instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_hh_connect(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
btif_hh_device_t *dev;
btif_hh_added_device_t *added_dev = NULL;
char bda_str[20];
int i;
BD_ADDR *bda = (BD_ADDR*)bd_addr;
CHECK_BTHH_INIT();
dev = btif_hh_find_dev_by_bda(bd_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Connect _hh");
sprintf(bda_str, "%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X",
(*bda)[0], (*bda)[1], (*bda)[2], (*bda)[3], (*bda)[4], (*bda)[5]);
if (dev == NULL && btif_hh_cb.device_num >= BTIF_HH_MAX_HID) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Error, exceeded the maximum supported HID device number %d",
__FUNCTION__, BTIF_HH_MAX_HID);
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_ADDED_DEV; i++) {
if (memcmp(&(btif_hh_cb.added_devices[i].bd_addr), bd_addr, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0) {
added_dev = &btif_hh_cb.added_devices[i];
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Device %s already added, attr_mask = 0x%x",
__FUNCTION__, bda_str, added_dev->attr_mask);
}
}
if (added_dev != NULL) {
if (added_dev->dev_handle == BTA_HH_INVALID_HANDLE) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error, device %s added but addition failed", __FUNCTION__, bda_str);
memset(&(added_dev->bd_addr), 0, 6);
added_dev->dev_handle = BTA_HH_INVALID_HANDLE;
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
}
/* Not checking the NORMALLY_Connectible flags from sdp record, and anyways sending this
request from host, for subsequent user initiated connection. If the remote is not in
pagescan mode, we will do 2 retries to connect before giving up */
tBTA_SEC sec_mask = BTUI_HH_SECURITY;
btif_hh_cb.status = BTIF_HH_DEV_CONNECTING;
BTA_HhOpen(*bda, BTA_HH_PROTO_RPT_MODE, sec_mask);
HAL_CBACK(bt_hh_callbacks, connection_state_cb, bd_addr, BTHH_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 19,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::cancel()
{
cancelWithError(ResourceError());
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int ewk_frame_text_matches_mark(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const char* string, Eina_Bool caseSensitive, Eina_Bool highlight, unsigned int limit)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, 0);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, 0);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(string, 0);
smartData->frame->editor()->setMarkedTextMatchesAreHighlighted(highlight);
return smartData->frame->editor()->countMatchesForText(WTF::String::fromUTF8(string), caseSensitive, limit, true);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fb_set_suspend(struct fb_info *info, int state)
{
struct fb_event event;
event.info = info;
if (state) {
fb_notifier_call_chain(FB_EVENT_SUSPEND, &event);
info->state = FBINFO_STATE_SUSPENDED;
} else {
info->state = FBINFO_STATE_RUNNING;
fb_notifier_call_chain(FB_EVENT_RESUME, &event);
}
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event, bool group)
{
int ret = 0;
/*
* If event is enabled and currently active on a CPU, update the
* value in the event structure:
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) {
struct perf_read_data data = {
.event = event,
.group = group,
.ret = 0,
};
smp_call_function_single(event->oncpu,
__perf_event_read, &data, 1);
ret = data.ret;
} else if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE) {
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
/*
* may read while context is not active
* (e.g., thread is blocked), in that case
* we cannot update context time
*/
if (ctx->is_active) {
update_context_time(ctx);
update_cgrp_time_from_event(event);
}
if (group)
update_group_times(event);
else
update_event_times(event);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_rt_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct rtable *rt;
int h, s_h;
int idx, s_idx;
struct net *net;
net = sock_net(skb->sk);
s_h = cb->args[0];
if (s_h < 0)
s_h = 0;
s_idx = idx = cb->args[1];
for (h = s_h; h <= rt_hash_mask; h++, s_idx = 0) {
if (!rt_hash_table[h].chain)
continue;
rcu_read_lock_bh();
for (rt = rcu_dereference_bh(rt_hash_table[h].chain), idx = 0; rt;
rt = rcu_dereference_bh(rt->dst.rt_next), idx++) {
if (!net_eq(dev_net(rt->dst.dev), net) || idx < s_idx)
continue;
if (rt_is_expired(rt))
continue;
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
if (rt_fill_info(net, skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWROUTE,
1, NLM_F_MULTI) <= 0) {
skb_dst_drop(skb);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
goto done;
}
skb_dst_drop(skb);
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
}
done:
cb->args[0] = h;
cb->args[1] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::Initialize() {
device_ = V4L2Device::Create();
if (!device_) {
VLOGF(1) << "Failed to Create V4L2Device";
return false;
}
output_buffer_pixelformat_ = V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG_RAW;
if (!device_->Open(V4L2Device::Type::kJpegEncoder,
output_buffer_pixelformat_)) {
VLOGF(1) << "Failed to open device";
return false;
}
struct v4l2_capability caps;
const __u32 kCapsRequired = V4L2_CAP_STREAMING | V4L2_CAP_VIDEO_M2M_MPLANE;
memset(&caps, 0, sizeof(caps));
if (device_->Ioctl(VIDIOC_QUERYCAP, &caps) != 0) {
VPLOGF(1) << "ioctl() failed: VIDIOC_QUERYCAP";
return false;
}
if ((caps.capabilities & kCapsRequired) != kCapsRequired) {
VLOGF(1) << "VIDIOC_QUERYCAP, caps check failed: 0x" << std::hex
<< caps.capabilities;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netdev_stats_to_stats64(struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats64,
const struct net_device_stats *netdev_stats)
{
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*stats64) < sizeof(*netdev_stats));
memcpy(stats64, netdev_stats, sizeof(*stats64));
/* zero out counters that only exist in rtnl_link_stats64 */
memset((char *)stats64 + sizeof(*netdev_stats), 0,
sizeof(*stats64) - sizeof(*netdev_stats));
#else
size_t i, n = sizeof(*netdev_stats) / sizeof(unsigned long);
const unsigned long *src = (const unsigned long *)netdev_stats;
u64 *dst = (u64 *)stats64;
BUILD_BUG_ON(n > sizeof(*stats64) / sizeof(u64));
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
dst[i] = src[i];
/* zero out counters that only exist in rtnl_link_stats64 */
memset((char *)stats64 + n * sizeof(u64), 0,
sizeof(*stats64) - n * sizeof(u64));
#endif
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 6,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppListSyncableService::FindSyncItem(const std::string& item_id) {
SyncItemMap::iterator iter = sync_items_.find(item_id);
if (iter == sync_items_.end())
return NULL;
return iter->second;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pdu_free(V9fsPDU *pdu)
{
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
g_assert(!pdu->cancelled);
QLIST_REMOVE(pdu, next);
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, pdu, next);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 20,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AssertObjectHasGCInfo(const void* payload, size_t gc_info_index) {
HeapObjectHeader::CheckFromPayload(payload);
#if !defined(COMPONENT_BUILD)
DCHECK_EQ(HeapObjectHeader::FromPayload(payload)->GcInfoIndex(),
gc_info_index);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 29,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_header_toggle_flag (DBusHeader *header,
dbus_uint32_t flag,
dbus_bool_t value)
{
unsigned char *flags_p;
flags_p = _dbus_string_get_data_len (&header->data, FLAGS_OFFSET, 1);
if (value)
*flags_p |= flag;
else
*flags_p &= ~flag;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
{
char *s;
u32 len;
if (selinux_enforcing)
return -EINVAL;
if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
kfree(s);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Free_LigatureArray( HB_LigatureArray* la,
HB_UShort num_classes )
{
HB_UShort n, count;
HB_LigatureAttach* lat;
if ( la->LigatureAttach )
{
count = la->LigatureCount;
lat = la->LigatureAttach;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
Free_LigatureAttach( &lat[n], num_classes );
FREE( lat );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inet_rtm_newaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct in_ifaddr *ifa;
struct in_ifaddr *ifa_existing;
__u32 valid_lft = INFINITY_LIFE_TIME;
__u32 prefered_lft = INFINITY_LIFE_TIME;
ASSERT_RTNL();
ifa = rtm_to_ifaddr(net, nlh, &valid_lft, &prefered_lft);
if (IS_ERR(ifa))
return PTR_ERR(ifa);
ifa_existing = find_matching_ifa(ifa);
if (!ifa_existing) {
/* It would be best to check for !NLM_F_CREATE here but
* userspace already relies on not having to provide this.
*/
set_ifa_lifetime(ifa, valid_lft, prefered_lft);
if (ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_MCAUTOJOIN) {
int ret = ip_mc_config(net->ipv4.mc_autojoin_sk,
true, ifa);
if (ret < 0) {
inet_free_ifa(ifa);
return ret;
}
}
return __inet_insert_ifa(ifa, nlh, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
} else {
inet_free_ifa(ifa);
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL ||
!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE))
return -EEXIST;
ifa = ifa_existing;
set_ifa_lifetime(ifa, valid_lft, prefered_lft);
cancel_delayed_work(&check_lifetime_work);
queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq,
&check_lifetime_work, 0);
rtmsg_ifa(RTM_NEWADDR, ifa, nlh, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int aac_parse_init(AVCodecParserContext *s1)
{
AACAC3ParseContext *s = s1->priv_data;
s->header_size = AAC_ADTS_HEADER_SIZE;
s->sync = aac_sync;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_decode_generic_template2a(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2GenericRegionParams *params, Jbig2ArithState *as, Jbig2Image *image, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
const int GBW = image->width;
const int GBH = image->height;
const int rowstride = image->stride;
int x, y;
byte *gbreg_line = (byte *) image->data;
/* This is a special case for GBATX1 = 3, GBATY1 = -1 */
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
printf("P4\n%d %d\n", GBW, GBH);
#endif
if (GBW <= 0)
return 0;
for (y = 0; y < GBH; y++) {
uint32_t CONTEXT;
uint32_t line_m1;
uint32_t line_m2;
int padded_width = (GBW + 7) & -8;
line_m1 = (y >= 1) ? gbreg_line[-rowstride] : 0;
line_m2 = (y >= 2) ? gbreg_line[-(rowstride << 1)] << 4 : 0;
CONTEXT = ((line_m1 >> 3) & 0x78) | ((line_m1 >> 2) & 0x4) | ((line_m2 >> 3) & 0x380);
/* 6.2.5.7 3d */
for (x = 0; x < padded_width; x += 8) {
byte result = 0;
int x_minor;
int minor_width = GBW - x > 8 ? 8 : GBW - x;
if (y >= 1)
line_m1 = (line_m1 << 8) | (x + 8 < GBW ? gbreg_line[-rowstride + (x >> 3) + 1] : 0);
if (y >= 2)
line_m2 = (line_m2 << 8) | (x + 8 < GBW ? gbreg_line[-(rowstride << 1) + (x >> 3) + 1] << 4 : 0);
/* This is the speed-critical inner loop. */
for (x_minor = 0; x_minor < minor_width; x_minor++) {
bool bit;
bit = jbig2_arith_decode(as, &GB_stats[CONTEXT]);
if (bit < 0)
return -1;
result |= bit << (7 - x_minor);
CONTEXT = ((CONTEXT & 0x1b9) << 1) | bit |
((line_m1 >> (10 - x_minor)) & 0x8) | ((line_m1 >> (9 - x_minor)) & 0x4) | ((line_m2 >> (10 - x_minor)) & 0x80);
}
gbreg_line[x >> 3] = result;
}
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
fwrite(gbreg_line, 1, rowstride, stdout);
#endif
gbreg_line += rowstride;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eval_acl(uschar ** sub, int nsub, uschar ** user_msgp)
{
int i;
uschar *tmp;
int sav_narg = acl_narg;
int ret;
extern int acl_where;
if(--nsub > sizeof(acl_arg)/sizeof(*acl_arg)) nsub = sizeof(acl_arg)/sizeof(*acl_arg);
for (i = 0; i < nsub && sub[i+1]; i++)
{
tmp = acl_arg[i];
acl_arg[i] = sub[i+1]; /* place callers args in the globals */
sub[i+1] = tmp; /* stash the old args using our caller's storage */
}
acl_narg = i;
while (i < nsub)
{
sub[i+1] = acl_arg[i];
acl_arg[i++] = NULL;
}
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("expanding: acl: %s arg: %s%s\n",
sub[0],
acl_narg>0 ? acl_arg[0] : US"<none>",
acl_narg>1 ? " +more" : "");
ret = acl_eval(acl_where, sub[0], user_msgp, &tmp);
for (i = 0; i < nsub; i++)
acl_arg[i] = sub[i+1]; /* restore old args */
acl_narg = sav_narg;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_entropy_coded_image(WebPContext *s, enum ImageRole role,
int w, int h)
{
ImageContext *img;
HuffReader *hg;
int i, j, ret, x, y, width;
img = &s->image[role];
img->role = role;
if (!img->frame) {
img->frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!img->frame)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
img->frame->format = AV_PIX_FMT_ARGB;
img->frame->width = w;
img->frame->height = h;
if (role == IMAGE_ROLE_ARGB && !img->is_alpha_primary) {
ThreadFrame pt = { .f = img->frame };
ret = ff_thread_get_buffer(s->avctx, &pt, 0);
} else
ret = av_frame_get_buffer(img->frame, 1);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (get_bits1(&s->gb)) {
img->color_cache_bits = get_bits(&s->gb, 4);
if (img->color_cache_bits < 1 || img->color_cache_bits > 11) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "invalid color cache bits: %d\n",
img->color_cache_bits);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
img->color_cache = av_mallocz_array(1 << img->color_cache_bits,
sizeof(*img->color_cache));
if (!img->color_cache)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
} else {
img->color_cache_bits = 0;
}
img->nb_huffman_groups = 1;
if (role == IMAGE_ROLE_ARGB && get_bits1(&s->gb)) {
ret = decode_entropy_image(s);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
img->nb_huffman_groups = s->nb_huffman_groups;
}
img->huffman_groups = av_mallocz_array(img->nb_huffman_groups *
HUFFMAN_CODES_PER_META_CODE,
sizeof(*img->huffman_groups));
if (!img->huffman_groups)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < img->nb_huffman_groups; i++) {
hg = &img->huffman_groups[i * HUFFMAN_CODES_PER_META_CODE];
for (j = 0; j < HUFFMAN_CODES_PER_META_CODE; j++) {
int alphabet_size = alphabet_sizes[j];
if (!j && img->color_cache_bits > 0)
alphabet_size += 1 << img->color_cache_bits;
if (get_bits1(&s->gb)) {
read_huffman_code_simple(s, &hg[j]);
} else {
ret = read_huffman_code_normal(s, &hg[j], alphabet_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
}
width = img->frame->width;
if (role == IMAGE_ROLE_ARGB && s->reduced_width > 0)
width = s->reduced_width;
x = 0; y = 0;
while (y < img->frame->height) {
int v;
hg = get_huffman_group(s, img, x, y);
v = huff_reader_get_symbol(&hg[HUFF_IDX_GREEN], &s->gb);
if (v < NUM_LITERAL_CODES) {
/* literal pixel values */
uint8_t *p = GET_PIXEL(img->frame, x, y);
p[2] = v;
p[1] = huff_reader_get_symbol(&hg[HUFF_IDX_RED], &s->gb);
p[3] = huff_reader_get_symbol(&hg[HUFF_IDX_BLUE], &s->gb);
p[0] = huff_reader_get_symbol(&hg[HUFF_IDX_ALPHA], &s->gb);
if (img->color_cache_bits)
color_cache_put(img, AV_RB32(p));
x++;
if (x == width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
} else if (v < NUM_LITERAL_CODES + NUM_LENGTH_CODES) {
/* LZ77 backwards mapping */
int prefix_code, length, distance, ref_x, ref_y;
/* parse length and distance */
prefix_code = v - NUM_LITERAL_CODES;
if (prefix_code < 4) {
length = prefix_code + 1;
} else {
int extra_bits = (prefix_code - 2) >> 1;
int offset = 2 + (prefix_code & 1) << extra_bits;
length = offset + get_bits(&s->gb, extra_bits) + 1;
}
prefix_code = huff_reader_get_symbol(&hg[HUFF_IDX_DIST], &s->gb);
if (prefix_code > 39) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"distance prefix code too large: %d\n", prefix_code);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (prefix_code < 4) {
distance = prefix_code + 1;
} else {
int extra_bits = prefix_code - 2 >> 1;
int offset = 2 + (prefix_code & 1) << extra_bits;
distance = offset + get_bits(&s->gb, extra_bits) + 1;
}
/* find reference location */
if (distance <= NUM_SHORT_DISTANCES) {
int xi = lz77_distance_offsets[distance - 1][0];
int yi = lz77_distance_offsets[distance - 1][1];
distance = FFMAX(1, xi + yi * width);
} else {
distance -= NUM_SHORT_DISTANCES;
}
ref_x = x;
ref_y = y;
if (distance <= x) {
ref_x -= distance;
distance = 0;
} else {
ref_x = 0;
distance -= x;
}
while (distance >= width) {
ref_y--;
distance -= width;
}
if (distance > 0) {
ref_x = width - distance;
ref_y--;
}
ref_x = FFMAX(0, ref_x);
ref_y = FFMAX(0, ref_y);
/* copy pixels
* source and dest regions can overlap and wrap lines, so just
* copy per-pixel */
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
uint8_t *p_ref = GET_PIXEL(img->frame, ref_x, ref_y);
uint8_t *p = GET_PIXEL(img->frame, x, y);
AV_COPY32(p, p_ref);
if (img->color_cache_bits)
color_cache_put(img, AV_RB32(p));
x++;
ref_x++;
if (x == width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
if (ref_x == width) {
ref_x = 0;
ref_y++;
}
if (y == img->frame->height || ref_y == img->frame->height)
break;
}
} else {
/* read from color cache */
uint8_t *p = GET_PIXEL(img->frame, x, y);
int cache_idx = v - (NUM_LITERAL_CODES + NUM_LENGTH_CODES);
if (!img->color_cache_bits) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "color cache not found\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (cache_idx >= 1 << img->color_cache_bits) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"color cache index out-of-bounds\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
AV_WB32(p, img->color_cache[cache_idx]);
x++;
if (x == width) {
x = 0;
y++;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
const struct open_flags *op)
{
struct nameidata nd;
int flags = op->lookup_flags;
struct file *filp;
filp = path_openat(dfd, pathname, &nd, op, flags | LOOKUP_RCU);
if (unlikely(filp == ERR_PTR(-ECHILD)))
filp = path_openat(dfd, pathname, &nd, op, flags);
if (unlikely(filp == ERR_PTR(-ESTALE)))
filp = path_openat(dfd, pathname, &nd, op, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL);
return filp;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 19,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_options(char *options, struct super_block *sb)
{
char *p;
struct ext2_sb_info *sbi = EXT2_SB(sb);
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int option;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
if (!options)
return 1;
while ((p = strsep (&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_bsd_df:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, MINIX_DF);
break;
case Opt_minix_df:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, MINIX_DF);
break;
case Opt_grpid:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPID);
break;
case Opt_nogrpid:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPID);
break;
case Opt_resuid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), option);
if (!uid_valid(uid)) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid uid value %d", option);
return 0;
}
sbi->s_resuid = uid;
break;
case Opt_resgid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
if (!gid_valid(gid)) {
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid gid value %d", option);
return 0;
}
sbi->s_resgid = gid;
break;
case Opt_sb:
/* handled by get_sb_block() instead of here */
/* *sb_block = match_int(&args[0]); */
break;
case Opt_err_panic:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
break;
case Opt_err_ro:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
break;
case Opt_err_cont:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_RO);
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_PANIC);
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, ERRORS_CONT);
break;
case Opt_nouid32:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, NO_UID32);
break;
case Opt_nocheck:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, CHECK);
break;
case Opt_debug:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, DEBUG);
break;
case Opt_oldalloc:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, OLDALLOC);
break;
case Opt_orlov:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, OLDALLOC);
break;
case Opt_nobh:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, NOBH);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XATTR
case Opt_user_xattr:
set_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, XATTR_USER);
break;
case Opt_nouser_xattr:
clear_opt (sbi->s_mount_opt, XATTR_USER);
break;
#else
case Opt_user_xattr:
case Opt_nouser_xattr:
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "(no)user_xattr options"
"not supported");
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_POSIX_ACL
case Opt_acl:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, POSIX_ACL);
break;
case Opt_noacl:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, POSIX_ACL);
break;
#else
case Opt_acl:
case Opt_noacl:
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"(no)acl options not supported");
break;
#endif
case Opt_xip:
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "use dax instead of xip");
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, XIP);
/* Fall through */
case Opt_dax:
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"DAX enabled. Warning: EXPERIMENTAL, use at your own risk");
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, DAX);
#else
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "dax option not supported");
#endif
break;
#if defined(CONFIG_QUOTA)
case Opt_quota:
case Opt_usrquota:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, USRQUOTA);
break;
case Opt_grpquota:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, GRPQUOTA);
break;
#else
case Opt_quota:
case Opt_usrquota:
case Opt_grpquota:
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"quota operations not supported");
break;
#endif
case Opt_reservation:
set_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, RESERVATION);
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "reservations ON");
break;
case Opt_noreservation:
clear_opt(sbi->s_mount_opt, RESERVATION);
ext2_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "reservations OFF");
break;
case Opt_ignore:
break;
default:
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 15,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_alloc_pending(struct packet_sock *po)
{
po->rx_ring.pending_refcnt = NULL;
po->tx_ring.pending_refcnt = alloc_percpu(unsigned int);
if (unlikely(po->tx_ring.pending_refcnt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void decode_and_reconstruct_block_intra (SAMPLE *rec, int stride, int size, int qp, SAMPLE *pblock, int16_t *coeffq,
int tb_split, int upright_available,int downleft_available, intra_mode_t intra_mode,int ypos,int xpos,int width,int comp, int bitdepth,
qmtx_t ** iwmatrix){
int16_t *rcoeff = thor_alloc(2*MAX_TR_SIZE*MAX_TR_SIZE, 32);
int16_t *rblock = thor_alloc(2*MAX_TR_SIZE*MAX_TR_SIZE, 32);
int16_t *rblock2 = thor_alloc(2*MAX_TR_SIZE*MAX_TR_SIZE, 32);
SAMPLE* left_data = (SAMPLE*)thor_alloc((2*MAX_TR_SIZE+2)*sizeof(SAMPLE),32)+1;
SAMPLE* top_data = (SAMPLE*)thor_alloc((2*MAX_TR_SIZE+2)*sizeof(SAMPLE),32)+1;
SAMPLE top_left;
if (tb_split){
int size2 = size/2;
int i,j,index;
for (i=0;i<size;i+=size2){
for (j=0;j<size;j+=size2){
TEMPLATE(make_top_and_left)(left_data,top_data,&top_left,rec,stride,&rec[i*stride+j],stride,i,j,ypos,xpos,size2,upright_available,downleft_available,1,bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(get_intra_prediction)(left_data,top_data,top_left,ypos+i,xpos+j,size2,&pblock[i*size+j],size,intra_mode,bitdepth);
index = 2*(i/size2) + (j/size2);
TEMPLATE(dequantize)(coeffq+index*size2*size2, rcoeff, qp, size2, iwmatrix ? iwmatrix[log2i(size2/4)] : NULL);
inverse_transform (rcoeff, rblock2, size2, bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(reconstruct_block)(rblock2,&pblock[i*size+j],&rec[i*stride+j],size2,size,stride,bitdepth);
}
}
}
else{
TEMPLATE(make_top_and_left)(left_data,top_data,&top_left,rec,stride,NULL,0,0,0,ypos,xpos,size,upright_available,downleft_available,0,bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(get_intra_prediction)(left_data,top_data,top_left,ypos,xpos,size,pblock,size,intra_mode,bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(dequantize)(coeffq, rcoeff, qp, size, iwmatrix ? iwmatrix[log2i(size/4)] : NULL);
inverse_transform (rcoeff, rblock, size, bitdepth);
TEMPLATE(reconstruct_block)(rblock,pblock,rec,size,size,stride,bitdepth);
}
thor_free(top_data - 1);
thor_free(left_data - 1);
thor_free(rcoeff);
thor_free(rblock);
thor_free(rblock2);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int yr_object_has_undefined_value(
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* field_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
field_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, 0, field, args);
else
field_obj = object;
va_end(args);
if (field_obj == NULL)
return TRUE;
switch(field_obj->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
return isnan(field_obj->value.d);
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
return field_obj->value.ss == NULL;
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
return field_obj->value.i == UNDEFINED;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::CreateObjectStore(IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
const base::string16& name,
const IndexedDBKeyPath& key_path,
bool auto_increment) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::CreateObjectStore", "txn.id",
transaction->id());
DCHECK_EQ(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
if (base::ContainsKey(metadata_.object_stores, object_store_id)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Invalid object_store_id";
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebCore.IndexedDB.Schema.ObjectStore.KeyPathType",
HistogramKeyPathType(key_path), KEY_PATH_TYPE_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("WebCore.IndexedDB.Schema.ObjectStore.AutoIncrement",
auto_increment);
IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata object_store_metadata;
Status s = metadata_coding_->CreateObjectStore(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction()->transaction(),
transaction->database()->id(), object_store_id, name, key_path,
auto_increment, &object_store_metadata);
if (!s.ok()) {
ReportErrorWithDetails(s, "Internal error creating object store.");
return;
}
AddObjectStore(std::move(object_store_metadata), object_store_id);
transaction->ScheduleAbortTask(
base::BindOnce(&IndexedDBDatabase::CreateObjectStoreAbortOperation, this,
object_store_id));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedFrameBufferBinder::ScopedFrameBufferBinder(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder,
GLuint id)
: decoder_(decoder) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int afiucv_pm_restore_thaw(struct device *dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
#ifdef CONFIG_PM_DEBUG
printk(KERN_WARNING "afiucv_pm_restore_thaw\n");
#endif
read_lock(&iucv_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &iucv_sk_list.head) {
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case IUCV_CONNECTED:
sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
break;
case IUCV_DISCONN:
case IUCV_CLOSING:
case IUCV_LISTEN:
case IUCV_BOUND:
case IUCV_OPEN:
default:
break;
}
}
read_unlock(&iucv_sk_list.lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response EmulationHandler::SetVisibleSize(int width, int height) {
if (width < 0 || height < 0)
return Response::InvalidParams("Width and height must be non-negative");
if (GetWebContents())
GetWebContents()->SetDeviceEmulationSize(gfx::Size(width, height));
else
return Response::Error("Can't find the associated web contents");
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int firstarg;
config.hostip = sdsnew("127.0.0.1");
config.hostport = 6379;
config.hostsocket = NULL;
config.repeat = 1;
config.interval = 0;
config.dbnum = 0;
config.interactive = 0;
config.shutdown = 0;
config.monitor_mode = 0;
config.pubsub_mode = 0;
config.latency_mode = 0;
config.latency_dist_mode = 0;
config.latency_history = 0;
config.lru_test_mode = 0;
config.lru_test_sample_size = 0;
config.cluster_mode = 0;
config.slave_mode = 0;
config.getrdb_mode = 0;
config.stat_mode = 0;
config.scan_mode = 0;
config.intrinsic_latency_mode = 0;
config.pattern = NULL;
config.rdb_filename = NULL;
config.pipe_mode = 0;
config.pipe_timeout = REDIS_CLI_DEFAULT_PIPE_TIMEOUT;
config.bigkeys = 0;
config.hotkeys = 0;
config.stdinarg = 0;
config.auth = NULL;
config.eval = NULL;
config.eval_ldb = 0;
config.eval_ldb_end = 0;
config.eval_ldb_sync = 0;
config.enable_ldb_on_eval = 0;
config.last_cmd_type = -1;
pref.hints = 1;
spectrum_palette = spectrum_palette_color;
spectrum_palette_size = spectrum_palette_color_size;
if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)) && (getenv("FAKETTY") == NULL))
config.output = OUTPUT_RAW;
else
config.output = OUTPUT_STANDARD;
config.mb_delim = sdsnew("\n");
firstarg = parseOptions(argc,argv);
argc -= firstarg;
argv += firstarg;
/* Latency mode */
if (config.latency_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
latencyMode();
}
/* Latency distribution mode */
if (config.latency_dist_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
latencyDistMode();
}
/* Slave mode */
if (config.slave_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
slaveMode();
}
/* Get RDB mode. */
if (config.getrdb_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
getRDB();
}
/* Pipe mode */
if (config.pipe_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
pipeMode();
}
/* Find big keys */
if (config.bigkeys) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
findBigKeys();
}
/* Find hot keys */
if (config.hotkeys) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
findHotKeys();
}
/* Stat mode */
if (config.stat_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
if (config.interval == 0) config.interval = 1000000;
statMode();
}
/* Scan mode */
if (config.scan_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
scanMode();
}
/* LRU test mode */
if (config.lru_test_mode) {
if (cliConnect(0) == REDIS_ERR) exit(1);
LRUTestMode();
}
/* Intrinsic latency mode */
if (config.intrinsic_latency_mode) intrinsicLatencyMode();
/* Start interactive mode when no command is provided */
if (argc == 0 && !config.eval) {
/* Ignore SIGPIPE in interactive mode to force a reconnect */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Note that in repl mode we don't abort on connection error.
* A new attempt will be performed for every command send. */
cliConnect(0);
repl();
}
/* Otherwise, we have some arguments to execute */
if (cliConnect(0) != REDIS_OK) exit(1);
if (config.eval) {
return evalMode(argc,argv);
} else {
return noninteractive(argc,convertToSds(argc,argv));
}
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaRecorderHandler::OnEncodedVideo(
const media::WebmMuxer::VideoParameters& params,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> encoded_data,
std::unique_ptr<std::string> encoded_alpha,
TimeTicks timestamp,
bool is_key_frame) {
DCHECK(main_render_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (UpdateTracksAndCheckIfChanged()) {
client_->OnError("Amount of tracks in MediaStream has changed.");
return;
}
if (!webm_muxer_)
return;
if (!webm_muxer_->OnEncodedVideo(params, std::move(encoded_data),
std::move(encoded_alpha), timestamp,
is_key_frame)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Error muxing video data";
client_->OnError("Error muxing video data");
}
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t CameraClient::cancelAutoFocus() {
LOG1("cancelAutoFocus (pid %d)", getCallingPid());
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
status_t result = checkPidAndHardware();
if (result != NO_ERROR) return result;
return mHardware->cancelAutoFocus();
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(struct page *page,
struct iov_iter *i, unsigned long offset, size_t bytes)
{
char *kaddr;
size_t copied;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
if (likely(i->nr_segs == 1)) {
int left;
char __user *buf = i->iov->iov_base + i->iov_offset;
left = __copy_from_user_inatomic(kaddr + offset, buf, bytes);
copied = bytes - left;
} else {
copied = __iovec_copy_from_user_inatomic(kaddr + offset,
i->iov, i->iov_offset, bytes);
}
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 11,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintingContext::Result PrintingContextCairo::PageDone() {
if (abort_printing_)
return CANCEL;
DCHECK(in_print_job_);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::createElement(const AtomicString& local_name,
const StringOrDictionary& string_or_options,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!IsValidElementName(this, local_name)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidCharacterError,
"The tag name provided ('" + local_name + "') is not a valid name.");
return nullptr;
}
const AtomicString& converted_local_name = ConvertLocalName(local_name);
bool is_v1 = string_or_options.isDictionary() || !RegistrationContext();
bool create_v1_builtin =
string_or_options.isDictionary() &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CustomElementsBuiltinEnabled();
bool should_create_builtin =
create_v1_builtin || string_or_options.isString();
const AtomicString& is =
AtomicString(GetTypeExtension(this, string_or_options, exception_state));
const AtomicString& name = should_create_builtin ? is : converted_local_name;
CustomElementDefinition* definition = nullptr;
if (is_v1) {
const CustomElementDescriptor desc =
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CustomElementsBuiltinEnabled()
? CustomElementDescriptor(name, converted_local_name)
: CustomElementDescriptor(converted_local_name,
converted_local_name);
if (CustomElementRegistry* registry = CustomElement::Registry(*this))
definition = registry->DefinitionFor(desc);
if (!definition && create_v1_builtin) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kNotFoundError,
"Custom element definition not found.");
return nullptr;
}
}
Element* element;
if (definition) {
element = CustomElement::CreateCustomElementSync(
*this, converted_local_name, definition);
} else if (V0CustomElement::IsValidName(local_name) &&
RegistrationContext()) {
element = RegistrationContext()->CreateCustomTagElement(
*this,
QualifiedName(g_null_atom, converted_local_name, xhtmlNamespaceURI));
} else {
element = createElement(local_name, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return nullptr;
}
if (!is.IsEmpty()) {
if (string_or_options.isString()) {
V0CustomElementRegistrationContext::SetIsAttributeAndTypeExtension(
element, is);
} else if (string_or_options.isDictionary()) {
element->setAttribute(HTMLNames::isAttr, is);
}
}
return element;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 29,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_user_data(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
char buf[256];
int i;
int e;
int ver = 0, build = 0, ver2 = 0, ver3 = 0;
char last;
for (i = 0; i < 255 && get_bits_count(gb) < gb->size_in_bits; i++) {
if (show_bits(gb, 23) == 0)
break;
buf[i] = get_bits(gb, 8);
}
buf[i] = 0;
/* divx detection */
e = sscanf(buf, "DivX%dBuild%d%c", &ver, &build, &last);
if (e < 2)
e = sscanf(buf, "DivX%db%d%c", &ver, &build, &last);
if (e >= 2) {
ctx->divx_version = ver;
ctx->divx_build = build;
s->divx_packed = e == 3 && last == 'p';
}
/* libavcodec detection */
e = sscanf(buf, "FFmpe%*[^b]b%d", &build) + 3;
if (e != 4)
e = sscanf(buf, "FFmpeg v%d.%d.%d / libavcodec build: %d", &ver, &ver2, &ver3, &build);
if (e != 4) {
e = sscanf(buf, "Lavc%d.%d.%d", &ver, &ver2, &ver3) + 1;
if (e > 1) {
if (ver > 0xFFU || ver2 > 0xFFU || ver3 > 0xFFU) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Unknown Lavc version string encountered, %d.%d.%d; "
"clamping sub-version values to 8-bits.\n",
ver, ver2, ver3);
}
build = ((ver & 0xFF) << 16) + ((ver2 & 0xFF) << 8) + (ver3 & 0xFF);
}
}
if (e != 4) {
if (strcmp(buf, "ffmpeg") == 0)
ctx->lavc_build = 4600;
}
if (e == 4)
ctx->lavc_build = build;
/* Xvid detection */
e = sscanf(buf, "XviD%d", &build);
if (e == 1)
ctx->xvid_build = build;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 12,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect GetPermissionAnchorRect(Browser* browser) {
return bubble_anchor_util::GetPageInfoAnchorRect(browser);
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_image_data(Gif_Context *gfc, Gif_Reader *grr)
{
/* we need a bit more than GIF_MAX_BLOCK in case a single code is split
across blocks */
uint8_t buffer[GIF_MAX_BLOCK + 5];
int i;
uint32_t accum;
int bit_position;
int bit_length;
Gif_Code code;
Gif_Code old_code;
Gif_Code clear_code;
Gif_Code eoi_code;
Gif_Code next_code;
#define CUR_BUMP_CODE (1 << bits_needed)
#define CUR_CODE_MASK ((1 << bits_needed) - 1)
int min_code_size;
int bits_needed;
gfc->decodepos = 0;
min_code_size = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\n\nmin_code_size(%d) ", min_code_size));
if (min_code_size >= GIF_MAX_CODE_BITS) {
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "image corrupted, min_code_size too big");
min_code_size = GIF_MAX_CODE_BITS - 1;
} else if (min_code_size < 2) {
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "image corrupted, min_code_size too small");
min_code_size = 2;
}
clear_code = 1 << min_code_size;
for (code = 0; code < clear_code; code++) {
gfc->prefix[code] = 49428;
gfc->suffix[code] = (uint8_t)code;
gfc->length[code] = 1;
}
eoi_code = clear_code + 1;
next_code = eoi_code;
bits_needed = min_code_size + 1;
code = clear_code;
bit_length = bit_position = 0;
/* Thus the 'Read in the next data block.' code below will be invoked on the
first time through: exactly right! */
while (1) {
old_code = code;
/* GET A CODE INTO THE 'code' VARIABLE.
*
* 9.Dec.1998 - Rather than maintain a byte pointer and a bit offset into
* the current byte (and the processing associated with that), we maintain
* one number: the offset, in bits, from the beginning of 'buffer'. This
* much cleaner choice was inspired by Patrick J. Naughton
* <naughton@wind.sun.com>'s GIF-reading code, which does the same thing.
* His code distributed as part of XV in xvgif.c. */
if (bit_position + bits_needed > bit_length)
/* Read in the next data block. */
if (!read_image_block(grr, buffer, &bit_position, &bit_length,
bits_needed))
goto zero_length_block;
i = bit_position / 8;
accum = buffer[i] + (buffer[i+1] << 8);
if (bits_needed >= 8)
accum |= (buffer[i+2]) << 16;
code = (Gif_Code)((accum >> (bit_position % 8)) & CUR_CODE_MASK);
bit_position += bits_needed;
GIF_DEBUG(("%d ", code));
/* CHECK FOR SPECIAL OR BAD CODES: clear_code, eoi_code, or a code that is
* too large. */
if (code == clear_code) {
GIF_DEBUG(("clear "));
bits_needed = min_code_size + 1;
next_code = eoi_code;
continue;
} else if (code == eoi_code)
break;
else if (code > next_code && next_code && next_code != clear_code) {
/* code > next_code: a (hopefully recoverable) error.
Bug fix, 5/27: Do this even if old_code == clear_code, and set code
to 0 to prevent errors later. (If we didn't zero code, we'd later set
old_code = code; then we had old_code >= next_code; so the prefixes
array got all screwed up!)
Bug fix, 4/12/2010: It is not an error if next_code == clear_code.
This happens at the end of a large GIF: see the next comment ("If no
meaningful next code should be defined...."). */
if (gfc->errors[1] < 20)
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "image corrupted, code out of range");
else if (gfc->errors[1] == 20)
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "(not reporting more errors)");
code = 0;
}
/* PROCESS THE CURRENT CODE and define the next code. If no meaningful
* next code should be defined, then we have set next_code to either
* 'eoi_code' or 'clear_code' -- so we'll store useless prefix/suffix data
* in a useless place. */
/* *First,* set up the prefix and length for the next code
(in case code == next_code). */
gfc->prefix[next_code] = old_code;
gfc->length[next_code] = gfc->length[old_code] + 1;
/* Use one_code to process code. It's nice that it returns the first
pixel in code: that's what we need. */
gfc->suffix[next_code] = one_code(gfc, code);
/* Special processing if code == next_code: we didn't know code's final
suffix when we called one_code, but we do now. */
/* 7.Mar.2014 -- Avoid error if image has zero width/height. */
if (code == next_code && gfc->image + gfc->decodepos <= gfc->maximage)
gfc->image[gfc->decodepos - 1] = gfc->suffix[next_code];
/* Increment next_code except for the 'clear_code' special case (that's
when we're reading at the end of a GIF) */
if (next_code != clear_code) {
next_code++;
if (next_code == CUR_BUMP_CODE) {
if (bits_needed < GIF_MAX_CODE_BITS)
bits_needed++;
else
next_code = clear_code;
}
}
}
/* read blocks until zero-length reached. */
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\nafter_image(%d)\n", i));
while (i > 0) {
gifgetblock(buffer, i, grr);
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\nafter_image(%d)\n", i));
}
/* zero-length block reached. */
zero_length_block: {
long delta = (long) (gfc->maximage - gfc->image) - (long) gfc->decodepos;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
if (delta > 0) {
sprintf(buf, "missing %ld %s of image data", delta,
delta == 1 ? "pixel" : "pixels");
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, buf);
memset(&gfc->image[gfc->decodepos], 0, delta);
} else if (delta < -1) {
/* One pixel of superfluous data is OK; that could be the
code == next_code case. */
sprintf(buf, "%ld superfluous pixels of image data", -delta);
gif_read_error(gfc, 0, buf);
}
}
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 5,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: omx_vdec::omx_vdec(): m_error_propogated(false),
m_state(OMX_StateInvalid),
m_app_data(NULL),
m_inp_mem_ptr(NULL),
m_out_mem_ptr(NULL),
input_flush_progress (false),
output_flush_progress (false),
input_use_buffer (false),
output_use_buffer (false),
ouput_egl_buffers(false),
m_use_output_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_mem_region_smi(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
pending_input_buffers(0),
pending_output_buffers(0),
m_out_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_flags(0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_heap_ptr(NULL),
#endif
m_inp_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_out_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_in_alloc_cnt(0),
m_platform_list(NULL),
m_platform_entry(NULL),
m_pmem_info(NULL),
h264_parser(NULL),
arbitrary_bytes (true),
psource_frame (NULL),
pdest_frame (NULL),
m_inp_heap_ptr (NULL),
m_phdr_pmem_ptr(NULL),
m_heap_inp_bm_count (0),
codec_type_parse ((codec_type)0),
first_frame_meta (true),
frame_count (0),
nal_count (0),
nal_length(0),
look_ahead_nal (false),
first_frame(0),
first_buffer(NULL),
first_frame_size (0),
m_device_file_ptr(NULL),
m_vc1_profile((vc1_profile_type)0),
h264_last_au_ts(LLONG_MAX),
h264_last_au_flags(0),
m_disp_hor_size(0),
m_disp_vert_size(0),
prev_ts(LLONG_MAX),
rst_prev_ts(true),
frm_int(0),
in_reconfig(false),
m_display_id(NULL),
client_extradata(0),
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp (0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_enable_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
m_use_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
iDivXDrmDecrypt(NULL),
#endif
m_desc_buffer_ptr(NULL),
secure_mode(false),
m_other_extradata(NULL),
m_profile(0),
client_set_fps(false),
m_last_rendered_TS(-1),
m_queued_codec_config_count(0),
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb(false)
{
/* Assumption is that , to begin with , we have all the frames with decoder */
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In %u bit OMX vdec Constructor", (unsigned int)sizeof(long) * 8);
memset(&m_debug,0,sizeof(m_debug));
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.debug.level", property_value, "1");
debug_level = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In OMX vdec Constructor");
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.perf", property_value, "0");
perf_flag = atoi(property_value);
if (perf_flag) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.perf is %d", perf_flag);
dec_time.start();
proc_frms = latency = 0;
}
prev_n_filled_len = 0;
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.ts", property_value, "0");
m_debug_timestamp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.ts value is %d",m_debug_timestamp);
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
time_stamp_dts.enable_debug_print(true);
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb", property_value, "0");
m_debug_concealedmb = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb value is %d",m_debug_concealedmb);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.profile.check", property_value, "0");
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.profile.check value is %d",m_reject_avc_1080p_mp);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.in", property_value, "0");
m_debug.in_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.out", property_value, "0");
m_debug.out_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
sprintf(m_debug.log_loc, "%s", BUFFER_LOG_LOC);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.log.loc", property_value, "");
if (*property_value)
strlcpy(m_debug.log_loc, property_value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.120fps.enabled", property_value, "0");
if(atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("feature 120 FPS decode enabled");
m_last_rendered_TS = 0;
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled", property_value, "0");
m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled value is %d",m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode);
#endif
memset(&m_cmp,0,sizeof(m_cmp));
memset(&m_cb,0,sizeof(m_cb));
memset (&drv_ctx,0,sizeof(drv_ctx));
memset (&h264_scratch,0,sizeof (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
memset (m_hwdevice_name,0,sizeof(m_hwdevice_name));
memset(m_demux_offsets, 0, ( sizeof(OMX_U32) * 8192) );
memset(&m_custom_buffersize, 0, sizeof(m_custom_buffersize));
m_demux_entries = 0;
msg_thread_id = 0;
async_thread_id = 0;
msg_thread_created = false;
async_thread_created = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
memset(&native_buffer, 0 ,(sizeof(struct nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
#endif
memset(&drv_ctx.extradata_info, 0, sizeof(drv_ctx.extradata_info));
/* invalidate m_frame_pack_arrangement */
memset(&m_frame_pack_arrangement, 0, sizeof(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT));
m_frame_pack_arrangement.cancel_flag = 1;
drv_ctx.timestamp_adjust = false;
drv_ctx.video_driver_fd = -1;
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
pthread_mutex_init(&m_lock, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&c_lock, NULL);
sem_init(&m_cmd_lock,0,0);
sem_init(&m_safe_flush, 0, 0);
streaming[CAPTURE_PORT] =
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char extradata_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.extradata", extradata_value, "0");
m_debug_extradata = atoi(extradata_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.extradata value is %d",m_debug_extradata);
#endif
m_fill_output_msg = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FTB;
client_buffers.set_vdec_client(this);
dynamic_buf_mode = false;
out_dynamic_list = NULL;
is_down_scalar_enabled = false;
m_smoothstreaming_mode = false;
m_smoothstreaming_width = 0;
m_smoothstreaming_height = 0;
is_q6_platform = false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 1 | 1,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnCSSInsertRequest(const std::wstring& frame_xpath,
const std::string& css,
const std::string& id) {
WebFrame* frame = GetChildFrame(frame_xpath);
if (!frame)
return;
frame->document().insertStyleText(WebString::fromUTF8(css),
WebString::fromUTF8(id));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gss_krb5int_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
OM_uint32 major_status;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
int ad_type = 0;
size_t i;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
major_status = generic_gss_oid_decompose(minor_status,
GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_OID,
GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_OID_LENGTH,
desired_object,
&ad_type);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE || ad_type == 0) {
*minor_status = ENOENT;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
if (ctx->authdata != NULL) {
for (i = 0; ctx->authdata[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (ctx->authdata[i]->ad_type == ad_type) {
gss_buffer_desc ad_data;
ad_data.length = ctx->authdata[i]->length;
ad_data.value = ctx->authdata[i]->contents;
major_status = generic_gss_add_buffer_set_member(minor_status,
&ad_data, data_set);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
break;
}
}
}
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
OM_uint32 tmp;
generic_gss_release_buffer_set(&tmp, data_set);
}
return major_status;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThread::IsRegisteredExtension(
const std::string& v8_extension_name) const {
return v8_extensions_.find(v8_extension_name) != v8_extensions_.end();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string GpuChannel::GetChannelName() {
return channel_id_;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TextTrack::IsVisualKind() const {
return kind() == SubtitlesKeyword() || kind() == CaptionsKeyword();
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int old_bridge_ioctl(compat_ulong_t __user *argp)
{
compat_ulong_t tmp;
if (get_user(tmp, argp))
return -EFAULT;
if (tmp == BRCTL_GET_VERSION)
return BRCTL_VERSION + 1;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_pid_auxv(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = mm_for_maps(task);
int res = PTR_ERR(mm);
if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) {
unsigned int nwords = 0;
do {
nwords += 2;
} while (mm->saved_auxv[nwords - 2] != 0); /* AT_NULL */
res = nwords * sizeof(mm->saved_auxv[0]);
if (res > PAGE_SIZE)
res = PAGE_SIZE;
memcpy(buffer, mm->saved_auxv, res);
mmput(mm);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<File> readFileHelper()
{
if (m_version < 3)
return nullptr;
ASSERT(!m_blobInfo);
String path;
String name;
String relativePath;
String uuid;
String type;
uint32_t hasSnapshot = 0;
uint64_t size = 0;
double lastModified = 0;
if (!readWebCoreString(&path))
return nullptr;
if (m_version >= 4 && !readWebCoreString(&name))
return nullptr;
if (m_version >= 4 && !readWebCoreString(&relativePath))
return nullptr;
if (!readWebCoreString(&uuid))
return nullptr;
if (!readWebCoreString(&type))
return nullptr;
if (m_version >= 4 && !doReadUint32(&hasSnapshot))
return nullptr;
if (hasSnapshot) {
if (!doReadUint64(&size))
return nullptr;
if (!doReadNumber(&lastModified))
return nullptr;
}
return File::createFromSerialization(path, name, relativePath, hasSnapshot > 0, size, lastModified, getOrCreateBlobDataHandle(uuid, type));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QuarantineLinuxTest()
: source_url_("http://www.source.com"),
referrer_url_("http://www.referrer.com"),
is_xattr_supported_(false) {}
Commit Message: Disable setxattr calls from quarantine subsystem on Chrome OS.
BUG=733943
Change-Id: I6e743469a8dc91536e180ecf4ff0df0cf427037c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1380571
Commit-Queue: Will Harris <wfh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiemo Nagel <tnagel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617961}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
u64 config;
if (!is_sampling_event(event)) {
hwc->sample_period = x86_pmu.max_period;
hwc->last_period = hwc->sample_period;
local64_set(&hwc->period_left, hwc->sample_period);
} else {
/*
* If we have a PMU initialized but no APIC
* interrupts, we cannot sample hardware
* events (user-space has to fall back and
* sample via a hrtimer based software event):
*/
if (!x86_pmu.apic)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_RAW)
return x86_pmu_extra_regs(event->attr.config, event);
if (attr->type == PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE)
return set_ext_hw_attr(hwc, event);
if (attr->config >= x86_pmu.max_events)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* The generic map:
*/
config = x86_pmu.event_map(attr->config);
if (config == 0)
return -ENOENT;
if (config == -1LL)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Branch tracing:
*/
if ((attr->config == PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS) &&
(hwc->sample_period == 1)) {
/* BTS is not supported by this architecture. */
if (!x86_pmu.bts_active)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* BTS is currently only allowed for user-mode. */
if (!attr->exclude_kernel)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
hwc->config |= config;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf, x86: Fix Intel fixed counters base initialization
The following patch solves the problems introduced by Robert's
commit 41bf498 and reported by Arun Sharma. This commit gets rid
of the base + index notation for reading and writing PMU msrs.
The problem is that for fixed counters, the new calculation for
the base did not take into account the fixed counter indexes,
thus all fixed counters were read/written from fixed counter 0.
Although all fixed counters share the same config MSR, they each
have their own counter register.
Without:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
242202299 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
2389685946 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
49473 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
With:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
2392703238 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
2389793744 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
47863 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ming.m.lin@intel.com
Cc: robert.richter@amd.com
Cc: asharma@fb.com
Cc: perfmon2-devel@lists.sf.net
LKML-Reference: <20110319172005.GB4978@quad>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: svc_prepare_thread(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int node)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
rqstp = svc_rqst_alloc(serv, pool, node);
if (!rqstp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
serv->sv_nrthreads++;
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
pool->sp_nrthreads++;
list_add_rcu(&rqstp->rq_all, &pool->sp_all_threads);
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
return rqstp;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 26,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jv_parser_remaining(struct jv_parser* p) {
if (p->curr_buf == 0)
return 0;
return (p->curr_buf_length - p->curr_buf_pos);
}
Commit Message: Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105)
This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on
resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256
bytes.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void async_removepending(struct async *as)
{
struct usb_dev_state *ps = as->ps;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
list_del_init(&as->asynclist);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vmci_transport_stream_is_active(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
{
return !vmci_handle_is_invalid(vmci_trans(vsk)->qp_handle);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::SetHaveScrollEventHandlers(bool have_event_handlers) {
if (have_scroll_event_handlers_ == have_event_handlers)
return;
have_scroll_event_handlers_ = have_event_handlers;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::UpdateFrameHost(
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (frame_host == frame_host_) {
if (frame_host && !render_frame_alive_) {
render_frame_alive_ = true;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetReloadedAfterCrash();
UpdateRendererChannel(IsAttached());
}
return;
}
if (frame_host && !ShouldCreateDevToolsForHost(frame_host)) {
DestroyOnRenderFrameGone();
return;
}
if (IsAttached())
RevokePolicy();
frame_host_ = frame_host;
std::vector<DevToolsSession*> restricted_sessions;
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions()) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
restricted_sessions.push_back(session);
}
if (!restricted_sessions.empty())
ForceDetachRestrictedSessions(restricted_sessions);
if (!render_frame_alive_) {
render_frame_alive_ = true;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetReloadedAfterCrash();
}
if (IsAttached())
GrantPolicy();
UpdateRendererChannel(IsAttached());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CParaNdisAbstractPath *GetPathByMessageId(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext, ULONG MessageId)
{
CParaNdisAbstractPath *path = NULL;
UINT bundleId = MessageId / 2;
if (bundleId >= pContext->nPathBundles)
{
path = &pContext->CXPath;
}
else if (MessageId % 2)
{
path = &(pContext->pPathBundles[bundleId].rxPath);
}
else
{
path = &(pContext->pPathBundles[bundleId].txPath);
}
return path;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_poc_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_poc_t *poc = &ms->parms.poc;
jpc_pocpchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
poc->numpchgs = (cstate->numcomps > 256) ? (ms->len / 9) :
(ms->len / 7);
if (!(poc->pchgs = jas_alloc2(poc->numpchgs, sizeof(jpc_pocpchg_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (pchgno = 0, pchg = poc->pchgs; pchgno < poc->numpchgs; ++pchgno,
++pchg) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->rlvlnostart)) {
goto error;
}
if (cstate->numcomps > 256) {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->compnostart)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
};
pchg->compnostart = tmp;
}
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->lyrnoend) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->rlvlnoend)) {
goto error;
}
if (cstate->numcomps > 256) {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->compnoend)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
}
pchg->compnoend = tmp;
}
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->prgord)) {
goto error;
}
if (pchg->rlvlnostart > pchg->rlvlnoend ||
pchg->compnostart > pchg->compnoend) {
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
jpc_poc_destroyparms(ms);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 25,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static byte cdecrypt(byte cipher, unsigned short *cr)
{
const byte plain = (cipher ^ (*cr >> 8));
*cr = (cipher + *cr) * t1_c1 + t1_c2;
return plain;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebMimeRegistry* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::mimeRegistry() {
return &mime_registry_;
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory,
WarmupURLFetcher::CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
NetworkPropertiesManager* manager,
const std::string& user_agent) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
network_properties_manager_ = manager;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
secure_proxy_checker_.reset(new SecureProxyChecker(url_loader_factory));
warmup_url_fetcher_.reset(new WarmupURLFetcher(
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfig::HandleWarmupFetcherResponse,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate,
base::Unretained(this)),
ui_task_runner_, user_agent));
AddDefaultProxyBypassRules();
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
network_connection_tracker_->GetConnectionType(
&connection_type_,
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 16,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result op_attr_value_to_binary(void *attr, void *data,
size_t data_len, size_t *offs)
{
uint32_t *v = attr;
return op_u32_to_binary_helper(*v, data, data_len, offs);
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::CacheUsersWallpapers() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
user_manager::UserList users = user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetUsers();
if (!users.empty()) {
user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users.begin();
it++;
for (int cached = 0; it != users.end() && cached < kMaxWallpapersToCache;
++it, ++cached) {
CacheUserWallpaper((*it)->GetAccountId());
}
}
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmci_transport_recv_connecting_client_invalid(struct sock *sk,
struct vmci_transport_packet *pkt)
{
int err = 0;
struct vsock_sock *vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
if (vsk->sent_request) {
vsk->sent_request = false;
vsk->ignore_connecting_rst = true;
err = vmci_transport_send_conn_request(
sk, vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_size);
if (err < 0)
err = vmci_transport_error_to_vsock_error(err);
else
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginDisplayHostDestroyed() { login_display_host_ = nullptr; }
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __always_inline void slab_lock(struct page *page)
{
bit_spin_lock(PG_locked, &page->flags);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_request_send_background_locked(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct fuse_req *req)
{
req->isreply = 1;
fuse_request_send_nowait_locked(fc, req);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sys_debug_setcontext(struct ucontext __user *ctx,
int ndbg, struct sig_dbg_op __user *dbg,
int r6, int r7, int r8,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct sig_dbg_op op;
int i;
unsigned char tmp;
unsigned long new_msr = regs->msr;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
unsigned long new_dbcr0 = current->thread.debug.dbcr0;
#endif
for (i=0; i<ndbg; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&op, dbg + i, sizeof(op)))
return -EFAULT;
switch (op.dbg_type) {
case SIG_DBG_SINGLE_STEPPING:
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
if (op.dbg_value) {
new_msr |= MSR_DE;
new_dbcr0 |= (DBCR0_IDM | DBCR0_IC);
} else {
new_dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IC;
if (!DBCR_ACTIVE_EVENTS(new_dbcr0,
current->thread.debug.dbcr1)) {
new_msr &= ~MSR_DE;
new_dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IDM;
}
}
#else
if (op.dbg_value)
new_msr |= MSR_SE;
else
new_msr &= ~MSR_SE;
#endif
break;
case SIG_DBG_BRANCH_TRACING:
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
return -EINVAL;
#else
if (op.dbg_value)
new_msr |= MSR_BE;
else
new_msr &= ~MSR_BE;
#endif
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* We wait until here to actually install the values in the
registers so if we fail in the above loop, it will not
affect the contents of these registers. After this point,
failure is a problem, anyway, and it's very unlikely unless
the user is really doing something wrong. */
regs->msr = new_msr;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 = new_dbcr0;
#endif
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, ctx, sizeof(*ctx))
|| __get_user(tmp, (u8 __user *) ctx)
|| __get_user(tmp, (u8 __user *) (ctx + 1) - 1))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* If we get a fault copying the context into the kernel's
* image of the user's registers, we can't just return -EFAULT
* because the user's registers will be corrupted. For instance
* the NIP value may have been updated but not some of the
* other registers. Given that we have done the access_ok
* and successfully read the first and last bytes of the region
* above, this should only happen in an out-of-memory situation
* or if another thread unmaps the region containing the context.
* We kill the task with a SIGSEGV in this situation.
*/
if (do_setcontext(ctx, regs, 1)) {
if (show_unhandled_signals)
printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO "%s[%d]: bad frame in "
"sys_debug_setcontext: %p nip %08lx "
"lr %08lx\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
ctx, regs->nip, regs->link);
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
goto out;
}
/*
* It's not clear whether or why it is desirable to save the
* sigaltstack setting on signal delivery and restore it on
* signal return. But other architectures do this and we have
* always done it up until now so it is probably better not to
* change it. -- paulus
*/
restore_altstack(&ctx->uc_stack);
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTOREALL);
out:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::synthesizeCancelationEventsForAllConnectionsLocked(
const CancelationOptions& options) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mConnectionsByFd.size(); i++) {
synthesizeCancelationEventsForConnectionLocked(
mConnectionsByFd.valueAt(i), options);
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isoent_cmp_node_iso9660(const struct archive_rb_node *n1,
const struct archive_rb_node *n2)
{
const struct idrent *e1 = (const struct idrent *)n1;
const struct idrent *e2 = (const struct idrent *)n2;
return (isoent_cmp_iso9660_identifier(e2->isoent, e1->isoent));
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 29,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: viz::LocalSurfaceIdAllocation CompositorImpl::GenerateLocalSurfaceId() const {
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
viz::ParentLocalSurfaceIdAllocator& allocator =
CompositorDependencies::Get().surface_id_allocator;
allocator.GenerateId();
return allocator.GetCurrentLocalSurfaceIdAllocation();
}
return viz::LocalSurfaceIdAllocation();
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void migrate_tasks(unsigned int dead_cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(dead_cpu);
struct task_struct *next, *stop = rq->stop;
int dest_cpu;
/*
* Fudge the rq selection such that the below task selection loop
* doesn't get stuck on the currently eligible stop task.
*
* We're currently inside stop_machine() and the rq is either stuck
* in the stop_machine_cpu_stop() loop, or we're executing this code,
* either way we should never end up calling schedule() until we're
* done here.
*/
rq->stop = NULL;
/*
* put_prev_task() and pick_next_task() sched
* class method both need to have an up-to-date
* value of rq->clock[_task]
*/
update_rq_clock(rq);
for ( ; ; ) {
/*
* There's this thread running, bail when that's the only
* remaining thread.
*/
if (rq->nr_running == 1)
break;
next = pick_next_task(rq);
BUG_ON(!next);
next->sched_class->put_prev_task(rq, next);
/* Find suitable destination for @next, with force if needed. */
dest_cpu = select_fallback_rq(dead_cpu, next);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
__migrate_task(next, dead_cpu, dest_cpu);
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
}
rq->stop = stop;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 18,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "cachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute");
ScriptValue cpp_value = ScriptValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
impl->setCachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute(cpp_value, exception_state);
V8PrivateProperty::GetSymbol(
isolate,
kPrivatePropertyCachedAttributeRaisesExceptionGetterAnyAttribute)
.DeleteProperty(holder);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IPC::Message* AutomationProviderBookmarkModelObserver::ReleaseReply() {
return reply_message_.release();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_Curve_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsUInt32Number Count;
cmsToneCurve* NewGamma;
*nItems = 0;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &Count)) return NULL;
switch (Count) {
case 0: // Linear.
{
cmsFloat64Number SingleGamma = 1.0;
NewGamma = cmsBuildParametricToneCurve(self ->ContextID, 1, &SingleGamma);
if (!NewGamma) return NULL;
*nItems = 1;
return NewGamma;
}
case 1: // Specified as the exponent of gamma function
{
cmsUInt16Number SingleGammaFixed;
cmsFloat64Number SingleGamma;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Number(io, &SingleGammaFixed)) return NULL;
SingleGamma = _cms8Fixed8toDouble(SingleGammaFixed);
*nItems = 1;
return cmsBuildParametricToneCurve(self ->ContextID, 1, &SingleGamma);
}
default: // Curve
if (Count > 0x7FFF)
return NULL; // This is to prevent bad guys for doing bad things
NewGamma = cmsBuildTabulatedToneCurve16(self ->ContextID, Count, NULL);
if (!NewGamma) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Array(io, Count, NewGamma -> Table16)) return NULL;
*nItems = 1;
return NewGamma;
}
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::BlockParser() {
parser_blocked_count_++;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DecodeDateTime(char **field, int *ftype, int nf,
int *dtype, struct tm * tm, fsec_t *fsec, bool EuroDates)
{
int fmask = 0,
tmask,
type;
int ptype = 0; /* "prefix type" for ISO y2001m02d04 format */
int i;
int val;
int mer = HR24;
int haveTextMonth = FALSE;
int is2digits = FALSE;
int bc = FALSE;
int t = 0;
int *tzp = &t;
/***
* We'll insist on at least all of the date fields, but initialize the
* remaining fields in case they are not set later...
***/
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
tm->tm_hour = 0;
tm->tm_min = 0;
tm->tm_sec = 0;
*fsec = 0;
/* don't know daylight savings time status apriori */
tm->tm_isdst = -1;
if (tzp != NULL)
*tzp = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nf; i++)
{
switch (ftype[i])
{
case DTK_DATE:
/***
* Integral julian day with attached time zone?
* All other forms with JD will be separated into
* distinct fields, so we handle just this case here.
***/
if (ptype == DTK_JULIAN)
{
char *cp;
int val;
if (tzp == NULL)
return -1;
val = strtol(field[i], &cp, 10);
if (*cp != '-')
return -1;
j2date(val, &tm->tm_year, &tm->tm_mon, &tm->tm_mday);
/* Get the time zone from the end of the string */
if (DecodeTimezone(cp, tzp) != 0)
return -1;
tmask = DTK_DATE_M | DTK_TIME_M | DTK_M(TZ);
ptype = 0;
break;
}
/***
* Already have a date? Then this might be a POSIX time
* zone with an embedded dash (e.g. "PST-3" == "EST") or
* a run-together time with trailing time zone (e.g. hhmmss-zz).
* - thomas 2001-12-25
***/
else if (((fmask & DTK_DATE_M) == DTK_DATE_M)
|| (ptype != 0))
{
/* No time zone accepted? Then quit... */
if (tzp == NULL)
return -1;
if (isdigit((unsigned char) *field[i]) || ptype != 0)
{
char *cp;
if (ptype != 0)
{
/* Sanity check; should not fail this test */
if (ptype != DTK_TIME)
return -1;
ptype = 0;
}
/*
* Starts with a digit but we already have a time
* field? Then we are in trouble with a date and time
* already...
*/
if ((fmask & DTK_TIME_M) == DTK_TIME_M)
return -1;
if ((cp = strchr(field[i], '-')) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Get the time zone from the end of the string */
if (DecodeTimezone(cp, tzp) != 0)
return -1;
*cp = '\0';
/*
* Then read the rest of the field as a concatenated
* time
*/
if ((ftype[i] = DecodeNumberField(strlen(field[i]), field[i], fmask,
&tmask, tm, fsec, &is2digits)) < 0)
return -1;
/*
* modify tmask after returning from
* DecodeNumberField()
*/
tmask |= DTK_M(TZ);
}
else
{
if (DecodePosixTimezone(field[i], tzp) != 0)
return -1;
ftype[i] = DTK_TZ;
tmask = DTK_M(TZ);
}
}
else if (DecodeDate(field[i], fmask, &tmask, tm, EuroDates) != 0)
return -1;
break;
case DTK_TIME:
if (DecodeTime(field[i], &tmask, tm, fsec) != 0)
return -1;
/*
* Check upper limit on hours; other limits checked in
* DecodeTime()
*/
/* test for > 24:00:00 */
if (tm->tm_hour > 24 ||
(tm->tm_hour == 24 && (tm->tm_min > 0 || tm->tm_sec > 0)))
return -1;
break;
case DTK_TZ:
{
int tz;
if (tzp == NULL)
return -1;
if (DecodeTimezone(field[i], &tz) != 0)
return -1;
/*
* Already have a time zone? Then maybe this is the second
* field of a POSIX time: EST+3 (equivalent to PST)
*/
if (i > 0 && (fmask & DTK_M(TZ)) != 0 &&
ftype[i - 1] == DTK_TZ &&
isalpha((unsigned char) *field[i - 1]))
{
*tzp -= tz;
tmask = 0;
}
else
{
*tzp = tz;
tmask = DTK_M(TZ);
}
}
break;
case DTK_NUMBER:
/*
* Was this an "ISO date" with embedded field labels? An
* example is "y2001m02d04" - thomas 2001-02-04
*/
if (ptype != 0)
{
char *cp;
int val;
val = strtol(field[i], &cp, 10);
/*
* only a few kinds are allowed to have an embedded
* decimal
*/
if (*cp == '.')
switch (ptype)
{
case DTK_JULIAN:
case DTK_TIME:
case DTK_SECOND:
break;
default:
return 1;
break;
}
else if (*cp != '\0')
return -1;
switch (ptype)
{
case DTK_YEAR:
tm->tm_year = val;
tmask = DTK_M(YEAR);
break;
case DTK_MONTH:
/*
* already have a month and hour? then assume
* minutes
*/
if ((fmask & DTK_M(MONTH)) != 0 &&
(fmask & DTK_M(HOUR)) != 0)
{
tm->tm_min = val;
tmask = DTK_M(MINUTE);
}
else
{
tm->tm_mon = val;
tmask = DTK_M(MONTH);
}
break;
case DTK_DAY:
tm->tm_mday = val;
tmask = DTK_M(DAY);
break;
case DTK_HOUR:
tm->tm_hour = val;
tmask = DTK_M(HOUR);
break;
case DTK_MINUTE:
tm->tm_min = val;
tmask = DTK_M(MINUTE);
break;
case DTK_SECOND:
tm->tm_sec = val;
tmask = DTK_M(SECOND);
if (*cp == '.')
{
double frac;
frac = strtod(cp, &cp);
if (*cp != '\0')
return -1;
#ifdef HAVE_INT64_TIMESTAMP
*fsec = frac * 1000000;
#else
*fsec = frac;
#endif
}
break;
case DTK_TZ:
tmask = DTK_M(TZ);
if (DecodeTimezone(field[i], tzp) != 0)
return -1;
break;
case DTK_JULIAN:
/***
* previous field was a label for "julian date"?
***/
tmask = DTK_DATE_M;
j2date(val, &tm->tm_year, &tm->tm_mon, &tm->tm_mday);
/* fractional Julian Day? */
if (*cp == '.')
{
double time;
time = strtod(cp, &cp);
if (*cp != '\0')
return -1;
tmask |= DTK_TIME_M;
#ifdef HAVE_INT64_TIMESTAMP
dt2time((time * USECS_PER_DAY), &tm->tm_hour, &tm->tm_min, &tm->tm_sec, fsec);
#else
dt2time((time * SECS_PER_DAY), &tm->tm_hour, &tm->tm_min, &tm->tm_sec, fsec);
#endif
}
break;
case DTK_TIME:
/* previous field was "t" for ISO time */
if ((ftype[i] = DecodeNumberField(strlen(field[i]), field[i], (fmask | DTK_DATE_M),
&tmask, tm, fsec, &is2digits)) < 0)
return -1;
if (tmask != DTK_TIME_M)
return -1;
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
ptype = 0;
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
}
else
{
char *cp;
int flen;
flen = strlen(field[i]);
cp = strchr(field[i], '.');
/* Embedded decimal and no date yet? */
if (cp != NULL && !(fmask & DTK_DATE_M))
{
if (DecodeDate(field[i], fmask, &tmask, tm, EuroDates) != 0)
return -1;
}
/* embedded decimal and several digits before? */
else if (cp != NULL && flen - strlen(cp) > 2)
{
/*
* Interpret as a concatenated date or time Set the
* type field to allow decoding other fields later.
* Example: 20011223 or 040506
*/
if ((ftype[i] = DecodeNumberField(flen, field[i], fmask,
&tmask, tm, fsec, &is2digits)) < 0)
return -1;
}
else if (flen > 4)
{
if ((ftype[i] = DecodeNumberField(flen, field[i], fmask,
&tmask, tm, fsec, &is2digits)) < 0)
return -1;
}
/* otherwise it is a single date/time field... */
else if (DecodeNumber(flen, field[i], fmask,
&tmask, tm, fsec, &is2digits, EuroDates) != 0)
return -1;
}
break;
case DTK_STRING:
case DTK_SPECIAL:
type = DecodeSpecial(i, field[i], &val);
if (type == IGNORE_DTF)
continue;
tmask = DTK_M(type);
switch (type)
{
case RESERV:
switch (val)
{
case DTK_NOW:
tmask = (DTK_DATE_M | DTK_TIME_M | DTK_M(TZ));
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
GetCurrentDateTime(tm);
break;
case DTK_YESTERDAY:
tmask = DTK_DATE_M;
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
GetCurrentDateTime(tm);
j2date(date2j(tm->tm_year, tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday) - 1,
&tm->tm_year, &tm->tm_mon, &tm->tm_mday);
tm->tm_hour = 0;
tm->tm_min = 0;
tm->tm_sec = 0;
break;
case DTK_TODAY:
tmask = DTK_DATE_M;
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
GetCurrentDateTime(tm);
tm->tm_hour = 0;
tm->tm_min = 0;
tm->tm_sec = 0;
break;
case DTK_TOMORROW:
tmask = DTK_DATE_M;
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
GetCurrentDateTime(tm);
j2date(date2j(tm->tm_year, tm->tm_mon, tm->tm_mday) + 1,
&tm->tm_year, &tm->tm_mon, &tm->tm_mday);
tm->tm_hour = 0;
tm->tm_min = 0;
tm->tm_sec = 0;
break;
case DTK_ZULU:
tmask = (DTK_TIME_M | DTK_M(TZ));
*dtype = DTK_DATE;
tm->tm_hour = 0;
tm->tm_min = 0;
tm->tm_sec = 0;
if (tzp != NULL)
*tzp = 0;
break;
default:
*dtype = val;
}
break;
case MONTH:
/*
* already have a (numeric) month? then see if we can
* substitute...
*/
if ((fmask & DTK_M(MONTH)) && !haveTextMonth &&
!(fmask & DTK_M(DAY)) && tm->tm_mon >= 1 && tm->tm_mon <= 31)
{
tm->tm_mday = tm->tm_mon;
tmask = DTK_M(DAY);
}
haveTextMonth = TRUE;
tm->tm_mon = val;
break;
case DTZMOD:
/*
* daylight savings time modifier (solves "MET DST"
* syntax)
*/
tmask |= DTK_M(DTZ);
tm->tm_isdst = 1;
if (tzp == NULL)
return -1;
*tzp += val * MINS_PER_HOUR;
break;
case DTZ:
/*
* set mask for TZ here _or_ check for DTZ later when
* getting default timezone
*/
tmask |= DTK_M(TZ);
tm->tm_isdst = 1;
if (tzp == NULL)
return -1;
*tzp = val * MINS_PER_HOUR;
ftype[i] = DTK_TZ;
break;
case TZ:
tm->tm_isdst = 0;
if (tzp == NULL)
return -1;
*tzp = val * MINS_PER_HOUR;
ftype[i] = DTK_TZ;
break;
case IGNORE_DTF:
break;
case AMPM:
mer = val;
break;
case ADBC:
bc = (val == BC);
break;
case DOW:
tm->tm_wday = val;
break;
case UNITS:
tmask = 0;
ptype = val;
break;
case ISOTIME:
/*
* This is a filler field "t" indicating that the next
* field is time. Try to verify that this is sensible.
*/
tmask = 0;
/* No preceding date? Then quit... */
if ((fmask & DTK_DATE_M) != DTK_DATE_M)
return -1;
/***
* We will need one of the following fields:
* DTK_NUMBER should be hhmmss.fff
* DTK_TIME should be hh:mm:ss.fff
* DTK_DATE should be hhmmss-zz
***/
if (i >= nf - 1 ||
(ftype[i + 1] != DTK_NUMBER &&
ftype[i + 1] != DTK_TIME &&
ftype[i + 1] != DTK_DATE))
return -1;
ptype = val;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (tmask & fmask)
return -1;
fmask |= tmask;
}
/* there is no year zero in AD/BC notation; i.e. "1 BC" == year 0 */
if (bc)
{
if (tm->tm_year > 0)
tm->tm_year = -(tm->tm_year - 1);
else
return -1;
}
else if (is2digits)
{
if (tm->tm_year < 70)
tm->tm_year += 2000;
else if (tm->tm_year < 100)
tm->tm_year += 1900;
}
if (mer != HR24 && tm->tm_hour > 12)
return -1;
if (mer == AM && tm->tm_hour == 12)
tm->tm_hour = 0;
else if (mer == PM && tm->tm_hour != 12)
tm->tm_hour += 12;
/* do additional checking for full date specs... */
if (*dtype == DTK_DATE)
{
if ((fmask & DTK_DATE_M) != DTK_DATE_M)
return ((fmask & DTK_TIME_M) == DTK_TIME_M) ? 1 : -1;
/*
* check for valid day of month, now that we know for sure the month
* and year...
*/
if (tm->tm_mday < 1 || tm->tm_mday > day_tab[isleap(tm->tm_year)][tm->tm_mon - 1])
return -1;
/*
* backend tried to find local timezone here but we don't use the
* result afterwards anyway so we only check for this error: daylight
* savings time modifier but no standard timezone?
*/
if ((fmask & DTK_DATE_M) == DTK_DATE_M && tzp != NULL && !(fmask & DTK_M(TZ)) && (fmask & DTK_M(DTZMOD)))
return -1;
}
return 0;
} /* DecodeDateTime() */
Commit Message: Fix handling of wide datetime input/output.
Many server functions use the MAXDATELEN constant to size a buffer for
parsing or displaying a datetime value. It was much too small for the
longest possible interval output and slightly too small for certain
valid timestamp input, particularly input with a long timezone name.
The long input was rejected needlessly; the long output caused
interval_out() to overrun its buffer. ECPG's pgtypes library has a copy
of the vulnerable functions, which bore the same vulnerabilities along
with some of its own. In contrast to the server, certain long inputs
caused stack overflow rather than failing cleanly. Back-patch to 8.4
(all supported versions).
Reported by Daniel Schüssler, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0063
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mem_cgroup_move_task(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
struct cgroup *cont,
struct cgroup_taskset *tset)
{
struct task_struct *p = cgroup_taskset_first(tset);
struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
if (mm) {
if (mc.to)
mem_cgroup_move_charge(mm);
put_swap_token(mm);
mmput(mm);
}
if (mc.to)
mem_cgroup_clear_mc();
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: session_x11_req(Session *s)
{
int success;
if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
"x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
return 0;
}
s->single_connection = packet_get_char();
s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL);
s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL);
s->screen = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
else {
success = 0;
error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
}
if (!success) {
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
s->auth_data = NULL;
}
return success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 3,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pack_pkt(git_pkt **out)
{
git_pkt *pkt;
pkt = git__malloc(sizeof(git_pkt));
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt);
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_PACK;
*out = pkt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 16,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gboolean try_write_to_ui(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
struct file_transfer *ft = data;
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = ft->data;
struct stat fs;
off_t tx_bytes;
/* If we don't have the file opened yet, there's no data so wait. */
if (px->fd < 0 || !px->ui_wants_data) {
return FALSE;
}
tx_bytes = lseek(px->fd, 0, SEEK_CUR);
fstat(px->fd, &fs);
if (fs.st_size > tx_bytes) {
char buf[1024];
size_t n = MIN(fs.st_size - tx_bytes, sizeof(buf));
if (read(px->fd, buf, n) == n && ft->write(ft, buf, n)) {
px->ui_wants_data = FALSE;
} else {
purple_xfer_cancel_local(px->xfer);
imcb_file_canceled(px->ic, ft, "Read error");
}
}
if (lseek(px->fd, 0, SEEK_CUR) == px->xfer->size) {
/*purple_xfer_end( px->xfer );*/
imcb_file_finished(px->ic, ft);
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OJPEGReadBlock(OJPEGState* sp, uint16 len, void* mem)
{
uint16 mlen;
uint8* mmem;
uint16 n;
assert(len>0);
mlen=len;
mmem=mem;
do
{
if (sp->in_buffer_togo==0)
{
if (OJPEGReadBufferFill(sp)==0)
return(0);
assert(sp->in_buffer_togo>0);
}
n=mlen;
if (n>sp->in_buffer_togo)
n=sp->in_buffer_togo;
_TIFFmemcpy(mmem,sp->in_buffer_cur,n);
sp->in_buffer_cur+=n;
sp->in_buffer_togo-=n;
mlen-=n;
mmem+=n;
} while(mlen>0);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 21,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebViewImpl* WebView() { return web_view_helper_->GetWebView(); }
Commit Message: [BGPT] Add a fast-path for transform-origin changes.
This patch adds a fast-path for updating composited transform-origin
changes without requiring a PaintArtifactCompositor update. This
closely follows the approach of https://crrev.com/651338.
Bug: 952473
Change-Id: I8b82909c1761a7aa16705813207739d29596b0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580260
Commit-Queue: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: vmpstr <vmpstr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653749}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t rx_desc_base(E1000State *s)
{
uint64_t bah = s->mac_reg[RDBAH];
uint64_t bal = s->mac_reg[RDBAL] & ~0xf;
return (bah << 32) + bal;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 6,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_ucode_info(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, unsigned int date)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
pr_info("CPU%d microcode updated early to revision 0x%x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n",
cpu,
uci->cpu_sig.rev,
date & 0xffff,
date >> 24,
(date >> 16) & 0xff);
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void d_rehash(struct dentry * entry)
{
spin_lock(&entry->d_lock);
_d_rehash(entry);
spin_unlock(&entry->d_lock);
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 17,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *ask_helper(const char *msg, void *args, bool password)
{
GtkWidget *dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(g_wnd_assistant),
GTK_DIALOG_MODAL | GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION,
GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL,
"%s", msg);
char *tagged_msg = tag_url(msg, "\n");
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
gtk_message_dialog_set_markup(GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(dialog), tagged_msg);
free(tagged_msg);
GtkWidget *vbox = gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
GtkWidget *textbox = gtk_entry_new();
/* gtk_entry_set_editable(GTK_ENTRY(textbox), TRUE);
* is not available in gtk3, so please use the highlevel
* g_object_set
*/
g_object_set(G_OBJECT(textbox), "editable", TRUE, NULL);
g_signal_connect(textbox, "activate", G_CALLBACK(gtk_entry_emit_dialog_response_ok), dialog);
if (password)
gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(textbox), FALSE);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(vbox), textbox, TRUE, TRUE, 0);
gtk_widget_show(textbox);
char *response = NULL;
if (gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)) == GTK_RESPONSE_OK)
{
const char *text = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(textbox));
response = xstrdup(text);
}
gtk_widget_destroy(textbox);
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
const char *log_response = "";
if (response)
log_response = password ? "********" : response;
log_request_response_communication(msg, log_response, (struct analyze_event_data *)args);
return response ? response : xstrdup("");
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_clean_rtx_queue(struct sock *sk, int prior_fackets,
u32 prior_snd_una)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
u32 now = tcp_time_stamp;
int fully_acked = 1;
int flag = 0;
u32 pkts_acked = 0;
u32 reord = tp->packets_out;
u32 prior_sacked = tp->sacked_out;
s32 seq_rtt = -1;
s32 ca_seq_rtt = -1;
ktime_t last_ackt = net_invalid_timestamp();
while ((skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk)) && skb != tcp_send_head(sk)) {
struct tcp_skb_cb *scb = TCP_SKB_CB(skb);
u32 acked_pcount;
u8 sacked = scb->sacked;
/* Determine how many packets and what bytes were acked, tso and else */
if (after(scb->end_seq, tp->snd_una)) {
if (tcp_skb_pcount(skb) == 1 ||
!after(tp->snd_una, scb->seq))
break;
acked_pcount = tcp_tso_acked(sk, skb);
if (!acked_pcount)
break;
fully_acked = 0;
} else {
acked_pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) {
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS)
tp->retrans_out -= acked_pcount;
flag |= FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED;
ca_seq_rtt = -1;
seq_rtt = -1;
if ((flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED) || (acked_pcount > 1))
flag |= FLAG_NONHEAD_RETRANS_ACKED;
} else {
ca_seq_rtt = now - scb->when;
last_ackt = skb->tstamp;
if (seq_rtt < 0) {
seq_rtt = ca_seq_rtt;
}
if (!(sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
reord = min(pkts_acked, reord);
}
if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)
tp->sacked_out -= acked_pcount;
if (sacked & TCPCB_LOST)
tp->lost_out -= acked_pcount;
tp->packets_out -= acked_pcount;
pkts_acked += acked_pcount;
/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue
* just like anything else we transmit. It is not
* true data, and if we misinform our callers that
* this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
* connection startup slow start one packet too
* quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.
*/
if (!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN)) {
flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;
} else {
flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED;
tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
}
if (!fully_acked)
break;
tcp_unlink_write_queue(skb, sk);
sk_wmem_free_skb(sk, skb);
tp->scoreboard_skb_hint = NULL;
if (skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)
tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL;
if (skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)
tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL;
}
if (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una)))
tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una;
if (skb && (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED))
flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;
if (flag & FLAG_ACKED) {
const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca_ops
= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_ops;
if (unlikely(icsk->icsk_mtup.probe_size &&
!after(tp->mtu_probe.probe_seq_end, tp->snd_una))) {
tcp_mtup_probe_success(sk);
}
tcp_ack_update_rtt(sk, flag, seq_rtt);
tcp_rearm_rto(sk);
if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked);
} else {
int delta;
/* Non-retransmitted hole got filled? That's reordering */
if (reord < prior_fackets)
tcp_update_reordering(sk, tp->fackets_out - reord, 0);
delta = tcp_is_fack(tp) ? pkts_acked :
prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out;
tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);
}
tp->fackets_out -= min(pkts_acked, tp->fackets_out);
if (ca_ops->pkts_acked) {
s32 rtt_us = -1;
/* Is the ACK triggering packet unambiguous? */
if (!(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
/* High resolution needed and available? */
if (ca_ops->flags & TCP_CONG_RTT_STAMP &&
!ktime_equal(last_ackt,
net_invalid_timestamp()))
rtt_us = ktime_us_delta(ktime_get_real(),
last_ackt);
else if (ca_seq_rtt >= 0)
rtt_us = jiffies_to_usecs(ca_seq_rtt);
}
ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, pkts_acked, rtt_us);
}
}
#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0
WARN_ON((int)tp->sacked_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0);
WARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0);
if (!tp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (tp->lost_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak l=%u %d\n",
tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->lost_out = 0;
}
if (tp->sacked_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak s=%u %d\n",
tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->sacked_out = 0;
}
if (tp->retrans_out) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Leak r=%u %d\n",
tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
tp->retrans_out = 0;
}
}
#endif
return flag;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvp_update_file(int pool)
{
FILE *filep;
size_t bytes_written;
/*
* We are going to write our in-memory registry out to
* disk; acquire the lock first.
*/
kvp_acquire_lock(pool);
filep = fopen(kvp_file_info[pool].fname, "w");
if (!filep) {
kvp_release_lock(pool);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to open file, pool: %d", pool);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
bytes_written = fwrite(kvp_file_info[pool].records,
sizeof(struct kvp_record),
kvp_file_info[pool].num_records, filep);
if (ferror(filep) || fclose(filep)) {
kvp_release_lock(pool);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to write file, pool: %d", pool);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
kvp_release_lock(pool);
}
Commit Message: tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS
The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed
a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user.
Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored
and a warning is printed into the syslog.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza <thozza@redhat.com>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GotSystemSlotOnUIThread(
base::Callback<void(crypto::ScopedPK11Slot)> callback_ui_thread,
crypto::ScopedPK11Slot system_slot) {
callback_ui_thread.Run(std::move(system_slot));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_udta_sdp(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
AVFormatContext *ctx = track->rtp_ctx;
char buf[1000] = "";
int len;
ff_sdp_write_media(buf, sizeof(buf), ctx->streams[0], track->src_track,
NULL, NULL, 0, 0, ctx);
av_strlcatf(buf, sizeof(buf), "a=control:streamid=%d\r\n", track->track_id);
len = strlen(buf);
avio_wb32(pb, len + 24);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "udta");
avio_wb32(pb, len + 16);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "hnti");
avio_wb32(pb, len + 8);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "sdp ");
avio_write(pb, buf, len);
return len + 24;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseConditionalSections(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int id = ctxt->input->id;
SKIP(3);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, 'I', 'N', 'C', 'L', 'U', 'D', 'E')) {
SKIP(7);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '[') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID, NULL);
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
} else {
if (ctxt->input->id != id) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"All markup of the conditional section is not"
" in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Entering INCLUDE Conditional Section\n");
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
while (((RAW != 0) && ((RAW != ']') || (NXT(1) != ']') ||
(NXT(2) != '>'))) && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '!') && (NXT(2) == '[')) {
xmlParseConditionalSections(ctxt);
} else
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EXT_SUBSET_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
break;
}
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Leaving INCLUDE Conditional Section\n");
}
} else if (CMP6(CUR_PTR, 'I', 'G', 'N', 'O', 'R', 'E')) {
int state;
xmlParserInputState instate;
int depth = 0;
SKIP(6);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW != '[') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID, NULL);
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
} else {
if (ctxt->input->id != id) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"All markup of the conditional section is not"
" in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Entering IGNORE Conditional Section\n");
}
/*
* Parse up to the end of the conditional section
* But disable SAX event generating DTD building in the meantime
*/
state = ctxt->disableSAX;
instate = ctxt->instate;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0) ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_IGNORE;
while (((depth >= 0) && (RAW != 0)) &&
(ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '!') && (NXT(2) == '[')) {
depth++;
SKIP(3);
continue;
}
if ((RAW == ']') && (NXT(1) == ']') && (NXT(2) == '>')) {
if (--depth >= 0) SKIP(3);
continue;
}
NEXT;
continue;
}
ctxt->disableSAX = state;
ctxt->instate = instate;
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Leaving IGNORE Conditional Section\n");
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID_KEYWORD, NULL);
xmlHaltParser(ctxt);
return;
}
if (RAW == 0)
SHRINK;
if (RAW == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CONDSEC_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
if (ctxt->input->id != id) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"All markup of the conditional section is not in"
" the same entity\n");
}
if ((ctxt-> instate != XML_PARSER_EOF) &&
((ctxt->input->cur + 3) <= ctxt->input->end))
SKIP(3);
}
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 25,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __udp4_lib_mcast_deliver(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct udphdr *uh,
__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
struct udp_table *udptable)
{
struct sock *sk, *stack[256 / sizeof(struct sock *)];
struct udp_hslot *hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, ntohs(uh->dest));
int dif;
unsigned int i, count = 0;
spin_lock(&hslot->lock);
sk = sk_nulls_head(&hslot->head);
dif = skb->dev->ifindex;
sk = udp_v4_mcast_next(net, sk, uh->dest, daddr, uh->source, saddr, dif);
while (sk) {
stack[count++] = sk;
sk = udp_v4_mcast_next(net, sk_nulls_next(sk), uh->dest,
daddr, uh->source, saddr, dif);
if (unlikely(count == ARRAY_SIZE(stack))) {
if (!sk)
break;
flush_stack(stack, count, skb, ~0);
count = 0;
}
}
/*
* before releasing chain lock, we must take a reference on sockets
*/
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
sock_hold(stack[i]);
spin_unlock(&hslot->lock);
/*
* do the slow work with no lock held
*/
if (count) {
flush_stack(stack, count, skb, count - 1);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
sock_put(stack[i]);
} else {
kfree_skb(skb);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown(const ui::LatencyInfo& latency_info) {
if (!is_hidden_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host", "RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasShown");
is_hidden_ = false;
if (new_content_rendering_timeout_ &&
new_content_rendering_timeout_->IsRunning()) {
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Stop();
ClearDisplayedGraphics();
}
SendScreenRects();
RestartHangMonitorTimeoutIfNecessary();
bool needs_repainting = true;
needs_repainting_on_restore_ = false;
Send(new ViewMsg_WasShown(routing_id_, needs_repainting, latency_info));
process_->WidgetRestored();
bool is_visible = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
Details<bool>(&is_visible));
WasResized();
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 1 | 19,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_event_set_bpf_prog(struct perf_event *event, u32 prog_fd)
{
return -ENOENT;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfc_llcp_recv_snl(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock;
u8 dsap, ssap, *tlv, type, length, tid, sap;
u16 tlv_len, offset;
char *service_name;
size_t service_name_len;
struct nfc_llcp_sdp_tlv *sdp;
HLIST_HEAD(llc_sdres_list);
size_t sdres_tlvs_len;
HLIST_HEAD(nl_sdres_list);
dsap = nfc_llcp_dsap(skb);
ssap = nfc_llcp_ssap(skb);
pr_debug("%d %d\n", dsap, ssap);
if (dsap != LLCP_SAP_SDP || ssap != LLCP_SAP_SDP) {
pr_err("Wrong SNL SAP\n");
return;
}
tlv = &skb->data[LLCP_HEADER_SIZE];
tlv_len = skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
offset = 0;
sdres_tlvs_len = 0;
while (offset < tlv_len) {
type = tlv[0];
length = tlv[1];
switch (type) {
case LLCP_TLV_SDREQ:
tid = tlv[2];
service_name = (char *) &tlv[3];
service_name_len = length - 1;
pr_debug("Looking for %.16s\n", service_name);
if (service_name_len == strlen("urn:nfc:sn:sdp") &&
!strncmp(service_name, "urn:nfc:sn:sdp",
service_name_len)) {
sap = 1;
goto add_snl;
}
llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(local, service_name,
service_name_len);
if (!llcp_sock) {
sap = 0;
goto add_snl;
}
/*
* We found a socket but its ssap has not been reserved
* yet. We need to assign it for good and send a reply.
* The ssap will be freed when the socket is closed.
*/
if (llcp_sock->ssap == LLCP_SDP_UNBOUND) {
atomic_t *client_count;
sap = nfc_llcp_reserve_sdp_ssap(local);
pr_debug("Reserving %d\n", sap);
if (sap == LLCP_SAP_MAX) {
sap = 0;
goto add_snl;
}
client_count =
&local->local_sdp_cnt[sap -
LLCP_WKS_NUM_SAP];
atomic_inc(client_count);
llcp_sock->ssap = sap;
llcp_sock->reserved_ssap = sap;
} else {
sap = llcp_sock->ssap;
}
pr_debug("%p %d\n", llcp_sock, sap);
add_snl:
sdp = nfc_llcp_build_sdres_tlv(tid, sap);
if (sdp == NULL)
goto exit;
sdres_tlvs_len += sdp->tlv_len;
hlist_add_head(&sdp->node, &llc_sdres_list);
break;
case LLCP_TLV_SDRES:
mutex_lock(&local->sdreq_lock);
pr_debug("LLCP_TLV_SDRES: searching tid %d\n", tlv[2]);
hlist_for_each_entry(sdp, &local->pending_sdreqs, node) {
if (sdp->tid != tlv[2])
continue;
sdp->sap = tlv[3];
pr_debug("Found: uri=%s, sap=%d\n",
sdp->uri, sdp->sap);
hlist_del(&sdp->node);
hlist_add_head(&sdp->node, &nl_sdres_list);
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&local->sdreq_lock);
break;
default:
pr_err("Invalid SNL tlv value 0x%x\n", type);
break;
}
offset += length + 2;
tlv += length + 2;
}
exit:
if (!hlist_empty(&nl_sdres_list))
nfc_genl_llc_send_sdres(local->dev, &nl_sdres_list);
if (!hlist_empty(&llc_sdres_list))
nfc_llcp_send_snl_sdres(local, &llc_sdres_list, sdres_tlvs_len);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 15,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CairoImageOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GBool maskInvert)
{
cairo_t *cr;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
double *ctm;
double mat[6];
CairoImage *image;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
x1 = mat[4];
y1 = mat[5];
x2 = x1 + width;
y2 = y1 + height;
image = new CairoImage (x1, y1, x2, y2);
saveImage (image);
if (imgDrawCbk && imgDrawCbk (numImages - 1, imgDrawCbkData)) {
surface = cairo_image_surface_create (CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32, width, height);
cr = cairo_create (surface);
setCairo (cr);
cairo_translate (cr, 0, height);
cairo_scale (cr, width, -height);
CairoOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(state, ref, str, width, height, colorMap,
maskStr, maskWidth, maskHeight, maskInvert);
image->setImage (surface);
setCairo (NULL);
cairo_surface_destroy (surface);
cairo_destroy (cr);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 16,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: first_named_child(xmlNode * parent, const char *name)
{
xmlNode *match = NULL;
for (match = __xml_first_child(parent); match != NULL; match = __xml_next(match)) {
/*
* name == NULL gives first child regardless of name; this is
* semantically incorrect in this funciton, but may be necessary
* due to prior use of xml_child_iter_filter
*/
if (name == NULL || strcmp((const char *)match->name, name) == 0) {
return match;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void S_AL_BufferLoad(sfxHandle_t sfx, qboolean cache)
{
ALenum error;
ALuint format;
void *data;
snd_info_t info;
alSfx_t *curSfx = &knownSfx[sfx];
if(curSfx->filename[0] == '\0')
return;
if(curSfx->filename[0] == '*')
return;
if((curSfx->inMemory) || (curSfx->isDefault) || (!cache && curSfx->isDefaultChecked))
return;
data = S_CodecLoad(curSfx->filename, &info);
if(!data)
{
S_AL_BufferUseDefault(sfx);
return;
}
curSfx->isDefaultChecked = qtrue;
if (!cache)
{
Hunk_FreeTempMemory(data);
return;
}
format = S_AL_Format(info.width, info.channels);
if (!S_AL_GenBuffers(1, &curSfx->buffer, curSfx->filename))
{
S_AL_BufferUseDefault(sfx);
Hunk_FreeTempMemory(data);
return;
}
if( info.size == 0 )
{
byte dummyData[ 2 ] = { 0 };
qalBufferData(curSfx->buffer, AL_FORMAT_MONO16, (void *)dummyData, 2, 22050);
}
else
qalBufferData(curSfx->buffer, format, data, info.size, info.rate);
error = qalGetError();
while(error == AL_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
{
if( !S_AL_BufferEvict( ) )
{
qalDeleteBuffers(1, &curSfx->buffer);
S_AL_BufferUseDefault(sfx);
Hunk_FreeTempMemory(data);
Com_Printf( S_COLOR_RED "ERROR: Out of memory loading %s\n", curSfx->filename);
return;
}
qalBufferData(curSfx->buffer, format, data, info.size, info.rate);
error = qalGetError();
}
if(error != AL_NO_ERROR)
{
qalDeleteBuffers(1, &curSfx->buffer);
S_AL_BufferUseDefault(sfx);
Hunk_FreeTempMemory(data);
Com_Printf( S_COLOR_RED "ERROR: Can't fill sound buffer for %s - %s\n",
curSfx->filename, S_AL_ErrorMsg(error));
return;
}
curSfx->info = info;
Hunk_FreeTempMemory(data);
curSfx->inMemory = qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 17,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ptaCreate(l_int32 n)
{
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaCreate");
if (n <= 0)
n = INITIAL_PTR_ARRAYSIZE;
pta = (PTA *)LEPT_CALLOC(1, sizeof(PTA));
pta->n = 0;
pta->nalloc = n;
ptaChangeRefcount(pta, 1); /* sets to 1 */
pta->x = (l_float32 *)LEPT_CALLOC(n, sizeof(l_float32));
pta->y = (l_float32 *)LEPT_CALLOC(n, sizeof(l_float32));
if (!pta->x || !pta->y) {
ptaDestroy(&pta);
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("x and y arrays not both made", procName, NULL);
}
return pta;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cirrus_read_hidden_dac(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
if (++s->cirrus_hidden_dac_lockindex == 5) {
s->cirrus_hidden_dac_lockindex = 0;
return s->cirrus_hidden_dac_data;
}
return 0xff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_ftrace_pid_function(ftrace_func_t func)
{
/* do not set ftrace_pid_function to itself! */
if (func != ftrace_pid_func)
ftrace_pid_function = func;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,343 |
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