instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool jsvIsInternalFunctionKey(JsVar *v) {
return (jsvIsString(v) && (
v->varData.str[0]==JS_HIDDEN_CHAR)
) ||
jsvIsFunctionParameter(v);
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned lodepng_inflatev(ucvector* out,
const unsigned char* in, size_t insize,
const LodePNGDecompressSettings* settings)
{
/*bit pointer in the "in" data, current byte is bp >> 3, current bit is bp & 0x7 (from lsb to msb of the byte)*/
size_t bp = 0;
unsigned BFINAL = 0;
size_t pos = 0; /*byte position in the out buffer*/
unsigned error = 0;
(void)settings;
while(!BFINAL)
{
unsigned BTYPE;
if(bp + 2 >= insize * 8) return 52; /*error, bit pointer will jump past memory*/
BFINAL = readBitFromStream(&bp, in);
BTYPE = 1u * readBitFromStream(&bp, in);
BTYPE += 2u * readBitFromStream(&bp, in);
if(BTYPE == 3) return 20; /*error: invalid BTYPE*/
else if(BTYPE == 0) error = inflateNoCompression(out, in, &bp, &pos, insize); /*no compression*/
else error = inflateHuffmanBlock(out, in, &bp, &pos, insize, BTYPE); /*compression, BTYPE 01 or 10*/
if(error) return error;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 1,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm)
{
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void WriteFourCC(Image *image, const size_t compression,
const MagickBooleanType clusterFit, const MagickBooleanType weightByAlpha,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
i,
y,
bx,
by;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=4)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=4)
{
MagickBooleanType
match;
DDSVector4
point,
points[16];
size_t
count = 0,
max5 = 0,
max7 = 0,
min5 = 255,
min7 = 255,
columns = 4,
rows = 4;
ssize_t
alphas[16],
map[16];
unsigned char
alpha;
if (x + columns >= image->columns)
columns = image->columns - x;
if (y + rows >= image->rows)
rows = image->rows - y;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,x,y,columns,rows,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (i=0; i<16; i++)
{
map[i] = -1;
alphas[i] = -1;
}
for (by=0; by < (ssize_t) rows; by++)
{
for (bx=0; bx < (ssize_t) columns; bx++)
{
if (compression == FOURCC_DXT5)
alpha = ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(p));
else
alpha = 255;
if (compression == FOURCC_DXT5)
{
if (alpha < min7)
min7 = alpha;
if (alpha > max7)
max7 = alpha;
if (alpha != 0 && alpha < min5)
min5 = alpha;
if (alpha != 255 && alpha > max5)
max5 = alpha;
}
alphas[4*by + bx] = (size_t)alpha;
point.x = (float)ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)) / 255.0f;
point.y = (float)ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)) / 255.0f;
point.z = (float)ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)) / 255.0f;
point.w = weightByAlpha ? (float)(alpha + 1) / 256.0f : 1.0f;
p++;
match = MagickFalse;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
if ((points[i].x == point.x) &&
(points[i].y == point.y) &&
(points[i].z == point.z) &&
(alpha >= 128 || compression == FOURCC_DXT5))
{
points[i].w += point.w;
map[4*by + bx] = i;
match = MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
if (match != MagickFalse)
continue;
points[count].x = point.x;
points[count].y = point.y;
points[count].z = point.z;
points[count].w = point.w;
map[4*by + bx] = count;
count++;
}
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
points[i].w = sqrt(points[i].w);
if (compression == FOURCC_DXT5)
WriteAlphas(image,alphas,min5,max5,min7,max7);
if (count == 1)
WriteSingleColorFit(image,points,map);
else
WriteCompressed(image,count,points,map,clusterFit);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXObject* AXObject::parentObjectIfExists() const {
if (isDetached())
return 0;
if (m_parent)
return m_parent;
return computeParentIfExists();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 12,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum try_read_result try_read_network(conn *c) {
enum try_read_result gotdata = READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
int res;
int num_allocs = 0;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->rcurr != c->rbuf) {
if (c->rbytes != 0) /* otherwise there's nothing to copy */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
}
while (1) {
if (c->rbytes >= c->rsize) {
if (num_allocs == 4) {
return gotdata;
}
++num_allocs;
char *new_rbuf = realloc(c->rbuf, c->rsize * 2);
if (!new_rbuf) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't realloc input buffer\n");
c->rbytes = 0; /* ignore what we read */
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory reading request");
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
return READ_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
c->rcurr = c->rbuf = new_rbuf;
c->rsize *= 2;
}
int avail = c->rsize - c->rbytes;
res = read(c->sfd, c->rbuf + c->rbytes, avail);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
gotdata = READ_DATA_RECEIVED;
c->rbytes += res;
if (res == avail) {
continue;
} else {
break;
}
}
if (res == 0) {
return READ_ERROR;
}
if (res == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
break;
}
return READ_ERROR;
}
}
return gotdata;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync(void)
{
synchronize_sched();
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_os_predefined_override(const struct acpi_predefined_names *init_val,
char **new_val)
{
if (!init_val || !new_val)
return AE_BAD_PARAMETER;
*new_val = NULL;
if (!memcmp(init_val->name, "_OS_", 4) && strlen(acpi_os_name)) {
printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "Overriding _OS definition to '%s'\n",
acpi_os_name);
*new_val = acpi_os_name;
}
if (!memcmp(init_val->name, "_REV", 4) && acpi_rev_override) {
printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "Overriding _REV return value to 5\n");
*new_val = (char *)5;
}
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 13,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HistogramEnumerateOsArch(const std::string& sandbox_isa) {
enum NaClOSArch {
kNaClLinux32 = 0,
kNaClLinux64,
kNaClLinuxArm,
kNaClMac32,
kNaClMac64,
kNaClMacArm,
kNaClWin32,
kNaClWin64,
kNaClWinArm,
kNaClOSArchMax
};
NaClOSArch os_arch = kNaClOSArchMax;
#if NACL_LINUX
os_arch = kNaClLinux32;
#elif NACL_OSX
os_arch = kNaClMac32;
#elif NACL_WINDOWS
os_arch = kNaClWin32;
#endif
if (sandbox_isa == "x86-64")
os_arch = static_cast<NaClOSArch>(os_arch + 1);
if (sandbox_isa == "arm")
os_arch = static_cast<NaClOSArch>(os_arch + 2);
HistogramEnumerate("NaCl.Client.OSArch", os_arch, kNaClOSArchMax, -1);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SendMouseMoveJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
int browser_index,
int tab_index,
int x,
int y,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "WebkitMouseMove");
dict.SetInteger("windex", browser_index);
dict.SetInteger("tab_index", tab_index);
dict.SetInteger("x", x);
dict.SetInteger("y", y);
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn_fast(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr *fwdtsn_hdr;
struct sctp_fwdtsn_skip *skip;
__u16 len;
__u32 tsn;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* Make sure that the FORWARD_TSN chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_fwdtsn_chunk)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
fwdtsn_hdr = (struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr *)chunk->skb->data;
chunk->subh.fwdtsn_hdr = fwdtsn_hdr;
len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
len -= sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
skb_pull(chunk->skb, len);
tsn = ntohl(fwdtsn_hdr->new_cum_tsn);
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: TSN 0x%x.\n", __func__, tsn);
/* The TSN is too high--silently discard the chunk and count on it
* getting retransmitted later.
*/
if (sctp_tsnmap_check(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, tsn) < 0)
goto gen_shutdown;
/* Silently discard the chunk if stream-id is not valid */
sctp_walk_fwdtsn(skip, chunk) {
if (ntohs(skip->stream) >= asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams)
goto gen_shutdown;
}
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_FWDTSN, SCTP_U32(tsn));
if (len > sizeof(struct sctp_fwdtsn_hdr))
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PROCESS_FWDTSN,
SCTP_CHUNK(chunk));
/* Go a head and force a SACK, since we are shutting down. */
gen_shutdown:
/* Implementor's Guide.
*
* While in SHUTDOWN-SENT state, the SHUTDOWN sender MUST immediately
* respond to each received packet containing one or more DATA chunk(s)
* with a SACK, a SHUTDOWN chunk, and restart the T2-shutdown timer
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SHUTDOWN, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, SCTP_FORCE());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T2_SHUTDOWN));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebExternalPopupMenu* RenderViewImpl::createExternalPopupMenu(
const WebPopupMenuInfo& popup_menu_info,
WebExternalPopupMenuClient* popup_menu_client) {
DCHECK(!external_popup_menu_.get());
external_popup_menu_.reset(
new ExternalPopupMenu(this, popup_menu_info, popup_menu_client));
return external_popup_menu_.get();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe) {
pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe->bufs) {
init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
return pipe;
}
kfree(pipe);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 10,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::CountUsage(WebFeature feature) const {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (DocumentLoader* loader = MasterDocumentLoader())
loader->GetUseCounter().Count(feature, GetFrame());
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::setMaxMarginAfterValues(LayoutUnit pos, LayoutUnit neg)
{
if (!m_rareData) {
if (pos == LayoutBlockFlowRareData::positiveMarginAfterDefault(this) && neg == LayoutBlockFlowRareData::negativeMarginAfterDefault(this))
return;
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new LayoutBlockFlowRareData(this));
}
m_rareData->m_margins.setPositiveMarginAfter(pos);
m_rareData->m_margins.setNegativeMarginAfter(neg);
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 20,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sched_avg_update(struct rq *rq)
{
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBox::sizesLogicalWidthToFitContent(const Length& logicalWidth) const
{
if (isFloating() || (isInlineBlockOrInlineTable() && !isMarquee()))
return true;
if (logicalWidth.type() == Intrinsic)
return true;
if (parent()->isMarquee()) {
EMarqueeDirection dir = parent()->style()->marqueeDirection();
if (dir == MAUTO || dir == MFORWARD || dir == MBACKWARD || dir == MLEFT || dir == MRIGHT)
return true;
}
if (parent()->isFlexibleBox()) {
if (!parent()->style()->isColumnFlexDirection() || parent()->style()->flexWrap() != FlexNoWrap)
return true;
if (!columnFlexItemHasStretchAlignment(this))
return true;
}
if (parent()->isDeprecatedFlexibleBox() && (parent()->style()->boxOrient() == HORIZONTAL || parent()->style()->boxAlign() != BSTRETCH))
return true;
if (logicalWidth.isAuto() && !isStretchingColumnFlexItem(this) && autoWidthShouldFitContent())
return true;
if (isHorizontalWritingMode() != containingBlock()->isHorizontalWritingMode())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XcursorFileLoadImage (FILE *file, int size)
{
XcursorFile f;
if (!file)
return NULL;
_XcursorStdioFileInitialize (file, &f);
return XcursorXcFileLoadImage (&f, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebp (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, -1);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 5,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reds_handle_auth_mechlen(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
AsyncRead *obj = &link->async_read;
RedsSASL *sasl = &link->stream->sasl;
if (sasl->len < 1 || sasl->len > 100) {
spice_warning("Got bad client mechname len %d", sasl->len);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
sasl->mechname = spice_malloc(sasl->len + 1);
spice_info("Wait for client mechname");
obj->now = (uint8_t *)sasl->mechname;
obj->end = obj->now + sasl->len;
obj->done = reds_handle_auth_mechname;
async_read_handler(0, 0, &link->async_read);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int VideoCaptureManager::Open(const MediaStreamDevice& device) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
const media::VideoCaptureSessionId capture_session_id =
new_capture_session_id_++;
DCHECK(sessions_.find(capture_session_id) == sessions_.end());
std::ostringstream string_stream;
string_stream << "VideoCaptureManager::Open, device.name = " << device.name
<< ", device.id = " << device.id
<< ", capture_session_id = " << capture_session_id;
EmitLogMessage(string_stream.str(), 1);
sessions_[capture_session_id] = device;
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&VideoCaptureManager::OnOpened, this,
device.type, capture_session_id));
return capture_session_id;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,298
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
__u16 sport;
__u16 dport;
__u32 vtag;
/* Get the source and destination port from the inbound packet. */
sport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->dest);
dport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source);
/* The V-tag is going to be the same as the inbound packet if no
* association exists, otherwise, use the peer's vtag.
*/
if (asoc) {
/* Special case the INIT-ACK as there is no peer's vtag
* yet.
*/
switch(chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK:
{
sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
break;
}
} else {
/* Special case the INIT and stale COOKIE_ECHO as there is no
* vtag yet.
*/
switch(chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT:
{
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(init->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
break;
}
}
/* Make a transport for the bucket, Eliza... */
transport = sctp_transport_new(net, sctp_source(chunk), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!transport)
goto nomem;
/* Cache a route for the transport with the chunk's destination as
* the source address.
*/
sctp_transport_route(transport, (union sctp_addr *)&chunk->dest,
sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock));
packet = sctp_packet_init(&transport->packet, transport, sport, dport);
packet = sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag, 0);
return packet;
nomem:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int git_delta_read_header_fromstream(
size_t *base_sz, size_t *res_sz, git_packfile_stream *stream)
{
static const size_t buffer_len = DELTA_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN;
unsigned char buffer[DELTA_HEADER_BUFFER_LEN];
const unsigned char *delta, *delta_end;
size_t len;
ssize_t read;
len = read = 0;
while (len < buffer_len) {
read = git_packfile_stream_read(stream, &buffer[len], buffer_len - len);
if (read == 0)
break;
if (read == GIT_EBUFS)
continue;
len += read;
}
delta = buffer;
delta_end = delta + len;
if ((hdr_sz(base_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0) ||
(hdr_sz(res_sz, &delta, delta_end) < 0))
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: delta: fix out-of-bounds read of delta
When computing the offset and length of the delta base, we repeatedly
increment the `delta` pointer without checking whether we have advanced
past its end already, which can thus result in an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by repeatedly checking whether we have reached the end. Add a
test which would cause Valgrind to produce an error.
Reported-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
Test-provided-by: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double AudioMixerAlsa::GetVolumeDb() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
return volume_db_;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_obj_remove_instance_variable(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_sym sym;
mrb_value val;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "n", &sym);
mrb_iv_check(mrb, sym);
val = mrb_iv_remove(mrb, self, sym);
if (mrb_undef_p(val)) {
mrb_name_error(mrb, sym, "instance variable %S not defined", mrb_sym2str(mrb, sym));
}
return val;
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 17,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ft_black_reset( black_PRaster raster,
char* pool_base,
long pool_size )
{
if ( raster )
{
if ( pool_base && pool_size >= (long)sizeof ( black_TWorker ) + 2048 )
{
black_PWorker worker = (black_PWorker)pool_base;
raster->buffer = pool_base + ( ( sizeof ( *worker ) + 7 ) & ~7 );
raster->buffer_size = (long)( pool_base + pool_size -
(char*)raster->buffer );
raster->worker = worker;
}
else
{
raster->buffer = NULL;
raster->buffer_size = 0;
raster->worker = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::EnableWildcardLoginCheck(
const std::string& username) {
DCHECK(access_token_.empty());
wildcard_username_ = username;
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long usp,
unsigned long arg, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct pt_regs *childregs, *kregs;
extern void ret_from_fork(void);
extern void ret_from_kernel_thread(void);
void (*f)(void);
unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE;
/* Copy registers */
sp -= sizeof(struct pt_regs);
childregs = (struct pt_regs *) sp;
if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
struct thread_info *ti = (void *)task_stack_page(p);
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
childregs->gpr[1] = sp + sizeof(struct pt_regs);
childregs->gpr[14] = usp; /* function */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_32BIT);
childregs->softe = 1;
#endif
childregs->gpr[15] = arg;
p->thread.regs = NULL; /* no user register state */
ti->flags |= _TIF_RESTOREALL;
f = ret_from_kernel_thread;
} else {
struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
CHECK_FULL_REGS(regs);
*childregs = *regs;
if (usp)
childregs->gpr[1] = usp;
p->thread.regs = childregs;
childregs->gpr[3] = 0; /* Result from fork() */
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (!is_32bit_task())
childregs->gpr[13] = childregs->gpr[6];
else
#endif
childregs->gpr[2] = childregs->gpr[6];
}
f = ret_from_fork;
}
sp -= STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
/*
* The way this works is that at some point in the future
* some task will call _switch to switch to the new task.
* That will pop off the stack frame created below and start
* the new task running at ret_from_fork. The new task will
* do some house keeping and then return from the fork or clone
* system call, using the stack frame created above.
*/
((unsigned long *)sp)[0] = 0;
sp -= sizeof(struct pt_regs);
kregs = (struct pt_regs *) sp;
sp -= STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
p->thread.ksp = sp;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
p->thread.ksp_limit = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) +
_ALIGN_UP(sizeof(struct thread_info), 16);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
p->thread.ptrace_bps[0] = NULL;
#endif
p->thread.fp_save_area = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
p->thread.vr_save_area = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_SLB)) {
unsigned long sp_vsid;
unsigned long llp = mmu_psize_defs[mmu_linear_psize].sllp;
if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_1T_SEGMENT))
sp_vsid = get_kernel_vsid(sp, MMU_SEGSIZE_1T)
<< SLB_VSID_SHIFT_1T;
else
sp_vsid = get_kernel_vsid(sp, MMU_SEGSIZE_256M)
<< SLB_VSID_SHIFT;
sp_vsid |= SLB_VSID_KERNEL | llp;
p->thread.ksp_vsid = sp_vsid;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_DSCR)) {
p->thread.dscr_inherit = current->thread.dscr_inherit;
p->thread.dscr = current->thread.dscr;
}
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR))
p->thread.ppr = INIT_PPR;
#endif
/*
* The PPC64 ABI makes use of a TOC to contain function
* pointers. The function (ret_from_except) is actually a pointer
* to the TOC entry. The first entry is a pointer to the actual
* function.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
kregs->nip = *((unsigned long *)f);
#else
kregs->nip = (unsigned long)f;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Track::GetNumber() const { return m_info.number; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tree_max_len(Node* node, ScanEnv* env)
{
OnigLen len;
OnigLen tmax;
len = 0;
switch (NODE_TYPE(node)) {
case NODE_LIST:
do {
tmax = tree_max_len(NODE_CAR(node), env);
len = distance_add(len, tmax);
} while (IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
break;
case NODE_ALT:
do {
tmax = tree_max_len(NODE_CAR(node), env);
if (len < tmax) len = tmax;
} while (IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
break;
case NODE_STRING:
{
StrNode* sn = STR_(node);
len = (OnigLen )(sn->end - sn->s);
}
break;
case NODE_CTYPE:
case NODE_CCLASS:
len = ONIGENC_MBC_MAXLEN_DIST(env->enc);
break;
case NODE_BACKREF:
if (! NODE_IS_CHECKER(node)) {
int i;
int* backs;
MemEnv* mem_env = SCANENV_MEMENV(env);
BackRefNode* br = BACKREF_(node);
if (NODE_IS_RECURSION(node)) {
len = INFINITE_LEN;
break;
}
backs = BACKREFS_P(br);
for (i = 0; i < br->back_num; i++) {
tmax = tree_max_len(mem_env[backs[i]].node, env);
if (len < tmax) len = tmax;
}
}
break;
#ifdef USE_CALL
case NODE_CALL:
if (! NODE_IS_RECURSION(node))
len = tree_max_len(NODE_BODY(node), env);
else
len = INFINITE_LEN;
break;
#endif
case NODE_QUANT:
{
QuantNode* qn = QUANT_(node);
if (qn->upper != 0) {
len = tree_max_len(NODE_BODY(node), env);
if (len != 0) {
if (! IS_REPEAT_INFINITE(qn->upper))
len = distance_multiply(len, qn->upper);
else
len = INFINITE_LEN;
}
}
}
break;
case NODE_BAG:
{
BagNode* en = BAG_(node);
switch (en->type) {
case BAG_MEMORY:
if (NODE_IS_MAX_FIXED(node))
len = en->max_len;
else {
if (NODE_IS_MARK1(node))
len = INFINITE_LEN;
else {
NODE_STATUS_ADD(node, MARK1);
len = tree_max_len(NODE_BODY(node), env);
NODE_STATUS_REMOVE(node, MARK1);
en->max_len = len;
NODE_STATUS_ADD(node, MAX_FIXED);
}
}
break;
case BAG_OPTION:
case BAG_STOP_BACKTRACK:
len = tree_max_len(NODE_BODY(node), env);
break;
case BAG_IF_ELSE:
{
OnigLen tlen, elen;
len = tree_max_len(NODE_BODY(node), env);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Then)) {
tlen = tree_max_len(en->te.Then, env);
len = distance_add(len, tlen);
}
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Else))
elen = tree_max_len(en->te.Else, env);
else elen = 0;
if (elen > len) len = elen;
}
break;
}
}
break;
case NODE_ANCHOR:
case NODE_GIMMICK:
default:
break;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 6,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::UpdateReloadStopState(bool is_loading, bool force) {
toolbar_->GetReloadButton()->ChangeMode(
is_loading ? ReloadButtonGtk::MODE_STOP : ReloadButtonGtk::MODE_RELOAD,
force);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cgroupstats_user_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int rc = 0;
struct sk_buff *rep_skb;
struct cgroupstats *stats;
struct nlattr *na;
size_t size;
u32 fd;
struct file *file;
int fput_needed;
na = info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD];
if (!na)
return -EINVAL;
fd = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CGROUPSTATS_CMD_ATTR_FD]);
file = fget_light(fd, &fput_needed);
if (!file)
return 0;
size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
rc = prepare_reply(info, CGROUPSTATS_CMD_NEW, &rep_skb,
size);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
na = nla_reserve(rep_skb, CGROUPSTATS_TYPE_CGROUP_STATS,
sizeof(struct cgroupstats));
stats = nla_data(na);
memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
rc = cgroupstats_build(stats, file->f_dentry);
if (rc < 0) {
nlmsg_free(rep_skb);
goto err;
}
rc = send_reply(rep_skb, info);
err:
fput_light(file, fput_needed);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 15,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "perWorldBindingsLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void usb_enable_endpoint(struct usb_device *dev, struct usb_host_endpoint *ep,
bool reset_ep)
{
int epnum = usb_endpoint_num(&ep->desc);
int is_out = usb_endpoint_dir_out(&ep->desc);
int is_control = usb_endpoint_xfer_control(&ep->desc);
if (reset_ep)
usb_hcd_reset_endpoint(dev, ep);
if (is_out || is_control)
dev->ep_out[epnum] = ep;
if (!is_out || is_control)
dev->ep_in[epnum] = ep;
ep->enabled = 1;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_data_6_2(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
sctp_arg_t force = SCTP_NOFORCE();
int error;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_data_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
error = sctp_eat_data(asoc, chunk, commands );
switch (error) {
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR:
break;
case SCTP_IERROR_HIGH_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_BAD_STREAM:
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_IN_DATA_CHUNK_DISCARDS);
goto discard_noforce;
case SCTP_IERROR_DUP_TSN:
case SCTP_IERROR_IGNORE_TSN:
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_IN_DATA_CHUNK_DISCARDS);
goto discard_force;
case SCTP_IERROR_NO_DATA:
goto consume;
case SCTP_IERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION:
return sctp_sf_abort_violation(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
(u8 *)chunk->subh.data_hdr, sizeof(sctp_datahdr_t));
default:
BUG();
}
if (chunk->chunk_hdr->flags & SCTP_DATA_SACK_IMM)
force = SCTP_FORCE();
if (asoc->autoclose) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE));
}
/* If this is the last chunk in a packet, we need to count it
* toward sack generation. Note that we need to SACK every
* OTHER packet containing data chunks, EVEN IF WE DISCARD
* THEM. We elect to NOT generate SACK's if the chunk fails
* the verification tag test.
*
* RFC 2960 6.2 Acknowledgement on Reception of DATA Chunks
*
* The SCTP endpoint MUST always acknowledge the reception of
* each valid DATA chunk.
*
* The guidelines on delayed acknowledgement algorithm
* specified in Section 4.2 of [RFC2581] SHOULD be followed.
* Specifically, an acknowledgement SHOULD be generated for at
* least every second packet (not every second DATA chunk)
* received, and SHOULD be generated within 200 ms of the
* arrival of any unacknowledged DATA chunk. In some
* situations it may be beneficial for an SCTP transmitter to
* be more conservative than the algorithms detailed in this
* document allow. However, an SCTP transmitter MUST NOT be
* more aggressive than the following algorithms allow.
*/
if (chunk->end_of_packet)
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, force);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
discard_force:
/* RFC 2960 6.2 Acknowledgement on Reception of DATA Chunks
*
* When a packet arrives with duplicate DATA chunk(s) and with
* no new DATA chunk(s), the endpoint MUST immediately send a
* SACK with no delay. If a packet arrives with duplicate
* DATA chunk(s) bundled with new DATA chunks, the endpoint
* MAY immediately send a SACK. Normally receipt of duplicate
* DATA chunks will occur when the original SACK chunk was lost
* and the peer's RTO has expired. The duplicate TSN number(s)
* SHOULD be reported in the SACK as duplicate.
*/
/* In our case, we split the MAY SACK advice up whether or not
* the last chunk is a duplicate.'
*/
if (chunk->end_of_packet)
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, SCTP_FORCE());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
discard_noforce:
if (chunk->end_of_packet)
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, force);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
consume:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePTIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*images,
*next,
*pyramid_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
resolution;
size_t
columns,
rows;
/*
Create pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
(void) SetImageProperty(clone_image,"tiff:subfiletype","none",exception);
AppendImageToList(&images,clone_image);
columns=next->columns;
rows=next->rows;
resolution=next->resolution;
while ((columns > 64) && (rows > 64))
{
columns/=2;
rows/=2;
resolution.x/=2;
resolution.y/=2;
pyramid_image=ResizeImage(next,columns,rows,image->filter,exception);
if (pyramid_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
DestroyBlob(pyramid_image);
pyramid_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(next->blob);
pyramid_image->resolution=resolution;
(void) SetImageProperty(pyramid_image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
AppendImageToList(&images,pyramid_image);
}
}
status=MagickFalse;
if (images != (Image *) NULL)
{
/*
Write pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
images=GetFirstImageInList(images);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
write_info->adjoin=MagickTrue;
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->magick,"TIFF",MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(images->magick,"TIFF",MagickPathExtent);
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,images,exception);
images=DestroyImageList(images);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl() {
if (host_) {
if (host_->WillGpuSwitchOccur(false, gpu_preference_)) {
host_->ForciblyCloseChannel();
ClearSharedContexts();
}
}
{
base::AutoLock lock(g_all_shared_contexts_lock.Get());
g_all_shared_contexts.Pointer()->erase(this);
}
delete context_;
}
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginDataRemoverImpl::PluginDataRemoverImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: mime_type_(kFlashPluginSwfMimeType),
browser_context_(browser_context) {
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int readContigStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf)
{
uint8* bufp = buf;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint32 strip, nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
uint32 stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
uint32 rows = 0;
uint32 rps = TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
tsize_t scanline_size = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
if (scanline_size == 0) {
TIFFError("", "TIFF scanline size is zero!");
return 0;
}
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) {
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, bufp, -1);
rows = bytes_read / scanline_size;
if ((strip < (nstrips - 1)) && (bytes_read != (int32)stripsize))
TIFFError("", "Strip %d: read %lu bytes, strip size %lu",
(int)strip + 1, (unsigned long) bytes_read,
(unsigned long)stripsize);
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore) {
TIFFError("", "Error reading strip %lu after %lu rows",
(unsigned long) strip, (unsigned long)rows);
return 0;
}
bufp += bytes_read;
}
return 1;
} /* end readContigStripsIntoBuffer */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: epass2003_hook_path(struct sc_path *path, int inc)
{
u8 fid_h = path->value[path->len - 2];
u8 fid_l = path->value[path->len - 1];
switch (fid_h) {
case 0x29:
case 0x30:
case 0x31:
case 0x32:
case 0x33:
case 0x34:
if (inc)
fid_l = fid_l * FID_STEP;
else
fid_l = fid_l / FID_STEP;
path->value[path->len - 1] = fid_l;
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadHRZImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Convert HRZ raster image to pixel packets.
*/
image->columns=256;
image->rows=240;
image->depth=8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,3*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) (3*image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if ((size_t) count != length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(4**p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 25,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QQmlComponent* QQuickWebViewExperimental::colorChooser() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->colorChooser;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sas_porte_bytes_dmaed(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct asd_sas_event *ev = to_asd_sas_event(work);
struct asd_sas_phy *phy = ev->phy;
sas_form_port(phy);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 9,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vm_stat_get_per_vm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
__simple_attr_check_format("%llu\n", 0ull);
return kvm_debugfs_open(inode, file, vm_stat_get_per_vm,
NULL, "%llu\n");
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smp_link_encrypted(const RawAddress& bda, uint8_t encr_enable) {
tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: encr_enable=%d", __func__, encr_enable);
if (smp_cb.pairing_bda == bda) {
/* encryption completed with STK, remember the key size now, could be
* overwritten when key exchange happens */
if (p_cb->loc_enc_size != 0 && encr_enable) {
/* update the link encryption key size if a SMP pairing just performed */
btm_ble_update_sec_key_size(bda, p_cb->loc_enc_size);
}
smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_ENCRYPTED_EVT, &encr_enable);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 17,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void color_apply_icc_profile(opj_image_t *image)
{
cmsHPROFILE in_prof, out_prof;
cmsHTRANSFORM transform;
cmsColorSpaceSignature in_space, out_space;
cmsUInt32Number intent, in_type, out_type;
int *r, *g, *b;
size_t nr_samples;
int prec, i, max, max_w, max_h, ok = 0;
OPJ_COLOR_SPACE new_space;
in_prof =
cmsOpenProfileFromMem(image->icc_profile_buf, image->icc_profile_len);
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
FILE *icm = fopen("debug.icm","wb");
fwrite( image->icc_profile_buf,1, image->icc_profile_len,icm);
fclose(icm);
#endif
if(in_prof == NULL) return;
in_space = cmsGetPCS(in_prof);
out_space = cmsGetColorSpace(in_prof);
intent = cmsGetHeaderRenderingIntent(in_prof);
max_w = (int)image->comps[0].w;
max_h = (int)image->comps[0].h;
prec = (int)image->comps[0].prec;
if(out_space == cmsSigRgbData) /* enumCS 16 */
{
if( prec <= 8 )
{
in_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
}
else
{
in_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
}
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
}
else
if(out_space == cmsSigGrayData) /* enumCS 17 */
{
in_type = TYPE_GRAY_8;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_8;
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
}
else
if(out_space == cmsSigYCbCrData) /* enumCS 18 */
{
in_type = TYPE_YCbCr_16;
out_type = TYPE_RGB_16;
out_prof = cmsCreate_sRGBProfile();
new_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
}
else
{
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d: color_apply_icc_profile\n\tICC Profile has unknown "
"output colorspace(%#x)(%c%c%c%c)\n\tICC Profile ignored.\n",
__FILE__,__LINE__,out_space,
(out_space>>24) & 0xff,(out_space>>16) & 0xff,
(out_space>>8) & 0xff, out_space & 0xff);
#endif
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
if(out_prof == NULL)
{
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d:color_apply_icc_profile\n\tchannels(%d) prec(%d) w(%d) h(%d)"
"\n\tprofile: in(%p) out(%p)\n",__FILE__,__LINE__,image->numcomps,prec,
max_w,max_h, (void*)in_prof,(void*)out_prof);
fprintf(stderr,"\trender_intent (%u)\n\t"
"color_space: in(%#x)(%c%c%c%c) out:(%#x)(%c%c%c%c)\n\t"
" type: in(%u) out:(%u)\n",
intent,
in_space,
(in_space>>24) & 0xff,(in_space>>16) & 0xff,
(in_space>>8) & 0xff, in_space & 0xff,
out_space,
(out_space>>24) & 0xff,(out_space>>16) & 0xff,
(out_space>>8) & 0xff, out_space & 0xff,
in_type,out_type
);
#else
(void)prec;
(void)in_space;
#endif /* DEBUG_PROFILE */
transform = cmsCreateTransform(in_prof, in_type,
out_prof, out_type, intent, 0);
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS2
/* Possible for: LCMS_VERSION >= 2000 :*/
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
if(transform == NULL)
{
#ifdef DEBUG_PROFILE
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d:color_apply_icc_profile\n\tcmsCreateTransform failed. "
"ICC Profile ignored.\n",__FILE__,__LINE__);
#endif
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS1
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
return;
}
if(image->numcomps > 2)/* RGB, RGBA */
{
if( prec <= 8 )
{
unsigned char *inbuf, *outbuf, *in, *out;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3 * sizeof(unsigned char));
in = inbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc(nr_samples);
if(inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL) goto fails0;
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*in++ = (unsigned char)*r++;
*in++ = (unsigned char)*g++;
*in++ = (unsigned char)*b++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*r++ = (int)*out++;
*g++ = (int)*out++;
*b++ = (int)*out++;
}
ok = 1;
fails0:
if(inbuf) free(inbuf);
if(outbuf) free(outbuf);
}
else /* prec > 8 */
{
unsigned short *inbuf, *outbuf, *in, *out;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3 * sizeof(unsigned short));
in = inbuf = (unsigned short*)malloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned short*)malloc(nr_samples);
if(inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL) goto fails1;
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*in++ = (unsigned short)*r++;
*in++ = (unsigned short)*g++;
*in++ = (unsigned short)*b++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*r++ = (int)*out++;
*g++ = (int)*out++;
*b++ = (int)*out++;
}
ok = 1;
fails1:
if(inbuf) free(inbuf);
if(outbuf) free(outbuf);
}
}
else /* image->numcomps <= 2 : GRAY, GRAYA */
{
if(prec <= 8)
{
unsigned char *in, *inbuf, *out, *outbuf;
opj_image_comp_t *new_comps;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3 * sizeof(unsigned char));
in = inbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc(nr_samples);
g = (int*)calloc((size_t)max, sizeof(int));
b = (int*)calloc((size_t)max, sizeof(int));
if(inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails2;
new_comps = (opj_image_comp_t*)
realloc(image->comps, (image->numcomps+2)*sizeof(opj_image_comp_t));
if(new_comps == NULL) goto fails2;
image->comps = new_comps;
if(image->numcomps == 2)
image->comps[3] = image->comps[1];
image->comps[1] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[2] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[1].data = g;
image->comps[2].data = b;
image->numcomps += 2;
r = image->comps[0].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*in++ = (unsigned char)*r++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*r++ = (int)*out++; *g++ = (int)*out++; *b++ = (int)*out++;
}
r = g = b = NULL;
ok = 1;
fails2:
if(inbuf) free(inbuf);
if(outbuf) free(outbuf);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}
else /* prec > 8 */
{
unsigned short *in, *inbuf, *out, *outbuf;
opj_image_comp_t *new_comps;
max = max_w * max_h;
nr_samples = (size_t)(max * 3 * sizeof(unsigned short));
in = inbuf = (unsigned short*)malloc(nr_samples);
out = outbuf = (unsigned short*)malloc(nr_samples);
g = (int*)calloc((size_t)max, sizeof(int));
b = (int*)calloc((size_t)max, sizeof(int));
if(inbuf == NULL || outbuf == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails3;
new_comps = (opj_image_comp_t*)
realloc(image->comps, (image->numcomps+2)*sizeof(opj_image_comp_t));
if(new_comps == NULL) goto fails3;
image->comps = new_comps;
if(image->numcomps == 2)
image->comps[3] = image->comps[1];
image->comps[1] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[2] = image->comps[0];
image->comps[1].data = g;
image->comps[2].data = b;
image->numcomps += 2;
r = image->comps[0].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*in++ = (unsigned short)*r++;
}
cmsDoTransform(transform, inbuf, outbuf, (cmsUInt32Number)max);
r = image->comps[0].data;
g = image->comps[1].data;
b = image->comps[2].data;
for(i = 0; i < max; ++i)
{
*r++ = (int)*out++; *g++ = (int)*out++; *b++ = (int)*out++;
}
r = g = b = NULL;
ok = 1;
fails3:
if(inbuf) free(inbuf);
if(outbuf) free(outbuf);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}
}/* if(image->numcomps > 2) */
cmsDeleteTransform(transform);
#ifdef OPJ_HAVE_LIBLCMS1
cmsCloseProfile(in_prof);
cmsCloseProfile(out_prof);
#endif
if(ok)
{
image->color_space = new_space;
}
}/* color_apply_icc_profile() */
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void gf_prompt_set_echo_off(Bool echo_off)
{
init_keyboard();
if (echo_off) t_orig.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
else t_orig.c_lflag |= ECHO;
close_keyboard(0);
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimplifiedBackwardsTextIterator::exitNode()
{
if (shouldEmitNewlineForNode(m_node, m_emitsOriginalText) || shouldEmitNewlineBeforeNode(m_node) || shouldEmitTabBeforeNode(m_node)) {
emitCharacter('\n', m_node, 0, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct rpc_cred *nfs4_get_setclientid_cred(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp;
struct rb_node *pos;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
cred = nfs4_get_machine_cred_locked(clp);
if (cred != NULL)
goto out;
pos = rb_first(&clp->cl_state_owners);
if (pos != NULL) {
sp = rb_entry(pos, struct nfs4_state_owner, so_client_node);
cred = get_rpccred(sp->so_cred);
}
out:
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
return cred;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void on_cli_rfc_connect(tBTA_JV_RFCOMM_OPEN *p_open, uint32_t id) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
if (p_open->status != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
goto out;
}
slot->rfc_port_handle = BTA_JvRfcommGetPortHdl(p_open->handle);
memcpy(slot->addr.address, p_open->rem_bda, 6);
if (send_app_connect_signal(slot->fd, &slot->addr, slot->scn, 0, -1))
slot->f.connected = true;
else
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to send connect completion signal to caller.", __func__);
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 2,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_name(VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
return rb_str_new2(EVP_CIPHER_name(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)));
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 12,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: param_boolean_int( const char *name, int default_value ) {
bool default_bool;
default_bool = default_value == 0 ? false : true;
return param_boolean(name, default_bool) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 9,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI void var_replace(php_unserialize_data_t *var_hashx, zval *ozval, zval **nzval)
{
long i;
var_entries *var_hash = (*var_hashx)->first;
#if VAR_ENTRIES_DBG
fprintf(stderr, "var_replace(%ld): %d\n", var_hash?var_hash->used_slots:-1L, Z_TYPE_PP(nzval));
#endif
while (var_hash) {
for (i = 0; i < var_hash->used_slots; i++) {
if (var_hash->data[i] == ozval) {
var_hash->data[i] = *nzval;
/* do not break here */
}
}
var_hash = var_hash->next;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_async_writev(struct cifs_writedata *wdata)
{
int i, rc = -EACCES;
WRITE_REQ *smb = NULL;
int wct;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(wdata->cfile->tlink);
struct inode *inode = wdata->cfile->dentry->d_inode;
struct kvec *iov = NULL;
if (tcon->ses->capabilities & CAP_LARGE_FILES) {
wct = 14;
} else {
wct = 12;
if (wdata->offset >> 32 > 0) {
/* can not handle big offset for old srv */
return -EIO;
}
}
rc = small_smb_init(SMB_COM_WRITE_ANDX, wct, tcon, (void **)&smb);
if (rc)
goto async_writev_out;
/* 1 iov per page + 1 for header */
iov = kzalloc((wdata->nr_pages + 1) * sizeof(*iov), GFP_NOFS);
if (iov == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto async_writev_out;
}
smb->hdr.Pid = cpu_to_le16((__u16)wdata->cfile->pid);
smb->hdr.PidHigh = cpu_to_le16((__u16)(wdata->cfile->pid >> 16));
smb->AndXCommand = 0xFF; /* none */
smb->Fid = wdata->cfile->netfid;
smb->OffsetLow = cpu_to_le32(wdata->offset & 0xFFFFFFFF);
if (wct == 14)
smb->OffsetHigh = cpu_to_le32(wdata->offset >> 32);
smb->Reserved = 0xFFFFFFFF;
smb->WriteMode = 0;
smb->Remaining = 0;
smb->DataOffset =
cpu_to_le16(offsetof(struct smb_com_write_req, Data) - 4);
/* 4 for RFC1001 length + 1 for BCC */
iov[0].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(smb->hdr.smb_buf_length) + 4 + 1;
iov[0].iov_base = smb;
/* marshal up the pages into iov array */
wdata->bytes = 0;
for (i = 0; i < wdata->nr_pages; i++) {
iov[i + 1].iov_len = min(inode->i_size -
page_offset(wdata->pages[i]),
(loff_t)PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
iov[i + 1].iov_base = kmap(wdata->pages[i]);
wdata->bytes += iov[i + 1].iov_len;
}
cFYI(1, "async write at %llu %u bytes", wdata->offset, wdata->bytes);
smb->DataLengthLow = cpu_to_le16(wdata->bytes & 0xFFFF);
smb->DataLengthHigh = cpu_to_le16(wdata->bytes >> 16);
if (wct == 14) {
inc_rfc1001_len(&smb->hdr, wdata->bytes + 1);
put_bcc(wdata->bytes + 1, &smb->hdr);
} else {
/* wct == 12 */
struct smb_com_writex_req *smbw =
(struct smb_com_writex_req *)smb;
inc_rfc1001_len(&smbw->hdr, wdata->bytes + 5);
put_bcc(wdata->bytes + 5, &smbw->hdr);
iov[0].iov_len += 4; /* pad bigger by four bytes */
}
kref_get(&wdata->refcount);
rc = cifs_call_async(tcon->ses->server, iov, wdata->nr_pages + 1,
cifs_writev_callback, wdata, false);
if (rc == 0)
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_writes);
else
kref_put(&wdata->refcount, cifs_writedata_release);
/* send is done, unmap pages */
for (i = 0; i < wdata->nr_pages; i++)
kunmap(wdata->pages[i]);
async_writev_out:
cifs_small_buf_release(smb);
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ukm::SourceId WebContentsImpl::GetUkmSourceIdForLastCommittedSource() const {
return last_committed_source_id_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 18,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SoftAVC::setParams(size_t stride) {
ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t s_ctl_ip;
ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t s_ctl_op;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
s_ctl_ip.u4_disp_wd = (UWORD32)stride;
s_ctl_ip.e_frm_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
s_ctl_ip.e_frm_out_mode = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
s_ctl_ip.e_vid_dec_mode = IVD_DECODE_FRAME;
s_ctl_ip.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_ctl_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVD_CMD_CTL_SETPARAMS;
s_ctl_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t);
s_ctl_op.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t);
ALOGV("Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters stride = %zu", stride);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_ctl_ip, (void *)&s_ctl_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in setting the run-time parameters: 0x%x",
s_ctl_op.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vtp_print (netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length)
{
int type, len, tlv_len, tlv_value, mgmtd_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const struct vtp_vlan_ *vtp_vlan;
if (length < VTP_HEADER_LEN)
goto trunc;
tptr = pptr;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_HEADER_LEN);
type = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VTPv%u, Message %s (0x%02x), length %u",
*tptr,
tok2str(vtp_message_type_values,"Unknown message type", type),
type,
length));
/* In non-verbose mode, just print version and message type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
/* verbose mode print all fields */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tDomain name: "));
mgmtd_len = *(tptr + 3);
if (mgmtd_len < 1 || mgmtd_len > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [invalid MgmtD Len %d]", mgmtd_len));
return;
}
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 4, mgmtd_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s: %u",
tok2str(vtp_header_values, "Unknown", type),
*(tptr+2)));
tptr += VTP_HEADER_LEN;
switch (type) {
case VTP_SUMMARY_ADV:
/*
* SUMMARY ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Followers | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Updater Identity IP address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Update Timestamp (12 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | MD5 digest (16 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Config Rev %x, Updater %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
tptr += 8;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Timestamp 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8)));
tptr += VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MD5 digest: %08x%08x%08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 12)));
tptr += VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
break;
case VTP_SUBSET_ADV:
/*
* SUBSET ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Seq number | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field 1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ................ |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Config Rev %x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
/*
* VLAN INFORMATION
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | V info len | Status | VLAN type | VLAN name len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ISL vlan id | MTU size |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 802.10 index (SAID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN name |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
tptr += 4;
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
len = *tptr;
if (len == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
vtp_vlan = (const struct vtp_vlan_*)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vtp_vlan);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVLAN info status %s, type %s, VLAN-id %u, MTU %u, SAID 0x%08x, Name ",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_status,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->status),
tok2str(vtp_vlan_type_values,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->type),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->vlanid),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vtp_vlan->index)));
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET, vtp_vlan->name_len, NULL);
/*
* Vlan names are aligned to 32-bit boundaries.
*/
len -= VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
tptr += VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
/* TLV information follows */
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Cisco specs says 2 bytes for type + 2 bytes for length, take only 1
* See: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/trsrb/frames.htm
*/
type = *tptr;
tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s (0x%04x) TLV",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_tlv_values, "Unknown", type),
type));
/*
* infinite loop check
*/
if (type == 0 || tlv_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlv_len * 2 +2);
tlv_value = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
switch (type) {
case VTP_VLAN_STE_HOP_COUNT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_PRUNING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_STP_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(vtp_stp_type_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BRIDGE_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "SRB" : "SRT",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BACKUP_CRF_MODE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Backup" : "Not backup",
tlv_value));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_RING_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_BRIDGE_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_PARENT_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_TRANS_BRIDGED_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_ARP_HOP_COUNT:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", 2 + tlv_len*2);
break;
}
len -= 2 + tlv_len*2;
tptr += 2 + tlv_len*2;
}
}
break;
case VTP_ADV_REQUEST:
/*
* ADVERTISEMENT REQUEST
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Reserved | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Start value |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tStart value: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case VTP_JOIN_MESSAGE:
/* FIXME - Could not find message format */
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vtp]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13020/VTP: Add some missing bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_power_down_phy(struct tg3 *tp, bool do_low_power)
{
u32 val;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES) {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704) {
u32 sg_dig_ctrl = tr32(SG_DIG_CTRL);
u32 serdes_cfg = tr32(MAC_SERDES_CFG);
sg_dig_ctrl |=
SG_DIG_USING_HW_AUTONEG | SG_DIG_SOFT_RESET;
tw32(SG_DIG_CTRL, sg_dig_ctrl);
tw32(MAC_SERDES_CFG, serdes_cfg | (1 << 15));
}
return;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tg3_bmcr_reset(tp);
val = tr32(GRC_MISC_CFG);
tw32_f(GRC_MISC_CFG, val | GRC_MISC_CFG_EPHY_IDDQ);
udelay(40);
return;
} else if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET) {
u32 phytest;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_TG3_FET_TEST, &phytest)) {
u32 phy;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, 0);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR,
BMCR_ANENABLE | BMCR_ANRESTART);
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_FET_TEST,
phytest | MII_TG3_FET_SHADOW_EN);
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_TG3_FET_SHDW_AUXMODE4, &phy)) {
phy |= MII_TG3_FET_SHDW_AUXMODE4_SBPD;
tg3_writephy(tp,
MII_TG3_FET_SHDW_AUXMODE4,
phy);
}
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_FET_TEST, phytest);
}
return;
} else if (do_low_power) {
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_EXT_CTRL,
MII_TG3_EXT_CTRL_FORCE_LED_OFF);
val = MII_TG3_AUXCTL_PCTL_100TX_LPWR |
MII_TG3_AUXCTL_PCTL_SPR_ISOLATE |
MII_TG3_AUXCTL_PCTL_VREG_11V;
tg3_phy_auxctl_write(tp, MII_TG3_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_PWRCTL, val);
}
/* The PHY should not be powered down on some chips because
* of bugs.
*/
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704 ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5780 &&
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)) ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 &&
!tp->pci_fn))
return;
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5784_AX ||
tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5761_AX) {
val = tr32(TG3_CPMU_LSPD_1000MB_CLK);
val &= ~CPMU_LSPD_1000MB_MACCLK_MASK;
val |= CPMU_LSPD_1000MB_MACCLK_12_5;
tw32_f(TG3_CPMU_LSPD_1000MB_CLK, val);
}
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_BMCR, BMCR_PDOWN);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btrfs_finish_ordered_io(struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered_extent)
{
struct inode *inode = ordered_extent->inode;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans = NULL;
struct extent_io_tree *io_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree;
struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL;
struct new_sa_defrag_extent *new = NULL;
int compress_type = 0;
int ret = 0;
u64 logical_len = ordered_extent->len;
bool nolock;
bool truncated = false;
nolock = btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
btrfs_free_io_failure_record(inode, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset +
ordered_extent->len - 1);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_TRUNCATED, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
truncated = true;
logical_len = ordered_extent->truncated_len;
/* Truncated the entire extent, don't bother adding */
if (!logical_len)
goto out;
}
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&ordered_extent->list)); /* Logic error */
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, 0, ordered_extent);
if (nolock)
trans = btrfs_join_transaction_nolock(root);
else
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
trans = NULL;
goto out;
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
ret = btrfs_update_inode_fallback(trans, root, inode);
if (ret) /* -ENOMEM or corruption */
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out;
}
lock_extent_bits(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset + ordered_extent->len - 1,
0, &cached_state);
ret = test_range_bit(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset + ordered_extent->len - 1,
EXTENT_DEFRAG, 1, cached_state);
if (ret) {
u64 last_snapshot = btrfs_root_last_snapshot(&root->root_item);
if (0 && last_snapshot >= BTRFS_I(inode)->generation)
/* the inode is shared */
new = record_old_file_extents(inode, ordered_extent);
clear_extent_bit(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset + ordered_extent->len - 1,
EXTENT_DEFRAG, 0, 0, &cached_state, GFP_NOFS);
}
if (nolock)
trans = btrfs_join_transaction_nolock(root);
else
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
trans = NULL;
goto out_unlock;
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_COMPRESSED, &ordered_extent->flags))
compress_type = ordered_extent->compress_type;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC, &ordered_extent->flags)) {
BUG_ON(compress_type);
ret = btrfs_mark_extent_written(trans, inode,
ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset +
logical_len);
} else {
BUG_ON(root == root->fs_info->tree_root);
ret = insert_reserved_file_extent(trans, inode,
ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->start,
ordered_extent->disk_len,
logical_len, logical_len,
compress_type, 0, 0,
BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG);
if (!ret)
btrfs_release_delalloc_bytes(root,
ordered_extent->start,
ordered_extent->disk_len);
}
unpin_extent_cache(&BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree,
ordered_extent->file_offset, ordered_extent->len,
trans->transid);
if (ret < 0) {
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_unlock;
}
add_pending_csums(trans, inode, ordered_extent->file_offset,
&ordered_extent->list);
btrfs_ordered_update_i_size(inode, 0, ordered_extent);
ret = btrfs_update_inode_fallback(trans, root, inode);
if (ret) { /* -ENOMEM or corruption */
btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, root, ret);
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = 0;
out_unlock:
unlock_extent_cached(io_tree, ordered_extent->file_offset,
ordered_extent->file_offset +
ordered_extent->len - 1, &cached_state, GFP_NOFS);
out:
if (root != root->fs_info->tree_root)
btrfs_delalloc_release_metadata(inode, ordered_extent->len);
if (trans)
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (ret || truncated) {
u64 start, end;
if (truncated)
start = ordered_extent->file_offset + logical_len;
else
start = ordered_extent->file_offset;
end = ordered_extent->file_offset + ordered_extent->len - 1;
clear_extent_uptodate(io_tree, start, end, NULL, GFP_NOFS);
/* Drop the cache for the part of the extent we didn't write. */
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, start, end, 0);
/*
* If the ordered extent had an IOERR or something else went
* wrong we need to return the space for this ordered extent
* back to the allocator. We only free the extent in the
* truncated case if we didn't write out the extent at all.
*/
if ((ret || !logical_len) &&
!test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW, &ordered_extent->flags) &&
!test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC, &ordered_extent->flags))
btrfs_free_reserved_extent(root, ordered_extent->start,
ordered_extent->disk_len, 1);
}
/*
* This needs to be done to make sure anybody waiting knows we are done
* updating everything for this ordered extent.
*/
btrfs_remove_ordered_extent(inode, ordered_extent);
/* for snapshot-aware defrag */
if (new) {
if (ret) {
free_sa_defrag_extent(new);
atomic_dec(&root->fs_info->defrag_running);
} else {
relink_file_extents(new);
}
}
/* once for us */
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered_extent);
/* once for the tree */
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered_extent);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 28,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_verify)
{
X509_STORE * store = NULL;
zval * cainfo = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *signers= NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *others = NULL;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
BIO * in = NULL, * datain = NULL, * dataout = NULL;
long flags = 0;
char * filename; int filename_len;
char * extracerts = NULL; int extracerts_len = 0;
char * signersfilename = NULL; int signersfilename_len = 0;
char * datafilename = NULL; int datafilename_len = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pl|papp", &filename, &filename_len,
&flags, &signersfilename, &signersfilename_len, &cainfo,
&extracerts, &extracerts_len, &datafilename, &datafilename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (extracerts) {
others = load_all_certs_from_file(extracerts);
if (others == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
flags = flags & ~PKCS7_DETACHED;
store = setup_verify(cainfo TSRMLS_CC);
if (!store) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
in = BIO_new_file(filename, (flags & PKCS7_BINARY) ? "rb" : "r");
if (in == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &datain);
if (p7 == NULL) {
#if DEBUG_SMIME
zend_printf("SMIME_read_PKCS7 failed\n");
#endif
goto clean_exit;
}
if (datafilename) {
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(datafilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
dataout = BIO_new_file(datafilename, "w");
if (dataout == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
#if DEBUG_SMIME
zend_printf("Calling PKCS7 verify\n");
#endif
if (PKCS7_verify(p7, others, store, datain, dataout, flags)) {
RETVAL_TRUE;
if (signersfilename) {
BIO *certout;
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(signersfilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
certout = BIO_new_file(signersfilename, "w");
if (certout) {
int i;
signers = PKCS7_get0_signers(p7, NULL, flags);
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(signers); i++) {
PEM_write_bio_X509(certout, sk_X509_value(signers, i));
}
BIO_free(certout);
sk_X509_free(signers);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "signature OK, but cannot open %s for writing", signersfilename);
RETVAL_LONG(-1);
}
}
goto clean_exit;
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
clean_exit:
X509_STORE_free(store);
BIO_free(datain);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free(dataout);
PKCS7_free(p7);
sk_X509_free(others);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: keydirection2ascii (int kd, bool remote)
{
if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL)
return NULL;
else if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL)
return remote ? "1" : "0";
else if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE)
return remote ? "0" : "1";
else
{
ASSERT (0);
}
return NULL; /* NOTREACHED */
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PolygonInfo **AcquirePolygonThreadSet(const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info)
{
PathInfo
*magick_restrict path_info;
PolygonInfo
**polygon_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
polygon_info=(PolygonInfo **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*polygon_info));
if (polygon_info == (PolygonInfo **) NULL)
return((PolygonInfo **) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(polygon_info,0,(size_t)
GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource)*sizeof(*polygon_info));
path_info=ConvertPrimitiveToPath(draw_info,primitive_info);
if (path_info == (PathInfo *) NULL)
return(DestroyPolygonThreadSet(polygon_info));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
polygon_info[i]=ConvertPathToPolygon(path_info);
if (polygon_info[i] == (PolygonInfo *) NULL)
return(DestroyPolygonThreadSet(polygon_info));
}
path_info=(PathInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(path_info);
return(polygon_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_ahash_op(struct ahash_request *req,
int (*op)(struct ahash_request *))
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
if ((unsigned long)req->result & alignmask)
return ahash_op_unaligned(req, op);
return op(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 27,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRouteCloseEvent() {
delegate_->RouteCloseEvent(this);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserPortFree(AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserPort *p)
{
SCEnter();
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElement *e;
e = p->dp;
while (e != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElement *e_next = e->next;
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElementFree(e);
e = e_next;
}
e = p->sp;
while (e != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElement *e_next = e->next;
AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElementFree(e);
e = e_next;
}
SCFree(p);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ati_remote2_set_mask(const char *val,
const struct kernel_param *kp,
unsigned int max)
{
unsigned int mask;
int ret;
if (!val)
return -EINVAL;
ret = kstrtouint(val, 0, &mask);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (mask & ~max)
return -EINVAL;
*(unsigned int *)kp->arg = mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_split_required_for_discard(struct dm_target *ti)
{
return ti->split_discard_bios;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 4,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct inode *ext4_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ext4_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->vfs_inode.i_version = 1;
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_raw_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_prealloc_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_prealloc_lock);
ext4_es_init_tree(&ei->i_es_tree);
rwlock_init(&ei->i_es_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_es_list);
ei->i_es_all_nr = 0;
ei->i_es_shk_nr = 0;
ei->i_es_shrink_lblk = 0;
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks = 0;
ei->i_reserved_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_allocated_meta_blocks = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_len = 0;
ei->i_da_metadata_calc_last_lblock = 0;
spin_lock_init(&(ei->i_block_reservation_lock));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
memset(&ei->i_dquot, 0, sizeof(ei->i_dquot));
#endif
ei->jinode = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_list);
spin_lock_init(&ei->i_completed_io_lock);
ei->i_sync_tid = 0;
ei->i_datasync_tid = 0;
atomic_set(&ei->i_unwritten, 0);
INIT_WORK(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_work, ext4_end_io_rsv_work);
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageRotateBilinear(gdImagePtr src, const float degrees, const int bgColor)
{
float _angle = (float)((- degrees / 180.0f) * M_PI);
const unsigned int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const unsigned int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
unsigned int new_width = abs((int)(src_w*cos(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*sin(_angle) + 0.5f));
unsigned int new_height = abs((int)(src_w*sin(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*cos(_angle) + 0.5f));
const gdFixed f_0_5 = gd_ftofx(0.5f);
const gdFixed f_H = gd_itofx(src_h/2);
const gdFixed f_W = gd_itofx(src_w/2);
const gdFixed f_cos = gd_ftofx(cos(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_sin = gd_ftofx(sin(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_1 = gd_itofx(1);
unsigned int i;
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
gdImagePtr dst;
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i = 0; i < new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j=0; j < new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx((int)i - (int)new_height / 2);
const gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx((int)j - (int)new_width / 2);
const gdFixed f_m = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_sin) + gd_mulfx(f_i,f_cos) + f_0_5 + f_H;
const gdFixed f_n = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_cos) - gd_mulfx(f_i,f_sin) + f_0_5 + f_W;
const unsigned int m = gd_fxtoi(f_m);
const unsigned int n = gd_fxtoi(f_n);
if ((m > 0) && (m < src_h - 1) && (n > 0) && (n < src_w - 1)) {
const gdFixed f_f = f_m - gd_itofx(m);
const gdFixed f_g = f_n - gd_itofx(n);
const gdFixed f_w1 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w2 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_g);
const gdFixed f_w3 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w4 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_g);
if (n < src_w - 1) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m;
}
if (m < src_h - 1) {
src_offset_x = n;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
if (!((n >= src_w - 1) || (m >= src_h - 1))) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
{
const int pixel1 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x];
register int pixel2, pixel3, pixel4;
if (src_offset_y + 1 >= src_h) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else if (src_offset_x + 1 >= src_w) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else {
pixel2 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x + 1];
pixel3 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x];
pixel4 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x + 1];
}
{
const gdFixed f_r1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_r2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_r3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_r4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_g1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_g2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_g3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_g4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_b1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_b2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_b3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_b4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_a1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_a2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_a3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_a4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_red = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_r1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_r2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_r3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_r4);
const gdFixed f_green = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_g1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_g2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_g3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_g4);
const gdFixed f_blue = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_b1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_b2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_b3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_b4);
const gdFixed f_alpha = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_a1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_a2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_a3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_a4);
const unsigned char red = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_red), 0, 255);
const unsigned char green = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_green), 0, 255);
const unsigned char blue = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_blue), 0, 255);
const unsigned char alpha = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_alpha), 0, 127);
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = gdTrueColorAlpha(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
}
} else {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = bgColor;
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 19,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::sendForInspectorXHRReplay(PassRefPtr<FormData> formData, ExceptionState& es)
{
m_requestEntityBody = formData ? formData->deepCopy() : 0;
createRequest(es);
m_exceptionCode = es.code();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass)
{
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int i, seqcontlen, seqlen, ndef = 1;
const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef;
const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb = 0;
if ((it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) && !*pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb;
switch (it->itype) {
case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
if (it->templates)
return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pval, out, it->templates,
tag, aclass);
return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
ASN1_VALUE **pchval;
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *chtt;
chtt = it->templates + i;
pchval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, chtt);
return asn1_template_ex_i2d(pchval, out, chtt, -1, aclass);
}
/* Fixme: error condition if selector out of range */
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
break;
case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN:
/* If new style i2d it does all the work */
ef = it->funcs;
return ef->asn1_ex_i2d(pval, out, it, tag, aclass);
case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT:
/* old style hackery... */
cf = it->funcs;
if (out)
p = *out;
i = cf->asn1_i2d(*pval, out);
/*
* Fixup for IMPLICIT tag: note this messes up for tags > 30, but so
* did the old code. Tags > 30 are very rare anyway.
*/
if (out && (tag != -1))
*p = aclass | tag | (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
return i;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
/* Use indefinite length constructed if requested */
if (aclass & ASN1_TFLG_NDEF)
ndef = 2;
/* fall through */
case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE:
i = asn1_enc_restore(&seqcontlen, out, pval, it);
/* An error occurred */
if (i < 0)
return 0;
/* We have a valid cached encoding... */
if (i > 0)
return seqcontlen;
/* Otherwise carry on */
seqcontlen = 0;
/* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */
if (tag == -1) {
tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
/* Retain any other flags in aclass */
aclass = (aclass & ~ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS)
| V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL;
}
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
/* First work out sequence content length */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
return 0;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
/* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
seqcontlen += asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, NULL, seqtt,
-1, aclass);
}
seqlen = ASN1_object_size(ndef, seqcontlen, tag);
if (!out)
return seqlen;
/* Output SEQUENCE header */
ASN1_put_object(out, ndef, seqcontlen, tag, aclass);
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
return 0;
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
/* FIXME: check for errors in enhanced version */
asn1_template_ex_i2d(pseqval, out, seqtt, -1, aclass);
}
if (ndef == 2)
ASN1_put_eoc(out);
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_POST, pval, it, NULL))
return 0;
return seqlen;
default:
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: authz_status oidc_authz_checker_claims_expr(request_rec *r, const char *require_args, const void *parsed_require_args) {
return oidc_authz_checker(r, require_args, parsed_require_args, oidc_authz_match_claims_expr);
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 15,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void IdAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kIdAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_t *json_load_callback(json_load_callback_t callback, void *arg, size_t flags, json_error_t *error)
{
lex_t lex;
json_t *result;
callback_data_t stream_data;
memset(&stream_data, 0, sizeof(stream_data));
stream_data.callback = callback;
stream_data.arg = arg;
jsonp_error_init(error, "<callback>");
if (callback == NULL) {
error_set(error, NULL, "wrong arguments");
return NULL;
}
if(lex_init(&lex, (get_func)callback_get, flags, &stream_data))
return NULL;
result = parse_json(&lex, flags, error);
lex_close(&lex);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix for issue #282
The fix limits recursion depths when parsing arrays and objects.
The limit is configurable via the `JSON_PARSER_MAX_DEPTH` setting
within `jansson_config.h` and is set by default to 2048.
Update the RFC conformance document to note the limit; the RFC
allows limits to be set by the implementation so nothing has
actually changed w.r.t. conformance state.
Reported by Gustavo Grieco.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetNetworkContextsParentDirectory() {
base::FilePath user_data_dir;
base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &user_data_dir);
DCHECK(!user_data_dir.empty());
base::FilePath cache_dir;
chrome::GetUserCacheDirectory(user_data_dir, &cache_dir);
DCHECK(!cache_dir.empty());
if (user_data_dir.IsParent(cache_dir))
return {user_data_dir};
return {user_data_dir, cache_dir};
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit crct10dif_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: assegment_prepend_asns (struct assegment *seg, as_t asnum, int num)
{
as_t *newas;
int i;
if (!num)
return seg;
if (num >= AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
return seg; /* we don't do huge prepends */
if ((newas = assegment_data_new (seg->length + num)) == NULL)
return seg;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
newas[i] = asnum;
memcpy (newas + num, seg->as, ASSEGMENT_DATA_SIZE (seg->length, 1));
assegment_data_free (seg->as);
seg->as = newas;
seg->length += num;
return seg;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetFeatureEntries(const std::vector<FeatureEntry>& entries) {
GetEntriesForTesting()->clear();
for (const auto& entry : entries)
GetEntriesForTesting()->push_back(entry);
FlagsStateSingleton::GetInstance()->RebuildState(*GetEntriesForTesting());
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<net::test::TestTaskRunner> runner() { return runner_; }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 2,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __mem_cgroup_put(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, int count)
{
if (atomic_sub_and_test(count, &memcg->refcnt)) {
struct mem_cgroup *parent = parent_mem_cgroup(memcg);
__mem_cgroup_free(memcg);
if (parent)
mem_cgroup_put(parent);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void v_block_filter(ERContext *s, uint8_t *dst, int w, int h,
ptrdiff_t stride, int is_luma)
{
int b_x, b_y;
ptrdiff_t mvx_stride, mvy_stride;
const uint8_t *cm = ff_crop_tab + MAX_NEG_CROP;
set_mv_strides(s, &mvx_stride, &mvy_stride);
mvx_stride >>= is_luma;
mvy_stride *= mvx_stride;
for (b_y = 0; b_y < h - 1; b_y++) {
for (b_x = 0; b_x < w; b_x++) {
int x;
int top_status = s->error_status_table[(b_x >> is_luma) + (b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride];
int bottom_status = s->error_status_table[(b_x >> is_luma) + ((b_y + 1) >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride];
int top_intra = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[(b_x >> is_luma) + ( b_y >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride]);
int bottom_intra = IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[(b_x >> is_luma) + ((b_y + 1) >> is_luma) * s->mb_stride]);
int top_damage = top_status & ER_MB_ERROR;
int bottom_damage = bottom_status & ER_MB_ERROR;
int offset = b_x * 8 + b_y * stride * 8;
int16_t *top_mv = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mvy_stride * b_y + mvx_stride * b_x];
int16_t *bottom_mv = s->cur_pic.motion_val[0][mvy_stride * (b_y + 1) + mvx_stride * b_x];
if (!(top_damage || bottom_damage))
continue; // both undamaged
if ((!top_intra) && (!bottom_intra) &&
FFABS(top_mv[0] - bottom_mv[0]) +
FFABS(top_mv[1] + bottom_mv[1]) < 2)
continue;
for (x = 0; x < 8; x++) {
int a, b, c, d;
a = dst[offset + x + 7 * stride] - dst[offset + x + 6 * stride];
b = dst[offset + x + 8 * stride] - dst[offset + x + 7 * stride];
c = dst[offset + x + 9 * stride] - dst[offset + x + 8 * stride];
d = FFABS(b) - ((FFABS(a) + FFABS(c) + 1) >> 1);
d = FFMAX(d, 0);
if (b < 0)
d = -d;
if (d == 0)
continue;
if (!(top_damage && bottom_damage))
d = d * 16 / 9;
if (top_damage) {
dst[offset + x + 7 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 7 * stride] + ((d * 7) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 6 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 6 * stride] + ((d * 5) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 5 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 5 * stride] + ((d * 3) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 4 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 4 * stride] + ((d * 1) >> 4)];
}
if (bottom_damage) {
dst[offset + x + 8 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 8 * stride] - ((d * 7) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 9 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 9 * stride] - ((d * 5) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 10 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 10 * stride] - ((d * 3) >> 4)];
dst[offset + x + 11 * stride] = cm[dst[offset + x + 11 * stride] - ((d * 1) >> 4)];
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 10,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fdctrl_handle_option(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
/* No result back */
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: flow_mod_init(struct ofputil_flow_mod *fm,
const struct match *match, int priority,
const struct ofpact *ofpacts, size_t ofpacts_len,
enum ofp_flow_mod_command command)
{
*fm = (struct ofputil_flow_mod) {
.match = *match,
.priority = priority,
.table_id = 0,
.command = command,
.buffer_id = UINT32_MAX,
.out_port = OFPP_ANY,
.out_group = OFPG_ANY,
.ofpacts = CONST_CAST(struct ofpact *, ofpacts),
.ofpacts_len = ofpacts_len,
};
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 13,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppResult::OnShutdown(extensions::ExtensionRegistry* registry) {
DCHECK_EQ(extension_registry_, registry);
StopObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ih264d_init_decoder(void * ps_dec_params)
{
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_dec_params;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc, *ps_cur_poc;
WORD32 size;
size = sizeof(pred_info_t) * 2 * 32;
memset(ps_dec->ps_pred, 0 , size);
size = sizeof(disp_mgr_t);
memset(ps_dec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, 0 , size);
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
memset(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dec_err_status_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status, 0, size);
size = sizeof(sei);
memset(ps_dec->ps_sei, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dpb_commands_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dec_bit_stream_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dec_slice_params_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice, 0, size);
size = MAX(sizeof(dec_seq_params_t), sizeof(dec_pic_params_t));
memset(ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps, 0, size);
size = sizeof(ctxt_inc_mb_info_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_left_mb_ctxt_info, 0, size);
size = (sizeof(neighbouradd_t) << 2);
memset(ps_dec->ps_left_mvpred_addr, 0 ,size);
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
memset(ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, 0, size);
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ih264d_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
ps_dec->init_done = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 1;
ps_dec->u2_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd = 0;
ps_dec->u1_separate_parse = DEFAULT_SEPARATE_PARSE;
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_type = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics = 0;
ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
memset(ps_dec->ps_pps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_pic_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS));
memset(ps_dec->ps_sps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_seq_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAMS));
/* Initialization of function pointers ih264d_deblock_picture function*/
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[0] = ih264d_deblock_picture_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[1] = ih264d_deblock_picture_mbaff;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
ps_dec->u4_num_fld_in_frm = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
/* Initialize the sei validity u4_flag with zero indiacting sei is not valid*/
ps_dec->ps_sei->u1_is_valid = 0;
/* decParams Initializations */
ps_dec->ps_cur_pps = NULL;
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps = NULL;
ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 1;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width = 0;
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS; //REJECT_PB_PICS;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_cur_frm = INIT_FRAME;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = 0xFF;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/* POC initializations */
ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_top_field_order_count = ps_cur_poc->i4_top_field_order_count =
0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count =
ps_cur_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp = 4;
/* Field PIC initializations */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
/* Set the cropping parameters as zero */
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv = 0;
/* The Initial Frame Rate Info is not Present */
ps_dec->i4_vui_frame_rate = -1;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 0;
ps_dec->u1_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* Set the default frame seek mask mode */
ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask = SKIP_NONE;
/********************************************************/
/* Initialize CAVLC residual decoding function pointers */
/********************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[0] = ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_1;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_2to10;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_11to16;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[0] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n0to7;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[1] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n8;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[0] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_none_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_left_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_top_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[3] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_both_available;
/***************************************************************************/
/* Initialize Bs calculation function pointers for P and B, 16x16/non16x16 */
/***************************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[0] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_frm;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[1] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_fld;
/* Initialize Reference Pic Buffers */
ih264d_init_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.cabac_table = gau4_ih264d_cabac_table;
ps_dec->pu1_left_mv_ctxt_inc = ps_dec->u1_left_mv_ctxt_inc_arr[0];
ps_dec->pi1_left_ref_idx_ctxt_inc =
&ps_dec->i1_left_ref_idx_ctx_inc_arr[0][0];
ps_dec->pu1_left_yuv_dc_csbp = &ps_dec->u1_yuv_dc_csbp_topmb;
/* ! */
/* Initializing flush frame u4_flag */
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 0;
{
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
}
memset(ps_dec->disp_bufs, 0, (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(disp_buf_t));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
memset(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice, 0, sizeof(dec_slice_params_t));
ih264d_init_arch(ps_dec);
ih264d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
ps_dec->init_done = 1;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Increased allocation and added checks in sei parsing.
This prevents heap overflow while parsing sei_message.
Bug: 63122634
Test: ran PoC on unpatched/patched
Change-Id: I61c1ff4ac053a060be8c24da4671db985cac628c
(cherry picked from commit f2b70d353768af8d4ead7f32497be05f197925ef)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int squashfs_readdir(struct dir *dir, char **name, unsigned int *start_block,
unsigned int *offset, unsigned int *type)
{
if(dir->cur_entry == dir->dir_count)
return FALSE;
*name = dir->dirs[dir->cur_entry].name;
*start_block = dir->dirs[dir->cur_entry].start_block;
*offset = dir->dirs[dir->cur_entry].offset;
*type = dir->dirs[dir->cur_entry].type;
dir->cur_entry ++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 28,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadController::SetDefaultDownloadFileName(
const std::string& file_name) {
default_file_name_ = file_name;
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 25,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetState(MediaStreamType stream_type, MediaRequestState new_state) {
if (stream_type == NUM_MEDIA_TYPES) {
for (int i = MEDIA_NO_SERVICE + 1; i < NUM_MEDIA_TYPES; ++i) {
state_[static_cast<MediaStreamType>(i)] = new_state;
}
} else {
state_[stream_type] = new_state;
}
MediaObserver* media_observer =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetMediaObserver();
if (!media_observer)
return;
if (stream_type == NUM_MEDIA_TYPES) {
for (int i = MEDIA_NO_SERVICE + 1; i < NUM_MEDIA_TYPES; ++i) {
media_observer->OnMediaRequestStateChanged(
target_process_id_, target_frame_id_, page_request_id,
salt_and_origin.origin.GetURL(), static_cast<MediaStreamType>(i),
new_state);
}
} else {
media_observer->OnMediaRequestStateChanged(
target_process_id_, target_frame_id_, page_request_id,
salt_and_origin.origin.GetURL(), stream_type, new_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT: {
struct kvm_vcpu_init init;
if (copy_from_user(&init, argp, sizeof(init)))
return -EFAULT;
return kvm_vcpu_set_target(vcpu, &init);
}
case KVM_SET_ONE_REG:
case KVM_GET_ONE_REG: {
struct kvm_one_reg reg;
if (copy_from_user(®, argp, sizeof(reg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (ioctl == KVM_SET_ONE_REG)
return kvm_arm_set_reg(vcpu, ®);
else
return kvm_arm_get_reg(vcpu, ®);
}
case KVM_GET_REG_LIST: {
struct kvm_reg_list __user *user_list = argp;
struct kvm_reg_list reg_list;
unsigned n;
if (copy_from_user(®_list, user_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
n = reg_list.n;
reg_list.n = kvm_arm_num_regs(vcpu);
if (copy_to_user(user_list, ®_list, sizeof(reg_list)))
return -EFAULT;
if (n < reg_list.n)
return -E2BIG;
return kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices(vcpu, user_list->reg);
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 24,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aio_ring_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct kioctx_table *table;
int i, res = -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
table = rcu_dereference(mm->ioctx_table);
for (i = 0; i < table->nr; i++) {
struct kioctx *ctx;
ctx = table->table[i];
if (ctx && ctx->aio_ring_file == file) {
if (!atomic_read(&ctx->dead)) {
ctx->user_id = ctx->mmap_base = vma->vm_start;
res = 0;
}
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <linux/aio_abi.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main(void) {
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
aio_context_t ctx = 0;
if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
err(1, "io_setup");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
(int)getpid());
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int noodle(ELFOBJ *bin, const char *s) {
const ut8 *p = bin->b->buf;
if (bin->b->length > 64) {
p += bin->b->length - 64;
} else {
return 0;
}
return r_mem_mem (p, 64, (const ut8 *)s, strlen (s)) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 1,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationEntry* NavigationControllerImpl::GetLastCommittedEntry() const {
if (last_committed_entry_index_ == -1)
return NULL;
return entries_[last_committed_entry_index_].get();
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AddDNSCertProvenanceCheckingWarningInfoBarIfNecessary(
TabContentsWrapper* tab) {
if (!command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDNSCertProvenanceChecking))
return;
const char* kLearnMoreURL =
"http://dev.chromium.org/dnscertprovenancechecking";
string16 message = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_DNS_CERT_PROVENANCE_CHECKING_WARNING_MESSAGE);
tab->infobar_tab_helper()->AddInfoBar(
new LearnMoreInfoBar(tab->infobar_tab_helper(),
message,
GURL(kLearnMoreURL)));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void remove_entity_load_avg(struct sched_entity *se)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
unsigned long flags;
/*
* tasks cannot exit without having gone through wake_up_new_task() ->
* post_init_entity_util_avg() which will have added things to the
* cfs_rq, so we can remove unconditionally.
*
* Similarly for groups, they will have passed through
* post_init_entity_util_avg() before unregister_sched_fair_group()
* calls this.
*/
sync_entity_load_avg(se);
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cfs_rq->removed.lock, flags);
++cfs_rq->removed.nr;
cfs_rq->removed.util_avg += se->avg.util_avg;
cfs_rq->removed.load_avg += se->avg.load_avg;
cfs_rq->removed.runnable_sum += se->avg.load_sum; /* == runnable_sum */
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cfs_rq->removed.lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 3,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
{
vcpu->arch.hflags = 0;
atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, 0);
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
memset(vcpu->arch.db, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
kvm_update_dr0123(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.dr6 = DR6_INIT;
kvm_update_dr6(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.dr7 = DR7_FIXED_1;
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.cr2 = 0;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vcpu->arch.apf.msr_val = 0;
vcpu->arch.st.msr_val = 0;
kvmclock_reset(vcpu);
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
if (!init_event) {
kvm_pmu_reset(vcpu);
vcpu->arch.smbase = 0x30000;
}
memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0;
vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0;
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_reset(vcpu, init_event);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::FilePath GetAppHostPathForInstallationLevel(InstallationLevel level) {
return FindExeRelativeToSetupExe(
GetSetupExeFromRegistry(level, kAppHostAppId), kChromeAppHostExe);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
struct sock *sk;
if (!conn)
return;
BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p, err %d", hcon, conn, err);
kfree_skb(conn->rx_skb);
/* Kill channels */
while ((sk = conn->chan_list.head)) {
bh_lock_sock(sk);
l2cap_chan_del(sk, err);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
}
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)
del_timer_sync(&conn->info_timer);
hcon->l2cap_data = NULL;
kfree(conn);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int len, padded_len;
const char *emsg;
const u_char *cp;
u_char *p;
u_int checksum, stored_checksum;
int r;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
/* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8)
return 0;
/* Get length of incoming packet. */
len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input));
if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u",
len)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7;
/* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len)
return 0;
/* The entire packet is in buffer. */
/* Consume packet length. */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Cryptographic attack detector for ssh
* (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina
* Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com)
*/
if (!state->receive_context.plaintext) {
emsg = NULL;
switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) {
case DEATTACK_OK:
break;
case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected";
break;
case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
emsg = "deattack denial of service detected";
break;
default:
emsg = "deattack error";
break;
}
if (emsg != NULL) {
error("%s", emsg);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
}
/* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, 0, p,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* Compute packet checksum. */
checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4);
/* Skip padding. */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Test check bytes. */
if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) {
error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__,
len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet));
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4;
stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (checksum != stored_checksum) {
error("Corrupted check bytes on input");
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0)
goto out;
if (state->packet_compression) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
}
state->p_read.packets++;
state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) {
error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,622
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.