0);
slot_contents = sysfs_get_string (md_dev_path, "slot");
g_strstrip (slot_contents);
slot_number = strtol (slot_contents, &endp, 0);
if (endp != NULL && *endp == '\0')
{
md_comp_position = slot_number;
}
g_free (slot_contents);
g_free (state_contents);
g_free (md_dev_path);
g_free (dev_name);
}
device_set_linux_md_component_state (device, state_tokens);
g_strfreev (state_tokens);
}
else
{
/* no holder, nullify properties */
device_set_linux_md_component_holder (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_state (device, NULL);
}
md_comp_level = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "MD_LEVEL");
md_comp_num_raid_devices = g_udev_device_get_property_as_int (device->priv->d, "MD_DEVICES");
md_comp_uuid = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "MD_UUID");
md_name = g_strdup (g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "MD_NAME"));
s = NULL;
if (md_name != NULL)
s = strstr (md_name, ":");
if (s != NULL)
{
*s = '\0';
md_comp_home_host = md_name;
md_comp_name = s + 1;
}
else
{
md_comp_home_host = "";
md_comp_name = md_name;
}
md_comp_version = device->priv->id_version;
device_set_linux_md_component_level (device, md_comp_level);
device_set_linux_md_component_position (device, md_comp_position);
device_set_linux_md_component_num_raid_devices (device, md_comp_num_raid_devices);
device_set_linux_md_component_uuid (device, md_comp_uuid);
device_set_linux_md_component_home_host (device, md_comp_home_host);
device_set_linux_md_component_name (device, md_comp_name);
device_set_linux_md_component_version (device, md_comp_version);
g_free (md_name);
}
else
{
device_set_device_is_linux_md_component (device, FALSE);
device_set_linux_md_component_level (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_position (device, -1);
device_set_linux_md_component_num_raid_devices (device, 0);
device_set_linux_md_component_uuid (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_home_host (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_name (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_version (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_holder (device, NULL);
device_set_linux_md_component_state (device, NULL);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 min_vruntime(u64 min_vruntime, u64 vruntime)
{
s64 delta = (s64)(vruntime - min_vruntime);
if (delta < 0)
min_vruntime = vruntime;
return min_vruntime;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 24,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BarProp* LocalDOMWindow::locationbar() const {
if (!locationbar_)
locationbar_ = BarProp::Create(GetFrame(), BarProp::kLocationbar);
return locationbar_.Get();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: undefinedCharacter(widechar c, const TranslationTableHeader *table, int pos,
const InString *input, OutString *output, int *posMapping, int *cursorPosition,
int *cursorStatus) {
/* Display an undefined character in the output buffer */
int k;
char *display;
widechar displayDots[20];
if (table->undefined) {
TranslationTableRule *rule =
(TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[table->undefined];
if (!for_updatePositions(&rule->charsdots[rule->charslen], rule->charslen,
rule->dotslen, 0, pos, input, output, posMapping, cursorPosition,
cursorStatus))
return 0;
return 1;
}
display = _lou_showString(&c, 1);
for (k = 0; k < (int)strlen(display); k++)
displayDots[k] = _lou_getDotsForChar(display[k]);
if (!for_updatePositions(displayDots, 1, (int)strlen(display), 0, pos, input, output,
posMapping, cursorPosition, cursorStatus))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int floadAlice(void *clientData, uint8_t **output, uint32_t *size, zrtpFreeBuffer_callback *cb) {
/* get filename from ClientData */
my_Context_t *clientContext = (my_Context_t *)clientData;
char *filename = clientContext->zidFilename;
FILE *ALICECACHE = fopen(filename, "r+");
fseek(ALICECACHE, 0L, SEEK_END); /* Position to end of file */
*size = ftell(ALICECACHE); /* Get file length */
rewind(ALICECACHE); /* Back to start of file */
*output = (uint8_t *)malloc(*size*sizeof(uint8_t)+1);
if (fread(*output, 1, *size, ALICECACHE)==0){
fprintf(stderr,"floadAlice() fread() error\n");
}
*(*output+*size) = '\0';
*size += 1;
fclose(ALICECACHE);
*cb=freeBuf;
return *size;
}
Commit Message: Add ZRTP Commit packet hvi check on DHPart2 packet reception
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 14,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ResetOverrideEncoding() {
canonical_encoding_.clear();
Send(new ViewMsg_ResetPageEncodingToDefault(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JArithmeticDecoderStats *getRefinementRegionStats()
{ return refinementRegionStats; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 16,566 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnBeforeUnload() {
CHECK(!frame_->parent());
base::TimeTicks before_unload_start_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
bool proceed = frame_->dispatchBeforeUnloadEvent();
base::TimeTicks before_unload_end_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
Send(new FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK(routing_id_, proceed,
before_unload_start_time,
before_unload_end_time));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool quit_called() const { return quit_called_; }
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 5,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t port_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
size_t count, loff_t *offp)
{
struct port *port;
ssize_t ret;
port = filp->private_data;
/* Port is hot-unplugged. */
if (!port->guest_connected)
return -ENODEV;
if (!port_has_data(port)) {
/*
* If nothing's connected on the host just return 0 in
* case of list_empty; this tells the userspace app
* that there's no connection
*/
if (!port->host_connected)
return 0;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
ret = wait_event_freezable(port->waitqueue,
!will_read_block(port));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
/* Port got hot-unplugged while we were waiting above. */
if (!port->guest_connected)
return -ENODEV;
/*
* We could've received a disconnection message while we were
* waiting for more data.
*
* This check is not clubbed in the if() statement above as we
* might receive some data as well as the host could get
* disconnected after we got woken up from our wait. So we
* really want to give off whatever data we have and only then
* check for host_connected.
*/
if (!port_has_data(port) && !port->host_connected)
return 0;
return fill_readbuf(port, ubuf, count, true);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int LocalDOMWindow::outerWidth() const {
if (!GetFrame())
return 0;
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return 0;
ChromeClient& chrome_client = page->GetChromeClient();
if (page->GetSettings().GetReportScreenSizeInPhysicalPixelsQuirk())
return lroundf(chrome_client.RootWindowRect().Width() *
chrome_client.GetScreenInfo().device_scale_factor);
return chrome_client.RootWindowRect().Width();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp)
{
*(void **)(object + s->offset) = fp;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 3,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::copyTexSubImage3D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexture3DBinding("copyTexSubImage3D", target))
return;
WebGLFramebuffer* read_framebuffer_binding = nullptr;
if (!ValidateReadBufferAndGetInfo("copyTexSubImage3D",
read_framebuffer_binding))
return;
ClearIfComposited();
ScopedDrawingBufferBinder binder(GetDrawingBuffer(),
read_framebuffer_binding);
ContextGL()->CopyTexSubImage3D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, x, y,
width, height);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
unsigned long n, nc, l;
unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *p, *q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
/*
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
* wont be doing client auth.
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num = *(p++);
if (s->cert->ctypes) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
}
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
p += p[-1];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
n2s(p, llen);
/*
* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
* length value.
*/
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += llen;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p, llen);
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2s(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q = p;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += l;
nc += l + 2;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
if (ca_sk != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 20,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_info_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->get_info_in_progress != NULL)
{
g_cancellable_cancel (directory->details->get_info_in_progress->cancellable);
directory->details->get_info_in_progress->directory = NULL;
directory->details->get_info_in_progress = NULL;
directory->details->get_info_file = NULL;
async_job_end (directory, "file info");
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabletModeWindowManager::OnDisplayRemoved(
const display::Display& display) {
DisplayConfigurationChanged();
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void iw_set_intermed_channeltypes(struct iw_context *ctx)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<ctx->intermed_numchannels;i++) {
ctx->intermed_ci[i].channeltype = iw_get_channeltype(ctx->intermed_imgtype,i);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 29,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnRAILModeChanged(v8::RAILMode rail_mode) {
blink::MainThreadIsolate()->SetRAILMode(rail_mode);
blink::SetRAILModeOnWorkerThreadIsolates(rail_mode);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 13,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_flush_file(struct smb_request *sr, struct smb_ofile *ofile)
{
sr->user_cr = smb_ofile_getcred(ofile);
if ((ofile->f_node->flags & NODE_FLAGS_WRITE_THROUGH) == 0)
(void) smb_fsop_commit(sr, sr->user_cr, ofile->f_node);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 19,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_overright(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPge(box1->low.x, box2->low.x));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
if (size > 512)
return 0;
net::ProxyBypassRules rules;
std::string input(data, data + size);
rules.ParseFromString(input);
rules.ParseFromStringUsingSuffixMatching(input);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 17,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WavpackUpdateNumSamples (WavpackContext *wpc, void *first_block)
{
uint32_t wrapper_size;
WavpackLittleEndianToNative (first_block, WavpackHeaderFormat);
SET_TOTAL_SAMPLES (* (WavpackHeader *) first_block, WavpackGetSampleIndex64 (wpc));
if (wpc->riff_header_created && WavpackGetWrapperLocation (first_block, &wrapper_size)) {
unsigned char riff_header [128];
if (wrapper_size == create_riff_header (wpc, WavpackGetSampleIndex64 (wpc), riff_header))
memcpy (WavpackGetWrapperLocation (first_block, NULL), riff_header, wrapper_size);
}
block_update_checksum (first_block);
WavpackNativeToLittleEndian (first_block, WavpackHeaderFormat);
}
Commit Message: issue #53: error out on zero sample rate
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 20,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_current_key(zend_object_iterator *iter, zval *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
ZVAL_LONG(key, object->u.dir.index);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 13,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::setScrollLeft(int newLeft)
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (RenderBox* rend = renderBox())
rend->setScrollLeft(static_cast<int>(newLeft * rend->style()->effectiveZoom()));
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OobeUI::ShowSigninScreen(const LoginScreenContext& context,
SigninScreenHandlerDelegate* delegate,
NativeWindowDelegate* native_window_delegate) {
policy::BrowserPolicyConnectorChromeOS* connector =
g_browser_process->platform_part()->browser_policy_connector_chromeos();
if (connector->GetDeviceMode() == policy::DEVICE_MODE_LEGACY_RETAIL_MODE) {
LoginDisplayHost* host = LoginDisplayHostImpl::default_host();
host->StartDemoAppLaunch();
return;
}
signin_screen_handler_->SetDelegate(delegate);
signin_screen_handler_->SetNativeWindowDelegate(native_window_delegate);
LoginScreenContext actual_context(context);
actual_context.set_oobe_ui(core_handler_->show_oobe_ui());
signin_screen_handler_->Show(actual_context);
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void esp_do_dma(ESPState *s)
{
uint32_t len;
int to_device;
to_device = (s->ti_size < 0);
len = s->dma_left;
if (s->do_cmd) {
trace_esp_do_dma(s->cmdlen, len);
s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, &s->cmdbuf[s->cmdlen], len);
s->ti_size = 0;
s->cmdlen = 0;
s->do_cmd = 0;
do_cmd(s, s->cmdbuf);
return;
}
if (s->async_len == 0) {
/* Defer until data is available. */
return;
}
if (len > s->async_len) {
len = s->async_len;
}
if (to_device) {
s->dma_memory_read(s->dma_opaque, s->async_buf, len);
} else {
s->dma_memory_write(s->dma_opaque, s->async_buf, len);
}
s->dma_left -= len;
s->async_buf += len;
s->async_len -= len;
if (to_device)
s->ti_size += len;
else
s->ti_size -= len;
if (s->async_len == 0) {
scsi_req_continue(s->current_req);
/* If there is still data to be read from the device then
complete the DMA operation immediately. Otherwise defer
until the scsi layer has completed. */
if (to_device || s->dma_left != 0 || s->ti_size == 0) {
return;
}
}
/* Partially filled a scsi buffer. Complete immediately. */
esp_dma_done(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool ASCIIHexStream::isBinary(GBool last) {
return str->isBinary(gFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DateTimeFieldElement::isDateTimeFieldElement() const
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_RSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(phar) /* {{{ */
{
int i;
PHAR_G(request_ends) = 1;
if (PHAR_G(request_init))
{
phar_release_functions();
zend_hash_destroy(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)));
PHAR_G(phar_alias_map.u.flags) = 0;
zend_hash_destroy(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)));
PHAR_G(phar_fname_map.u.flags) = 0;
zend_hash_destroy(&(PHAR_G(phar_persist_map)));
PHAR_G(phar_persist_map.u.flags) = 0;
PHAR_G(phar_SERVER_mung_list) = 0;
if (PHAR_G(cached_fp)) {
for (i = 0; i < zend_hash_num_elements(&cached_phars); ++i) {
if (PHAR_G(cached_fp)[i].fp) {
php_stream_close(PHAR_G(cached_fp)[i].fp);
}
if (PHAR_G(cached_fp)[i].ufp) {
php_stream_close(PHAR_G(cached_fp)[i].ufp);
}
efree(PHAR_G(cached_fp)[i].manifest);
}
efree(PHAR_G(cached_fp));
PHAR_G(cached_fp) = 0;
}
PHAR_G(request_init) = 0;
if (PHAR_G(cwd)) {
efree(PHAR_G(cwd));
}
PHAR_G(cwd) = NULL;
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = 0;
PHAR_G(cwd_init) = 0;
}
PHAR_G(request_done) = 1;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_do_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nfs4_createdata *data)
{
int status = rpc_call_sync(NFS_CLIENT(dir), &data->msg, 0);
if (status == 0) {
update_changeattr(dir, &data->res.dir_cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(dir, data->res.dir_fattr);
status = nfs_instantiate(dentry, data->res.fh, data->res.fattr);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void menu_cache_file_dir_unref(MenuCacheFileDir *file_dir)
{
if (file_dir && g_atomic_int_dec_and_test(&file_dir->n_ref))
{
g_free(file_dir->dir);
g_free(file_dir);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 6,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMX::freeNode(node_id node) {
OMXNodeInstance *instance = findInstance(node);
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t index = mLiveNodes.indexOfKey(IInterface::asBinder(instance->observer()));
if (index < 0) {
return OK;
}
mLiveNodes.removeItemsAt(index);
}
IInterface::asBinder(instance->observer())->unlinkToDeath(this);
status_t err = instance->freeNode(mMaster);
{
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
ssize_t index = mDispatchers.indexOfKey(node);
CHECK(index >= 0);
mDispatchers.removeItemsAt(index);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstallPrompt::ShowConfirmation() {
scoped_ptr<const PermissionSet> permissions_wrapper;
const PermissionSet* permissions_to_display = nullptr;
if (custom_permissions_.get()) {
permissions_to_display = custom_permissions_.get();
} else if (extension_) {
extensions::PermissionsUpdater(
profile_, extensions::PermissionsUpdater::INIT_FLAG_TRANSIENT)
.InitializePermissions(extension_);
permissions_to_display =
&extension_->permissions_data()->active_permissions();
if (prompt_->type() == DELEGATED_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT ||
prompt_->type() == DELEGATED_BUNDLE_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT) {
const PermissionSet& optional_permissions =
extensions::PermissionsParser::GetOptionalPermissions(extension_);
permissions_wrapper = PermissionSet::CreateUnion(*permissions_to_display,
optional_permissions);
permissions_to_display = permissions_wrapper.get();
}
}
if (permissions_to_display &&
(!extension_ ||
!extensions::PermissionsData::ShouldSkipPermissionWarnings(
extension_->id()))) {
Manifest::Type type =
extension_ ? extension_->GetType() : Manifest::TYPE_UNKNOWN;
const extensions::PermissionMessageProvider* message_provider =
extensions::PermissionMessageProvider::Get();
prompt_->SetPermissions(message_provider->GetPermissionMessages(
message_provider->GetAllPermissionIDs(
*permissions_to_display, type)),
REGULAR_PERMISSIONS);
const PermissionSet* withheld =
extension_ ? &extension_->permissions_data()->withheld_permissions()
: nullptr;
if (withheld && !withheld->IsEmpty()) {
prompt_->SetPermissions(
message_provider->GetPermissionMessages(
message_provider->GetAllPermissionIDs(*withheld, type)),
WITHHELD_PERMISSIONS);
}
}
switch (prompt_->type()) {
case PERMISSIONS_PROMPT:
case RE_ENABLE_PROMPT:
case INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT:
case EXTERNAL_INSTALL_PROMPT:
case INSTALL_PROMPT:
case POST_INSTALL_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT:
case REMOTE_INSTALL_PROMPT:
case REPAIR_PROMPT:
case DELEGATED_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT: {
prompt_->set_extension(extension_);
break;
}
case BUNDLE_INSTALL_PROMPT:
case DELEGATED_BUNDLE_PERMISSIONS_PROMPT: {
prompt_->set_bundle(bundle_);
break;
}
case LAUNCH_PROMPT_DEPRECATED:
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unknown message";
return;
}
prompt_->set_delegated_username(delegated_username_);
prompt_->set_icon(gfx::Image::CreateFrom1xBitmap(icon_));
g_last_prompt_type_for_tests = prompt_->type();
if (AutoConfirmPrompt(delegate_))
return;
if (show_params_->WasParentDestroyed()) {
delegate_->InstallUIAbort(false);
return;
}
if (show_dialog_callback_.is_null())
GetDefaultShowDialogCallback().Run(show_params_.get(), delegate_, prompt_);
else
show_dialog_callback_.Run(show_params_.get(), delegate_, prompt_);
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 25,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileBrowserPrivateRequestAccessTokenFunction::RunAsync() {
using extensions::api::file_browser_private::RequestAccessToken::Params;
const scoped_ptr<Params> params(Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
drive::DriveServiceInterface* const drive_service =
drive::util::GetDriveServiceByProfile(GetProfile());
if (!drive_service) {
SetResult(new base::StringValue(""));
SendResponse(true);
return true;
}
if (params->refresh)
drive_service->ClearAccessToken();
drive_service->RequestAccessToken(
base::Bind(&FileBrowserPrivateRequestAccessTokenFunction::
OnAccessTokenFetched, this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::repaintTreeAfterLayout()
{
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled());
ASSERT(!needsLayout());
const LayoutRect oldRepaintRect = previousRepaintRect();
setPreviousRepaintRect(clippedOverflowRectForRepaint(containerForRepaint()));
if (view()->doingFullRepaint() && this != view()) {
LayoutStateMaintainer statePusher(*this, isTableRow() ? LayoutSize() : locationOffset());
RenderObject::repaintTreeAfterLayout();
return;
}
if ((onlyNeededPositionedMovementLayout() && compositingState() != PaintsIntoOwnBacking)
|| (shouldDoFullRepaintIfSelfPaintingLayer()
&& hasLayer()
&& layer()->isSelfPaintingLayer())) {
setShouldDoFullRepaintAfterLayout(true);
}
const LayoutRect newRepaintRect = previousRepaintRect();
bool didFullRepaint = repaintAfterLayoutIfNeeded(containerForRepaint(),
shouldDoFullRepaintAfterLayout(), oldRepaintRect, &newRepaintRect);
if (!didFullRepaint)
repaintOverflowIfNeeded();
if (enclosingLayer()) {
if (RenderLayerScrollableArea* area = enclosingLayer()->scrollableArea()) {
if (area->hasVerticalBarDamage())
repaintRectangle(area->verticalBarDamage());
if (area->hasHorizontalBarDamage())
repaintRectangle(area->horizontalBarDamage());
area->resetScrollbarDamage();
}
}
LayoutStateMaintainer statePusher(*this, isTableRow() ? LayoutSize() : locationOffset());
RenderObject::repaintTreeAfterLayout();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDeleteShader(GLuint shader) {
return DeleteHelper(
shader, &resources_->shader_id_map,
[this](GLuint shader) { api()->glDeleteShaderFn(shader); });
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 23,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::registerIntentService(
WebFrame* frame, const WebIntentServiceInfo& service) {
string16 title = service.title();
if (title.empty())
title = webview()->mainFrame()->document().title();
Send(new IntentsHostMsg_RegisterIntentService(routing_id_,
service.action(),
service.type(),
service.url().spec().utf16(),
title,
service.disposition()));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
AHCIState *s = opaque;
/* Only aligned reads are allowed on AHCI */
if (addr & 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "ahci: Mis-aligned write to addr 0x"
TARGET_FMT_plx "\n", addr);
return;
}
if (addr < AHCI_GENERIC_HOST_CONTROL_REGS_MAX_ADDR) {
DPRINTF(-1, "(addr 0x%08X), val 0x%08"PRIX64"\n", (unsigned) addr, val);
switch (addr) {
case HOST_CAP: /* R/WO, RO */
/* FIXME handle R/WO */
break;
case HOST_CTL: /* R/W */
if (val & HOST_CTL_RESET) {
DPRINTF(-1, "HBA Reset\n");
ahci_reset(s);
} else {
s->control_regs.ghc = (val & 0x3) | HOST_CTL_AHCI_EN;
ahci_check_irq(s);
}
break;
case HOST_IRQ_STAT: /* R/WC, RO */
s->control_regs.irqstatus &= ~val;
ahci_check_irq(s);
break;
case HOST_PORTS_IMPL: /* R/WO, RO */
/* FIXME handle R/WO */
break;
case HOST_VERSION: /* RO */
/* FIXME report write? */
break;
default:
DPRINTF(-1, "write to unknown register 0x%x\n", (unsigned)addr);
}
} else if ((addr >= AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR) &&
(addr < (AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR +
(s->ports * AHCI_PORT_ADDR_OFFSET_LEN)))) {
ahci_port_write(s, (addr - AHCI_PORT_REGS_START_ADDR) >> 7,
addr & AHCI_PORT_ADDR_OFFSET_MASK, val);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, u32 mtu)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *) skb->data;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
struct dst_entry *odst = NULL;
bool new = false;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (!ip_sk_accept_pmtu(sk))
goto out;
odst = sk_dst_get(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk) || !odst) {
__ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, mtu);
goto out;
}
__build_flow_key(&fl4, sk, iph, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
rt = (struct rtable *)odst;
if (odst->obsolete && odst->ops->check(odst, 0) == NULL) {
rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out;
new = true;
}
__ip_rt_update_pmtu((struct rtable *) rt->dst.path, &fl4, mtu);
if (!dst_check(&rt->dst, 0)) {
if (new)
dst_release(&rt->dst);
rt = ip_route_output_flow(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto out;
new = true;
}
if (new)
sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->dst);
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
dst_release(odst);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 18,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int rv, pad;
rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
if (rv <= 0)
return rv;
pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->p) - rv;
if (pad > 0) {
memmove(key + pad, key, rv);
memset(key, 0, pad);
}
return rv + pad;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 26,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DetermineDownloadTarget(
DownloadItemImpl* item, const DownloadTargetCallback& callback) {
if (!delegate_ || !delegate_->DetermineDownloadTarget(item, callback)) {
base::FilePath target_path = item->GetForcedFilePath();
callback.Run(target_path, DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS, target_path,
DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE);
}
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static WebString GetValueWrapper(WebFormControlElement element) {
if (element.FormControlType() == "textarea")
return element.To<WebFormControlElement>().Value();
if (element.FormControlType() == "select-one")
return element.To<WebSelectElement>().Value();
return element.To<WebInputElement>().Value();
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gup_huge_pmd(pmd_t orig, pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (write && !pmd_write(orig))
return 0;
refs = 0;
head = pmd_page(orig);
page = head + ((addr & ~PMD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pmd_val(orig) != pmd_val(*pmdp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 4,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mac80211_hwsim_cancel_hw_scan(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *hwsim = hw->priv;
struct cfg80211_scan_info info = {
.aborted = true,
};
wiphy_dbg(hw->wiphy, "hwsim cancel_hw_scan\n");
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hwsim->hw_scan);
mutex_lock(&hwsim->mutex);
ieee80211_scan_completed(hwsim->hw, &info);
hwsim->tmp_chan = NULL;
hwsim->hw_scan_request = NULL;
hwsim->hw_scan_vif = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&hwsim->mutex);
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 21,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameworkListener::registerCmd(FrameworkCommand *cmd) {
mCommands->push_back(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Fix vold vulnerability in FrameworkListener
Modify FrameworkListener to ignore commands that exceed the maximum
buffer length and send an error message.
Bug: 29831647
Change-Id: I9e57d1648d55af2ca0191bb47868e375ecc26950
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit baa126dc158a40bc83c17c6d428c760e5b93fb1a)
(cherry picked from commit 470484d2a25ad432190a01d1c763b4b36db33c7e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 7,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent(int32_t result) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent (result=%"
NACL_PRId32")\n", result));
if (result < 0) {
return;
}
if (progress_events_.empty()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent: no pending events\n"));
return;
}
nacl::scoped_ptr<ProgressEvent> event(progress_events_.front());
progress_events_.pop();
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent ("
"event_type='%s', url='%s', length_computable=%d, "
"loaded=%"NACL_PRIu64", total=%"NACL_PRIu64")\n",
event->event_type(),
event->url(),
static_cast<int>(event->length_computable()),
event->loaded_bytes(),
event->total_bytes()));
static const char* kEventClosureJS =
"(function(target, type, url,"
" lengthComputable, loadedBytes, totalBytes) {"
" var progress_event = new ProgressEvent(type, {"
" bubbles: false,"
" cancelable: true,"
" lengthComputable: lengthComputable,"
" loaded: loadedBytes,"
" total: totalBytes"
" });"
" progress_event.url = url;"
" target.dispatchEvent(progress_event);"
"})";
pp::VarPrivate exception;
pp::VarPrivate function_object = ExecuteScript(kEventClosureJS, &exception);
if (!exception.is_undefined() || !function_object.is_object()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent:"
" Function object creation failed.\n"));
return;
}
pp::Var owner_element_object = GetOwnerElementObject();
if (!owner_element_object.is_object()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent:"
" Couldn't get owner element object.\n"));
NACL_NOTREACHED();
return;
}
pp::Var argv[6];
static const uint32_t argc = NACL_ARRAY_SIZE(argv);
argv[0] = owner_element_object;
argv[1] = pp::Var(event->event_type());
argv[2] = pp::Var(event->url());
argv[3] = pp::Var(event->length_computable() == LENGTH_IS_COMPUTABLE);
argv[4] = pp::Var(static_cast<double>(event->loaded_bytes()));
argv[5] = pp::Var(static_cast<double>(event->total_bytes()));
const pp::Var default_method;
function_object.Call(default_method, argc, argv, &exception);
if (!exception.is_undefined()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::DispatchProgressEvent:"
" event dispatch failed.\n"));
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void send_monitor_event(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct hlist_node *node;
BT_DBG("len %d", skb->len);
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, node, &hci_sk_list.head) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND)
continue;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
continue;
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 4,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_set_test_reporter_interval(struct iperf_test *ipt, double reporter_interval)
{
ipt->reporter_interval = reporter_interval;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
int i;
STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
/* CRLs can't be delta already */
if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
return NULL;
}
/* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
return NULL;
}
/* Issuer names must match */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
/* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
return NULL;
}
/* CRLs must verify */
if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
/* Create new CRL */
crl = X509_CRL_new();
if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
goto memerr;
/* Set issuer name */
if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
goto memerr;
/* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
goto memerr;
/*
* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
* number to correct value too.
*/
for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
goto memerr;
}
/* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
/*
* Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
* for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
*/
if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
if (!rvtmp)
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
goto memerr;
}
}
}
/* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
goto memerr;
return crl;
memerr:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::condor_job_hold(const char *schedd_name, PROC_ID job_id,
const char *reason)
{
static const char* command = "CONDOR_JOB_HOLD";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!schedd_name) schedd_name=NULLSTRING;
if (!reason) reason=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(schedd_name) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(reason) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d.%d %s", esc1, job_id.cluster, job_id.proc,
esc2);
free(esc1);
free(esc2);
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = 1;
if ( result->argv[1][0] == 'S' ) {
rc = 0;
}
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[2];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 29,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_do_background(png_row_infop row_info, png_bytep row,
png_color_16p trans_values, png_color_16p background
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
, png_color_16p background_1,
png_bytep gamma_table, png_bytep gamma_from_1, png_bytep gamma_to_1,
png_uint_16pp gamma_16, png_uint_16pp gamma_16_from_1,
png_uint_16pp gamma_16_to_1, int gamma_shift
#endif
)
{
png_bytep sp, dp;
png_uint_32 i;
png_uint_32 row_width=row_info->width;
int shift;
png_debug(1, "in png_do_background");
if (background != NULL &&
#ifdef PNG_USELESS_TESTS_SUPPORTED
row != NULL && row_info != NULL &&
#endif
(!(row_info->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) ||
(row_info->color_type != PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE && trans_values)))
{
switch (row_info->color_type)
{
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
{
switch (row_info->bit_depth)
{
case 1:
{
sp = row;
shift = 7;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if ((png_uint_16)((*sp >> shift) & 0x01)
== trans_values->gray)
{
*sp &= (png_byte)((0x7f7f >> (7 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(background->gray << shift);
}
if (!shift)
{
shift = 7;
sp++;
}
else
shift--;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_table != NULL)
{
sp = row;
shift = 6;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if ((png_uint_16)((*sp >> shift) & 0x03)
== trans_values->gray)
{
*sp &= (png_byte)((0x3f3f >> (6 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(background->gray << shift);
}
else
{
png_byte p = (png_byte)((*sp >> shift) & 0x03);
png_byte g = (png_byte)((gamma_table [p | (p << 2) |
(p << 4) | (p << 6)] >> 6) & 0x03);
*sp &= (png_byte)((0x3f3f >> (6 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(g << shift);
}
if (!shift)
{
shift = 6;
sp++;
}
else
shift -= 2;
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
shift = 6;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if ((png_uint_16)((*sp >> shift) & 0x03)
== trans_values->gray)
{
*sp &= (png_byte)((0x3f3f >> (6 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(background->gray << shift);
}
if (!shift)
{
shift = 6;
sp++;
}
else
shift -= 2;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_table != NULL)
{
sp = row;
shift = 4;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if ((png_uint_16)((*sp >> shift) & 0x0f)
== trans_values->gray)
{
*sp &= (png_byte)((0xf0f >> (4 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(background->gray << shift);
}
else
{
png_byte p = (png_byte)((*sp >> shift) & 0x0f);
png_byte g = (png_byte)((gamma_table[p |
(p << 4)] >> 4) & 0x0f);
*sp &= (png_byte)((0xf0f >> (4 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(g << shift);
}
if (!shift)
{
shift = 4;
sp++;
}
else
shift -= 4;
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
shift = 4;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++)
{
if ((png_uint_16)((*sp >> shift) & 0x0f)
== trans_values->gray)
{
*sp &= (png_byte)((0xf0f >> (4 - shift)) & 0xff);
*sp |= (png_byte)(background->gray << shift);
}
if (!shift)
{
shift = 4;
sp++;
}
else
shift -= 4;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_table != NULL)
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp++)
{
if (*sp == trans_values->gray)
{
*sp = (png_byte)background->gray;
}
else
{
*sp = gamma_table[*sp];
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp++)
{
if (*sp == trans_values->gray)
{
*sp = (png_byte)background->gray;
}
}
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_16 != NULL)
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 2)
{
png_uint_16 v;
v = (png_uint_16)(((*sp) << 8) + *(sp + 1));
if (v == trans_values->gray)
{
/* Background is already in screen gamma */
*sp = (png_byte)((background->gray >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->gray & 0xff);
}
else
{
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 1) >> gamma_shift][*sp];
*sp = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 2)
{
png_uint_16 v;
v = (png_uint_16)(((*sp) << 8) + *(sp + 1));
if (v == trans_values->gray)
{
*sp = (png_byte)((background->gray >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->gray & 0xff);
}
}
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_table != NULL)
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 3)
{
if (*sp == trans_values->red &&
*(sp + 1) == trans_values->green &&
*(sp + 2) == trans_values->blue)
{
*sp = (png_byte)background->red;
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)background->green;
*(sp + 2) = (png_byte)background->blue;
}
else
{
*sp = gamma_table[*sp];
*(sp + 1) = gamma_table[*(sp + 1)];
*(sp + 2) = gamma_table[*(sp + 2)];
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 3)
{
if (*sp == trans_values->red &&
*(sp + 1) == trans_values->green &&
*(sp + 2) == trans_values->blue)
{
*sp = (png_byte)background->red;
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)background->green;
*(sp + 2) = (png_byte)background->blue;
}
}
}
}
else /* if (row_info->bit_depth == 16) */
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_16 != NULL)
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 6)
{
png_uint_16 r = (png_uint_16)(((*sp) << 8) + *(sp + 1));
png_uint_16 g = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp+2)) << 8) + *(sp+3));
png_uint_16 b = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp+4)) << 8) + *(sp+5));
if (r == trans_values->red && g == trans_values->green &&
b == trans_values->blue)
{
/* Background is already in screen gamma */
*sp = (png_byte)((background->red >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->red & 0xff);
*(sp + 2) = (png_byte)((background->green >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 3) = (png_byte)(background->green & 0xff);
*(sp + 4) = (png_byte)((background->blue >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 5) = (png_byte)(background->blue & 0xff);
}
else
{
png_uint_16 v = gamma_16[*(sp + 1) >> gamma_shift][*sp];
*sp = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 3) >> gamma_shift][*(sp + 2)];
*(sp + 2) = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 3) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 5) >> gamma_shift][*(sp + 4)];
*(sp + 4) = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 5) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 6)
{
png_uint_16 r = (png_uint_16)(((*sp) << 8) + *(sp+1));
png_uint_16 g = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp+2)) << 8) + *(sp+3));
png_uint_16 b = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp+4)) << 8) + *(sp+5));
if (r == trans_values->red && g == trans_values->green &&
b == trans_values->blue)
{
*sp = (png_byte)((background->red >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->red & 0xff);
*(sp + 2) = (png_byte)((background->green >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 3) = (png_byte)(background->green & 0xff);
*(sp + 4) = (png_byte)((background->blue >> 8) & 0xff);
*(sp + 5) = (png_byte)(background->blue & 0xff);
}
}
}
}
break;
}
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_to_1 != NULL && gamma_from_1 != NULL &&
gamma_table != NULL)
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 2, dp++)
{
png_uint_16 a = *(sp + 1);
if (a == 0xff)
{
*dp = gamma_table[*sp];
}
else if (a == 0)
{
/* Background is already in screen gamma */
*dp = (png_byte)background->gray;
}
else
{
png_byte v, w;
v = gamma_to_1[*sp];
png_composite(w, v, a, background_1->gray);
*dp = gamma_from_1[w];
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 2, dp++)
{
png_byte a = *(sp + 1);
if (a == 0xff)
{
*dp = *sp;
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
else if (a == 0)
{
*dp = (png_byte)background->gray;
}
else
{
png_composite(*dp, *sp, a, background_1->gray);
}
#else
*dp = (png_byte)background->gray;
#endif
}
}
}
else /* if (png_ptr->bit_depth == 16) */
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_16 != NULL && gamma_16_from_1 != NULL &&
gamma_16_to_1 != NULL)
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 4, dp += 2)
{
png_uint_16 a = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp+2)) << 8) + *(sp+3));
if (a == (png_uint_16)0xffff)
{
png_uint_16 v;
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 1) >> gamma_shift][*sp];
*dp = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
else if (a == 0)
#else
else
#endif
{
/* Background is already in screen gamma */
*dp = (png_byte)((background->gray >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->gray & 0xff);
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
else
{
png_uint_16 g, v, w;
g = gamma_16_to_1[*(sp + 1) >> gamma_shift][*sp];
png_composite_16(v, g, a, background_1->gray);
w = gamma_16_from_1[(v&0xff) >> gamma_shift][v >> 8];
*dp = (png_byte)((w >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(w & 0xff);
}
#endif
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 4, dp += 2)
{
png_uint_16 a = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp+2)) << 8) + *(sp+3));
if (a == (png_uint_16)0xffff)
{
png_memcpy(dp, sp, 2);
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
else if (a == 0)
#else
else
#endif
{
*dp = (png_byte)((background->gray >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->gray & 0xff);
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
else
{
png_uint_16 g, v;
g = (png_uint_16)(((*sp) << 8) + *(sp + 1));
png_composite_16(v, g, a, background_1->gray);
*dp = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
}
#endif
}
}
}
break;
}
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
{
if (row_info->bit_depth == 8)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_to_1 != NULL && gamma_from_1 != NULL &&
gamma_table != NULL)
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 4, dp += 3)
{
png_byte a = *(sp + 3);
if (a == 0xff)
{
*dp = gamma_table[*sp];
*(dp + 1) = gamma_table[*(sp + 1)];
*(dp + 2) = gamma_table[*(sp + 2)];
}
else if (a == 0)
{
/* Background is already in screen gamma */
*dp = (png_byte)background->red;
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)background->green;
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)background->blue;
}
else
{
png_byte v, w;
v = gamma_to_1[*sp];
png_composite(w, v, a, background_1->red);
*dp = gamma_from_1[w];
v = gamma_to_1[*(sp + 1)];
png_composite(w, v, a, background_1->green);
*(dp + 1) = gamma_from_1[w];
v = gamma_to_1[*(sp + 2)];
png_composite(w, v, a, background_1->blue);
*(dp + 2) = gamma_from_1[w];
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 4, dp += 3)
{
png_byte a = *(sp + 3);
if (a == 0xff)
{
*dp = *sp;
*(dp + 1) = *(sp + 1);
*(dp + 2) = *(sp + 2);
}
else if (a == 0)
{
*dp = (png_byte)background->red;
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)background->green;
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)background->blue;
}
else
{
png_composite(*dp, *sp, a, background->red);
png_composite(*(dp + 1), *(sp + 1), a,
background->green);
png_composite(*(dp + 2), *(sp + 2), a,
background->blue);
}
}
}
}
else /* if (row_info->bit_depth == 16) */
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (gamma_16 != NULL && gamma_16_from_1 != NULL &&
gamma_16_to_1 != NULL)
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 8, dp += 6)
{
png_uint_16 a = (png_uint_16)(((png_uint_16)(*(sp + 6))
<< 8) + (png_uint_16)(*(sp + 7)));
if (a == (png_uint_16)0xffff)
{
png_uint_16 v;
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 1) >> gamma_shift][*sp];
*dp = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 3) >> gamma_shift][*(sp + 2)];
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 3) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
v = gamma_16[*(sp + 5) >> gamma_shift][*(sp + 4)];
*(dp + 4) = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 5) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
}
else if (a == 0)
{
/* Background is already in screen gamma */
*dp = (png_byte)((background->red >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->red & 0xff);
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)((background->green >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 3) = (png_byte)(background->green & 0xff);
*(dp + 4) = (png_byte)((background->blue >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 5) = (png_byte)(background->blue & 0xff);
}
else
{
png_uint_16 v, w, x;
v = gamma_16_to_1[*(sp + 1) >> gamma_shift][*sp];
png_composite_16(w, v, a, background_1->red);
x = gamma_16_from_1[((w&0xff) >> gamma_shift)][w >> 8];
*dp = (png_byte)((x >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(x & 0xff);
v = gamma_16_to_1[*(sp + 3) >> gamma_shift][*(sp + 2)];
png_composite_16(w, v, a, background_1->green);
x = gamma_16_from_1[((w&0xff) >> gamma_shift)][w >> 8];
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)((x >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 3) = (png_byte)(x & 0xff);
v = gamma_16_to_1[*(sp + 5) >> gamma_shift][*(sp + 4)];
png_composite_16(w, v, a, background_1->blue);
x = gamma_16_from_1[(w & 0xff) >> gamma_shift][w >> 8];
*(dp + 4) = (png_byte)((x >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 5) = (png_byte)(x & 0xff);
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
sp = row;
dp = row;
for (i = 0; i < row_width; i++, sp += 8, dp += 6)
{
png_uint_16 a = (png_uint_16)(((png_uint_16)(*(sp + 6))
<< 8) + (png_uint_16)(*(sp + 7)));
if (a == (png_uint_16)0xffff)
{
png_memcpy(dp, sp, 6);
}
else if (a == 0)
{
*dp = (png_byte)((background->red >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(background->red & 0xff);
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)((background->green >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 3) = (png_byte)(background->green & 0xff);
*(dp + 4) = (png_byte)((background->blue >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 5) = (png_byte)(background->blue & 0xff);
}
else
{
png_uint_16 v;
png_uint_16 r = (png_uint_16)(((*sp) << 8) + *(sp + 1));
png_uint_16 g = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp + 2)) << 8)
+ *(sp + 3));
png_uint_16 b = (png_uint_16)(((*(sp + 4)) << 8)
+ *(sp + 5));
png_composite_16(v, r, a, background->red);
*dp = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 1) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
png_composite_16(v, g, a, background->green);
*(dp + 2) = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 3) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
png_composite_16(v, b, a, background->blue);
*(dp + 4) = (png_byte)((v >> 8) & 0xff);
*(dp + 5) = (png_byte)(v & 0xff);
}
}
}
}
break;
}
}
if (row_info->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
{
row_info->color_type &= ~PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA;
row_info->channels--;
row_info->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(row_info->channels *
row_info->bit_depth);
row_info->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(row_info->pixel_depth, row_width);
}
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mnt_drop_write(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
__mnt_drop_write(mnt);
sb_end_write(mnt->mnt_sb);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipv6_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct ipv6hdr *iph = (struct ipv6hdr *)(skb->data + nhoff);
int err = -ENOSYS;
if (skb->encapsulation) {
skb_set_inner_protocol(skb, cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IPV6));
skb_set_inner_network_header(skb, nhoff);
}
iph->payload_len = htons(skb->len - nhoff - sizeof(*iph));
rcu_read_lock();
nhoff += sizeof(*iph) + ipv6_exthdrs_len(iph, &ops);
if (WARN_ON(!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_complete))
goto out_unlock;
err = ops->callbacks.gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileImplIOData::Handle::ClearNetworkingHistorySince(
base::Time time) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
LazyInitialize();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&ClearNetworkingHistorySinceOnIOThread,
io_data_,
time));
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageCopy (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY, int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h)
{
int c;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int i;
int colorMap[gdMaxColors];
if (dst->trueColor) {
/* 2.0: much easier when the destination is truecolor. */
/* 2.0.10: needs a transparent-index check that is still valid if
* the source is not truecolor. Thanks to Frank Warmerdam.
*/
if (src->trueColor) {
for (y = 0; (y < h); y++) {
for (x = 0; (x < w); x++) {
int c = gdImageGetTrueColorPixel (src, srcX + x, srcY + y);
gdImageSetPixel (dst, dstX + x, dstY + y, c);
}
}
} else {
/* source is palette based */
for (y = 0; (y < h); y++) {
for (x = 0; (x < w); x++) {
int c = gdImageGetPixel (src, srcX + x, srcY + y);
if (c != src->transparent) {
gdImageSetPixel(dst, dstX + x, dstY + y, gdTrueColorAlpha(src->red[c], src->green[c], src->blue[c], src->alpha[c]));
}
}
}
}
return;
}
/* Destination is palette based */
if (src->trueColor) { /* But source is truecolor (Ouch!) */
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + h)); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; x < (srcX + w); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Get best match possible. */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha(dst, gdTrueColorGetRed(c), gdTrueColorGetGreen(c), gdTrueColorGetBlue(c), gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c));
gdImageSetPixel(dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
return;
}
/* Palette based to palette based */
for (i = 0; i < gdMaxColors; i++) {
colorMap[i] = (-1);
}
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; y < (srcY + h); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; x < (srcX + w); x++) {
int nc;
int mapTo;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/* Have we established a mapping for this color? */
if (src->trueColor) {
/* 2.05: remap to the palette available in the destination image. This is slow and
* works badly, but it beats crashing! Thanks to Padhrig McCarthy.
*/
mapTo = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst, gdTrueColorGetRed (c), gdTrueColorGetGreen (c), gdTrueColorGetBlue (c), gdTrueColorGetAlpha (c));
} else if (colorMap[c] == (-1)) {
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
/* Get best match possible. This function never returns error. */
nc = gdImageColorResolveAlpha (dst, src->red[c], src->green[c], src->blue[c], src->alpha[c]);
}
colorMap[c] = nc;
mapTo = colorMap[c];
} else {
mapTo = colorMap[c];
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, mapTo);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 27,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff **ipv6_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct sk_buff *p;
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
unsigned int nlen;
unsigned int hlen;
unsigned int off;
u16 flush = 1;
int proto;
off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off + sizeof(*iph);
iph = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
iph = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!iph))
goto out;
}
skb_set_network_header(skb, off);
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph));
skb_set_transport_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
flush += ntohs(iph->payload_len) != skb_gro_len(skb);
rcu_read_lock();
proto = iph->nexthdr;
ops = rcu_dereference(inet6_offloads[proto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_receive) {
__pskb_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
proto = ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs(skb, proto);
skb_gro_pull(skb, -skb_transport_offset(skb));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
__skb_push(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
ops = rcu_dereference(inet6_offloads[proto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_receive)
goto out_unlock;
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto = proto;
flush--;
nlen = skb_network_header_len(skb);
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
const struct ipv6hdr *iph2;
__be32 first_word; /* <Version:4><Traffic_Class:8><Flow_Label:20> */
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
iph2 = (struct ipv6hdr *)(p->data + off);
first_word = *(__be32 *)iph ^ *(__be32 *)iph2;
/* All fields must match except length and Traffic Class.
* XXX skbs on the gro_list have all been parsed and pulled
* already so we don't need to compare nlen
* (nlen != (sizeof(*iph2) + ipv6_exthdrs_len(iph2, &ops)))
* memcmp() alone below is suffcient, right?
*/
if ((first_word & htonl(0xF00FFFFF)) ||
memcmp(&iph->nexthdr, &iph2->nexthdr,
nlen - offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr))) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
/* flush if Traffic Class fields are different */
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush |= !!(first_word & htonl(0x0FF00000));
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush |= flush;
/* Clear flush_id, there's really no concept of ID in IPv6. */
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush_id = 0;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, iph, nlen);
pp = ops->callbacks.gro_receive(head, skb);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
return pp;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 22,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::updateTextTrackDisplay() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "updateTextTrackDisplay(" << (void*)this << ")";
ensureTextTrackContainer().updateDisplay(
*this, TextTrackContainer::DidNotStartExposingControls);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void variadicStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::variadicStringMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::AddEntryFlags(const GURL& entry_url,
int64_t cache_id,
int additional_flags) {
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"UPDATE Entries SET flags = flags | ? WHERE cache_id = ? AND url = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt(0, additional_flags);
statement.BindInt64(1, cache_id);
statement.BindString(2, entry_url.spec());
return statement.Run() && db_->GetLastChangeCount();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::cream_job_suspend(const char *service, const char *job_id)
{
static const char* command = "CREAM_JOB_SUSPEND";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!service) service=NULLSTRING;
if (!job_id) job_id=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(job_id) );
int job_number = 1; // Just query 1 job for now
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d %s", esc1, job_number, esc2);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy,medium_prio);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc;
if (strcmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) == 0) {
rc = 0;
} else {
rc = 1;
error_string = result->argv[1];
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 6,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage3DBucket(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage3DBucket& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage3DBucket*>(
cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLsizei depth = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.depth);
GLuint bucket_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.bucket_id);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
if (state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(bucket_id);
if (!bucket)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
uint32_t image_size = bucket->size();
const void* data = bucket->GetData(0, image_size);
DCHECK(data || !image_size);
return DoCompressedTexImage(target, level, internal_format, width, height,
depth, border, image_size, data,
ContextState::k3D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 26,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::CommitDataNavigation(
const WebData& data,
const WebString& mime_type,
const WebString& text_encoding,
const WebURL& base_url,
const WebURL& unreachable_url,
bool replace,
WebFrameLoadType web_frame_load_type,
const WebHistoryItem& item,
bool is_client_redirect,
std::unique_ptr<WebDocumentLoader::ExtraData> navigation_data,
const WebURLRequest* original_failed_request,
const WebNavigationTimings& navigation_timings) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
ResourceRequest request;
HistoryItem* history_item = item;
DocumentLoader* provisional_document_loader =
GetFrame()->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
if (replace && !unreachable_url.IsEmpty() && provisional_document_loader) {
request = provisional_document_loader->OriginalRequest();
WebFrameLoadType previous_load_type =
provisional_document_loader->LoadType();
if (previous_load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward &&
provisional_document_loader->GetHistoryItem()) {
history_item = provisional_document_loader->GetHistoryItem();
web_frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kBackForward;
} else if (previous_load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kReload ||
previous_load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kReloadBypassingCache) {
web_frame_load_type = previous_load_type;
}
} else if (original_failed_request) {
request = original_failed_request->ToResourceRequest();
request.SetCacheMode(mojom::FetchCacheMode::kNoStore);
}
request.SetURL(base_url);
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(
nullptr, request,
SubstituteData(data, mime_type, text_encoding, unreachable_url));
DCHECK(frame_request.GetSubstituteData().IsValid());
frame_request.SetReplacesCurrentItem(replace);
if (is_client_redirect)
frame_request.SetClientRedirect(ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect);
GetFrame()->Loader().CommitNavigation(
frame_request, web_frame_load_type, history_item,
std::move(navigation_data), navigation_timings);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int len)
{
struct hci_ufilter uf = { .opcode = 0 };
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0, opt = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p, opt %d", sk, optname);
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
switch (optname) {
case HCI_DATA_DIR:
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask |= HCI_CMSG_DIR;
else
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask &= ~HCI_CMSG_DIR;
break;
case HCI_TIME_STAMP:
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask |= HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP;
else
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask &= ~HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP;
break;
case HCI_FILTER:
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
uf.type_mask = f->type_mask;
uf.opcode = f->opcode;
uf.event_mask[0] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0);
uf.event_mask[1] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1);
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf));
if (copy_from_user(&uf, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
uf.type_mask &= hci_sec_filter.type_mask;
uf.event_mask[0] &= *((u32 *) hci_sec_filter.event_mask + 0);
uf.event_mask[1] &= *((u32 *) hci_sec_filter.event_mask + 1);
}
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
f->type_mask = uf.type_mask;
f->opcode = uf.opcode;
*((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0) = uf.event_mask[0];
*((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1) = uf.event_mask[1];
}
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int genprime_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
{
char c='*';
if (p == 0) c='.';
if (p == 1) c='+';
if (p == 2) c='*';
if (p == 3) c='\n';
putc(c, stderr);
fflush(stderr);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 21,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Eina_Bool _ewk_frame_contents_set_internal(Ewk_Frame_Smart_Data* smartData, const char* contents, size_t contentsSize, const char* mimeType, const char* encoding, const char* baseUri, const char* unreachableUri)
{
size_t length = strlen(contents);
if (contentsSize < 1 || contentsSize > length)
contentsSize = length;
if (!mimeType)
mimeType = "text/html";
if (!encoding)
encoding = "UTF-8";
if (!baseUri)
baseUri = "about:blank";
WebCore::KURL baseKURL(WebCore::KURL(), WTF::String::fromUTF8(baseUri));
WebCore::KURL unreachableKURL;
if (unreachableUri)
unreachableKURL = WebCore::KURL(WebCore::KURL(), WTF::String::fromUTF8(unreachableUri));
else
unreachableKURL = WebCore::KURL();
WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::SharedBuffer> buffer = WebCore::SharedBuffer::create(contents, contentsSize);
WebCore::SubstituteData substituteData
(buffer.release(),
WTF::String::fromUTF8(mimeType),
WTF::String::fromUTF8(encoding),
baseKURL, unreachableKURL);
WebCore::ResourceRequest request(baseKURL);
smartData->frame->loader()->load(request, substituteData, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SubsetterImpl::ResolveCompositeGlyphs(const unsigned int* glyph_ids,
size_t glyph_count,
IntegerSet* glyph_id_processed) {
if (glyph_ids == NULL || glyph_count == 0 || glyph_id_processed == NULL) {
return false;
}
GlyphTablePtr glyph_table =
down_cast<GlyphTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::glyf));
LocaTablePtr loca_table = down_cast<LocaTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::loca));
if (glyph_table == NULL || loca_table == NULL) {
return false;
}
IntegerSet glyph_id_remaining;
glyph_id_remaining.insert(0); // Always include glyph id 0.
for (size_t i = 0; i < glyph_count; ++i) {
glyph_id_remaining.insert(glyph_ids[i]);
}
while (!glyph_id_remaining.empty()) {
IntegerSet comp_glyph_id;
for (IntegerSet::iterator i = glyph_id_remaining.begin(),
e = glyph_id_remaining.end(); i != e; ++i) {
if (*i < 0 || *i >= loca_table->NumGlyphs()) {
continue;
}
int32_t length = loca_table->GlyphLength(*i);
if (length == 0) {
continue;
}
int32_t offset = loca_table->GlyphOffset(*i);
GlyphPtr glyph;
glyph.Attach(glyph_table->GetGlyph(offset, length));
if (glyph == NULL) {
continue;
}
if (glyph->GlyphType() == GlyphType::kComposite) {
Ptr<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph> comp_glyph =
down_cast<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph*>(glyph.p_);
for (int32_t j = 0; j < comp_glyph->NumGlyphs(); ++j) {
int32_t glyph_id = comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j);
if (glyph_id_processed->find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_processed->end() &&
glyph_id_remaining.find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_remaining.end()) {
comp_glyph_id.insert(comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j));
}
}
}
glyph_id_processed->insert(*i);
}
glyph_id_remaining.clear();
glyph_id_remaining = comp_glyph_id;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix compile warning.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 15,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebSize WebMediaPlayerImpl::NaturalSize() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return blink::WebSize(pipeline_metadata_.natural_size);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 5,657 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.