instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcXResQueryClientResources(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXResQueryClientResourcesReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXResQueryClientResourcesReq);
swapl(&stuff->xid);
return ProcXResQueryClientResources(client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cff_lookup_glyph_by_stdcharcode( CFF_Font cff,
FT_Int charcode )
{
FT_UInt n;
FT_UShort glyph_sid;
/* CID-keyed fonts don't have glyph names */
if ( !cff->charset.sids )
return -1;
/* check range of standard char code */
if ( charcode < 0 || charcode > 255 )
return -1;
/* Get code to SID mapping from `cff_standard_encoding'. */
glyph_sid = cff_get_standard_encoding( (FT_UInt)charcode );
for ( n = 0; n < cff->num_glyphs; n++ )
{
if ( cff->charset.sids[n] == glyph_sid )
return n;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedByte(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint8* value)
{
(void) tif;
*value=*(uint8*)(&direntry->tdir_offset);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 8,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: msg_write (int fd, struct msg *msg)
{
u_char buf[OSPF_API_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
int l;
int wlen;
assert (msg);
assert (msg->s);
/* Length of message including header */
l = sizeof (struct apimsghdr) + ntohs (msg->hdr.msglen);
/* Make contiguous memory buffer for message */
memcpy (buf, &msg->hdr, sizeof (struct apimsghdr));
memcpy (buf + sizeof (struct apimsghdr), STREAM_DATA (msg->s),
ntohs (msg->hdr.msglen));
wlen = writen (fd, buf, l);
if (wlen < 0)
{
zlog_warn ("msg_write: writen %s", safe_strerror (errno));
return -1;
}
else if (wlen == 0)
{
zlog_warn ("msg_write: Connection closed by peer");
return -1;
}
else if (wlen != l)
{
zlog_warn ("msg_write: Cannot write API message");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
struct file *file, const struct open_flags *op,
int *opened, struct filename *name)
{
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
int open_flag = op->open_flag;
bool will_truncate = (open_flag & O_TRUNC) != 0;
bool got_write = false;
int acc_mode = op->acc_mode;
struct inode *inode;
bool symlink_ok = false;
struct path save_parent = { .dentry = NULL, .mnt = NULL };
bool retried = false;
int error;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags |= op->intent;
if (nd->last_type != LAST_NORM) {
error = handle_dots(nd, nd->last_type);
if (error)
return error;
goto finish_open;
}
if (!(open_flag & O_CREAT)) {
if (nd->last.name[nd->last.len])
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
if (open_flag & O_PATH && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_FOLLOW))
symlink_ok = true;
/* we _can_ be in RCU mode here */
error = lookup_fast(nd, path, &inode);
if (likely(!error))
goto finish_lookup;
if (error < 0)
goto out;
BUG_ON(nd->inode != dir->d_inode);
} else {
/* create side of things */
/*
* This will *only* deal with leaving RCU mode - LOOKUP_JUMPED
* has been cleared when we got to the last component we are
* about to look up
*/
error = complete_walk(nd);
if (error)
return error;
audit_inode(name, dir, LOOKUP_PARENT);
error = -EISDIR;
/* trailing slashes? */
if (nd->last.name[nd->last.len])
goto out;
}
retry_lookup:
if (op->open_flag & (O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR)) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (!error)
got_write = true;
/*
* do _not_ fail yet - we might not need that or fail with
* a different error; let lookup_open() decide; we'll be
* dropping this one anyway.
*/
}
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
error = lookup_open(nd, path, file, op, got_write, opened);
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (error <= 0) {
if (error)
goto out;
if ((*opened & FILE_CREATED) ||
!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
will_truncate = false;
audit_inode(name, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
goto opened;
}
if (*opened & FILE_CREATED) {
/* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */
open_flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
will_truncate = false;
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN;
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
goto finish_open_created;
}
/*
* create/update audit record if it already exists.
*/
if (d_is_positive(path->dentry))
audit_inode(name, path->dentry, 0);
/*
* If atomic_open() acquired write access it is dropped now due to
* possible mount and symlink following (this might be optimized away if
* necessary...)
*/
if (got_write) {
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
got_write = false;
}
error = -EEXIST;
if ((open_flag & (O_EXCL | O_CREAT)) == (O_EXCL | O_CREAT))
goto exit_dput;
error = follow_managed(path, nd->flags);
if (error < 0)
goto exit_dput;
if (error)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
BUG_ON(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_is_negative(path->dentry)) {
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
goto out;
}
finish_lookup:
/* we _can_ be in RCU mode here */
if (should_follow_link(path->dentry, !symlink_ok)) {
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlikely(nd->path.mnt != path->mnt ||
unlazy_walk(nd, path->dentry))) {
error = -ECHILD;
goto out;
}
}
BUG_ON(inode != path->dentry->d_inode);
return 1;
}
if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) || nd->path.mnt != path->mnt) {
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
} else {
save_parent.dentry = nd->path.dentry;
save_parent.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
}
nd->inode = inode;
/* Why this, you ask? _Now_ we might have grown LOOKUP_JUMPED... */
finish_open:
error = complete_walk(nd);
if (error) {
path_put(&save_parent);
return error;
}
audit_inode(name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
error = -EISDIR;
if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry))
goto out;
error = -ENOTDIR;
if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) && !d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry))
goto out;
if (!d_is_reg(nd->path.dentry))
will_truncate = false;
if (will_truncate) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (error)
goto out;
got_write = true;
}
finish_open_created:
error = may_open(&nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (error)
goto out;
BUG_ON(*opened & FILE_OPENED); /* once it's opened, it's opened */
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file, current_cred());
if (!error) {
*opened |= FILE_OPENED;
} else {
if (error == -EOPENSTALE)
goto stale_open;
goto out;
}
opened:
error = open_check_o_direct(file);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode, *opened);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
if (will_truncate) {
error = handle_truncate(file);
if (error)
goto exit_fput;
}
out:
if (got_write)
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
path_put(&save_parent);
terminate_walk(nd);
return error;
exit_dput:
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
goto out;
exit_fput:
fput(file);
goto out;
stale_open:
/* If no saved parent or already retried then can't retry */
if (!save_parent.dentry || retried)
goto out;
BUG_ON(save_parent.dentry != dir);
path_put(&nd->path);
nd->path = save_parent;
nd->inode = dir->d_inode;
save_parent.mnt = NULL;
save_parent.dentry = NULL;
if (got_write) {
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
got_write = false;
}
retried = true;
goto retry_lookup;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->getIntegralAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectlongattributeAttr));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_entries_to_user(unsigned int total_size,
const struct xt_table *table,
void __user *userptr)
{
unsigned int off, num;
const struct ip6t_entry *e;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
int ret = 0;
const void *loc_cpu_entry;
counters = alloc_counters(table);
if (IS_ERR(counters))
return PTR_ERR(counters);
loc_cpu_entry = private->entries;
/* FIXME: use iterator macros --RR */
/* ... then go back and fix counters and names */
for (off = 0, num = 0; off < total_size; off += e->next_offset, num++){
unsigned int i;
const struct xt_entry_match *m;
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
e = loc_cpu_entry + off;
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off, e, sizeof(*e))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
if (copy_to_user(userptr + off
+ offsetof(struct ip6t_entry, counters),
&counters[num],
sizeof(counters[num])) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
for (i = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry);
i < e->target_offset;
i += m->u.match_size) {
m = (void *)e + i;
if (xt_match_to_user(m, userptr + off + i)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (xt_target_to_user(t, userptr + off + e->target_offset)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_counters;
}
}
free_counters:
vfree(counters);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 18,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_var_value(const gchar *name, gchar *val) {
uzbl_cmdprop *c = NULL;
char *endp = NULL;
char *buf = NULL;
char *invalid_chars = "^°!\"§$%&/()=?'`'+~*'#-.:,;@<>| \\{}[]¹²³¼½";
GString *msg;
if( (c = g_hash_table_lookup(uzbl.comm.proto_var, name)) ) {
if(!c->writeable) return FALSE;
msg = g_string_new(name);
/* check for the variable type */
if (c->type == TYPE_STR) {
buf = g_strdup(val);
g_free(*c->ptr.s);
*c->ptr.s = buf;
g_string_append_printf(msg, " str %s", buf);
} else if(c->type == TYPE_INT) {
*c->ptr.i = (int)strtoul(val, &endp, 10);
g_string_append_printf(msg, " int %d", *c->ptr.i);
} else if (c->type == TYPE_FLOAT) {
*c->ptr.f = strtod(val, &endp);
g_string_append_printf(msg, " float %f", *c->ptr.f);
}
send_event(VARIABLE_SET, msg->str, NULL);
g_string_free(msg,TRUE);
/* invoke a command specific function */
if(c->func) c->func();
} else {
/* check wether name violates our naming scheme */
if(strpbrk(name, invalid_chars)) {
if (uzbl.state.verbose)
printf("Invalid variable name\n");
return FALSE;
}
/* custom vars */
c = g_malloc(sizeof(uzbl_cmdprop));
c->type = TYPE_STR;
c->dump = 0;
c->func = NULL;
c->writeable = 1;
buf = g_strdup(val);
c->ptr.s = g_malloc(sizeof(char *));
*c->ptr.s = buf;
g_hash_table_insert(uzbl.comm.proto_var,
g_strdup(name), (gpointer) c);
msg = g_string_new(name);
g_string_append_printf(msg, " str %s", buf);
send_event(VARIABLE_SET, msg->str, NULL);
g_string_free(msg,TRUE);
}
update_title();
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnStreamCreated(
int stream_id,
base::SharedMemory* shared_memory,
base::CancelableSyncSocket* foreign_socket) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!PeerHandle()) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Renderer process handle is invalid.";
OnStreamError(stream_id);
return;
}
if (!LookupById(stream_id)) {
OnStreamError(stream_id);
return;
}
base::SharedMemoryHandle foreign_memory_handle;
base::SyncSocket::TransitDescriptor socket_descriptor;
size_t shared_memory_size = shared_memory->requested_size();
if (!(shared_memory->ShareToProcess(PeerHandle(), &foreign_memory_handle) &&
foreign_socket->PrepareTransitDescriptor(PeerHandle(),
&socket_descriptor))) {
OnStreamError(stream_id);
return;
}
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyStreamCreated(
stream_id, foreign_memory_handle, socket_descriptor,
base::checked_cast<uint32_t>(shared_memory_size)));
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ut64 MACH0_(get_baddr)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
int i;
if (bin->hdr.filetype != MH_EXECUTE && bin->hdr.filetype != MH_DYLINKER) {
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsegs; ++i) {
if (bin->segs[i].fileoff == 0 && bin->segs[i].filesize != 0) {
return bin->segs[i].vmaddr;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 12,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(void*) iw_mallocz(struct iw_context *ctx, size_t n)
{
return iw_malloc_ex(ctx,IW_MALLOCFLAG_ZEROMEM,n);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
| 0
| 8,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext4_da_page_release_reservation(struct page *page,
unsigned long offset)
{
int to_release = 0;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh;
unsigned int curr_off = 0;
head = page_buffers(page);
bh = head;
do {
unsigned int next_off = curr_off + bh->b_size;
if ((offset <= curr_off) && (buffer_delay(bh))) {
to_release++;
clear_buffer_delay(bh);
}
curr_off = next_off;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
ext4_da_release_space(page->mapping->host, to_release);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void gen_lods(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot)
{
gen_string_movl_A0_ESI(s);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
gen_op_mov_reg_v(ot, R_EAX, cpu_T0);
gen_op_movl_T0_Dshift(ot);
gen_op_add_reg_T0(s->aflag, R_ESI);
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 27,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::IsUnused() {
return is_unused_;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 22,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_copy_to_iovec(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int hlen)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int chunk = skb->len - hlen;
int err;
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, hlen, tp->ucopy.msg, chunk);
else
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, hlen, tp->ucopy.msg);
if (!err) {
tp->ucopy.len -= chunk;
tp->copied_seq += chunk;
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(int) gdImageCompare (gdImagePtr im1, gdImagePtr im2)
{
int x, y;
int p1, p2;
int cmpStatus = 0;
int sx, sy;
if (im1->interlace != im2->interlace) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_INTERLACE;
}
if (im1->transparent != im2->transparent) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_TRANSPARENT;
}
if (im1->trueColor != im2->trueColor) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_TRUECOLOR;
}
sx = im1->sx;
if (im1->sx != im2->sx) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_SIZE_X + GD_CMP_IMAGE;
if (im2->sx < im1->sx) {
sx = im2->sx;
}
}
sy = im1->sy;
if (im1->sy != im2->sy) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_SIZE_Y + GD_CMP_IMAGE;
if (im2->sy < im1->sy) {
sy = im2->sy;
}
}
if (im1->colorsTotal != im2->colorsTotal) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_NUM_COLORS;
}
for (y = 0; (y < sy); y++) {
for (x = 0; (x < sx); x++) {
p1 =
im1->trueColor ? gdImageTrueColorPixel (im1, x,
y) :
gdImagePalettePixel (im1, x, y);
p2 =
im2->trueColor ? gdImageTrueColorPixel (im2, x,
y) :
gdImagePalettePixel (im2, x, y);
if (gdImageRed (im1, p1) != gdImageRed (im2, p2)) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_COLOR + GD_CMP_IMAGE;
break;
}
if (gdImageGreen (im1, p1) != gdImageGreen (im2, p2)) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_COLOR + GD_CMP_IMAGE;
break;
}
if (gdImageBlue (im1, p1) != gdImageBlue (im2, p2)) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_COLOR + GD_CMP_IMAGE;
break;
}
#if 0
/* Soon we'll add alpha channel to palettes */
if (gdImageAlpha (im1, p1) != gdImageAlpha (im2, p2)) {
cmpStatus |= GD_CMP_COLOR + GD_CMP_IMAGE;
break;
}
#endif
}
if (cmpStatus & GD_CMP_COLOR) {
break;
};
}
return cmpStatus;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::InitializeEmbeddedTestServer() {
if (!embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndListen())
return false;
if (test_config_) {
test_config_->SetInteger(kEmbeddedTestServerPort,
embedded_test_server()->port());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perWorldAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::perWorldAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int raw_v4_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return raw_seq_open(inode, file, &raw_v4_hashinfo, &raw_seq_ops);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 29,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: authentic_pin_verify(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *pin_cmd)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct authentic_private_data *prv_data = (struct authentic_private_data *) card->drv_data;
unsigned char pin_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "PIN(type:%X,reference:%X,data:%p,length:%i)",
pin_cmd->pin_type, pin_cmd->pin_reference, pin_cmd->pin1.data, pin_cmd->pin1.len);
if (pin_cmd->pin1.data && !pin_cmd->pin1.len) {
pin_cmd->pin1.tries_left = -1;
rv = authentic_pin_is_verified(card, pin_cmd, &pin_cmd->pin1.tries_left);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
if (pin_cmd->pin1.data)
SHA1(pin_cmd->pin1.data, pin_cmd->pin1.len, pin_sha1);
else
SHA1((unsigned char *)"", 0, pin_sha1);
if (!memcmp(pin_sha1, prv_data->pins_sha1[pin_cmd->pin_reference], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
sc_log(ctx, "Already verified");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
memset(prv_data->pins_sha1[pin_cmd->pin_reference], 0, sizeof(prv_data->pins_sha1[0]));
rv = authentic_pin_get_policy(card, pin_cmd);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Get 'PIN policy' error");
if (pin_cmd->pin1.len > (int)pin_cmd->pin1.max_length)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_PIN_LENGTH, "PIN policy check failed");
pin_cmd->pin1.tries_left = -1;
rv = authentic_chv_verify(card, pin_cmd, &pin_cmd->pin1.tries_left);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "PIN CHV verification error");
memcpy(prv_data->pins_sha1[pin_cmd->pin_reference], pin_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostCreatedObserver::RenderFrameCreated(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
frames_created_++;
if (frames_created_ == expected_frame_count_) {
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid sharing process for blob URLs with null origin.
Previously, when a frame with a unique origin, such as from a data
URL, created a blob URL, the blob URL looked like blob:null/guid and
resulted in a site URL of "blob:" when navigated to. This incorrectly
allowed all such blob URLs to share a process, even if they were
created by different sites.
This CL changes the site URL assigned in such cases to be the full
blob URL, which includes the GUID. This avoids process sharing for
all blob URLs with unique origins.
This fix is conservative in the sense that it would also isolate
different blob URLs created by the same unique origin from each other.
This case isn't expected to be common, so it's unlikely to affect
process count. There's ongoing work to maintain a GUID for unique
origins, so longer-term, we could try using that to track down the
creator and potentially use that GUID in the site URL instead of the
blob URL's GUID, to avoid unnecessary process isolation in scenarios
like this.
Note that as part of this, we discovered a bug where data URLs aren't
able to script blob URLs that they create: https://crbug.com/865254.
This scripting bug should be fixed independently of this CL, and as
far as we can tell, this CL doesn't regress scripting cases like this
further.
Bug: 863623
Change-Id: Ib50407adbba3d5ee0cf6d72d3df7f8d8f24684ee
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142389
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576318}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 28,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CheckPinholeWorking(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<IsWorking>%d</IsWorking>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
int r;
struct NameValueParserData data;
const char * uid_str;
int uid;
char iaddr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
unsigned short iport;
unsigned int packets;
if(CheckStatus(h)==0)
return;
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
uid_str = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "UniqueID");
uid = uid_str ? atoi(uid_str) : -1;
ClearNameValueList(&data);
if(uid < 0 || uid > 65535)
{
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
return;
}
/* Check that client is not checking a pinhole
* it doesn't have access to, because of its public access */
r = upnp_get_pinhole_info(uid,
NULL, 0, NULL,
iaddr, sizeof(iaddr), &iport,
NULL, /* proto */
NULL, 0, /* desc, desclen */
NULL, &packets);
if (r >= 0)
{
if(PinholeVerification(h, iaddr, iport) <= 0)
return ;
if(packets == 0)
{
SoapError(h, 709, "NoPacketSent");
return;
}
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns/*"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:WANIPv6FirewallControl:1"*/,
1, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
}
else if(r == -2)
SoapError(h, 704, "NoSuchEntry");
else
SoapError(h, 501, "ActionFailed");
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vpx_codec_err_t vp8_init(vpx_codec_ctx_t *ctx,
vpx_codec_priv_enc_mr_cfg_t *data)
{
vpx_codec_err_t res = VPX_CODEC_OK;
vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *priv = NULL;
(void) data;
vp8_rtcd();
vpx_dsp_rtcd();
vpx_scale_rtcd();
/* This function only allocates space for the vpx_codec_alg_priv_t
* structure. More memory may be required at the time the stream
* information becomes known.
*/
if (!ctx->priv) {
vp8_init_ctx(ctx);
priv = (vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *)ctx->priv;
/* initialize number of fragments to zero */
priv->fragments.count = 0;
/* is input fragments enabled? */
priv->fragments.enabled =
(priv->base.init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_INPUT_FRAGMENTS);
/*post processing level initialized to do nothing */
} else {
priv = (vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *)ctx->priv;
}
priv->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads =
(ctx->priv->init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_FRAME_THREADING);
/* for now, disable frame threading */
priv->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads = 0;
if (priv->yv12_frame_buffers.use_frame_threads &&
((ctx->priv->init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_ERROR_CONCEALMENT) ||
(ctx->priv->init_flags & VPX_CODEC_USE_INPUT_FRAGMENTS))) {
/* row-based threading, error concealment, and input fragments will
* not be supported when using frame-based threading */
res = VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: Cherry-pick 0f42d1f from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp8: fix decoder crash with invalid leading keyframes
decoding the same invalid keyframe twice would result in a crash as the
second time through the decoder would be assumed to have been
initialized as there was no resolution change. in this case the
resolution was itself invalid (0x6), but vp8_peek_si() was only failing
in the case of 0x0.
invalid-vp80-00-comprehensive-018.ivf.2kf_0x6.ivf tests this case by
duplicating the first keyframe and additionally adds a valid one to
ensure decoding can resume without error.
Bug: 30593765
Change-Id: I0de85f5a5eb5c0a5605230faf20c042b69aea507
(cherry picked from commit fc0466b695dce03e10390101844caa374848d903)
(cherry picked from commit 1114575245cb9d2f108749f916c76549524f5136)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExecutableAllocator::dumpProfile()
{
allocator->dumpProfile();
}
Commit Message: Add missing sys/mman.h include on Mac
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98089
Patch by Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> on 2013-01-16
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
The madvise function and MADV_FREE constant require sys/mman.h.
* jit/ExecutableAllocatorFixedVMPool.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139926 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_setsize_buftarg_early(
xfs_buftarg_t *btp,
struct block_device *bdev)
{
return xfs_setsize_buftarg_flags(btp,
PAGE_SIZE, bdev_logical_block_size(bdev), 0);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> SafeBuiltins::GetObjekt() const {
return Load("Object", context_->v8_context());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Finish freezing schema
BUG=604901
BUG=603725
BUG=591164
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1906593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388945}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_cached_metrics(struct ass_shaper_metrics_data *metrics, FT_Face face,
hb_codepoint_t unicode, hb_codepoint_t glyph)
{
GlyphMetricsHashValue *val;
metrics->hash_key.glyph_index = glyph;
if (ass_cache_get(metrics->metrics_cache, &metrics->hash_key, &val)) {
if (val->metrics.width >= 0)
return val;
ass_cache_dec_ref(val);
return NULL;
}
if (!val)
return NULL;
int load_flags = FT_LOAD_DEFAULT | FT_LOAD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ADVANCE_WIDTH
| FT_LOAD_IGNORE_TRANSFORM;
if (FT_Load_Glyph(face, glyph, load_flags)) {
val->metrics.width = -1;
ass_cache_commit(val, 1);
ass_cache_dec_ref(val);
return NULL;
}
memcpy(&val->metrics, &face->glyph->metrics, sizeof(FT_Glyph_Metrics));
if (metrics->vertical && unicode >= VERTICAL_LOWER_BOUND)
val->metrics.horiAdvance = val->metrics.vertAdvance;
ass_cache_commit(val, 1);
return val;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nx842_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct nx842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int wmemsize;
wmemsize = max_t(int, nx842_get_workmem_size(), LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS);
ctx->nx842_wmem = kmalloc(wmemsize, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ctx->nx842_wmem)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(sscanf)
{
zval *args = NULL;
char *str, *format;
size_t str_len, format_len;
int result, num_args = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ss*", &str, &str_len, &format, &format_len,
&args, &num_args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
result = php_sscanf_internal(str, format, num_args, args, 0, return_value);
if (SCAN_ERROR_WRONG_PARAM_COUNT == result) {
WRONG_PARAM_COUNT;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 3,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setDomain(const String& newDomain, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::DocumentSetDomain);
if (isSandboxed(SandboxDocumentDomain)) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("Assignment is forbidden for sandboxed iframes.");
return;
}
if (SchemeRegistry::isDomainRelaxationForbiddenForURLScheme(securityOrigin()->protocol())) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("Assignment is forbidden for the '" + securityOrigin()->protocol() + "' scheme.");
return;
}
if (newDomain.isEmpty()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is an empty domain.");
return;
}
OriginAccessEntry accessEntry(securityOrigin()->protocol(), newDomain, OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains);
OriginAccessEntry::MatchResult result = accessEntry.matchesOrigin(*securityOrigin());
if (result == OriginAccessEntry::DoesNotMatchOrigin) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is not a suffix of '" + domain() + "'.");
return;
}
if (result == OriginAccessEntry::MatchesOriginButIsPublicSuffix) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("'" + newDomain + "' is a top-level domain.");
return;
}
securityOrigin()->setDomainFromDOM(newDomain);
if (m_frame)
m_frame->script().updateSecurityOrigin(securityOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t setConsumerUsageBits(uint32_t usage) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(usage);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferConsumer: fix ATTACH_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338113
Change-Id: I019c4df2c6adbc944122df96968ddd11a02ebe33
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 7,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AuthenticatorSheetModelBase::IsActivityIndicatorVisible() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAuraTest()
: widget_host_uses_shutdown_to_destroy_(false),
is_guest_view_hack_(false) {
ui::GestureConfiguration::GetInstance()->set_scroll_debounce_interval_in_ms(
0);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
return proc_fd_info(inode, path, NULL);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationEntry* NavigationControllerImpl::GetPendingEntry() const {
return pending_entry_;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl )
{
const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry;
while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 )
{
if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len &&
memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 )
{
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cur->revocation_date ) )
return( 1 );
}
cur = cur->next;
}
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 18,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperImageData(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei depth,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
ImageData* pixels,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLint unpack_image_height) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
DCHECK(pixels);
if (pixels->data()->BufferBase()->IsNeutered()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name,
"The source data has been neutered.");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target))
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceImageData, target,
level, internalformat, pixels->width(), pixels->height(),
depth, border, format, type, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset))
return;
bool selecting_sub_rectangle = false;
if (!ValidateTexImageSubRectangle(
func_name, function_id, pixels, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height, &selecting_sub_rectangle)) {
return;
}
IntRect adjusted_source_image_rect = source_image_rect;
if (unpack_flip_y_) {
adjusted_source_image_rect.SetY(pixels->height() -
adjusted_source_image_rect.MaxY());
}
Vector<uint8_t> data;
bool need_conversion = true;
if (!unpack_flip_y_ && !unpack_premultiply_alpha_ && format == GL_RGBA &&
type == GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE && !selecting_sub_rectangle && depth == 1) {
need_conversion = false;
} else {
if (type == GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV) {
type = GL_FLOAT;
}
if (!WebGLImageConversion::ExtractImageData(
pixels->data()->Data(),
WebGLImageConversion::DataFormat::kDataFormatRGBA8, pixels->Size(),
adjusted_source_image_rect, depth, unpack_image_height, format,
type, unpack_flip_y_, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, data)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "bad image data");
return;
}
}
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore temporary_reset_unpack(this);
const uint8_t* bytes = need_conversion ? data.data() : pixels->data()->Data();
if (function_id == kTexImage2D) {
DCHECK_EQ(unpack_image_height, 0);
TexImage2DBase(
target, level, internalformat, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), border, format, type, bytes);
} else if (function_id == kTexSubImage2D) {
DCHECK_EQ(unpack_image_height, 0);
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
adjusted_source_image_rect.Height(), format, type, bytes);
} else {
GLint upload_height = adjusted_source_image_rect.Height();
if (unpack_image_height) {
upload_height = unpack_image_height;
}
if (function_id == kTexImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexImage3D(target, level, internalformat,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(), upload_height,
depth, border, format, type, bytes);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(function_id, kTexSubImage3D);
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset,
adjusted_source_image_rect.Width(),
upload_height, depth, format, type, bytes);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderBox::RenderBox(Node* node)
: RenderBoxModelObject(node)
, m_marginLeft(0)
, m_marginRight(0)
, m_marginTop(0)
, m_marginBottom(0)
, m_minPreferredLogicalWidth(-1)
, m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth(-1)
, m_inlineBoxWrapper(0)
{
setIsBox();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetTabWindowId(base::DictionaryValue* tab) {
int id = kUndefinedId;
if (tab)
tab->GetInteger(keys::kWindowIdKey, &id);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Change TemporaryAddressSpoof test to not depend on PDF OpenActions.
OpenActions that navigate to URIs are going to be blocked when
https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/42731 relands.
It was reverted because this test was breaking and blocking the
pdfium roll into chromium.
The test will now click on a link in the PDF that navigates to the
URI.
Bug: 851821
Change-Id: I49853e99de7b989858b1962ad4a92a4168d4c2db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1244367
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#596011}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaQueryMatcher& Document::GetMediaQueryMatcher() {
if (!media_query_matcher_)
media_query_matcher_ = MediaQueryMatcher::Create(*this);
return *media_query_matcher_;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 8,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lxcfs_mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
if (strncmp(path, "/cgroup", 7) == 0)
return cg_mkdir(path, mode);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(struct packet_sock *po,
int blk_size_in_bytes)
{
struct net_device *dev;
unsigned int mbits = 0, msec = 0, div = 0, tmo = 0;
struct ethtool_link_ksettings ecmd;
int err;
rtnl_lock();
dev = __dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), po->ifindex);
if (unlikely(!dev)) {
rtnl_unlock();
return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
}
err = __ethtool_get_link_ksettings(dev, &ecmd);
rtnl_unlock();
if (!err) {
/*
* If the link speed is so slow you don't really
* need to worry about perf anyways
*/
if (ecmd.base.speed < SPEED_1000 ||
ecmd.base.speed == SPEED_UNKNOWN) {
return DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV;
} else {
msec = 1;
div = ecmd.base.speed / 1000;
}
}
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
if (div)
mbits /= div;
tmo = mbits * msec;
if (div)
return tmo+1;
return tmo;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool Splash::pathAllOutside(SplashPath *path) {
SplashCoord xMin1, yMin1, xMax1, yMax1;
SplashCoord xMin2, yMin2, xMax2, yMax2;
SplashCoord x, y;
int xMinI, yMinI, xMaxI, yMaxI;
int i;
xMin1 = xMax1 = path->pts[0].x;
yMin1 = yMax1 = path->pts[0].y;
for (i = 1; i < path->length; ++i) {
if (path->pts[i].x < xMin1) {
xMin1 = path->pts[i].x;
} else if (path->pts[i].x > xMax1) {
xMax1 = path->pts[i].x;
}
if (path->pts[i].y < yMin1) {
yMin1 = path->pts[i].y;
} else if (path->pts[i].y > yMax1) {
yMax1 = path->pts[i].y;
}
}
transform(state->matrix, xMin1, yMin1, &x, &y);
xMin2 = xMax2 = x;
yMin2 = yMax2 = y;
transform(state->matrix, xMin1, yMax1, &x, &y);
if (x < xMin2) {
xMin2 = x;
} else if (x > xMax2) {
xMax2 = x;
}
if (y < yMin2) {
yMin2 = y;
} else if (y > yMax2) {
yMax2 = y;
}
transform(state->matrix, xMax1, yMin1, &x, &y);
if (x < xMin2) {
xMin2 = x;
} else if (x > xMax2) {
xMax2 = x;
}
if (y < yMin2) {
yMin2 = y;
} else if (y > yMax2) {
yMax2 = y;
}
transform(state->matrix, xMax1, yMax1, &x, &y);
if (x < xMin2) {
xMin2 = x;
} else if (x > xMax2) {
xMax2 = x;
}
if (y < yMin2) {
yMin2 = y;
} else if (y > yMax2) {
yMax2 = y;
}
xMinI = splashFloor(xMin2);
yMinI = splashFloor(yMin2);
xMaxI = splashFloor(xMax2);
yMaxI = splashFloor(yMax2);
return state->clip->testRect(xMinI, yMinI, xMaxI, yMaxI) ==
splashClipAllOutside;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int expwrite(off_t a, char *buf, size_t len, CLIENT *client) {
char pagebuf[DIFFPAGESIZE];
off_t mapcnt,mapl,maph;
off_t wrlen,rdlen;
off_t pagestart;
off_t offset;
if (!(client->server->flags & F_COPYONWRITE))
return(rawexpwrite_fully(a, buf, len, client));
DEBUG3("Asked to write %d bytes at %llu.\n", len, (unsigned long long)a);
mapl=a/DIFFPAGESIZE ; maph=(a+len-1)/DIFFPAGESIZE ;
for (mapcnt=mapl;mapcnt<=maph;mapcnt++) {
pagestart=mapcnt*DIFFPAGESIZE ;
offset=a-pagestart ;
wrlen=(0<DIFFPAGESIZE-offset && len<(size_t)(DIFFPAGESIZE-offset)) ?
len : (size_t)DIFFPAGESIZE-offset;
if (client->difmap[mapcnt]!=(u32)(-1)) { /* the block is already there */
DEBUG3("Page %llu is at %lu\n", (unsigned long long)mapcnt,
(unsigned long)(client->difmap[mapcnt])) ;
myseek(client->difffile,
client->difmap[mapcnt]*DIFFPAGESIZE+offset);
if (write(client->difffile, buf, wrlen) != wrlen) return -1 ;
} else { /* the block is not there */
myseek(client->difffile,client->difffilelen*DIFFPAGESIZE) ;
client->difmap[mapcnt]=(client->server->flags&F_SPARSE)?mapcnt:client->difffilelen++;
DEBUG3("Page %llu is not here, we put it at %lu\n",
(unsigned long long)mapcnt,
(unsigned long)(client->difmap[mapcnt]));
rdlen=DIFFPAGESIZE ;
if (rawexpread_fully(pagestart, pagebuf, rdlen, client))
return -1;
memcpy(pagebuf+offset,buf,wrlen) ;
if (write(client->difffile, pagebuf, DIFFPAGESIZE) !=
DIFFPAGESIZE)
return -1;
}
len-=wrlen ; a+=wrlen ; buf+=wrlen ;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs41_check_expired_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, unsigned int flags)
{
int status = NFS_OK;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
if (state->flags & flags) {
status = nfs41_test_stateid(server, stateid);
if (status != NFS_OK) {
nfs41_free_stateid(server, stateid);
state->flags &= ~flags;
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_install_in_context(struct perf_event_context *ctx,
struct perf_event *event,
int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
event->ctx = ctx;
if (event->cpu != -1)
event->cpu = cpu;
if (!task) {
/*
* Per cpu events are installed via an smp call and
* the install is always successful.
*/
cpu_function_call(cpu, __perf_install_in_context, event);
return;
}
retry:
if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_install_in_context, event))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* If we failed to find a running task, but find the context active now
* that we've acquired the ctx->lock, retry.
*/
if (ctx->is_active) {
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
goto retry;
}
/*
* Since the task isn't running, its safe to add the event, us holding
* the ctx->lock ensures the task won't get scheduled in.
*/
add_event_to_ctx(event, ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void qeth_irq(struct ccw_device *cdev, unsigned long intparm,
struct irb *irb)
{
int rc;
int cstat, dstat;
struct qeth_cmd_buffer *buffer;
struct qeth_channel *channel;
struct qeth_card *card;
struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob;
__u8 index;
if (__qeth_check_irb_error(cdev, intparm, irb))
return;
cstat = irb->scsw.cmd.cstat;
dstat = irb->scsw.cmd.dstat;
card = CARD_FROM_CDEV(cdev);
if (!card)
return;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 5, "irq");
if (card->read.ccwdev == cdev) {
channel = &card->read;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 5, "read");
} else if (card->write.ccwdev == cdev) {
channel = &card->write;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 5, "write");
} else {
channel = &card->data;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 5, "data");
}
atomic_set(&channel->irq_pending, 0);
if (irb->scsw.cmd.fctl & (SCSW_FCTL_CLEAR_FUNC))
channel->state = CH_STATE_STOPPED;
if (irb->scsw.cmd.fctl & (SCSW_FCTL_HALT_FUNC))
channel->state = CH_STATE_HALTED;
/*let's wake up immediately on data channel*/
if ((channel == &card->data) && (intparm != 0) &&
(intparm != QETH_RCD_PARM))
goto out;
if (intparm == QETH_CLEAR_CHANNEL_PARM) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 6, "clrchpar");
/* we don't have to handle this further */
intparm = 0;
}
if (intparm == QETH_HALT_CHANNEL_PARM) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 6, "hltchpar");
/* we don't have to handle this further */
intparm = 0;
}
if ((dstat & DEV_STAT_UNIT_EXCEP) ||
(dstat & DEV_STAT_UNIT_CHECK) ||
(cstat)) {
if (irb->esw.esw0.erw.cons) {
dev_warn(&channel->ccwdev->dev,
"The qeth device driver failed to recover "
"an error on the device\n");
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "%s sense data available. cstat "
"0x%X dstat 0x%X\n",
dev_name(&channel->ccwdev->dev), cstat, dstat);
print_hex_dump(KERN_WARNING, "qeth: irb ",
DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1, irb, 32, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_WARNING, "qeth: sense data ",
DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1, irb->ecw, 32, 1);
}
if (intparm == QETH_RCD_PARM) {
channel->state = CH_STATE_DOWN;
goto out;
}
rc = qeth_get_problem(cdev, irb);
if (rc) {
qeth_clear_ipacmd_list(card);
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
goto out;
}
}
if (intparm == QETH_RCD_PARM) {
channel->state = CH_STATE_RCD_DONE;
goto out;
}
if (intparm) {
buffer = (struct qeth_cmd_buffer *) __va((addr_t)intparm);
buffer->state = BUF_STATE_PROCESSED;
}
if (channel == &card->data)
return;
if (channel == &card->read &&
channel->state == CH_STATE_UP)
qeth_issue_next_read(card);
iob = channel->iob;
index = channel->buf_no;
while (iob[index].state == BUF_STATE_PROCESSED) {
if (iob[index].callback != NULL)
iob[index].callback(channel, iob + index);
index = (index + 1) % QETH_CMD_BUFFER_NO;
}
channel->buf_no = index;
out:
wake_up(&card->wait_q);
return;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setDataSource(
int fd, int64_t offset, int64_t length) {
resetDataSource();
mFd = dup(fd);
mOffset = offset;
mLength = length;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_bmControl(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
gint ett_subtree, const int** bm_items)
{
guint8 bm_size = 0;
bm_size = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_usb_vid_bControlSize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
++offset;
if (bm_size > 0)
{
proto_tree_add_bitmask_len(tree, tvb, offset, bm_size, hf_usb_vid_bmControl,
ett_subtree, bm_items, &ei_usb_vid_bitmask_len, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += bm_size;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 27,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cmd_env(void *data, const char *input) {
RCore *core = (RCore*)data;
int ret = true;
switch (*input) {
case '?':
cmd_help_percent (core);
break;
default:
ret = r_core_cmdf (core, "env %s", input);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 9,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void h264bsdInitRefPicList(dpbStorage_t *dpb)
{
/* Variables */
u32 i;
/* Code */
for (i = 0; i < dpb->numRefFrames; i++)
dpb->list[i] = &dpb->buffer[i];
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantSendMidiSysExMessage(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return;
state->second->GrantPermissionForMidiSysEx();
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req,
unsigned int *total_len)
{
char *pneg_ctxt = (char *)req;
unsigned int ctxt_len;
if (*total_len > 200) {
/* In case length corrupted don't want to overrun smb buffer */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Bad frame length assembling neg contexts\n");
return;
}
/*
* round up total_len of fixed part of SMB3 negotiate request to 8
* byte boundary before adding negotiate contexts
*/
*total_len = roundup(*total_len, 8);
pneg_ctxt = (*total_len) + (char *)req;
req->NegotiateContextOffset = cpu_to_le32(*total_len);
build_preauth_ctxt((struct smb2_preauth_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt);
ctxt_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context), 8) * 8;
*total_len += ctxt_len;
pneg_ctxt += ctxt_len;
build_encrypt_ctxt((struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt);
ctxt_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(sizeof(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context), 8) * 8;
*total_len += ctxt_len;
pneg_ctxt += ctxt_len;
build_posix_ctxt((struct smb2_posix_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt);
*total_len += sizeof(struct smb2_posix_neg_context);
req->NegotiateContextCount = cpu_to_le16(3);
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::IncrementKeepaliveCount(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
if (context() && ExtensionFrameHelper::IsContextForEventPage(context())) {
content::RenderFrame* render_frame = context()->GetRenderFrame();
render_frame->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_IncrementLazyKeepaliveCount(
render_frame->GetRoutingID()));
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 11,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void treatReturnedNullStringAsNullStringMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueStringOrNull(info, imp->treatReturnedNullStringAsNullStringMethod(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaControlsProgressView::SetProgressTime(const base::string16& time) {
progress_time_->SetText(time);
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(private);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(private),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->iv) {
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(private));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
atomic_set(&ctx->inflight, 0);
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
ask->private = ctx;
skcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, private);
skcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
sk->sk_destruct = skcipher_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 7,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Point RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::GetLastTouchEventLocation() const {
return gfx::Point();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int AudioInputRendererHost::LookupSessionById(int stream_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
for (SessionEntryMap::iterator it = session_entries_.begin();
it != session_entries_.end(); ++it) {
if (stream_id == it->second) {
return it->first;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vnc_write_u16(VncState *vs, uint16_t value)
{
uint8_t buf[2];
buf[0] = (value >> 8) & 0xFF;
buf[1] = value & 0xFF;
vnc_write(vs, buf, 2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoadingStatsCollector::RecordPageRequestSummary(
const PageRequestSummary& summary) {
const GURL& initial_url = summary.initial_url;
PreconnectPrediction preconnect_prediction;
if (predictor_->PredictPreconnectOrigins(initial_url, &preconnect_prediction))
ReportPreconnectPredictionAccuracy(preconnect_prediction, summary);
auto it = preconnect_stats_.find(initial_url);
if (it != preconnect_stats_.end()) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second, summary.origins);
preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
}
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *ReferenceImage(Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
LockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
image->reference_count++;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void opj_get_encoding_parameters( const opj_image_t *p_image,
const opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tileno,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tx1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_ty1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dx_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_dy_min,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_prec,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_max_res )
{
/* loop */
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* pointers */
const opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
const opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
/* position in x and y of tile */
OPJ_UINT32 p, q;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tileno < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations */
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps [p_tileno];
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
/* here calculation of tx0, tx1, ty0, ty1, maxprec, dx and dy */
p = p_tileno % p_cp->tw;
q = p_tileno / p_cp->tw;
/* find extent of tile */
*p_tx0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + p * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0);
*p_tx1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->tx0 + (p + 1) * p_cp->tdx), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->x1);
*p_ty0 = opj_int_max((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + q * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y0);
*p_ty1 = opj_int_min((OPJ_INT32)(p_cp->ty0 + (q + 1) * p_cp->tdy), (OPJ_INT32)p_image->y1);
/* max precision is 0 (can only grow) */
*p_max_prec = 0;
*p_max_res = 0;
/* take the largest value for dx_min and dy_min */
*p_dx_min = 0x7fffffff;
*p_dy_min = 0x7fffffff;
for (compno = 0; compno < p_image->numcomps; ++compno) {
/* arithmetic variables to calculate */
OPJ_UINT32 l_level_no;
OPJ_INT32 l_rx0, l_ry0, l_rx1, l_ry1;
OPJ_INT32 l_px0, l_py0, l_px1, py1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pdx, l_pdy;
OPJ_UINT32 l_pw, l_ph;
OPJ_UINT32 l_product;
OPJ_INT32 l_tcx0, l_tcy0, l_tcx1, l_tcy1;
l_tcx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy0 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty0, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
l_tcx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_tx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
l_tcy1 = opj_int_ceildiv(*p_ty1, (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dy);
if (l_tccp->numresolutions > *p_max_res) {
*p_max_res = l_tccp->numresolutions;
}
/* use custom size for precincts */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_tccp->numresolutions; ++resno) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx, l_dy;
/* precinct width and height */
l_pdx = l_tccp->prcw[resno];
l_pdy = l_tccp->prch[resno];
l_dx = l_img_comp->dx * (1u << (l_pdx + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
l_dy = l_img_comp->dy * (1u << (l_pdy + l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
/* take the minimum size for dx for each comp and resolution */
*p_dx_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dx_min, l_dx);
*p_dy_min = opj_uint_min(*p_dy_min, l_dy);
/* various calculations of extents */
l_level_no = l_tccp->numresolutions - 1 - resno;
l_rx0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry0 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy0, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_rx1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_ry1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_tcy1, (OPJ_INT32)l_level_no);
l_px0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_rx0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_py0 = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_ry0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_px1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_rx1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
py1 = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_ry1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_pw = (l_rx0==l_rx1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((l_px1 - l_px0) >> l_pdx);
l_ph = (l_ry0==l_ry1)?0:(OPJ_UINT32)((py1 - l_py0) >> l_pdy);
l_product = l_pw * l_ph;
/* update precision */
if (l_product > *p_max_prec) {
*p_max_prec = l_product;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
}
Commit Message: [trunk] fixed a buffer overflow in opj_tcd_init_decode_tile
Update issue 431
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 27,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __unregister_pernet_operations(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
struct net *net;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_del(&ops->list);
for_each_net(net)
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Document::webkitVisibilityState() const
{
return pageVisibilityStateString(visibilityState());
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int transfer_objects(struct array_cache *to,
struct array_cache *from, unsigned int max)
{
/* Figure out how many entries to transfer */
int nr = min3(from->avail, max, to->limit - to->avail);
if (!nr)
return 0;
memcpy(to->entry + to->avail, from->entry + from->avail -nr,
sizeof(void *) *nr);
from->avail -= nr;
to->avail += nr;
return nr;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_cong_avoid(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 in_flight)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_avoid(sk, ack, in_flight);
tcp_sk(sk)->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_time_stamp;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index = 0;
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(intern->u.dir.dirp);
}
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 6,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool bio_check_ro(struct bio *bio, struct hd_struct *part)
{
if (part->policy && op_is_write(bio_op(bio))) {
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
printk(KERN_ERR
"generic_make_request: Trying to write "
"to read-only block-device %s (partno %d)\n",
bio_devname(bio, b), part->partno);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void update_rice(APERice *rice, unsigned int x)
{
int lim = rice->k ? (1 << (rice->k + 4)) : 0;
rice->ksum += ((x + 1) / 2) - ((rice->ksum + 16) >> 5);
if (rice->ksum < lim)
rice->k--;
else if (rice->ksum >= (1 << (rice->k + 5)))
rice->k++;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebURLRequest WebLocalFrameImpl::RequestForReload(
WebFrameLoadType load_type,
const WebURL& override_url) const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
ResourceRequest request = GetFrame()->Loader().ResourceRequestForReload(
static_cast<FrameLoadType>(load_type), override_url);
return WrappedResourceRequest(request);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 26,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(filp);
unsigned long flags;
int retval = 0;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode, "tty_fasync"))
goto out;
retval = fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &tty->fasync);
if (retval <= 0)
goto out;
if (on) {
enum pid_type type;
struct pid *pid;
if (!waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
tty->minimum_to_wake = 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->pgrp) {
pid = tty->pgrp;
type = PIDTYPE_PGID;
} else {
pid = task_pid(current);
type = PIDTYPE_PID;
}
get_pid(pid);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
retval = __f_setown(filp, pid, type, 0);
put_pid(pid);
if (retval)
goto out;
} else {
if (!tty->fasync && !waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
tty->minimum_to_wake = N_TTY_BUF_SIZE;
}
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Type_ProfileSequenceDesc_Free(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, void* Ptr)
{
cmsFreeProfileSequenceDescription((cmsSEQ*) Ptr);
return;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 10,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void opj_applyLUT8u_8u32s_C1P3R(
OPJ_UINT8 const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32 srcStride,
OPJ_INT32* const* pDst, OPJ_INT32 const* pDstStride,
OPJ_UINT8 const* const* pLUT,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 y;
OPJ_INT32* pR = pDst[0];
OPJ_INT32* pG = pDst[1];
OPJ_INT32* pB = pDst[2];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_R = pLUT[0];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_G = pLUT[1];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_B = pLUT[2];
for (y = height; y != 0U; --y) {
OPJ_UINT32 x;
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
OPJ_UINT8 idx = pSrc[x];
pR[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_R[idx];
pG[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_G[idx];
pB[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_B[idx];
}
pSrc += srcStride;
pR += pDstStride[0];
pG += pDstStride[1];
pB += pDstStride[2];
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 7,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::createFirstLetterRenderer(RenderObject* firstLetterBlock, RenderObject* currentChild, unsigned length)
{
ASSERT(length && currentChild->isText());
RenderObject* firstLetterContainer = currentChild->parent();
RenderStyle* pseudoStyle = styleForFirstLetter(firstLetterBlock, firstLetterContainer);
RenderObject* firstLetter = 0;
if (pseudoStyle->display() == INLINE)
firstLetter = RenderInline::createAnonymous(&document());
else
firstLetter = RenderBlockFlow::createAnonymous(&document());
firstLetter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
firstLetterContainer->addChild(firstLetter, currentChild);
RenderText* textObj = toRenderText(currentChild);
String oldText = textObj->originalText();
ASSERT(oldText.impl());
RenderTextFragment* remainingText =
new RenderTextFragment(textObj->node() ? textObj->node() : &textObj->document(), oldText.impl(), length, oldText.length() - length);
remainingText->setStyle(textObj->style());
if (remainingText->node())
remainingText->node()->setRenderer(remainingText);
firstLetterContainer->addChild(remainingText, textObj);
firstLetterContainer->removeChild(textObj);
remainingText->setFirstLetter(firstLetter);
toRenderBoxModelObject(firstLetter)->setFirstLetterRemainingText(remainingText);
RenderTextFragment* letter =
new RenderTextFragment(remainingText->node() ? remainingText->node() : &remainingText->document(), oldText.impl(), 0, length);
letter->setStyle(pseudoStyle);
firstLetter->addChild(letter);
textObj->destroy();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool __init sparc64_has_md5_opcode(void)
{
unsigned long cfr;
if (!(sparc64_elf_hwcap & HWCAP_SPARC_CRYPTO))
return false;
__asm__ __volatile__("rd %%asr26, %0" : "=r" (cfr));
if (!(cfr & CFR_MD5))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_nx_packet_in2(const struct ofp_header *oh, bool loose,
const struct tun_table *tun_table,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
struct ofputil_packet_in *pin,
size_t *total_len, uint32_t *buffer_id,
struct ofpbuf *continuation)
{
*total_len = 0;
*buffer_id = UINT32_MAX;
struct ofpbuf properties;
ofpbuf_use_const(&properties, oh, ntohs(oh->length));
ofpraw_pull_assert(&properties);
while (properties.size > 0) {
struct ofpbuf payload;
uint64_t type;
enum ofperr error = ofpprop_pull(&properties, &payload, &type);
if (error) {
return error;
}
switch (type) {
case NXPINT_PACKET:
pin->packet = payload.msg;
pin->packet_len = ofpbuf_msgsize(&payload);
break;
case NXPINT_FULL_LEN: {
uint32_t u32;
error = ofpprop_parse_u32(&payload, &u32);
*total_len = u32;
break;
}
case NXPINT_BUFFER_ID:
error = ofpprop_parse_u32(&payload, buffer_id);
break;
case NXPINT_TABLE_ID:
error = ofpprop_parse_u8(&payload, &pin->table_id);
break;
case NXPINT_COOKIE:
error = ofpprop_parse_be64(&payload, &pin->cookie);
break;
case NXPINT_REASON: {
uint8_t reason;
error = ofpprop_parse_u8(&payload, &reason);
pin->reason = reason;
break;
}
case NXPINT_METADATA:
error = oxm_decode_match(payload.msg, ofpbuf_msgsize(&payload),
loose, tun_table, vl_mff_map,
&pin->flow_metadata);
break;
case NXPINT_USERDATA:
pin->userdata = payload.msg;
pin->userdata_len = ofpbuf_msgsize(&payload);
break;
case NXPINT_CONTINUATION:
if (continuation) {
error = ofpprop_parse_nested(&payload, continuation);
}
break;
default:
error = OFPPROP_UNKNOWN(loose, "NX_PACKET_IN2", type);
break;
}
if (error) {
return error;
}
}
if (!pin->packet_len) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "NXT_PACKET_IN2 lacks packet");
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
} else if (!*total_len) {
*total_len = pin->packet_len;
} else if (*total_len < pin->packet_len) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "NXT_PACKET_IN2 claimed full_len < len");
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 10,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *set_allow2f(cmd_parms *cmd, void *d_, const char *arg)
{
core_dir_config *d = d_;
if (0 == ap_cstr_casecmp(arg, "on")) {
d->allow_encoded_slashes = 1;
d->decode_encoded_slashes = 1; /* for compatibility with 2.0 & 2.2 */
} else if (0 == ap_cstr_casecmp(arg, "off")) {
d->allow_encoded_slashes = 0;
d->decode_encoded_slashes = 0;
} else if (0 == ap_cstr_casecmp(arg, "nodecode")) {
d->allow_encoded_slashes = 1;
d->decode_encoded_slashes = 0;
} else {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool,
cmd->cmd->name, " must be On, Off, or NoDecode",
NULL);
}
d->allow_encoded_slashes_set = 1;
d->decode_encoded_slashes_set = 1;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 1,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TimeDelta RendererSchedulerImpl::MostRecentExpectedQueueingTime() {
return main_thread_only().most_recent_expected_queueing_time;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sf_read_raw (SNDFILE *sndfile, void *ptr, sf_count_t bytes)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
sf_count_t count, extra ;
int bytewidth, blockwidth ;
VALIDATE_SNDFILE_AND_ASSIGN_PSF (sndfile, psf, 1) ;
bytewidth = (psf->bytewidth > 0) ? psf->bytewidth : 1 ;
blockwidth = (psf->blockwidth > 0) ? psf->blockwidth : 1 ;
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_WRITE)
{ psf->error = SFE_NOT_READMODE ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (bytes < 0 || psf->read_current >= psf->sf.frames)
{ psf_memset (ptr, 0, bytes) ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (bytes % (psf->sf.channels * bytewidth))
{ psf->error = SFE_BAD_READ_ALIGN ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (psf->last_op != SFM_READ)
if (psf->seek (psf, SFM_READ, psf->read_current) < 0)
return 0 ;
count = psf_fread (ptr, 1, bytes, psf) ;
if (psf->read_current + count / blockwidth <= psf->sf.frames)
psf->read_current += count / blockwidth ;
else
{ count = (psf->sf.frames - psf->read_current) * blockwidth ;
extra = bytes - count ;
psf_memset (((char *) ptr) + count, 0, extra) ;
psf->read_current = psf->sf.frames ;
} ;
psf->last_op = SFM_READ ;
return count ;
} /* sf_read_raw */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map> privateMap(const char* name)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> console = ensureConsole();
v8::Local<v8::Private> privateKey = v8::Private::ForApi(m_isolate, toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, name));
v8::Local<v8::Value> mapValue;
if (!console->GetPrivate(m_context, privateKey).ToLocal(&mapValue))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map>();
if (mapValue->IsUndefined()) {
v8::Local<v8::Map> map = v8::Map::New(m_isolate);
if (!console->SetPrivate(m_context, privateKey, map).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map>();
return map;
}
return mapValue->IsMap() ? mapValue.As<v8::Map>() : v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Map>();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 3,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_flag_item_set_comment(RFlagItem *item, const char *comment) {
if (item) {
free (item->comment);
item->comment = ISNULLSTR (comment) ? NULL : strdup (comment);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int connection_based(struct sock *sk)
{
return sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET || sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderFrameCreated(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderFrameCreated(render_frame_host);
UpdateAccessibilityModeOnFrame(render_frame_host);
if (!render_frame_host->IsRenderFrameLive() || render_frame_host->GetParent())
return;
NavigationEntry* entry = controller_.GetPendingEntry();
if (entry && entry->IsViewSourceMode()) {
render_frame_host->Send(
new FrameMsg_EnableViewSourceMode(render_frame_host->GetRoutingID()));
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_vq_free_iovecs(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
{
kfree(vq->indirect);
vq->indirect = NULL;
kfree(vq->log);
vq->log = NULL;
kfree(vq->heads);
vq->heads = NULL;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _free_resources(r_pe_resource *rs) {
if (rs) {
free (rs->timestr);
free (rs->data);
free (rs->type);
free (rs->language);
free (rs);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_proc_sequence(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct rpc_task *task;
int ret;
task = _nfs41_proc_sequence(clp, cred);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(task);
goto out;
}
ret = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
if (!ret) {
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res = task->tk_msg.rpc_resp;
if (task->tk_status == 0)
nfs41_handle_sequence_flag_errors(clp, res->sr_status_flags);
ret = task->tk_status;
}
rpc_put_task(task);
out:
dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *register_package_helper(cmd_parms *cmd,
const char *arg,
apr_array_header_t *dir_array)
{
apr_status_t rv;
ap_lua_server_cfg *server_cfg =
ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &lua_module);
char *fixed_filename;
rv = apr_filepath_merge(&fixed_filename,
server_cfg->root_path,
arg,
APR_FILEPATH_NOTRELATIVE,
cmd->pool);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return apr_psprintf(cmd->pool,
"Unable to build full path to file, %s", arg);
}
*(const char **) apr_array_push(dir_array) = fixed_filename;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int is_digit(char ch)
{
return (ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9');
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 23,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::commitRootLayerIfNeeded()
{
#if DEBUG_AC_COMMIT
BBLOG(Platform::LogLevelCritical, "%s: m_suspendRootLayerCommit = %d, m_needsCommit = %d, m_frameLayers = 0x%x, m_frameLayers->hasLayer() = %d, needsLayoutRecursive() = %d",
WTF_PRETTY_FUNCTION,
m_suspendRootLayerCommit,
m_needsCommit,
m_frameLayers.get(),
m_frameLayers && m_frameLayers->hasLayer(),
m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view() && needsLayoutRecursive(m_mainFrame->view()));
#endif
if (m_suspendRootLayerCommit)
return false;
if (!m_needsCommit)
return false;
if (!(m_frameLayers && m_frameLayers->hasLayer()) && !m_overlayLayer
&& !m_needsOneShotDrawingSynchronization)
return false;
FrameView* view = m_mainFrame->view();
if (!view)
return false;
updateDelegatedOverlays();
if (needsLayoutRecursive(view)) {
ASSERT(!needsOneShotDrawingSynchronization());
return false;
}
willComposite();
m_needsCommit = false;
m_needsOneShotDrawingSynchronization = false;
if (m_rootLayerCommitTimer->isActive())
m_rootLayerCommitTimer->stop();
double scale = currentScale();
if (m_frameLayers && m_frameLayers->hasLayer())
m_frameLayers->commitOnWebKitThread(scale);
if (m_overlayLayer)
m_overlayLayer->platformLayer()->commitOnWebKitThread(scale);
IntRect layoutRectForCompositing(scrollPosition(), actualVisibleSize());
IntSize contentsSizeForCompositing = contentsSize();
bool drawsRootLayer = compositorDrawsRootLayer();
Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->dispatchSyncMessage(
Platform::createMethodCallMessage(
&WebPagePrivate::commitRootLayer,
this,
layoutRectForCompositing,
contentsSizeForCompositing,
drawsRootLayer));
didComposite();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool parse_signature(struct MACH0_(obj_t) *bin, ut64 off) {
int i,len;
ut32 data;
bin->signature = NULL;
struct linkedit_data_command link = {0};
ut8 lit[sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command)] = {0};
struct blob_index_t idx = {0};
struct super_blob_t super = {{0}};
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command) > bin->size) {
return false;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, lit, sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command));
if (len != sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command)) {
bprintf ("Failed to get data while parsing LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command\n");
return false;
}
link.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&lit[0], bin->big_endian);
link.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&lit[4], bin->big_endian);
link.dataoff = r_read_ble32 (&lit[8], bin->big_endian);
link.datasize = r_read_ble32 (&lit[12], bin->big_endian);
data = link.dataoff;
if (data > bin->size || data + sizeof (struct super_blob_t) > bin->size) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
return true;
}
super.blob.magic = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + data, little_);
super.blob.length = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + data + 4, little_);
super.count = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + data + 8, little_);
for (i = 0; i < super.count; ++i) {
if ((ut8 *)(bin->b->buf + data + i) > (ut8 *)(bin->b->buf + bin->size)) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
break;
}
struct blob_index_t bi;
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, data + 12 + (i * sizeof (struct blob_index_t)),
(ut8*)&bi, sizeof (struct blob_index_t)) < sizeof (struct blob_index_t)) {
break;
}
idx.type = r_read_ble32 (&bi.type, little_);
idx.offset = r_read_ble32 (&bi.offset, little_);
if (idx.type == CSSLOT_ENTITLEMENTS) {
ut64 off = data + idx.offset;
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct blob_t) > bin->size) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
break;
}
struct blob_t entitlements = {0};
entitlements.magic = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + off, little_);
entitlements.length = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + off + 4, little_);
len = entitlements.length - sizeof (struct blob_t);
if (len <= bin->size && len > 1) {
bin->signature = calloc (1, len + 1);
if (bin->signature) {
ut8 *src = bin->b->buf + off + sizeof (struct blob_t);
if (off + sizeof (struct blob_t) + len < bin->b->length) {
memcpy (bin->signature, src, len);
bin->signature[len] = '\0';
return true;
}
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
return true;
}
} else {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
}
}
}
if (!bin->signature) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("No entitlement found");
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
struct nfsd4_exchange_id *exid)
{
int dummy, tmp;
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
COPYMEM(exid->verifier.data, NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE);
status = nfsd4_decode_opaque(argp, &exid->clname);
if (status)
return nfserr_bad_xdr;
READ_BUF(4);
exid->flags = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/* Ignore state_protect4_a */
READ_BUF(4);
exid->spa_how = be32_to_cpup(p++);
switch (exid->spa_how) {
case SP4_NONE:
break;
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
/* spo_must_enforce */
status = nfsd4_decode_bitmap(argp,
exid->spo_must_enforce);
if (status)
goto out;
/* spo_must_allow */
status = nfsd4_decode_bitmap(argp, exid->spo_must_allow);
if (status)
goto out;
break;
case SP4_SSV:
/* ssp_ops */
READ_BUF(4);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(dummy * 4);
p += dummy;
READ_BUF(4);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(dummy * 4);
p += dummy;
/* ssp_hash_algs<> */
READ_BUF(4);
tmp = be32_to_cpup(p++);
while (tmp--) {
READ_BUF(4);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(dummy);
p += XDR_QUADLEN(dummy);
}
/* ssp_encr_algs<> */
READ_BUF(4);
tmp = be32_to_cpup(p++);
while (tmp--) {
READ_BUF(4);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(dummy);
p += XDR_QUADLEN(dummy);
}
/* ssp_window and ssp_num_gss_handles */
READ_BUF(8);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
break;
default:
goto xdr_error;
}
/* Ignore Implementation ID */
READ_BUF(4); /* nfs_impl_id4 array length */
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (dummy > 1)
goto xdr_error;
if (dummy == 1) {
/* nii_domain */
READ_BUF(4);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(dummy);
p += XDR_QUADLEN(dummy);
/* nii_name */
READ_BUF(4);
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(dummy);
p += XDR_QUADLEN(dummy);
/* nii_date */
READ_BUF(12);
p += 3;
}
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 24,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_proc_remove(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs_removeargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(dir),
.name.len = name->len,
.name.name = name->name,
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
};
struct nfs_removeres res = {
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_REMOVE],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
res.dir_attr = nfs_alloc_fattr();
if (res.dir_attr == NULL)
goto out;
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status == 0) {
update_changeattr(dir, &res.cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(dir, res.dir_attr);
}
nfs_free_fattr(res.dir_attr);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit cleanup_ipmi(void)
{
int count;
if (!initialized)
return;
atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(&panic_notifier_list, &panic_block);
/*
* This can't be called if any interfaces exist, so no worry
* about shutting down the interfaces.
*/
/*
* Tell the timer to stop, then wait for it to stop. This
* avoids problems with race conditions removing the timer
* here.
*/
atomic_inc(&stop_operation);
del_timer_sync(&ipmi_timer);
driver_unregister(&ipmidriver.driver);
initialized = 0;
/* Check for buffer leaks. */
count = atomic_read(&smi_msg_inuse_count);
if (count != 0)
pr_warn("SMI message count %d at exit\n", count);
count = atomic_read(&recv_msg_inuse_count);
if (count != 0)
pr_warn("recv message count %d at exit\n", count);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int mount_entry_on_systemfs(struct mntent *mntent)
{
return mount_entry_on_generic(mntent, mntent->mnt_dir);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 21,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::updateBlockChildDirtyBitsBeforeLayout(bool relayoutChildren, RenderBox* child)
{
if (relayoutChildren || (child->hasRelativeLogicalHeight() && !isRenderView()))
child->setChildNeedsLayout(MarkOnlyThis);
if (relayoutChildren && child->needsPreferredWidthsRecalculation())
child->setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty(MarkOnlyThis);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::DemuxerDestructionHelper(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<Demuxer> demuxer) {
DCHECK(task_runner->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE,
{base::TaskPriority::BACKGROUND,
base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::BindOnce(
[](std::unique_ptr<Demuxer> demuxer_to_destroy) {
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMER("Media.MSE.DemuxerDestructionTime");
demuxer_to_destroy.reset();
},
std::move(demuxer)));
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346
| 0
| 15,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_object_list_from_bitmap(struct rev_info *revs)
{
if (prepare_bitmap_walk(revs) < 0)
return -1;
if (pack_options_allow_reuse() &&
!reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap(
&reuse_packfile,
&reuse_packfile_objects,
&reuse_packfile_offset)) {
assert(reuse_packfile_objects);
nr_result += reuse_packfile_objects;
display_progress(progress_state, nr_result);
}
traverse_bitmap_commit_list(&add_object_entry_from_bitmap);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ib_uverbs_free_hw_resources(struct ib_uverbs_device *uverbs_dev,
struct ib_device *ib_dev)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *file;
struct ib_uverbs_async_event_file *event_file;
struct ib_event event;
/* Pending running commands to terminate */
uverbs_disassociate_api_pre(uverbs_dev);
event.event = IB_EVENT_DEVICE_FATAL;
event.element.port_num = 0;
event.device = ib_dev;
mutex_lock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
while (!list_empty(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_file_list)) {
file = list_first_entry(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_file_list,
struct ib_uverbs_file, list);
list_del_init(&file->list);
kref_get(&file->ref);
/* We must release the mutex before going ahead and calling
* uverbs_cleanup_ufile, as it might end up indirectly calling
* uverbs_close, for example due to freeing the resources (e.g
* mmput).
*/
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
ib_uverbs_event_handler(&file->event_handler, &event);
uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw(file, RDMA_REMOVE_DRIVER_REMOVE);
kref_put(&file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
mutex_lock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
}
while (!list_empty(&uverbs_dev->uverbs_events_file_list)) {
event_file = list_first_entry(&uverbs_dev->
uverbs_events_file_list,
struct ib_uverbs_async_event_file,
list);
spin_lock_irq(&event_file->ev_queue.lock);
event_file->ev_queue.is_closed = 1;
spin_unlock_irq(&event_file->ev_queue.lock);
list_del(&event_file->list);
ib_unregister_event_handler(
&event_file->uverbs_file->event_handler);
event_file->uverbs_file->event_handler.device =
NULL;
wake_up_interruptible(&event_file->ev_queue.poll_wait);
kill_fasync(&event_file->ev_queue.async_queue, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_dev->lists_mutex);
uverbs_disassociate_api(uverbs_dev->uapi);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 7,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsSession::ReceivedBadMessage() {
MojoConnectionDestroyed();
if (process_) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
process_, bad_message::RFH_INCONSISTENT_DEVTOOLS_MESSAGE);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 13,564
|
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