instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TakeOwnership() {
target_contents_owner_.reset(params_->target_contents);
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetterAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrSetterAttributeSetterForMainWorld(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: s_aes_process(stream_state * ss, stream_cursor_read * pr,
stream_cursor_write * pw, bool last)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
const unsigned char *limit;
const long in_size = pr->limit - pr->ptr;
const long out_size = pw->limit - pw->ptr;
unsigned char temp[16];
int status = 0;
/* figure out if we're going to run out of space */
if (in_size > out_size) {
limit = pr->ptr + out_size;
status = 1; /* need more output space */
} else {
limit = pr->limit;
status = last ? EOFC : 0; /* need more input */
}
/* set up state and context */
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
/* allocate the aes context. this is a public struct but it
contains internal pointers, so we need to store it separately
in immovable memory like any opaque structure. */
state->ctx = (aes_context *)gs_alloc_bytes_immovable(state->memory,
sizeof(aes_context), "aes context structure");
if (state->ctx == NULL) {
gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "could not allocate aes context");
return ERRC;
}
if (state->keylength < 1 || state->keylength > SAES_MAX_KEYLENGTH) {
gs_throw1(gs_error_rangecheck, "invalid aes key length (%d bytes)",
state->keylength);
}
aes_setkey_dec(state->ctx, state->key, state->keylength * 8);
}
if (!state->initialized) {
/* read the initialization vector from the first 16 bytes */
if (in_size < 16) return 0; /* get more data */
memcpy(state->iv, pr->ptr + 1, 16);
state->initialized = 1;
pr->ptr += 16;
}
/* decrypt available blocks */
while (pr->ptr + 16 <= limit) {
aes_crypt_cbc(state->ctx, AES_DECRYPT, 16, state->iv,
pr->ptr + 1, temp);
pr->ptr += 16;
if (last && pr->ptr == pr->limit) {
/* we're on the last block; unpad if necessary */
int pad;
if (state->use_padding) {
/* we are using RFC 1423-style padding, so the last byte of the
plaintext gives the number of bytes to discard */
pad = temp[15];
if (pad < 1 || pad > 16) {
/* Bug 692343 - don't error here, just warn. Take padding to be
* zero. This may give us a stream that's too long - preferable
* to the alternatives. */
gs_warn1("invalid aes padding byte (0x%02x)",
(unsigned char)pad);
pad = 0;
}
} else {
/* not using padding */
pad = 0;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16 - pad);
pw->ptr += 16 - pad;
return EOFC;
}
memcpy(pw->ptr + 1, temp, 16);
pw->ptr += 16;
}
/* if we got to the end of the file without triggering the padding
check, the input must not have been a multiple of 16 bytes long.
complain. */
if (status == EOFC) {
gs_throw(gs_error_rangecheck, "aes stream isn't a multiple of 16 bytes");
return 0;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 3,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SVGElement* SVGElement::viewportElement() const {
ContainerNode* n = ParentOrShadowHostNode();
while (n) {
if (IsSVGSVGElement(*n) || IsSVGImageElement(*n) || IsSVGSymbolElement(*n))
return ToSVGElement(n);
n = n->ParentOrShadowHostNode();
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 6,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ecp_point mP;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
char is_grp_capable = 0;
#endif
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) != ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &mP );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, &mP, m, P ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts( grp, R, n, Q ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_add_mixed( grp, R, &mP, R ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) );
cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
if ( is_grp_capable )
{
mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &mP );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void aio_run_all_iocbs(struct kioctx *ctx)
{
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
while (__aio_run_iocbs(ctx))
;
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Bool Calc_Length( EXEC_OP )
{
CUR.opcode = CUR.code[CUR.IP];
switch ( CUR.opcode )
{
case 0x40:
if ( CUR.IP + 1 >= CUR.codeSize )
return FAILURE;
CUR.length = CUR.code[CUR.IP + 1] + 2;
break;
case 0x41:
if ( CUR.IP + 1 >= CUR.codeSize )
return FAILURE;
CUR.length = CUR.code[CUR.IP + 1] * 2 + 2;
break;
case 0xB0:
case 0xB1:
case 0xB2:
case 0xB3:
case 0xB4:
case 0xB5:
case 0xB6:
case 0xB7:
CUR.length = CUR.opcode - 0xB0 + 2;
break;
case 0xB8:
case 0xB9:
case 0xBA:
case 0xBB:
case 0xBC:
case 0xBD:
case 0xBE:
case 0xBF:
CUR.length = (CUR.opcode - 0xB8) * 2 + 3;
break;
default:
CUR.length = 1;
break;
}
/* make sure result is in range */
if ( CUR.IP + CUR.length > CUR.codeSize )
return FAILURE;
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(pcre)
{
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_row(2, "PCRE (Perl Compatible Regular Expressions) Support", "enabled" );
php_info_print_table_row(2, "PCRE Library Version", pcre_version() );
php_info_print_table_end();
DISPLAY_INI_ENTRIES();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t BufferQueueConsumer::releaseBuffer(int slot, uint64_t frameNumber,
const sp<Fence>& releaseFence, EGLDisplay eglDisplay,
EGLSyncKHR eglFence) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ATRACE_BUFFER_INDEX(slot);
if (slot < 0 || slot >= BufferQueueDefs::NUM_BUFFER_SLOTS ||
releaseFence == NULL) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
sp<IProducerListener> listener;
{ // Autolock scope
Mutex::Autolock lock(mCore->mMutex);
if (frameNumber != mSlots[slot].mFrameNumber) {
return STALE_BUFFER_SLOT;
}
BufferQueueCore::Fifo::iterator current(mCore->mQueue.begin());
while (current != mCore->mQueue.end()) {
if (current->mSlot == slot) {
BQ_LOGE("releaseBuffer: buffer slot %d pending release is "
"currently queued", slot);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
++current;
}
if (mSlots[slot].mBufferState == BufferSlot::ACQUIRED) {
mSlots[slot].mEglDisplay = eglDisplay;
mSlots[slot].mEglFence = eglFence;
mSlots[slot].mFence = releaseFence;
mSlots[slot].mBufferState = BufferSlot::FREE;
listener = mCore->mConnectedProducerListener;
BQ_LOGV("releaseBuffer: releasing slot %d", slot);
} else if (mSlots[slot].mNeedsCleanupOnRelease) {
BQ_LOGV("releaseBuffer: releasing a stale buffer slot %d "
"(state = %d)", slot, mSlots[slot].mBufferState);
mSlots[slot].mNeedsCleanupOnRelease = false;
return STALE_BUFFER_SLOT;
} else {
BQ_LOGV("releaseBuffer: attempted to release buffer slot %d "
"but its state was %d", slot, mSlots[slot].mBufferState);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
mCore->mDequeueCondition.broadcast();
} // Autolock scope
if (listener != NULL) {
listener->onBufferReleased();
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_unpack_header(cdf_header_t *h, char *buf)
{
size_t i;
size_t len = 0;
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_magic);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_uuid);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_revision);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_version);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_byte_order);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_sec_size_p2);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_short_sec_size_p2);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_unused0);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_directory);
CDF_UNPACKA(h->h_unused1);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_min_size_standard_stream);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_sector_in_short_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_short_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_secid_first_sector_in_master_sat);
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_num_sectors_in_master_sat);
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(h->h_master_sat); i++)
CDF_UNPACK(h->h_master_sat[i]);
}
Commit Message: Fix bounds checks again.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
struct search_domain *dom;
for (dom = state->head; dom; dom = dom->next) {
if (!n--) {
/* this is the postfix we want */
/* the actual postfix string is kept at the end of the structure */
const u8 *const postfix = ((u8 *) dom) + sizeof(struct search_domain);
const int postfix_len = dom->len;
char *const newname = (char *) mm_malloc(base_len + need_to_append_dot + postfix_len + 1);
if (!newname) return NULL;
memcpy(newname, base_name, base_len);
if (need_to_append_dot) newname[base_len] = '.';
memcpy(newname + base_len + need_to_append_dot, postfix, postfix_len);
newname[base_len + need_to_append_dot + postfix_len] = 0;
return newname;
}
}
/* we ran off the end of the list and still didn't find the requested string */
EVUTIL_ASSERT(0);
return NULL; /* unreachable; stops warnings in some compilers. */
}
Commit Message: evdns: name_parse(): fix remote stack overread
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"the name_parse() function in libevent's DNS code is vulnerable to a buffer overread.
971 if (cp != name_out) {
972 if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
973 *cp++ = '.';
974 }
975 if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
976 memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
977 cp += label_len;
978 j += label_len;
No check is made against length before the memcpy occurs.
This was found through the Tor bug bounty program and the discovery should be credited to 'Guido Vranken'."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/e4fcf540e9b89ab86d02):
set $PROT_NONE=0x0
set $PROT_READ=0x1
set $PROT_WRITE=0x2
set $MAP_ANONYMOUS=0x20
set $MAP_SHARED=0x01
set $MAP_FIXED=0x10
set $MAP_32BIT=0x40
start
set $length=202
# overread
set $length=2
# allocate with mmap to have a seg fault on page boundary
set $l=(1<<20)*2
p mmap(0, $l, $PROT_READ|$PROT_WRITE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $packet=(char *)$1+$l-$length
# hack the packet
set $packet[0]=63
set $packet[1]='/'
p malloc(sizeof(int))
set $idx=(int *)$2
set $idx[0]=0
set $name_out_len=202
p malloc($name_out_len)
set $name_out=$3
# have WRITE only mapping to fail on read
set $end=$1+$l
p (void *)mmap($end, 1<<12, $PROT_NONE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_FIXED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $m=$4
p name_parse($packet, $length, $idx, $name_out, $name_out_len)
x/2s (char *)$name_out
Before this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:33
After this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
$5 = -1
0x633030: "/"
0x633032: ""
(gdb) p $m
$6 = (void *) 0x40200000
(gdb) p $1
$7 = 1073741824
(gdb) p/x $1
$8 = 0x40000000
(gdb) quit
P.S. plus drop one condition duplicate.
Fixes: #317
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dealloc_gids(gids_t *p)
{
xfree(p->gids);
xfree(p);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 10,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opfnstcw(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xd9;
data[l++] = 0x38 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __u8 *lg_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct usb_device_descriptor *udesc;
__u16 bcdDevice, rev_maj, rev_min;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[84] == 0x8c && rdesc[85] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech keyboard report descriptor\n");
rdesc[84] = rdesc[89] = 0x4d;
rdesc[85] = rdesc[90] = 0x10;
}
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 50 &&
rdesc[32] == 0x81 && rdesc[33] == 0x06 &&
rdesc[49] == 0x81 && rdesc[50] == 0x06) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up rel/abs in Logitech report descriptor\n");
rdesc[33] = rdesc[50] = 0x02;
}
switch (hdev->product) {
/* Several wheels report as this id when operating in emulation mode. */
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WHEEL:
udesc = &(hid_to_usb_dev(hdev)->descriptor);
if (!udesc) {
hid_err(hdev, "NULL USB device descriptor\n");
break;
}
bcdDevice = le16_to_cpu(udesc->bcdDevice);
rev_maj = bcdDevice >> 8;
rev_min = bcdDevice & 0xff;
/* Update the report descriptor for only the Driving Force wheel */
if (rev_maj == 1 && rev_min == 2 &&
*rsize == DF_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force report descriptor\n");
rdesc = df_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(df_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == MOMO_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Force (Red) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL2:
if (*rsize == MOMO2_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Racing Force (Black) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo2_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo2_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_VIBRATION_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == FV_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Formula Vibration report descriptor\n");
rdesc = fv_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(fv_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_DFP_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == DFP_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force Pro report descriptor\n");
rdesc = dfp_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(dfp_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WII_WHEEL:
if (*rsize >= 101 && rdesc[41] == 0x95 && rdesc[42] == 0x0B &&
rdesc[47] == 0x05 && rdesc[48] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Logitech Speed Force Wireless report descriptor\n");
rdesc[41] = 0x05;
rdesc[42] = 0x09;
rdesc[47] = 0x95;
rdesc[48] = 0x0B;
}
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 27,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
size_t datalen;
long ret;
datalen = rka->callout_len;
ret = datalen;
/* we can return the data as is */
if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
if (buflen > datalen)
buflen = datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 18,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowSetCookie(
const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party,
const std::string& cookie_line,
const content::ResourceContext& context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
net::CookieOptions* options) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data =
reinterpret_cast<ProfileIOData*>(context.GetUserData(NULL));
ContentSetting setting = io_data->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->
GetCookieContentSetting(url, first_party, true);
if (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_SESSION_ONLY)
options->set_force_session();
bool allow = setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW ||
setting == CONTENT_SETTING_SESSION_ONLY;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableFunction(
&TabSpecificContentSettings::CookieChanged,
render_process_id, render_view_id, url, cookie_line, *options,
!allow));
return allow;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *yam_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return (*pos < NR_PORTS) ? yam_devs[*pos] : NULL;
}
Commit Message: hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::GenerateStream(
int32_t page_request_id,
const StreamControls& controls,
bool user_gesture,
GenerateStreamCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::UI}).get(),
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(salt_and_origin_callback_, render_process_id_,
render_frame_id_),
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::DoGenerateStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), page_request_id, controls,
user_gesture, std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t VolumeGetStereoPosition(EffectContext *pContext, int16_t *position){
LVM_ControlParams_t ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVM_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus = LVM_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVM_INT16 balance;
LvmStatus = LVM_GetControlParameters(pContext->pBundledContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetControlParameters", "VolumeGetStereoPosition")
if(LvmStatus != LVM_SUCCESS) return -EINVAL;
balance = VolumeConvertStereoPosition(pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved);
if(pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled == LVM_TRUE){
if(balance != ActiveParams.VC_Balance){
return -EINVAL;
}
}
*position = (LVM_INT16)pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved; // Convert dB to millibels
return 0;
} /* end VolumeGetStereoPosition */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Cursor ChromeClientImpl::LastSetCursorForTesting() const {
return last_set_mouse_cursor_for_testing_;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::fillXfrmId(const std::string& sourceAddress,
const std::string& destinationAddress, int32_t spi,
int32_t markValue, int32_t markMask,
int32_t transformId, XfrmId* xfrmId) {
xfrmId->transformId = transformId;
xfrmId->spi = htonl(spi);
xfrmId->mark.v = markValue;
xfrmId->mark.m = markMask;
xfrm_address_t sourceXfrmAddr{}, destXfrmAddr{};
StatusOr<int> sourceFamily, destFamily;
sourceFamily = convertToXfrmAddr(sourceAddress, &sourceXfrmAddr);
destFamily = convertToXfrmAddr(destinationAddress, &destXfrmAddr);
if (!isOk(sourceFamily) || !isOk(destFamily)) {
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Invalid address " + sourceAddress + "/" +
destinationAddress);
}
if (destFamily.value() == AF_UNSPEC ||
(sourceFamily.value() != AF_UNSPEC && sourceFamily.value() != destFamily.value())) {
ALOGD("Invalid or Mismatched Address Families, %d != %d, line=%d", sourceFamily.value(),
destFamily.value(), __LINE__);
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(EINVAL, "Invalid or mismatched address families");
}
xfrmId->addrFamily = destFamily.value();
xfrmId->dstAddr = destXfrmAddr;
xfrmId->srcAddr = sourceXfrmAddr;
return netdutils::status::ok;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 27,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmstate_subsection_load(QEMUFile *f, const VMStateDescription *vmsd,
void *opaque)
{
while (qemu_peek_byte(f, 0) == QEMU_VM_SUBSECTION) {
char idstr[256];
int ret;
uint8_t version_id, len, size;
const VMStateDescription *sub_vmsd;
len = qemu_peek_byte(f, 1);
if (len < strlen(vmsd->name) + 1) {
/* subsection name has be be "section_name/a" */
return 0;
}
size = qemu_peek_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)idstr, len, 2);
if (size != len) {
return 0;
}
idstr[size] = 0;
if (strncmp(vmsd->name, idstr, strlen(vmsd->name)) != 0) {
/* it don't have a valid subsection name */
return 0;
}
sub_vmsd = vmstate_get_subsection(vmsd->subsections, idstr);
if (sub_vmsd == NULL) {
return -ENOENT;
}
qemu_file_skip(f, 1); /* subsection */
qemu_file_skip(f, 1); /* len */
qemu_file_skip(f, len); /* idstr */
version_id = qemu_get_be32(f);
ret = vmstate_load_state(f, sub_vmsd, opaque, version_id);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CertMatchesFilter(const net::X509Certificate& cert,
const base::DictionaryValue& filter) {
if (filter.empty())
return true;
std::string common_name;
if (filter.GetString("ISSUER.CN", &common_name) &&
(cert.issuer().common_name == common_name)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perContextEnabledRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "perContextEnabledRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setPerContextEnabledRuntimeEnabledLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 4,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_client_encoding)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
int id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "|r", &pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc == 0) {
id = FETCH_DEFAULT_LINK();
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
/* Just do the same as found in PostgreSQL sources... */
RETURN_STRING((char *) pg_encoding_to_char(PQclientEncoding(pgsql)));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int skcipher_next_fast(struct skcipher_walk *walk)
{
unsigned long diff;
walk->src.phys.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->in);
walk->src.phys.offset = offset_in_page(walk->in.offset);
walk->dst.phys.page = scatterwalk_page(&walk->out);
walk->dst.phys.offset = offset_in_page(walk->out.offset);
if (walk->flags & SKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS)
return 0;
diff = walk->src.phys.offset - walk->dst.phys.offset;
diff |= walk->src.virt.page - walk->dst.virt.page;
skcipher_map_src(walk);
walk->dst.virt.addr = walk->src.virt.addr;
if (diff) {
walk->flags |= SKCIPHER_WALK_DIFF;
skcipher_map_dst(walk);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 25,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfc_genl_target_lost(struct nfc_dev *dev, u32 target_idx)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_EVENT_TARGET_LOST);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_string(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_NAME, nfc_device_name(dev)) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX, target_idx))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::EnableIsPreloadedForTest() {
if (preloaded_urls_for_test_)
return;
preloaded_urls_for_test_ = WTF::WrapUnique(new HashSet<String>);
for (const auto& pair : preloads_) {
Resource* resource = pair.value;
preloaded_urls_for_test_->insert(resource->Url().GetString());
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_1_6_dummy(kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char **passptr)
{
int i;
char *password = *passptr;
/* Old-style randkey operations disallowed tickets to start. */
if (!(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) ||
!(entry->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX))
return;
/* The 1.6 dummy password was the octets 1..255. */
for (i = 0; (unsigned char) password[i] == i + 1; i++);
if (password[i] != '\0' || i != 255)
return;
/* This will make the caller use a random password instead. */
*passptr = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Null pointer deref in kadmind [CVE-2012-1013]
The fix for #6626 could cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer if
a create-principal request contains no password but does contain the
KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag (e.g. "addprinc -randkey -allow_tix
name"). Only clients authorized to create principals can trigger the
bug. Fix the bug by testing for a null password in check_1_6_dummy.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: Minor style change and commit message]
ticket: 7152
target_version: 1.10.2
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 1 | 14,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BasicFindMainFallbackResponseInWorkingSet() {
BasicFindMainFallbackResponse(false);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpen(
scoped_refptr<MessageLoopProxy> message_loop_proxy,
const FilePath& file_path, int file_flags,
CreateOrOpenCallback* callback) {
return Start(FROM_HERE, message_loop_proxy, new RelayCreateOrOpen(
message_loop_proxy, file_path, file_flags, callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,
unsigned int key_usage )
{
int ret;
size_t n = *size;
char *p = *buf;
const char *sep = "";
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" );
KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" );
*size = n;
*buf = p;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::didChangeIcon(WebFrame* frame, WebIconURL::Type type) {
favicon_helper_->DidChangeIcon(frame, type);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init set_ihash_entries(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return 0;
ihash_entries = simple_strtoul(str, &str, 0);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RIL_requestTimedCallback (RIL_TimedCallback callback, void *param,
const struct timeval *relativeTime) {
internalRequestTimedCallback (callback, param, relativeTime);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ClientGpuFence GpuFence::AsClientGpuFence() {
return reinterpret_cast<ClientGpuFence>(this);
}
Commit Message: gfx: Add GpuFence::Wait() method
Provide a GpuFence::Wait() method to hide the implementation details of
waiting for a GpuFence object.
Bug: 828393
Change-Id: I2153ebcb4b8cca6bb43c827fb0a9740f6a6cc221
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1021513
Reviewed-by: David Reveman <reveman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniele Castagna <dcastagna@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559292}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_attr_unintern_sub (struct attr *attr)
{
/* aspath refcount shoud be decrement. */
if (attr->aspath)
aspath_unintern (&attr->aspath);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH);
if (attr->community)
community_unintern (&attr->community);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
if (attr->extra)
{
if (attr->extra->ecommunity)
ecommunity_unintern (&attr->extra->ecommunity);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES);
if (attr->extra->cluster)
cluster_unintern (attr->extra->cluster);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST);
if (attr->extra->transit)
transit_unintern (attr->extra->transit);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_napi_enable(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < tp->irq_cnt; i++)
napi_enable(&tp->napi[i].napi);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::RegisterNativeLogCallback(
int renderer_host_id,
const base::Callback<void(const std::string&)>& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
MediaStreamManager* msm = g_media_stream_manager_tls_ptr.Pointer()->Get();
if (!msm) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "No MediaStreamManager on the IO thread.";
return;
}
msm->DoNativeLogCallbackRegistration(renderer_host_id, callback);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **),
int (*hash)(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *twp))
{
struct inet_hashinfo *hinfo = death_row->hashinfo;
const unsigned short snum = inet_sk(sk)->inet_num;
struct inet_bind_hashbucket *head;
struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
int ret;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int twrefcnt = 1;
if (!snum) {
int i, remaining, low, high, port;
static u32 hint;
u32 offset = hint + port_offset;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = NULL;
inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
remaining = (high - low) + 1;
local_bh_disable();
for (i = 1; i <= remaining; i++) {
port = low + (i + offset) % remaining;
if (inet_is_reserved_local_port(port))
continue;
head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
hinfo->bhash_size)];
spin_lock(&head->lock);
/* Does not bother with rcv_saddr checks,
* because the established check is already
* unique enough.
*/
inet_bind_bucket_for_each(tb, node, &head->chain) {
if (net_eq(ib_net(tb), net) &&
tb->port == port) {
if (tb->fastreuse >= 0)
goto next_port;
WARN_ON(hlist_empty(&tb->owners));
if (!check_established(death_row, sk,
port, &tw))
goto ok;
goto next_port;
}
}
tb = inet_bind_bucket_create(hinfo->bind_bucket_cachep,
net, head, port);
if (!tb) {
spin_unlock(&head->lock);
break;
}
tb->fastreuse = -1;
goto ok;
next_port:
spin_unlock(&head->lock);
}
local_bh_enable();
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok:
hint += i;
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport = htons(port);
twrefcnt += hash(sk, tw);
}
if (tw)
twrefcnt += inet_twsk_bind_unhash(tw, hinfo);
spin_unlock(&head->lock);
if (tw) {
inet_twsk_deschedule(tw, death_row);
while (twrefcnt) {
twrefcnt--;
inet_twsk_put(tw);
}
}
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, snum, hinfo->bhash_size)];
tb = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash;
spin_lock_bh(&head->lock);
if (sk_head(&tb->owners) == sk && !sk->sk_bind_node.next) {
hash(sk, NULL);
spin_unlock_bh(&head->lock);
return 0;
} else {
spin_unlock(&head->lock);
/* No definite answer... Walk to established hash table */
ret = check_established(death_row, sk, snum, NULL);
out:
local_bh_enable();
return ret;
}
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::RegisterServiceWorker(
const GURL& script_url,
const blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerRegistrationOptions& options,
RegistrationCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
std::string error_message;
if (!IsValidRegisterRequest(script_url, options.scope, &error_message)) {
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode::kErrorInvalidArguments, error_message,
blink::mojom::kInvalidServiceWorkerRegistrationId);
return;
}
was_service_worker_registered_ = true;
job_coordinator_->Register(
script_url, options,
base::BindOnce(&ServiceWorkerContextCore::RegistrationComplete,
AsWeakPtr(), options.scope, std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Smb4KMountJob::Smb4KMountJob( QObject *parent ) : KJob( parent ),
m_started( false ), m_parent_widget( NULL ), m_processed( 0 )
{
setCapabilities( KJob::Killable );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateFocusAppearanceTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
Element* element = FocusedElement();
if (!element)
return;
UpdateStyleAndLayout();
if (element->IsFocusable())
element->UpdateFocusAppearance(SelectionBehaviorOnFocus::kRestore);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vhost_dev_stop(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
if (dev->vqs[i]->kick && dev->vqs[i]->handle_kick) {
vhost_poll_stop(&dev->vqs[i]->poll);
vhost_poll_flush(&dev->vqs[i]->poll);
}
}
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest(void)
{
/* Expected data. */
u_char expected[] = {
"AAAAAAAA"
"AAAAAAAA"
"AAAAAAAA"
"JJJJJJJJ"
"BBBBBBBB"
"BBBBBBBB"
"CCCCCCCC"
"CCCCCCCC"
"CCCCCCCC"
"LLLLLLLL"
"LLLLLLLL"
"LLLLLLLL"
"MMMMMMMM"
"MMMMMMMM"
"MMMMMMMM"
"FFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFF"
"GGGGGGGG"
"GGGGGGGG"
"HHHHHHHH"
"HHHHHHHH"
"IIIIIIII"
"QQQQQQQQ"
};
return DefragDoSturgesNovakTest(DEFRAG_POLICY_SOLARIS, expected, sizeof(expected));
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 5,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: val_init_sec_ctx_args(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID req_mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
/* Initialize outputs. */
if (minor_status != NULL)
*minor_status = 0;
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
/* Validate arguments. */
if (minor_status == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
if (context_handle == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (target_name == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_BAD_NAME);
if (output_token == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long set_max_huge_pages(struct hstate *h, unsigned long count,
nodemask_t *nodes_allowed)
{
unsigned long min_count, ret;
if (hstate_is_gigantic(h) && !gigantic_page_supported())
return h->max_huge_pages;
/*
* Increase the pool size
* First take pages out of surplus state. Then make up the
* remaining difference by allocating fresh huge pages.
*
* We might race with alloc_surplus_huge_page() here and be unable
* to convert a surplus huge page to a normal huge page. That is
* not critical, though, it just means the overall size of the
* pool might be one hugepage larger than it needs to be, but
* within all the constraints specified by the sysctls.
*/
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
while (h->surplus_huge_pages && count > persistent_huge_pages(h)) {
if (!adjust_pool_surplus(h, nodes_allowed, -1))
break;
}
while (count > persistent_huge_pages(h)) {
/*
* If this allocation races such that we no longer need the
* page, free_huge_page will handle it by freeing the page
* and reducing the surplus.
*/
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
/* yield cpu to avoid soft lockup */
cond_resched();
ret = alloc_pool_huge_page(h, nodes_allowed);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (!ret)
goto out;
/* Bail for signals. Probably ctrl-c from user */
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out;
}
/*
* Decrease the pool size
* First return free pages to the buddy allocator (being careful
* to keep enough around to satisfy reservations). Then place
* pages into surplus state as needed so the pool will shrink
* to the desired size as pages become free.
*
* By placing pages into the surplus state independent of the
* overcommit value, we are allowing the surplus pool size to
* exceed overcommit. There are few sane options here. Since
* alloc_surplus_huge_page() is checking the global counter,
* though, we'll note that we're not allowed to exceed surplus
* and won't grow the pool anywhere else. Not until one of the
* sysctls are changed, or the surplus pages go out of use.
*/
min_count = h->resv_huge_pages + h->nr_huge_pages - h->free_huge_pages;
min_count = max(count, min_count);
try_to_free_low(h, min_count, nodes_allowed);
while (min_count < persistent_huge_pages(h)) {
if (!free_pool_huge_page(h, nodes_allowed, 0))
break;
cond_resched_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
}
while (count < persistent_huge_pages(h)) {
if (!adjust_pool_surplus(h, nodes_allowed, 1))
break;
}
out:
ret = persistent_huge_pages(h);
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *str = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
CIRCLE *circle;
char *s,
*cp;
int depth = 0;
circle = (CIRCLE *) palloc(sizeof(CIRCLE));
s = str;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *s))
s++;
if ((*s == LDELIM_C) || (*s == LDELIM))
{
depth++;
cp = (s + 1);
while (isspace((unsigned char) *cp))
cp++;
if (*cp == LDELIM)
s = cp;
}
if (!pair_decode(s, &circle->center.x, &circle->center.y, &s))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type circle: \"%s\"", str)));
if (*s == DELIM)
s++;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *s))
s++;
if ((!single_decode(s, &circle->radius, &s)) || (circle->radius < 0))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type circle: \"%s\"", str)));
while (depth > 0)
{
if ((*s == RDELIM)
|| ((*s == RDELIM_C) && (depth == 1)))
{
depth--;
s++;
while (isspace((unsigned char) *s))
s++;
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type circle: \"%s\"", str)));
}
if (*s != '\0')
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("invalid input syntax for type circle: \"%s\"", str)));
PG_RETURN_CIRCLE_P(circle);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_drop_xobject(fz_context *ctx, pdf_xobject *xobj)
{
fz_drop_storable(ctx, &xobj->storable);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnWindowFocused(aura::Window* gained_focus,
aura::Window* lost_focus) {
DCHECK(window_ == gained_focus || window_ == lost_focus);
if (window_ == gained_focus) {
if (host_->ignore_input_events())
return;
host_->GotFocus();
host_->SetActive(true);
ui::InputMethod* input_method = GetInputMethod();
if (input_method) {
input_method->SetFocusedTextInputClient(this);
}
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
host_->GetRootBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnWindowFocused();
} else if (window_ == lost_focus) {
host_->SetActive(false);
host_->Blur();
DetachFromInputMethod();
selection_controller_->HideAndDisallowShowingAutomatically();
if (overscroll_controller_)
overscroll_controller_->Cancel();
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
host_->GetRootBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnWindowBlurred();
display::Screen* screen = display::Screen::GetScreen();
bool focusing_other_display =
gained_focus && screen->GetNumDisplays() > 1 &&
(screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(window_).id() !=
screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(gained_focus).id());
if (is_fullscreen_ && !in_shutdown_ && !focusing_other_display) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!gained_focus) {
POINT point = {0};
::GetCursorPos(&point);
if (screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(window_).id() !=
screen->GetDisplayNearestPoint(gfx::Point(point)).id())
return;
}
#endif
Shutdown();
return;
}
if (popup_child_host_view_)
popup_child_host_view_->Shutdown();
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::doAppend(const QString& newLine, bool rtl, bool self)
{
if (m_rememberLineDirtyBit)
appendRememberLine();
if (!self && m_chatWin)
m_chatWin->activateTabNotification(m_tabNotification);
int scrollMax = Preferences::self()->scrollbackMax();
if (scrollMax != 0)
{
bool atBottom = (verticalScrollBar()->value() == verticalScrollBar()->maximum());
document()->setMaximumBlockCount(atBottom ? scrollMax : document()->maximumBlockCount() + 1);
}
doRawAppend(newLine, rtl);
if (!m_autoTextToSend.isEmpty() && m_server)
{
QString sendText = m_server->parseWildcards(m_autoTextToSend,m_server->getNickname(), QString(), QString(), QString(), QString());
m_autoTextToSend.clear();
emit autoText(sendText);
}
else
{
m_autoTextToSend.clear();
}
if (!m_lastStatusText.isEmpty())
emit clearStatusBarTempText();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_transfer_context (tBTIF_CBACK *p_cback, UINT16 event, char* p_params, int param_len, tBTIF_COPY_CBACK *p_copy_cback)
{
tBTIF_CONTEXT_SWITCH_CBACK *p_msg;
BTIF_TRACE_VERBOSE("btif_transfer_context event %d, len %d", event, param_len);
/* allocate and send message that will be executed in btif context */
if ((p_msg = (tBTIF_CONTEXT_SWITCH_CBACK *) GKI_getbuf(sizeof(tBTIF_CONTEXT_SWITCH_CBACK) + param_len)) != NULL)
{
p_msg->hdr.event = BT_EVT_CONTEXT_SWITCH_EVT; /* internal event */
p_msg->p_cb = p_cback;
p_msg->event = event; /* callback event */
/* check if caller has provided a copy callback to do the deep copy */
if (p_copy_cback)
{
p_copy_cback(event, p_msg->p_param, p_params);
}
else if (p_params)
{
memcpy(p_msg->p_param, p_params, param_len); /* callback parameter data */
}
btif_sendmsg(p_msg);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
/* let caller deal with a failed allocation */
return BT_STATUS_NOMEM;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 8,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SettingsWindowEnabled() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kDisableSettingsWindow);
#else
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kEnableSettingsWindow);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value)
{
if (!value || (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) {
void *p = (void *)value;
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, p);
} else if (type == V_ASN1_OBJECT) {
ASN1_OBJECT *odup;
odup = OBJ_dup(value);
if (!odup)
return 0;
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, odup);
} else {
ASN1_STRING *sdup;
sdup = ASN1_STRING_dup(value);
if (!sdup)
return 0;
ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, sdup);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 26,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sparse_skip_file (struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
bool rc = true;
struct tar_sparse_file file;
if (!tar_sparse_init (&file))
return dump_status_not_implemented;
file.stat_info = st;
file.fd = -1;
rc = tar_sparse_decode_header (&file);
skip_file (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 27,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cf2_hint_isPairTop( const CF2_Hint hint )
{
return (FT_Bool)( ( hint->flags & CF2_PairTop ) != 0 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::doForm(Object *str) {
Dict *dict;
GBool transpGroup, isolated, knockout;
GfxColorSpace *blendingColorSpace;
Object matrixObj, bboxObj;
double m[6], bbox[4];
Object resObj;
Dict *resDict;
Object obj1, obj2, obj3;
int i;
if (formDepth > 20) {
return;
}
dict = str->streamGetDict();
dict->lookup("FormType", &obj1);
if (!(obj1.isNull() || (obj1.isInt() && obj1.getInt() == 1))) {
error(getPos(), "Unknown form type");
}
obj1.free();
dict->lookup("BBox", &bboxObj);
if (!bboxObj.isArray()) {
bboxObj.free();
error(getPos(), "Bad form bounding box");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
bboxObj.arrayGet(i, &obj1);
bbox[i] = obj1.getNum();
obj1.free();
}
bboxObj.free();
dict->lookup("Matrix", &matrixObj);
if (matrixObj.isArray()) {
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
matrixObj.arrayGet(i, &obj1);
m[i] = obj1.getNum();
obj1.free();
}
} else {
m[0] = 1; m[1] = 0;
m[2] = 0; m[3] = 1;
m[4] = 0; m[5] = 0;
}
matrixObj.free();
dict->lookup("Resources", &resObj);
resDict = resObj.isDict() ? resObj.getDict() : (Dict *)NULL;
transpGroup = isolated = knockout = gFalse;
blendingColorSpace = NULL;
if (dict->lookup("Group", &obj1)->isDict()) {
if (obj1.dictLookup("S", &obj2)->isName("Transparency")) {
transpGroup = gTrue;
if (!obj1.dictLookup("CS", &obj3)->isNull()) {
blendingColorSpace = GfxColorSpace::parse(&obj3, this);
}
obj3.free();
if (obj1.dictLookup("I", &obj3)->isBool()) {
isolated = obj3.getBool();
}
obj3.free();
if (obj1.dictLookup("K", &obj3)->isBool()) {
knockout = obj3.getBool();
}
obj3.free();
}
obj2.free();
}
obj1.free();
++formDepth;
doForm1(str, resDict, m, bbox,
transpGroup, gFalse, blendingColorSpace, isolated, knockout);
--formDepth;
if (blendingColorSpace) {
delete blendingColorSpace;
}
resObj.free();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: retrieve_from_file (const char *file, bool html, int *count)
{
uerr_t status;
struct urlpos *url_list, *cur_url;
struct iri *iri = iri_new();
char *input_file, *url_file = NULL;
const char *url = file;
status = RETROK; /* Suppose everything is OK. */
*count = 0; /* Reset the URL count. */
/* sXXXav : Assume filename and links in the file are in the locale */
set_uri_encoding (iri, opt.locale, true);
set_content_encoding (iri, opt.locale);
if (url_valid_scheme (url))
{
int dt,url_err;
struct url *url_parsed = url_parse (url, &url_err, iri, true);
if (!url_parsed)
{
char *error = url_error (url, url_err);
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s.\n", url, error);
xfree (error);
iri_free (iri);
return URLERROR;
}
if (!opt.base_href)
opt.base_href = xstrdup (url);
status = retrieve_url (url_parsed, url, &url_file, NULL, NULL, &dt,
false, iri, true);
url_free (url_parsed);
if (!url_file || (status != RETROK))
return status;
if (dt & TEXTHTML)
html = true;
#ifdef ENABLE_IRI
/* If we have a found a content encoding, use it.
* ( == is okay, because we're checking for identical object) */
if (iri->content_encoding != opt.locale)
set_uri_encoding (iri, iri->content_encoding, false);
#endif
/* Reset UTF-8 encode status */
iri->utf8_encode = opt.enable_iri;
xfree (iri->orig_url);
input_file = url_file;
}
else
input_file = (char *) file;
url_list = (html ? get_urls_html (input_file, NULL, NULL, iri)
: get_urls_file (input_file));
xfree (url_file);
for (cur_url = url_list; cur_url; cur_url = cur_url->next, ++*count)
{
char *filename = NULL, *new_file = NULL, *proxy;
int dt = 0;
struct iri *tmpiri = iri_dup (iri);
struct url *parsed_url = NULL;
if (cur_url->ignore_when_downloading)
continue;
if (opt.quota && total_downloaded_bytes > opt.quota)
{
status = QUOTEXC;
break;
}
parsed_url = url_parse (cur_url->url->url, NULL, tmpiri, true);
proxy = getproxy (cur_url->url);
if ((opt.recursive || opt.page_requisites)
&& ((cur_url->url->scheme != SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
&& cur_url->url->scheme != SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
) || proxy))
{
int old_follow_ftp = opt.follow_ftp;
/* Turn opt.follow_ftp on in case of recursive FTP retrieval */
if (cur_url->url->scheme == SCHEME_FTP
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
|| cur_url->url->scheme == SCHEME_FTPS
#endif
)
opt.follow_ftp = 1;
status = retrieve_tree (parsed_url ? parsed_url : cur_url->url,
tmpiri);
opt.follow_ftp = old_follow_ftp;
}
else
status = retrieve_url (parsed_url ? parsed_url : cur_url->url,
cur_url->url->url, &filename,
&new_file, NULL, &dt, opt.recursive, tmpiri,
true);
xfree (proxy);
if (parsed_url)
url_free (parsed_url);
if (filename && opt.delete_after && file_exists_p (filename, NULL))
{
DEBUGP (("\
Removing file due to --delete-after in retrieve_from_file():\n"));
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Removing %s.\n"), filename);
if (unlink (filename))
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "Failed to unlink %s: (%d) %s\n", filename, errno, strerror (errno));
dt &= ~RETROKF;
}
xfree (new_file);
xfree (filename);
iri_free (tmpiri);
}
/* Free the linked list of URL-s. */
free_urlpos (url_list);
iri_free (iri);
return status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int softnet_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &softnet_seq_ops);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_inodecache(void)
{
sock_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sock_inode_cache",
sizeof(struct socket_alloc),
0,
(SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT |
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD | SLAB_ACCOUNT),
init_once);
if (sock_inode_cachep == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 25,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: re_get_entry(struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct file_info *file;
if ((file = iso9660->re_files.first) != NULL) {
iso9660->re_files.first = file->re_next;
if (iso9660->re_files.first == NULL)
iso9660->re_files.last =
&(iso9660->re_files.first);
}
return (file);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 15,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return (1);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp,
SSL_USE_ETM(s))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return (0);
}
s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num *= 2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("server random\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("master key\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],
((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num))
goto err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{
int z;
for (z = 0; z < num; z++)
printf("%02X%c", p[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
/*
* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
* problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
#endif
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 19,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BaseAudioContext::~BaseAudioContext() {
GetDeferredTaskHandler().ContextWillBeDestroyed();
DCHECK(!active_source_nodes_.size());
DCHECK(!is_resolving_resume_promises_);
DCHECK(!resume_resolvers_.size());
DCHECK(!autoplay_status_.has_value());
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct vm_area_struct *remove_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct vm_area_struct *next = vma->vm_next;
might_sleep();
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
vma->vm_ops->close(vma);
if (vma->vm_file)
fput(vma->vm_file);
mpol_put(vma_policy(vma));
vm_area_free(vma);
return next;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 11,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AskAllowCount() { return mock_permission_prompt_factory_->show_count(); }
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | 0 | 20,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen(ecc_key* private_key, ecc_point* point,
byte* out, word32 *outlen)
{
int err;
DECLARE_CURVE_SPECS(2)
if (private_key == NULL || point == NULL || out == NULL ||
outlen == NULL) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
/* load curve info */
err = wc_ecc_curve_load(private_key->dp, &curve,
(ECC_CURVE_FIELD_PRIME | ECC_CURVE_FIELD_AF));
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return err;
#if defined(WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT) && defined(WC_ASYNC_ENABLE_ECC)
if (private_key->asyncDev.marker == WOLFSSL_ASYNC_MARKER_ECC) {
err = wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen_async(private_key, point,
out, outlen, curve);
}
else
#endif
{
err = wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen_sync(private_key, point,
out, outlen, curve);
}
wc_ecc_curve_free(curve);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
sprintf(url_address, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 12,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_pdiscard(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_IN_PKT_DISCARDS);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_libxml_externalSubset(void* user_data, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *ExternalID, const xmlChar *SystemID)
{
raptor_sax2* sax2 = (raptor_sax2*)user_data;
libxml2_externalSubset(sax2->xc, name, ExternalID, SystemID);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int req_log_at(lua_State *L, int level)
{
const char *msg;
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
lua_Debug dbg;
lua_getstack(L, 1, &dbg);
lua_getinfo(L, "Sl", &dbg);
msg = luaL_checkstring(L, 2);
ap_log_rerror(dbg.source, dbg.currentline, APLOG_MODULE_INDEX, level, 0,
r, "%s", msg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_predictor_decoder(APEContext *ctx)
{
APEPredictor *p = &ctx->predictor;
/* Zero the history buffers */
memset(p->historybuffer, 0, PREDICTOR_SIZE * sizeof(*p->historybuffer));
p->buf = p->historybuffer;
/* Initialize and zero the coefficients */
if (ctx->fileversion < 3930) {
if (ctx->compression_level == COMPRESSION_LEVEL_FAST) {
memcpy(p->coeffsA[0], initial_coeffs_fast_3320,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_fast_3320));
memcpy(p->coeffsA[1], initial_coeffs_fast_3320,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_fast_3320));
} else {
memcpy(p->coeffsA[0], initial_coeffs_a_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_a_3800));
memcpy(p->coeffsA[1], initial_coeffs_a_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_a_3800));
}
} else {
memcpy(p->coeffsA[0], initial_coeffs_3930, sizeof(initial_coeffs_3930));
memcpy(p->coeffsA[1], initial_coeffs_3930, sizeof(initial_coeffs_3930));
}
memset(p->coeffsB, 0, sizeof(p->coeffsB));
if (ctx->fileversion < 3930) {
memcpy(p->coeffsB[0], initial_coeffs_b_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_b_3800));
memcpy(p->coeffsB[1], initial_coeffs_b_3800,
sizeof(initial_coeffs_b_3800));
}
p->filterA[0] = p->filterA[1] = 0;
p->filterB[0] = p->filterB[1] = 0;
p->lastA[0] = p->lastA[1] = 0;
p->sample_pos = 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UIResourceManager* LayerTreeHost::GetUIResourceManager() const {
return ui_resource_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 3,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: apprentice_map(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn)
{
int fd;
struct stat st;
uint32_t *ptr;
uint32_t version, entries, nentries;
int needsbyteswap;
char *dbname = NULL;
struct magic_map *map;
size_t i;
fd = -1;
if ((map = CAST(struct magic_map *, calloc(1, sizeof(*map)))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*map));
goto error;
}
dbname = mkdbname(ms, fn, 0);
if (dbname == NULL)
goto error;
if ((fd = open(dbname, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY)) == -1)
goto error;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_error(ms, errno, "cannot stat `%s'", dbname);
goto error;
}
if (st.st_size < 8 || st.st_size > MAXMAGIC_SIZE) {
file_error(ms, 0, "file `%s' is too %s", dbname,
st.st_size < 8 ? "small" : "large");
goto error;
}
map->len = (size_t)st.st_size;
#ifdef QUICK
if ((map->p = mmap(0, (size_t)st.st_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FILE, fd, (off_t)0)) == MAP_FAILED) {
file_error(ms, errno, "cannot map `%s'", dbname);
goto error;
}
#else
if ((map->p = CAST(void *, malloc(map->len))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, map->len);
goto error;
}
if (read(fd, map->p, map->len) != (ssize_t)map->len) {
file_badread(ms);
goto error;
}
map->len = 0;
#define RET 1
#endif
(void)close(fd);
fd = -1;
ptr = CAST(uint32_t *, map->p);
if (*ptr != MAGICNO) {
if (swap4(*ptr) != MAGICNO) {
file_error(ms, 0, "bad magic in `%s'", dbname);
goto error;
}
needsbyteswap = 1;
} else
needsbyteswap = 0;
if (needsbyteswap)
version = swap4(ptr[1]);
else
version = ptr[1];
if (version != VERSIONNO) {
file_error(ms, 0, "File %s supports only version %d magic "
"files. `%s' is version %d", VERSION,
VERSIONNO, dbname, version);
goto error;
}
entries = (uint32_t)(st.st_size / sizeof(struct magic));
if ((off_t)(entries * sizeof(struct magic)) != st.st_size) {
file_error(ms, 0, "Size of `%s' %" INT64_T_FORMAT "u is not "
"a multiple of %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u",
dbname, (unsigned long long)st.st_size,
sizeof(struct magic));
goto error;
}
map->magic[0] = CAST(struct magic *, map->p) + 1;
nentries = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
if (needsbyteswap)
map->nmagic[i] = swap4(ptr[i + 2]);
else
map->nmagic[i] = ptr[i + 2];
if (i != MAGIC_SETS - 1)
map->magic[i + 1] = map->magic[i] + map->nmagic[i];
nentries += map->nmagic[i];
}
if (entries != nentries + 1) {
file_error(ms, 0, "Inconsistent entries in `%s' %u != %u",
dbname, entries, nentries + 1);
goto error;
}
if (needsbyteswap)
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
byteswap(map->magic[i], map->nmagic[i]);
free(dbname);
return map;
error:
if (fd != -1)
(void)close(fd);
apprentice_unmap(map);
free(dbname);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_vs_flush(void)
{
int idx;
struct ip_vs_service *svc, *nxt;
/*
* Flush the service table hashed by <protocol,addr,port>
*/
for(idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(svc, nxt, &ip_vs_svc_table[idx], s_list) {
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
}
/*
* Flush the service table hashed by fwmark
*/
for(idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(svc, nxt,
&ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[idx], f_list) {
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
{
int flags;
int32_t fid;
int64_t size;
ssize_t err = 0;
V9fsString name;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *file_fidp;
V9fsFidState *xattr_fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsqd", &fid, &name, &size, &flags);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrcreate(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, size, flags);
file_fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (file_fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
/* Make the file fid point to xattr */
xattr_fidp = file_fidp;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = 0;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
err = offset;
put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
int open_flag, int mode, int acc_mode)
{
struct file *filp;
struct nameidata nd;
int error;
struct path path, save;
struct dentry *dir;
int count = 0;
int will_truncate;
int flag = open_to_namei_flags(open_flag);
/*
* O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
* check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
* always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
* for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
*/
if (open_flag & __O_SYNC)
open_flag |= O_DSYNC;
if (!acc_mode)
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flag);
/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
if (flag & O_TRUNC)
acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
/* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
access from general write access. */
if (flag & O_APPEND)
acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
/*
* The simplest case - just a plain lookup.
*/
if (!(flag & O_CREAT)) {
filp = get_empty_filp();
if (filp == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
nd.intent.open.file = filp;
filp->f_flags = open_flag;
nd.intent.open.flags = flag;
nd.intent.open.create_mode = 0;
error = do_path_lookup(dfd, pathname,
lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_OPEN, &nd);
if (IS_ERR(nd.intent.open.file)) {
if (error == 0) {
error = PTR_ERR(nd.intent.open.file);
path_put(&nd.path);
}
} else if (error)
release_open_intent(&nd);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
goto ok;
}
/*
* Create - we need to know the parent.
*/
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, LOOKUP_PARENT, &nd);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
error = path_walk(pathname, &nd);
if (error) {
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
audit_inode(pathname, nd.path.dentry);
/*
* We have the parent and last component. First of all, check
* that we are not asked to creat(2) an obvious directory - that
* will not do.
*/
error = -EISDIR;
if (nd.last_type != LAST_NORM || nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
goto exit_parent;
error = -ENFILE;
filp = get_empty_filp();
if (filp == NULL)
goto exit_parent;
nd.intent.open.file = filp;
filp->f_flags = open_flag;
nd.intent.open.flags = flag;
nd.intent.open.create_mode = mode;
dir = nd.path.dentry;
nd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_CREATE | LOOKUP_OPEN;
if (flag & O_EXCL)
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
path.dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
path.mnt = nd.path.mnt;
do_last:
error = PTR_ERR(path.dentry);
if (IS_ERR(path.dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto exit;
}
if (IS_ERR(nd.intent.open.file)) {
error = PTR_ERR(nd.intent.open.file);
goto exit_mutex_unlock;
}
/* Negative dentry, just create the file */
if (!path.dentry->d_inode) {
/*
* This write is needed to ensure that a
* ro->rw transition does not occur between
* the time when the file is created and when
* a permanent write count is taken through
* the 'struct file' in nameidata_to_filp().
*/
error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit_mutex_unlock;
error = __open_namei_create(&nd, &path, flag, mode);
if (error) {
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
goto exit;
}
filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
}
return filp;
}
/*
* It already exists.
*/
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
audit_inode(pathname, path.dentry);
error = -EEXIST;
if (flag & O_EXCL)
goto exit_dput;
if (__follow_mount(&path)) {
error = -ELOOP;
if (flag & O_NOFOLLOW)
goto exit_dput;
}
error = -ENOENT;
if (!path.dentry->d_inode)
goto exit_dput;
if (path.dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link)
goto do_link;
path_to_nameidata(&path, &nd);
error = -EISDIR;
if (S_ISDIR(path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto exit;
ok:
/*
* Consider:
* 1. may_open() truncates a file
* 2. a rw->ro mount transition occurs
* 3. nameidata_to_filp() fails due to
* the ro mount.
* That would be inconsistent, and should
* be avoided. Taking this mnt write here
* ensures that (2) can not occur.
*/
will_truncate = open_will_truncate(flag, nd.path.dentry->d_inode);
if (will_truncate) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit;
}
error = may_open(&nd.path, acc_mode, flag);
if (error) {
if (will_truncate)
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
goto exit;
}
filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
}
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
vfs_dq_init(nd.path.dentry->d_inode);
if (will_truncate) {
error = handle_truncate(&nd.path);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
}
}
/*
* It is now safe to drop the mnt write
* because the filp has had a write taken
* on its behalf.
*/
if (will_truncate)
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
return filp;
exit_mutex_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
exit_dput:
path_put_conditional(&path, &nd);
exit:
if (!IS_ERR(nd.intent.open.file))
release_open_intent(&nd);
exit_parent:
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
path_put(&nd.path);
return ERR_PTR(error);
do_link:
error = -ELOOP;
if (flag & O_NOFOLLOW)
goto exit_dput;
/*
* This is subtle. Instead of calling do_follow_link() we do the
* thing by hands. The reason is that this way we have zero link_count
* and path_walk() (called from ->follow_link) honoring LOOKUP_PARENT.
* After that we have the parent and last component, i.e.
* we are in the same situation as after the first path_walk().
* Well, almost - if the last component is normal we get its copy
* stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we
* are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND.
*/
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
error = security_inode_follow_link(path.dentry, &nd);
if (error)
goto exit_dput;
save = nd.path;
path_get(&save);
error = __do_follow_link(&path, &nd);
if (error == -ESTALE) {
/* nd.path had been dropped */
nd.path = save;
path_get(&nd.path);
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
error = __do_follow_link(&path, &nd);
}
path_put(&save);
path_put(&path);
if (error) {
/* Does someone understand code flow here? Or it is only
* me so stupid? Anathema to whoever designed this non-sense
* with "intent.open".
*/
release_open_intent(&nd);
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
nd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (nd.last_type == LAST_BIND)
goto ok;
error = -EISDIR;
if (nd.last_type != LAST_NORM)
goto exit;
if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len]) {
__putname(nd.last.name);
goto exit;
}
error = -ELOOP;
if (count++==32) {
__putname(nd.last.name);
goto exit;
}
dir = nd.path.dentry;
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
path.dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
path.mnt = nd.path.mnt;
__putname(nd.last.name);
goto do_last;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetElementHandler(XML_Parser parser, XML_StartElementHandler start,
XML_EndElementHandler end) {
if (parser == NULL)
return;
parser->m_startElementHandler = start;
parser->m_endElementHandler = end;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 11,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: showhelp(argv)
char **argv;
{
if (phase == PHASE_INITIALIZE) {
usage();
exit(0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
bool in_memory,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
blob_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
file_system_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
developer_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
chrome_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
chrome_devtools_protocol_handler) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
return profile->CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
partition_path,
in_memory,
blob_protocol_handler.Pass(),
file_system_protocol_handler.Pass(),
developer_protocol_handler.Pass(),
chrome_protocol_handler.Pass(),
chrome_devtools_protocol_handler.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::Callback<bool(const GURL&)>& last_filter() const {
return mock_service_->last_filter();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rtnl_unicast(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 pid)
{
struct sock *rtnl = net->rtnl;
return nlmsg_unicast(rtnl, skb, pid);
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::IncrementCapturerCount(const gfx::Size& capture_size) {
DCHECK(!is_being_destroyed_);
const bool was_captured = IsBeingCaptured();
++capturer_count_;
DVLOG(1) << "There are now " << capturer_count_
<< " capturing(s) of WebContentsImpl@" << this;
if (!capture_size.IsEmpty() && preferred_size_for_capture_.IsEmpty()) {
preferred_size_for_capture_ = capture_size;
OnPreferredSizeChanged(preferred_size_);
}
if (GetVisibility() != Visibility::VISIBLE && !was_captured) {
for (RenderWidgetHostView* view : GetRenderWidgetHostViewsInTree())
view->WasUnOccluded();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 1,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryp_state_free(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, struct tee_cryp_state *cs)
{
struct tee_obj *o;
if (tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o) == TEE_SUCCESS)
tee_obj_close(utc, o);
if (tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key2, &o) == TEE_SUCCESS)
tee_obj_close(utc, o);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&utc->cryp_states, cs, link);
if (cs->ctx_finalize != NULL)
cs->ctx_finalize(cs->ctx, cs->algo);
switch (TEE_ALG_GET_CLASS(cs->algo)) {
case TEE_OPERATION_CIPHER:
crypto_cipher_free_ctx(cs->ctx, cs->algo);
break;
case TEE_OPERATION_AE:
crypto_authenc_free_ctx(cs->ctx, cs->algo);
break;
case TEE_OPERATION_DIGEST:
crypto_hash_free_ctx(cs->ctx, cs->algo);
break;
case TEE_OPERATION_MAC:
crypto_mac_free_ctx(cs->ctx, cs->algo);
break;
default:
assert(!cs->ctx);
}
free(cs);
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NetworkChangeNotifierMac::~NetworkChangeNotifierMac() {
config_watcher_.reset();
if (reachability_.get() && run_loop_.get()) {
SCNetworkReachabilityUnscheduleFromRunLoop(reachability_.get(),
run_loop_.get(),
kCFRunLoopCommonModes);
}
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 24,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Flush() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DVLOG(1) << "DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Flush";
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Unexpected decoder state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_COMMAND_DRAIN, 0),
"Failed to send drain message", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
while (state_ != kStopped) {
DoDecode();
}
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyFlushDone, this));
state_ = kNormal;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct kiocb iocb;
struct sock_iocb siocb;
int ret;
init_sync_kiocb(&iocb, NULL);
iocb.private = &siocb;
ret = __sock_sendmsg(&iocb, sock, msg, size);
if (-EIOCBQUEUED == ret)
ret = wait_on_sync_kiocb(&iocb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp)
{
Sg_scatter_hold *req_schp = &srp->data;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, srp->parentfp->parentdp,
"sg_unlink_reserve: req->k_use_sg=%d\n",
(int) req_schp->k_use_sg));
req_schp->k_use_sg = 0;
req_schp->bufflen = 0;
req_schp->pages = NULL;
req_schp->page_order = 0;
req_schp->sglist_len = 0;
srp->res_used = 0;
/* Called without mutex lock to avoid deadlock */
sfp->res_in_use = 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API ZEND_FUNCTION(display_disabled_function)
{
zend_error(E_WARNING, "%s() has been disabled for security reasons", get_active_function_name(TSRMLS_C));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp)
{
const struct path *path = &filp->f_path;
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
int error = get_write_access(inode);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them.
*/
error = locks_verify_locked(filp);
if (!error)
error = security_path_truncate(path);
if (!error) {
error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0,
ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
filp);
}
put_write_access(inode);
return error;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptableObject(v8::Isolate* isolate,
base::WeakPtr<MimeHandlerViewContainer> container)
: gin::NamedPropertyInterceptor(isolate, this),
container_(container) {}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long tun_chr_compat_ioctl(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case TUNSETIFF:
case TUNGETIFF:
case TUNSETTXFILTER:
case TUNGETSNDBUF:
case TUNSETSNDBUF:
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
arg = (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg);
break;
default:
arg = (compat_ulong_t)arg;
break;
}
/*
* compat_ifreq is shorter than ifreq, so we must not access beyond
* the end of that structure. All fields that are used in this
* driver are compatible though, we don't need to convert the
* contents.
*/
return __tun_chr_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, sizeof(struct compat_ifreq));
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoginPromptObserver() : auth_handled_(false) {}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fsmChmod(const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
int rc = chmod(path, (mode & 07777));
if (rc < 0) {
struct stat st;
if (lstat(path, &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & 07777) == (mode & 07777))
rc = 0;
}
if (_fsm_debug)
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, " %8s (%s, 0%04o) %s\n", __func__,
path, (unsigned)(mode & 07777),
(rc < 0 ? strerror(errno) : ""));
if (rc < 0) rc = RPMERR_CHMOD_FAILED;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 26,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_EVEN( INS_ARG )
{
if ( (CUR_Func_round( args[0], 0L ) & 127) == 0 )
args[0] = 1;
else
args[0] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcopy(struct magic_set *ms, union VALUETYPE *p, int type, int indir,
const unsigned char *s, uint32_t offset, size_t nbytes, size_t linecnt)
{
/*
* Note: FILE_SEARCH and FILE_REGEX do not actually copy
* anything, but setup pointers into the source
*/
if (indir == 0) {
switch (type) {
case FILE_SEARCH:
ms->search.s = RCAST(const char *, s) + offset;
ms->search.s_len = nbytes - offset;
ms->search.offset = offset;
return 0;
case FILE_REGEX: {
const char *b;
const char *c;
const char *last; /* end of search region */
const char *buf; /* start of search region */
const char *end;
size_t lines;
if (s == NULL) {
ms->search.s_len = 0;
ms->search.s = NULL;
return 0;
}
buf = RCAST(const char *, s) + offset;
end = last = RCAST(const char *, s) + nbytes;
/* mget() guarantees buf <= last */
for (lines = linecnt, b = buf; lines && b < end &&
((b = CAST(const char *,
memchr(c = b, '\n', CAST(size_t, (end - b)))))
|| (b = CAST(const char *,
memchr(c, '\r', CAST(size_t, (end - c))))));
lines--, b++) {
last = b;
if (b[0] == '\r' && b[1] == '\n')
b++;
}
if (lines)
last = RCAST(const char *, s) + nbytes;
ms->search.s = buf;
ms->search.s_len = last - buf;
ms->search.offset = offset;
ms->search.rm_len = 0;
return 0;
}
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
const unsigned char *src = s + offset;
const unsigned char *esrc = s + nbytes;
char *dst = p->s;
char *edst = &p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1];
if (type == FILE_BESTRING16)
src++;
/* check that offset is within range */
if (offset >= nbytes)
break;
for (/*EMPTY*/; src < esrc; src += 2, dst++) {
if (dst < edst)
*dst = *src;
else
break;
if (*dst == '\0') {
if (type == FILE_BESTRING16 ?
*(src - 1) != '\0' :
*(src + 1) != '\0')
*dst = ' ';
}
}
*edst = '\0';
return 0;
}
case FILE_STRING: /* XXX - these two should not need */
case FILE_PSTRING: /* to copy anything, but do anyway. */
default:
break;
}
}
if (offset >= nbytes) {
(void)memset(p, '\0', sizeof(*p));
return 0;
}
if (nbytes - offset < sizeof(*p))
nbytes = nbytes - offset;
else
nbytes = sizeof(*p);
(void)memcpy(p, s + offset, nbytes);
/*
* the usefulness of padding with zeroes eludes me, it
* might even cause problems
*/
if (nbytes < sizeof(*p))
(void)memset(((char *)(void *)p) + nbytes, '\0',
sizeof(*p) - nbytes);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int mach, int strtab, int *flags,
uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
ssize_t namesize;
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, CAST(off_t, (off + size * strtab)))
< (ssize_t)xsh_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if ((namesize = pread(fd, name, sizeof(name) - 1, name_off + xsh_name)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[namesize] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xsh_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((uintmax_t)(xsh_size + xsh_offset) >
(uintmax_t)fsize) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", note offset/size 0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT
"x+0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x exceeds"
" file size 0x%" INTMAX_T_FORMAT "x",
(uintmax_t)xsh_offset, (uintmax_t)xsh_size,
(uintmax_t)fsize) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) <
(ssize_t)xsh_size) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags, notecount,
fd, 0, 0, 0);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Extend build-id reporting to 8-byte IDs that lld can generate (Ed Maste)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UniqueElementData::UniqueElementData()
{
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaintPropertyTreeBuilder::ObjectTypeMightNeedPaintProperties() const {
return object_.IsBoxModelObject() || object_.IsSVG() ||
context_.painting_layer->EnclosingPaginationLayer() ||
context_.is_repeating_table_section ||
context_.is_repeating_fixed_position;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool floppy_available(int drive)
{
if (!(allowed_drive_mask & (1 << drive)))
return false;
if (fdc_state[FDC(drive)].version == FDC_NONE)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx(void *ctx, u8 *out,
const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv,
u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx;
if ((plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)){
aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad,
aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
} else {
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, hash_subkey);
aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, aad,
aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,180 |
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