instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFShape_drawScaledLineTo(SWFShape shape, int x, int y)
{
SWFShape_drawScaledLine(shape, x-shape->xpos, y-shape->ypos);
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct netdev_queue *netdev_pick_tx(struct net_device *dev,
struct sk_buff *skb,
void *accel_priv)
{
int queue_index = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_XPS
u32 sender_cpu = skb->sender_cpu - 1;
if (sender_cpu >= (u32)NR_CPUS)
skb->sender_cpu = raw_smp_processor_id() + 1;
#endif
if (dev->real_num_tx_queues != 1) {
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
if (ops->ndo_select_queue)
queue_index = ops->ndo_select_queue(dev, skb, accel_priv,
__netdev_pick_tx);
else
queue_index = __netdev_pick_tx(dev, skb);
if (!accel_priv)
queue_index = netdev_cap_txqueue(dev, queue_index);
}
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_index);
return netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, queue_index);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 20,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_and_bind(const char *host, const char *port, int protocol)
{
struct addrinfo hints;
struct addrinfo *result, *rp, *ipv4v6bindall;
int s, listen_sock = -1;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; /* Return IPv4 and IPv6 choices */
hints.ai_socktype = protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ?
SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM; /* We want a TCP or UDP socket */
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_ADDRCONFIG; /* For wildcard IP address */
hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
s = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &result);
if (s != 0) {
LOGE("getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(s));
return -1;
}
rp = result;
/*
* On Linux, with net.ipv6.bindv6only = 0 (the default), getaddrinfo(NULL) with
* AI_PASSIVE returns 0.0.0.0 and :: (in this order). AI_PASSIVE was meant to
* return a list of addresses to listen on, but it is impossible to listen on
* 0.0.0.0 and :: at the same time, if :: implies dualstack mode.
*/
if (!host) {
ipv4v6bindall = result;
/* Loop over all address infos found until a IPV6 address is found. */
while (ipv4v6bindall) {
if (ipv4v6bindall->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
rp = ipv4v6bindall; /* Take first IPV6 address available */
break;
}
ipv4v6bindall = ipv4v6bindall->ai_next; /* Get next address info, if any */
}
}
for (/*rp = result*/; rp != NULL; rp = rp->ai_next) {
listen_sock = socket(rp->ai_family, rp->ai_socktype, rp->ai_protocol);
if (listen_sock == -1) {
continue;
}
if (rp->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
int ipv6only = host ? 1 : 0;
setsockopt(listen_sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &ipv6only, sizeof(ipv6only));
}
int opt = 1;
setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &opt, sizeof(opt));
#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, &opt, sizeof(opt));
#endif
s = bind(listen_sock, rp->ai_addr, rp->ai_addrlen);
if (s == 0) {
/* We managed to bind successfully! */
close(listen_sock);
break;
} else {
ERROR("bind");
}
}
if (!result) {
freeaddrinfo(result);
}
if (rp == NULL) {
LOGE("Could not bind");
return -1;
}
return listen_sock;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 23,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hugetlb_vm_op_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct resv_map *reservations = vma_resv_map(vma);
/*
* This new VMA should share its siblings reservation map if present.
* The VMA will only ever have a valid reservation map pointer where
* it is being copied for another still existing VMA. As that VMA
* has a reference to the reservation map it cannot disappear until
* after this open call completes. It is therefore safe to take a
* new reference here without additional locking.
*/
if (reservations)
kref_get(&reservations->refs);
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fsck_finish(struct fsck_options *options)
{
int ret = 0;
struct oidset_iter iter;
const struct object_id *oid;
oidset_iter_init(&gitmodules_found, &iter);
while ((oid = oidset_iter_next(&iter))) {
struct blob *blob;
enum object_type type;
unsigned long size;
char *buf;
if (oidset_contains(&gitmodules_done, oid))
continue;
blob = lookup_blob(oid);
if (!blob) {
ret |= report(options, &blob->object,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_BLOB,
"non-blob found at .gitmodules");
continue;
}
buf = read_sha1_file(oid->hash, &type, &size);
if (!buf) {
if (is_promisor_object(&blob->object.oid))
continue;
ret |= report(options, &blob->object,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_MISSING,
"unable to read .gitmodules blob");
continue;
}
if (type == OBJ_BLOB)
ret |= fsck_blob(blob, buf, size, options);
else
ret |= report(options, &blob->object,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_BLOB,
"non-blob found at .gitmodules");
free(buf);
}
oidset_clear(&gitmodules_found);
oidset_clear(&gitmodules_done);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *revealextraspc(char * const s_)
{
unsigned char *s = (unsigned char *) s_;
unsigned char *sn;
if (s == NULL) {
return s_;
}
simplify(s_);
while (*s != 0U && isspace(*s)) {
*s++ = '_';
}
if (*s == 0U) {
return s_;
}
sn = s;
do {
sn++;
} while (*sn != 0U);
do {
sn--;
if (!isspace(*sn)) {
break;
}
*sn = '_';
} while (sn != s);
return s_;
}
Commit Message: Flush the command buffer after switching to TLS.
Fixes a flaw similar to CVE-2011-0411.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err dac3_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_AC3ConfigBox *ptr = (GF_AC3ConfigBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (ptr->cfg.is_ec3) {
u32 i;
ptr->cfg.brcode = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 13);
ptr->cfg.nb_streams = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3) + 1;
for (i=0; i<ptr->cfg.nb_streams; i++) {
ptr->cfg.streams[i].fscod = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptr->cfg.streams[i].bsid = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->cfg.streams[i].bsmod = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->cfg.streams[i].acmod = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
ptr->cfg.streams[i].lfon = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
ptr->cfg.streams[i].nb_dep_sub = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 4);
if (ptr->cfg.streams[i].nb_dep_sub) {
ptr->cfg.streams[i].chan_loc = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 9);
} else {
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
}
}
} else {
ptr->cfg.nb_streams = 1;
ptr->cfg.streams[0].fscod = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptr->cfg.streams[0].bsid = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->cfg.streams[0].bsmod = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
ptr->cfg.streams[0].acmod = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
ptr->cfg.streams[0].lfon = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptr->cfg.brcode = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamImpl::VideoRendererWrapper::SetVideoDecoder(
RTCVideoDecoder* decoder) {
rtc_video_decoder_ = decoder;
}
Commit Message: Explicitly stopping thread in MediaStreamImpl dtor to avoid any racing issues.
This may solve the below bugs.
BUG=112408,111202
TEST=content_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9307058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120222 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS smb1cli_session_protect_session_key(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
if (session->smb1.protected_key) {
/* already protected */
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (session->smb1.application_key.length != 16) {
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX;
}
smb_key_derivation(session->smb1.application_key.data,
session->smb1.application_key.length,
session->smb1.application_key.data);
session->smb1.protected_key = true;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockNetworkLayer::TransactionStopCaching() {
stop_caching_called_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::send(Blob* body, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!initSend(es))
return;
if (areMethodAndURLValidForSend()) {
const String& contentType = getRequestHeader("Content-Type");
if (contentType.isEmpty()) {
const String& blobType = body->type();
if (!blobType.isEmpty() && isValidContentType(blobType))
setRequestHeaderInternal("Content-Type", blobType);
else {
setRequestHeaderInternal("Content-Type", "");
}
}
m_requestEntityBody = FormData::create();
if (body->isFile())
m_requestEntityBody->appendFile(toFile(body)->path());
else
m_requestEntityBody->appendBlob(body->url());
}
createRequest(es);
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 17,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_sregs *sregs)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RunLoop::Delegate::Client::IsNested() const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(outer_->bound_thread_checker_);
DCHECK(outer_->bound_);
return outer_->active_run_loops_.size() > 1;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct socket *sock_from_file(struct file *file, int *err)
{
if (file->f_op == &socket_file_ops)
return file->private_data; /* set in sock_map_fd */
*err = -ENOTSOCK;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 16,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: View* GetFocusedView() {
return widget_->GetFocusManager()->GetFocusedView();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::dispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(ChromeClient& chromeClient, bool& didAllowNavigation)
{
if (!m_domWindow)
return true;
if (!body())
return true;
if (processingBeforeUnload())
return false;
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> protect(this);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<BeforeUnloadEvent> beforeUnloadEvent = BeforeUnloadEvent::create();
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventInProgress;
m_domWindow->dispatchEvent(beforeUnloadEvent.get(), this);
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventCompleted;
if (!beforeUnloadEvent->defaultPrevented())
defaultEventHandler(beforeUnloadEvent.get());
if (!frame() || beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue().isNull())
return true;
if (didAllowNavigation) {
addConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::create(JSMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Blocked attempt to show multiple 'beforeunload' confirmation panels for a single navigation."));
return true;
}
String text = beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue();
if (chromeClient.openBeforeUnloadConfirmPanel(text, m_frame)) {
didAllowNavigation = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline const char *GetCINProperty(const ImageInfo *image_info,
const Image *image,const char *property,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*value;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,property);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
return(value);
return(GetImageProperty(image,property,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 19,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadMNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
return(ReadPNGImage(image_info,exception));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportDirectiveAsSourceExpression(
const String& directive_name,
const String& source_expression) {
String message = "The Content Security Policy directive '" + directive_name +
"' contains '" + source_expression +
"' as a source expression. Did you mean '" + directive_name +
" ...; " + source_expression + "...' (note the semicolon)?";
LogToConsole(message);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AwLocaleManager* AwMainDelegate::CreateAwLocaleManager() {
return new AwLocaleManagerImpl();
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::OnExternalExtensionFileFound(
const std::string& id,
const Version* version,
const FilePath& path,
Extension::Location location) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
CHECK(Extension::IdIsValid(id));
if (extension_prefs_->IsExternalExtensionUninstalled(id))
return;
DCHECK(version);
const Extension* existing = GetExtensionById(id, true);
if (existing) {
switch (existing->version()->CompareTo(*version)) {
case -1: // existing version is older, we should upgrade
break;
case 0: // existing version is same, do nothing
return;
case 1: // existing version is newer, uh-oh
LOG(WARNING) << "Found external version of extension " << id
<< "that is older than current version. Current version "
<< "is: " << existing->VersionString() << ". New version "
<< "is: " << version << ". Keeping current version.";
return;
}
}
pending_extension_manager()->AddFromExternalFile(id, location);
scoped_refptr<CrxInstaller> installer(MakeCrxInstaller(NULL));
installer->set_install_source(location);
installer->set_expected_id(id);
installer->set_expected_version(*version);
installer->set_install_cause(extension_misc::INSTALL_CAUSE_EXTERNAL_FILE);
installer->InstallCrx(path);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessWebContents::Builder::Builder(
HeadlessBrowserContextImpl* browser_context)
: browser_context_(browser_context),
window_size_(browser_context->options()->window_size()) {}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 6,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevtoolsInterceptionWithAuthProxyTest()
: proxy_server_(net::SpawnedTestServer::TYPE_BASIC_AUTH_PROXY,
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("headless/test/data"))) {
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool XSSAuditor::FilterObjectToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request) {
DCHECK_EQ(request.token.GetType(), HTMLToken::kStartTag);
DCHECK(HasName(request.token, objectTag));
bool did_block_script = false;
if (IsContainedInRequest(CanonicalizedSnippetForTagName(request))) {
did_block_script |= EraseAttributeIfInjected(
request, dataAttr, BlankURL().GetString(), kSrcLikeAttributeTruncation);
did_block_script |= EraseAttributeIfInjected(request, typeAttr);
did_block_script |= EraseAttributeIfInjected(request, classidAttr);
}
return did_block_script;
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 3,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bgp_header_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, int length)
{
struct bgp bgp;
ND_TCHECK2(dat[0], BGP_SIZE);
memcpy(&bgp, dat, BGP_SIZE);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s Message (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_msg_values, "Unknown", bgp.bgp_type),
bgp.bgp_type,
length));
switch (bgp.bgp_type) {
case BGP_OPEN:
bgp_open_print(ndo, dat, length);
break;
case BGP_UPDATE:
bgp_update_print(ndo, dat, length);
break;
case BGP_NOTIFICATION:
bgp_notification_print(ndo, dat, length);
break;
case BGP_KEEPALIVE:
break;
case BGP_ROUTE_REFRESH:
bgp_route_refresh_print(ndo, dat, length);
break;
default:
/* we have no decoder for the BGP message */
ND_TCHECK2(*dat, length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Message %u decoder", bgp.bgp_type));
print_unknown_data(ndo, dat, "\n\t ", length);
break;
}
return 1;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|BGP]"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13053/BGP: fix VPN route target bounds checks
decode_rt_routing_info() didn't check bounds before fetching 4 octets of
the origin AS field and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
It also fetched the varying number of octets of the route target field
from 4 octets lower than the correct offset, put it right.
It also used the same temporary buffer explicitly through as_printf()
and implicitly through bgp_vpn_rd_print() so the end result of snprintf()
was not what was originally intended.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 7,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: show_hidden_files_changed_callback (gpointer callback_data)
{
show_hidden_files = g_settings_get_boolean (gtk_filechooser_preferences, NAUTILUS_PREFERENCES_SHOW_HIDDEN_FILES);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatA32F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing,
float,
float>(const float* source,
float* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = source[3];
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 29,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenImportSettingsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Import_ShowDlg"));
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kImportDataSubPage);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gMemReport(FILE *f) {
GMemHdr *p;
fprintf(f, "%d memory allocations in all\n", gMemIndex);
if (gMemAlloc > 0) {
fprintf(f, "%d memory blocks left allocated:\n", gMemAlloc);
fprintf(f, " index size\n");
fprintf(f, "-------- --------\n");
for (p = gMemHead; p; p = p->next) {
fprintf(f, "%8d %8d\n", p->index, p->size);
}
} else {
fprintf(f, "No memory blocks left allocated\n");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(setsockopt, int, fd, int, level, int, optname,
char __user *, optval, int, optlen)
{
int err, fput_needed;
struct socket *sock;
if (optlen < 0)
return -EINVAL;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock != NULL) {
err = security_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
if (err)
goto out_put;
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
err =
sock_setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval,
optlen);
else
err =
sock->ops->setsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval,
optlen);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<AccessibilityUIElement> AccessibilityUIElement::elementAtPoint(int x, int y)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RenderBlock::columnGap() const
{
if (style()->hasNormalColumnGap())
return style()->fontDescription().computedPixelSize(); // "1em" is recommended as the normal gap setting. Matches <p> margins.
return static_cast<int>(style()->columnGap());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qeth_init_qdio_out_buf(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *q, int bidx)
{
int rc;
struct qeth_qdio_out_buffer *newbuf;
rc = 0;
newbuf = kmem_cache_zalloc(qeth_qdio_outbuf_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!newbuf) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
newbuf->buffer = &q->qdio_bufs[bidx];
skb_queue_head_init(&newbuf->skb_list);
lockdep_set_class(&newbuf->skb_list.lock, &qdio_out_skb_queue_key);
newbuf->q = q;
newbuf->aob = NULL;
newbuf->next_pending = q->bufs[bidx];
atomic_set(&newbuf->state, QETH_QDIO_BUF_EMPTY);
q->bufs[bidx] = newbuf;
if (q->bufstates) {
q->bufstates[bidx].user = newbuf;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "nbs%d", bidx);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "%lx", (long) newbuf);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 2, "%lx",
(long) newbuf->next_pending);
}
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 11,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t reclaim_account_store(struct kmem_cache *s,
const char *buf, size_t length)
{
s->flags &= ~SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT;
if (buf[0] == '1')
s->flags |= SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT;
return length;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 15,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void zend_shared_alloc_save_state(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ZSMMG(shared_segments_count); i++) {
ZSMMG(shared_memory_state).positions[i] = ZSMMG(shared_segments)[i]->pos;
}
ZSMMG(shared_memory_state).shared_free = ZSMMG(shared_free);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::MultiDrawArraysInstancedWEBGLHelper(
GLenum mode,
const GLint* firsts,
const GLsizei* counts,
const GLsizei* instance_counts,
GLsizei drawcount) {
DCHECK_GT(drawcount, 0);
uint32_t buffer_size =
ComputeCombinedCopySize(drawcount, firsts, counts, instance_counts);
ScopedTransferBufferPtr buffer(buffer_size, helper_, transfer_buffer_);
helper_->MultiDrawBeginCHROMIUM(drawcount);
auto DoMultiDraw = [&](const std::array<uint32_t, 3>& offsets, uint32_t,
uint32_t copy_count) {
helper_->MultiDrawArraysInstancedCHROMIUM(
mode, buffer.shm_id(), buffer.offset() + offsets[0], buffer.shm_id(),
buffer.offset() + offsets[1], buffer.shm_id(),
buffer.offset() + offsets[2], copy_count);
};
if (!TransferArraysAndExecute(drawcount, &buffer, DoMultiDraw, firsts, counts,
instance_counts)) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glMultiDrawArraysInstancedWEBGL",
"out of memory");
}
helper_->MultiDrawEndCHROMIUM();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 3,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::willWriteSelectionToPasteboard(WebCore::Range*)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mpeg4_decode_partitioned_mb(MpegEncContext *s, int16_t block[6][64])
{
Mpeg4DecContext *ctx = s->avctx->priv_data;
int cbp, mb_type;
const int xy = s->mb_x + s->mb_y * s->mb_stride;
av_assert2(s == (void*)ctx);
mb_type = s->current_picture.mb_type[xy];
cbp = s->cbp_table[xy];
ctx->use_intra_dc_vlc = s->qscale < ctx->intra_dc_threshold;
if (s->current_picture.qscale_table[xy] != s->qscale)
ff_set_qscale(s, s->current_picture.qscale_table[xy]);
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P ||
s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_S) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
s->mv[0][i][0] = s->current_picture.motion_val[0][s->block_index[i]][0];
s->mv[0][i][1] = s->current_picture.motion_val[0][s->block_index[i]][1];
}
s->mb_intra = IS_INTRA(mb_type);
if (IS_SKIP(mb_type)) {
/* skip mb */
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
s->block_last_index[i] = -1;
s->mv_dir = MV_DIR_FORWARD;
s->mv_type = MV_TYPE_16X16;
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_S
&& ctx->vol_sprite_usage == GMC_SPRITE) {
s->mcsel = 1;
s->mb_skipped = 0;
} else {
s->mcsel = 0;
s->mb_skipped = 1;
}
} else if (s->mb_intra) {
s->ac_pred = IS_ACPRED(s->current_picture.mb_type[xy]);
} else if (!s->mb_intra) {
s->mv_dir = MV_DIR_FORWARD;
if (IS_8X8(mb_type)) {
s->mv_type = MV_TYPE_8X8;
} else {
s->mv_type = MV_TYPE_16X16;
}
}
} else { /* I-Frame */
s->mb_intra = 1;
s->ac_pred = IS_ACPRED(s->current_picture.mb_type[xy]);
}
if (!IS_SKIP(mb_type)) {
int i;
s->bdsp.clear_blocks(s->block[0]);
/* decode each block */
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
if (mpeg4_decode_block(ctx, block[i], i, cbp & 32, s->mb_intra, ctx->rvlc) < 0) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"texture corrupted at %d %d %d\n",
s->mb_x, s->mb_y, s->mb_intra);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
cbp += cbp;
}
}
/* per-MB end of slice check */
if (--s->mb_num_left <= 0) {
if (mpeg4_is_resync(ctx))
return SLICE_END;
else
return SLICE_NOEND;
} else {
if (mpeg4_is_resync(ctx)) {
const int delta = s->mb_x + 1 == s->mb_width ? 2 : 1;
if (s->cbp_table[xy + delta])
return SLICE_END;
}
return SLICE_OK;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmcs_clear(struct vmcs *vmcs)
{
u64 phys_addr = __pa(vmcs);
u8 error;
asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMCLEAR_RAX) "; setna %0"
: "=qm"(error) : "a"(&phys_addr), "m"(phys_addr)
: "cc", "memory");
if (error)
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: vmclear fail: %p/%llx\n",
vmcs, phys_addr);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool tcp_ack_update_rtt(struct sock *sk, const int flag,
long seq_rtt_us, long sack_rtt_us,
long ca_rtt_us)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
/* Prefer RTT measured from ACK's timing to TS-ECR. This is because
* broken middle-boxes or peers may corrupt TS-ECR fields. But
* Karn's algorithm forbids taking RTT if some retransmitted data
* is acked (RFC6298).
*/
if (seq_rtt_us < 0)
seq_rtt_us = sack_rtt_us;
/* RTTM Rule: A TSecr value received in a segment is used to
* update the averaged RTT measurement only if the segment
* acknowledges some new data, i.e., only if it advances the
* left edge of the send window.
* See draft-ietf-tcplw-high-performance-00, section 3.3.
*/
if (seq_rtt_us < 0 && tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp && tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr &&
flag & FLAG_ACKED)
seq_rtt_us = ca_rtt_us = jiffies_to_usecs(tcp_time_stamp -
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr);
if (seq_rtt_us < 0)
return false;
/* ca_rtt_us >= 0 is counting on the invariant that ca_rtt_us is
* always taken together with ACK, SACK, or TS-opts. Any negative
* values will be skipped with the seq_rtt_us < 0 check above.
*/
tcp_update_rtt_min(sk, ca_rtt_us);
tcp_rtt_estimator(sk, seq_rtt_us);
tcp_set_rto(sk);
/* RFC6298: only reset backoff on valid RTT measurement. */
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_backoff = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::didChangeIcon(WebFrame* frame, WebIconURL::Type type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidChangeIcon(frame, type));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_update_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
kvm_x86_ops->set_dr6(vcpu, vcpu->arch.dr6);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 22,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginServiceImpl::OnWaitableEventSignaled(
base::WaitableEvent* waitable_event) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (waitable_event == hkcu_event_.get()) {
hkcu_key_.StartWatching();
} else {
hklm_key_.StartWatching();
}
plugin_list_->RefreshPlugins();
PurgePluginListCache(NULL, false);
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 22,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethod(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->voidMethod();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpu_attach_domain(struct sched_domain *sd, struct root_domain *rd, int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct sched_domain *tmp;
/* Remove the sched domains which do not contribute to scheduling. */
for (tmp = sd; tmp; ) {
struct sched_domain *parent = tmp->parent;
if (!parent)
break;
if (sd_parent_degenerate(tmp, parent)) {
tmp->parent = parent->parent;
if (parent->parent)
parent->parent->child = tmp;
destroy_sched_domain(parent, cpu);
} else
tmp = tmp->parent;
}
if (sd && sd_degenerate(sd)) {
tmp = sd;
sd = sd->parent;
destroy_sched_domain(tmp, cpu);
if (sd)
sd->child = NULL;
}
sched_domain_debug(sd, cpu);
rq_attach_root(rq, rd);
tmp = rq->sd;
rcu_assign_pointer(rq->sd, sd);
destroy_sched_domains(tmp, cpu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool cmd_nop(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 FormatUrl(const GURL& url,
FormatUrlTypes format_types,
net::UnescapeRule::Type unescape_rules,
url::Parsed* new_parsed,
size_t* prefix_end,
size_t* offset_for_adjustment) {
base::OffsetAdjuster::Adjustments adjustments;
base::string16 result = FormatUrlWithAdjustments(
url, format_types, unescape_rules, new_parsed, prefix_end, &adjustments);
if (offset_for_adjustment) {
base::OffsetAdjuster::AdjustOffset(adjustments, offset_for_adjustment,
result.length());
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t GLES2Util::CalcClearBufferfvDataCount(int buffer) {
switch (buffer) {
case GL_COLOR:
return 4;
case GL_DEPTH:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 28,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Renegotiation - fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
/*
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endif
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool signal_has_si_addr(int sig) {
switch (sig) {
case SIGBUS:
case SIGFPE:
case SIGILL:
case SIGSEGV:
case SIGTRAP:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create tombstone directory.
Partial backport of cf79748.
Bug: http://b/26403620
Change-Id: Ib877ab6cfab6aef079830c5a50ba81141ead35ee
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameSubmissionObserver::Quit() {
if (run_loop_)
run_loop_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MXFPackage* mxf_resolve_source_package(MXFContext *mxf, UID package_uid)
{
MXFPackage *package = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < mxf->packages_count; i++) {
package = mxf_resolve_strong_ref(mxf, &mxf->packages_refs[i], SourcePackage);
if (!package)
continue;
if (!memcmp(package->package_uid, package_uid, 16))
return package;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 26,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::didChangeContentsSize(const QSize& newSize)
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
if (isTransitioningToNewPage) {
postTransitionState->contentsSize = newSize;
return;
}
pageView->setContentsSize(newSize);
q->experimental()->viewportInfo()->didUpdateContentsSize();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::FrameScheduledNavigation(LocalFrame* frame,
ScheduledNavigation*) {
String frame_id = IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame);
frames_with_scheduled_navigation_.insert(frame_id);
if (!frames_with_scheduled_client_navigation_.Contains(frame_id)) {
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.Set(
frame_id,
BuildInitiatorObject(frame->GetDocument(), FetchInitiatorInfo()));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::scheduleStyleRecalc()
{
if (shouldDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent()) {
ownerElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
ownerElement()->document()->scheduleStyleRecalc();
return;
}
if (m_styleRecalcTimer.isActive() || inPageCache())
return;
ASSERT(childNeedsStyleRecalc() || m_pendingStyleRecalcShouldForce);
if (!documentsThatNeedStyleRecalc)
documentsThatNeedStyleRecalc = new HashSet<Document*>;
documentsThatNeedStyleRecalc->add(this);
invalidateAccessKeyMap();
m_styleRecalcTimer.startOneShot(0);
InspectorInstrumentation::didScheduleStyleRecalculation(this);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double WebMediaPlayerMS::CurrentTime() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const base::TimeDelta current_time = compositor_->GetCurrentTime();
if (current_time.ToInternalValue() != 0)
return current_time.InSecondsF();
else if (audio_renderer_.get())
return audio_renderer_->GetCurrentRenderTime().InSecondsF();
return 0.0;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 26,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mailimf_cc_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, struct mailimf_cc ** result)
{
struct mailimf_address_list * addr_list;
struct mailimf_cc * cc;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token, "Cc");
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_address_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &addr_list);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_addr_list;
}
cc = mailimf_cc_new(addr_list);
if (cc == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_addr_list;
}
* result = cc;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_addr_list:
mailimf_address_list_free(addr_list);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 4,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kwsalloc (char const *trans)
{
struct kwset *kwset;
kwset = (struct kwset *) malloc(sizeof (struct kwset));
if (!kwset)
return NULL;
obstack_init(&kwset->obstack);
kwset->words = 0;
kwset->trie
= (struct trie *) obstack_alloc(&kwset->obstack, sizeof (struct trie));
if (!kwset->trie)
{
kwsfree((kwset_t) kwset);
return NULL;
}
kwset->trie->accepting = 0;
kwset->trie->links = NULL;
kwset->trie->parent = NULL;
kwset->trie->next = NULL;
kwset->trie->fail = NULL;
kwset->trie->depth = 0;
kwset->trie->shift = 0;
kwset->mind = INT_MAX;
kwset->maxd = -1;
kwset->target = NULL;
kwset->trans = trans;
return (kwset_t) kwset;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ps_sd *ps_sd_lookup(ps_mm *data, const char *key, int rw)
{
php_uint32 hv, slot;
ps_sd *ret, *prev;
hv = ps_sd_hash(key, strlen(key));
slot = hv & data->hash_max;
for (prev = NULL, ret = data->hash[slot]; ret; prev = ret, ret = ret->next) {
if (ret->hv == hv && !strcmp(ret->key, key)) {
break;
}
}
if (ret && rw && ret != data->hash[slot]) {
/* Move the entry to the top of the linked list */
if (prev) {
prev->next = ret->next;
}
ret->next = data->hash[slot];
data->hash[slot] = ret;
}
ps_mm_debug(("lookup(%s): ret=%p,hv=%u,slot=%d\n", key, ret, hv, slot));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int equalizer_get_parameter(effect_context_t *context, effect_param_t *p,
uint32_t *size)
{
equalizer_context_t *eq_ctxt = (equalizer_context_t *)context;
int voffset = ((p->psize - 1) / sizeof(int32_t) + 1) * sizeof(int32_t);
int32_t *param_tmp = (int32_t *)p->data;
int32_t param = *param_tmp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
void *value = p->data + voffset;
int i;
ALOGV("%s", __func__);
p->status = 0;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (p->vsize < sizeof(int16_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (p->vsize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (p->vsize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (p->vsize < sizeof(int32_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (p->vsize < (2 + NUM_EQ_BANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t))
p->status = -EINVAL;
p->vsize = (2 + NUM_EQ_BANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
}
*size = sizeof(effect_param_t) + voffset + p->vsize;
if (p->status != 0)
return 0;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS", __func__);
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)NUM_EQ_BANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE", __func__);
*(int16_t *)value = -1500;
*((int16_t *)value + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
if (param2 >= NUM_EQ_BANDS) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int16_t *)value = (int16_t)equalizer_get_band_level(eq_ctxt, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
if (param2 >= NUM_EQ_BANDS) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int32_t *)value = equalizer_get_center_frequency(eq_ctxt, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
if (param2 >= NUM_EQ_BANDS) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
equalizer_get_band_freq_range(eq_ctxt, param2, (uint32_t *)value,
((uint32_t *)value + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)equalizer_get_band(eq_ctxt, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET", __func__);
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)equalizer_get_preset(eq_ctxt);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS", __func__);
*(uint16_t *)value = (uint16_t)equalizer_get_num_presets(eq_ctxt);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME", __func__);
param2 = *param_tmp;
ALOGV("param2: %d", param2);
if (param2 >= equalizer_get_num_presets(eq_ctxt)) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)value;
strlcpy(name, equalizer_get_preset_name(eq_ctxt, param2), p->vsize - 1);
name[p->vsize - 1] = 0;
p->vsize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
ALOGV("%s: EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES", __func__);
int16_t *prop = (int16_t *)value;
prop[0] = (int16_t)equalizer_get_preset(eq_ctxt);
prop[1] = (int16_t)NUM_EQ_BANDS;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_EQ_BANDS; i++) {
prop[2 + i] = (int16_t)equalizer_get_band_level(eq_ctxt, i);
}
} break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 4,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned WebMediaPlayerMS::DecodedFrameCount() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return compositor_->total_frame_count();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 12,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, mrb_sym mid, mrb_int argc, const mrb_value *argv, mrb_value blk)
{
mrb_value val;
if (!mrb->jmp) {
struct mrb_jmpbuf c_jmp;
ptrdiff_t nth_ci = mrb->c->ci - mrb->c->cibase;
MRB_TRY(&c_jmp) {
mrb->jmp = &c_jmp;
/* recursive call */
val = mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb, self, mid, argc, argv, blk);
mrb->jmp = 0;
}
MRB_CATCH(&c_jmp) { /* error */
while (nth_ci < (mrb->c->ci - mrb->c->cibase)) {
mrb->c->stack = mrb->c->ci->stackent;
cipop(mrb);
}
mrb->jmp = 0;
val = mrb_obj_value(mrb->exc);
}
MRB_END_EXC(&c_jmp);
mrb->jmp = 0;
}
else {
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *c;
mrb_callinfo *ci;
int n;
ptrdiff_t voff = -1;
if (!mrb->c->stack) {
stack_init(mrb);
}
n = mrb->c->ci->nregs;
if (argc < 0) {
mrb_raisef(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "negative argc for funcall (%S)", mrb_fixnum_value(argc));
}
c = mrb_class(mrb, self);
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, mid);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_sym missing = mrb_intern_lit(mrb, "method_missing");
mrb_value args = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, argc, argv);
m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, missing);
if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
mrb_method_missing(mrb, mid, self, args);
}
mrb_ary_unshift(mrb, args, mrb_symbol_value(mid));
stack_extend(mrb, n+2);
mrb->c->stack[n+1] = args;
argc = -1;
}
if (mrb->c->ci - mrb->c->cibase > MRB_FUNCALL_DEPTH_MAX) {
mrb_exc_raise(mrb, mrb_obj_value(mrb->stack_err));
}
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->mid = mid;
ci->stackent = mrb->c->stack;
ci->argc = (int)argc;
ci->target_class = c;
mrb->c->stack = mrb->c->stack + n;
if (mrb->c->stbase <= argv && argv < mrb->c->stend) {
voff = argv - mrb->c->stbase;
}
if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) {
ci->nregs = (int)(argc + 2);
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs);
}
else if (argc >= CALL_MAXARGS) {
mrb_value args = mrb_ary_new_from_values(mrb, argc, argv);
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs+2);
mrb->c->stack[1] = args;
ci->argc = -1;
argc = 1;
}
else {
struct RProc *p = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
ci->proc = p;
if (argc < 0) argc = 1;
ci->nregs = (int)(p->body.irep->nregs + argc);
stack_extend(mrb, ci->nregs);
}
if (voff >= 0) {
argv = mrb->c->stbase + voff;
}
mrb->c->stack[0] = self;
if (ci->argc > 0) {
stack_copy(mrb->c->stack+1, argv, argc);
}
mrb->c->stack[argc+1] = blk;
if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) {
int ai = mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb);
ci->acc = CI_ACC_DIRECT;
if (MRB_METHOD_PROC_P(m)) {
ci->proc = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
}
val = MRB_METHOD_CFUNC(m)(mrb, self);
mrb->c->stack = mrb->c->ci->stackent;
cipop(mrb);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
}
else {
ci->acc = CI_ACC_SKIP;
val = mrb_run(mrb, MRB_METHOD_PROC(m), self);
}
}
mrb_gc_protect(mrb, val);
return val;
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 27,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(
int child_id,
const storage::FileSystemURL& url,
int permissions) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false;
if (url.path().ReferencesParent())
return false;
if (storage::VirtualPath::IsRootPath(url.path()) &&
(permissions & ~READ_FILE_GRANT)) {
return false;
}
if (url.mount_type() == storage::kFileSystemTypeIsolated) {
return HasPermissionsForFileSystem(
child_id, url.mount_filesystem_id(), permissions);
}
FileSystemPermissionPolicyMap::iterator found =
file_system_policy_map_.find(url.type());
if (found == file_system_policy_map_.end())
return false;
if ((found->second & storage::FILE_PERMISSION_READ_ONLY) &&
permissions & ~READ_FILE_GRANT) {
return false;
}
if (found->second & storage::FILE_PERMISSION_USE_FILE_PERMISSION)
return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id, url.path(), permissions);
if (found->second & storage::FILE_PERMISSION_SANDBOX)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: usage( char* execname )
{
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "ftgrid: simple glyph grid viewer -- part of the FreeType project\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "-----------------------------------------------------------\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [status below] ppem fontname[.ttf|.ttc] ...\n",
execname );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -r R use resolution R dpi (default: 72 dpi)\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -f index specify first index to display\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
exit( 1 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsImpl* PageHandler::GetWebContents() {
return host_ && !host_->frame_tree_node()->parent()
? static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(
WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(host_))
: nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Cryptographer* cryptographer(syncable::BaseTransaction* trans) {
return directory()->GetCryptographer(trans);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 15,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlBufferAllocationScheme xmlThrDefBufferAllocScheme(xmlBufferAllocationScheme v) {
xmlBufferAllocationScheme ret;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
ret = xmlBufferAllocSchemeThrDef;
xmlBufferAllocSchemeThrDef = v;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 25,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotificationConstructor(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetNotificationConstructorEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 18,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::MaybeSetContainerName() {
if (chunk_demuxer_ || using_media_player_renderer_)
return;
if (!demuxer_)
return;
if (highest_ready_state_ >= WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveMetadata)
return;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_FFMPEG)
media_metrics_provider_->SetContainerName(
static_cast<FFmpegDemuxer*>(demuxer_.get())->container());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 5,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
list_del_init(&u->link);
unix_tot_inflight--;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 24,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GaiaScreenHandler* OobeUI::GetGaiaScreenActor() {
return gaia_screen_handler_;
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_itu_t_ext(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,EXT_ID_LEN);
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
}
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init arc4_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_algs(arc4_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(arc4_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hns_rcbv2_int_ctrl_hw(struct hnae_queue *q, u32 flag, u32 mask)
{
u32 int_mask_en = !!mask;
if (flag & RCB_INT_FLAG_TX)
dsaf_write_dev(q, RCB_RING_INTMSK_TXWL_REG, int_mask_en);
if (flag & RCB_INT_FLAG_RX)
dsaf_write_dev(q, RCB_RING_INTMSK_RXWL_REG, int_mask_en);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void armv8pmu_reset(void *info)
{
u32 idx, nb_cnt = cpu_pmu->num_events;
/* The counter and interrupt enable registers are unknown at reset. */
for (idx = ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER; idx < nb_cnt; ++idx)
armv8pmu_disable_event(NULL, idx);
/* Initialize & Reset PMNC: C and P bits. */
armv8pmu_pmcr_write(ARMV8_PMCR_P | ARMV8_PMCR_C);
/* Disable access from userspace. */
asm volatile("msr pmuserenr_el0, %0" :: "r" (0));
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_path(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn;
char *ptr, *end;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
txn = smp->strm->txn;
end = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u + txn->req.sl.rq.u_l;
ptr = http_get_path(txn);
if (!ptr)
return 0;
/* OK, we got the '/' ! */
smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->data.u.str.str = ptr;
while (ptr < end && *ptr != '?')
ptr++;
smp->data.u.str.len = ptr - smp->data.u.str.str;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST | SMP_F_CONST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 1,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tty_ldisc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_ldisc *ld)
{
WARN_ON(!test_bit(TTY_LDISC_OPEN, &tty->flags));
clear_bit(TTY_LDISC_OPEN, &tty->flags);
if (ld->ops->close)
ld->ops->close(tty);
tty_ldisc_debug(tty, "%p: closed\n", tty->ldisc);
}
Commit Message: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 27,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *crypto_spawn_tfm2(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
alg = crypto_spawn_alg(spawn);
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return ERR_CAST(alg);
tfm = crypto_create_tfm(alg, spawn->frontend);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
goto out_put_alg;
return tfm;
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return tfm;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetSessionStorageNamespace(
const std::string& partition_id,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
if (!session_storage_namespace)
return;
bool successful_insert = session_storage_namespace_map_.insert(
make_pair(partition_id,
static_cast<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl*>(
session_storage_namespace)))
.second;
CHECK(successful_insert) << "Cannot replace existing SessionStorageNamespace";
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifyNavigationEntryChanged(
const EntryChangedDetails& change_details) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.NavigationEntryChanged(change_details);
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterTXTImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("SPARSE-COLOR");
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTXTImage;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Sparse Color");
entry->module=ConstantString("TXT");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("TEXT");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTEXTImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTXTImage;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->format_type=ImplicitFormatType;
entry->description=ConstantString("Text");
entry->module=ConstantString("TXT");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("TXT");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadTXTImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteTXTImage;
entry->description=ConstantString("Text");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsTXT;
entry->module=ConstantString("TXT");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/713
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 22,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputType::ValueMissing(const String&) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
Oid val_type, bool key_scalar)
{
JsonTypeCategory tcategory;
Oid outfuncoid;
if (val_type == InvalidOid)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("could not determine input data type")));
if (is_null)
{
tcategory = JSONTYPE_NULL;
outfuncoid = InvalidOid;
}
else
json_categorize_type(val_type,
&tcategory, &outfuncoid);
datum_to_json(val, is_null, result, tcategory, outfuncoid, key_scalar);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBlockFlow::mustDiscardMarginAfter() const
{
return style()->marginAfterCollapse() == MDISCARD || (m_rareData && m_rareData->m_discardMarginAfter);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void entersafe_reverse_buffer(u8* buff,size_t size)
{
u8 t;
u8 * end=buff+size-1;
while(buff<end)
{
t = *buff;
*buff = *end;
*end=t;
++buff;
--end;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterVIPSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("VIPS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadVIPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteVIPSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsVIPS;
entry->description=ConstantString("VIPS image");
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->module=ConstantString("VIPS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdpsnd_queue_init(void)
{
queue_pending = queue_lo = queue_hi = 0;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterRGFImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("RGF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadRGFImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteRGFImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"LEGO Mindstorms EV3 Robot Graphic Format (black and white)");
entry->module=ConstantString("RGF");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static opj_pi_iterator_t * opj_pi_create(const opj_image_t *image,
const opj_cp_t *cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno)
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino, compno;
/* number of poc in the p_pi*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_poc_bound;
/* pointers to tile coding parameters and components.*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *tccp = 00;
/* current packet iterator being allocated*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_current_pi = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(cp != 00);
assert(image != 00);
assert(tileno < cp->tw * cp->th);
/* initializations*/
tcp = &cp->tcps[tileno];
l_poc_bound = tcp->numpocs + 1;
/* memory allocations*/
l_pi = (opj_pi_iterator_t*) opj_calloc((l_poc_bound),
sizeof(opj_pi_iterator_t));
if (!l_pi) {
return NULL;
}
l_current_pi = l_pi;
for (pino = 0; pino < l_poc_bound ; ++pino) {
l_current_pi->comps = (opj_pi_comp_t*) opj_calloc(image->numcomps,
sizeof(opj_pi_comp_t));
if (! l_current_pi->comps) {
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_poc_bound);
return NULL;
}
l_current_pi->numcomps = image->numcomps;
for (compno = 0; compno < image->numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = &l_current_pi->comps[compno];
tccp = &tcp->tccps[compno];
comp->resolutions = (opj_pi_resolution_t*) opj_calloc(tccp->numresolutions,
sizeof(opj_pi_resolution_t));
if (!comp->resolutions) {
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_poc_bound);
return 00;
}
comp->numresolutions = tccp->numresolutions;
}
++l_current_pi;
}
return l_pi;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 15,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::EnableStreamTextureCopy() {
return sync_compositor_message_filter_.get();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 1,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitClientHost() {
if (!InitTabContents())
return false;
client_host_ = AttachedClientHosts::GetInstance()->Lookup(contents_);
if (!client_host_ ||
!client_host_->MatchesContentsAndExtensionId(contents_,
GetExtension()->id())) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kNotAttachedError,
base::IntToString(tab_id_));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void icmpv6_notify(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __be32 info)
{
const struct inet6_protocol *ipprot;
int inner_offset;
__be16 frag_off;
u8 nexthdr;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto out;
nexthdr = ((struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data)->nexthdr;
if (ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr)) {
/* now skip over extension headers */
inner_offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr),
&nexthdr, &frag_off);
if (inner_offset < 0)
goto out;
} else {
inner_offset = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
}
/* Checkin header including 8 bytes of inner protocol header. */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, inner_offset+8))
goto out;
/* BUGGG_FUTURE: we should try to parse exthdrs in this packet.
Without this we will not able f.e. to make source routed
pmtu discovery.
Corresponding argument (opt) to notifiers is already added.
--ANK (980726)
*/
ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet6_protos[nexthdr]);
if (ipprot && ipprot->err_handler)
ipprot->err_handler(skb, NULL, type, code, inner_offset, info);
raw6_icmp_error(skb, nexthdr, type, code, inner_offset, info);
return;
out:
__ICMP6_INC_STATS(net, __in6_dev_get(skb->dev), ICMP6_MIB_INERRORS);
}
Commit Message: net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send
Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>]
icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451
RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0
FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460
ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046
ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557
[< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88
[<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157
[<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663
[<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191
...
icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both
cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain
if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has
not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on
Rx before the route lookup.
Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::PepperPluginCreated(RendererPpapiHost* host) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_,
DidCreatePepperPlugin(host));
if (host->GetPluginName() == kFlashPluginName) {
RenderThread::Get()->RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("FrameLoadWithFlash"));
}
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *PolynomialImage(const Image *images,
const size_t number_terms,const double *terms,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define PolynomialImageTag "Polynomial/Image"
CacheView
*polynomial_view;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
PixelChannels
**magick_restrict polynomial_pixels;
size_t
number_images;
ssize_t
y;
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImageCanvas(images,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
number_images=GetImageListLength(images);
polynomial_pixels=AcquirePixelThreadSet(images);
if (polynomial_pixels == (PixelChannels **) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",images->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Polynomial image pixels.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
polynomial_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
const Image
*next;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelChannels
*polynomial_pixel;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
j;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(polynomial_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
polynomial_pixel=polynomial_pixels[id];
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) image->columns; j++)
for (i=0; i < MaxPixelChannels; i++)
polynomial_pixel[j].channel[i]=0.0;
next=images;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) number_images; j++)
{
register const Quantum
*p;
if (j >= (ssize_t) number_terms)
continue;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(next,exception);
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
{
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(next); i++)
{
MagickRealType
coefficient,
degree;
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(next,channel);
PixelTrait polynomial_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(polynomial_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
coefficient=(MagickRealType) terms[2*j];
degree=(MagickRealType) terms[(j << 1)+1];
polynomial_pixel[x].channel[i]+=coefficient*
pow(QuantumScale*GetPixelChannel(image,channel,p),degree);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(next);
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
next=GetNextImageInList(next);
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if (traits == UndefinedPixelTrait)
continue;
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
q[i]=ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*polynomial_pixel[x].channel[i]);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(polynomial_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (images->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(images,PolynomialImageTag,progress,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
polynomial_view=DestroyCacheView(polynomial_view);
polynomial_pixels=DestroyPixelThreadSet(polynomial_pixels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::cancelRememberLine() //slot
{
m_rememberLineDirtyBit = false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 16,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::WebContents* ExtensionTabsZoomTest::OpenUrlAndWaitForLoad(
const GURL& url) {
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURLWithDisposition(
browser(), url, WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui_test_utils::BROWSER_TEST_WAIT_FOR_NAVIGATION);
return browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
}
Commit Message: Change TemporaryAddressSpoof test to not depend on PDF OpenActions.
OpenActions that navigate to URIs are going to be blocked when
https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/42731 relands.
It was reverted because this test was breaking and blocking the
pdfium roll into chromium.
The test will now click on a link in the PDF that navigates to the
URI.
Bug: 851821
Change-Id: I49853e99de7b989858b1962ad4a92a4168d4c2db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1244367
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#596011}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestLoadTimingReused(const net::LoadTimingInfo& load_timing_info) {
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.socket_reused);
EXPECT_NE(net::NetLog::Source::kInvalidId, load_timing_info.socket_log_id);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.proxy_resolve_end.is_null());
net::ExpectConnectTimingHasNoTimes(load_timing_info.connect_timing);
EXPECT_FALSE(load_timing_info.send_start.is_null());
EXPECT_LE(load_timing_info.send_start, load_timing_info.send_end);
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start_time.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.request_start.is_null());
EXPECT_TRUE(load_timing_info.receive_headers_end.is_null());
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 26,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBaseSet& ActiveContexts() {
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(
ThreadSpecific<Persistent<WebGLRenderingContextBaseSet>>, active_contexts,
());
Persistent<WebGLRenderingContextBaseSet>& active_contexts_persistent =
*active_contexts;
if (!active_contexts_persistent) {
active_contexts_persistent =
MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLRenderingContextBaseSet>();
active_contexts_persistent.RegisterAsStaticReference();
}
return *active_contexts_persistent;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitUntilShown() {
while (!is_visible_) {
message_loop_runner_ = new MessageLoopRunner;
message_loop_runner_->Run();
}
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 26,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ims_pcu_destroy_application_mode(struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
if (pcu->setup_complete) {
pcu->setup_complete = false;
mb(); /* make sure flag setting is not reordered */
if (pcu->gamepad)
ims_pcu_destroy_gamepad(pcu);
ims_pcu_destroy_buttons(pcu);
ims_pcu_destroy_backlight(pcu);
if (pcu->device_id != IMS_PCU_PCU_B_DEVICE_ID)
sysfs_remove_group(&pcu->dev->kobj,
&ims_pcu_ofn_attr_group);
}
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,721 |
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