instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
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int64 0
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int64 0
30k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int macvlan_device_event(struct notifier_block *unused,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = ptr;
struct macvlan_dev *vlan, *next;
struct macvlan_port *port;
LIST_HEAD(list_kill);
if (!macvlan_port_exists(dev))
return NOTIFY_DONE;
port = macvlan_port_get(dev);
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_CHANGE:
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &port->vlans, list)
netif_stacked_transfer_operstate(vlan->lowerdev,
vlan->dev);
break;
case NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE:
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &port->vlans, list) {
vlan->dev->features = dev->features & MACVLAN_FEATURES;
vlan->dev->gso_max_size = dev->gso_max_size;
netdev_features_change(vlan->dev);
}
break;
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
/* twiddle thumbs on netns device moves */
if (dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNREGISTERING)
break;
list_for_each_entry_safe(vlan, next, &port->vlans, list)
vlan->dev->rtnl_link_ops->dellink(vlan->dev, &list_kill);
unregister_netdevice_many(&list_kill);
list_del(&list_kill);
break;
case NETDEV_PRE_TYPE_CHANGE:
/* Forbid underlaying device to change its type. */
return NOTIFY_BAD;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnGetManifest(const GURL& manifest_url, const Manifest& manifest) {
manifest_url_ = manifest_url;
manifest_ = manifest;
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_REQUIRES(ofproto_mutex)
{
enum ofperr error;
error = ofproto_check_ofpacts(ofproto, opo->ofpacts, opo->ofpacts_len);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return ofproto->ofproto_class->packet_xlate(ofproto, opo);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 25,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (node.isNull() || !node.document().frame()) {
return;
}
if (is_preview_enabled_) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithNode(node);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE);
} else {
WebKit::WebNode duplicate_node(node);
Print(duplicate_node.document().frame(), duplicate_node);
}
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 20,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ipv6_push_nfrag_opts(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
u8 *proto,
struct in6_addr **daddr)
{
if (opt->srcrt) {
ipv6_push_rthdr(skb, proto, opt->srcrt, daddr);
/*
* IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS is ignored
* unless IPV6_RTHDR is set (RFC3542).
*/
if (opt->dst0opt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_DEST, opt->dst0opt);
}
if (opt->hopopt)
ipv6_push_exthdr(skb, proto, NEXTHDR_HOP, opt->hopopt);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_do_ecn_cwr_work(struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 lowest_tsn)
{
/* Turn off ECNE getting auto-prepended to every outgoing
* packet
*/
asoc->need_ecne = 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool sas_ata_qc_fill_rtf(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
{
struct domain_device *dev = qc->ap->private_data;
ata_tf_from_fis(dev->sata_dev.fis, &qc->result_tf);
return true;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int phar_hex_str(const char *digest, size_t digest_len, char **signature) /* {{{ */
{
int pos = -1;
size_t len = 0;
*signature = (char*)safe_pemalloc(digest_len, 2, 1, PHAR_G(persist));
for (; len < digest_len; ++len) {
(*signature)[++pos] = hexChars[((const unsigned char *)digest)[len] >> 4];
(*signature)[++pos] = hexChars[((const unsigned char *)digest)[len] & 0x0F];
}
(*signature)[++pos] = '\0';
return pos;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltShallowCopyElem(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr insert, int isLRE)
{
xmlNodePtr copy;
if ((node->type == XML_DTD_NODE) || (insert == NULL))
return(NULL);
if ((node->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) ||
(node->type == XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE))
return(xsltCopyText(ctxt, insert, node, 0));
copy = xmlDocCopyNode(node, insert->doc, 0);
if (copy != NULL) {
copy->doc = ctxt->output;
copy = xsltAddChild(insert, copy);
if (node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
/*
* Add namespaces as they are needed
*/
if (node->nsDef != NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Remove the LRE case in the refactored code
* gets enabled.
*/
if (isLRE)
xsltCopyNamespaceList(ctxt, copy, node->nsDef);
else
xsltCopyNamespaceListInternal(copy, node->nsDef);
}
/*
* URGENT TODO: The problem with this is that it does not
* copy over all namespace nodes in scope.
* The damn thing about this is, that we would need to
* use the xmlGetNsList(), for every single node; this is
* also done in xsltCopyTreeInternal(), but only for the top node.
*/
if (node->ns != NULL) {
if (isLRE) {
/*
* REVISIT TODO: Since the non-refactored code still does
* ns-aliasing, we need to call xsltGetNamespace() here.
* Remove this when ready.
*/
copy->ns = xsltGetNamespace(ctxt, node, node->ns, copy);
} else {
copy->ns = xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt,
node, node->ns->href, node->ns->prefix, copy);
}
} else if ((insert->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(insert->ns != NULL))
{
/*
* "Undeclare" the default namespace.
*/
xsltGetSpecialNamespace(ctxt, node, NULL, NULL, copy);
}
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltShallowCopyElem: copy %s failed\n", node->name);
}
return(copy);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 22,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isatap_chksrc(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph, struct ip_tunnel *t)
{
struct ip_tunnel_prl_entry *p;
int ok = 1;
rcu_read_lock();
p = __ipip6_tunnel_locate_prl(t, iph->saddr);
if (p) {
if (p->flags & PRL_DEFAULT)
skb->ndisc_nodetype = NDISC_NODETYPE_DEFAULT;
else
skb->ndisc_nodetype = NDISC_NODETYPE_NODEFAULT;
} else {
const struct in6_addr *addr6 = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
if (ipv6_addr_is_isatap(addr6) &&
(addr6->s6_addr32[3] == iph->saddr) &&
ipv6_chk_prefix(addr6, t->dev))
skb->ndisc_nodetype = NDISC_NODETYPE_HOST;
else
ok = 0;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ok;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 14,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShelfLayoutManager::OnWindowRemovedFromLayout(aura::Window* child) {
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnUpdateWebPreferences(const WebPreferences& prefs) {
webkit_preferences_ = prefs;
ApplyWebPreferencesInternal(webkit_preferences_, webview());
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 9,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void intel_pmu_disable_all(void)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
wrmsrl(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, 0);
if (test_bit(X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED_BTS, cpuc->active_mask))
intel_pmu_disable_bts();
intel_pmu_pebs_disable_all();
intel_pmu_lbr_disable_all();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> PrivateScriptRunner::installClassIfNeeded(
Document* document,
String className) {
if (!document->contextDocument()->frame())
return v8::Local<v8::Value>();
v8::HandleScope handleScope(toIsolate(document));
ScriptState* scriptState =
ScriptState::forWorld(document->contextDocument()->frame(),
DOMWrapperWorld::privateScriptIsolatedWorld());
if (!scriptState)
return v8::Local<v8::Value>();
ScriptState::Scope scope(scriptState);
return classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
}
Commit Message: Don't touch the prototype chain to get the private script controller.
Prior to this patch, private scripts attempted to get the
"privateScriptController" property off the global object without verifying if
the property actually exists on the global. If the property hasn't been set yet,
this operation could descend into the prototype chain and potentially return
a named property from the WindowProperties object, leading to release asserts
and general confusion.
BUG=668552
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2529163002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#434627}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 22,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rm_sync(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t *timestamp, int *flags, int *stream_index, int64_t *pos){
RMDemuxContext *rm = s->priv_data;
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
AVStream *st;
uint32_t state=0xFFFFFFFF;
while(!avio_feof(pb)){
int len, num, i;
int mlti_id;
*pos= avio_tell(pb) - 3;
if(rm->remaining_len > 0){
num= rm->current_stream;
mlti_id = 0;
len= rm->remaining_len;
*timestamp = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
*flags= 0;
}else{
state= (state<<8) + avio_r8(pb);
if(state == MKBETAG('I', 'N', 'D', 'X')){
int n_pkts, expected_len;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 2);
n_pkts = avio_rb32(pb);
expected_len = 20 + n_pkts * 14;
if (len == 20)
/* some files don't add index entries to chunk size... */
len = expected_len;
else if (len != expected_len)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Index size %d (%d pkts) is wrong, should be %d.\n",
len, n_pkts, expected_len);
len -= 14; // we already read part of the index header
if(len<0)
continue;
goto skip;
} else if (state == MKBETAG('D','A','T','A')) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"DATA tag in middle of chunk, file may be broken.\n");
}
if(state > (unsigned)0xFFFF || state <= 12)
continue;
len=state - 12;
state= 0xFFFFFFFF;
num = avio_rb16(pb);
*timestamp = avio_rb32(pb);
mlti_id = (avio_r8(pb)>>1)-1<<16;
mlti_id = FFMAX(mlti_id, 0);
*flags = avio_r8(pb); /* flags */
}
for(i=0;i<s->nb_streams;i++) {
st = s->streams[i];
if (mlti_id + num == st->id)
break;
}
if (i == s->nb_streams) {
skip:
/* skip packet if unknown number */
avio_skip(pb, len);
rm->remaining_len = 0;
continue;
}
*stream_index= i;
return len;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 18,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ColorChooserWin::~ColorChooserWin() {
DCHECK(!color_chooser_dialog_);
}
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
R=jschuh@chromium.org, pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dwc3_gadget_wakeup(struct usb_gadget *g)
{
struct dwc3 *dwc = gadget_to_dwc(g);
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
ret = __dwc3_gadget_wakeup(dwc);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame(
ScrollDirection direction,
ScrollGranularity granularity) {
web_frame_->Client()->BubbleLogicalScrollInParentFrame(direction,
granularity);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 16,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: param_double( const char *name, double default_value,
double min_value, double max_value,
ClassAd *me, ClassAd *target,
bool use_param_table )
{
if(use_param_table) {
int tbl_default_valid;
double tbl_default_value =
param_default_double( name, &tbl_default_valid );
param_range_double(name, &min_value, &max_value);
if (tbl_default_valid) {
default_value = tbl_default_value;
}
}
double result;
char *string;
char *endptr = NULL;
ASSERT( name );
string = param( name );
if( ! string ) {
dprintf( D_CONFIG, "%s is undefined, using default value of %f\n",
name, default_value );
return default_value;
}
result = strtod(string,&endptr);
ASSERT(endptr);
if( endptr != string ) {
while( isspace(*endptr) ) {
endptr++;
}
}
bool valid = (endptr != string && *endptr == '\0');
if( !valid ) {
ClassAd rhs;
float float_result;
if( me ) {
rhs = *me;
}
if( !rhs.AssignExpr( name, string ) ) {
EXCEPT("Invalid expression for %s (%s) "
"in condor configuration. Please set it to "
"a numeric expression in the range %lg to %lg "
"(default %lg).",
name,string,min_value,max_value,default_value);
}
if( !rhs.EvalFloat(name,target,float_result) ) {
EXCEPT("Invalid result (not a number) for %s (%s) "
"in condor configuration. Please set it to "
"a numeric expression in the range %lg to %lg "
"(default %lg).",
name,string,min_value,max_value,default_value);
}
result = float_result;
}
if( result < min_value ) {
EXCEPT( "%s in the condor configuration is too low (%s)."
" Please set it to a number in the range %lg to %lg"
" (default %lg).",
name, string, min_value, max_value, default_value );
}
else if( result > max_value ) {
EXCEPT( "%s in the condor configuration is too high (%s)."
" Please set it to a number in the range %lg to %lg"
" (default %lg).",
name, string, min_value, max_value, default_value );
}
free( string );
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __blk_mq_complete_request(struct request *rq)
{
struct request_queue *q = rq->q;
if (!q->softirq_done_fn)
blk_mq_end_request(rq, rq->errors);
else
blk_mq_ipi_complete_request(rq);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WindowController::TypeFilter type_filters() {
if (params_->get_info.get() && params_->get_info->window_types.get())
return WindowController::GetFilterFromWindowTypes(
*params_->get_info->window_types);
return WindowController::kNoWindowFilter;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,665
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t bb_store(struct md_rdev *rdev, const char *page, size_t len)
{
int rv = badblocks_store(&rdev->badblocks, page, len, 0);
/* Maybe that ack was all we needed */
if (test_and_clear_bit(BlockedBadBlocks, &rdev->flags))
wake_up(&rdev->blocked_wait);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ref_param_key(const iparam_list * plist, gs_param_name pkey, ref * pkref)
{
if (plist->int_keys) {
long key;
if (sscanf(pkey, "%ld", &key) != 1)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
make_int(pkref, key);
return 0;
} else
return name_ref(plist->memory, (const byte *)pkey, strlen(pkey), pkref, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 17,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AddInterp(CompatInfo *info, SymInterpInfo *new, bool same_file)
{
SymInterpInfo *old = FindMatchingInterp(info, new);
if (old) {
const int verbosity = xkb_context_get_log_verbosity(info->ctx);
const bool report = (same_file && verbosity > 0) || verbosity > 9;
enum si_field collide = 0;
if (new->merge == MERGE_REPLACE) {
if (report)
log_warn(info->ctx,
"Multiple definitions for \"%s\"; "
"Earlier interpretation ignored\n",
siText(new, info));
*old = *new;
return true;
}
if (UseNewInterpField(SI_FIELD_VIRTUAL_MOD, old, new, report,
&collide)) {
old->interp.virtual_mod = new->interp.virtual_mod;
old->defined |= SI_FIELD_VIRTUAL_MOD;
}
if (UseNewInterpField(SI_FIELD_ACTION, old, new, report,
&collide)) {
old->interp.action = new->interp.action;
old->defined |= SI_FIELD_ACTION;
}
if (UseNewInterpField(SI_FIELD_AUTO_REPEAT, old, new, report,
&collide)) {
old->interp.repeat = new->interp.repeat;
old->defined |= SI_FIELD_AUTO_REPEAT;
}
if (UseNewInterpField(SI_FIELD_LEVEL_ONE_ONLY, old, new, report,
&collide)) {
old->interp.level_one_only = new->interp.level_one_only;
old->defined |= SI_FIELD_LEVEL_ONE_ONLY;
}
if (collide) {
log_warn(info->ctx,
"Multiple interpretations of \"%s\"; "
"Using %s definition for duplicate fields\n",
siText(new, info),
(new->merge != MERGE_AUGMENT ? "last" : "first"));
}
return true;
}
darray_append(info->interps, *new);
return true;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 17,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool param_get_location(
const char *parameter,
MyString &filename,
int &line_number)
{
bool found_it;
if (parameter != NULL && extra_info != NULL) {
found_it = extra_info->GetParam(parameter, filename, line_number);
} else {
found_it = false;
}
return found_it;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 8,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_SIZE_T JP2WriteHandler(void *buffer,OPJ_SIZE_T length,void *context)
{
Image
*image;
ssize_t
count;
image=(Image *) context;
count=WriteBlob(image,(ssize_t) length,(unsigned char *) buffer);
return((OPJ_SIZE_T) count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/501
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputHandler::setBatchEditingActive(bool active)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return false;
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document());
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame());
BackingStoreClient* backingStoreClient = m_webPage->backingStoreClient();
ASSERT(backingStoreClient);
if (!active) {
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::RenderAndBlit);
} else {
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
backingStoreClient->backingStore()->suspendScreenUpdates();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int samldb_generate_sAMAccountName(struct ldb_context *ldb,
struct ldb_message *msg)
{
char *name;
/* Format: $000000-000000000000 */
name = talloc_asprintf(msg, "$%.6X-%.6X%.6X",
(unsigned int)generate_random(),
(unsigned int)generate_random(),
(unsigned int)generate_random());
if (name == NULL) {
return ldb_oom(ldb);
}
return ldb_msg_add_steal_string(msg, "sAMAccountName", name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_do_ebt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk,
int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES:
ret = compat_do_replace(net, user, len);
break;
case EBT_SO_SET_COUNTERS:
ret = compat_update_counters(net, user, len);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 25,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct pfkey_sock *pfk = pfkey_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *supp_skb;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype > SADB_SATYPE_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC) {
if (pfk->registered&(1<<hdr->sadb_msg_satype))
return -EEXIST;
pfk->registered |= (1<<hdr->sadb_msg_satype);
}
xfrm_probe_algs();
supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!supp_skb) {
if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC)
pfk->registered &= ~(1<<hdr->sadb_msg_satype);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
pfkey_broadcast(supp_skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, sk, sock_net(sk));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int verify_stack(unsigned long sp)
{
if (sp < PAGE_OFFSET ||
(sp > (unsigned long)high_memory && high_memory != NULL))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: free_side (ProxySide *side)
{
g_clear_object (&side->connection);
g_clear_pointer (&side->extra_input_data, g_bytes_unref);
g_list_free_full (side->buffers, (GDestroyNotify) buffer_unref);
g_list_free_full (side->control_messages, (GDestroyNotify) g_object_unref);
if (side->in_source)
g_source_destroy (side->in_source);
if (side->out_source)
g_source_destroy (side->out_source);
g_hash_table_destroy (side->expected_replies);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 26,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SetSubframeUnloadTimeoutForTesting(
const base::TimeDelta& timeout) {
subframe_unload_timeout_ = timeout;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
if (!file_caps_enabled)
return 0;
if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
return 0;
dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
out:
dput(dentry);
if (rc)
bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_modrm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct operand *op)
{
u8 sib;
int index_reg, base_reg, scale;
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
ulong modrm_ea = 0;
ctxt->modrm_reg = ((ctxt->rex_prefix << 1) & 8); /* REX.R */
index_reg = (ctxt->rex_prefix << 2) & 8; /* REX.X */
base_reg = (ctxt->rex_prefix << 3) & 8; /* REX.B */
ctxt->modrm_mod = (ctxt->modrm & 0xc0) >> 6;
ctxt->modrm_reg |= (ctxt->modrm & 0x38) >> 3;
ctxt->modrm_rm = base_reg | (ctxt->modrm & 0x07);
ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_DS;
if (ctxt->modrm_mod == 3 || (ctxt->d & NoMod)) {
op->type = OP_REG;
op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
op->addr.reg = decode_register(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_rm,
ctxt->d & ByteOp);
if (ctxt->d & Sse) {
op->type = OP_XMM;
op->bytes = 16;
op->addr.xmm = ctxt->modrm_rm;
read_sse_reg(ctxt, &op->vec_val, ctxt->modrm_rm);
return rc;
}
if (ctxt->d & Mmx) {
op->type = OP_MM;
op->bytes = 8;
op->addr.mm = ctxt->modrm_rm & 7;
return rc;
}
fetch_register_operand(op);
return rc;
}
op->type = OP_MEM;
if (ctxt->ad_bytes == 2) {
unsigned bx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
unsigned bp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
unsigned si = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
unsigned di = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
/* 16-bit ModR/M decode. */
switch (ctxt->modrm_mod) {
case 0:
if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 6)
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
break;
case 1:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
break;
case 2:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
break;
}
switch (ctxt->modrm_rm) {
case 0:
modrm_ea += bx + si;
break;
case 1:
modrm_ea += bx + di;
break;
case 2:
modrm_ea += bp + si;
break;
case 3:
modrm_ea += bp + di;
break;
case 4:
modrm_ea += si;
break;
case 5:
modrm_ea += di;
break;
case 6:
if (ctxt->modrm_mod != 0)
modrm_ea += bp;
break;
case 7:
modrm_ea += bx;
break;
}
if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 2 || ctxt->modrm_rm == 3 ||
(ctxt->modrm_rm == 6 && ctxt->modrm_mod != 0))
ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
modrm_ea = (u16)modrm_ea;
} else {
/* 32/64-bit ModR/M decode. */
if ((ctxt->modrm_rm & 7) == 4) {
sib = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
index_reg |= (sib >> 3) & 7;
base_reg |= sib & 7;
scale = sib >> 6;
if ((base_reg & 7) == 5 && ctxt->modrm_mod == 0)
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
else {
modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, base_reg);
adjust_modrm_seg(ctxt, base_reg);
}
if (index_reg != 4)
modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, index_reg) << scale;
} else if ((ctxt->modrm_rm & 7) == 5 && ctxt->modrm_mod == 0) {
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->rip_relative = 1;
} else {
base_reg = ctxt->modrm_rm;
modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, base_reg);
adjust_modrm_seg(ctxt, base_reg);
}
switch (ctxt->modrm_mod) {
case 0:
if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 5)
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
break;
case 1:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
break;
case 2:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
break;
}
}
op->addr.mem.ea = modrm_ea;
if (ctxt->ad_bytes != 8)
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea = (u32)ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea;
done:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string DownloadItemImpl::DebugString(bool verbose) const {
std::string description =
base::StringPrintf("{ id = %d"
" state = %s",
download_id_.local(),
DebugDownloadStateString(GetState()));
std::string url_list("<none>");
if (!url_chain_.empty()) {
std::vector<GURL>::const_iterator iter = url_chain_.begin();
std::vector<GURL>::const_iterator last = url_chain_.end();
url_list = (*iter).spec();
++iter;
for ( ; verbose && (iter != last); ++iter) {
url_list += " ->\n\t";
const GURL& next_url = *iter;
url_list += next_url.spec();
}
}
if (verbose) {
description += base::StringPrintf(
" db_handle = %" PRId64
" total = %" PRId64
" received = %" PRId64
" reason = %s"
" paused = %c"
" otr = %c"
" safety = %s"
" last_modified = '%s'"
" etag = '%s'"
" url_chain = \n\t\"%s\"\n\t"
" full_path = \"%" PRFilePath "\""
" target_path = \"%" PRFilePath "\"",
GetDbHandle(),
GetTotalBytes(),
GetReceivedBytes(),
InterruptReasonDebugString(last_reason_).c_str(),
IsPaused() ? 'T' : 'F',
IsOtr() ? 'T' : 'F',
DebugSafetyStateString(GetSafetyState()),
GetLastModifiedTime().c_str(),
GetETag().c_str(),
url_list.c_str(),
GetFullPath().value().c_str(),
GetTargetFilePath().value().c_str());
} else {
description += base::StringPrintf(" url = \"%s\"", url_list.c_str());
}
description += " }";
return description;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PP_Bool StartPpapiProxy(PP_Instance instance) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableNaClIPCProxy)) {
ChannelHandleMap& map = g_channel_handle_map.Get();
ChannelHandleMap::iterator it = map.find(instance);
if (it == map.end())
return PP_FALSE;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle = it->second;
map.erase(it);
webkit::ppapi::PluginInstance* plugin_instance =
content::GetHostGlobals()->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_FALSE;
WebView* web_view =
plugin_instance->container()->element().document().frame()->view();
RenderView* render_view = content::RenderView::FromWebView(web_view);
webkit::ppapi::PluginModule* plugin_module = plugin_instance->module();
scoped_refptr<SyncMessageStatusReceiver>
status_receiver(new SyncMessageStatusReceiver());
scoped_ptr<OutOfProcessProxy> out_of_process_proxy(new OutOfProcessProxy);
if (out_of_process_proxy->Init(
channel_handle,
plugin_module->pp_module(),
webkit::ppapi::PluginModule::GetLocalGetInterfaceFunc(),
ppapi::Preferences(render_view->GetWebkitPreferences()),
status_receiver.get())) {
plugin_module->InitAsProxiedNaCl(
out_of_process_proxy.PassAs<PluginDelegate::OutOfProcessProxy>(),
instance);
return PP_TRUE;
}
}
return PP_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 26,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int http_send_data(HTTPContext *c)
{
int len, ret;
for(;;) {
if (c->buffer_ptr >= c->buffer_end) {
ret = http_prepare_data(c);
if (ret < 0)
return -1;
else if (ret)
/* state change requested */
break;
} else {
if (c->is_packetized) {
/* RTP data output */
len = c->buffer_end - c->buffer_ptr;
if (len < 4) {
/* fail safe - should never happen */
fail1:
c->buffer_ptr = c->buffer_end;
return 0;
}
len = (c->buffer_ptr[0] << 24) |
(c->buffer_ptr[1] << 16) |
(c->buffer_ptr[2] << 8) |
(c->buffer_ptr[3]);
if (len > (c->buffer_end - c->buffer_ptr))
goto fail1;
if ((get_packet_send_clock(c) - get_server_clock(c)) > 0) {
/* nothing to send yet: we can wait */
return 0;
}
c->data_count += len;
update_datarate(&c->datarate, c->data_count);
if (c->stream)
c->stream->bytes_served += len;
if (c->rtp_protocol == RTSP_LOWER_TRANSPORT_TCP) {
/* RTP packets are sent inside the RTSP TCP connection */
AVIOContext *pb;
int interleaved_index, size;
uint8_t header[4];
HTTPContext *rtsp_c;
rtsp_c = c->rtsp_c;
/* if no RTSP connection left, error */
if (!rtsp_c)
return -1;
/* if already sending something, then wait. */
if (rtsp_c->state != RTSPSTATE_WAIT_REQUEST)
break;
if (avio_open_dyn_buf(&pb) < 0)
goto fail1;
interleaved_index = c->packet_stream_index * 2;
/* RTCP packets are sent at odd indexes */
if (c->buffer_ptr[1] == 200)
interleaved_index++;
/* write RTSP TCP header */
header[0] = '$';
header[1] = interleaved_index;
header[2] = len >> 8;
header[3] = len;
avio_write(pb, header, 4);
/* write RTP packet data */
c->buffer_ptr += 4;
avio_write(pb, c->buffer_ptr, len);
size = avio_close_dyn_buf(pb, &c->packet_buffer);
/* prepare asynchronous TCP sending */
rtsp_c->packet_buffer_ptr = c->packet_buffer;
rtsp_c->packet_buffer_end = c->packet_buffer + size;
c->buffer_ptr += len;
/* send everything we can NOW */
len = send(rtsp_c->fd, rtsp_c->packet_buffer_ptr,
rtsp_c->packet_buffer_end - rtsp_c->packet_buffer_ptr, 0);
if (len > 0)
rtsp_c->packet_buffer_ptr += len;
if (rtsp_c->packet_buffer_ptr < rtsp_c->packet_buffer_end) {
/* if we could not send all the data, we will
* send it later, so a new state is needed to
* "lock" the RTSP TCP connection */
rtsp_c->state = RTSPSTATE_SEND_PACKET;
break;
} else
/* all data has been sent */
av_freep(&c->packet_buffer);
} else {
/* send RTP packet directly in UDP */
c->buffer_ptr += 4;
ffurl_write(c->rtp_handles[c->packet_stream_index],
c->buffer_ptr, len);
c->buffer_ptr += len;
/* here we continue as we can send several packets
* per 10 ms slot */
}
} else {
/* TCP data output */
len = send(c->fd, c->buffer_ptr,
c->buffer_end - c->buffer_ptr, 0);
if (len < 0) {
if (ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EAGAIN) &&
ff_neterrno() != AVERROR(EINTR))
/* error : close connection */
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
c->buffer_ptr += len;
c->data_count += len;
update_datarate(&c->datarate, c->data_count);
if (c->stream)
c->stream->bytes_served += len;
break;
}
}
} /* for(;;) */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: path_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(path_encode(path->closed ? PATH_CLOSED : PATH_OPEN, path->npts, path->p));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebRect WebLocalFrameImpl::GetSelectionBoundsRectForTesting() const {
return HasSelection()
? WebRect(PixelSnappedIntRect(
GetFrame()->Selection().AbsoluteUnclippedBounds()))
: WebRect();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void zend_set_timeout(zend_long seconds, int reset_signals) /* {{{ */
{
EG(timeout_seconds) = seconds;
#ifdef ZEND_WIN32
if(!seconds) {
return;
}
/* Don't use ChangeTimerQueueTimer() as it will not restart an expired
timer, so we could end up with just an ignored timeout. Instead
delete and recreate. */
if (NULL != tq_timer) {
if (!DeleteTimerQueueTimer(NULL, tq_timer, NULL)) {
EG(timed_out) = 0;
tq_timer = NULL;
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Could not delete queued timer");
return;
}
tq_timer = NULL;
}
/* XXX passing NULL means the default timer queue provided by the system is used */
if (!CreateTimerQueueTimer(&tq_timer, NULL, (WAITORTIMERCALLBACK)tq_timer_cb, (VOID*)&EG(timed_out), seconds*1000, 0, WT_EXECUTEONLYONCE)) {
EG(timed_out) = 0;
tq_timer = NULL;
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Could not queue new timer");
return;
}
EG(timed_out) = 0;
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SETITIMER
{
struct itimerval t_r; /* timeout requested */
int signo;
if(seconds) {
t_r.it_value.tv_sec = seconds;
t_r.it_value.tv_usec = t_r.it_interval.tv_sec = t_r.it_interval.tv_usec = 0;
# ifdef __CYGWIN__
setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &t_r, NULL);
}
signo = SIGALRM;
# else
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &t_r, NULL);
}
signo = SIGPROF;
# endif
if (reset_signals) {
# ifdef ZEND_SIGNALS
zend_signal(signo, zend_timeout);
# else
sigset_t sigset;
signal(signo, zend_timeout);
sigemptyset(&sigset);
sigaddset(&sigset, signo);
sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &sigset, NULL);
# endif
}
}
# endif /* HAVE_SETITIMER */
#endif
}
/* }}} */
void zend_unset_timeout(void) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef ZEND_WIN32
if (NULL != tq_timer) {
if (!DeleteTimerQueueTimer(NULL, tq_timer, NULL)) {
EG(timed_out) = 0;
tq_timer = NULL;
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Could not delete queued timer");
return;
}
tq_timer = NULL;
}
EG(timed_out) = 0;
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SETITIMER
if (EG(timeout_seconds)) {
struct itimerval no_timeout;
no_timeout.it_value.tv_sec = no_timeout.it_value.tv_usec = no_timeout.it_interval.tv_sec = no_timeout.it_interval.tv_usec = 0;
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
setitimer(ITIMER_REAL, &no_timeout, NULL);
#else
setitimer(ITIMER_PROF, &no_timeout, NULL);
#endif
}
# endif
#endif
}
/* }}} */
zend_class_entry *zend_fetch_class(zend_string *class_name, int fetch_type) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *ce;
int fetch_sub_type = fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_MASK;
check_fetch_type:
switch (fetch_sub_type) {
case ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_SELF:
if (UNEXPECTED(!EG(scope))) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Cannot access self:: when no class scope is active");
}
return EG(scope);
case ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_PARENT:
if (UNEXPECTED(!EG(scope))) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Cannot access parent:: when no class scope is active");
return NULL;
}
if (UNEXPECTED(!EG(scope)->parent)) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Cannot access parent:: when current class scope has no parent");
}
return EG(scope)->parent;
case ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_STATIC:
ce = zend_get_called_scope(EG(current_execute_data));
if (UNEXPECTED(!ce)) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Cannot access static:: when no class scope is active");
return NULL;
}
return ce;
case ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_AUTO: {
fetch_sub_type = zend_get_class_fetch_type(class_name);
if (UNEXPECTED(fetch_sub_type != ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_DEFAULT)) {
goto check_fetch_type;
}
}
break;
}
if (fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_NO_AUTOLOAD) {
return zend_lookup_class_ex(class_name, NULL, 0);
} else if ((ce = zend_lookup_class_ex(class_name, NULL, 1)) == NULL) {
if (!(fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_SILENT) && !EG(exception)) {
if (fetch_sub_type == ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_INTERFACE) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Interface '%s' not found", ZSTR_VAL(class_name));
} else if (fetch_sub_type == ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_TRAIT) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Trait '%s' not found", ZSTR_VAL(class_name));
} else {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Class '%s' not found", ZSTR_VAL(class_name));
}
}
return NULL;
}
return ce;
}
/* }}} */
zend_class_entry *zend_fetch_class_by_name(zend_string *class_name, const zval *key, int fetch_type) /* {{{ */
{
zend_class_entry *ce;
if (fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_NO_AUTOLOAD) {
return zend_lookup_class_ex(class_name, key, 0);
} else if ((ce = zend_lookup_class_ex(class_name, key, 1)) == NULL) {
if ((fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_SILENT) == 0 && !EG(exception)) {
if ((fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_MASK) == ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_INTERFACE) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Interface '%s' not found", ZSTR_VAL(class_name));
} else if ((fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_MASK) == ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_TRAIT) {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Trait '%s' not found", ZSTR_VAL(class_name));
} else {
zend_throw_or_error(fetch_type, NULL, "Class '%s' not found", ZSTR_VAL(class_name));
}
}
return NULL;
}
return ce;
}
/* }}} */
#define MAX_ABSTRACT_INFO_CNT 3
#define MAX_ABSTRACT_INFO_FMT "%s%s%s%s"
#define DISPLAY_ABSTRACT_FN(idx) \
ai.afn[idx] ? ZEND_FN_SCOPE_NAME(ai.afn[idx]) : "", \
ai.afn[idx] ? "::" : "", \
ai.afn[idx] ? ZSTR_VAL(ai.afn[idx]->common.function_name) : "", \
ai.afn[idx] && ai.afn[idx + 1] ? ", " : (ai.afn[idx] && ai.cnt > MAX_ABSTRACT_INFO_CNT ? ", ..." : "")
typedef struct _zend_abstract_info {
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 14,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~AcceleratorControllerTest() {};
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool isabsolutepath(const char *path)
{
char ThreeChars[4];
if(path == NULL)
return FALSE;
if (path[0] == 0)
return FALSE;
strncpy(ThreeChars, path, 3);
ThreeChars[3] = 0;
if(ThreeChars[0] == DIR_CHAR)
return TRUE;
#ifdef CMS_IS_WINDOWS_
if (isalpha((int) ThreeChars[0]) && ThreeChars[1] == ':')
return TRUE;
#endif
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DRM_ENUM_NAME_FN(drm_get_dirty_info_name,
drm_dirty_info_enum_list)
struct drm_conn_prop_enum_list {
int type;
char *name;
int count;
};
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_ms_tag(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int ret;
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0);
avio_wl32(pb, track->tag); // store it byteswapped
track->par->codec_tag = av_bswap16(track->tag >> 16);
if ((ret = ff_put_wav_header(s, pb, track->par, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 19,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int touch(const char *path) {
return touch_file(path, false, USEC_INFINITY, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, MODE_INVALID);
}
Commit Message: basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nss_update_connecting_state(ssl_connect_state state, void *secret)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = (struct ssl_connect_data *)secret;
if(PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
/* an unrelated error is passing by */
return;
switch(connssl->connecting_state) {
case ssl_connect_2:
case ssl_connect_2_reading:
case ssl_connect_2_writing:
break;
default:
/* we are not called from an SSL handshake */
return;
}
/* update the state accordingly */
connssl->connecting_state = state;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 3,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XineramaGetCursorScreen(DeviceIntPtr pDev)
{
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
return pDev->spriteInfo->sprite->screen->myNum;
}
else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string EscapeCacheFileName(const std::string& filename) {
std::string escaped;
for (size_t i = 0; i < filename.size(); ++i) {
char c = filename[i];
if (c == '%' || c == '.' || c == '/') {
base::StringAppendF(&escaped, "%%%02X", c);
} else {
escaped.push_back(c);
}
}
return escaped;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mkdir, const char __user *, pathname, umode_t, mode)
{
return sys_mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, pathname, mode);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 10,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void withScriptStateObjMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
RefPtr<TestObject> result = imp->withScriptStateObj(&state);
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
v8SetReturnValue(info, result.release());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameSubmissionObserver::WaitForMetadataChange() {
Wait();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UINT32 GKI_get_os_tick_count(void) {
struct timespec timespec;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×pec);
return (timespec.tv_sec * 1000) + (timespec.tv_nsec / 1000000);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 3,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_id_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct task_struct *task;
struct seq_file *seq;
int ret = -EINVAL;
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
rcu_read_lock();
ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(task, user_ns));
rcu_read_unlock();
put_task_struct(task);
}
if (!ns)
goto err;
ret = seq_open(file, seq_ops);
if (ret)
goto err_put_ns;
seq = file->private_data;
seq->private = ns;
return 0;
err_put_ns:
put_user_ns(ns);
err:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: row_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_const_bytep fromBuffer, unsigned int bitWidth)
{
memcpy(toBuffer, fromBuffer, bitWidth >> 3);
if ((bitWidth & 7) != 0)
{
unsigned int mask;
toBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
fromBuffer += bitWidth >> 3;
/* The remaining bits are in the top of the byte, the mask is the bits to
* retain.
*/
mask = 0xff >> (bitWidth & 7);
*toBuffer = (png_byte)((*toBuffer & mask) | (*fromBuffer & ~mask));
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 18,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptExecutor* ExecuteCodeInTabFunction::GetScriptExecutor() {
Browser* browser = NULL;
content::WebContents* contents = NULL;
bool success =
GetTabById(execute_tab_id_, browser_context(), include_incognito(),
&browser, nullptr, &contents, nullptr, &error_) &&
contents && browser;
if (!success)
return NULL;
return TabHelper::FromWebContents(contents)->script_executor();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OneClickSigninSyncStarter::SigninDialogDelegate::SigninDialogDelegate(
base::WeakPtr<OneClickSigninSyncStarter> sync_starter)
: sync_starter_(sync_starter) {
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_seek_page_info(stb_vorbis *f, ProbedPage *z)
{
uint8 header[27], lacing[255];
int i,len;
z->page_start = stb_vorbis_get_file_offset(f);
getn(f, header, 27);
if (header[0] != 'O' || header[1] != 'g' || header[2] != 'g' || header[3] != 'S')
return 0;
getn(f, lacing, header[26]);
len = 0;
for (i=0; i < header[26]; ++i)
len += lacing[i];
z->page_end = z->page_start + 27 + header[26] + len;
z->last_decoded_sample = header[6] + (header[7] << 8) + (header[8] << 16) + (header[9] << 24);
set_file_offset(f, z->page_start);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimpleExtensionLoadPrompt::InstallUIProceed() {
if (extension_service_.get())
extension_service_->OnExtensionInstalled(
extension_, false, 0); // Not from web store.
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::ClearPendingMasterEntries() {
for (PendingMasters::iterator it = pending_master_entries_.begin();
it != pending_master_entries_.end(); ++it) {
PendingHosts& hosts = it->second;
for (PendingHosts::iterator host_it = hosts.begin();
host_it != hosts.end(); ++host_it) {
(*host_it)->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
pending_master_entries_.clear();
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int XKeyEventKeyCode(ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
int flags,
Display* display) {
const int keysym = XKeysymForWindowsKeyCode(key_code,
flags & ui::EF_SHIFT_DOWN);
return (keysym == XK_less) ? 59 : XKeysymToKeycode(display, keysym);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NameValueParserGetData(void * d, const char * datas, int l)
{
struct NameValueParserData * data = (struct NameValueParserData *)d;
if(strcmp(data->curelt, "NewPortListing") == 0)
{
/* specific case for NewPortListing which is a XML Document */
data->portListing = malloc(l + 1);
if(!data->portListing)
{
/* malloc error */
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error allocating memory",
"NameValueParserGetData");
#endif /* DEBUG */
return;
}
memcpy(data->portListing, datas, l);
data->portListing[l] = '\0';
data->portListingLength = l;
}
else
{
/* standard case. */
data->cdata = datas;
data->cdatalen = l;
}
}
Commit Message: properly initialize data structure for SOAP parsing in ParseNameValue()
topelt field was not properly initialized.
should fix #268
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: calc_load_n(unsigned long load, unsigned long exp,
unsigned long active, unsigned int n)
{
return calc_load(load, fixed_power_int(exp, FSHIFT, n), active);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DesktopMediaID MediaStreamManager::ResolveTabCaptureDeviceIdOnUIThread(
const std::string& capture_device_id,
int requesting_process_id,
int requesting_frame_id,
const GURL& origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
return DesktopStreamsRegistry::GetInstance()->RequestMediaForStreamId(
capture_device_id, requesting_process_id, requesting_frame_id, origin,
nullptr, kRegistryStreamTypeTab);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pop_fetch_mail(void)
{
char buffer[LONG_STRING];
char msgbuf[SHORT_STRING];
char *url = NULL, *p = NULL;
int delanswer, last = 0, msgs, bytes, rset = 0, ret;
struct Connection *conn = NULL;
struct Context ctx;
struct Message *msg = NULL;
struct Account acct;
struct PopData *pop_data = NULL;
if (!PopHost)
{
mutt_error(_("POP host is not defined."));
return;
}
url = p = mutt_mem_calloc(strlen(PopHost) + 7, sizeof(char));
if (url_check_scheme(PopHost) == U_UNKNOWN)
{
strcpy(url, "pop://");
p = strchr(url, '\0');
}
strcpy(p, PopHost);
ret = pop_parse_path(url, &acct);
FREE(&url);
if (ret)
{
mutt_error(_("%s is an invalid POP path"), PopHost);
return;
}
conn = mutt_conn_find(NULL, &acct);
if (!conn)
return;
pop_data = mutt_mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct PopData));
pop_data->conn = conn;
if (pop_open_connection(pop_data) < 0)
{
mutt_socket_free(pop_data->conn);
FREE(&pop_data);
return;
}
conn->data = pop_data;
mutt_message(_("Checking for new messages..."));
/* find out how many messages are in the mailbox. */
mutt_str_strfcpy(buffer, "STAT\r\n", sizeof(buffer));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (ret == -1)
goto fail;
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
goto finish;
}
sscanf(buffer, "+OK %d %d", &msgs, &bytes);
/* only get unread messages */
if (msgs > 0 && PopLast)
{
mutt_str_strfcpy(buffer, "LAST\r\n", sizeof(buffer));
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (ret == -1)
goto fail;
if (ret == 0)
sscanf(buffer, "+OK %d", &last);
}
if (msgs <= last)
{
mutt_message(_("No new mail in POP mailbox."));
goto finish;
}
if (mx_mbox_open(NONULL(Spoolfile), MUTT_APPEND, &ctx) == NULL)
goto finish;
delanswer = query_quadoption(PopDelete, _("Delete messages from server?"));
snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf),
ngettext("Reading new messages (%d byte)...",
"Reading new messages (%d bytes)...", bytes),
bytes);
mutt_message("%s", msgbuf);
for (int i = last + 1; i <= msgs; i++)
{
msg = mx_msg_open_new(&ctx, NULL, MUTT_ADD_FROM);
if (!msg)
ret = -3;
else
{
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "RETR %d\r\n", i);
ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, buffer, NULL, fetch_message, msg->fp);
if (ret == -3)
rset = 1;
if (ret == 0 && mx_msg_commit(&ctx, msg) != 0)
{
rset = 1;
ret = -3;
}
mx_msg_close(&ctx, &msg);
}
if (ret == 0 && delanswer == MUTT_YES)
{
/* delete the message on the server */
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "DELE %d\r\n", i);
ret = pop_query(pop_data, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
}
if (ret == -1)
{
mx_mbox_close(&ctx, NULL);
goto fail;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
break;
}
if (ret == -3)
{
mutt_error(_("Error while writing mailbox!"));
break;
}
/* L10N: The plural is picked by the second numerical argument, i.e.
* the %d right before 'messages', i.e. the total number of messages. */
mutt_message(ngettext("%s [%d of %d message read]",
"%s [%d of %d messages read]", msgs - last),
msgbuf, i - last, msgs - last);
}
mx_mbox_close(&ctx, NULL);
if (rset)
{
/* make sure no messages get deleted */
mutt_str_strfcpy(buffer, "RSET\r\n", sizeof(buffer));
if (pop_query(pop_data, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) == -1)
goto fail;
}
finish:
/* exit gracefully */
mutt_str_strfcpy(buffer, "QUIT\r\n", sizeof(buffer));
if (pop_query(pop_data, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) == -1)
goto fail;
mutt_socket_close(conn);
FREE(&pop_data);
return;
fail:
mutt_error(_("Server closed connection!"));
mutt_socket_close(conn);
FREE(&pop_data);
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 22,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_drop_xobject_imp(fz_context *ctx, fz_storable *xobj_)
{
pdf_xobject *xobj = (pdf_xobject *)xobj_;
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, xobj->obj);
fz_free(ctx, xobj);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int process_metadata(AVFormatContext *s, const uint8_t *name, uint16_t name_len,
uint16_t val_len, uint16_t type, AVDictionary **met)
{
int ret;
ff_asf_guid guid;
if (val_len) {
switch (type) {
case ASF_UNICODE:
asf_read_value(s, name, val_len, type, met);
break;
case ASF_BYTE_ARRAY:
if (!strcmp(name, "WM/Picture")) // handle cover art
asf_read_picture(s, val_len);
else if (!strcmp(name, "ID3")) // handle ID3 tag
get_id3_tag(s, val_len);
else
asf_read_value(s, name, val_len, type, met);
break;
case ASF_GUID:
ff_get_guid(s->pb, &guid);
break;
default:
if ((ret = asf_set_metadata(s, name, type, met)) < 0)
return ret;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ops_make_string_pool(regex_t* reg)
{
int i;
int len;
int size;
UChar* pool;
UChar* curr;
size = ops_calc_size_of_string_pool(reg);
if (size <= 0) {
return 0;
}
curr = pool = (UChar* )xmalloc((size_t )size);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(pool);
for (i = 0; i < (int )reg->ops_used; i++) {
enum OpCode opcode;
Operation* op;
op = reg->ops + i;
#ifdef USE_DIRECT_THREADED_CODE
opcode = *(reg->ocs + i);
#else
opcode = op->opcode;
#endif
switch (opcode) {
case OP_EXACTMBN:
len = op->exact_len_n.len * op->exact_len_n.n;
xmemcpy(curr, op->exact_len_n.s, len);
xfree(op->exact_len_n.s);
op->exact_len_n.s = curr;
curr += len;
break;
case OP_EXACTN:
case OP_EXACTN_IC:
len = op->exact_n.n;
copy:
xmemcpy(curr, op->exact_n.s, len);
xfree(op->exact_n.s);
op->exact_n.s = curr;
curr += len;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB2N:
len = op->exact_n.n * 2;
goto copy;
break;
case OP_EXACTMB3N:
len = op->exact_n.n * 3;
goto copy;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
reg->string_pool = pool;
reg->string_pool_end = pool + size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 23,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cgsleep_us_r(cgtimer_t *ts_start, int64_t us)
{
struct timespec ts_diff;
us_to_timespec(&ts_diff, us);
cgsleep_spec(&ts_diff, ts_start);
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SVGLayoutSupport::screenScaleFactorChanged(const LayoutObject* ancestor)
{
for (; ancestor; ancestor = ancestor->parent()) {
if (ancestor->isSVGRoot())
return toLayoutSVGRoot(ancestor)->didScreenScaleFactorChange();
if (ancestor->isSVGTransformableContainer())
return toLayoutSVGTransformableContainer(ancestor)->didScreenScaleFactorChange();
if (ancestor->isSVGViewportContainer())
return toLayoutSVGViewportContainer(ancestor)->didScreenScaleFactorChange();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void power_pmu_setup(int cpu)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu);
if (!ppmu)
return;
memset(cpuhw, 0, sizeof(*cpuhw));
cpuhw->mmcr[0] = MMCR0_FC;
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void crypto_inc_byte(u8 *a, unsigned int size)
{
u8 *b = (a + size);
u8 c;
for (; size; size--) {
c = *--b + 1;
*b = c;
if (c)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha1_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int i, index, padlen;
__be32 *dst = (__be32 *)out;
__be64 bits;
static const u8 padding[SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0x80, };
bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
/* Pad out to 56 mod 64 and append length */
index = sctx->count % SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
padlen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE+56) - index);
/* We need to fill a whole block for __sha1_update() */
if (padlen <= 56) {
sctx->count += padlen;
memcpy(sctx->buffer + index, padding, padlen);
} else {
__sha1_update(sctx, padding, padlen, index);
}
__sha1_update(sctx, (const u8 *)&bits, sizeof(bits), 56);
/* Store state in digest */
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
dst[i] = cpu_to_be32(sctx->state[i]);
/* Wipe context */
memset(sctx, 0, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void t2p_read_tiff_init(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input){
tdir_t directorycount=0;
tdir_t i=0;
uint16 pagen=0;
uint16 paged=0;
uint16 xuint16=0;
directorycount=TIFFNumberOfDirectories(input);
t2p->tiff_pages = (T2P_PAGE*) _TIFFmalloc(TIFFSafeMultiply(tmsize_t,directorycount,sizeof(T2P_PAGE)));
if(t2p->tiff_pages==NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory for tiff_pages array, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) directorycount * sizeof(T2P_PAGE),
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
_TIFFmemset( t2p->tiff_pages, 0x00, directorycount * sizeof(T2P_PAGE));
t2p->tiff_tiles = (T2P_TILES*) _TIFFmalloc(TIFFSafeMultiply(tmsize_t,directorycount,sizeof(T2P_TILES)));
if(t2p->tiff_tiles==NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory for tiff_tiles array, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) directorycount * sizeof(T2P_TILES),
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
_TIFFmemset( t2p->tiff_tiles, 0x00, directorycount * sizeof(T2P_TILES));
for(i=0;i<directorycount;i++){
uint32 subfiletype = 0;
if(!TIFFSetDirectory(input, i)){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't set directory %u of input file %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, &pagen, &paged)){
if((pagen>paged) && (paged != 0)){
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_number =
paged;
} else {
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_number =
pagen;
}
goto ispage2;
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE, &subfiletype)){
if ( ((subfiletype & FILETYPE_PAGE) != 0)
|| (subfiletype == 0)){
goto ispage;
} else {
goto isnotpage;
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_OSUBFILETYPE, &subfiletype)){
if ((subfiletype == OFILETYPE_IMAGE)
|| (subfiletype == OFILETYPE_PAGE)
|| (subfiletype == 0) ){
goto ispage;
} else {
goto isnotpage;
}
}
ispage:
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_number=t2p->tiff_pagecount;
ispage2:
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_directory=i;
if(TIFFIsTiled(input)){
t2p->tiff_pages[t2p->tiff_pagecount].page_tilecount =
TIFFNumberOfTiles(input);
}
t2p->tiff_pagecount++;
isnotpage:
(void)0;
}
qsort((void*) t2p->tiff_pages, t2p->tiff_pagecount,
sizeof(T2P_PAGE), t2p_cmp_t2p_page);
for(i=0;i<t2p->tiff_pagecount;i++){
t2p->pdf_xrefcount += 5;
TIFFSetDirectory(input, t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_directory );
if((TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, &xuint16)
&& (xuint16==PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE))
|| TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_INDEXED, &xuint16)) {
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra++;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount++;
}
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, &xuint16)) {
if( (xuint16== COMPRESSION_DEFLATE ||
xuint16== COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE) &&
((t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_tilecount != 0)
|| TIFFNumberOfStrips(input)==1) &&
(t2p->pdf_nopassthrough==0) ){
if(t2p->pdf_minorversion<2){t2p->pdf_minorversion=2;}
}
}
#endif
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_TRANSFERFUNCTION,
&(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[0]),
&(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[1]),
&(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[2]))) {
if((t2p->tiff_transferfunction[1] != (float*) NULL) &&
(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[2] != (float*) NULL) &&
(t2p->tiff_transferfunction[1] !=
t2p->tiff_transferfunction[0])) {
t2p->tiff_transferfunctioncount = 3;
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra += 4;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount += 4;
} else {
t2p->tiff_transferfunctioncount = 1;
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra += 2;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount += 2;
}
if(t2p->pdf_minorversion < 2)
t2p->pdf_minorversion = 2;
} else {
t2p->tiff_transferfunctioncount=0;
}
if( TIFFGetField(
input,
TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE,
&(t2p->tiff_iccprofilelength),
&(t2p->tiff_iccprofile)) != 0){
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_extra++;
t2p->pdf_xrefcount++;
if(t2p->pdf_minorversion<3){t2p->pdf_minorversion=3;}
}
t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount=
t2p->tiff_pages[i].page_tilecount;
if( (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &xuint16) != 0)
&& (xuint16 == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE ) ){
if( !TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, &xuint16) )
{
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Missing SamplesPerPixel, %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
if( (t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount % xuint16) != 0 )
{
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Invalid tile count, %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount/= xuint16;
}
if( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount > 0){
t2p->pdf_xrefcount +=
(t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount -1)*2;
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,
&( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilewidth) );
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,
&( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilelength) );
t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tiles =
(T2P_TILE*) _TIFFmalloc(TIFFSafeMultiply(tmsize_t,t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount,
sizeof(T2P_TILE)) );
if( t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tiles == NULL){
TIFFError(
TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate " TIFF_SIZE_FORMAT " bytes of memory for t2p_read_tiff_init, %s",
(TIFF_SIZE_T) t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tilecount * sizeof(T2P_TILE),
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return;
}
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 16,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetSchemesBypassingSecureContextCheckWhitelist(
std::set<std::string>* schemes) {
*schemes = secure_origin_whitelist::GetSchemesBypassingSecureContextCheck();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tcp_simple_retransmit(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int mss = tcp_current_mss(sk);
u32 prior_lost = tp->lost_out;
tcp_for_write_queue(skb, sk) {
if (skb == tcp_send_head(sk))
break;
if (tcp_skb_seglen(skb) > mss &&
!(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)) {
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS) {
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked &= ~TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS;
tp->retrans_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
tcp_skb_mark_lost_uncond_verify(tp, skb);
}
}
tcp_clear_retrans_hints_partial(tp);
if (prior_lost == tp->lost_out)
return;
if (tcp_is_reno(tp))
tcp_limit_reno_sacked(tp);
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
/* Don't muck with the congestion window here.
* Reason is that we do not increase amount of _data_
* in network, but units changed and effective
* cwnd/ssthresh really reduced now.
*/
if (icsk->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Loss) {
tp->high_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
tp->snd_ssthresh = tcp_current_ssthresh(sk);
tp->prior_ssthresh = 0;
tp->undo_marker = 0;
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Loss);
}
tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(sk);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *jas_image_fmttostr(int fmt)
{
jas_image_fmtinfo_t *fmtinfo;
if (!(fmtinfo = jas_image_lookupfmtbyid(fmt))) {
return 0;
}
return fmtinfo->name;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_NegHints(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred, gss_buffer_t *outbuf)
{
gss_buffer_desc hintNameBuf;
gss_name_t hintName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_name_t hintKerberosName;
gss_OID hintNameType;
OM_uint32 major_status;
OM_uint32 minor;
unsigned int tlen = 0;
unsigned int hintNameSize = 0;
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned char *t;
*outbuf = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
if (spcred != NULL) {
major_status = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status,
spcred->mcred,
&hintName,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (major_status);
}
if (hintName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
krb5_error_code code;
krb5int_access kaccess;
char hostname[HOST_PREFIX_LEN + MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1] = HOST_PREFIX;
code = krb5int_accessor(&kaccess, KRB5INT_ACCESS_VERSION);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
/* this breaks mutual authentication but Samba relies on it */
code = (*kaccess.clean_hostname)(NULL, NULL,
&hostname[HOST_PREFIX_LEN],
MAXHOSTNAMELEN);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return (GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
hintNameBuf.value = hostname;
hintNameBuf.length = strlen(hostname);
major_status = gss_import_name(minor_status,
&hintNameBuf,
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
&hintName);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
return (major_status);
}
}
hintNameBuf.value = NULL;
hintNameBuf.length = 0;
major_status = gss_canonicalize_name(minor_status,
hintName,
(gss_OID)&gss_mech_krb5_oid,
&hintKerberosName);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
gss_release_name(&minor, &hintName);
return (major_status);
}
gss_release_name(&minor, &hintName);
major_status = gss_display_name(minor_status,
hintKerberosName,
&hintNameBuf,
&hintNameType);
if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
gss_release_name(&minor, &hintName);
return (major_status);
}
gss_release_name(&minor, &hintKerberosName);
/*
* Now encode the name hint into a NegHints ASN.1 type
*/
major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
/* Length of DER encoded GeneralString */
tlen = 1 + gssint_der_length_size(hintNameBuf.length) +
hintNameBuf.length;
hintNameSize = tlen;
/* Length of DER encoded hintName */
tlen += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(hintNameSize);
t = gssalloc_malloc(tlen);
if (t == NULL) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
goto errout;
}
ptr = t;
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x00; /* hintName identifier */
if (gssint_put_der_length(hintNameSize,
&ptr, tlen - (int)(ptr-t)))
goto errout;
*ptr++ = GENERAL_STRING;
if (gssint_put_der_length(hintNameBuf.length,
&ptr, tlen - (int)(ptr-t)))
goto errout;
memcpy(ptr, hintNameBuf.value, hintNameBuf.length);
ptr += hintNameBuf.length;
*outbuf = (gss_buffer_t)malloc(sizeof(gss_buffer_desc));
if (*outbuf == NULL) {
*minor_status = ENOMEM;
goto errout;
}
(*outbuf)->value = (void *)t;
(*outbuf)->length = ptr - t;
t = NULL; /* don't free */
*minor_status = 0;
major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
errout:
if (t != NULL) {
free(t);
}
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hintNameBuf);
return (major_status);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 20,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TargetHandler::Throttle::Clear() {
CleanupPointers();
if (agent_host_) {
agent_host_ = nullptr;
Resume();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DevToolsWindow::GetMinimizedHeight() {
const int kMinimizedDevToolsHeight = 24;
return kMinimizedDevToolsHeight;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_cpch_channel_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info)
{
gboolean is_control_frame;
/* Header CRC */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_header_crc, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* Frame Type */
is_control_frame = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_ft, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, is_control_frame ? " [Control] " : " [Data] ");
if (is_control_frame) {
dissect_common_control(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, p_fp_info);
}
else {
guint cfn;
guint header_length = 0;
/* DATA */
/* CFN */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "CFN=%03u ", cfn);
/* TFI */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cpch_tfi, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Propagation delay */
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_fp_propagation_delay, tvb, offset, 1,
tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) * 3);
offset++;
header_length = offset; /* XXX this might be wrong */
/* TB data */
offset = dissect_tb_data(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, p_fp_info, NULL, NULL);
/* CRCIs */
offset = dissect_crci_bits(tvb, pinfo, tree, p_fp_info, offset);
/* Spare Extension and Payload CRC */
dissect_spare_extension_and_crc(tvb, pinfo, tree, 1, offset, header_length);
}
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ctl_table_header *__register_sysctl_paths(
struct ctl_table_root *root,
struct nsproxy *namespaces,
const struct ctl_path *path, struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct ctl_table_header *header;
struct ctl_table *new, **prevp;
unsigned int n, npath;
struct ctl_table_set *set;
/* Count the path components */
for (npath = 0; path[npath].procname; ++npath)
;
/*
* For each path component, allocate a 2-element ctl_table array.
* The first array element will be filled with the sysctl entry
* for this, the second will be the sentinel (procname == 0).
*
* We allocate everything in one go so that we don't have to
* worry about freeing additional memory in unregister_sysctl_table.
*/
header = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ctl_table_header) +
(2 * npath * sizeof(struct ctl_table)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!header)
return NULL;
new = (struct ctl_table *) (header + 1);
/* Now connect the dots */
prevp = &header->ctl_table;
for (n = 0; n < npath; ++n, ++path) {
/* Copy the procname */
new->procname = path->procname;
new->mode = 0555;
*prevp = new;
prevp = &new->child;
new += 2;
}
*prevp = table;
header->ctl_table_arg = table;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&header->ctl_entry);
header->used = 0;
header->unregistering = NULL;
header->root = root;
sysctl_set_parent(NULL, header->ctl_table);
header->count = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL_CHECK
if (sysctl_check_table(namespaces, header->ctl_table)) {
kfree(header);
return NULL;
}
#endif
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
header->set = lookup_header_set(root, namespaces);
header->attached_by = header->ctl_table;
header->attached_to = root_table;
header->parent = &root_table_header;
for (set = header->set; set; set = set->parent) {
struct ctl_table_header *p;
list_for_each_entry(p, &set->list, ctl_entry) {
if (p->unregistering)
continue;
try_attach(p, header);
}
}
header->parent->count++;
list_add_tail(&header->ctl_entry, &header->set->list);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
return header;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_property_node(Node **np, ScanEnv* env, const char* propname)
{
int r;
CClassNode* cc;
*np = node_new_cclass();
if (IS_NULL(*np)) return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
cc = NCCLASS(*np);
r = add_property_to_cc(cc, propname, 0, env);
if (r != 0)
onig_node_free(*np);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceFetcher::~ResourceFetcher()
{
m_documentLoader = 0;
m_document = nullptr;
clearPreloads();
ASSERT(!m_requestCount);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs41_test_stateid(struct nfs_server *server, nfs4_stateid *stateid)
{
int status;
struct nfs41_test_stateid_args args = {
.stateid = stateid,
};
struct nfs41_test_stateid_res res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_TEST_STATEID],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
nfs41_init_sequence(&args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
status = nfs4_call_sync_sequence(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status == NFS_OK)
return res.status;
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* GetEmbedderForGuest(content::WebContents* guest) {
CHECK(guest);
return static_cast<content::WebContentsImpl*>(guest)->GetOuterWebContents();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PPB_Widget_Impl::GetLocation(PP_Rect* location) {
*location = location_;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sas_target_destroy(struct scsi_target *starget)
{
struct domain_device *found_dev = starget->hostdata;
if (!found_dev)
return;
starget->hostdata = NULL;
sas_put_device(found_dev);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,811
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: megasas_read_fw_status_reg_xscale(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
return readl(&instance->reg_set->outbound_msg_0);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 21,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __fire_sched_in_preempt_notifiers(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct preempt_notifier *notifier;
hlist_for_each_entry(notifier, &curr->preempt_notifiers, link)
notifier->ops->sched_in(notifier, raw_smp_processor_id());
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::goBack() {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return;
}
d->proxy_->goBack();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::didFailLoad(WebFrame* frame, const WebURLError& error) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, DidFailLoad(frame, error));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t timerfd_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct timerfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
ssize_t res;
u64 ticks = 0;
if (count < sizeof(ticks))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->wqh.lock);
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
res = -EAGAIN;
else
res = wait_event_interruptible_locked_irq(ctx->wqh, ctx->ticks);
/*
* If clock has changed, we do not care about the
* ticks and we do not rearm the timer. Userspace must
* reevaluate anyway.
*/
if (timerfd_canceled(ctx)) {
ctx->ticks = 0;
ctx->expired = 0;
res = -ECANCELED;
}
if (ctx->ticks) {
ticks = ctx->ticks;
if (ctx->expired && ctx->tintv) {
/*
* If tintv != 0, this is a periodic timer that
* needs to be re-armed. We avoid doing it in the timer
* callback to avoid DoS attacks specifying a very
* short timer period.
*/
if (isalarm(ctx)) {
ticks += alarm_forward_now(
&ctx->t.alarm, ctx->tintv) - 1;
alarm_restart(&ctx->t.alarm);
} else {
ticks += hrtimer_forward_now(&ctx->t.tmr,
ctx->tintv) - 1;
hrtimer_restart(&ctx->t.tmr);
}
}
ctx->expired = 0;
ctx->ticks = 0;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->wqh.lock);
if (ticks)
res = put_user(ticks, (u64 __user *) buf) ? -EFAULT: sizeof(ticks);
return res;
}
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 1,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_deassign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_pci_dev *assigned_dev)
{
int r = 0;
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
match = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id);
if (!match) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: device hasn't been assigned before, "
"so cannot be deassigned\n", __func__);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
kvm_deassign_device(kvm, match);
kvm_free_assigned_device(kvm, match);
out:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <hamo.by@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XMLHttpRequest::send(const String& body, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!initSend(es))
return;
if (!body.isNull() && areMethodAndURLValidForSend()) {
String contentType = getRequestHeader("Content-Type");
if (contentType.isEmpty()) {
setRequestHeaderInternal("Content-Type", "text/plain;charset=UTF-8");
} else {
replaceCharsetInMediaType(contentType, "UTF-8");
m_requestHeaders.set("Content-Type", contentType);
}
m_requestEntityBody = FormData::create(UTF8Encoding().encode(body, WTF::EntitiesForUnencodables));
if (m_upload)
m_requestEntityBody->setAlwaysStream(true);
}
createRequest(es);
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::AbortWithError(
int64_t transaction_id,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks,
const IndexedDBDatabaseError& error) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
callbacks->OnError(error);
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->AbortTransaction(transaction, error);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofpact_hdrs_equal(const struct ofpact_hdrs *a,
const struct ofpact_hdrs *b)
{
return (a->vendor == b->vendor
&& a->type == b->type
&& a->ofp_version == b->ofp_version);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltUnregisterAllExtModuleElement(void)
{
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
xmlHashFree(xsltElementsHash, (xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtElement);
xsltElementsHash = NULL;
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::SelectionChanged(const string16& text,
size_t offset,
const ui::Range& range) {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase::SelectionChanged(text, offset, range);
if (text.empty() || range.is_empty() || !content_view_core_)
return;
size_t pos = range.GetMin() - offset;
size_t n = range.length();
DCHECK(pos + n <= text.length()) << "The text can not fully cover range.";
if (pos >= text.length()) {
NOTREACHED() << "The text can not cover range.";
return;
}
std::string utf8_selection = UTF16ToUTF8(text.substr(pos, n));
content_view_core_->OnSelectionChanged(utf8_selection);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,085
|
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