instruction
stringclasses 1
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stringlengths 64
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int64 0
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int64 0
30k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rds_ib_send_add_credits(struct rds_connection *conn, unsigned int credits)
{
struct rds_ib_connection *ic = conn->c_transport_data;
if (credits == 0)
return;
rdsdebug("rds_ib_send_add_credits(%u): current=%u%s\n",
credits,
IB_GET_SEND_CREDITS(atomic_read(&ic->i_credits)),
test_bit(RDS_LL_SEND_FULL, &conn->c_flags) ? ", ll_send_full" : "");
atomic_add(IB_SET_SEND_CREDITS(credits), &ic->i_credits);
if (test_and_clear_bit(RDS_LL_SEND_FULL, &conn->c_flags))
queue_delayed_work(rds_wq, &conn->c_send_w, 0);
WARN_ON(IB_GET_SEND_CREDITS(credits) >= 16384);
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_rx_credit_updates);
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void advance(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
regs->tpc = regs->tnpc;
regs->tnpc += 4;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS fuji_rotate()
{
int i, row, col;
double step;
float r, c, fr, fc;
int ur, uc;
ushort wide, high, (*img)[4], (*pix)[4];
if (!fuji_width) return;
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("Rotating image 45 degrees...\n"));
fuji_width = (fuji_width - 1 + shrink) >> shrink;
step = sqrt(0.5);
wide = fuji_width / step;
high = (height - fuji_width) / step;
img = (ushort (*)[4]) calloc (wide*high, sizeof *img);
merror (img, "fuji_rotate()");
for (row=0; row < high; row++)
for (col=0; col < wide; col++) {
ur = r = fuji_width + (row-col)*step;
uc = c = (row+col)*step;
if (ur > height-2 || uc > width-2) continue;
fr = r - ur;
fc = c - uc;
pix = image + ur*width + uc;
for (i=0; i < colors; i++)
img[row*wide+col][i] =
(pix[ 0][i]*(1-fc) + pix[ 1][i]*fc) * (1-fr) +
(pix[width][i]*(1-fc) + pix[width+1][i]*fc) * fr;
}
free (image);
width = wide;
height = high;
image = img;
fuji_width = 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SupervisedUserService::SetSafeSearchURLReporter(
std::unique_ptr<SafeSearchURLReporter> reporter) {
url_reporter_ = std::move(reporter);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CallWithExecutionContextRaisesExceptionVoidMethodLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "callWithExecutionContextRaisesExceptionVoidMethodLongArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
int32_t long_arg;
long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::ForRelevantRealm(info);
impl->callWithExecutionContextRaisesExceptionVoidMethodLongArg(execution_context, long_arg, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_lidt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
return em_lgdt_lidt(ctxt, false);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: media_status_t AMediaCodec_releaseCrypto(AMediaCodec *mData) {
return translate_error(mData->mCodec->releaseCrypto());
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 19,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_rq_unprep_clone(struct request *rq)
{
struct bio *bio;
while ((bio = rq->bio) != NULL) {
rq->bio = bio->bi_next;
bio_put(bio);
}
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int fd_copyin(void __user *param, void *address,
unsigned long size)
{
return copy_from_user(address, param, size) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state *ps)
{
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
memcpy(ps, &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state));
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_larval *larval = (void *)alg;
long timeout;
timeout = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
&larval->completion, 60 * HZ);
alg = larval->adult;
if (timeout < 0)
alg = ERR_PTR(-EINTR);
else if (!timeout)
alg = ERR_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT);
else if (!alg)
alg = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
else if (crypto_is_test_larval(larval) &&
!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED))
alg = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
else if (!crypto_mod_get(alg))
alg = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
crypto_mod_put(&larval->alg);
return alg;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnCompositorHidden(CompositorImpl* compositor) {
size_t elements_removed = visible_compositors_.erase(compositor);
DCHECK_EQ(1u, elements_removed);
if (visible_compositors_.size() == 0)
OnVisibilityChanged();
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgPaintAtSizeAck(int tag, const gfx::Size& size) {
std::pair<int, gfx::Size> details = std::make_pair(tag, size);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_HOST_DID_RECEIVE_PAINT_AT_SIZE_ACK,
Source<RenderWidgetHost>(this),
Details<std::pair<int, gfx::Size> >(&details));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PeopleHandler::HandleAttemptUserExit(const base::ListValue* args) {
DVLOG(1) << "Signing out the user to fix a sync error.";
chrome::AttemptUserExit();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContainerNode::checkParserAcceptChild(const Node& newChild) const
{
if (!isDocumentNode())
return true;
return toDocument(*this).canAcceptChild(newChild, nullptr, IGNORE_EXCEPTION);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::Init(SiteInstance* site_instance,
int32_t view_routing_id,
int32_t frame_routing_id,
int32_t widget_routing_id,
bool renderer_initiated_creation) {
DCHECK(site_instance);
DCHECK(!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() ||
view_routing_id == widget_routing_id);
SetRenderFrameHost(CreateRenderFrameHost(site_instance, view_routing_id,
frame_routing_id, widget_routing_id,
delegate_->IsHidden(),
renderer_initiated_creation));
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
delegate_->NotifySwappedFromRenderManager(
nullptr, render_frame_host_.get(), false);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
{
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&child->ptrace_entry));
list_add(&child->ptrace_entry, &new_parent->ptraced);
child->parent = new_parent;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
*olen = 0;
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret "
"extension" ) );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::AddCrashedInfoBarIfNecessary(
Browser* browser,
TabContentsWrapper* tab) {
if (!profile_->DidLastSessionExitCleanly() && !profile_->IsOffTheRecord()) {
tab->infobar_tab_helper()->AddInfoBar(
new SessionCrashedInfoBarDelegate(profile_, tab->infobar_tab_helper()));
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bta_hl_co_save_mdl(UINT8 mdep_id, UINT8 item_idx, tBTA_HL_MDL_CFG *p_mdl_cfg )
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s mdep_id =%d, item_idx=%d active=%d mdl_id=%d time=%d",
__FUNCTION__, mdep_id, item_idx,
p_mdl_cfg->active,
p_mdl_cfg->mdl_id,
p_mdl_cfg->time);
btif_hl_save_mdl_cfg(mdep_id, item_idx, p_mdl_cfg);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static V9fsFidState *get_fid(V9fsPDU *pdu, int32_t fid)
{
int err;
V9fsFidState *f;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
for (f = s->fid_list; f; f = f->next) {
BUG_ON(f->clunked);
if (f->fid == fid) {
/*
* Update the fid ref upfront so that
* we don't get reclaimed when we yield
* in open later.
*/
f->ref++;
/*
* check whether we need to reopen the
* file. We might have closed the fd
* while trying to free up some file
* descriptors.
*/
err = v9fs_reopen_fid(pdu, f);
if (err < 0) {
f->ref--;
return NULL;
}
/*
* Mark the fid as referenced so that the LRU
* reclaim won't close the file descriptor
*/
f->flags |= FID_REFERENCED;
return f;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gfs2_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct gfs2_holder i_gh;
struct gfs2_file *fp;
int error;
fp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct gfs2_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_init(&fp->f_fl_mutex);
gfs2_assert_warn(GFS2_SB(inode), !file->private_data);
file->private_data = fp;
if (S_ISREG(ip->i_inode.i_mode)) {
error = gfs2_glock_nq_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_SHARED, LM_FLAG_ANY,
&i_gh);
if (error)
goto fail;
if (!(file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE) &&
i_size_read(inode) > MAX_NON_LFS) {
error = -EOVERFLOW;
goto fail_gunlock;
}
gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&i_gh);
}
return 0;
fail_gunlock:
gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&i_gh);
fail:
file->private_data = NULL;
kfree(fp);
return error;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AssertObjectHasGCInfo(const void* payload, size_t gc_info_index) {
HeapObjectHeader::CheckFromPayload(payload);
#if !defined(COMPONENT_BUILD)
DCHECK_EQ(HeapObjectHeader::FromPayload(payload)->GcInfoIndex(),
gc_info_index);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _zip_u2d_time(time_t time, unsigned short *dtime, unsigned short *ddate)
{
struct tm *tm;
tm = localtime(&time);
*ddate = ((tm->tm_year+1900-1980)<<9) + ((tm->tm_mon+1)<<5)
+ tm->tm_mday;
*dtime = ((tm->tm_hour)<<11) + ((tm->tm_min)<<5)
+ ((tm->tm_sec)>>1);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 7,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDatabase::SetIndexKeys(
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t object_store_id,
std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> primary_key,
const std::vector<IndexedDBIndexKeys>& index_keys) {
DCHECK(transaction);
IDB_TRACE1("IndexedDBDatabase::SetIndexKeys", "txn.id", transaction->id());
DCHECK_EQ(transaction->mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
IndexedDBBackingStore::RecordIdentifier record_identifier;
bool found = false;
Status s = backing_store_->KeyExistsInObjectStore(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), metadata_.id, object_store_id,
*primary_key, &record_identifier, &found);
if (!s.ok()) {
ReportErrorWithDetails(s, "Internal error setting index keys.");
return;
}
if (!found) {
transaction->Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionUnknownError,
"Internal error setting index keys for object store."));
return;
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<IndexWriter>> index_writers;
base::string16 error_message;
bool obeys_constraints = false;
DCHECK(metadata_.object_stores.find(object_store_id) !=
metadata_.object_stores.end());
const IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata& object_store_metadata =
metadata_.object_stores[object_store_id];
bool backing_store_success = MakeIndexWriters(transaction,
backing_store_.get(),
id(),
object_store_metadata,
*primary_key,
false,
index_keys,
&index_writers,
&error_message,
&obeys_constraints);
if (!backing_store_success) {
transaction->Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionUnknownError,
"Internal error: backing store error updating index keys."));
return;
}
if (!obeys_constraints) {
transaction->Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionConstraintError, error_message));
return;
}
for (const auto& writer : index_writers) {
writer->WriteIndexKeys(record_identifier, backing_store_.get(),
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), id(),
object_store_id);
}
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int _mkp_stage_30(struct plugin *p,
struct client_session *cs,
struct session_request *sr)
{
mk_ptr_t referer;
(void) p;
(void) cs;
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Mandril validating URL", cs->socket);
if (mk_security_check_url(sr->uri) < 0) {
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Close connection, blocked URL", cs->socket);
mk_api->header_set_http_status(sr, MK_CLIENT_FORBIDDEN);
return MK_PLUGIN_RET_CLOSE_CONX;
}
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %d] Mandril validating hotlinking", cs->socket);
referer = mk_api->header_get(&sr->headers_toc, "Referer", strlen("Referer"));
if (mk_security_check_hotlink(sr->uri_processed, sr->host, referer) < 0) {
PLUGIN_TRACE("[FD %i] Close connection, deny hotlinking.", cs->socket);
mk_api->header_set_http_status(sr, MK_CLIENT_FORBIDDEN);
return MK_PLUGIN_RET_CLOSE_CONX;
}
return MK_PLUGIN_RET_NOT_ME;
}
Commit Message: Mandril: check decoded URI (fix #92)
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <eduardo@monkey.io>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 29,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ixheaacd_inv_emodulation(WORD32 *qmf_real,
ia_sbr_qmf_filter_bank_struct *syn_qmf,
ia_qmf_dec_tables_struct *qmf_dec_tables_ptr) {
ixheaacd_cos_sin_mod(qmf_real, syn_qmf, (WORD16 *)qmf_dec_tables_ptr->w1024,
(WORD32 *)qmf_dec_tables_ptr->dig_rev_table2_128);
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 19,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SoftAACEncoder::initEncoder() {
mApiHandle = new VO_AUDIO_CODECAPI;
if (VO_ERR_NONE != voGetAACEncAPI(mApiHandle)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get api handle");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
mMemOperator = new VO_MEM_OPERATOR;
mMemOperator->Alloc = cmnMemAlloc;
mMemOperator->Copy = cmnMemCopy;
mMemOperator->Free = cmnMemFree;
mMemOperator->Set = cmnMemSet;
mMemOperator->Check = cmnMemCheck;
VO_CODEC_INIT_USERDATA userData;
memset(&userData, 0, sizeof(userData));
userData.memflag = VO_IMF_USERMEMOPERATOR;
userData.memData = (VO_PTR) mMemOperator;
if (VO_ERR_NONE !=
mApiHandle->Init(&mEncoderHandle, VO_AUDIO_CodingAAC, &userData)) {
ALOGE("Failed to init AAC encoder");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t copy_page_to_iter(struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t bytes,
struct iov_iter *i)
{
if (i->type & (ITER_BVEC|ITER_KVEC)) {
void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
size_t wanted = copy_to_iter(kaddr + offset, bytes, i);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
return wanted;
} else if (likely(!(i->type & ITER_PIPE)))
return copy_page_to_iter_iovec(page, offset, bytes, i);
else
return copy_page_to_iter_pipe(page, offset, bytes, i);
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 63
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_name(const person_t* person)
{
return person != NULL ? person->name : "";
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 15,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxEditModel::OnUpOrDownKeyPressed(int count) {
if (popup_model() && popup_model()->IsOpen()) {
popup_model()->Move(count);
return;
}
if (!query_in_progress()) {
if (!user_input_in_progress_)
InternalSetUserText(permanent_text_);
view_->UpdatePopup();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnMoveRangeSelectionExtent(const gfx::Point& point) {
Send(new InputHostMsg_MoveRangeSelectionExtent_ACK(
GetRenderWidget()->routing_id()));
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
frame_->moveRangeSelectionExtent(point);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FolderNameView() {
SetBorder(views::Border::CreateEmptyBorder(1, 1, 1, 1));
const SkColor kFocusBorderColor = SkColorSetRGB(64, 128, 250);
SetFocusPainter(views::Painter::CreateSolidFocusPainter(
kFocusBorderColor,
gfx::Insets(0, 0, 1, 1)));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NotifyPrunedEntries(NavigationControllerImpl* nav_controller,
bool from_front,
int count) {
PrunedDetails details;
details.from_front = from_front;
details.count = count;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_NAV_LIST_PRUNED,
Source<NavigationController>(nav_controller),
Details<PrunedDetails>(&details));
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tt_cmap0_get_info( TT_CMap cmap,
TT_CMapInfo *cmap_info )
{
FT_Byte* p = cmap->data + 4;
cmap_info->format = 0;
cmap_info->language = (FT_ULong)TT_PEEK_USHORT( p );
return SFNT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd = ps_dec->u4_width_at_init;
UWORD16 pic_ht = ps_dec->u4_height_at_init;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
}
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
/* Initialize for field reference as well */
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][MAX_REF_BUFS]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row =
ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row
+ ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 1)
<< (1
- ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->pu1_y = ps_dec->pu1_y_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_u = ps_dec->pu1_u_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_v = ps_dec->pu1_v_scratch[0];
ps_dec->u1_yuv_scratch_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_yleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_uleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_vleft = 0;
ps_dec->u1_not_wait_rec = 2;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_curr = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_prev = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Treat first slice in a picture as part of new picture always
This is needed to decode streams with consecutive IDRs.
Bug: 34097231
Test: successful run of POC in security bug
Change-Id: Ib737a4ef4b8c5bb7a57c90292102dd28af0615fe
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct jfs_inode_info *ji = JFS_IP(inode);
spin_lock_irq(&ji->ag_lock);
if (ji->active_ag != -1) {
struct bmap *bmap = JFS_SBI(inode->i_sb)->bmap;
atomic_dec(&bmap->db_active[ji->active_ag]);
ji->active_ag = -1;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ji->ag_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hid_device_probe(struct device *dev)
{
struct hid_driver *hdrv = to_hid_driver(dev->driver);
struct hid_device *hdev = to_hid_device(dev);
const struct hid_device_id *id;
int ret = 0;
if (down_interruptible(&hdev->driver_lock))
return -EINTR;
if (down_interruptible(&hdev->driver_input_lock)) {
ret = -EINTR;
goto unlock_driver_lock;
}
hdev->io_started = false;
if (!hdev->driver) {
id = hid_match_device(hdev, hdrv);
if (id == NULL) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto unlock;
}
hdev->driver = hdrv;
if (hdrv->probe) {
ret = hdrv->probe(hdev, id);
} else { /* default probe */
ret = hid_open_report(hdev);
if (!ret)
ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT);
}
if (ret) {
hid_close_report(hdev);
hdev->driver = NULL;
}
}
unlock:
if (!hdev->io_started)
up(&hdev->driver_input_lock);
unlock_driver_lock:
up(&hdev->driver_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 25,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_durable_reconnect_v2_context(struct kvec *iov, unsigned int *num_iovec,
struct cifs_open_parms *oparms)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
/* indicate that we don't need to relock the file */
oparms->reconnect = false;
iov[num].iov_base = create_reconnect_durable_v2_buf(oparms->fid);
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = sizeof(struct create_durable_handle_reconnect_v2);
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) - 4 +
iov[1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength,
sizeof(struct create_durable_handle_reconnect_v2));
inc_rfc1001_len(&req->hdr,
sizeof(struct create_durable_handle_reconnect_v2));
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 28,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FontFileSortTable (FontTablePtr table)
{
if (!table->sorted) {
qsort((char *) table->entries, table->used, sizeof(FontEntryRec),
FontFileNameCompare);
table->sorted = TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hls_read_seek(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index,
int64_t timestamp, int flags)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
struct playlist *seek_pls = NULL;
int i, seq_no;
int j;
int stream_subdemuxer_index;
int64_t first_timestamp, seek_timestamp, duration;
if ((flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_BYTE) ||
!(c->variants[0]->playlists[0]->finished || c->variants[0]->playlists[0]->type == PLS_TYPE_EVENT))
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
first_timestamp = c->first_timestamp == AV_NOPTS_VALUE ?
0 : c->first_timestamp;
seek_timestamp = av_rescale_rnd(timestamp, AV_TIME_BASE,
s->streams[stream_index]->time_base.den,
flags & AVSEEK_FLAG_BACKWARD ?
AV_ROUND_DOWN : AV_ROUND_UP);
duration = s->duration == AV_NOPTS_VALUE ?
0 : s->duration;
if (0 < duration && duration < seek_timestamp - first_timestamp)
return AVERROR(EIO);
/* find the playlist with the specified stream */
for (i = 0; i < c->n_playlists; i++) {
struct playlist *pls = c->playlists[i];
for (j = 0; j < pls->n_main_streams; j++) {
if (pls->main_streams[j] == s->streams[stream_index]) {
seek_pls = pls;
stream_subdemuxer_index = j;
break;
}
}
}
/* check if the timestamp is valid for the playlist with the
* specified stream index */
if (!seek_pls || !find_timestamp_in_playlist(c, seek_pls, seek_timestamp, &seq_no))
return AVERROR(EIO);
/* set segment now so we do not need to search again below */
seek_pls->cur_seq_no = seq_no;
seek_pls->seek_stream_index = stream_subdemuxer_index;
for (i = 0; i < c->n_playlists; i++) {
/* Reset reading */
struct playlist *pls = c->playlists[i];
if (pls->input)
ff_format_io_close(pls->parent, &pls->input);
av_packet_unref(&pls->pkt);
reset_packet(&pls->pkt);
pls->pb.eof_reached = 0;
/* Clear any buffered data */
pls->pb.buf_end = pls->pb.buf_ptr = pls->pb.buffer;
/* Reset the pos, to let the mpegts demuxer know we've seeked. */
pls->pb.pos = 0;
/* Flush the packet queue of the subdemuxer. */
ff_read_frame_flush(pls->ctx);
pls->seek_timestamp = seek_timestamp;
pls->seek_flags = flags;
if (pls != seek_pls) {
/* set closest segment seq_no for playlists not handled above */
find_timestamp_in_playlist(c, pls, seek_timestamp, &pls->cur_seq_no);
/* seek the playlist to the given position without taking
* keyframes into account since this playlist does not have the
* specified stream where we should look for the keyframes */
pls->seek_stream_index = -1;
pls->seek_flags |= AVSEEK_FLAG_ANY;
}
}
c->cur_timestamp = seek_timestamp;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 2,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 3,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compile_string_raw_node(StrNode* sn, regex_t* reg)
{
if (sn->end <= sn->s)
return 0;
return add_compile_string(sn->s, 1 /* sb */, (int )(sn->end - sn->s), reg, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 12,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillDialogViews::ValidateForm() {
bool all_valid = true;
validity_map_.clear();
for (DetailGroupMap::iterator iter = detail_groups_.begin();
iter != detail_groups_.end(); ++iter) {
const DetailsGroup& group = iter->second;
if (!group.container->visible())
continue;
if (!ValidateGroup(group, VALIDATE_FINAL))
all_valid = false;
}
return all_valid;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WorkerThread::isCurrentThread()
{
return m_started && backingThread().isCurrentThread();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RegisterForAllNavNotifications(TestNotificationTracker* tracker,
NavigationController* controller) {
tracker->ListenFor(NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(controller));
tracker->ListenFor(NotificationType::NAV_LIST_PRUNED,
Source<NavigationController>(controller));
tracker->ListenFor(NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_CHANGED,
Source<NavigationController>(controller));
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSObject* createURIError(JSGlobalObject* globalObject, const UString& message)
{
ASSERT(!message.isEmpty());
return ErrorInstance::create(globalObject->globalData(), globalObject->URIErrorConstructor()->errorStructure(), message);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLKeygenElement::didAddUserAgentShadowRoot(ShadowRoot& root)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(AtomicString, keygenSelectPseudoId, ("-webkit-keygen-select", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
Vector<String> keys;
getSupportedKeySizes(locale(), keys);
RefPtr<HTMLSelectElement> select = HTMLSelectElement::create(document());
select->setShadowPseudoId(keygenSelectPseudoId);
for (size_t i = 0; i < keys.size(); ++i) {
RefPtr<HTMLOptionElement> option = HTMLOptionElement::create(document());
option->appendChild(Text::create(document(), keys[i]));
select->appendChild(option);
}
root.appendChild(select);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sctp_write_space(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
/* Wake up the tasks in each wait queue. */
list_for_each_entry(asoc, &((sctp_sk(sk))->ep->asocs), asocs) {
__sctp_write_space(asoc);
}
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void testUri() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriParserStateW stateW;
UriUriA uriA;
UriUriW uriW;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
stateW.uri = &uriW;
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "//user:pass@[::1]:80/segment/index.html?query#frag"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://[::1]:80/segment/index.html?query#frag"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://user:pass@[::1]/segment/index.html?query#frag"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://user:pass@[::1]:80?query#frag"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://user:pass@[::1]:80/segment/index.html#frag"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://user:pass@[::1]:80/segment/index.html?query"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "ftp://host:21/gnu/"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "one/two/three"));
TEST_ASSERT(!uriA.absolutePath);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "/one/two/three"));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.absolutePath);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "//user:pass@localhost/one/two/three"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://www.example.com/"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriW(&stateW, L"http://www.example.com/"));
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uriW);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://sourceforge.net/projects/uriparser/"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://sourceforge.net/project/platformdownload.php?group_id=182840"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "mailto:test@example.com"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "../../"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "/"));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.absolutePath)
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, ""));
TEST_ASSERT(!uriA.absolutePath)
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "file:///bin/bash"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://www.example.com/name%20with%20spaces/"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
TEST_ASSERT(0 != uriParseUriA(&stateA, "http://www.example.com/name with spaces/"));
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 18,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_duplicate_context(MpegEncContext *s)
{
if (!s)
return;
av_freep(&s->sc.edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&s->me.scratchpad);
s->me.temp =
s->sc.rd_scratchpad =
s->sc.b_scratchpad =
s->sc.obmc_scratchpad = NULL;
av_freep(&s->dct_error_sum);
av_freep(&s->me.map);
av_freep(&s->me.score_map);
av_freep(&s->blocks);
av_freep(&s->block32);
av_freep(&s->ac_val_base);
s->block = NULL;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_pkcs15emu_tcos_init_ex(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
struct sc_aid *aid,
sc_pkcs15emu_opt_t *opts
){
sc_card_t *card = p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx = p15card->card->ctx;
sc_serial_number_t serialnr;
char serial[30];
int i, r;
/* check if we have the correct card OS unless SC_PKCS15EMU_FLAGS_NO_CHECK */
i=(opts && (opts->flags & SC_PKCS15EMU_FLAGS_NO_CHECK));
if (!i && card->type!=SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V2 && card->type!=SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3) return SC_ERROR_WRONG_CARD;
/* get the card serial number */
r = sc_card_ctl(card, SC_CARDCTL_GET_SERIALNR, &serialnr);
if (r < 0) {
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "unable to get ICCSN\n");
return SC_ERROR_WRONG_CARD;
}
sc_bin_to_hex(serialnr.value, serialnr.len , serial, sizeof(serial), 0);
serial[19] = '\0';
p15card->tokeninfo->serial_number = strdup(serial);
if(!detect_netkey(p15card)) return SC_SUCCESS;
if(!detect_idkey(p15card)) return SC_SUCCESS;
if(!detect_unicard(p15card)) return SC_SUCCESS;
if(!detect_signtrust(p15card)) return SC_SUCCESS;
if(!detect_datev(p15card)) return SC_SUCCESS;
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 10,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct hlist_head *dn_find_list(struct sock *sk)
{
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
if (scp->addr.sdn_flags & SDF_WILD)
return hlist_empty(&dn_wild_sk) ? &dn_wild_sk : NULL;
return &dn_sk_hash[le16_to_cpu(scp->addrloc) & DN_SK_HASH_MASK];
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_include_module(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *c, struct RClass *m)
{
int changed = include_module_at(mrb, c, find_origin(c), m, 1);
if (changed < 0) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "cyclic include detected");
}
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 15,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbFetchPixel_x8r8g8b8 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
return READ((CARD32 *)bits + offset) | 0xff000000;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetPlatformNotificationService() {
return PlatformNotificationServiceImpl::GetInstance();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_usb_is_big_endian_format(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, struct audioformat *fp)
{
/* it depends on altsetting whether the device is big-endian or not */
switch (chip->usb_id) {
case USB_ID(0x0763, 0x2001): /* M-Audio Quattro: captured data only */
if (fp->altsetting == 2 || fp->altsetting == 3 ||
fp->altsetting == 5 || fp->altsetting == 6)
return 1;
break;
case USB_ID(0x0763, 0x2003): /* M-Audio Audiophile USB */
if (chip->setup == 0x00 ||
fp->altsetting == 1 || fp->altsetting == 2 ||
fp->altsetting == 3)
return 1;
break;
case USB_ID(0x0763, 0x2012): /* M-Audio Fast Track Pro */
if (fp->altsetting == 2 || fp->altsetting == 3 ||
fp->altsetting == 5 || fp->altsetting == 6)
return 1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _c2s_ar_free(const char *module, int modulelen, void *val, void *arg) {
authreg_t ar = (authreg_t) val;
authreg_free(ar);
}
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 21,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _ewk_frame_smart_resize(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, Evas_Coord width, Evas_Coord height)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET(ewkFrame, smartData);
evas_object_resize(smartData->base.clipper, width, height);
#ifdef EWK_FRAME_DEBUG
evas_object_resize(smartData->region, width, height);
Evas_Coord x, y;
evas_object_geometry_get(smartData->region, &x, &y, &width, &height);
INF("region=%p, visible=%d, geo=%d,%d + %dx%d",
smartData->region, evas_object_visible_get(smartData->region), x, y, width, height);
_ewk_frame_debug(ewkFrame);
#endif
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_map_handler(request_rec *r)
{
int rc, n = 0;
apr_pool_t *pool;
lua_State *L;
const char *filename, *function_name;
const char *values[10];
ap_lua_vm_spec *spec;
ap_regmatch_t match[10];
ap_lua_server_cfg *server_cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&lua_module);
const ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
&lua_module);
for (n = 0; n < cfg->mapped_handlers->nelts; n++) {
ap_lua_mapped_handler_spec *hook_spec =
((ap_lua_mapped_handler_spec **) cfg->mapped_handlers->elts)[n];
if (hook_spec == NULL) {
continue;
}
if (!ap_regexec(hook_spec->uri_pattern, r->uri, 10, match, 0)) {
int i;
for (i=0 ; i < 10; i++) {
if (match[i].rm_eo >= 0) {
values[i] = apr_pstrndup(r->pool, r->uri+match[i].rm_so, match[i].rm_eo - match[i].rm_so);
}
else values[i] = "";
}
filename = ap_lua_interpolate_string(r->pool, hook_spec->file_name, values);
function_name = ap_lua_interpolate_string(r->pool, hook_spec->function_name, values);
spec = create_vm_spec(&pool, r, cfg, server_cfg,
filename,
hook_spec->bytecode,
hook_spec->bytecode_len,
function_name,
"mapped handler");
L = ap_lua_get_lua_state(pool, spec, r);
if (!L) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, r, APLOGNO(02330)
"lua: Failed to obtain Lua interpreter for entry function '%s' in %s",
function_name, filename);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
if (function_name != NULL) {
lua_getglobal(L, function_name);
if (!lua_isfunction(L, -1)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, r, APLOGNO(02331)
"lua: Unable to find entry function '%s' in %s (not a valid function)",
function_name,
filename);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
ap_lua_run_lua_request(L, r);
}
else {
int t;
ap_lua_run_lua_request(L, r);
t = lua_gettop(L);
lua_setglobal(L, "r");
lua_settop(L, t);
}
if (lua_pcall(L, 1, 1, 0)) {
report_lua_error(L, r);
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
rc = DECLINED;
if (lua_isnumber(L, -1)) {
rc = lua_tointeger(L, -1);
}
else {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(02483)
"lua: Lua handler %s in %s did not return a value, assuming apache2.OK",
function_name,
filename);
rc = OK;
}
ap_lua_release_state(L, spec, r);
if (rc != DECLINED) {
return rc;
}
}
}
return DECLINED;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING];
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
if (sscanf(line, "%s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
return 0;
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Set length modifiers for group and desc
nntp_add_group parses a line controlled by the connected nntp server.
Restrict the maximum lengths read into the stack buffers group, and
desc.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 18,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetSnapshotFromBrowser(
const GetSnapshotFromBrowserCallback& callback,
bool from_surface) {
int snapshot_id = next_browser_snapshot_id_++;
if (from_surface) {
pending_surface_browser_snapshots_.insert(
std::make_pair(snapshot_id, callback));
Send(new ViewMsg_ForceRedraw(GetRoutingID(), snapshot_id));
return;
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (pending_browser_snapshots_.empty())
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
pending_browser_snapshots_.insert(std::make_pair(snapshot_id, callback));
Send(new ViewMsg_ForceRedraw(GetRoutingID(), snapshot_id));
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PasswordAutofillManager::DidNavigateMainFrame() {
login_to_password_info_.clear();
did_show_form_not_secure_warning_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_ioctx_reqs(struct percpu_ref *ref)
{
struct kioctx *ctx = container_of(ref, struct kioctx, reqs);
/* At this point we know that there are no any in-flight requests */
if (ctx->rq_wait && atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->rq_wait->count))
complete(&ctx->rq_wait->comp);
INIT_WORK(&ctx->free_work, free_ioctx);
schedule_work(&ctx->free_work);
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsBytes(DataElement::Type type) {
return type == DataElement::TYPE_BYTES ||
type == DataElement::TYPE_BYTES_DESCRIPTION;
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CancelRequestsForContext(
ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(context);
CHECK(ContainsKey(active_resource_contexts_, context));
typedef std::vector<scoped_ptr<ResourceLoader>> LoaderList;
LoaderList loaders_to_cancel;
for (LoaderMap::iterator i = pending_loaders_.begin();
i != pending_loaders_.end();) {
ResourceLoader* loader = i->second.get();
if (loader->GetRequestInfo()->GetContext() == context) {
loaders_to_cancel.push_back(std::move(i->second));
IncrementOutstandingRequestsMemory(-1, *loader->GetRequestInfo());
pending_loaders_.erase(i++);
} else {
++i;
}
}
for (BlockedLoadersMap::iterator i = blocked_loaders_map_.begin();
i != blocked_loaders_map_.end();) {
BlockedLoadersList* loaders = i->second.get();
if (loaders->empty()) {
++i;
continue;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loaders->front()->GetRequestInfo();
if (info->GetContext() == context) {
scoped_ptr<BlockedLoadersList> deleter(std::move(i->second));
blocked_loaders_map_.erase(i++);
for (auto& loader : *loaders) {
info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
DCHECK_EQ(context, info->GetContext());
IncrementOutstandingRequestsMemory(-1, *info);
loaders_to_cancel.push_back(std::move(loader));
}
} else {
++i;
}
}
#ifndef NDEBUG
for (const auto& loader : loaders_to_cancel) {
DCHECK(loader->GetRequestInfo()->IsDownload() ||
loader->GetRequestInfo()->is_stream() ||
(loader->GetRequestInfo()->detachable_handler() &&
loader->GetRequestInfo()->detachable_handler()->is_detached()) ||
loader->GetRequestInfo()->GetProcessType() == PROCESS_TYPE_BROWSER ||
loader->is_transferring());
}
#endif
loaders_to_cancel.clear();
if (async_revalidation_manager_) {
async_revalidation_manager_->CancelAsyncRevalidationsForResourceContext(
context);
}
for (const auto& loader : pending_loaders_) {
CHECK_NE(loader.second->GetRequestInfo()->GetContext(), context);
}
for (const auto& blocked_loaders : blocked_loaders_map_) {
BlockedLoadersList* loaders = blocked_loaders.second.get();
if (!loaders->empty()) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loaders->front()->GetRequestInfo();
CHECK_NE(info->GetContext(), context);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool semaphore_try_wait(semaphore_t *semaphore) {
assert(semaphore != NULL);
assert(semaphore->fd != INVALID_FD);
int flags = fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to get flags for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
if (fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to set O_NONBLOCK for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return false;
}
eventfd_t value;
if (eventfd_read(semaphore->fd, &value) == -1)
return false;
if (fcntl(semaphore->fd, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to resetore flags for semaphore fd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 1,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int LayerTreeHostImpl::RequestedMSAASampleCount() const {
if (settings_.gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count == -1) {
float device_scale_factor = pending_tree_
? pending_tree_->device_scale_factor()
: active_tree_->device_scale_factor();
return device_scale_factor >= 2.0f ? 4 : 8;
}
return settings_.gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsAgent::exposeV8DebuggerProtocol() {
return expose_v8_debugger_protocol_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::BeginCommit() {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHostImpl::BeginCommit");
if (compositor_frame_sink_)
compositor_frame_sink_->ForceReclaimResources();
if (!CommitToActiveTree())
CreatePendingTree();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 22,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SoundTriggerHwService::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags) {
return BnSoundTriggerHwService::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_turtle_writer_raw_counted(raptor_turtle_writer* turtle_writer,
const unsigned char *s, unsigned int len)
{
raptor_iostream_counted_string_write(s, len, turtle_writer->iostr);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderView::RenderView(RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name)
: RenderWidget(render_thread, WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone),
webkit_preferences_(webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(pepper_delegate_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(accessibility_method_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_input_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
accessibility_ack_pending_(false),
p2p_socket_dispatcher_(NULL),
session_storage_namespace_id_(session_storage_namespace_id) {
routing_id_ = routing_id;
if (opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
opener_id_ = opener_id;
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
if (counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = counter;
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
render_thread_->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit(parent_hwnd);
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (!frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(renderer_prefs);
host_window_ = parent_hwnd;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccessibility))
WebAccessibilityCache::enableAccessibility();
#if defined(ENABLE_P2P_APIS)
p2p_socket_dispatcher_ = new P2PSocketDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream)) {
media_stream_impl_ = new MediaStreamImpl(
RenderThread::current()->video_capture_impl_manager());
}
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 15,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setLooping(int loop)
{
ALOGV("[%d] setLooping(%d)", mConnId, loop);
mLoop = loop;
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p != 0) return p->setLooping(loop);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *SpliceImage(const Image *image,
const RectangleInfo *geometry,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SpliceImageTag "Splice/Image"
CacheView
*image_view,
*splice_view;
Image
*splice_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
RectangleInfo
splice_geometry;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate splice image.
*/
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(geometry != (const RectangleInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
splice_geometry=(*geometry);
splice_image=CloneImage(image,image->columns+splice_geometry.width,
image->rows+splice_geometry.height,MagickTrue,exception);
if (splice_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(splice_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
splice_image=DestroyImage(splice_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((IsPixelInfoGray(&splice_image->background_color) == MagickFalse) &&
(IsGrayColorspace(splice_image->colorspace) != MagickFalse))
(void) SetImageColorspace(splice_image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if ((splice_image->background_color.alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) &&
(splice_image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait))
(void) SetImageAlpha(splice_image,OpaqueAlpha,exception);
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(splice_image,exception);
/*
Respect image geometry.
*/
switch (image->gravity)
{
default:
case UndefinedGravity:
case NorthWestGravity:
break;
case NorthGravity:
{
splice_geometry.x+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width/2;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
{
splice_geometry.x+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width;
break;
}
case WestGravity:
{
splice_geometry.y+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width/2;
break;
}
case CenterGravity:
{
splice_geometry.x+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width/2;
splice_geometry.y+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.height/2;
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
splice_geometry.x+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width;
splice_geometry.y+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.height/2;
break;
}
case SouthWestGravity:
{
splice_geometry.y+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.height;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
splice_geometry.x+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width/2;
splice_geometry.y+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.height;
break;
}
case SouthEastGravity:
{
splice_geometry.x+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.width;
splice_geometry.y+=(ssize_t) splice_geometry.height;
break;
}
}
/*
Splice image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
splice_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(splice_image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,splice_image,1,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) splice_geometry.y; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(splice_view,0,y,splice_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < splice_geometry.x; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,p) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(splice_image,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
continue;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait splice_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(splice_image,channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(splice_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
SetPixelChannel(splice_image,channel,p[i],q);
}
SetPixelRed(splice_image,GetPixelRed(image,p),q);
SetPixelGreen(splice_image,GetPixelGreen(image,p),q);
SetPixelBlue(splice_image,GetPixelBlue(image,p),q);
SetPixelAlpha(splice_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
}
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) (splice_geometry.x+splice_geometry.width); x++)
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) splice_image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,p) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(splice_image,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
continue;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait splice_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(splice_image,channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(splice_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
SetPixelChannel(splice_image,channel,p[i],q);
}
SetPixelRed(splice_image,GetPixelRed(image,p),q);
SetPixelGreen(splice_image,GetPixelGreen(image,p),q);
SetPixelBlue(splice_image,GetPixelBlue(image,p),q);
SetPixelAlpha(splice_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(splice_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_TransposeImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,SpliceImageTag,progress++,
splice_image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(progress,status) \
magick_threads(image,splice_image,1,1)
#endif
for (y=(ssize_t) (splice_geometry.y+splice_geometry.height);
y < (ssize_t) splice_image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y-(ssize_t) splice_geometry.height,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((y < 0) || (y >= (ssize_t) splice_image->rows))
continue;
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(splice_view,0,y,splice_image->columns,1,
exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < splice_geometry.x; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(splice_image,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
continue;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait splice_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(splice_image,channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(splice_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
SetPixelChannel(splice_image,channel,p[i],q);
}
SetPixelRed(splice_image,GetPixelRed(image,p),q);
SetPixelGreen(splice_image,GetPixelGreen(image,p),q);
SetPixelBlue(splice_image,GetPixelBlue(image,p),q);
SetPixelAlpha(splice_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
}
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) (splice_geometry.x+splice_geometry.width); x++)
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) splice_image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
if (GetPixelReadMask(image,q) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(splice_image,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
continue;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
PixelTrait splice_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(splice_image,channel);
if ((traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(splice_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
SetPixelChannel(splice_image,channel,p[i],q);
}
SetPixelRed(splice_image,GetPixelRed(image,p),q);
SetPixelGreen(splice_image,GetPixelGreen(image,p),q);
SetPixelBlue(splice_image,GetPixelBlue(image,p),q);
SetPixelAlpha(splice_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,p),q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(splice_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(splice_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_TransposeImage)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,SpliceImageTag,progress++,
splice_image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
splice_view=DestroyCacheView(splice_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
splice_image=DestroyImage(splice_image);
return(splice_image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 15,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
struct sidtab *sidtabp,
char *scontext,
u32 scontext_len,
struct context *ctx,
u32 def_sid)
{
struct role_datum *role;
struct type_datum *typdatum;
struct user_datum *usrdatum;
char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
int rc = 0;
context_init(ctx);
/* Parse the security context. */
rc = -EINVAL;
scontextp = (char *) scontext;
/* Extract the user. */
p = scontextp;
while (*p && *p != ':')
p++;
if (*p == 0)
goto out;
*p++ = 0;
usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
if (!usrdatum)
goto out;
ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
/* Extract role. */
scontextp = p;
while (*p && *p != ':')
p++;
if (*p == 0)
goto out;
*p++ = 0;
role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
if (!role)
goto out;
ctx->role = role->value;
/* Extract type. */
scontextp = p;
while (*p && *p != ':')
p++;
oldc = *p;
*p++ = 0;
typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
goto out;
ctx->type = typdatum->value;
rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
goto out;
/* Check the validity of the new context. */
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
goto out;
rc = 0;
out:
if (rc)
context_destroy(ctx);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int FLTCheckFeatureIdFilters(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode,
mapObj *map, int i)
{
int status = MS_SUCCESS;
if (psFilterNode->eType == FILTER_NODE_TYPE_FEATUREID)
{
char** tokens;
int nTokens = 0;
layerObj* lp;
int j;
lp = GET_LAYER(map, i);
tokens = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->pszValue,',', &nTokens);
for (j=0; j<nTokens; j++) {
const char* pszId = tokens[j];
const char* pszDot = strchr(pszId, '.');
if( pszDot )
{
if( pszDot - pszId != strlen(lp->name) ||
strncasecmp(pszId, lp->name, strlen(lp->name)) != 0 )
{
msSetError(MS_MISCERR, "Feature id %s not consistent with feature type name %s.",
"FLTPreParseFilterForAlias()", pszId, lp->name);
status = MS_FAILURE;
break;
}
}
}
msFreeCharArray(tokens, nTokens);
}
if (psFilterNode->psLeftNode)
{
status = FLTCheckFeatureIdFilters(psFilterNode->psLeftNode, map, i);
if( status == MS_SUCCESS )
{
if (psFilterNode->psRightNode)
status = FLTCheckFeatureIdFilters(psFilterNode->psRightNode, map, i);
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL GetOriginalRequestURL(WebDataSource* ds) {
if (ds->hasUnreachableURL())
return ds->unreachableURL();
std::vector<GURL> redirects;
GetRedirectChain(ds, &redirects);
if (!redirects.empty())
return redirects.at(0);
return ds->originalRequest().url();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline const char *qeth_get_cardname(struct qeth_card *card)
{
if (card->info.guestlan) {
switch (card->info.type) {
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD:
return " Virtual NIC QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD:
return " Virtual NIC Hiper";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSM:
return " Virtual NIC QDIO - OSM";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX:
return " Virtual NIC QDIO - OSX";
default:
return " unknown";
}
} else {
switch (card->info.type) {
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD:
return " OSD Express";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD:
return " HiperSockets";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSN:
return " OSN QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSM:
return " OSM QDIO";
case QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX:
return " OSX QDIO";
default:
return " unknown";
}
}
return " n/a";
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdClearErrorMethod(void)
{
gd_error_method = gd_stderr_error;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_trace_event_init(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event,
struct perf_event *p_event)
{
int ret;
ret = perf_trace_event_perm(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = perf_trace_event_reg(tp_event, p_event);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = perf_trace_event_open(p_event);
if (ret) {
perf_trace_event_unreg(p_event);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __archive_read_free_filters(struct archive_read *a)
{
while (a->filter != NULL) {
struct archive_read_filter *t = a->filter->upstream;
free(a->filter);
a->filter = t;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit VisibleEntryWaiter(WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct mapped_device *alloc_dev(int minor)
{
int r, numa_node_id = dm_get_numa_node();
struct dax_device *dax_dev;
struct mapped_device *md;
void *old_md;
md = kvzalloc_node(sizeof(*md), GFP_KERNEL, numa_node_id);
if (!md) {
DMWARN("unable to allocate device, out of memory.");
return NULL;
}
if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
goto bad_module_get;
/* get a minor number for the dev */
if (minor == DM_ANY_MINOR)
r = next_free_minor(&minor);
else
r = specific_minor(minor);
if (r < 0)
goto bad_minor;
r = init_srcu_struct(&md->io_barrier);
if (r < 0)
goto bad_io_barrier;
md->numa_node_id = numa_node_id;
md->use_blk_mq = dm_use_blk_mq_default();
md->init_tio_pdu = false;
md->type = DM_TYPE_NONE;
mutex_init(&md->suspend_lock);
mutex_init(&md->type_lock);
mutex_init(&md->table_devices_lock);
spin_lock_init(&md->deferred_lock);
atomic_set(&md->holders, 1);
atomic_set(&md->open_count, 0);
atomic_set(&md->event_nr, 0);
atomic_set(&md->uevent_seq, 0);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&md->uevent_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&md->table_devices);
spin_lock_init(&md->uevent_lock);
md->queue = blk_alloc_queue_node(GFP_KERNEL, numa_node_id);
if (!md->queue)
goto bad;
dm_init_md_queue(md);
md->disk = alloc_disk_node(1, numa_node_id);
if (!md->disk)
goto bad;
atomic_set(&md->pending[0], 0);
atomic_set(&md->pending[1], 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&md->wait);
INIT_WORK(&md->work, dm_wq_work);
init_waitqueue_head(&md->eventq);
init_completion(&md->kobj_holder.completion);
md->kworker_task = NULL;
md->disk->major = _major;
md->disk->first_minor = minor;
md->disk->fops = &dm_blk_dops;
md->disk->queue = md->queue;
md->disk->private_data = md;
sprintf(md->disk->disk_name, "dm-%d", minor);
dax_dev = alloc_dax(md, md->disk->disk_name, &dm_dax_ops);
if (!dax_dev)
goto bad;
md->dax_dev = dax_dev;
add_disk(md->disk);
format_dev_t(md->name, MKDEV(_major, minor));
md->wq = alloc_workqueue("kdmflush", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0);
if (!md->wq)
goto bad;
md->bdev = bdget_disk(md->disk, 0);
if (!md->bdev)
goto bad;
bio_init(&md->flush_bio, NULL, 0);
bio_set_dev(&md->flush_bio, md->bdev);
md->flush_bio.bi_opf = REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC;
dm_stats_init(&md->stats);
/* Populate the mapping, nobody knows we exist yet */
spin_lock(&_minor_lock);
old_md = idr_replace(&_minor_idr, md, minor);
spin_unlock(&_minor_lock);
BUG_ON(old_md != MINOR_ALLOCED);
return md;
bad:
cleanup_mapped_device(md);
bad_io_barrier:
free_minor(minor);
bad_minor:
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
bad_module_get:
kvfree(md);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 16,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API zend_object_handle zend_objects_store_put(void *object, zend_objects_store_dtor_t dtor, zend_objects_free_object_storage_t free_storage, zend_objects_store_clone_t clone TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_handle handle;
struct _store_object *obj;
if (EG(objects_store).free_list_head != -1) {
handle = EG(objects_store).free_list_head;
EG(objects_store).free_list_head = EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.free_list.next;
} else {
if (EG(objects_store).top == EG(objects_store).size) {
EG(objects_store).size <<= 1;
EG(objects_store).object_buckets = (zend_object_store_bucket *) erealloc(EG(objects_store).object_buckets, EG(objects_store).size * sizeof(zend_object_store_bucket));
}
handle = EG(objects_store).top++;
}
obj = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj;
EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].destructor_called = 0;
EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].valid = 1;
EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].apply_count = 0;
obj->refcount = 1;
GC_OBJ_INIT(obj);
obj->object = object;
obj->dtor = dtor?dtor:(zend_objects_store_dtor_t)zend_objects_destroy_object;
obj->free_storage = free_storage;
obj->clone = clone;
obj->handlers = NULL;
#if ZEND_DEBUG_OBJECTS
fprintf(stderr, "Allocated object id #%d\n", handle);
#endif
return handle;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: enum act_return http_action_req_capture(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags)
{
struct sample *key;
struct cap_hdr *h = rule->arg.cap.hdr;
char **cap = s->req_cap;
int len;
key = sample_fetch_as_type(s->be, sess, s, SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ|SMP_OPT_FINAL, rule->arg.cap.expr, SMP_T_STR);
if (!key)
return ACT_RET_CONT;
if (cap[h->index] == NULL)
cap[h->index] = pool_alloc(h->pool);
if (cap[h->index] == NULL) /* no more capture memory */
return ACT_RET_CONT;
len = key->data.u.str.len;
if (len > h->len)
len = h->len;
memcpy(cap[h->index], key->data.u.str.str, len);
cap[h->index][len] = 0;
return ACT_RET_CONT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 16,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_ConnectionlessPacket( netadr_t from, msg_t *msg ) {
char *s;
char *c;
int challenge = 0;
MSG_BeginReadingOOB( msg );
MSG_ReadLong( msg ); // skip the -1
s = MSG_ReadStringLine( msg );
Cmd_TokenizeString( s );
c = Cmd_Argv(0);
Com_DPrintf ("CL packet %s: %s\n", NET_AdrToStringwPort(from), c);
if (!Q_stricmp(c, "challengeResponse"))
{
char *strver;
int ver;
if (clc.state != CA_CONNECTING)
{
Com_DPrintf("Unwanted challenge response received. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
c = Cmd_Argv(2);
if(*c)
challenge = atoi(c);
strver = Cmd_Argv(3);
if(*strver)
{
ver = atoi(strver);
if(ver != com_protocol->integer)
{
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(com_legacyprotocol->integer > 0)
{
clc.compat = qtrue;
Com_Printf(S_COLOR_YELLOW "Warning: Server reports protocol version %d, "
"we have %d. Trying legacy protocol %d.\n",
ver, com_protocol->integer, com_legacyprotocol->integer);
}
else
#endif
{
Com_Printf(S_COLOR_YELLOW "Warning: Server reports protocol version %d, we have %d. "
"Trying anyways.\n", ver, com_protocol->integer);
}
}
}
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
else
clc.compat = qtrue;
if(clc.compat)
{
if(!NET_CompareAdr(from, clc.serverAddress))
{
if(!*c || challenge != clc.challenge)
{
Com_DPrintf("Challenge response received from unexpected source. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
if(!*c || challenge != clc.challenge)
{
Com_Printf("Bad challenge for challengeResponse. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
}
clc.challenge = atoi(Cmd_Argv(1));
clc.state = CA_CHALLENGING;
clc.connectPacketCount = 0;
clc.connectTime = -99999;
clc.serverAddress = from;
Com_DPrintf ("challengeResponse: %d\n", clc.challenge);
return;
}
if ( !Q_stricmp(c, "connectResponse") ) {
if ( clc.state >= CA_CONNECTED ) {
Com_Printf ("Dup connect received. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
if ( clc.state != CA_CHALLENGING ) {
Com_Printf ("connectResponse packet while not connecting. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
if ( !NET_CompareAdr( from, clc.serverAddress ) ) {
Com_Printf( "connectResponse from wrong address. Ignored.\n" );
return;
}
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(!clc.compat)
#endif
{
c = Cmd_Argv(1);
if(*c)
challenge = atoi(c);
else
{
Com_Printf("Bad connectResponse received. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
if(challenge != clc.challenge)
{
Com_Printf("ConnectResponse with bad challenge received. Ignored.\n");
return;
}
}
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
Netchan_Setup(NS_CLIENT, &clc.netchan, from, Cvar_VariableValue("net_qport"),
clc.challenge, clc.compat);
#else
Netchan_Setup(NS_CLIENT, &clc.netchan, from, Cvar_VariableValue("net_qport"),
clc.challenge, qfalse);
#endif
clc.state = CA_CONNECTED;
clc.lastPacketSentTime = -9999; // send first packet immediately
return;
}
if ( !Q_stricmp(c, "infoResponse") ) {
CL_ServerInfoPacket( from, msg );
return;
}
if ( !Q_stricmp(c, "statusResponse") ) {
CL_ServerStatusResponse( from, msg );
return;
}
if ( !Q_stricmp(c, "echo") ) {
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, from, "%s", Cmd_Argv(1) );
return;
}
if ( !Q_stricmp(c, "keyAuthorize") ) {
return;
}
if ( !Q_stricmp(c, "motd") ) {
CL_MotdPacket( from );
return;
}
if(!Q_stricmp(c, "print")){
s = MSG_ReadString( msg );
Q_strncpyz( clc.serverMessage, s, sizeof( clc.serverMessage ) );
Com_Printf( "%s", s );
return;
}
if ( !Q_strncmp(c, "getserversResponse", 18) ) {
CL_ServersResponsePacket( &from, msg, qfalse );
return;
}
if ( !Q_strncmp(c, "getserversExtResponse", 21) ) {
CL_ServersResponsePacket( &from, msg, qtrue );
return;
}
Com_DPrintf ("Unknown connectionless packet command.\n");
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 23,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPrintedPagesCount(
int cookie, int number_pages) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->SetPrintedPagesCount(cookie, number_pages);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 19,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, const char** argv)
{
U32 seed = 0;
int seedset = 0;
int argNb;
int nbTests = nbTestsDefault;
int testNb = 0;
U32 proba = FUZ_compressibility_default;
int result = 0;
U32 mainPause = 0;
U32 maxDuration = 0;
int bigTests = 1;
U32 memTestsOnly = 0;
const char* const programName = argv[0];
/* Check command line */
for (argNb=1; argNb<argc; argNb++) {
const char* argument = argv[argNb];
if(!argument) continue; /* Protection if argument empty */
/* Handle commands. Aggregated commands are allowed */
if (argument[0]=='-') {
if (longCommandWArg(&argument, "--memtest=")) { memTestsOnly = readU32FromChar(&argument); continue; }
if (!strcmp(argument, "--memtest")) { memTestsOnly=1; continue; }
if (!strcmp(argument, "--no-big-tests")) { bigTests=0; continue; }
argument++;
while (*argument!=0) {
switch(*argument)
{
case 'h':
return FUZ_usage(programName);
case 'v':
argument++;
g_displayLevel++;
break;
case 'q':
argument++;
g_displayLevel--;
break;
case 'p': /* pause at the end */
argument++;
mainPause = 1;
break;
case 'i':
argument++; maxDuration = 0;
nbTests = readU32FromChar(&argument);
break;
case 'T':
argument++;
nbTests = 0;
maxDuration = readU32FromChar(&argument);
if (*argument=='s') argument++; /* seconds */
if (*argument=='m') maxDuration *= 60, argument++; /* minutes */
if (*argument=='n') argument++;
break;
case 's':
argument++;
seedset = 1;
seed = readU32FromChar(&argument);
break;
case 't':
argument++;
testNb = readU32FromChar(&argument);
break;
case 'P': /* compressibility % */
argument++;
proba = readU32FromChar(&argument);
if (proba>100) proba = 100;
break;
default:
return (FUZ_usage(programName), 1);
} } } } /* for (argNb=1; argNb<argc; argNb++) */
/* Get Seed */
DISPLAY("Starting zstd tester (%i-bits, %s)\n", (int)(sizeof(size_t)*8), ZSTD_VERSION_STRING);
if (!seedset) {
time_t const t = time(NULL);
U32 const h = XXH32(&t, sizeof(t), 1);
seed = h % 10000;
}
DISPLAY("Seed = %u\n", seed);
if (proba!=FUZ_compressibility_default) DISPLAY("Compressibility : %u%%\n", proba);
if (memTestsOnly) {
g_displayLevel = MAX(3, g_displayLevel);
return FUZ_mallocTests(seed, ((double)proba) / 100, memTestsOnly);
}
if (nbTests < testNb) nbTests = testNb;
if (testNb==0)
result = basicUnitTests(0, ((double)proba) / 100); /* constant seed for predictability */
if (!result)
result = fuzzerTests(seed, nbTests, testNb, maxDuration, ((double)proba) / 100, bigTests);
if (mainPause) {
int unused;
DISPLAY("Press Enter \n");
unused = getchar();
(void)unused;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 15,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *skcipher_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
return crypto_alloc_ablkcipher(name, type, mask);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::CancelAllMasterEntryFetches(
const AppCacheErrorDetails& error_details) {
for (PendingUrlFetches::iterator it = master_entry_fetches_.begin();
it != master_entry_fetches_.end(); ++it) {
delete it->second;
master_entries_to_fetch_.insert(it->first); // back in unfetched list
}
master_entry_fetches_.clear();
master_entries_completed_ += master_entries_to_fetch_.size();
HostNotifier host_notifier;
while (!master_entries_to_fetch_.empty()) {
const GURL& url = *master_entries_to_fetch_.begin();
PendingMasters::iterator found = pending_master_entries_.find(url);
DCHECK(found != pending_master_entries_.end());
PendingHosts& hosts = found->second;
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
AppCacheHost* host = *host_it;
host->AssociateNoCache(GURL());
host_notifier.AddHost(host);
host->RemoveObserver(this);
}
hosts.clear();
master_entries_to_fetch_.erase(master_entries_to_fetch_.begin());
}
host_notifier.SendErrorNotifications(error_details);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,273
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForHostedAppAvailability() {
bool has_toolbar =
browser_->is_type_tabbed() ||
extensions::HostedAppBrowserController::IsForExperimentalHostedAppBrowser(
browser_);
if (window() && window()->ShouldHideUIForFullscreen())
has_toolbar = false;
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR, has_toolbar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE, has_toolbar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE, has_toolbar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU, has_toolbar);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_associnfo(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_assocparams assocparams;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos;
int cnt = 0;
if (len < sizeof (struct sctp_assocparams))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_assocparams);
if (copy_from_user(&assocparams, optval, len))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, assocparams.sasoc_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && assocparams.sasoc_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Values correspoinding to the specific association */
if (asoc) {
assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt = asoc->max_retrans;
assocparams.sasoc_peer_rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
assocparams.sasoc_local_rwnd = asoc->a_rwnd;
assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life = (asoc->cookie_life.tv_sec
* 1000) +
(asoc->cookie_life.tv_usec
/ 1000);
list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
cnt ++;
}
assocparams.sasoc_number_peer_destinations = cnt;
} else {
/* Values corresponding to the endpoint */
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt = sp->assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt;
assocparams.sasoc_peer_rwnd = sp->assocparams.sasoc_peer_rwnd;
assocparams.sasoc_local_rwnd = sp->assocparams.sasoc_local_rwnd;
assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life =
sp->assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life;
assocparams.sasoc_number_peer_destinations =
sp->assocparams.
sasoc_number_peer_destinations;
}
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &assocparams, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool others_have_blocked(struct rq *rq)
{
if (READ_ONCE(rq->avg_rt.util_avg))
return true;
if (READ_ONCE(rq->avg_dl.util_avg))
return true;
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SCHED_AVG_IRQ
if (READ_ONCE(rq->avg_irq.util_avg))
return true;
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 14,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t smb2cli_conn_max_read_size(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb2.server.max_read_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long tty_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(file);
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
int retval = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, inode, "tty_ioctl"))
return -EINVAL;
if (tty->ops->compat_ioctl) {
retval = (tty->ops->compat_ioctl)(tty, cmd, arg);
if (retval != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
return retval;
}
ld = tty_ldisc_ref_wait(tty);
if (ld->ops->compat_ioctl)
retval = ld->ops->compat_ioctl(tty, file, cmd, arg);
else
retval = n_tty_compat_ioctl_helper(tty, file, cmd, arg);
tty_ldisc_deref(ld);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MockInputMethod::OnTextInputTypeChanged(
const ui::TextInputClient* client) {
if (IsTextInputClientFocused(client))
text_input_type_changed_ = true;
InputMethodBase::OnTextInputTypeChanged(client);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::needsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() const
{
if (!isActive() || !view())
return false;
if (!m_useElementsNeedingUpdate.isEmpty())
return true;
if (!m_layerUpdateSVGFilterElements.isEmpty())
return true;
if (needsStyleRecalc())
return true;
if (needsStyleInvalidation())
return true;
if (childNeedsDistributionRecalc())
return true;
if (DocumentAnimations::needsOutdatedAnimationUpdate(*this))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 7,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HandleLoadTerminationCancel(
Offliner::CompletionCallback completion_callback,
const SavePageRequest& canceled_request) {
std::move(completion_callback)
.Run(canceled_request, Offliner::RequestStatus::FOREGROUND_CANCELED);
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,316
|
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