instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int regulator_set_voltage(struct regulator *regulator, int min_uV, int max_uV)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = regulator->rdev;
int ret = 0;
int old_min_uV, old_max_uV;
int current_uV;
mutex_lock(&rdev->mutex);
/* If we're setting the same range as last time the change
* should be a noop (some cpufreq implementations use the same
* voltage for multiple frequencies, for example).
*/
if (regulator->min_uV == min_uV && regulator->max_uV == max_uV)
goto out;
/* If we're trying to set a range that overlaps the current voltage,
* return succesfully even though the regulator does not support
* changing the voltage.
*/
if (!(rdev->constraints->valid_ops_mask & REGULATOR_CHANGE_VOLTAGE)) {
current_uV = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev);
if (min_uV <= current_uV && current_uV <= max_uV) {
regulator->min_uV = min_uV;
regulator->max_uV = max_uV;
goto out;
}
}
/* sanity check */
if (!rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage &&
!rdev->desc->ops->set_voltage_sel) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* constraints check */
ret = regulator_check_voltage(rdev, &min_uV, &max_uV);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* restore original values in case of error */
old_min_uV = regulator->min_uV;
old_max_uV = regulator->max_uV;
regulator->min_uV = min_uV;
regulator->max_uV = max_uV;
ret = regulator_check_consumers(rdev, &min_uV, &max_uV);
if (ret < 0)
goto out2;
ret = _regulator_do_set_voltage(rdev, min_uV, max_uV);
if (ret < 0)
goto out2;
out:
mutex_unlock(&rdev->mutex);
return ret;
out2:
regulator->min_uV = old_min_uV;
regulator->max_uV = old_max_uV;
mutex_unlock(&rdev->mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ecryptfs_derive_iv(char *iv, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
loff_t offset)
{
int rc = 0;
char dst[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
char src[ECRYPTFS_MAX_IV_BYTES + 16];
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "root iv:\n");
ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->root_iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
}
/* TODO: It is probably secure to just cast the least
* significant bits of the root IV into an unsigned long and
* add the offset to that rather than go through all this
* hashing business. -Halcrow */
memcpy(src, crypt_stat->root_iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
memset((src + crypt_stat->iv_bytes), 0, 16);
snprintf((src + crypt_stat->iv_bytes), 16, "%lld", offset);
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "source:\n");
ecryptfs_dump_hex(src, (crypt_stat->iv_bytes + 16));
}
rc = ecryptfs_calculate_md5(dst, crypt_stat, src,
(crypt_stat->iv_bytes + 16));
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error attempting to compute "
"MD5 while generating IV for a page\n");
goto out;
}
memcpy(iv, dst, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "derived iv:\n");
ecryptfs_dump_hex(iv, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
}
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContents* Browser::OpenURLFromTab(WebContents* source,
const OpenURLParams& params) {
if (is_devtools()) {
DevToolsWindow* window = DevToolsWindow::AsDevToolsWindow(source);
DCHECK(window);
return window->OpenURLFromTab(source, params);
}
chrome::NavigateParams nav_params(this, params.url, params.transition);
FillNavigateParamsFromOpenURLParams(&nav_params, params);
nav_params.source_contents = source;
nav_params.tabstrip_add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_NONE;
if (params.user_gesture)
nav_params.window_action = chrome::NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
nav_params.user_gesture = params.user_gesture;
PopupBlockerTabHelper* popup_blocker_helper = NULL;
if (source)
popup_blocker_helper = PopupBlockerTabHelper::FromWebContents(source);
if (popup_blocker_helper) {
if ((params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_POPUP ||
params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB ||
params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB ||
params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_WINDOW) &&
!params.user_gesture &&
!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisablePopupBlocking)) {
if (popup_blocker_helper->MaybeBlockPopup(nav_params,
WebWindowFeatures())) {
return NULL;
}
}
}
chrome::Navigate(&nav_params);
return nav_params.target_contents;
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HarfBuzzShaper::shape(GlyphBuffer* glyphBuffer)
{
if (!createHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
m_totalWidth = 0;
if (!shapeHarfBuzzRuns())
return false;
if (glyphBuffer && !fillGlyphBuffer(glyphBuffer))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 11,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftG711::DecodeMLaw(
int16_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t inSize) {
while (inSize-- > 0) {
int32_t x = *in++;
int32_t mantissa = ~x;
int32_t exponent = (mantissa >> 4) & 7;
int32_t segment = exponent + 1;
mantissa &= 0x0f;
int32_t step = 4 << segment;
int32_t abs = (0x80l << exponent) + step * mantissa + step / 2 - 4 * 33;
*out++ = (x < 0x80) ? -abs : abs;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEK);
return 0;
}
kekri = ri->d.kekri;
kekri->key = key;
kekri->keylen = keylen;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 18,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document& Document::axObjectCacheOwner() const
{
Document* top = const_cast<Document*>(this);
LocalFrame* frame = this->frame();
if (!frame)
return *top;
while (frame && frame->owner() && frame->owner()->isLocal()) {
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = toHTMLFrameOwnerElement(frame->owner());
top = &owner->document();
frame = top->frame();
}
if (top->frame() && top->frame()->pagePopupOwner()) {
ASSERT(!top->m_axObjectCache);
return top->frame()->pagePopupOwner()->document().axObjectCacheOwner();
}
ASSERT(top);
return *top;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc txcq_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
/* Flush changes in TX descriptor before changing the counter value */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_inc_tx_completion_counter(s, qidx);
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->txq_descr[qidx].intr_idx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 29,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data(struct address_space *mapping,
struct inode *inode, loff_t pos,
unsigned len, struct page *mmap_page,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc)
{
int ret, written = 0;
loff_t end = pos + len;
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_dinode *di = NULL;
trace_ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data((unsigned long long)oi->ip_blkno,
len, (unsigned long long)pos,
oi->ip_dyn_features);
/*
* Handle inodes which already have inline data 1st.
*/
if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) {
if (mmap_page == NULL &&
ocfs2_size_fits_inline_data(wc->w_di_bh, end))
goto do_inline_write;
/*
* The write won't fit - we have to give this inode an
* inline extent list now.
*/
ret = ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents(inode, wc->w_di_bh);
if (ret)
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check whether the inode can accept inline data.
*/
if (oi->ip_clusters != 0 || i_size_read(inode) != 0)
return 0;
/*
* Check whether the write can fit.
*/
di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)wc->w_di_bh->b_data;
if (mmap_page ||
end > ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(inode->i_sb, di))
return 0;
do_inline_write:
ret = ocfs2_write_begin_inline(mapping, inode, wc);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* This signals to the caller that the data can be written
* inline.
*/
written = 1;
out:
return written ? written : ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnUserGesture() {
delegate_->OnUserGesture();
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 17,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(gd_info)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_string(return_value, "GD Version", PHP_GD_VERSION_STRING, 1);
#ifdef ENABLE_GD_TTF
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "FreeType Support", 1);
#if HAVE_LIBFREETYPE
add_assoc_string(return_value, "FreeType Linkage", "with freetype", 1);
#else
add_assoc_string(return_value, "FreeType Linkage", "with unknown library", 1);
#endif
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "FreeType Support", 0);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIBT1
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "T1Lib Support", 1);
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "T1Lib Support", 0);
#endif
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "GIF Read Support", 1);
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "GIF Create Support", 1);
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "JPEG Support", 1);
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "JPEG Support", 0);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GD_PNG
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "PNG Support", 1);
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "PNG Support", 0);
#endif
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "WBMP Support", 1);
#if defined(HAVE_GD_XPM)
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "XPM Support", 1);
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "XPM Support", 0);
#endif
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "XBM Support", 1);
#ifdef HAVE_GD_WEBP
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "WebP Support", 1);
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "WebP Support", 0);
#endif
#if defined(USE_GD_JISX0208)
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "JIS-mapped Japanese Font Support", 1);
#else
add_assoc_bool(return_value, "JIS-mapped Japanese Font Support", 0);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 17,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::notifyDeviceReset(const NotifyDeviceResetArgs* args) {
#if DEBUG_INBOUND_EVENT_DETAILS
ALOGD("notifyDeviceReset - eventTime=%lld, deviceId=%d",
args->eventTime, args->deviceId);
#endif
bool needWake;
{ // acquire lock
AutoMutex _l(mLock);
DeviceResetEntry* newEntry = new DeviceResetEntry(args->eventTime, args->deviceId);
needWake = enqueueInboundEventLocked(newEntry);
} // release lock
if (needWake) {
mLooper->wake();
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::DoCompleteCreation(
media::AudioInputController* controller) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupByController(controller);
if (!entry)
return;
if (!peer_handle()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Renderer process handle is invalid.";
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
if (!entry->controller->LowLatencyMode()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Only low-latency mode is supported.";
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
base::SharedMemoryHandle foreign_memory_handle;
if (!entry->shared_memory.ShareToProcess(peer_handle(),
&foreign_memory_handle)) {
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
AudioInputSyncWriter* writer =
static_cast<AudioInputSyncWriter*>(entry->writer.get());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::SyncSocket::Handle foreign_socket_handle;
#else
base::FileDescriptor foreign_socket_handle;
#endif
if (!writer->PrepareForeignSocketHandle(peer_handle(),
&foreign_socket_handle)) {
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
return;
}
Send(new AudioInputMsg_NotifyStreamCreated(entry->stream_id,
foreign_memory_handle, foreign_socket_handle,
entry->shared_memory.created_size()));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_verbosity_command(conn *c, token_t *tokens, const size_t ntokens) {
unsigned int level;
assert(c != NULL);
set_noreply_maybe(c, tokens, ntokens);
level = strtoul(tokens[1].value, NULL, 10);
settings.verbose = level > MAX_VERBOSITY_LEVEL ? MAX_VERBOSITY_LEVEL : level;
out_string(c, "OK");
return;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_create_ve(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
struct pipe_vertex_element *ve = NULL;
int num_elements;
int i;
int ret;
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
if ((length - 1) % 4)
return EINVAL;
num_elements = (length - 1) / 4;
if (num_elements) {
ve = calloc(num_elements, sizeof(struct pipe_vertex_element));
if (!ve)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
ve[i].src_offset = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_OFFSET(i));
ve[i].instance_divisor = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_INSTANCE_DIVISOR(i));
ve[i].vertex_buffer_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_VERTEX_BUFFER_INDEX(i));
ve[i].src_format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_FORMAT(i));
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 4,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BlackBerryInputType InputHandler::elementType(Element* element) const
{
if (const HTMLInputElement* inputElement = static_cast<const HTMLInputElement*>(element->toInputElement()))
return convertInputType(inputElement);
if (element->hasTagName(HTMLNames::textareaTag))
return InputTypeTextArea;
return InputTypeTextArea;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AttestationPermissionRequestSheetModel::OnCancel() {
dialog_model()->OnAttestationPermissionResponse(false);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void UrlStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->GetURLAttribute(html_names::kUrlstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool acceptsBuffers() {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Skip composition of frames lacking a color map
Bug:68399117
Change-Id: I32f1d6856221b8a60130633edb69da2d2986c27c
(cherry picked from commit 0dc887f70eeea8d707cb426b96c6756edd1c607d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acct_clear_integrals(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
tsk->acct_stimexpd = 0;
tsk->acct_rss_mem1 = 0;
tsk->acct_vm_mem1 = 0;
}
Commit Message: [PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
bool changes_data;
int i, err;
/* find function prototype */
if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog);
if (!fn) {
verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */
changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
err = check_func_proto(fn);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
}
/* check args */
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
/* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0,
* this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error.
*/
if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage &&
!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) {
verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* reset caller saved regs */
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
}
/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL ||
fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
else
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
* can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
* to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
*/
if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
verbose(env,
"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
} else {
verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
if (err)
return err;
if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack && !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) {
const char *err_str;
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
err = get_callchain_buffers(sysctl_perf_event_max_stack);
err_str = "cannot get callchain buffer for func %s#%d\n";
#else
err = -ENOTSUPP;
err_str = "func %s#%d not supported without CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS\n";
#endif
if (err) {
verbose(env, err_str, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
}
env->prog->has_callchain_buf = true;
}
if (changes_data)
clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HWBType * RGB_to_HWB (RGBType RGB, HWBType * HWB)
{
/*
* RGB are each on [0, 1]. W and B are returned on [0, 1] and H is
* returned on [0, 6]. Exception: H is returned UNDEFINED if W == 1 - B.
*/
float R = RGB.R, G = RGB.G, B = RGB.B, w, v, b, f;
int i;
w = MIN3 (R, G, B);
v = MAX3 (R, G, B);
b = 1 - v;
if (v == w) {
RETURN_HWB(HWB_UNDEFINED, w, b);
}
f = (R == w) ? G - B : ((G == w) ? B - R : R - G);
i = (R == w) ? 3 : ((G == w) ? 5 : 1);
RETURN_HWB(i - f / (v - w), w, b);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 23,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CastConfigDelegateChromeos::CastConfigDelegateChromeos() {
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 11,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __init static int tracing_set_default_clock(void)
{
/* sched_clock_stable() is determined in late_initcall */
if (!trace_boot_clock && !sched_clock_stable()) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"Unstable clock detected, switching default tracing clock to \"global\"\n"
"If you want to keep using the local clock, then add:\n"
" \"trace_clock=local\"\n"
"on the kernel command line\n");
tracing_set_clock(&global_trace, "global");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 6,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void digit_gen(diy_fp_t Mp, diy_fp_t delta, char* buffer, int* len, int* K)
{
uint32_t div, p1;
uint64_t p2;
int d,kappa;
diy_fp_t one;
one.f = ((uint64_t) 1) << -Mp.e; one.e = Mp.e;
p1 = Mp.f >> -one.e;
p2 = Mp.f & (one.f - 1);
*len = 0; kappa = 3; div = TEN2;
while (kappa > 0) {
d = p1 / div;
if (d || *len) buffer[(*len)++] = '0' + d;
p1 %= div; kappa--; div /= 10;
if ((((uint64_t)p1)<<-one.e)+p2 <= delta.f) {
*K += kappa; return;
}
}
do {
p2 *= 10;
d = p2 >> -one.e;
if (d || *len) buffer[(*len)++] = '0' + d;
p2 &= one.f - 1; kappa--; delta.f *= 10;
} while (p2 > delta.f);
*K += kappa;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 28,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
{
int rc;
struct policy_file fp;
if (!ss_initialized)
return -EINVAL;
*len = security_policydb_len();
*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
if (!*data)
return -ENOMEM;
fp.data = *data;
fp.len = *len;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc)
return rc;
*len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 25,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__be32 v4addr = 0;
unsigned short snum;
int addr_type = 0;
int err = 0;
/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. */
if (sk->sk_prot->bind)
return sk->sk_prot->bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
if ((addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) && sock->type == SOCK_STREAM)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check these errors (active socket, double bind). */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || inet->inet_num) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
int chk_addr_ret;
/* Binding to v4-mapped address on a v6-only socket
* makes no sense
*/
if (sk->sk_ipv6only) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Reproduce AF_INET checks to make the bindings consistent */
v4addr = addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, v4addr);
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind &&
!(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) &&
v4addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out;
}
} else {
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
addr->sin6_scope_id) {
/* Override any existing binding, if another one
* is supplied by user.
*/
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Binding to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* ipv4 addr of the socket is invalid. Only the
* unspecified and mapped address have a v4 equivalent.
*/
v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) {
if (!net->ipv6.sysctl.ip_nonlocal_bind &&
!(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) &&
!ipv6_chk_addr(net, &addr->sin6_addr,
dev, 0)) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = v4addr;
inet->inet_saddr = v4addr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
/* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */
if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) &&
sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) {
inet_reset_saddr(sk);
err = -EADDRINUSE;
goto out;
}
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK;
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
sk->sk_ipv6only = 1;
}
if (snum)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK;
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
inet->inet_dport = 0;
inet->inet_daddr = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_encode(const opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
J2K_T2_MODE p_t2_mode)
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* to store w, h, dx and dy fro all components and resolutions*/
OPJ_UINT32 * l_tmp_data;
OPJ_UINT32 ** l_tmp_ptr;
/* encoding prameters to set*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min, l_dy_min;
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
OPJ_UINT32 l_step_p, l_step_c, l_step_r, l_step_l ;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_stride;
/* pointers*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *l_tccp = 00;
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_comp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
OPJ_UINT32 * l_encoding_value_ptr = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no];
l_bound = l_tcp->numpocs + 1;
l_data_stride = 4 * OPJ_J2K_MAXRLVLS;
l_tmp_data = (OPJ_UINT32*)opj_malloc(
l_data_stride * p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (! l_tmp_data) {
return 00;
}
l_tmp_ptr = (OPJ_UINT32**)opj_malloc(
p_image->numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32 *));
if (! l_tmp_ptr) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
return 00;
}
/* memory allocation for pi*/
l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no);
if (!l_pi) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
return 00;
}
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_data;
/* update pointer array*/
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
l_tmp_ptr[compno] = l_encoding_value_ptr;
l_encoding_value_ptr += l_data_stride;
}
/* get encoding parameters*/
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no, &l_tx0, &l_tx1,
&l_ty0, &l_ty1, &l_dx_min, &l_dy_min, &l_max_prec, &l_max_res, l_tmp_ptr);
/* step calculations*/
l_step_p = 1;
l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;
l_step_r = p_image->numcomps * l_step_c;
l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;
/* set values for first packet iterator*/
l_pi->tp_on = (OPJ_BYTE)p_cp->m_specific_param.m_enc.m_tp_on;
l_current_pi = l_pi;
/* memory allocation for include*/
l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(l_tcp->numlayers * l_step_l,
sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
if (!l_current_pi->include) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_bound);
return 00;
}
/* special treatment for the first packet iterator*/
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;
l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for (compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
++l_current_pi;
for (pino = 1 ; pino < l_bound ; ++pino) {
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;
l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for (compno = 0; compno < l_current_pi->numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
/* special treatment*/
l_current_pi->include = (l_current_pi - 1)->include;
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
l_tmp_data = 00;
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
l_tmp_ptr = 00;
if (l_tcp->POC && (OPJ_IS_CINEMA(p_cp->rsiz) || p_t2_mode == FINAL_PASS)) {
opj_pi_update_encode_poc_and_final(p_cp, p_tile_no, l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1,
l_max_prec, l_max_res, l_dx_min, l_dy_min);
} else {
opj_pi_update_encode_not_poc(p_cp, p_image->numcomps, p_tile_no, l_tx0, l_tx1,
l_ty0, l_ty1, l_max_prec, l_max_res, l_dx_min, l_dy_min);
}
return l_pi;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 21,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int getArg(char ch, int def) {
switch (ch) {
case '&':
case '-':
return ch;
}
return def;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *__d_find_alias(struct inode *inode)
{
struct dentry *alias, *discon_alias;
again:
discon_alias = NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry(alias, &inode->i_dentry, d_u.d_alias) {
spin_lock(&alias->d_lock);
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || !d_unhashed(alias)) {
if (IS_ROOT(alias) &&
(alias->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED)) {
discon_alias = alias;
} else {
__dget_dlock(alias);
spin_unlock(&alias->d_lock);
return alias;
}
}
spin_unlock(&alias->d_lock);
}
if (discon_alias) {
alias = discon_alias;
spin_lock(&alias->d_lock);
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || !d_unhashed(alias)) {
__dget_dlock(alias);
spin_unlock(&alias->d_lock);
return alias;
}
spin_unlock(&alias->d_lock);
goto again;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 10,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Block* SimpleBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return &m_block;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 6,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestStreamToFile() {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("test_url_loader_data/hello.txt");
ASSERT_FALSE(request.SetStreamToFile(true));
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
pp::URLLoader loader(instance_);
callback.WaitForResult(loader.Open(request, callback.GetCallback()));
CHECK_CALLBACK_BEHAVIOR(callback);
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, callback.result());
pp::URLResponseInfo response_info(loader.GetResponseInfo());
if (response_info.is_null())
return "URLLoader::GetResponseInfo returned null";
int32_t status_code = response_info.GetStatusCode();
if (status_code != 200)
return "Unexpected HTTP status code";
pp::FileRef body(response_info.GetBodyAsFileRef());
ASSERT_TRUE(body.is_null());
callback.WaitForResult(loader.FinishStreamingToFile(callback.GetCallback()));
CHECK_CALLBACK_BEHAVIOR(callback);
ASSERT_EQ(PP_ERROR_NOTSUPPORTED, callback.result());
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 3,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t1_scan_keys(PDF pdf)
{
int i, k;
char *p, *q, *r;
const key_entry *key;
if (t1_prefix("/FontType")) {
p = t1_line_array + strlen("FontType") + 1;
if ((i = (int) t1_scan_num(p, 0)) != 1)
formatted_error("type 1","Type%d fonts unsupported by backend", i);
return;
}
for (key = (const key_entry *) font_key; key - font_key < FONT_KEYS_NUM;
key++) {
if (key->t1name[0] != '\0'
&& str_prefix(t1_line_array + 1, key->t1name))
break;
}
if (key - font_key == FONT_KEYS_NUM)
return;
p = t1_line_array + strlen(key->t1name) + 1;
skip_char(p, ' ');
if ((k = (int) (key - font_key)) == FONTNAME_CODE) {
if (*p != '/') {
remove_eol(p, t1_line_array);
formatted_error("type 1","a name expected: '%s'", t1_line_array);
}
/*tex Skip the slash. */
r = ++p;
for (q = t1_buf_array; *p != ' ' && *p != 10; *q++ = *p++);
*q = 0;
xfree(fd_cur->fontname);
fd_cur->fontname = xstrdup(t1_buf_array);
/*tex
At this moment we cannot call |make_subset_tag| yet, as the encoding
is not read; thus we mark the offset of the subset tag and write it
later.
*/
if (is_subsetted(fd_cur->fm)) {
t1_fontname_offset = (int) (t1_offset() + (r - t1_line_array));
strcpy(t1_buf_array, p);
sprintf(r, "ABCDEF+%s%s", fd_cur->fontname, t1_buf_array);
t1_line_ptr = eol(r);
}
return;
}
if ((k == STEMV_CODE || k == FONTBBOX1_CODE) && (*p == '[' || *p == '{'))
p++;
if (k == FONTBBOX1_CODE) {
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, k++) {
fd_cur->font_dim[k].val = (int) t1_scan_num(p, &r);
fd_cur->font_dim[k].set = true;
p = r;
}
return;
}
fd_cur->font_dim[k].val = (int) t1_scan_num(p, 0);
fd_cur->font_dim[k].set = true;
}
static void t1_scan_param(PDF pdf)
{
static const char *lenIV = "/lenIV";
if (!t1_scan || *t1_line_array != '/')
return;
if (t1_prefix(lenIV)) {
t1_lenIV = (short) t1_scan_num(t1_line_array + strlen(lenIV), 0);
if (t1_lenIV < 0)
normal_error("type 1","negative value of lenIV is not supported");
return;
}
t1_scan_keys(pdf);
}
static void copy_glyph_names(char **glyph_names, int a, int b)
{
if (glyph_names[b] != notdef) {
xfree(glyph_names[b]);
glyph_names[b] = (char *) notdef;
}
if (glyph_names[a] != notdef) {
glyph_names[b] = xstrdup(glyph_names[a]);
}
}
/*tex Read encoding from Type1 font file, return |glyph_names| array, or |pdffail|. */
static char **t1_builtin_enc(void)
{
int i, a, b, c, counter = 0;
char *r, *p, **glyph_names;
/*tex At this moment |/Encoding| is the prefix of |t1_line_array|. */
glyph_names = xtalloc(256, char *);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
glyph_names[i] = (char *) notdef;
if (t1_suffix("def")) {
/*tex A predefined encoding: */
sscanf(t1_line_array + strlen("/Encoding"), "%255s", t1_buf_array);
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array, "StandardEncoding") == 0) {
t1_encoding = ENC_STANDARD;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
if (standard_glyph_names[i] != notdef)
glyph_names[i] = xstrdup(standard_glyph_names[i]);
}
return glyph_names;
} else
formatted_error("type 1","cannot subset font (unknown predefined encoding '%s')",t1_buf_array);
}
/*
At this moment |/Encoding| is the prefix of |t1_line_array|, and the
encoding is not a predefined encoding. We have two possible forms of
vector. The first case is
\starttyping
/Encoding [
/a /b /c ...
] readonly def
\stoptyping
and the second case can look like
\starttyping
/Encoding 256 array 0 1 255 {
1 index exch /.notdef put} for
dup 0 /x put
dup 1 /y put
...
} readonly def
\stoptyping
*/
t1_encoding = ENC_BUILTIN;
if (t1_prefix("/Encoding [") || t1_prefix("/Encoding[")) { /* the first case */
r = strchr(t1_line_array, '[') + 1;
skip_char(r, ' ');
for (;;) {
while (*r == '/') {
for (p = t1_buf_array, r++; *r != 32 && *r != 10 && *r != ']' && *r != '/'; *p++ = *r++);
*p = 0;
skip_char(r, ' ');
if (counter > 255)
normal_error("type 1","encoding vector contains more than 256 names");
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array, notdef) != 0)
glyph_names[counter] = xstrdup(t1_buf_array);
counter++;
}
if (*r != 10 && *r != '%') {
if (str_prefix(r, "] def") || str_prefix(r, "] readonly def"))
break;
else {
remove_eol(r, t1_line_array);
formatted_error("type 1","a name or '] def' or '] readonly def' expected: '%s'", t1_line_array);
}
}
t1_getline();
r = t1_line_array;
}
} else {
/*tex The second case. */
p = strchr(t1_line_array, 10);
for (;;) {
if (*p == 10) {
t1_getline();
p = t1_line_array;
}
/*tex Check for |dup <index> <glyph> put|. */
if (sscanf(p, "dup %i%255s put", &i, t1_buf_array) == 2 &&
*t1_buf_array == '/' && valid_code(i)) {
if (strcmp(t1_buf_array + 1, notdef) != 0)
glyph_names[i] = xstrdup(t1_buf_array + 1);
p = strstr(p, " put") + strlen(" put");
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
/*tex Check for |dup dup <to> exch <from> get put|. */
else if (sscanf(p, "dup dup %i exch %i get put", &b, &a) == 2 && valid_code(a) && valid_code(b)) {
copy_glyph_names(glyph_names, a, b);
p = strstr(p, " get put") + strlen(" get put");
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
/*tex Check for |dup dup <from> <size> getinterval <to> exch putinterval|. */
else if (sscanf(p, "dup dup %i %i getinterval %i exch putinterval",
&a, &c, &b) == 3 && valid_code(a) && valid_code(b) && valid_code(c)) {
for (i = 0; i < c; i++)
copy_glyph_names(glyph_names, a + i, b + i);
p = strstr(p, " putinterval") + strlen(" putinterval");
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
/*tex Check for |def or |readonly def|. */
else if ((p == t1_line_array || (p > t1_line_array && p[-1] == ' ')) && strcmp(p, "def\n") == 0) {
return glyph_names;
} else {
/*tex Skip an unrecognizable word. */
while (*p != ' ' && *p != 10)
p++;
skip_char(p, ' ');
}
}
}
return glyph_names;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_page_bootmem(unsigned long info, struct page *page,
unsigned long type)
{
page->lru.next = (struct list_head *) type;
SetPagePrivate(page);
set_page_private(page, info);
atomic_inc(&page->_count);
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_set_compression(void *pDest, void *argument TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_entry_info *entry = (phar_entry_info *)pDest;
php_uint32 compress = *(php_uint32 *)argument;
if (entry->is_deleted) {
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
entry->old_flags = entry->flags;
entry->flags &= ~PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK;
entry->flags |= compress;
entry->is_modified = 1;
return ZEND_HASH_APPLY_KEEP;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_mac_string(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, int len,
char *dst, int dstlen)
{
char *p = dst;
char *end = dst+dstlen-1;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
uint8_t t, c = avio_r8(pb);
if (p >= end)
continue;
if (c < 0x80)
*p++ = c;
else if (p < end)
PUT_UTF8(mac_to_unicode[c-0x80], t, if (p < end) *p++ = t;);
}
*p = 0;
return p - dst;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 23,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unsignedLongMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::unsignedLongMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 5,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockAutofillClient(MockSyncService* sync_service)
: sync_service_(sync_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "init mpck client";
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t sbi_ui_show(struct ext4_attr *a,
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi, char *buf)
{
unsigned int *ui = (unsigned int *) (((char *) sbi) + a->offset);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", *ui);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 7,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sas_get_port_device(struct asd_sas_port *port)
{
struct asd_sas_phy *phy;
struct sas_rphy *rphy;
struct domain_device *dev;
int rc = -ENODEV;
dev = sas_alloc_device();
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_irq(&port->phy_list_lock);
if (list_empty(&port->phy_list)) {
spin_unlock_irq(&port->phy_list_lock);
sas_put_device(dev);
return -ENODEV;
}
phy = container_of(port->phy_list.next, struct asd_sas_phy, port_phy_el);
spin_lock(&phy->frame_rcvd_lock);
memcpy(dev->frame_rcvd, phy->frame_rcvd, min(sizeof(dev->frame_rcvd),
(size_t)phy->frame_rcvd_size));
spin_unlock(&phy->frame_rcvd_lock);
spin_unlock_irq(&port->phy_list_lock);
if (dev->frame_rcvd[0] == 0x34 && port->oob_mode == SATA_OOB_MODE) {
struct dev_to_host_fis *fis =
(struct dev_to_host_fis *) dev->frame_rcvd;
if (fis->interrupt_reason == 1 && fis->lbal == 1 &&
fis->byte_count_low==0x69 && fis->byte_count_high == 0x96
&& (fis->device & ~0x10) == 0)
dev->dev_type = SAS_SATA_PM;
else
dev->dev_type = SAS_SATA_DEV;
dev->tproto = SAS_PROTOCOL_SATA;
} else {
struct sas_identify_frame *id =
(struct sas_identify_frame *) dev->frame_rcvd;
dev->dev_type = id->dev_type;
dev->iproto = id->initiator_bits;
dev->tproto = id->target_bits;
}
sas_init_dev(dev);
dev->port = port;
switch (dev->dev_type) {
case SAS_SATA_DEV:
rc = sas_ata_init(dev);
if (rc) {
rphy = NULL;
break;
}
/* fall through */
case SAS_END_DEVICE:
rphy = sas_end_device_alloc(port->port);
break;
case SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE:
rphy = sas_expander_alloc(port->port,
SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE);
break;
case SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE:
rphy = sas_expander_alloc(port->port,
SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE);
break;
default:
printk("ERROR: Unidentified device type %d\n", dev->dev_type);
rphy = NULL;
break;
}
if (!rphy) {
sas_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
rphy->identify.phy_identifier = phy->phy->identify.phy_identifier;
memcpy(dev->sas_addr, port->attached_sas_addr, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
sas_fill_in_rphy(dev, rphy);
sas_hash_addr(dev->hashed_sas_addr, dev->sas_addr);
port->port_dev = dev;
dev->linkrate = port->linkrate;
dev->min_linkrate = port->linkrate;
dev->max_linkrate = port->linkrate;
dev->pathways = port->num_phys;
memset(port->disc.fanout_sas_addr, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
memset(port->disc.eeds_a, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
memset(port->disc.eeds_b, 0, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
port->disc.max_level = 0;
sas_device_set_phy(dev, port->port);
dev->rphy = rphy;
get_device(&dev->rphy->dev);
if (dev_is_sata(dev) || dev->dev_type == SAS_END_DEVICE)
list_add_tail(&dev->disco_list_node, &port->disco_list);
else {
spin_lock_irq(&port->dev_list_lock);
list_add_tail(&dev->dev_list_node, &port->dev_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&port->dev_list_lock);
}
spin_lock_irq(&port->phy_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(phy, &port->phy_list, port_phy_el)
sas_phy_set_target(phy, dev);
spin_unlock_irq(&port->phy_list_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int gfn_to_page_many_atomic(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, struct page **pages,
int nr_pages)
{
unsigned long addr;
gfn_t entry;
addr = gfn_to_hva_many(gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn), gfn, &entry);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -1;
if (entry < nr_pages)
return 0;
return __get_user_pages_fast(addr, nr_pages, 1, pages);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethod(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSC::JSValue result = jsNumber(impl->intMethod());
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteFontSize(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource source,
const String& value) {
CSSValueID size;
if (!HTMLFontElement::CssValueFromFontSizeNumber(value, size))
return false;
return ExecuteApplyStyle(frame, source, InputEvent::InputType::kNone,
CSSPropertyFontSize, size);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderWidgetHostViewForRenderManager(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* rwh_view = nullptr;
bool is_guest_in_site_per_process =
!!browser_plugin_guest_.get() &&
BrowserPluginGuestMode::UseCrossProcessFramesForGuests();
if (is_guest_in_site_per_process) {
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* rwh_view_child =
new RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame(render_view_host->GetWidget());
rwh_view = rwh_view_child;
} else {
rwh_view = view_->CreateViewForWidget(render_view_host->GetWidget(), false);
}
if (rwh_view)
rwh_view->SetSize(GetSizeForNewRenderView());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(const WebContents* web_contents,
TabStripModel** tab_strip_model,
int* tab_index) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
DCHECK(tab_strip_model);
DCHECK(tab_index);
for (BrowserList::const_iterator it = BrowserList::begin();
it != BrowserList::end(); ++it) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = (*it)->tab_strip_model();
int index = tab_strip->GetIndexOfWebContents(web_contents);
if (index != -1) {
*tab_strip_model = tab_strip;
*tab_index = index;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TypingCommand::TypingCommand(Document& document,
ETypingCommand commandType,
const String& textToInsert,
Options options,
TextGranularity granularity,
TextCompositionType compositionType)
: CompositeEditCommand(document),
m_commandType(commandType),
m_textToInsert(textToInsert),
m_openForMoreTyping(true),
m_selectInsertedText(options & SelectInsertedText),
m_smartDelete(options & SmartDelete),
m_granularity(granularity),
m_compositionType(compositionType),
m_killRing(options & KillRing),
m_openedByBackwardDelete(false),
m_shouldRetainAutocorrectionIndicator(options &
RetainAutocorrectionIndicator),
m_shouldPreventSpellChecking(options & PreventSpellChecking) {
updatePreservesTypingStyle(m_commandType);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ifsock *find_iface(struct sockaddr *sa)
{
struct ifsock *ifs;
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
if (!sa)
return NULL;
LIST_FOREACH(ifs, &il, link) {
if (ifs->addr.sin_addr.s_addr == addr->sin_addr.s_addr)
return ifs;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_pmu_register(struct pmu *pmu, const char *name, int type)
{
int cpu, ret;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_disable_count = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!pmu->pmu_disable_count)
goto unlock;
pmu->type = -1;
if (!name)
goto skip_type;
pmu->name = name;
if (type < 0) {
type = idr_alloc(&pmu_idr, pmu, PERF_TYPE_MAX, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (type < 0) {
ret = type;
goto free_pdc;
}
}
pmu->type = type;
if (pmu_bus_running) {
ret = pmu_dev_alloc(pmu);
if (ret)
goto free_idr;
}
skip_type:
if (pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_hw_context) {
static int hw_context_taken = 0;
/*
* Other than systems with heterogeneous CPUs, it never makes
* sense for two PMUs to share perf_hw_context. PMUs which are
* uncore must use perf_invalid_context.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_context_taken &&
!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_HETEROGENEOUS_CPUS)))
pmu->task_ctx_nr = perf_invalid_context;
hw_context_taken = 1;
}
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = find_pmu_context(pmu->task_ctx_nr);
if (pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto got_cpu_context;
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = alloc_percpu(struct perf_cpu_context);
if (!pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto free_dev;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
__perf_event_init_context(&cpuctx->ctx);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.mutex, &cpuctx_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.lock, &cpuctx_lock);
cpuctx->ctx.pmu = pmu;
__perf_mux_hrtimer_init(cpuctx, cpu);
cpuctx->unique_pmu = pmu;
}
got_cpu_context:
if (!pmu->start_txn) {
if (pmu->pmu_enable) {
/*
* If we have pmu_enable/pmu_disable calls, install
* transaction stubs that use that to try and batch
* hardware accesses.
*/
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_start_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_commit_txn;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_cancel_txn;
} else {
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_nop_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_nop_int;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
}
if (!pmu->pmu_enable) {
pmu->pmu_enable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->pmu_disable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
if (!pmu->event_idx)
pmu->event_idx = perf_event_idx_default;
list_add_rcu(&pmu->entry, &pmus);
atomic_set(&pmu->exclusive_cnt, 0);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
return ret;
free_dev:
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
free_idr:
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
free_pdc:
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
goto unlock;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 12,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual std::string GetMimeType(const std::string&) const {
return "text/html";
}
Commit Message: Add missing shortcut keys to the keyboard overlay.
This CL adds the following shortcuts to the keyboard overlay.
* Alt - 1, Alt - 2, .., Alt - 8: go to the window at the specified position
* Alt - 9: go to the last window open
* Ctrl - Forward: switches focus to the next keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Back: switches focus to the previous keyboard-accessible pane
* Ctrl - Right: move the text cursor to the end of the next word
* Ctrl - Left: move the text cursor to the start of the previous word
* Ctrl - Alt - Z: enable or disable accessibility features
* Ctrl - Shift - Maximize: take a screenshot of the selected region
* Ctrl - Shift - O: open the Bookmark Manager
I also deleted a duplicated entry of "Close window".
BUG=chromium-os:17152
TEST=Manually checked on chromebook
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7489040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93906 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void update_rq_clock(struct rq *rq)
{
if (!rq->skip_clock_update) {
int cpu = cpu_of(rq);
u64 irq_time;
rq->clock = sched_clock_cpu(cpu);
irq_time = irq_time_cpu(cpu);
if (rq->clock - irq_time > rq->clock_task)
rq->clock_task = rq->clock - irq_time;
sched_irq_time_avg_update(rq, irq_time);
}
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 1 | 23,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
server_loop2(authctxt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
if (key->type_data.x[0])
return key->type_data.x[0];
return user_read(key, buffer, buflen);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 28,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void retrieveResourcesForFrame(LocalFrame* frame,
const WebVector<WebCString>& supportedSchemes,
Vector<LocalFrame*>* visitedFrames,
Vector<LocalFrame*>* framesToVisit,
Vector<KURL>* frameURLs,
Vector<KURL>* resourceURLs)
{
KURL frameURL = frame->loader().documentLoader()->request().url();
if (!frameURL.isValid())
return;
bool isValidScheme = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < supportedSchemes.size(); ++i) {
if (frameURL.protocolIs(static_cast<CString>(supportedSchemes[i]).data())) {
isValidScheme = true;
break;
}
}
if (!isValidScheme)
return;
if (visitedFrames->contains(frame))
return;
visitedFrames->append(frame);
if (!frameURLs->contains(frameURL))
frameURLs->append(frameURL);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLAllCollection> allElements = frame->document()->all();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < allElements->length(); ++i) {
Element* element = allElements->item(i);
retrieveResourcesForElement(element,
visitedFrames, framesToVisit,
frameURLs, resourceURLs);
}
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect RenderBox::clippedOverflowRectForRepaint(RenderBoxModelObject* repaintContainer)
{
if (style()->visibility() != VISIBLE && !enclosingLayer()->hasVisibleContent())
return IntRect();
IntRect r = visualOverflowRect();
RenderView* v = view();
if (v) {
r.move(v->layoutDelta());
}
if (style()) {
if (style()->hasAppearance())
theme()->adjustRepaintRect(this, r);
if (v) {
ASSERT(style()->outlineSize() <= v->maximalOutlineSize());
r.inflate(v->maximalOutlineSize());
}
}
computeRectForRepaint(repaintContainer, r);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void classMethodWithOptionalMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::classMethodWithOptionalMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pipe_to_sg(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf,
struct splice_desc *sd)
{
struct sg_list *sgl = sd->u.data;
unsigned int offset, len;
if (sgl->n == sgl->size)
return 0;
/* Try lock this page */
if (pipe_buf_steal(pipe, buf) == 0) {
/* Get reference and unlock page for moving */
get_page(buf->page);
unlock_page(buf->page);
len = min(buf->len, sd->len);
sg_set_page(&(sgl->sg[sgl->n]), buf->page, len, buf->offset);
} else {
/* Failback to copying a page */
struct page *page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
char *src;
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
offset = sd->pos & ~PAGE_MASK;
len = sd->len;
if (len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)
len = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
src = kmap_atomic(buf->page);
memcpy(page_address(page) + offset, src + buf->offset, len);
kunmap_atomic(src);
sg_set_page(&(sgl->sg[sgl->n]), page, len, offset);
}
sgl->n++;
sgl->len += len;
return len;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddPageToHistory(const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const history::RedirectList& redirects,
base::Time time) {
history_service()->AddPage(
url, time, reinterpret_cast<ContextID>(1), 0, GURL(),
redirects, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED, history::SOURCE_BROWSED,
false);
history_service()->SetPageTitle(url, title);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 25,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_ret_devn_params(gx_device *pdev)
{
pdf14_device *p14dev = (pdf14_device *)pdev;
return(&(p14dev->devn_params));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iterate_mounts(int (*f)(struct vfsmount *, void *), void *arg,
struct vfsmount *root)
{
struct mount *mnt;
int res = f(root, arg);
if (res)
return res;
list_for_each_entry(mnt, &real_mount(root)->mnt_list, mnt_list) {
res = f(&mnt->mnt, arg);
if (res)
return res;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VP8XChunk::VP8XChunk(Container* parent)
: Chunk(parent, kChunk_VP8X)
{
this->needsRewrite = true;
this->size = 10;
this->data.resize(this->size);
this->data.assign(this->size, 0);
XMP_Uns8* bitstream =
(XMP_Uns8*)parent->chunks[WEBP_CHUNK_IMAGE][0]->data.data();
XMP_Uns32 width = ((bitstream[7] << 8) | bitstream[6]) & 0x3fff;
XMP_Uns32 height = ((bitstream[9] << 8) | bitstream[8]) & 0x3fff;
this->width(width);
this->height(height);
parent->vp8x = this;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp7_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
return vp78_decode_frame(avctx, data, got_frame, avpkt, IS_VP7);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_larval *larval;
int err;
err = crypto_check_alg(alg);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
larval = __crypto_register_alg(alg);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
if (IS_ERR(larval))
return PTR_ERR(larval);
crypto_wait_for_test(larval);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_func_state *old,
struct bpf_func_state *cur)
{
struct idpair *idmap;
bool ret = false;
int i;
idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL);
/* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */
if (!idmap)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
goto out_free;
}
if (!stacksafe(old, cur, idmap))
goto out_free;
ret = true;
out_free:
kfree(idmap);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 14,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ib_send_cm_req(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
struct ib_cm_req_param *param)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_req_msg *req_msg;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
ret = cm_validate_req_param(param);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* Verify that we're not in timewait. */
cm_id_priv = container_of(cm_id, struct cm_id_private, id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
if (cm_id->state != IB_CM_IDLE) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
cm_id_priv->timewait_info = cm_create_timewait_info(cm_id_priv->
id.local_id);
if (IS_ERR(cm_id_priv->timewait_info)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
goto out;
}
ret = cm_init_av_by_path(param->primary_path, &cm_id_priv->av);
if (ret)
goto error1;
if (param->alternate_path) {
ret = cm_init_av_by_path(param->alternate_path,
&cm_id_priv->alt_av);
if (ret)
goto error1;
}
cm_id->service_id = param->service_id;
cm_id->service_mask = ~cpu_to_be64(0);
cm_id_priv->timeout_ms = cm_convert_to_ms(
param->primary_path->packet_life_time) * 2 +
cm_convert_to_ms(
param->remote_cm_response_timeout);
cm_id_priv->max_cm_retries = param->max_cm_retries;
cm_id_priv->initiator_depth = param->initiator_depth;
cm_id_priv->responder_resources = param->responder_resources;
cm_id_priv->retry_count = param->retry_count;
cm_id_priv->path_mtu = param->primary_path->mtu;
cm_id_priv->pkey = param->primary_path->pkey;
cm_id_priv->qp_type = param->qp_type;
ret = cm_alloc_msg(cm_id_priv, &cm_id_priv->msg);
if (ret)
goto error1;
req_msg = (struct cm_req_msg *) cm_id_priv->msg->mad;
cm_format_req(req_msg, cm_id_priv, param);
cm_id_priv->tid = req_msg->hdr.tid;
cm_id_priv->msg->timeout_ms = cm_id_priv->timeout_ms;
cm_id_priv->msg->context[1] = (void *) (unsigned long) IB_CM_REQ_SENT;
cm_id_priv->local_qpn = cm_req_get_local_qpn(req_msg);
cm_id_priv->rq_psn = cm_req_get_starting_psn(req_msg);
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
ret = ib_post_send_mad(cm_id_priv->msg, NULL);
if (ret) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
goto error2;
}
BUG_ON(cm_id->state != IB_CM_IDLE);
cm_id->state = IB_CM_REQ_SENT;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm_id_priv->lock, flags);
return 0;
error2: cm_free_msg(cm_id_priv->msg);
error1: kfree(cm_id_priv->timewait_info);
out: return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WorkerFetchContext::ShouldBlockFetchAsCredentialedSubresource(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const KURL& url) const {
if ((!url.User().IsEmpty() || !url.Pass().IsEmpty()) &&
resource_request.GetRequestContext() !=
WebURLRequest::kRequestContextXMLHttpRequest) {
if (Url().User() != url.User() || Url().Pass() != url.Pass()) {
CountDeprecation(
WebFeature::kRequestedSubresourceWithEmbeddedCredentials);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlockCredentialedSubresourcesEnabled())
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType Get8BIMProperty(const Image *image,const char *key,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*attribute,
format[MagickPathExtent],
name[MagickPathExtent],
*resource;
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*info;
long
start,
stop;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
id,
sub_number;
size_t
length;
/*
There are no newlines in path names, so it's safe as terminator.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(key,"8BIM:%ld,%ld:%1024[^\n]\n%1024[^\n]",&start,&stop,
name,format);
if ((count != 2) && (count != 3) && (count != 4))
return(MagickFalse);
if (count < 4)
(void) CopyMagickString(format,"SVG",MagickPathExtent);
if (count < 3)
*name='\0';
sub_number=1;
if (*name == '#')
sub_number=(ssize_t) StringToLong(&name[1]);
sub_number=MagickMax(sub_number,1L);
resource=(char *) NULL;
status=MagickFalse;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while ((length > 0) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) '8')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'B')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'I')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'M')
continue;
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&info,&length);
if (id < (ssize_t) start)
continue;
if (id > (ssize_t) stop)
continue;
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
if ((count != 0) && ((size_t) count <= length))
{
resource=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
resource=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*resource));
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
resource[i]=(char) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
resource[count]='\0';
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&info,&length);
if ((*name != '\0') && (*name != '#'))
if ((resource == (char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,resource) != 0))
{
/*
No name match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
if ((*name == '#') && (sub_number != 1))
{
/*
No numbered match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
sub_number--;
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
/*
We have the resource of interest.
*/
attribute=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
attribute=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*attribute));
if (attribute != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(attribute,(char *) info,(size_t) count);
attribute[count]='\0';
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
if ((id <= 1999) || (id >= 2999))
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *)
attribute,exception);
else
{
char
*path;
if (LocaleCompare(format,"svg") == 0)
path=TraceSVGClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count,
image->columns,image->rows);
else
path=TracePSClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count);
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *) path,
exception);
path=DestroyString(path);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<RadioNodeList> ContainerNode::radioNodeList(const AtomicString& name, bool onlyMatchImgElements)
{
ASSERT(isHTMLFormElement(this) || isHTMLFieldSetElement(this));
CollectionType type = onlyMatchImgElements ? RadioImgNodeListType : RadioNodeListType;
return ensureCachedCollection<RadioNodeList>(type, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Gfx::~Gfx() {
while (stateGuards.size()) {
popStateGuard();
}
while (state->hasSaves()) {
error(-1, "Found state under last state guard. Popping.");
restoreState();
}
if (!subPage) {
out->endPage();
}
while (res) {
popResources();
}
if (state) {
delete state;
}
while (mcStack) {
popMarkedContent();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btif_get_remote_device_property(bt_bdaddr_t *remote_addr,
bt_property_type_t type)
{
btif_storage_req_t req;
if (!btif_is_enabled())
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
memcpy(&(req.read_req.bd_addr), remote_addr, sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t));
req.read_req.type = type;
return btif_transfer_context(execute_storage_remote_request,
BTIF_CORE_STORAGE_REMOTE_READ,
(char*)&req, sizeof(btif_storage_req_t),
NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 14,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID:
case MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON:
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
case MSR_K8_SYSCFG:
case MSR_K7_HWCR:
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG:
case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
case MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE:
case MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2:
data = 0;
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR0:
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR1:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0:
case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
data = 0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
data = 0x100000000ULL;
break;
case MSR_MTRRcap:
data = 0x500 | KVM_NR_VAR_MTRR;
break;
case 0x200 ... 0x2ff:
return get_msr_mtrr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
case 0xcd: /* fsb frequency */
data = 3;
break;
/*
* MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID
* Conservative value valid for even the basic CPU models.
* Models 0,1: 000 in bits 23:21 indicating a bus speed of
* 100MHz, model 2 000 in bits 18:16 indicating 100MHz,
* and 266MHz for model 3, or 4. Set Core Clock
* Frequency to System Bus Frequency Ratio to 1 (bits
* 31:24) even though these are only valid for CPU
* models > 2, however guests may end up dividing or
* multiplying by zero otherwise.
*/
case MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID:
data = 1 << 24;
break;
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
data = kvm_get_apic_base(vcpu);
break;
case APIC_BASE_MSR ... APIC_BASE_MSR + 0x3ff:
return kvm_x2apic_msr_read(vcpu, msr, pdata);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE:
data = kvm_get_lapic_tscdeadline_msr(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
data = (u64)vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE:
data = vcpu->arch.ia32_misc_enable_msr;
break;
case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS:
/* TSC increment by tick */
data = 1000ULL;
/* CPU multiplier */
data |= (((uint64_t)4ULL) << 40);
break;
case MSR_EFER:
data = vcpu->arch.efer;
break;
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK:
case MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW:
data = vcpu->kvm->arch.wall_clock;
break;
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME:
case MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW:
data = vcpu->arch.time;
break;
case MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN:
data = vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME:
data = vcpu->arch.st.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_KVM_PV_EOI_EN:
data = vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val;
break;
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS - 1:
return get_msr_mce(vcpu, msr, pdata);
case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL:
/*
* Provide expected ramp-up count for K7. All other
* are set to zero, indicating minimum divisors for
* every field.
*
* This prevents guest kernels on AMD host with CPU
* type 6, model 8 and higher from exploding due to
* the rdmsr failing.
*/
data = 0x20000000;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15:
if (kvm_hv_msr_partition_wide(msr)) {
int r;
mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
r = get_msr_hyperv_pw(vcpu, msr, pdata);
mutex_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->lock);
return r;
} else
return get_msr_hyperv(vcpu, msr, pdata);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3:
/* This legacy MSR exists but isn't fully documented in current
* silicon. It is however accessed by winxp in very narrow
* scenarios where it sets bit #19, itself documented as
* a "reserved" bit. Best effort attempt to source coherent
* read data here should the balance of the register be
* interpreted by the guest:
*
* L2 cache control register 3: 64GB range, 256KB size,
* enabled, latency 0x1, configured
*/
data = 0xbe702111;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
data = vcpu->arch.osvw.length;
break;
case MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_osvw(vcpu))
return 1;
data = vcpu->arch.osvw.status;
break;
default:
if (kvm_pmu_msr(vcpu, msr))
return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr, pdata);
if (!ignore_msrs) {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
return 1;
} else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "ignored rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
data = 0;
}
break;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setUrl(const QUrl& url) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
QUrl old_url = this->url();
if (!d->proxy_) {
d->construct_props_->load_html = false;
d->construct_props_->url = url;
d->construct_props_->html.clear();
} else {
d->proxy_->setUrl(url);
}
if (this->url() != old_url) {
emit urlChanged();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::didRecalcStyle(StyleRecalcChange) {
if (LayoutObject* layoutObject = this->layoutObject())
layoutObject->updateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 6,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *PruneTagFromXMLTree(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*node;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (xml_info->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
xml_info->next->sibling=xml_info->sibling;
if (xml_info->parent != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
node=xml_info->parent->child;
if (node == xml_info)
xml_info->parent->child=xml_info->ordered;
else
{
while (node->ordered != xml_info)
node=node->ordered;
node->ordered=node->ordered->ordered;
node=xml_info->parent->child;
if (strcmp(node->tag,xml_info->tag) != 0)
{
while (strcmp(node->sibling->tag,xml_info->tag) != 0)
node=node->sibling;
if (node->sibling != xml_info)
node=node->sibling;
else
node->sibling=(xml_info->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) ?
xml_info->next : node->sibling->sibling;
}
while ((node->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) &&
(node->next != xml_info))
node=node->next;
if (node->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
node->next=node->next->next;
}
}
xml_info->ordered=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->sibling=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->next=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
return(xml_info);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 22,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t aac_show_max_channel(struct device *device,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
class_to_shost(device)->max_channel);
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseExternalEntityPrivate(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlParserCtxtPtr oldctxt,
xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax,
void *user_data, int depth, const xmlChar *URL,
const xmlChar *ID, xmlNodePtr *list) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlDocPtr newDoc;
xmlNodePtr newRoot;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr oldsax = NULL;
xmlParserErrors ret = XML_ERR_OK;
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
if (((depth > 40) &&
((oldctxt == NULL) || (oldctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) ||
(depth > 1024)) {
return(XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP);
}
if (list != NULL)
*list = NULL;
if ((URL == NULL) && (ID == NULL))
return(XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (doc == NULL)
return(XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ctxt = xmlCreateEntityParserCtxtInternal(URL, ID, NULL, oldctxt);
if (ctxt == NULL) return(XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY);
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
if (oldctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->_private = oldctxt->_private;
ctxt->loadsubset = oldctxt->loadsubset;
ctxt->validate = oldctxt->validate;
ctxt->external = oldctxt->external;
ctxt->record_info = oldctxt->record_info;
ctxt->node_seq.maximum = oldctxt->node_seq.maximum;
ctxt->node_seq.length = oldctxt->node_seq.length;
ctxt->node_seq.buffer = oldctxt->node_seq.buffer;
} else {
/*
* Doing validity checking on chunk without context
* doesn't make sense
*/
ctxt->_private = NULL;
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->external = 2;
ctxt->loadsubset = 0;
}
if (sax != NULL) {
oldsax = ctxt->sax;
ctxt->sax = sax;
if (user_data != NULL)
ctxt->userData = user_data;
}
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
newDoc = xmlNewDoc(BAD_CAST "1.0");
if (newDoc == NULL) {
ctxt->node_seq.maximum = 0;
ctxt->node_seq.length = 0;
ctxt->node_seq.buffer = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
newDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
newDoc->intSubset = doc->intSubset;
newDoc->extSubset = doc->extSubset;
newDoc->dict = doc->dict;
xmlDictReference(newDoc->dict);
if (doc->URL != NULL) {
newDoc->URL = xmlStrdup(doc->URL);
}
newRoot = xmlNewDocNode(newDoc, NULL, BAD_CAST "pseudoroot", NULL);
if (newRoot == NULL) {
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
ctxt->node_seq.maximum = 0;
ctxt->node_seq.length = 0;
ctxt->node_seq.buffer = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
return(XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
xmlAddChild((xmlNodePtr) newDoc, newRoot);
nodePush(ctxt, newDoc->children);
ctxt->myDoc = doc;
newRoot->doc = doc;
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
*/
GROW;
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4) {
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
/*
* Parse a possible text declaration first
*/
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
ctxt->depth = depth;
xmlParseContent(ctxt);
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED, NULL);
} else if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EXTRA_CONTENT, NULL);
}
if (ctxt->node != newDoc->children) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED, NULL);
}
if (!ctxt->wellFormed) {
if (ctxt->errNo == 0)
ret = XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
else
ret = (xmlParserErrors)ctxt->errNo;
} else {
if (list != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
/*
* Return the newly created nodeset after unlinking it from
* they pseudo parent.
*/
cur = newDoc->children->children;
*list = cur;
while (cur != NULL) {
cur->parent = NULL;
cur = cur->next;
}
newDoc->children->children = NULL;
}
ret = XML_ERR_OK;
}
/*
* Record in the parent context the number of entities replacement
* done when parsing that reference.
*/
if (oldctxt != NULL)
oldctxt->nbentities += ctxt->nbentities;
/*
* Also record the size of the entity parsed
*/
if (ctxt->input != NULL && oldctxt != NULL) {
oldctxt->sizeentities += ctxt->input->consumed;
oldctxt->sizeentities += (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
/*
* And record the last error if any
*/
if ((oldctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->lastError.code != XML_ERR_OK))
xmlCopyError(&ctxt->lastError, &oldctxt->lastError);
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
if (oldctxt != NULL) {
oldctxt->node_seq.maximum = ctxt->node_seq.maximum;
oldctxt->node_seq.length = ctxt->node_seq.length;
oldctxt->node_seq.buffer = ctxt->node_seq.buffer;
}
ctxt->node_seq.maximum = 0;
ctxt->node_seq.length = 0;
ctxt->node_seq.buffer = NULL;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 24,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API void r_core_cmd_init(RCore *core) {
struct {
const char *cmd;
const char *description;
r_cmd_callback (cb);
void (*descriptor_init)(RCore *core);
} cmds[] = {
{"!", "run system command", cmd_system},
{"_", "print last output", cmd_last},
{"#", "calculate hash", cmd_hash},
{"$", "alias", cmd_alias},
{"%", "short version of 'env' command", cmd_env},
{"&", "tasks", cmd_tasks},
{"(", "macro", cmd_macro, cmd_macro_init},
{"*", "pointer read/write", cmd_pointer},
{"-", "open cfg.editor and run script", cmd_stdin},
{".", "interpret", cmd_interpret},
{"/", "search kw, pattern aes", cmd_search, cmd_search_init},
{"=", "io pipe", cmd_rap},
{"?", "help message", cmd_help, cmd_help_init},
{"\\", "alias for =!", cmd_rap_run},
{"'", "alias for =!", cmd_rap_run},
{"0x", "alias for s 0x", cmd_ox},
{"analysis", "analysis", cmd_anal, cmd_anal_init},
{"bsize", "change block size", cmd_bsize},
{"cmp", "compare memory", cmd_cmp, cmd_cmp_init},
{"Code", "code metadata", cmd_meta, cmd_meta_init},
{"debug", "debugger operations", cmd_debug, cmd_debug_init},
{"eval", "evaluate configuration variable", cmd_eval, cmd_eval_init},
{"flag", "get/set flags", cmd_flag, cmd_flag_init},
{"g", "egg manipulation", cmd_egg, cmd_egg_init},
{"info", "get file info", cmd_info, cmd_info_init},
{"kuery", "perform sdb query", cmd_kuery},
{"l", "list files and directories", cmd_ls},
{"join", "join the contents of the two files", cmd_join},
{"head", "show the top n number of line in file", cmd_head},
{"L", "manage dynamically loaded plugins", cmd_plugins},
{"mount", "mount filesystem", cmd_mount, cmd_mount_init},
{"open", "open or map file", cmd_open, cmd_open_init},
{"print", "print current block", cmd_print, cmd_print_init},
{"Project", "project", cmd_project, cmd_project_init},
{"quit", "exit program session", cmd_quit, cmd_quit_init},
{"Q", "alias for q!", cmd_Quit},
{":", "long commands starting with :", cmd_colon},
{"resize", "change file size", cmd_resize},
{"seek", "seek to an offset", cmd_seek, cmd_seek_init},
{"t", "type information (cparse)", cmd_type, cmd_type_init},
{"Text", "Text log utility", cmd_log, cmd_log_init},
{"u", "uname/undo", cmd_uname},
{"<", "pipe into RCons.readChar", cmd_pipein},
{"Visual", "enter visual mode", cmd_visual},
{"visualPanels", "enter visual mode", cmd_panels},
{"write", "write bytes", cmd_write, cmd_write_init},
{"x", "alias for px", cmd_hexdump},
{"yank", "yank bytes", cmd_yank},
{"zign", "zignatures", cmd_zign, cmd_zign_init},
};
core->rcmd = r_cmd_new ();
core->rcmd->macro.user = core;
core->rcmd->macro.num = core->num;
core->rcmd->macro.cmd = core_cmd0_wrapper;
core->rcmd->nullcallback = r_core_cmd_nullcallback;
core->rcmd->macro.cb_printf = (PrintfCallback)r_cons_printf;
r_cmd_set_data (core->rcmd, core);
core->cmd_descriptors = r_list_newf (free);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < R_ARRAY_SIZE (cmds); i++) {
r_cmd_add (core->rcmd, cmds[i].cmd, cmds[i].description, cmds[i].cb);
if (cmds[i].descriptor_init) {
cmds[i].descriptor_init (core);
}
}
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, $, dollar);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, %, percent);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, *, star);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, ., dot);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR_SPECIAL (core, =, equal);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, b);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, k);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, r);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, u);
DEFINE_CMD_DESCRIPTOR (core, y);
cmd_descriptor_init (core);
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 14,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockNetworkTransaction::SetQuicServerInfo(
QuicServerInfo* quic_server_info) {
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ConfirmSetDefaultSearchProvider(
TabContents* tab_contents,
TemplateURL* template_url,
TemplateURLService* template_url_service) {
window()->ConfirmSetDefaultSearchProvider(tab_contents, template_url,
template_url_service);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WasShown() {
controller_.SetActive(true);
for (RenderWidgetHostView* view : GetRenderWidgetHostViewsInTree()) {
if (view) {
view->Show();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
view->SetActive(true);
#endif
}
}
last_active_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = GetRenderViewHost();
if (rvh) {
rvh->GetWidget()->ResizeRectChanged(
GetRootWindowResizerRect(rvh->GetWidget()));
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, WasShown());
should_normally_be_visible_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
const char __user *, put_old)
{
struct path new, old, parent_path, root_parent, root;
struct mount *new_mnt, *root_mnt, *old_mnt;
struct mountpoint *old_mp, *root_mp;
int error;
if (!may_mount())
return -EPERM;
error = user_path_dir(new_root, &new);
if (error)
goto out0;
error = user_path_dir(put_old, &old);
if (error)
goto out1;
error = security_sb_pivotroot(&old, &new);
if (error)
goto out2;
get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
old_mp = lock_mount(&old);
error = PTR_ERR(old_mp);
if (IS_ERR(old_mp))
goto out3;
error = -EINVAL;
new_mnt = real_mount(new.mnt);
root_mnt = real_mount(root.mnt);
old_mnt = real_mount(old.mnt);
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(old_mnt) ||
IS_MNT_SHARED(new_mnt->mnt_parent) ||
IS_MNT_SHARED(root_mnt->mnt_parent))
goto out4;
if (!check_mnt(root_mnt) || !check_mnt(new_mnt))
goto out4;
if (new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto out4;
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_unlinked(new.dentry))
goto out4;
error = -EBUSY;
if (new_mnt == root_mnt || old_mnt == root_mnt)
goto out4; /* loop, on the same file system */
error = -EINVAL;
if (root.mnt->mnt_root != root.dentry)
goto out4; /* not a mountpoint */
if (!mnt_has_parent(root_mnt))
goto out4; /* not attached */
root_mp = root_mnt->mnt_mp;
if (new.mnt->mnt_root != new.dentry)
goto out4; /* not a mountpoint */
if (!mnt_has_parent(new_mnt))
goto out4; /* not attached */
/* make sure we can reach put_old from new_root */
if (!is_path_reachable(old_mnt, old.dentry, &new))
goto out4;
/* make certain new is below the root */
if (!is_path_reachable(new_mnt, new.dentry, &root))
goto out4;
root_mp->m_count++; /* pin it so it won't go away */
lock_mount_hash();
detach_mnt(new_mnt, &parent_path);
detach_mnt(root_mnt, &root_parent);
if (root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) {
new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
}
/* mount old root on put_old */
attach_mnt(root_mnt, old_mnt, old_mp);
/* mount new_root on / */
attach_mnt(new_mnt, real_mount(root_parent.mnt), root_mp);
touch_mnt_namespace(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns);
/* A moved mount should not expire automatically */
list_del_init(&new_mnt->mnt_expire);
unlock_mount_hash();
chroot_fs_refs(&root, &new);
put_mountpoint(root_mp);
error = 0;
out4:
unlock_mount(old_mp);
if (!error) {
path_put(&root_parent);
path_put(&parent_path);
}
out3:
path_put(&root);
out2:
path_put(&old);
out1:
path_put(&new);
out0:
return error;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 26,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *hashtable_get(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return pair->value;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 7,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableGenericSensorExtraClasses(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetSensorExtraClassesEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 16,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_any_retrans_done(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (tp->retrans_out)
return 1;
skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk);
if (unlikely(skb && TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
BUG_ON(!kvm);
kvm->arch.is_sn2 = ia64_platform_is("sn2");
kvm->arch.metaphysical_rr0 = GUEST_PHYSICAL_RR0;
kvm->arch.metaphysical_rr4 = GUEST_PHYSICAL_RR4;
kvm->arch.vmm_init_rr = VMM_INIT_RR;
/*
*Fill P2M entries for MMIO/IO ranges
*/
kvm_build_io_pmt(kvm);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
/* Reserve bit 0 of irq_sources_bitmap for userspace irq source */
set_bit(KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID, &kvm->arch.irq_sources_bitmap);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void check_tmp_dir(){
#if !defined(WIN32)
if (!RmFlag) return;
const char *tmpDir = NULL;
bool newLock = param_boolean("CREATE_LOCKS_ON_LOCAL_DISK", true);
if (newLock) {
FileLock *lock = new FileLock(-1, NULL, NULL);
tmpDir = lock->GetTempPath();
delete lock;
rec_lock_cleanup(tmpDir, 3);
if (tmpDir != NULL)
delete []tmpDir;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 20,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GLES2Util::ConvertToSizedFormat(uint32_t format, uint32_t type) {
switch (format) {
case GL_RGB:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_RGB8;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_6_5:
return GL_RGB565;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
return GL_RGB16F;
case GL_FLOAT:
return GL_RGB32F;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_RGBA:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_RGBA8;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_4_4_4_4:
return GL_RGBA4;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT_5_5_5_1:
return GL_RGB5_A1;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
return GL_RGBA16F;
case GL_FLOAT:
return GL_RGBA32F;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_ALPHA:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_ALPHA8_EXT;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
return GL_ALPHA16F_EXT;
case GL_FLOAT:
return GL_ALPHA32F_EXT;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_RED:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_R8;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
return GL_R16F;
case GL_FLOAT:
return GL_R32F;
case GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT:
return GL_R16_EXT;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_RG:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_RG8;
case GL_HALF_FLOAT_OES:
return GL_RG16F;
case GL_FLOAT:
return GL_RG32F;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_SRGB_EXT:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_SRGB8;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
case GL_BGRA_EXT:
switch (type) {
case GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE:
return GL_BGRA8_EXT;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return format;
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WillStartUsingPeerConnectionHandler(
blink::WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler* handler) {
static_cast<RTCPeerConnectionHandler*>(handler)->associateWithFrame(frame_);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 20,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt,
struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
u32 blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
stat->dev = BTRFS_I(inode)->root->anon_dev;
stat->blksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
stat->blocks = (ALIGN(inode_get_bytes(inode), blocksize) +
ALIGN(BTRFS_I(inode)->delalloc_bytes, blocksize)) >> 9;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 13,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::_q_onReceivedResponseFromDownload(QWebDownloadItem* downloadItem)
{
if (!downloadItem)
return;
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
QQmlEngine::setObjectOwnership(downloadItem, QQmlEngine::JavaScriptOwnership);
emit q->experimental()->downloadRequested(downloadItem);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionViewGuest::DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
if (render_frame_host->GetParent())
return;
url_ = url;
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> args(new base::DictionaryValue());
args->SetString(guest_view::kUrl, url_.spec());
DispatchEventToView(make_scoped_ptr(
new GuestViewEvent(extensionview::kEventLoadCommit, std::move(args))));
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 13,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!render_frame_created_)
return false;
ScopedActiveURL scoped_active_url(this);
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (handled)
return true;
if (delegate_->OnMessageReceived(this, msg))
return true;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (proxy && proxy->cross_process_frame_connector() &&
proxy->cross_process_frame_connector()->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole,
OnDidAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_Detach, OnDetach)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FrameFocused, OnFrameFocused)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStartProvisionalLoad,
OnDidStartProvisionalLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError,
OnDidFailProvisionalLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateState, OnUpdateState)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_OpenURL, OnOpenURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DocumentOnLoadCompleted,
OnDocumentOnLoadCompleted)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_BeforeUnload_ACK, OnBeforeUnloadACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK, OnSwapOutACK)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ContextMenu, OnContextMenu)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_JavaScriptExecuteResponse,
OnJavaScriptExecuteResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_VisualStateResponse,
OnVisualStateResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunJavaScriptDialog,
OnRunJavaScriptDialog)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(FrameHostMsg_RunBeforeUnloadConfirm,
OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RunFileChooser, OnRunFileChooser)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAccessInitialDocument,
OnDidAccessInitialDocument)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeOpener, OnDidChangeOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies,
OnDidAddContentSecurityPolicies)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFramePolicy,
OnDidChangeFramePolicy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeFrameOwnerProperties,
OnDidChangeFrameOwnerProperties)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_UpdateTitle, OnUpdateTitle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidBlockFramebust, OnDidBlockFramebust)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_AbortNavigation, OnAbortNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DispatchLoad, OnDispatchLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent,
OnForwardResourceTimingToParent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionResponse,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_Events, OnAccessibilityEvents)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_LocationChanges,
OnAccessibilityLocationChanges)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_FindInPageResult,
OnAccessibilityFindInPageResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_ChildFrameHitTestResult,
OnAccessibilityChildFrameHitTestResult)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityHostMsg_SnapshotResponse,
OnAccessibilitySnapshotResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ToggleFullscreen, OnToggleFullscreen)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SuddenTerminationDisablerChanged,
OnSuddenTerminationDisablerChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStartLoading, OnDidStartLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading, OnDidStopLoading)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_DidChangeLoadProgress,
OnDidChangeLoadProgress)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SerializeAsMHTMLResponse,
OnSerializeAsMHTMLResponse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SelectionChanged, OnSelectionChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_FocusedNodeChanged, OnFocusedNodeChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGesture,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGesture)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation,
OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame,
OnScrollRectToVisibleInParentFrame)
#if BUILDFLAG(USE_EXTERNAL_POPUP_MENU)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowPopup, OnShowPopup)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HidePopup, OnHidePopup)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken,
OnRequestOverlayRoutingToken)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_ShowCreatedWindow, OnShowCreatedWindow)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_StreamHandleConsumed,
OnStreamHandleConsumed)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 1 | 20,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int credssp_sizeof_nego_tokens(int length)
{
length = credssp_sizeof_nego_token(length);
length += ber_sizeof_sequence_tag(length);
length += ber_sizeof_sequence_tag(length);
length += ber_sizeof_contextual_tag(length);
return length;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_output_image_size(struct iw_context *ctx, double w, double h)
{
ctx->req.out_true_width = w;
if(ctx->req.out_true_width<0.01) ctx->req.out_true_width=0.01;
ctx->req.out_true_height = h;
if(ctx->req.out_true_height<0.01) ctx->req.out_true_height=0.01;
ctx->req.out_true_valid = 1;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 1,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AreExperimentalAccessibilityFeaturesEnabled() {
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
chromeos::switches::kEnableExperimentalAccessibilityFeatures);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsFocused() {
return GetRenderWidgetHost()->is_focused() &&
frame_tree_->GetFocusedFrame() &&
(frame_tree_->GetFocusedFrame() == frame_tree_node() ||
frame_tree_->GetFocusedFrame()->IsDescendantOf(frame_tree_node()));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 14,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: datum_to_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
JsonTypeCategory tcategory, Oid outfuncoid,
bool key_scalar)
{
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
Assert(!(key_scalar && is_null));
if (key_scalar &&
(tcategory == JSONTYPE_ARRAY ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_JSON ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_CAST))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("key value must be scalar, not array, composite, or json")));
switch (tcategory)
{
case JSONTYPE_ARRAY:
array_to_json_internal(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE:
composite_to_json(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_BOOL:
outputstr = DatumGetBool(val) ? "true" : "false";
if (key_scalar)
escape_json(result, outputstr);
else
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_NUMERIC:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
/*
* Don't call escape_json for a non-key if it's a valid JSON
* number.
*/
if (!key_scalar && IsValidJsonNumber(outputstr, strlen(outputstr)))
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
else
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_DATE:
{
DateADT date;
struct pg_tm tm;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
date = DatumGetDateADT(val);
if (DATE_NOT_FINITE(date))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else
{
j2date(date + POSTGRES_EPOCH_JDATE,
&(tm.tm_year), &(tm.tm_mon), &(tm.tm_mday));
EncodeDateOnly(&tm, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMP:
{
Timestamp timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
fsec_t fsec;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, NULL, &tm, &fsec, NULL, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, false, 0, NULL, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMPTZ:
{
TimestampTz timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
int tz;
fsec_t fsec;
const char *tzn = NULL;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, &tz, &tm, &fsec, &tzn, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, true, tz, tzn, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_JSON:
/* JSON and JSONB output will already be escaped */
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_CAST:
/* outfuncoid refers to a cast function, not an output function */
jsontext = DatumGetTextP(OidFunctionCall1(outfuncoid, val));
outputstr = text_to_cstring(jsontext);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
pfree(jsontext);
break;
default:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 11,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::SendFailedToGetPrinterCapabilities(
const std::string& printer_name) {
VLOG(1) << "Get printer capabilities failed";
base::StringValue printer_name_value(printer_name);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("failedToGetPrinterCapabilities",
printer_name_value);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendFixEnumerators() {
InitCache();
int seed = static_cast<int>(Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
srand(seed);
const int kNumEntries = 10;
for (int i = 0; i < kNumEntries; i++) {
std::string key = GenerateKey(true);
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(key, &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
}
EXPECT_EQ(kNumEntries, cache_->GetEntryCount());
disk_cache::Entry *entry1, *entry2;
std::unique_ptr<TestIterator> iter1 = CreateIterator(),
iter2 = CreateIterator();
ASSERT_THAT(iter1->OpenNextEntry(&entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry1);
entry1->Close();
entry1 = NULL;
for (int i = 0; i < kNumEntries / 2; i++) {
if (entry1)
entry1->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(iter1->OpenNextEntry(&entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry1);
ASSERT_THAT(iter2->OpenNextEntry(&entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry2);
entry2->Close();
}
entry1->Doom();
ASSERT_THAT(iter2->OpenNextEntry(&entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry2);
EXPECT_NE(entry2->GetKey(), entry1->GetKey());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(iter2->OpenNextEntry(&entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry2);
entry2->Close();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport const char *GetLocaleValue(const LocaleInfo *locale_info)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(locale_info != (LocaleInfo *) NULL);
assert(locale_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
return(locale_info->message);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 22,162 |
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