instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dec_mnt_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
{
dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_MNT_NAMESPACES);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 21,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dcchkstr(int size)
{
while( (strsize+size) > strmaxsize ) {
dcstr=realloc(dcstr,strmaxsize+DCSTRSIZE);
strmaxsize+=DCSTRSIZE;
dcptr=dcstr+strsize;
}
}
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaManager::NotifyStorageModifiedInternal(
QuotaClient::ID client_id,
const GURL& origin,
StorageType type,
int64 delta,
base::Time modified_time) {
LazyInitialize();
GetUsageTracker(type)->UpdateUsageCache(client_id, origin, delta);
PostTaskAndReplyWithResultForDBThread(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UpdateModifiedTimeOnDBThread, origin, type, modified_time),
base::Bind(&QuotaManager::DidDatabaseWork,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectCanDiscardFalseAllReasons(const LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit,
DecisionFailureReason failure_reason) {
ExpectCanDiscardFalse(lifecycle_unit, failure_reason,
DiscardReason::kExternal);
ExpectCanDiscardFalse(lifecycle_unit, failure_reason,
DiscardReason::kProactive);
ExpectCanDiscardFalse(lifecycle_unit, failure_reason, DiscardReason::kUrgent);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProfilingService::ProfilingService() : weak_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 22,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dispatchRaw(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
int32_t len;
status_t status;
const void *data;
status = p.readInt32(&len);
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
if (((int)len) == -1) {
data = NULL;
len = 0;
}
data = p.readInplace(len);
startRequest;
appendPrintBuf("%sraw_size=%d", printBuf, len);
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, const_cast<void *>(data), len, pRI, pRI->socket_id);
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 18,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidAddContentSecurityPolicies(
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebContentSecurityPolicy>& policies) {
std::vector<ContentSecurityPolicy> content_policies;
for (const auto& policy : policies)
content_policies.push_back(BuildContentSecurityPolicy(policy));
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidAddContentSecurityPolicies(routing_id_,
content_policies));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PlatformThreadId WorkerThread::platformThreadId()
{
if (!m_started)
return 0;
return backingThread().platformThread().threadId();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 28,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftp_mdtm(ftpbuf_t *ftp, const char *path)
{
time_t stamp;
struct tm *gmt, tmbuf;
struct tm tm;
char *ptr;
int n;
if (ftp == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "MDTM", path)) {
return -1;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 213) {
return -1;
}
/* parse out the timestamp */
for (ptr = ftp->inbuf; *ptr && !isdigit(*ptr); ptr++);
n = sscanf(ptr, "%4u%2u%2u%2u%2u%2u", &tm.tm_year, &tm.tm_mon, &tm.tm_mday, &tm.tm_hour, &tm.tm_min, &tm.tm_sec);
if (n != 6) {
return -1;
}
tm.tm_year -= 1900;
tm.tm_mon--;
tm.tm_isdst = -1;
/* figure out the GMT offset */
stamp = time(NULL);
gmt = php_gmtime_r(&stamp, &tmbuf);
if (!gmt) {
return -1;
}
gmt->tm_isdst = -1;
/* apply the GMT offset */
tm.tm_sec += stamp - mktime(gmt);
tm.tm_isdst = gmt->tm_isdst;
stamp = mktime(&tm);
return stamp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate::SendTabToSelfInfoBarDelegate(
const SendTabToSelfEntry* entry) {
entry_ = entry;
}
Commit Message: [SendTabToSelf] Added logic to display an infobar for the feature.
This CL is one of many to come. It covers:
* Creation of the infobar from the SendTabToSelfInfoBarController
* Plumbed the call to create the infobar to the native code.
* Open the link when user taps on the link
In follow-up CLs, the following will be done:
* Instantiate the InfobarController in the ChromeActivity
* Listen for Model changes in the Controller
Bug: 949233,963193
Change-Id: I5df1359debb5f0f35c32c2df3b691bf9129cdeb8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1604406
Reviewed-by: Tommy Nyquist <nyquist@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: sebsg <sebsg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Cohen <jeffreycohen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Jones <mdjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tanya Gupta <tgupta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660854}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 1,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmci_transport_queue_pair_alloc(struct vmci_qp **qpair,
struct vmci_handle *handle,
u64 produce_size,
u64 consume_size,
u32 peer, u32 flags, bool trusted)
{
int err = 0;
if (trusted) {
/* Try to allocate our queue pair as trusted. This will only
* work if vsock is running in the host.
*/
err = vmci_qpair_alloc(qpair, handle, produce_size,
consume_size,
peer, flags,
VMCI_PRIVILEGE_FLAG_TRUSTED);
if (err != VMCI_ERROR_NO_ACCESS)
goto out;
}
err = vmci_qpair_alloc(qpair, handle, produce_size, consume_size,
peer, flags, VMCI_NO_PRIVILEGE_FLAGS);
out:
if (err < 0) {
pr_err("Could not attach to queue pair with %d\n",
err);
err = vmci_transport_error_to_vsock_error(err);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_fstatfs, unsigned long, fd,
struct osf_statfs __user *, buffer, unsigned long, bufsiz)
{
struct kstatfs linux_stat;
int error = fd_statfs(fd, &linux_stat);
if (!error)
error = linux_to_osf_statfs(&linux_stat, buffer, bufsiz);
return error;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint8_t* add_attr(uint8_t* p, tSDP_DISCOVERY_DB* p_db,
tSDP_DISC_REC* p_rec, uint16_t attr_id,
tSDP_DISC_ATTR* p_parent_attr, uint8_t nest_level) {
tSDP_DISC_ATTR* p_attr;
uint32_t attr_len;
uint32_t total_len;
uint16_t attr_type;
uint16_t id;
uint8_t type;
uint8_t* p_end;
uint8_t is_additional_list = nest_level & SDP_ADDITIONAL_LIST_MASK;
nest_level &= ~(SDP_ADDITIONAL_LIST_MASK);
type = *p++;
p = sdpu_get_len_from_type(p, type, &attr_len);
attr_len &= SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN_MASK;
attr_type = (type >> 3) & 0x0f;
/* See if there is enough space in the database */
if (attr_len > 4)
total_len = attr_len - 4 + (uint16_t)sizeof(tSDP_DISC_ATTR);
else
total_len = sizeof(tSDP_DISC_ATTR);
/* Ensure it is a multiple of 4 */
total_len = (total_len + 3) & ~3;
/* See if there is enough space in the database */
if (p_db->mem_free < total_len) return (NULL);
p_attr = (tSDP_DISC_ATTR*)p_db->p_free_mem;
p_attr->attr_id = attr_id;
p_attr->attr_len_type = (uint16_t)attr_len | (attr_type << 12);
p_attr->p_next_attr = NULL;
/* Store the attribute value */
switch (attr_type) {
case UINT_DESC_TYPE:
if ((is_additional_list != 0) && (attr_len == 2)) {
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(id, p);
if (id != ATTR_ID_PROTOCOL_DESC_LIST)
p -= 2;
else {
/* Reserve the memory for the attribute now, as we need to add
* sub-attributes */
p_db->p_free_mem += sizeof(tSDP_DISC_ATTR);
p_db->mem_free -= sizeof(tSDP_DISC_ATTR);
p_end = p + attr_len;
total_len = 0;
/* SDP_TRACE_DEBUG ("SDP - attr nest level:%d(list)", nest_level); */
if (nest_level >= MAX_NEST_LEVELS) {
SDP_TRACE_ERROR("SDP - attr nesting too deep");
return (p_end);
}
/* Now, add the list entry */
p = add_attr(p, p_db, p_rec, ATTR_ID_PROTOCOL_DESC_LIST, p_attr,
(uint8_t)(nest_level + 1));
break;
}
}
/* Case falls through */
case TWO_COMP_INT_DESC_TYPE:
switch (attr_len) {
case 1:
p_attr->attr_value.v.u8 = *p++;
break;
case 2:
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attr->attr_value.v.u16, p);
break;
case 4:
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT32(p_attr->attr_value.v.u32, p);
break;
default:
BE_STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p, p_attr->attr_value.v.array, (int32_t)attr_len);
break;
}
break;
case UUID_DESC_TYPE:
switch (attr_len) {
case 2:
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attr->attr_value.v.u16, p);
break;
case 4:
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT32(p_attr->attr_value.v.u32, p);
if (p_attr->attr_value.v.u32 < 0x10000) {
attr_len = 2;
p_attr->attr_len_type = (uint16_t)attr_len | (attr_type << 12);
p_attr->attr_value.v.u16 = (uint16_t)p_attr->attr_value.v.u32;
}
break;
case 16:
/* See if we can compress his UUID down to 16 or 32bit UUIDs */
if (sdpu_is_base_uuid(p)) {
if ((p[0] == 0) && (p[1] == 0)) {
p_attr->attr_len_type =
(p_attr->attr_len_type & ~SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN_MASK) | 2;
p += 2;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT16(p_attr->attr_value.v.u16, p);
p += Uuid::kNumBytes128 - 4;
} else {
p_attr->attr_len_type =
(p_attr->attr_len_type & ~SDP_DISC_ATTR_LEN_MASK) | 4;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT32(p_attr->attr_value.v.u32, p);
p += Uuid::kNumBytes128 - 4;
}
} else {
BE_STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p, p_attr->attr_value.v.array,
(int32_t)attr_len);
}
break;
default:
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("SDP - bad len in UUID attr: %d", attr_len);
return (p + attr_len);
}
break;
case DATA_ELE_SEQ_DESC_TYPE:
case DATA_ELE_ALT_DESC_TYPE:
/* Reserve the memory for the attribute now, as we need to add
* sub-attributes */
p_db->p_free_mem += sizeof(tSDP_DISC_ATTR);
p_db->mem_free -= sizeof(tSDP_DISC_ATTR);
p_end = p + attr_len;
total_len = 0;
/* SDP_TRACE_DEBUG ("SDP - attr nest level:%d", nest_level); */
if (nest_level >= MAX_NEST_LEVELS) {
SDP_TRACE_ERROR("SDP - attr nesting too deep");
return (p_end);
}
if (is_additional_list != 0 ||
attr_id == ATTR_ID_ADDITION_PROTO_DESC_LISTS)
nest_level |= SDP_ADDITIONAL_LIST_MASK;
/* SDP_TRACE_DEBUG ("SDP - attr nest level:0x%x(finish)", nest_level); */
while (p < p_end) {
/* Now, add the list entry */
p = add_attr(p, p_db, p_rec, 0, p_attr, (uint8_t)(nest_level + 1));
if (!p) return (NULL);
}
break;
case TEXT_STR_DESC_TYPE:
case URL_DESC_TYPE:
BE_STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p, p_attr->attr_value.v.array, (int32_t)attr_len);
break;
case BOOLEAN_DESC_TYPE:
switch (attr_len) {
case 1:
p_attr->attr_value.v.u8 = *p++;
break;
default:
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("SDP - bad len in boolean attr: %d", attr_len);
return (p + attr_len);
}
break;
default: /* switch (attr_type) */
break;
}
p_db->p_free_mem += total_len;
p_db->mem_free -= total_len;
/* Add the attribute to the end of the chain */
if (!p_parent_attr) {
if (!p_rec->p_first_attr)
p_rec->p_first_attr = p_attr;
else {
tSDP_DISC_ATTR* p_attr1 = p_rec->p_first_attr;
while (p_attr1->p_next_attr) p_attr1 = p_attr1->p_next_attr;
p_attr1->p_next_attr = p_attr;
}
} else {
if (!p_parent_attr->attr_value.v.p_sub_attr) {
p_parent_attr->attr_value.v.p_sub_attr = p_attr;
/* SDP_TRACE_DEBUG ("parent:0x%x(id:%d), ch:0x%x(id:%d)",
p_parent_attr, p_parent_attr->attr_id, p_attr, p_attr->attr_id); */
} else {
tSDP_DISC_ATTR* p_attr1 = p_parent_attr->attr_value.v.p_sub_attr;
/* SDP_TRACE_DEBUG ("parent:0x%x(id:%d), ch1:0x%x(id:%d)",
p_parent_attr, p_parent_attr->attr_id, p_attr1, p_attr1->attr_id); */
while (p_attr1->p_next_attr) p_attr1 = p_attr1->p_next_attr;
p_attr1->p_next_attr = p_attr;
/* SDP_TRACE_DEBUG ("new ch:0x%x(id:%d)", p_attr, p_attr->attr_id); */
}
}
return (p);
}
Commit Message: Fix copy length calculation in sdp_copy_raw_data
Test: compilation
Bug: 110216176
Change-Id: Ic4a19c9f0fe8cd592bc6c25dcec7b1da49ff7459
(cherry picked from commit 23aa15743397b345f3d948289fe90efa2a2e2b3e)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 13,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vorbis_book_clear(codebook *b){
/* static book is not cleared; we're likely called on the lookup and
the static codebook belongs to the info struct */
if(b->q_val)_ogg_free(b->q_val);
if(b->dec_table)_ogg_free(b->dec_table);
if(b->dec_buf)_ogg_free(b->dec_buf);
memset(b,0,sizeof(*b));
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void filter(GradFunContext *ctx, uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int width, int height, int dst_linesize, int src_linesize, int r)
{
int bstride = FFALIGN(width, 16) / 2;
int y;
uint32_t dc_factor = (1 << 21) / (r * r);
uint16_t *dc = ctx->buf + 16;
uint16_t *buf = ctx->buf + bstride + 32;
int thresh = ctx->thresh;
memset(dc, 0, (bstride + 16) * sizeof(*buf));
for (y = 0; y < r; y++)
ctx->blur_line(dc, buf + y * bstride, buf + (y - 1) * bstride, src + 2 * y * src_linesize, src_linesize, width / 2);
for (;;) {
if (y < height - r) {
int mod = ((y + r) / 2) % r;
uint16_t *buf0 = buf + mod * bstride;
uint16_t *buf1 = buf + (mod ? mod - 1 : r - 1) * bstride;
int x, v;
ctx->blur_line(dc, buf0, buf1, src + (y + r) * src_linesize, src_linesize, width / 2);
for (x = v = 0; x < r; x++)
v += dc[x];
for (; x < width / 2; x++) {
v += dc[x] - dc[x-r];
dc[x-r] = v * dc_factor >> 16;
}
for (; x < (width + r + 1) / 2; x++)
dc[x-r] = v * dc_factor >> 16;
for (x = -r / 2; x < 0; x++)
dc[x] = dc[0];
}
if (y == r) {
for (y = 0; y < r; y++)
ctx->filter_line(dst + y * dst_linesize, src + y * src_linesize, dc - r / 2, width, thresh, dither[y & 7]);
}
ctx->filter_line(dst + y * dst_linesize, src + y * src_linesize, dc - r / 2, width, thresh, dither[y & 7]);
if (++y >= height) break;
ctx->filter_line(dst + y * dst_linesize, src + y * src_linesize, dc - r / 2, width, thresh, dither[y & 7]);
if (++y >= height) break;
}
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode imap_doing(struct connectdata *conn,
bool *dophase_done)
{
CURLcode result;
result = imap_multi_statemach(conn, dophase_done);
if(*dophase_done) {
result = imap_dophase_done(conn, FALSE /* not connected */);
DEBUGF(infof(conn->data, "DO phase is complete\n"));
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 3,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_icache_free_eofblocks(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_eofblocks *eofb)
{
return __xfs_icache_free_eofblocks(mp, eofb, xfs_inode_free_eofblocks,
XFS_ICI_EOFBLOCKS_TAG);
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 8,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void md_make_request(struct request_queue *q, struct bio *bio)
{
const int rw = bio_data_dir(bio);
struct mddev *mddev = q->queuedata;
unsigned int sectors;
int cpu;
if (mddev == NULL || mddev->pers == NULL
|| !mddev->ready) {
bio_io_error(bio);
return;
}
if (mddev->ro == 1 && unlikely(rw == WRITE)) {
bio_endio(bio, bio_sectors(bio) == 0 ? 0 : -EROFS);
return;
}
smp_rmb(); /* Ensure implications of 'active' are visible */
rcu_read_lock();
if (mddev->suspended) {
DEFINE_WAIT(__wait);
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait(&mddev->sb_wait, &__wait,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!mddev->suspended)
break;
rcu_read_unlock();
schedule();
rcu_read_lock();
}
finish_wait(&mddev->sb_wait, &__wait);
}
atomic_inc(&mddev->active_io);
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* save the sectors now since our bio can
* go away inside make_request
*/
sectors = bio_sectors(bio);
mddev->pers->make_request(mddev, bio);
cpu = part_stat_lock();
part_stat_inc(cpu, &mddev->gendisk->part0, ios[rw]);
part_stat_add(cpu, &mddev->gendisk->part0, sectors[rw], sectors);
part_stat_unlock();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->active_io) && mddev->suspended)
wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ktime_t common_hrtimer_remaining(struct k_itimer *timr, ktime_t now)
{
struct hrtimer *timer = &timr->it.real.timer;
return __hrtimer_expires_remaining_adjusted(timer, now);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmxnet3_on_rx_done_update_stats(VMXNET3State *s,
int qidx,
Vmxnet3PktStatus status)
{
struct UPT1_RxStats *stats = &s->rxq_descr[qidx].rxq_stats;
size_t tot_len = vmxnet_rx_pkt_get_total_len(s->rx_pkt);
switch (status) {
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OUT_OF_BUF:
stats->pktsRxOutOfBuf++;
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_ERROR:
stats->pktsRxError++;
break;
case VMXNET3_PKT_STATUS_OK:
switch (vmxnet_rx_pkt_get_packet_type(s->rx_pkt)) {
case ETH_PKT_BCAST:
stats->bcastPktsRxOK++;
stats->bcastBytesRxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_MCAST:
stats->mcastPktsRxOK++;
stats->mcastBytesRxOK += tot_len;
break;
case ETH_PKT_UCAST:
stats->ucastPktsRxOK++;
stats->ucastBytesRxOK += tot_len;
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
if (tot_len > s->mtu) {
stats->LROPktsRxOK++;
stats->LROBytesRxOK += tot_len;
}
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ovl_create_object(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t rdev,
const char *link)
{
int err;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (!err) {
err = ovl_create_or_link(dentry, mode, rdev, link, NULL);
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XSyncHandler::PushPaintCounter(Display* display,
Picture picture,
Pixmap pixmap,
const base::Closure& completion_callback) {
backing_store_events_.push(
new BackingStoreEvents(display, picture, pixmap, completion_callback));
XSyncValue value;
XSyncIntToValue(&value, 1);
XSyncChangeCounter(ui::GetXDisplay(),
backing_store_sync_counter_,
value);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::MaybeQueueSendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext() {
if (logged_field_edit_ || sensitive_input_edited_task_.IsActive() ||
IsSecureContext()) {
return;
}
logged_field_edit_ = true;
sensitive_input_edited_task_ = PostCancellableTask(
*GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kUserInteraction), FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&Document::SendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 8,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::GetModuleSystem(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
ScriptContext* context = ScriptContextSet::GetContextByObject(
v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[0]));
if (blink::WebFrame::scriptCanAccess(context->web_frame()))
args.GetReturnValue().Set(context->module_system()->NewInstance());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 18,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BitStack::top() const
{
if (!m_size)
return false;
unsigned shift = (m_size - 1) & bitInWordMask;
return m_words.last() & (1U << shift);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: linux_md_create_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Daemon *daemon,
const char *first_component_objpath)
{
LinuxMdCreateData *data;
data = g_new0 (LinuxMdCreateData, 1);
data->refcount = 1;
data->context = context;
data->daemon = g_object_ref (daemon);
data->first_component_objpath = g_strdup (first_component_objpath);
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only(void)
{
return vmx_capability.ept & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int perf_cgroup_connect(int fd, struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_event_attr *attr,
struct perf_event *group_leader)
{
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp;
struct cgroup_subsys_state *css;
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
int ret = 0;
if (!f.file)
return -EBADF;
css = css_tryget_online_from_dir(f.file->f_path.dentry,
&perf_event_cgrp_subsys);
if (IS_ERR(css)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(css);
goto out;
}
cgrp = container_of(css, struct perf_cgroup, css);
event->cgrp = cgrp;
/*
* all events in a group must monitor
* the same cgroup because a task belongs
* to only one perf cgroup at a time
*/
if (group_leader && group_leader->cgrp != cgrp) {
perf_detach_cgroup(event);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_clist_begin_image(gx_device * dev,
const gs_gstate * pgs, const gs_image_t * pim,
gs_image_format_t format, const gs_int_rect * prect,
const gx_drawing_color * pdcolor,
const gx_clip_path * pcpath,
gs_memory_t * memory, gx_image_enum_common_t ** pinfo)
{
pdf14_clist_device * pdev = (pdf14_clist_device *)dev;
int code;
/*
* Ensure that that the PDF 1.4 reading compositor will have the current
* blending parameters. This is needed since the fill_rectangle routines
* do not have access to the gs_gstate. Thus we have to pass any
* changes explictly.
*/
code = pdf14_clist_update_params(pdev, pgs, false, NULL);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Pass image to the target */
code = gx_forward_begin_image(dev, pgs, pim, format, prect,
pdcolor, pcpath, memory, pinfo);
if (code < 0)
return gx_default_begin_image(dev, pgs, pim, format, prect,
pdcolor, pcpath, memory, pinfo);
else return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 23,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapter::NotifyDiscoveryError(CallbackQueue callback_queue) {
while (!callback_queue.empty()) {
std::unique_ptr<StartOrStopDiscoveryCallback> callbacks =
std::move(callback_queue.front());
callback_queue.pop();
if (callbacks->start_error_callback)
callbacks->start_error_callback.Run();
if (callbacks->stop_callback)
std::move(callbacks->stop_callback).Run();
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vrend_decode_create_object(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, int length)
{
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
uint32_t header = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_CREATE_HEADER);
uint32_t handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_CREATE_HANDLE);
uint8_t obj_type = (header >> 8) & 0xff;
int ret = 0;
if (handle == 0)
return EINVAL;
switch (obj_type){
case VIRGL_OBJECT_BLEND:
ret = vrend_decode_create_blend(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_DSA:
ret = vrend_decode_create_dsa(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_RASTERIZER:
ret = vrend_decode_create_rasterizer(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER:
ret = vrend_decode_create_shader(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_VERTEX_ELEMENTS:
ret = vrend_decode_create_ve(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_SURFACE:
ret = vrend_decode_create_surface(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_VIEW:
ret = vrend_decode_create_sampler_view(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_STATE:
ret = vrend_decode_create_sampler_state(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_QUERY:
ret = vrend_decode_create_query(ctx, handle, length);
break;
case VIRGL_OBJECT_STREAMOUT_TARGET:
ret = vrend_decode_create_stream_output_target(ctx, handle, length);
break;
default:
return EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 22,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __inet_check_established(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk, __u16 lport,
struct inet_timewait_sock **twp)
{
struct inet_hashinfo *hinfo = death_row->hashinfo;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
__be32 daddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
__be32 saddr = inet->inet_daddr;
int dif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
INET_ADDR_COOKIE(acookie, saddr, daddr)
const __portpair ports = INET_COMBINED_PORTS(inet->inet_dport, lport);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
unsigned int hash = inet_ehashfn(net, daddr, lport,
saddr, inet->inet_dport);
struct inet_ehash_bucket *head = inet_ehash_bucket(hinfo, hash);
spinlock_t *lock = inet_ehash_lockp(hinfo, hash);
struct sock *sk2;
const struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw;
int twrefcnt = 0;
spin_lock(lock);
/* Check TIME-WAIT sockets first. */
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &head->twchain) {
tw = inet_twsk(sk2);
if (INET_TW_MATCH(sk2, net, hash, acookie,
saddr, daddr, ports, dif)) {
if (twsk_unique(sk, sk2, twp))
goto unique;
else
goto not_unique;
}
}
tw = NULL;
/* And established part... */
sk_nulls_for_each(sk2, node, &head->chain) {
if (INET_MATCH(sk2, net, hash, acookie,
saddr, daddr, ports, dif))
goto not_unique;
}
unique:
/* Must record num and sport now. Otherwise we will see
* in hash table socket with a funny identity. */
inet->inet_num = lport;
inet->inet_sport = htons(lport);
sk->sk_hash = hash;
WARN_ON(!sk_unhashed(sk));
__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, &head->chain);
if (tw) {
twrefcnt = inet_twsk_unhash(tw);
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_TIMEWAITRECYCLED);
}
spin_unlock(lock);
if (twrefcnt)
inet_twsk_put(tw);
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, 1);
if (twp) {
*twp = tw;
} else if (tw) {
/* Silly. Should hash-dance instead... */
inet_twsk_deschedule(tw, death_row);
inet_twsk_put(tw);
}
return 0;
not_unique:
spin_unlock(lock);
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
return 0;
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
return 0;
} else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
}
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
else if (crl->base_crl_number)
return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
return 0;
} else
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
/* Check expiry */
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
return 0;
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
}
*preasons = tmp_reasons;
return crl_score;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool srv_send_smb(int fd, char *buffer,
bool do_signing, uint32_t seqnum,
bool do_encrypt,
struct smb_perfcount_data *pcd)
{
size_t len = 0;
size_t nwritten=0;
ssize_t ret;
char *buf_out = buffer;
if (do_signing) {
/* Sign the outgoing packet if required. */
srv_calculate_sign_mac(smbd_server_conn, buf_out, seqnum);
}
if (do_encrypt) {
NTSTATUS status = srv_encrypt_buffer(buffer, &buf_out);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("send_smb: SMB encryption failed "
"on outgoing packet! Error %s\n",
nt_errstr(status) ));
goto out;
}
}
len = smb_len(buf_out) + 4;
ret = write_data(fd,buf_out+nwritten,len - nwritten);
if (ret <= 0) {
DEBUG(0,("Error writing %d bytes to client. %d. (%s)\n",
(int)len,(int)ret, strerror(errno) ));
srv_free_enc_buffer(buf_out);
goto out;
}
SMB_PERFCOUNT_SET_MSGLEN_OUT(pcd, len);
srv_free_enc_buffer(buf_out);
out:
SMB_PERFCOUNT_END(pcd);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
return 0;
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
return 0;
} else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
}
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
else if (crl->base_crl_number)
return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
return 0;
} else
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
/* Check expiry */
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
return 0;
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
}
*preasons = tmp_reasons;
return crl_score;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 24,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::DestroyOnRenderFrameGone() {
scoped_refptr<RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost> protect(this);
if (IsAttached())
RevokePolicy();
ForceDetachAllSessions();
frame_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
SetFrameTreeNode(nullptr);
Release();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not create target handler for restricted sessions
Bug: 805224
Change-Id: I08528e44e79d0a097cfe72ab4949dda538efd098
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/988695
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547496}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _prevA(int visited)
{
HmarkerList *hl = Currentbuf->hmarklist;
BufferPoint *po;
Anchor *an, *pan;
int i, x, y, n = searchKeyNum();
ParsedURL url;
if (Currentbuf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
if (!hl || hl->nmark == 0)
return;
an = retrieveCurrentAnchor(Currentbuf);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveCurrentForm(Currentbuf);
y = Currentbuf->currentLine->linenumber;
x = Currentbuf->pos;
if (visited == TRUE) {
n = hl->nmark;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
pan = an;
if (an && an->hseq >= 0) {
int hseq = an->hseq - 1;
do {
if (hseq < 0) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
goto _end;
}
po = hl->marks + hseq;
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->href, po->line, po->pos);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->formitem, po->line,
po->pos);
hseq--;
if (visited == TRUE && an) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
} while (an == NULL || an == pan);
}
else {
an = closest_prev_anchor(Currentbuf->href, NULL, x, y);
if (visited != TRUE)
an = closest_prev_anchor(Currentbuf->formitem, an, x, y);
if (an == NULL) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
break;
}
x = an->start.pos;
y = an->start.line;
if (visited == TRUE && an) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
}
}
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
_end:
if (an == NULL || an->hseq < 0)
return;
po = hl->marks + an->hseq;
gotoLine(Currentbuf, po->line);
Currentbuf->pos = po->pos;
arrangeCursor(Currentbuf);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 7,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_ready_event(void *devt, u8 *datap, u8 phyCap, u32 sw_ver, u32 abi_ver)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)devt;
struct net_device *dev = ar->arNetDev;
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, datap, AR6000_ETH_ADDR_LEN);
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("mac address = %2.2x:%2.2x:%2.2x:%2.2x:%2.2x:%2.2x\n",
dev->dev_addr[0], dev->dev_addr[1],
dev->dev_addr[2], dev->dev_addr[3],
dev->dev_addr[4], dev->dev_addr[5]));
ar->arPhyCapability = phyCap;
ar->arVersion.wlan_ver = sw_ver;
ar->arVersion.abi_ver = abi_ver;
/* Indicate to the waiting thread that the ready event was received */
ar->arWmiReady = true;
wake_up(&arEvent);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResetScreenHandler::SetDelegate(Delegate* delegate) {
delegate_ = delegate;
if (page_is_ready())
Initialize();
}
Commit Message: Rollback option put behind the flag.
BUG=368860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/267393011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269753 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssh_hostport_setup(const char *host, int port, Conf *conf,
char **savedhost, int *savedport,
char **loghost_ret)
{
char *loghost = conf_get_str(conf, CONF_loghost);
if (loghost_ret)
*loghost_ret = loghost;
if (*loghost) {
char *tmphost;
char *colon;
tmphost = dupstr(loghost);
*savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
/*
* A colon suffix on the hostname string also lets us affect
* savedport. (Unless there are multiple colons, in which case
* we assume this is an unbracketed IPv6 literal.)
*/
colon = host_strrchr(tmphost, ':');
if (colon && colon == host_strchr(tmphost, ':')) {
*colon++ = '\0';
if (*colon)
*savedport = atoi(colon);
}
*savedhost = host_strduptrim(tmphost);
sfree(tmphost);
} else {
*savedhost = host_strduptrim(host);
if (port < 0)
port = 22; /* default ssh port */
*savedport = port;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadProtectionService::ShowDetailsForDownload(
const content::DownloadItem& item,
content::PageNavigator* navigator) {
GURL learn_more_url(chrome::kDownloadScanningLearnMoreURL);
learn_more_url = google_util::AppendGoogleLocaleParam(
learn_more_url, g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale());
learn_more_url = net::AppendQueryParameter(
learn_more_url, "ctx",
base::IntToString(static_cast<int>(item.GetDangerType())));
navigator->OpenURL(
content::OpenURLParams(learn_more_url,
content::Referrer(),
NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
false));
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Luv24fromLuv48(LogLuvState* sp, uint8* op, tmsize_t n)
{
uint32* luv = (uint32*) sp->tbuf;
int16* luv3 = (int16*) op;
while (n-- > 0) {
int Le, Ce;
if (luv3[0] <= 0)
Le = 0;
else if (luv3[0] >= (1<<12)+3314)
Le = (1<<10) - 1;
else if (sp->encode_meth == SGILOGENCODE_NODITHER)
Le = (luv3[0]-3314) >> 2;
else
Le = itrunc(.25*(luv3[0]-3314.), sp->encode_meth);
Ce = uv_encode((luv3[1]+.5)/(1<<15), (luv3[2]+.5)/(1<<15),
sp->encode_meth);
if (Ce < 0) /* never happens */
Ce = uv_encode(U_NEU, V_NEU, SGILOGENCODE_NODITHER);
*luv++ = (uint32)Le << 14 | Ce;
luv3 += 3;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TracingControllerImpl::StopTracing(
const scoped_refptr<TraceDataEndpoint>& trace_data_endpoint,
const std::string& agent_label) {
if (!IsTracing() || drainer_)
return false;
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()->AddClockSyncMetadataEvent();
#endif
tracing::TraceStartupConfig::GetInstance()->SetDisabled();
trace_data_endpoint_ = std::move(trace_data_endpoint);
is_data_complete_ = false;
is_metadata_available_ = false;
mojo::DataPipe data_pipe;
drainer_.reset(
new mojo::DataPipeDrainer(this, std::move(data_pipe.consumer_handle)));
if (agent_label.empty()) {
coordinator_->StopAndFlush(
std::move(data_pipe.producer_handle),
base::BindRepeating(&TracingControllerImpl::OnMetadataAvailable,
base::Unretained(this)));
} else {
coordinator_->StopAndFlushAgent(
std::move(data_pipe.producer_handle), agent_label,
base::BindRepeating(&TracingControllerImpl::OnMetadataAvailable,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 5,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnShutdown() {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
is_shutdown_ = true;
weak_factory_on_io_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
pending_loaders_.clear();
update_load_info_timer_.reset();
std::set<GlobalFrameRoutingId> ids;
for (const auto& blocked_loaders : blocked_loaders_map_) {
std::pair<std::set<GlobalFrameRoutingId>::iterator, bool> result =
ids.insert(blocked_loaders.first);
DCHECK(result.second);
}
for (const auto& routing_id : ids) {
CancelBlockedRequestsForRoute(routing_id);
}
scheduler_.reset();
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 1,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderMessageFilter::RenderMessageFilter(
int render_process_id,
PluginServiceImpl* plugin_service,
BrowserContext* browser_context,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context,
RenderWidgetHelper* render_widget_helper,
MediaInternals* media_internals,
DOMStorageContextImpl* dom_storage_context)
: resource_dispatcher_host_(ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get()),
plugin_service_(plugin_service),
profile_data_directory_(browser_context->GetPath()),
request_context_(request_context),
resource_context_(browser_context->GetResourceContext()),
render_widget_helper_(render_widget_helper),
incognito_(browser_context->IsOffTheRecord()),
dom_storage_context_(dom_storage_context),
render_process_id_(render_process_id),
cpu_usage_(0),
media_internals_(media_internals) {
DCHECK(request_context_);
render_widget_helper_->Init(render_process_id_, resource_dispatcher_host_);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 18,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void co64_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *ptr;
ptr = (GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->offsets) gf_free(ptr->offsets);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCreateReadWriteFileSystemFile(
int child_id,
const storage::FileSystemURL& url) {
return HasPermissionsForFileSystemFile(child_id, url,
CREATE_READ_WRITE_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,334
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void perf_event_disable(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
_perf_event_disable(event);
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseDTD(const xmlChar *ExternalID, const xmlChar *SystemID) {
return(xmlSAXParseDTD(NULL, ExternalID, SystemID));
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 12,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetViewBounds() const {
return window_->GetBoundsInScreen();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init taskstats_init(void)
{
int rc;
rc = genl_register_family(&family);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = genl_register_ops(&family, &taskstats_ops);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
rc = genl_register_ops(&family, &cgroupstats_ops);
if (rc < 0)
goto err_cgroup_ops;
family_registered = 1;
pr_info("registered taskstats version %d\n", TASKSTATS_GENL_VERSION);
return 0;
err_cgroup_ops:
genl_unregister_ops(&family, &taskstats_ops);
err:
genl_unregister_family(&family);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Reverb_getDescriptor(effect_handle_t self,
effect_descriptor_t *pDescriptor)
{
android::ReverbContext * pContext = (android::ReverbContext *)self;
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
if (pContext == NULL || pDescriptor == NULL) {
ALOGV("Reverb_getDescriptor() invalid param");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->auxiliary) {
if (pContext->preset) {
desc = &android::gAuxPresetReverbDescriptor;
} else {
desc = &android::gAuxEnvReverbDescriptor;
}
} else {
if (pContext->preset) {
desc = &android::gInsertPresetReverbDescriptor;
} else {
desc = &android::gInsertEnvReverbDescriptor;
}
}
*pDescriptor = *desc;
return 0;
} /* end Reverb_getDescriptor */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageScaleBicubicFixed(gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int width, const unsigned int height)
{
const long new_width = MAX(1, width);
const long new_height = MAX(1, height);
const int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
const gdFixed f_dx = gd_ftofx((float)src_w / (float)new_width);
const gdFixed f_dy = gd_ftofx((float)src_h / (float)new_height);
const gdFixed f_1 = gd_itofx(1);
const gdFixed f_2 = gd_itofx(2);
const gdFixed f_4 = gd_itofx(4);
const gdFixed f_6 = gd_itofx(6);
const gdFixed f_gamma = gd_ftofx(1.04f);
gdImagePtr dst;
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
long i;
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (!dst) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i=0; i < new_height; i++) {
long j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j=0; j < new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_a = gd_mulfx(gd_itofx(i), f_dy);
const gdFixed f_b = gd_mulfx(gd_itofx(j), f_dx);
const long m = gd_fxtoi(f_a);
const long n = gd_fxtoi(f_b);
const gdFixed f_f = f_a - gd_itofx(m);
const gdFixed f_g = f_b - gd_itofx(n);
unsigned int src_offset_x[16], src_offset_y[16];
long k;
register gdFixed f_red = 0, f_green = 0, f_blue = 0, f_alpha = 0;
unsigned char red, green, blue, alpha = 0;
int *dst_row = dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y];
if ((m < 1) || (n < 1)) {
src_offset_x[0] = n;
src_offset_y[0] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[0] = n - 1;
src_offset_y[0] = m;
}
if (m < 1) {
src_offset_x[1] = n;
src_offset_y[1] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[1] = n;
src_offset_y[1] = m;
}
if ((m < 1) || (n >= src_w - 1)) {
src_offset_x[2] = n;
src_offset_y[2] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[2] = n + 1;
src_offset_y[2] = m;
}
if ((m < 1) || (n >= src_w - 2)) {
src_offset_x[3] = n;
src_offset_y[3] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[3] = n + 1 + 1;
src_offset_y[3] = m;
}
if (n < 1) {
src_offset_x[4] = n;
src_offset_y[4] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[4] = n - 1;
src_offset_y[4] = m;
}
src_offset_x[5] = n;
src_offset_y[5] = m;
if (n >= src_w-1) {
src_offset_x[6] = n;
src_offset_y[6] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[6] = n + 1;
src_offset_y[6] = m;
}
if (n >= src_w - 2) {
src_offset_x[7] = n;
src_offset_y[7] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[7] = n + 1 + 1;
src_offset_y[7] = m;
}
if ((m >= src_h - 1) || (n < 1)) {
src_offset_x[8] = n;
src_offset_y[8] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[8] = n - 1;
src_offset_y[8] = m;
}
if (m >= src_h - 1) {
src_offset_x[8] = n;
src_offset_y[8] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[9] = n;
src_offset_y[9] = m;
}
if ((m >= src_h-1) || (n >= src_w-1)) {
src_offset_x[10] = n;
src_offset_y[10] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[10] = n + 1;
src_offset_y[10] = m;
}
if ((m >= src_h - 1) || (n >= src_w - 2)) {
src_offset_x[11] = n;
src_offset_y[11] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[11] = n + 1 + 1;
src_offset_y[11] = m;
}
if ((m >= src_h - 2) || (n < 1)) {
src_offset_x[12] = n;
src_offset_y[12] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[12] = n - 1;
src_offset_y[12] = m;
}
if (m >= src_h - 2) {
src_offset_x[13] = n;
src_offset_y[13] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[13] = n;
src_offset_y[13] = m;
}
if ((m >= src_h - 2) || (n >= src_w - 1)) {
src_offset_x[14] = n;
src_offset_y[14] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[14] = n + 1;
src_offset_y[14] = m;
}
if ((m >= src_h - 2) || (n >= src_w - 2)) {
src_offset_x[15] = n;
src_offset_y[15] = m;
} else {
src_offset_x[15] = n + 1 + 1;
src_offset_y[15] = m;
}
for (k = -1; k < 3; k++) {
const gdFixed f = gd_itofx(k)-f_f;
const gdFixed f_fm1 = f - f_1;
const gdFixed f_fp1 = f + f_1;
const gdFixed f_fp2 = f + f_2;
register gdFixed f_a = 0, f_b = 0, f_d = 0, f_c = 0;
register gdFixed f_RY;
int l;
if (f_fp2 > 0) f_a = gd_mulfx(f_fp2, gd_mulfx(f_fp2,f_fp2));
if (f_fp1 > 0) f_b = gd_mulfx(f_fp1, gd_mulfx(f_fp1,f_fp1));
if (f > 0) f_c = gd_mulfx(f, gd_mulfx(f,f));
if (f_fm1 > 0) f_d = gd_mulfx(f_fm1, gd_mulfx(f_fm1,f_fm1));
f_RY = gd_divfx((f_a - gd_mulfx(f_4,f_b) + gd_mulfx(f_6,f_c) - gd_mulfx(f_4,f_d)),f_6);
for (l = -1; l < 3; l++) {
const gdFixed f = gd_itofx(l) - f_g;
const gdFixed f_fm1 = f - f_1;
const gdFixed f_fp1 = f + f_1;
const gdFixed f_fp2 = f + f_2;
register gdFixed f_a = 0, f_b = 0, f_c = 0, f_d = 0;
register gdFixed f_RX, f_R, f_rs, f_gs, f_bs, f_ba;
register int c;
const int _k = ((k+1)*4) + (l+1);
if (f_fp2 > 0) f_a = gd_mulfx(f_fp2,gd_mulfx(f_fp2,f_fp2));
if (f_fp1 > 0) f_b = gd_mulfx(f_fp1,gd_mulfx(f_fp1,f_fp1));
if (f > 0) f_c = gd_mulfx(f,gd_mulfx(f,f));
if (f_fm1 > 0) f_d = gd_mulfx(f_fm1,gd_mulfx(f_fm1,f_fm1));
f_RX = gd_divfx((f_a-gd_mulfx(f_4,f_b)+gd_mulfx(f_6,f_c)-gd_mulfx(f_4,f_d)),f_6);
f_R = gd_mulfx(f_RY,f_RX);
c = src->tpixels[*(src_offset_y + _k)][*(src_offset_x + _k)];
f_rs = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(c));
f_gs = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(c));
f_bs = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(c));
f_ba = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c));
f_red += gd_mulfx(f_rs,f_R);
f_green += gd_mulfx(f_gs,f_R);
f_blue += gd_mulfx(f_bs,f_R);
f_alpha += gd_mulfx(f_ba,f_R);
}
}
red = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(gd_mulfx(f_red, f_gamma)), 0, 255);
green = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(gd_mulfx(f_green, f_gamma)), 0, 255);
blue = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(gd_mulfx(f_blue, f_gamma)), 0, 255);
alpha = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(gd_mulfx(f_alpha, f_gamma)), 0, 127);
*(dst_row + dst_offset_x) = gdTrueColorAlpha(red, green, blue, alpha);
dst_offset_x++;
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipa_region_frame(wmfAPI * API, wmfPolyRectangle_t * poly_rect)
{
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
if (TO_FILL(poly_rect) || TO_DRAW(poly_rect))
{
long
i;
draw_fill_color_string(WmfDrawingWand,"none");
util_set_brush(API, poly_rect->dc, BrushApplyStroke);
for (i = 0; i < (long) poly_rect->count; i++)
{
DrawRectangle(WmfDrawingWand,
XC(poly_rect->TL[i].x), YC(poly_rect->TL[i].y),
XC(poly_rect->BR[i].x), YC(poly_rect->BR[i].y));
}
}
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **tb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int i, err;
if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
return nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
err = nlmsg_parse_strict(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0; i <= NETNSA_MAX; i++) {
if (!tb[i])
continue;
switch (i) {
case NETNSA_PID:
case NETNSA_FD:
case NETNSA_NSID:
case NETNSA_TARGET_NSID:
break;
default:
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unsupported attribute in peer netns getid request");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlData::IncreaseLoadersInState(
UrlDataWithLoadingState::LoadingState state) {
switch (state) {
case UrlDataWithLoadingState::LoadingState::kIdle:
break;
case UrlDataWithLoadingState::LoadingState::kPreload:
preloading_++;
break;
case UrlDataWithLoadingState::LoadingState::kHasPlayed:
playing_++;
if (playing_ == 1)
url_index_->RemoveLoading(this);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 19,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPluginDelegateProxy::UseSynchronousGeometryUpdates() {
if (info_.name.find(ASCIIToUTF16("Windows Media Player")) != string16::npos)
return true;
std::vector<webkit::WebPluginMimeType>::iterator index;
for (index = info_.mime_types.begin(); index != info_.mime_types.end();
index++) {
if (index->mime_type == "application/x-vnd.moveplayer.qm" ||
index->mime_type == "application/x-vnd.moveplay2.qm" ||
index->mime_type == "application/x-vnd.movenetworks.qm" ||
index->mime_type == "application/x-vnd.mnplayer.qm") {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rdp_send_fonts(uint16 seq)
{
STREAM s;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
s = rdp_init_data(8);
out_uint16(s, 0); /* number of fonts */
out_uint16_le(s, 0); /* pad? */
out_uint16_le(s, seq); /* unknown */
out_uint16_le(s, 0x32); /* entry size */
s_mark_end(s);
rdp_send_data(s, RDP_DATA_PDU_FONT2);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int AecGetParameter(preproc_effect_t *effect,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
uint32_t param = *(uint32_t *)pParam;
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param) {
case AEC_PARAM_ECHO_DELAY:
case AEC_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
*(uint32_t *)pValue = 1000 * effect->session->apm->stream_delay_ms();
ALOGV("AecGetParameter() echo delay %d us", *(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
default:
ALOGW("AecGetParameter() unknown param %08x value %08x", param, *(uint32_t *)pValue);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageDownloadBridge::Destroy(JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>&) {
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vop_dev_remove(struct vop_info *pvi, struct mic_device_ctrl *devp,
struct vop_device *vpdev)
{
struct mic_bootparam *bootparam = vpdev->hw_ops->get_dp(vpdev);
s8 db;
int ret, retry;
DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_ONSTACK(wake);
devp->config_change = MIC_VIRTIO_PARAM_DEV_REMOVE;
db = bootparam->h2c_config_db;
if (db != -1)
vpdev->hw_ops->send_intr(vpdev, db);
else
goto done;
for (retry = 15; retry--;) {
ret = wait_event_timeout(wake, devp->guest_ack,
msecs_to_jiffies(1000));
if (ret)
break;
}
done:
devp->config_change = 0;
devp->guest_ack = 0;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void reds_set_client_mouse_allowed(int is_client_mouse_allowed, int x_res, int y_res)
{
reds->monitor_mode.x_res = x_res;
reds->monitor_mode.y_res = y_res;
reds->dispatcher_allows_client_mouse = is_client_mouse_allowed;
reds_update_mouse_mode();
if (reds->is_client_mouse_allowed && inputs_has_tablet()) {
inputs_set_tablet_logical_size(reds->monitor_mode.x_res, reds->monitor_mode.y_res);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xhci_ep_kick_timer(void *opaque)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx = opaque;
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 9,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_run_S(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_show_path(ctx, pr, 0, 0, 1, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
int ret;
u8 cpl;
if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
/* General purpose registers */
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->ecx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->edx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->ebx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->esp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->ebp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->esi;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->edi;
/*
* SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
* descriptors. This is important because CPL checks will
* use CS.RPL.
*/
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
/*
* If we're switching between Protected Mode and VM86, we need to make
* sure to update the mode before loading the segment descriptors so
* that the selectors are interpreted correctly.
*/
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
cpl = 3;
} else {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cpl = tss->cs & 3;
}
/*
* Now load segment descriptors. If fault happenes at this stage
* it is handled in a context of new task
*/
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR,
cpl, X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_TASK_SWITCH, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 28,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnBeforeSendHeaders(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback,
net::HttpRequestHeaders* headers) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_PAST0("net", "URLRequest", request, "SendRequest");
return ExtensionWebRequestEventRouter::GetInstance()->OnBeforeSendHeaders(
profile_, extension_info_map_.get(), request, callback, headers);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 28,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SoftHEVC::deInitDecoder() {
size_t i;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
if (mCodecCtx) {
ivdext_delete_ip_t s_delete_ip;
ivdext_delete_op_t s_delete_op;
s_delete_ip.s_ivd_delete_ip_t.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_delete_ip_t);
s_delete_ip.s_ivd_delete_ip_t.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_DELETE;
s_delete_op.s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_delete_op_t);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_delete_ip, (void *)&s_delete_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in delete: 0x%x",
s_delete_op.s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
}
mChangingResolution = false;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172
| 0
| 20,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Buffer::Buffer(const HostResource& resource,
const base::SharedMemoryHandle& shm_handle,
uint32_t size)
: Resource(OBJECT_IS_PROXY, resource),
shm_(shm_handle, false),
size_(size),
map_count_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Add permission checks for PPB_Buffer.
BUG=116317
TEST=browser_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11446075
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171951 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftAACEncoder::~SoftAACEncoder() {
delete[] mInputFrame;
mInputFrame = NULL;
if (mEncoderHandle) {
CHECK_EQ(VO_ERR_NONE, mApiHandle->Uninit(mEncoderHandle));
mEncoderHandle = NULL;
}
delete mApiHandle;
mApiHandle = NULL;
delete mMemOperator;
mMemOperator = NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uint8ArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->uint8ArrayMethod());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsElementEditable(const blink::WebInputElement& element) {
return element.isEnabled() && !element.isReadOnly();
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_async_commit(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct btrfs_async_commit *ac =
container_of(work, struct btrfs_async_commit, work.work);
/*
* We've got freeze protection passed with the transaction.
* Tell lockdep about it.
*/
if (ac->newtrans->type < TRANS_JOIN_NOLOCK)
rwsem_acquire_read(
&ac->root->fs_info->sb->s_writers.lock_map[SB_FREEZE_FS-1],
0, 1, _THIS_IP_);
current->journal_info = ac->newtrans;
btrfs_commit_transaction(ac->newtrans, ac->root);
kfree(ac);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 7,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TRBCCode xhci_configure_slot(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
uint64_t pictx, bool dc)
{
dma_addr_t ictx, octx;
uint32_t ictl_ctx[2];
uint32_t slot_ctx[4];
uint32_t islot_ctx[4];
uint32_t ep_ctx[5];
int i;
TRBCCode res;
trace_usb_xhci_slot_configure(slotid);
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
ictx = xhci_mask64(pictx);
octx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].ctx;
DPRINTF("xhci: input context at "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", ictx);
DPRINTF("xhci: output context at "DMA_ADDR_FMT"\n", octx);
if (dc) {
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[i-1]) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
slot_ctx[3] &= ~(SLOT_STATE_MASK << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[3] |= SLOT_ADDRESSED << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT;
DPRINTF("xhci: output slot context: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
slot_ctx[0], slot_ctx[1], slot_ctx[2], slot_ctx[3]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx, ictl_ctx, sizeof(ictl_ctx));
if ((ictl_ctx[0] & 0x3) != 0x0 || (ictl_ctx[1] & 0x3) != 0x1) {
DPRINTF("xhci: invalid input context control %08x %08x\n",
ictl_ctx[0], ictl_ctx[1]);
return CC_TRB_ERROR;
}
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx+32, islot_ctx, sizeof(islot_ctx));
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
if (SLOT_STATE(slot_ctx[3]) < SLOT_ADDRESSED) {
DPRINTF("xhci: invalid slot state %08x\n", slot_ctx[3]);
return CC_CONTEXT_STATE_ERROR;
}
xhci_free_device_streams(xhci, slotid, ictl_ctx[0] | ictl_ctx[1]);
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (ictl_ctx[0] & (1<<i)) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
if (ictl_ctx[1] & (1<<i)) {
xhci_dma_read_u32s(xhci, ictx+32+(32*i), ep_ctx, sizeof(ep_ctx));
DPRINTF("xhci: input ep%d.%d context: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
i/2, i%2, ep_ctx[0], ep_ctx[1], ep_ctx[2],
ep_ctx[3], ep_ctx[4]);
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
res = xhci_enable_ep(xhci, slotid, i, octx+(32*i), ep_ctx);
if (res != CC_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
DPRINTF("xhci: output ep%d.%d context: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
i/2, i%2, ep_ctx[0], ep_ctx[1], ep_ctx[2],
ep_ctx[3], ep_ctx[4]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx+(32*i), ep_ctx, sizeof(ep_ctx));
}
}
res = xhci_alloc_device_streams(xhci, slotid, ictl_ctx[1]);
if (res != CC_SUCCESS) {
for (i = 2; i <= 31; i++) {
if (ictl_ctx[1] & (1 << i)) {
xhci_disable_ep(xhci, slotid, i);
}
}
return res;
}
slot_ctx[3] &= ~(SLOT_STATE_MASK << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[3] |= SLOT_CONFIGURED << SLOT_STATE_SHIFT;
slot_ctx[0] &= ~(SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_MASK << SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_SHIFT);
slot_ctx[0] |= islot_ctx[0] & (SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_MASK <<
SLOT_CONTEXT_ENTRIES_SHIFT);
DPRINTF("xhci: output slot context: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
slot_ctx[0], slot_ctx[1], slot_ctx[2], slot_ctx[3]);
xhci_dma_write_u32s(xhci, octx, slot_ctx, sizeof(slot_ctx));
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
}
if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu) {
struct desc_ptr *gdt = this_cpu_ptr(&host_gdt);
unsigned long sysenter_esp;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
local_irq_disable();
crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
/*
* Read loaded_vmcs->cpu should be before fetching
* loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link.
* See the comments in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
*/
smp_rmb();
list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
local_irq_enable();
/*
* Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
* processors.
*/
vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE, kvm_read_tr_base()); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, gdt->address); /* 22.2.4 */
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */
vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
union {
ut16 word;
ut8 byte[2];
} endian = { 1 };
little_ = endian.byte[0];
if (!init_hdr(bin)) {
bprintf ("Warning: File is not MACH0\n");
return false;
}
if (!init_items (bin)) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot initialize items\n");
}
bin->baddr = MACH0_(get_baddr)(bin);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PasswordAutofillManager::DidAcceptSuggestion(const base::string16& value,
int identifier,
int position) {
autofill_client_->ExecuteCommand(identifier);
if (identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_GENERATE_PASSWORD_ENTRY) {
password_manager_driver_->UserSelectedManualGenerationOption();
} else if (identifier !=
autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_HTTP_NOT_SECURE_WARNING_MESSAGE &&
identifier != autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_ENTRY) {
bool success =
FillSuggestion(form_data_key_, GetUsernameFromSuggestion(value));
DCHECK(success);
}
if (identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_ENTRY) {
DCHECK_NE(show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_,
metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_NONE);
metrics_util::LogContextOfShowAllSavedPasswordsAccepted(
show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_);
if (password_client_) {
using UserAction =
password_manager::PasswordManagerMetricsRecorder::PageLevelUserAction;
switch (show_all_saved_passwords_shown_context_) {
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_PASSWORD:
password_client_->GetMetricsRecorder().RecordPageLevelUserAction(
UserAction::kShowAllPasswordsWhileSomeAreSuggested);
break;
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_MANUAL_FALLBACK:
password_client_->GetMetricsRecorder().RecordPageLevelUserAction(
UserAction::kShowAllPasswordsWhileNoneAreSuggested);
break;
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_CONTEXT_MENU:
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_NONE:
case metrics_util::SHOW_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_CONTEXT_COUNT:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
}
autofill_client_->HideAutofillPopup();
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_mmap_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
u32 dst_portid, u32 dst_group,
struct sock_iocb *siocb)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct netlink_ring *ring;
struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int maxlen;
bool excl = true;
int err = 0, len = 0;
/* Netlink messages are validated by the receiver before processing.
* In order to avoid userspace changing the contents of the message
* after validation, the socket and the ring may only be used by a
* single process, otherwise we fall back to copying.
*/
if (atomic_long_read(&sk->sk_socket->file->f_count) > 2 ||
atomic_read(&nlk->mapped) > 1)
excl = false;
mutex_lock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
ring = &nlk->tx_ring;
maxlen = ring->frame_size - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN;
do {
hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID);
if (hdr == NULL) {
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) &&
atomic_read(&nlk->tx_ring.pending))
schedule();
continue;
}
if (hdr->nm_len > maxlen) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
netlink_frame_flush_dcache(hdr);
if (likely(dst_portid == 0 && dst_group == 0 && excl)) {
skb = alloc_skb_head(GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto out;
}
sock_hold(sk);
netlink_ring_setup_skb(skb, sk, ring, hdr);
NETLINK_CB(skb).flags |= NETLINK_SKB_TX;
__skb_put(skb, hdr->nm_len);
netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_RESERVED);
atomic_inc(&ring->pending);
} else {
skb = alloc_skb(hdr->nm_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto out;
}
__skb_put(skb, hdr->nm_len);
memcpy(skb->data, (void *)hdr + NL_MMAP_HDRLEN, hdr->nm_len);
netlink_set_status(hdr, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
}
netlink_increment_head(ring);
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid = nlk->portid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
NETLINK_CB(skb).creds = siocb->scm->creds;
err = security_netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
if (unlikely(dst_group)) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
netlink_broadcast(sk, skb, dst_portid, dst_group,
GFP_KERNEL);
}
err = netlink_unicast(sk, skb, dst_portid,
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
len += err;
} while (hdr != NULL ||
(!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) &&
atomic_read(&nlk->tx_ring.pending)));
if (len > 0)
err = len;
out:
mutex_unlock(&nlk->pg_vec_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strlen((const char *)start) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0') {
n += 2;
}
return n + 2;
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String CSSStyleSheet::href() const {
return contents_->OriginalURL();
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::CanSaveContents(content::WebContents* web_contents) const {
return chrome::CanSavePage(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::didRemoveAllPendingStylesheet()
{
m_needsNotifyRemoveAllPendingStylesheet = false;
styleResolverChanged(RecalcStyleDeferred, AnalyzedStyleUpdate);
executeScriptsWaitingForResourcesIfNeeded();
if (m_gotoAnchorNeededAfterStylesheetsLoad && view())
view()->scrollToFragment(m_url);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vma_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page;
page = vmalloc_to_page((void *)(vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT));
if (!page)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
get_page(page);
vmf->page = page;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _SSL_context_init (void (*info_cb_func), int server)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx;
#ifdef WIN32
int i, r;
#endif
SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms ();
SSL_load_error_strings ();
ctx = SSL_CTX_new (server ? SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method ());
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode (ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH);
SSL_CTX_set_timeout (ctx, 300);
SSL_CTX_set_options (ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
|SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
|SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE|SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
|SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
|SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
/* used in SSL_connect(), SSL_accept() */
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback (ctx, info_cb_func);
#ifdef WIN32
/* under win32, OpenSSL needs to be seeded with some randomness */
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++)
{
r = rand ();
RAND_seed ((unsigned char *)&r, sizeof (r));
}
#endif
return(ctx);
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 21,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Tab::OnKeyPressed(const ui::KeyEvent& event) {
controller_->UpdateHoverCard(this, false);
if (event.key_code() == ui::VKEY_SPACE && !IsSelected()) {
controller_->SelectTab(this, event);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnMoveValidationMessage(
RenderViewHostImpl* source,
const gfx::Rect& anchor_in_root_view) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->MoveValidationMessage(this, anchor_in_root_view);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionsAPIClient::CreateVirtualKeyboardDelegate(
content::BrowserContext* context) const {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bio_free(struct bio *bio)
{
struct bio_set *bs = bio->bi_pool;
void *p;
bio_uninit(bio);
if (bs) {
bvec_free(bs->bvec_pool, bio->bi_io_vec, BVEC_POOL_IDX(bio));
/*
* If we have front padding, adjust the bio pointer before freeing
*/
p = bio;
p -= bs->front_pad;
mempool_free(p, bs->bio_pool);
} else {
/* Bio was allocated by bio_kmalloc() */
kfree(bio);
}
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 24,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ipgre_tunnel_ioctl (struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
int err = 0;
struct ip_tunnel_parm p;
struct ip_tunnel *t;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ipgre_net *ign = net_generic(net, ipgre_net_id);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGETTUNNEL:
t = NULL;
if (dev == ign->fb_tunnel_dev) {
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof(p))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
t = ipgre_tunnel_locate(net, &p, 0);
}
if (t == NULL)
t = netdev_priv(dev);
memcpy(&p, &t->parms, sizeof(p));
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &p, sizeof(p)))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case SIOCADDTUNNEL:
case SIOCCHGTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof(p)))
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
if (p.iph.version != 4 || p.iph.protocol != IPPROTO_GRE ||
p.iph.ihl != 5 || (p.iph.frag_off&htons(~IP_DF)) ||
((p.i_flags|p.o_flags)&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING)))
goto done;
if (p.iph.ttl)
p.iph.frag_off |= htons(IP_DF);
if (!(p.i_flags&GRE_KEY))
p.i_key = 0;
if (!(p.o_flags&GRE_KEY))
p.o_key = 0;
t = ipgre_tunnel_locate(net, &p, cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL);
if (dev != ign->fb_tunnel_dev && cmd == SIOCCHGTUNNEL) {
if (t != NULL) {
if (t->dev != dev) {
err = -EEXIST;
break;
}
} else {
unsigned int nflags = 0;
t = netdev_priv(dev);
if (ipv4_is_multicast(p.iph.daddr))
nflags = IFF_BROADCAST;
else if (p.iph.daddr)
nflags = IFF_POINTOPOINT;
if ((dev->flags^nflags)&(IFF_POINTOPOINT|IFF_BROADCAST)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
ipgre_tunnel_unlink(ign, t);
synchronize_net();
t->parms.iph.saddr = p.iph.saddr;
t->parms.iph.daddr = p.iph.daddr;
t->parms.i_key = p.i_key;
t->parms.o_key = p.o_key;
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, &p.iph.saddr, 4);
memcpy(dev->broadcast, &p.iph.daddr, 4);
ipgre_tunnel_link(ign, t);
netdev_state_change(dev);
}
}
if (t) {
err = 0;
if (cmd == SIOCCHGTUNNEL) {
t->parms.iph.ttl = p.iph.ttl;
t->parms.iph.tos = p.iph.tos;
t->parms.iph.frag_off = p.iph.frag_off;
if (t->parms.link != p.link) {
t->parms.link = p.link;
dev->mtu = ipgre_tunnel_bind_dev(dev);
netdev_state_change(dev);
}
}
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &t->parms, sizeof(p)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
err = (cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL ? -ENOBUFS : -ENOENT);
break;
case SIOCDELTUNNEL:
err = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
goto done;
if (dev == ign->fb_tunnel_dev) {
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&p, ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, sizeof(p)))
goto done;
err = -ENOENT;
if ((t = ipgre_tunnel_locate(net, &p, 0)) == NULL)
goto done;
err = -EPERM;
if (t == netdev_priv(ign->fb_tunnel_dev))
goto done;
dev = t->dev;
}
unregister_netdevice(dev);
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
}
done:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udf_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int wait)
{
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
if (sbi->s_lvid_dirty) {
/*
* Blockdevice will be synced later so we don't have to submit
* the buffer for IO
*/
mark_buffer_dirty(sbi->s_lvid_bh);
sb->s_dirt = 0;
sbi->s_lvid_dirty = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *ReadImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent],
magick[MagickPathExtent],
magick_filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*value;
const DelegateInfo
*delegate_info;
const MagickInfo
*magick_info;
ExceptionInfo
*sans_exception;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image,
*next;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PolicyDomain
domain;
PolicyRights
rights;
/*
Determine image type from filename prefix or suffix (e.g. image.jpg).
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image_info->filename != (char *) NULL);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(magick_filename,read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) SetImageInfo(read_info,0,exception);
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,read_info->magick,MagickPathExtent);
domain=CoderPolicyDomain;
rights=ReadPolicyRights;
if (IsRightsAuthorized(domain,rights,read_info->magick) == MagickFalse)
{
errno=EPERM;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),PolicyError,
"NotAuthorized","`%s'",read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Call appropriate image reader based on image type.
*/
sans_exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(read_info->magick,sans_exception);
sans_exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans_exception);
if (magick_info != (const MagickInfo *) NULL)
{
if (GetMagickEndianSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse)
read_info->endian=UndefinedEndian;
else
if ((image_info->endian == UndefinedEndian) &&
(GetMagickRawSupport(magick_info) != MagickFalse))
{
unsigned long
lsb_first;
lsb_first=1;
read_info->endian=(*(char *) &lsb_first) == 1 ? LSBEndian :
MSBEndian;
}
}
if ((magick_info != (const MagickInfo *) NULL) &&
(GetMagickSeekableStream(magick_info) != MagickFalse))
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
image=AcquireImage(read_info,exception);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,read_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (IsBlobSeekable(image) == MagickFalse)
{
/*
Coder requires a seekable stream.
*/
*read_info->filename='\0';
status=ImageToFile(image,read_info->filename,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
read_info->temporary=MagickTrue;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
}
image=NewImageList();
if ((magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL) ||
(GetImageDecoder(magick_info) == (DecodeImageHandler *) NULL))
{
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo(read_info->magick,(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageInfo(read_info,0,exception);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->filename,filename,
MagickPathExtent);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(read_info->magick,exception);
}
}
if ((magick_info != (const MagickInfo *) NULL) &&
(GetImageDecoder(magick_info) != (DecodeImageHandler *) NULL))
{
if (GetMagickDecoderThreadSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse)
LockSemaphoreInfo(magick_info->semaphore);
image=GetImageDecoder(magick_info)(read_info,exception);
if (GetMagickDecoderThreadSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse)
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(magick_info->semaphore);
}
else
{
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo(read_info->magick,(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"NoDecodeDelegateForThisImageFormat","`%s'",
read_info->magick);
if (read_info->temporary != MagickFalse)
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Let our decoding delegate process the image.
*/
image=AcquireImage(read_info,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,read_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
*read_info->filename='\0';
if (GetDelegateThreadSupport(delegate_info) == MagickFalse)
LockSemaphoreInfo(delegate_info->semaphore);
(void) InvokeDelegate(read_info,image,read_info->magick,(char *) NULL,
exception);
if (GetDelegateThreadSupport(delegate_info) == MagickFalse)
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(delegate_info->semaphore);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
read_info->temporary=MagickTrue;
(void) SetImageInfo(read_info,0,exception);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(read_info->magick,exception);
if ((magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL) ||
(GetImageDecoder(magick_info) == (DecodeImageHandler *) NULL))
{
if (IsPathAccessible(read_info->filename) != MagickFalse)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"NoDecodeDelegateForThisImageFormat","`%s'",
read_info->magick);
else
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (GetMagickDecoderThreadSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse)
LockSemaphoreInfo(magick_info->semaphore);
image=(Image *) (GetImageDecoder(magick_info))(read_info,exception);
if (GetMagickDecoderThreadSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse)
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(magick_info->semaphore);
}
if (read_info->temporary != MagickFalse)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info->temporary=MagickFalse;
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,filename,MagickPathExtent);
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(image);
}
if (exception->severity >= ErrorException)
(void) LogMagickEvent(ExceptionEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Coder (%s) generated an image despite an error (%d), "
"notify the developers",image->magick,exception->severity);
if (IsBlobTemporary(image) != MagickFalse)
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
if ((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(IsSceneGeometry(read_info->scenes,MagickFalse) != MagickFalse))
{
Image
*clones;
clones=CloneImages(image,read_info->scenes,exception);
if (clones == (Image *) NULL)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SubimageSpecificationReturnsNoImages","`%s'",read_info->filename);
else
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=GetFirstImageInList(clones);
}
}
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
char
magick_path[MagickPathExtent],
*property,
timestamp[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*option;
const StringInfo
*profile;
next->taint=MagickFalse;
GetPathComponent(magick_filename,MagickPath,magick_path);
if (*magick_path == '\0' && *next->magick == '\0')
(void) CopyMagickString(next->magick,magick,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(next->magick_filename,magick_filename,
MagickPathExtent);
if (IsBlobTemporary(image) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(next->filename,filename,MagickPathExtent);
if (next->magick_columns == 0)
next->magick_columns=next->columns;
if (next->magick_rows == 0)
next->magick_rows=next->rows;
value=GetImageProperty(next,"tiff:Orientation",exception);
if (value == (char *) NULL)
value=GetImageProperty(next,"exif:Orientation",exception);
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
next->orientation=(OrientationType) StringToLong(value);
(void) DeleteImageProperty(next,"tiff:Orientation");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(next,"exif:Orientation");
}
value=GetImageProperty(next,"exif:XResolution",exception);
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
geometry_info.rho=next->resolution.x;
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if (geometry_info.sigma != 0)
next->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho/geometry_info.sigma;
(void) DeleteImageProperty(next,"exif:XResolution");
}
value=GetImageProperty(next,"exif:YResolution",exception);
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
geometry_info.rho=next->resolution.y;
geometry_info.sigma=1.0;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if (geometry_info.sigma != 0)
next->resolution.y=geometry_info.rho/geometry_info.sigma;
(void) DeleteImageProperty(next,"exif:YResolution");
}
value=GetImageProperty(next,"tiff:ResolutionUnit",exception);
if (value == (char *) NULL)
value=GetImageProperty(next,"exif:ResolutionUnit",exception);
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
next->units=(ResolutionType) (StringToLong(value)-1);
(void) DeleteImageProperty(next,"exif:ResolutionUnit");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(next,"tiff:ResolutionUnit");
}
if (next->page.width == 0)
next->page.width=next->columns;
if (next->page.height == 0)
next->page.height=next->rows;
option=GetImageOption(read_info,"caption");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
property=InterpretImageProperties(read_info,next,option,exception);
(void) SetImageProperty(next,"caption",property,exception);
property=DestroyString(property);
}
option=GetImageOption(read_info,"comment");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
property=InterpretImageProperties(read_info,next,option,exception);
(void) SetImageProperty(next,"comment",property,exception);
property=DestroyString(property);
}
option=GetImageOption(read_info,"label");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
property=InterpretImageProperties(read_info,next,option,exception);
(void) SetImageProperty(next,"label",property,exception);
property=DestroyString(property);
}
if (LocaleCompare(next->magick,"TEXT") == 0)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry("0x0+0+0",&next->page);
if ((read_info->extract != (char *) NULL) &&
(read_info->stream == (StreamHandler) NULL))
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(read_info->extract,&geometry);
if ((next->columns != geometry.width) ||
(next->rows != geometry.height))
{
if (((flags & XValue) != 0) || ((flags & YValue) != 0))
{
Image
*crop_image;
crop_image=CropImage(next,&geometry,exception);
if (crop_image != (Image *) NULL)
ReplaceImageInList(&next,crop_image);
}
else
if (((flags & WidthValue) != 0) || ((flags & HeightValue) != 0))
{
Image
*size_image;
flags=ParseRegionGeometry(next,read_info->extract,&geometry,
exception);
size_image=ResizeImage(next,geometry.width,geometry.height,
next->filter,exception);
if (size_image != (Image *) NULL)
ReplaceImageInList(&next,size_image);
}
}
}
profile=GetImageProfile(next,"icc");
if (profile == (const StringInfo *) NULL)
profile=GetImageProfile(next,"icm");
profile=GetImageProfile(next,"iptc");
if (profile == (const StringInfo *) NULL)
profile=GetImageProfile(next,"8bim");
(void) FormatMagickTime(GetBlobProperties(next)->st_mtime,MagickPathExtent,
timestamp);
(void) SetImageProperty(next,"date:modify",timestamp,exception);
(void) FormatMagickTime(GetBlobProperties(next)->st_ctime,MagickPathExtent,
timestamp);
(void) SetImageProperty(next,"date:create",timestamp,exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"delay");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & GreaterValue) != 0)
{
if (next->delay > (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
next->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
else
if ((flags & LessValue) != 0)
{
if (next->delay < (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
next->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
else
next->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
next->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dispose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
next->dispose=(DisposeType) ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
if (read_info->verbose != MagickFalse)
(void) IdentifyImage(next,stderr,MagickFalse,exception);
image=next;
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/34
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 27,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: id_sys(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, u16 code)
{
int n = ((code >> 8) & 0xf);
unsigned long *reg = (code & 0x0010) ? &FPUL : &FPSCR;
switch (code & 0xf0ff) {
case 0x005a:
case 0x006a:
Rn = *reg;
break;
case 0x405a:
case 0x406a:
*reg = Rn;
break;
case 0x4052:
case 0x4062:
Rn -= 4;
WRITE(*reg, Rn);
break;
case 0x4056:
case 0x4066:
READ(*reg, Rn);
Rn += 4;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 24,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UrlData::OnRedirect(const RedirectCB& cb) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
redirect_callbacks_.push_back(cb);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 29,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_object_options_copy_state(raptor_object_options* to,
raptor_object_options* from)
{
int rc = 0;
int i;
to->area = from->area;
for(i = 0; !rc && i <= RAPTOR_OPTION_LAST; i++) {
if(raptor_option_value_is_numeric((raptor_option)i))
to->options[i].integer = from->options[i].integer;
else {
/* non-numeric values may need allocations */
char* string = from->options[i].string;
if(string) {
size_t len = strlen(string);
to->options[i].string = RAPTOR_MALLOC(char*, len + 1);
if(to->options[i].string)
memcpy(to->options[i].string, string, len + 1);
else
rc = 1;
}
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int btrfs_init_acl(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
{
struct posix_acl *default_acl, *acl;
int ret = 0;
/* this happens with subvols */
if (!dir)
return 0;
ret = posix_acl_create(dir, &inode->i_mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (default_acl) {
ret = __btrfs_set_acl(trans, inode, default_acl,
ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
posix_acl_release(default_acl);
}
if (acl) {
if (!ret)
ret = __btrfs_set_acl(trans, inode, acl,
ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
posix_acl_release(acl);
}
if (!default_acl && !acl)
cache_no_acl(inode);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 16,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::computeInlineDirectionMargins(RenderBlock* containingBlock, int containerWidth, int childWidth)
{
const RenderStyle* containingBlockStyle = containingBlock->style();
Length marginStartLength = style()->marginStartUsing(containingBlockStyle);
Length marginEndLength = style()->marginEndUsing(containingBlockStyle);
if (isFloating() || isInline()) {
containingBlock->setMarginStartForChild(this, marginStartLength.calcMinValue(containerWidth));
containingBlock->setMarginEndForChild(this, marginEndLength.calcMinValue(containerWidth));
return;
}
if ((marginStartLength.isAuto() && marginEndLength.isAuto() && childWidth < containerWidth)
|| (!marginStartLength.isAuto() && !marginEndLength.isAuto() && containingBlock->style()->textAlign() == WEBKIT_CENTER)) {
containingBlock->setMarginStartForChild(this, max(0, (containerWidth - childWidth) / 2));
containingBlock->setMarginEndForChild(this, containerWidth - childWidth - containingBlock->marginStartForChild(this));
return;
}
if (marginEndLength.isAuto() && childWidth < containerWidth) {
containingBlock->setMarginStartForChild(this, marginStartLength.calcValue(containerWidth));
containingBlock->setMarginEndForChild(this, containerWidth - childWidth - containingBlock->marginStartForChild(this));
return;
}
bool pushToEndFromTextAlign = !marginEndLength.isAuto() && ((!containingBlockStyle->isLeftToRightDirection() && containingBlockStyle->textAlign() == WEBKIT_LEFT)
|| (containingBlockStyle->isLeftToRightDirection() && containingBlockStyle->textAlign() == WEBKIT_RIGHT));
if ((marginStartLength.isAuto() && childWidth < containerWidth) || pushToEndFromTextAlign) {
containingBlock->setMarginEndForChild(this, marginEndLength.calcValue(containerWidth));
containingBlock->setMarginStartForChild(this, containerWidth - childWidth - containingBlock->marginEndForChild(this));
return;
}
containingBlock->setMarginStartForChild(this, marginStartLength.calcMinValue(containerWidth));
containingBlock->setMarginEndForChild(this, marginEndLength.calcMinValue(containerWidth));
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *t_hash_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ftrace_iterator *iter = m->private;
void *p = NULL;
loff_t l;
if (!(iter->flags & FTRACE_ITER_DO_HASH))
return NULL;
if (iter->func_pos > *pos)
return NULL;
iter->hidx = 0;
for (l = 0; l <= (*pos - iter->func_pos); ) {
p = t_hash_next(m, &l);
if (!p)
break;
}
if (!p)
return NULL;
/* Only set this if we have an item */
iter->flags |= FTRACE_ITER_HASH;
return iter;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gboolean webkit_web_view_can_copy_clipboard(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
return frame->editor()->canCopy() || frame->editor()->canDHTMLCopy();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _krb5_pk_rd_pa_reply(krb5_context context,
const char *realm,
void *c,
krb5_enctype etype,
const krb5_krbhst_info *hi,
unsigned nonce,
const krb5_data *req_buffer,
PA_DATA *pa,
krb5_keyblock **key)
{
krb5_pk_init_ctx ctx = c;
krb5_error_code ret;
size_t size;
/* Check for IETF PK-INIT first */
if (ctx->type == PKINIT_27) {
PA_PK_AS_REP rep;
heim_octet_string os, data;
heim_oid oid;
if (pa->padata_type != KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("PKINIT: wrong padata recv", ""));
return EINVAL;
}
ret = decode_PA_PK_AS_REP(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&rep,
&size);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("Failed to decode pkinit AS rep", ""));
return ret;
}
switch (rep.element) {
case choice_PA_PK_AS_REP_dhInfo:
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: using pkinit dh");
os = rep.u.dhInfo.dhSignedData;
break;
case choice_PA_PK_AS_REP_encKeyPack:
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: using kinit enc reply key");
os = rep.u.encKeyPack;
break;
default: {
PA_PK_AS_REP_BTMM btmm;
free_PA_PK_AS_REP(&rep);
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
_krb5_debug(context, 5, "krb5_get_init_creds: using BTMM kinit enc reply key");
ret = decode_PA_PK_AS_REP_BTMM(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&btmm,
&size);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("PKINIT: -27 reply "
"invalid content type", ""));
return EINVAL;
}
if (btmm.dhSignedData || btmm.encKeyPack == NULL) {
free_PA_PK_AS_REP_BTMM(&btmm);
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("DH mode not supported for BTMM mode", ""));
return ret;
}
/*
* Transform to IETF style PK-INIT reply so that free works below
*/
rep.element = choice_PA_PK_AS_REP_encKeyPack;
rep.u.encKeyPack.data = btmm.encKeyPack->data;
rep.u.encKeyPack.length = btmm.encKeyPack->length;
btmm.encKeyPack->data = NULL;
btmm.encKeyPack->length = 0;
free_PA_PK_AS_REP_BTMM(&btmm);
os = rep.u.encKeyPack;
}
}
ret = hx509_cms_unwrap_ContentInfo(&os, &oid, &data, NULL);
if (ret) {
free_PA_PK_AS_REP(&rep);
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT: failed to unwrap CI", ""));
return ret;
}
switch (rep.element) {
case choice_PA_PK_AS_REP_dhInfo:
ret = pk_rd_pa_reply_dh(context, &data, &oid, realm, ctx, etype, hi,
ctx->clientDHNonce,
rep.u.dhInfo.serverDHNonce,
nonce, pa, key);
break;
case choice_PA_PK_AS_REP_encKeyPack:
ret = pk_rd_pa_reply_enckey(context, PKINIT_27, &data, &oid, realm,
ctx, etype, hi, nonce, req_buffer, pa, key);
break;
default:
krb5_abortx(context, "pk-init as-rep case not possible to happen");
}
der_free_octet_string(&data);
der_free_oid(&oid);
free_PA_PK_AS_REP(&rep);
} else if (ctx->type == PKINIT_WIN2K) {
PA_PK_AS_REP_Win2k w2krep;
/* Check for Windows encoding of the AS-REP pa data */
#if 0 /* should this be ? */
if (pa->padata_type != KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
"PKINIT: wrong padata recv");
return EINVAL;
}
#endif
memset(&w2krep, 0, sizeof(w2krep));
ret = decode_PA_PK_AS_REP_Win2k(pa->padata_value.data,
pa->padata_value.length,
&w2krep,
&size);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT: Failed decoding windows "
"pkinit reply %d", ""), (int)ret);
return ret;
}
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
switch (w2krep.element) {
case choice_PA_PK_AS_REP_Win2k_encKeyPack: {
heim_octet_string data;
heim_oid oid;
ret = hx509_cms_unwrap_ContentInfo(&w2krep.u.encKeyPack,
&oid, &data, NULL);
free_PA_PK_AS_REP_Win2k(&w2krep);
if (ret) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT: failed to unwrap CI", ""));
return ret;
}
ret = pk_rd_pa_reply_enckey(context, PKINIT_WIN2K, &data, &oid, realm,
ctx, etype, hi, nonce, req_buffer, pa, key);
der_free_octet_string(&data);
der_free_oid(&oid);
break;
}
default:
free_PA_PK_AS_REP_Win2k(&w2krep);
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT: win2k reply invalid "
"content type", ""));
break;
}
} else {
ret = EINVAL;
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
N_("PKINIT: unknown reply type", ""));
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 17,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::hasBadInput() const
{
DateTimeEditElement* edit = dateTimeEditElement();
return element()->value().isEmpty() && edit && edit->anyEditableFieldsHaveValues();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static XPointer alloc_mem_cache(void)
{
struct mem_cache_str *cache;
/* note that an error will go unnoticed */
cache = (struct mem_cache_str *) Xmalloc(sizeof(struct mem_cache_str));
if (cache) {
cache->display_closed = False;
cache->inter_data = NULL;
cache->inter_data_count = 0;
cache->reply_buffers = NULL;
}
return (XPointer) cache;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,396
|
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