instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::WaitForReadPixels(base::OnceClosure callback) {
if (features().use_async_readpixels && !pending_readpixel_fences_.empty()) {
pending_readpixel_fences_.back().callbacks.push_back(std::move(callback));
} else {
std::move(callback).Run();
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 21,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void boundaryTextRemoved(RangeBoundaryPoint& boundary, Node* text, unsigned offset, unsigned length)
{
if (boundary.container() != text)
return;
unsigned boundaryOffset = boundary.offset();
if (offset >= boundaryOffset)
return;
if (offset + length >= boundaryOffset)
boundary.setOffset(offset);
else
boundary.setOffset(boundaryOffset - length);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NormalPageArena::takeFreelistSnapshot(const String& dumpName) {
if (m_freeList.takeSnapshot(dumpName)) {
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* bucketsDump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::instance()
->createMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(dumpName + "/buckets");
base::trace_event::MemoryAllocatorDump* pagesDump =
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::instance()
->createMemoryAllocatorDumpForCurrentGC(dumpName + "/pages");
BlinkGCMemoryDumpProvider::instance()
->currentProcessMemoryDump()
->AddOwnershipEdge(pagesDump->guid(), bucketsDump->guid());
}
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __send_write_same(struct clone_info *ci)
{
return __send_changing_extent_only(ci, get_num_write_same_bios, NULL);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BitStack::~BitStack()
{
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlStringDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int what,
xmlChar end, xmlChar end2, xmlChar end3) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (str == NULL)) return(NULL);
return(xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(ctxt, str, xmlStrlen(str), what,
end, end2, end3));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 5,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::willBeDestroyed()
{
m_beingDestroyed = true;
children()->destroyLeftoverChildren();
RenderBoxModelObject* continuation = this->continuation();
if (continuation) {
continuation->destroy();
setContinuation(0);
}
if (!documentBeingDestroyed()) {
if (firstLineBox()) {
if (isSelectionBorder())
view()->clearSelection();
if (isAnonymousBlock()) {
for (InlineFlowBox* box = firstLineBox(); box; box = box->nextLineBox()) {
while (InlineBox* childBox = box->firstChild())
childBox->remove();
}
}
} else if (parent())
parent()->dirtyLinesFromChangedChild(this);
}
m_lineBoxes.deleteLineBoxes();
if (UNLIKELY(gDelayedUpdateScrollInfoSet != 0))
gDelayedUpdateScrollInfoSet->remove(this);
if (FastTextAutosizer* textAutosizer = document().fastTextAutosizer())
textAutosizer->destroy(this);
RenderBox::willBeDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeFileDescriptor(int fd, bool takeOwnership)
{
flat_binder_object obj;
obj.type = BINDER_TYPE_FD;
obj.flags = 0x7f | FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_ACCEPTS_FDS;
obj.binder = 0; /* Don't pass uninitialized stack data to a remote process */
obj.handle = fd;
obj.cookie = takeOwnership ? 1 : 0;
return writeObject(obj, true);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std_conv_pixmap(fz_context *ctx, fz_pixmap *dst, fz_pixmap *src, fz_colorspace *prf, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, const fz_color_params *color_params, int copy_spots)
{
float srcv[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
float dstv[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
int srcn, dstn;
int k, i;
size_t w = src->w;
int h = src->h;
ptrdiff_t d_line_inc = dst->stride - w * dst->n;
ptrdiff_t s_line_inc = src->stride - w * src->n;
int da = dst->alpha;
int sa = src->alpha;
fz_colorspace *ss = src->colorspace;
fz_colorspace *ds = dst->colorspace;
unsigned char *s = src->samples;
unsigned char *d = dst->samples;
if ((int)w < 0 || h < 0)
return;
if (color_params == NULL)
color_params = fz_default_color_params(ctx);
srcn = ss->n;
dstn = ds->n;
assert(src->w == dst->w && src->h == dst->h);
assert(src->n == srcn + sa);
assert(dst->n == dstn + da);
if (d_line_inc == 0 && s_line_inc == 0)
{
w *= h;
h = 1;
}
/* Special case for Lab colorspace (scaling of components to float) */
if ((fz_colorspace_is_lab(ctx, ss) || fz_colorspace_is_lab_icc(ctx, ss)) && srcn == 3)
{
fz_color_converter cc;
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cc, NULL, ds, ss, color_params);
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
srcv[0] = *s++ / 255.0f * 100;
srcv[1] = *s++ - 128;
srcv[2] = *s++ - 128;
cc.convert(ctx, &cc, dstv, srcv);
for (k = 0; k < dstn; k++)
*d++ = dstv[k] * 255;
if (da)
*d++ = (sa ? *s : 255);
s += sa;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cc);
}
/* Brute-force for small images */
else if (w*h < 256)
{
fz_color_converter cc;
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cc, NULL, ds, ss, color_params);
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
for (k = 0; k < srcn; k++)
srcv[k] = *s++ / 255.0f;
cc.convert(ctx, &cc, dstv, srcv);
for (k = 0; k < dstn; k++)
*d++ = dstv[k] * 255;
if (da)
*d++ = (sa ? *s : 255);
s += sa;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cc);
}
/* 1-d lookup table for separation and similar colorspaces */
else if (srcn == 1)
{
unsigned char lookup[FZ_MAX_COLORS * 256];
fz_color_converter cc;
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cc, NULL, ds, ss, color_params);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
srcv[0] = i / 255.0f;
cc.convert(ctx, &cc, dstv, srcv);
for (k = 0; k < dstn; k++)
lookup[i * dstn + k] = dstv[k] * 255;
}
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cc);
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
i = *s++;
for (k = 0; k < dstn; k++)
*d++ = lookup[i * dstn + k];
if (da)
*d++ = (sa ? *s : 255);
s += sa;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
/* Memoize colors using a hash table for the general case */
else
{
fz_hash_table *lookup;
unsigned char *color;
unsigned char dummy = s[0] ^ 255;
unsigned char *sold = &dummy;
unsigned char *dold;
fz_color_converter cc;
lookup = fz_new_hash_table(ctx, 509, srcn, -1, NULL);
fz_find_color_converter(ctx, &cc, NULL, ds, ss, color_params);
fz_try(ctx)
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
if (*s == *sold && memcmp(sold,s,srcn) == 0)
{
sold = s;
memcpy(d, dold, dstn);
d += dstn;
s += srcn;
if (da)
*d++ = (sa ? *s : 255);
s += sa;
}
else
{
sold = s;
dold = d;
color = fz_hash_find(ctx, lookup, s);
if (color)
{
memcpy(d, color, dstn);
s += srcn;
d += dstn;
if (da)
*d++ = (sa ? *s : 255);
s += sa;
}
else
{
for (k = 0; k < srcn; k++)
srcv[k] = *s++ / 255.0f;
cc.convert(ctx, &cc, dstv, srcv);
for (k = 0; k < dstn; k++)
*d++ = dstv[k] * 255;
fz_hash_insert(ctx, lookup, s - srcn, d - dstn);
if (da)
*d++ = (sa ? *s : 255);
s += sa;
}
}
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
fz_always(ctx)
fz_drop_color_converter(ctx, &cc);
fz_catch(ctx)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
fz_drop_hash_table(ctx, lookup);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_getassociationid(u64 connectionid)
{
return connectionid & ~NVMET_FC_QUEUEID_MASK;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
{
struct xt_match *match;
int ret;
match = xt_request_find_match(NFPROTO_IPV6, m->u.user.name,
m->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(match)) {
duprintf("find_check_match: `%s' not found\n", m->u.user.name);
return PTR_ERR(match);
}
m->u.kernel.match = match;
ret = check_match(m, par);
if (ret)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
module_put(m->u.kernel.match->me);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FindAndTestFilePath(const FilePath& file_path) {
GDataEntry* entry = FindEntry(file_path);
ASSERT_TRUE(entry) << "Entry can't be found " << file_path.value();
EXPECT_EQ(entry->GetFilePath(), file_path);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void virtio_config_writeb(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr, uint32_t data)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint8_t val = data;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return;
}
stb_p(vdev->config + addr, val);
if (k->set_config) {
k->set_config(vdev, vdev->config);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillDialogViews::SuggestionView::UpdateLabelText() {
int unused;
SetLabelText(CanUseVerticallyCompactText(width(), &unused) ?
state_.vertically_compact_text :
state_.horizontally_compact_text);
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t cuse_class_waiting_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct cuse_conn *cc = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", atomic_read(&cc->fc.num_waiting));
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_get_frame_delay(const person_t* person)
{
return person->anim_frames;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 11,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UniqueElementData::addAttribute(const QualifiedName& attributeName, const AtomicString& value)
{
m_attributeVector.append(Attribute(attributeName, value));
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: try_resource_fork (SF_PRIVATE * psf)
{ int old_error = psf->error ;
/* Set READ mode now, to see if resource fork exists. */
psf->rsrc.mode = SFM_READ ;
if (psf_open_rsrc (psf) != 0)
{ psf->error = old_error ;
return 0 ;
} ;
/* More checking here. */
psf_log_printf (psf, "Resource fork : %s\n", psf->rsrc.path.c) ;
return SF_FORMAT_SD2 ;
} /* try_resource_fork */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::OnMessageReceived(RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const IPC::Message& message) {
if (GetWebUI() &&
static_cast<WebUIImpl*>(GetWebUI())->OnMessageReceived(message)) {
return true;
}
ObserverListBase<WebContentsObserver>::Iterator it(observers_);
WebContentsObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL)
if (observer->OnMessageReceived(message))
return true;
message_source_ = render_view_host;
bool handled = true;
bool message_is_ok = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_EX(WebContentsImpl, message, message_is_ok)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache,
OnDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidDisplayInsecureContent,
OnDidDisplayInsecureContent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidRunInsecureContent,
OnDidRunInsecureContent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DocumentLoadedInFrame,
OnDocumentLoadedInFrame)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidFinishLoad, OnDidFinishLoad)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidFailLoadWithError,
OnDidFailLoadWithError)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_GoToEntryAtOffset, OnGoToEntryAtOffset)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_UpdateZoomLimits, OnUpdateZoomLimits)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_EnumerateDirectory, OnEnumerateDirectory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_JSOutOfMemory, OnJSOutOfMemory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_RegisterProtocolHandler,
OnRegisterProtocolHandler)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_Find_Reply, OnFindReply)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_DidProgrammaticallyScroll,
OnDidProgrammaticallyScroll)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_CrashedPlugin, OnCrashedPlugin)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_AppCacheAccessed, OnAppCacheAccessed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_OpenColorChooser, OnOpenColorChooser)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_EndColorChooser, OnEndColorChooser)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_SetSelectedColorInColorChooser,
OnSetSelectedColorInColorChooser)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_PepperPluginHung, OnPepperPluginHung)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_WebUISend, OnWebUISend)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_RequestPpapiBrokerPermission,
OnRequestPpapiBrokerPermission)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_GENERIC(BrowserPluginHostMsg_AllocateInstanceID,
OnBrowserPluginMessage(message))
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_GENERIC(BrowserPluginHostMsg_Attach,
OnBrowserPluginMessage(message))
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ImageHostMsg_DidDownloadImage, OnDidDownloadImage)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_UpdateFaviconURL, OnUpdateFaviconURL)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_FindMatchRects_Reply,
OnFindMatchRectsReply)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_OpenDateTimeDialog,
OnOpenDateTimeDialog)
#endif
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_FrameAttached, OnFrameAttached)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_FrameDetached, OnFrameDetached)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_MediaNotification, OnMediaNotification)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP_EX()
message_source_ = NULL;
if (!message_is_ok) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BadMessageTerminate_RVD"));
GetRenderProcessHost()->ReceivedBadMessage();
}
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void preg_replace_impl(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int is_callable_replace, int is_filter)
{
zval **regex,
**replace,
**subject,
**subject_entry,
**zcount = NULL;
char *result;
int result_len;
int limit_val = -1;
long limit = -1;
char *string_key;
ulong num_key;
char *callback_name;
int replace_count=0, old_replace_count;
/* Get function parameters and do error-checking. */
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ZZZ|lZ", ®ex, &replace, &subject, &limit, &zcount) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!is_callable_replace && Z_TYPE_PP(replace) == IS_ARRAY && Z_TYPE_PP(regex) != IS_ARRAY) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Parameter mismatch, pattern is a string while replacement is an array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
SEPARATE_ZVAL(replace);
if (Z_TYPE_PP(replace) != IS_ARRAY && (Z_TYPE_PP(replace) != IS_OBJECT || !is_callable_replace)) {
convert_to_string_ex(replace);
}
if (is_callable_replace) {
if (!zend_is_callable(*replace, 0, &callback_name TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Requires argument 2, '%s', to be a valid callback", callback_name);
efree(callback_name);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(subject, return_value);
return;
}
efree(callback_name);
}
SEPARATE_ZVAL(regex);
SEPARATE_ZVAL(subject);
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 3) {
limit_val = limit;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(regex) != IS_ARRAY)
convert_to_string_ex(regex);
/* if subject is an array */
if (Z_TYPE_PP(subject) == IS_ARRAY) {
array_init(return_value);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_PP(subject));
/* For each subject entry, convert it to string, then perform replacement
and add the result to the return_value array. */
while (zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_PP(subject), (void **)&subject_entry) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(subject_entry);
old_replace_count = replace_count;
if ((result = php_replace_in_subject(*regex, *replace, subject_entry, &result_len, limit_val, is_callable_replace, &replace_count TSRMLS_CC)) != NULL) {
if (!is_filter || replace_count > old_replace_count) {
/* Add to return array */
switch(zend_hash_get_current_key(Z_ARRVAL_PP(subject), &string_key, &num_key, 0))
{
case HASH_KEY_IS_STRING:
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, string_key, result, result_len, 0);
break;
case HASH_KEY_IS_LONG:
add_index_stringl(return_value, num_key, result, result_len, 0);
break;
}
} else {
efree(result);
}
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_PP(subject));
}
} else { /* if subject is not an array */
old_replace_count = replace_count;
if ((result = php_replace_in_subject(*regex, *replace, subject, &result_len, limit_val, is_callable_replace, &replace_count TSRMLS_CC)) != NULL) {
if (!is_filter || replace_count > old_replace_count) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(result, result_len, 0);
} else {
efree(result);
}
}
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 4) {
zval_dtor(*zcount);
ZVAL_LONG(*zcount, replace_count);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int __user *, policy,
compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode,
compat_ulong_t, addr, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
long err;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask)
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err = sys_get_mempolicy(policy, nm, nr_bits+1, addr, flags);
if (!err && nmask) {
unsigned long copy_size;
copy_size = min_t(unsigned long, sizeof(bm), alloc_size);
err = copy_from_user(bm, nm, copy_size);
/* ensure entire bitmap is zeroed */
err |= clear_user(nmask, ALIGN(maxnode-1, 8) / 8);
err |= compat_put_bitmap(nmask, bm, nr_bits);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 11,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders(const SpdyHeaderBlock& headers) {
SpdyHeaderBlock::const_iterator it = headers.find(kHttp2MethodHeader);
DCHECK(it != headers.end());
if (!(it->second == "GET" || it->second == "HEAD")) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid method "
<< it->second;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_METHOD);
return;
}
if (!SpdyUtils::UrlIsValid(headers)) {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Promise for stream " << id_ << " has invalid URL "
<< url_;
Reset(QUIC_INVALID_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
if (!session_->IsAuthorized(SpdyUtils::GetHostNameFromHeaderBlock(headers))) {
Reset(QUIC_UNAUTHORIZED_PROMISE_URL);
return;
}
request_headers_.reset(new SpdyHeaderBlock(headers.Clone()));
}
Commit Message: Fix Stack Buffer Overflow in QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders
BUG=777728
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I6a80db88aafdf20c7abd3847404b818565681310
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748425
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513105}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 10,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usb_xhci_realize(struct PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
{
int i, ret;
Error *err = NULL;
XHCIState *xhci = XHCI(dev);
dev->config[PCI_CLASS_PROG] = 0x30; /* xHCI */
dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0x01; /* interrupt pin 1 */
dev->config[PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE] = 0x10;
dev->config[0x60] = 0x30; /* release number */
if (xhci->numintrs > MAXINTRS) {
xhci->numintrs = MAXINTRS;
}
while (xhci->numintrs & (xhci->numintrs - 1)) { /* ! power of 2 */
xhci->numintrs++;
}
if (xhci->numintrs < 1) {
xhci->numintrs = 1;
}
if (xhci->numslots > MAXSLOTS) {
xhci->numslots = MAXSLOTS;
}
if (xhci->numslots < 1) {
xhci->numslots = 1;
}
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_ENABLE_STREAMS)) {
xhci->max_pstreams_mask = 7; /* == 256 primary streams */
} else {
xhci->max_pstreams_mask = 0;
}
if (xhci->msi != ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF) {
ret = msi_init(dev, 0x70, xhci->numintrs, true, false, &err);
/* Any error other than -ENOTSUP(board's MSI support is broken)
* is a programming error */
assert(!ret || ret == -ENOTSUP);
if (ret && xhci->msi == ON_OFF_AUTO_ON) {
/* Can't satisfy user's explicit msi=on request, fail */
error_append_hint(&err, "You have to use msi=auto (default) or "
"msi=off with this machine type.\n");
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
assert(!err || xhci->msi == ON_OFF_AUTO_AUTO);
/* With msi=auto, we fall back to MSI off silently */
error_free(err);
}
usb_xhci_init(xhci);
xhci->mfwrap_timer = timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, xhci_mfwrap_timer, xhci);
memory_region_init(&xhci->mem, OBJECT(xhci), "xhci", LEN_REGS);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_cap, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_cap_ops, xhci,
"capabilities", LEN_CAP);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_oper, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_oper_ops, xhci,
"operational", 0x400);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_runtime, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_runtime_ops, xhci,
"runtime", LEN_RUNTIME);
memory_region_init_io(&xhci->mem_doorbell, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_doorbell_ops, xhci,
"doorbell", LEN_DOORBELL);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, 0, &xhci->mem_cap);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, OFF_OPER, &xhci->mem_oper);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, OFF_RUNTIME, &xhci->mem_runtime);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, OFF_DOORBELL, &xhci->mem_doorbell);
for (i = 0; i < xhci->numports; i++) {
XHCIPort *port = &xhci->ports[i];
uint32_t offset = OFF_OPER + 0x400 + 0x10 * i;
port->xhci = xhci;
memory_region_init_io(&port->mem, OBJECT(xhci), &xhci_port_ops, port,
port->name, 0x10);
memory_region_add_subregion(&xhci->mem, offset, &port->mem);
}
pci_register_bar(dev, 0,
PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY|PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64,
&xhci->mem);
if (pci_bus_is_express(dev->bus) ||
xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_FORCE_PCIE_ENDCAP)) {
ret = pcie_endpoint_cap_init(dev, 0xa0);
assert(ret >= 0);
}
if (xhci->msix != ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF) {
/* TODO check for errors, and should fail when msix=on */
msix_init(dev, xhci->numintrs,
&xhci->mem, 0, OFF_MSIX_TABLE,
&xhci->mem, 0, OFF_MSIX_PBA,
0x90, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 4,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int addrconf_sysctl_proxy_ndp(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
int *valp = ctl->data;
int ret;
int old, new;
old = *valp;
ret = proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
new = *valp;
if (write && old != new) {
struct net *net = ctl->extra2;
if (!rtnl_trylock())
return restart_syscall();
if (valp == &net->ipv6.devconf_dflt->proxy_ndp)
inet6_netconf_notify_devconf(net, NETCONFA_PROXY_NEIGH,
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_DEFAULT,
net->ipv6.devconf_dflt);
else if (valp == &net->ipv6.devconf_all->proxy_ndp)
inet6_netconf_notify_devconf(net, NETCONFA_PROXY_NEIGH,
NETCONFA_IFINDEX_ALL,
net->ipv6.devconf_all);
else {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ctl->extra1;
inet6_netconf_notify_devconf(net, NETCONFA_PROXY_NEIGH,
idev->dev->ifindex,
&idev->cnf);
}
rtnl_unlock();
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mon_winresize(int nsig)
{
static int not_done;
int lines = 0, cols = 0;
if (!not_done++) {
if (ncurses_winch_handler)
/* the original ncurses WINCH signal handler does the
* magic of retrieving the new window size;
* otherwise, we'd have to use ioctl or tgetent */
(*ncurses_winch_handler) (SIGWINCH);
getmaxyx(stdscr, lines, cols);
resizeterm(lines, cols);
mainloop_set_trigger(refresh_trigger);
}
not_done--;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_file_identifier(unsigned char *bp, int from, int to, enum vdc vdc,
struct archive_write *a, struct vdd *vdd, struct archive_string *id,
const char *label, int leading_under, enum char_type char_type)
{
char identifier[256];
struct isoent *isoent;
const char *ids;
size_t len;
int r;
if (id->length > 0 && leading_under && id->s[0] != '_') {
if (char_type == A_CHAR)
r = set_str_a_characters_bp(a, bp, from, to, id->s, vdc);
else
r = set_str_d_characters_bp(a, bp, from, to, id->s, vdc);
} else if (id->length > 0) {
ids = id->s;
if (leading_under)
ids++;
isoent = isoent_find_entry(vdd->rootent, ids);
if (isoent == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Not Found %s `%s'.",
label, ids);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
len = isoent->ext_off + isoent->ext_len;
if (vdd->vdd_type == VDD_JOLIET) {
if (len > sizeof(identifier)-2)
len = sizeof(identifier)-2;
} else {
if (len > sizeof(identifier)-1)
len = sizeof(identifier)-1;
}
memcpy(identifier, isoent->identifier, len);
identifier[len] = '\0';
if (vdd->vdd_type == VDD_JOLIET) {
identifier[len+1] = 0;
vdc = VDC_UCS2_DIRECT;
}
if (char_type == A_CHAR)
r = set_str_a_characters_bp(a, bp, from, to,
identifier, vdc);
else
r = set_str_d_characters_bp(a, bp, from, to,
identifier, vdc);
} else {
if (char_type == A_CHAR)
r = set_str_a_characters_bp(a, bp, from, to, NULL, vdc);
else
r = set_str_d_characters_bp(a, bp, from, to, NULL, vdc);
}
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 14,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int chmd_sys_write(struct mspack_file *file, void *buffer, int bytes) {
struct mschm_decompressor_p *self = (struct mschm_decompressor_p *) file;
self->d->offset += bytes;
if (self->d->outfh) {
return self->system->write(self->d->outfh, buffer, bytes);
}
return bytes;
}
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 20,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(xml)
{
xml_globals->default_encoding = "UTF-8";
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void auth_exit_ev(const void *event_data, void *user_data) {
/* Close the scoreboard descriptor that we opened. */
(void) pr_close_scoreboard(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 20,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rend_service_validate_intro_late(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
char **err_msg_out)
{
int status = 0;
if (!intro) {
if (err_msg_out)
*err_msg_out =
tor_strdup("NULL intro cell passed to "
"rend_service_validate_intro_late()");
status = -1;
goto err;
}
if (intro->version == 3 && intro->parsed) {
if (!(intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ||
intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ||
intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH)) {
/* This is an informative message, not an error, as in the old code */
if (err_msg_out)
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"unknown authorization type %d",
intro->u.v3.auth_type);
}
}
err:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 19,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripGtk::Init() {
model_->AddObserver(this);
tabstrip_.Own(gtk_fixed_new());
ViewIDUtil::SetID(tabstrip_.get(), VIEW_ID_TAB_STRIP);
gtk_widget_set_size_request(tabstrip_.get(), 0,
TabGtk::GetMinimumUnselectedSize().height());
gtk_widget_set_app_paintable(tabstrip_.get(), TRUE);
gtk_drag_dest_set(tabstrip_.get(), GTK_DEST_DEFAULT_ALL,
NULL, 0,
static_cast<GdkDragAction>(
GDK_ACTION_COPY | GDK_ACTION_MOVE | GDK_ACTION_LINK));
static const int targets[] = { ui::TEXT_URI_LIST,
ui::NETSCAPE_URL,
ui::TEXT_PLAIN,
-1 };
ui::SetDestTargetList(tabstrip_.get(), targets);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "map",
G_CALLBACK(OnMapThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "expose-event",
G_CALLBACK(OnExposeThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "size-allocate",
G_CALLBACK(OnSizeAllocateThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-motion",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragMotionThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-drop",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragDropThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-leave",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragLeaveThunk), this);
g_signal_connect(tabstrip_.get(), "drag-data-received",
G_CALLBACK(OnDragDataReceivedThunk), this);
newtab_button_.reset(MakeNewTabButton());
newtab_surface_bounds_.SetRect(0, 0, newtab_button_->SurfaceWidth(),
newtab_button_->SurfaceHeight());
gtk_widget_show_all(tabstrip_.get());
bounds_ = GetInitialWidgetBounds(tabstrip_.get());
if (drop_indicator_width == 0) {
GdkPixbuf* drop_image = GetDropArrowImage(true)->ToGdkPixbuf();
drop_indicator_width = gdk_pixbuf_get_width(drop_image);
drop_indicator_height = gdk_pixbuf_get_height(drop_image);
}
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED,
content::Source<ThemeService>(theme_service_));
theme_service_->InitThemesFor(this);
ViewIDUtil::SetDelegateForWidget(widget(), this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGStyleElement::ChildrenChanged(const ChildrenChange& change) {
SVGElement::ChildrenChanged(change);
if (StyleElement::ChildrenChanged(*this) ==
StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError)
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _yr_re_fiber_kill_tail(
RE_FIBER_LIST* fiber_list,
RE_FIBER_POOL* fiber_pool,
RE_FIBER* fiber)
{
RE_FIBER* prev_fiber = fiber->prev;
if (prev_fiber != NULL)
prev_fiber->next = NULL;
fiber->prev = fiber_pool->fibers.tail;
if (fiber_pool->fibers.tail != NULL)
fiber_pool->fibers.tail->next = fiber;
fiber_pool->fibers.tail = fiber_list->tail;
fiber_list->tail = prev_fiber;
if (fiber_list->head == fiber)
fiber_list->head = NULL;
if (fiber_pool->fibers.head == NULL)
fiber_pool->fibers.head = fiber;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 8,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_proc_exchange_id(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
nfs4_verifier verifier;
struct nfs41_exchange_id_args args = {
.verifier = &verifier,
.client = clp,
.flags = EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER,
};
struct nfs41_exchange_id_res res = {
0
};
int status;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_EXCHANGE_ID],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
nfs4_init_boot_verifier(clp, &verifier);
args.id_len = nfs4_init_uniform_client_string(clp, args.id,
sizeof(args.id));
dprintk("NFS call exchange_id auth=%s, '%.*s'\n",
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_auth->au_ops->au_name,
args.id_len, args.id);
res.server_owner = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs41_server_owner),
GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(res.server_owner == NULL)) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
res.server_scope = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs41_server_scope),
GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(res.server_scope == NULL)) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out_server_owner;
}
res.impl_id = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs41_impl_id), GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(res.impl_id == NULL)) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out_server_scope;
}
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_check_cl_exchange_flags(res.flags);
if (status == 0) {
clp->cl_clientid = res.clientid;
clp->cl_exchange_flags = (res.flags & ~EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R);
if (!(res.flags & EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R))
clp->cl_seqid = res.seqid;
kfree(clp->cl_serverowner);
clp->cl_serverowner = res.server_owner;
res.server_owner = NULL;
/* use the most recent implementation id */
kfree(clp->cl_implid);
clp->cl_implid = res.impl_id;
if (clp->cl_serverscope != NULL &&
!nfs41_same_server_scope(clp->cl_serverscope,
res.server_scope)) {
dprintk("%s: server_scope mismatch detected\n",
__func__);
set_bit(NFS4CLNT_SERVER_SCOPE_MISMATCH, &clp->cl_state);
kfree(clp->cl_serverscope);
clp->cl_serverscope = NULL;
}
if (clp->cl_serverscope == NULL) {
clp->cl_serverscope = res.server_scope;
goto out;
}
} else
kfree(res.impl_id);
out_server_owner:
kfree(res.server_owner);
out_server_scope:
kfree(res.server_scope);
out:
if (clp->cl_implid != NULL)
dprintk("NFS reply exchange_id: Server Implementation ID: "
"domain: %s, name: %s, date: %llu,%u\n",
clp->cl_implid->domain, clp->cl_implid->name,
clp->cl_implid->date.seconds,
clp->cl_implid->date.nseconds);
dprintk("NFS reply exchange_id: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollbarManager::Dispose() {
h_bar_is_attached_ = v_bar_is_attached_ = 0;
DestroyScrollbar(kHorizontalScrollbar);
DestroyScrollbar(kVerticalScrollbar);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 17,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShutDown() {
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&InProcessServiceManagerContext::ShutDownOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pmcraid_eh_bus_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, scmd,
"Doing bus reset due to an I/O command timeout.\n");
return pmcraid_reset_device(scmd,
PMCRAID_RESET_BUS_TIMEOUT,
RESET_DEVICE_BUS);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderThreadImpl::GetCompositorImplThreadTaskRunner() {
return compositor_task_runner_;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemManagerImpl::ReadMetadata(const GURL& path,
ReadMetadataCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
FileSystemURL url(context_->CrackURL(path));
base::Optional<base::File::Error> opt_error = ValidateFileSystemURL(url);
if (opt_error) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::Info(), opt_error.value());
return;
}
if (!security_policy_->CanReadFileSystemFile(process_id_, url)) {
std::move(callback).Run(base::File::Info(),
base::File::FILE_ERROR_SECURITY);
return;
}
operation_runner()->GetMetadata(
url,
FileSystemOperation::GET_METADATA_FIELD_IS_DIRECTORY |
FileSystemOperation::GET_METADATA_FIELD_SIZE |
FileSystemOperation::GET_METADATA_FIELD_LAST_MODIFIED,
base::BindRepeating(&FileSystemManagerImpl::DidGetMetadata, GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(&callback)));
}
Commit Message: Disable FileSystemManager::CreateWriter if WritableFiles isn't enabled.
Bug: 922677
Change-Id: Ib16137cbabb2ec07f1ffc0484722f1d9cc533404
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1416570
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623552}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError(
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to unregister agent: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 21,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PasswordAutofillAgent::FrameCanAccessPasswordManager() {
WebLocalFrame* frame = render_frame()->GetWebFrame();
blink::WebURL url = frame->GetDocument().Url();
if (!url.ProtocolIs(url::kHttpScheme) && !url.ProtocolIs(url::kHttpsScheme))
return false;
return frame->GetSecurityOrigin().CanAccessPasswordManager();
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Editor::Command::Command(const EditorInternalCommand* command,
EditorCommandSource source,
LocalFrame* frame)
: command_(command), source_(source), frame_(command ? frame : nullptr) {
if (!command)
DCHECK(!frame_);
else
DCHECK(frame_);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nohz_balance_exit_idle(struct rq *rq)
{
SCHED_WARN_ON(rq != this_rq());
if (likely(!rq->nohz_tick_stopped))
return;
rq->nohz_tick_stopped = 0;
cpumask_clear_cpu(rq->cpu, nohz.idle_cpus_mask);
atomic_dec(&nohz.nr_cpus);
set_cpu_sd_state_busy(rq->cpu);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *skb_clone(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct sk_buff *n;
if (skb_orphan_frags(skb, gfp_mask))
return NULL;
n = skb + 1;
if (skb->fclone == SKB_FCLONE_ORIG &&
n->fclone == SKB_FCLONE_UNAVAILABLE) {
atomic_t *fclone_ref = (atomic_t *) (n + 1);
n->fclone = SKB_FCLONE_CLONE;
atomic_inc(fclone_ref);
} else {
if (skb_pfmemalloc(skb))
gfp_mask |= __GFP_MEMALLOC;
n = kmem_cache_alloc(skbuff_head_cache, gfp_mask);
if (!n)
return NULL;
kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(n, flags1);
kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(n, flags2);
n->fclone = SKB_FCLONE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
return __skb_clone(n, skb);
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int entersafe_pin_cmd(sc_card_t *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data,
int *tries_left)
{
int r;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
entersafe_init_pin_info(&data->pin1,0);
entersafe_init_pin_info(&data->pin2,1);
data->flags |= SC_PIN_CMD_NEED_PADDING;
if(data->cmd!=SC_PIN_CMD_UNBLOCK)
{
r = iso_ops->pin_cmd(card,data,tries_left);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Verify rv:%i", r);
}
else
{
{/*verify*/
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 sbuf[0x10]={0};
memcpy(sbuf,data->pin1.data,data->pin1.len);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT,0x20,0x00,data->pin_reference+1);
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen = sizeof(sbuf);
apdu.data = sbuf;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
}
{/*change*/
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 sbuf[0x12]={0};
sbuf[0] = 0x33;
sbuf[1] = 0x00;
memcpy(sbuf+2,data->pin2.data,data->pin2.len);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT,0xF4,0x0B,data->pin_reference);
apdu.cla = 0x84;
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen = sizeof(sbuf);
apdu.data = sbuf;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,key_maintain,sizeof(key_maintain),1,1);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
}
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetElementHandler(XML_Parser parser, XML_StartElementHandler start,
XML_EndElementHandler end) {
if (parser == NULL)
return;
parser->m_startElementHandler = start;
parser->m_endElementHandler = end;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 16,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void * CLASS foveon_camf_matrix (unsigned dim[3], const char *name)
{
unsigned i, idx, type, ndim, size, *mat;
char *pos, *cp, *dp;
double dsize;
for (idx=0; idx < meta_length; idx += sget4(pos+8)) {
pos = meta_data + idx;
if (strncmp (pos, "CMb", 3)) break;
if (pos[3] != 'M') continue;
if (strcmp (name, pos+sget4(pos+12))) continue;
dim[0] = dim[1] = dim[2] = 1;
cp = pos + sget4(pos+16);
type = sget4(cp);
if ((ndim = sget4(cp+4)) > 3) break;
dp = pos + sget4(cp+8);
for (i=ndim; i--; ) {
cp += 12;
dim[i] = sget4(cp);
}
if ((dsize = (double) dim[0]*dim[1]*dim[2]) > meta_length/4) break;
mat = (unsigned *) malloc ((size = dsize) * 4);
merror (mat, "foveon_camf_matrix()");
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
if (type && type != 6)
mat[i] = sget4(dp + i*4);
else
mat[i] = sget4(dp + i*2) & 0xffff;
return mat;
}
fprintf (stderr,_("%s: \"%s\" matrix not found!\n"), ifname, name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible foveon buffer overrun (Secunia SA750000)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct thread_q *tq_new(void)
{
struct thread_q *tq;
tq = (struct thread_q *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tq));
if (!tq)
return NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tq->q);
pthread_mutex_init(&tq->mutex, NULL);
pthread_cond_init(&tq->cond, NULL);
return tq;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CredentialManagerImpl::DoneRequiringUserMediation() {
DCHECK(pending_require_user_mediation_);
pending_require_user_mediation_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_remove(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs4_change_info *cinfo)
{
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_REMOVE);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_change_info(xdr, cinfo);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
struct kvm *kvm = mmu_notifier_to_kvm(mn);
int need_tlb_flush = 0, idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
/*
* The count increase must become visible at unlock time as no
* spte can be established without taking the mmu_lock and
* count is also read inside the mmu_lock critical section.
*/
kvm->mmu_notifier_count++;
for (; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
need_tlb_flush |= kvm_unmap_hva(kvm, start);
need_tlb_flush |= kvm->tlbs_dirty;
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
/* we've to flush the tlb before the pages can be freed */
if (need_tlb_flush)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_transform_ini_end(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that)
{
UNUSED(this)
UNUSED(that)
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 19,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(struct bpf_map *map)
{
return (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ApplyPSDOpacityMask(Image *image,const Image *mask,
Quantum background,MagickBooleanType revert,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*complete_mask;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
color;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" applying opacity mask");
complete_mask=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,
exception);
complete_mask->matte=MagickTrue;
GetMagickPixelPacket(complete_mask,&color);
color.red=background;
SetImageColor(complete_mask,&color);
status=CompositeImage(complete_mask,OverCompositeOp,mask,
mask->page.x-image->page.x,mask->page.y-image->page.y);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
complete_mask=DestroyImage(complete_mask);
return(status);
}
image->matte=MagickTrue;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
p=GetAuthenticPixels(complete_mask,0,y,complete_mask->columns,1,exception);
if ((q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) || (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
MagickRealType
alpha,
intensity;
alpha=GetPixelAlpha(q);
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(complete_mask,p);
if (revert == MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ClampToQuantum(intensity*(QuantumScale*alpha)));
else if (intensity > 0)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ClampToQuantum((alpha/intensity)*QuantumRange));
q++;
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
complete_mask=DestroyImage(complete_mask);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 15,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ASessionDescription::setTo(const void *data, size_t size) {
mIsValid = parse(data, size);
if (!mIsValid) {
mTracks.clear();
mFormats.clear();
}
return mIsValid;
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 5,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::LoseContextImpl(
WebGLRenderingContextBase::LostContextMode mode,
AutoRecoveryMethod auto_recovery_method) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
context_lost_mode_ = mode;
DCHECK_NE(context_lost_mode_, kNotLostContext);
auto_recovery_method_ = auto_recovery_method;
for (size_t i = 0; i < extensions_.size(); ++i) {
ExtensionTracker* tracker = extensions_[i];
tracker->LoseExtension(false);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < kWebGLExtensionNameCount; ++i)
extension_enabled_[i] = false;
RemoveAllCompressedTextureFormats();
if (mode == kRealLostContext) {
task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&WebGLRenderingContextBase::HoldReferenceToDrawingBuffer,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), WTF::RetainedRef(drawing_buffer_)));
}
DestroyContext();
ConsoleDisplayPreference display =
(mode == kRealLostContext) ? kDisplayInConsole : kDontDisplayInConsole;
SynthesizeGLError(GC3D_CONTEXT_LOST_WEBGL, "loseContext", "context lost",
display);
restore_allowed_ = false;
DeactivateContext(this);
if (auto_recovery_method_ == kWhenAvailable)
AddToEvictedList(this);
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_.StartOneShot(TimeDelta(), FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlockPainter::PaintAllChildPhasesAtomically(
const LayoutBox& child,
const PaintInfo& paint_info,
const LayoutPoint& paint_offset) {
LayoutPoint child_point =
layout_block_.FlipForWritingModeForChildForPaint(&child, paint_offset);
if (!child.HasSelfPaintingLayer() && !child.IsFloating())
ObjectPainter(child).PaintAllPhasesAtomically(paint_info, child_point);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static StyleSheetContents* parseUASheet(const String& str)
{
StyleSheetContents* sheet = StyleSheetContents::create(CSSParserContext(UASheetMode)).leakRef(); // leak the sheet on purpose
sheet->parseString(str);
return sheet;
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::InsertEntriesFrom(
const NavigationControllerImpl& source,
int max_index) {
DCHECK_LE(max_index, source.GetEntryCount());
size_t insert_index = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < max_index; i++) {
if (source.entries_[i]->GetPageType() != PAGE_TYPE_INTERSTITIAL) {
entries_.insert(entries_.begin() + insert_index++,
source.entries_[i]->Clone());
}
}
DCHECK(pending_entry_index_ == -1 ||
pending_entry_ == GetEntryAtIndex(pending_entry_index_));
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::DidFinishLoad() {
SendPasswordForms(true);
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionRegistry::SetDisabledModificationCallback(
const ExtensionSet::ModificationCallback& callback) {
disabled_extensions_.set_modification_callback(callback);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureManager::ConnectClient(
media::VideoCaptureSessionId session_id,
const media::VideoCaptureParams& params,
VideoCaptureControllerID client_id,
VideoCaptureControllerEventHandler* client_handler,
const DoneCB& done_cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
{
std::ostringstream string_stream;
string_stream << "ConnectClient: session_id = " << session_id
<< ", request: "
<< media::VideoCaptureFormat::ToString(
params.requested_format);
EmitLogMessage(string_stream.str(), 1);
}
VideoCaptureController* controller =
GetOrCreateController(session_id, params);
if (!controller) {
done_cb.Run(base::WeakPtr<VideoCaptureController>());
return;
}
LogVideoCaptureEvent(VIDEO_CAPTURE_START_CAPTURE);
if (!controller->HasActiveClient() && !controller->HasPausedClient()) {
std::ostringstream string_stream;
string_stream
<< "VideoCaptureManager queueing device start for device_id = "
<< controller->device_id();
EmitLogMessage(string_stream.str(), 1);
QueueStartDevice(session_id, controller, params);
}
done_cb.Run(controller->GetWeakPtrForIOThread());
controller->AddClient(client_id, client_handler, session_id, params);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SwapOut(
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy,
bool is_loading) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN0("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::SwapOut", this);
if (!is_active()) {
NOTREACHED() << "RFH should be in default state when calling SwapOut.";
return;
}
if (swapout_event_monitor_timeout_) {
swapout_event_monitor_timeout_->Start(base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
RenderViewHostImpl::kUnloadTimeoutMS));
}
CHECK(proxy);
if (IsRenderFrameLive()) {
FrameReplicationState replication_state =
proxy->frame_tree_node()->current_replication_state();
Send(new FrameMsg_SwapOut(routing_id_, proxy->GetRoutingID(), is_loading,
replication_state));
}
if (web_ui())
web_ui()->RenderFrameHostSwappingOut();
is_waiting_for_swapout_ack_ = true;
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())
render_view_host_->set_is_active(false);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bta_av_accept_signalling_timer_cback(void* data) {
uint32_t inx = PTR_TO_UINT(data);
tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb = &bta_av_cb;
tBTA_AV_SCB* p_scb = NULL;
if (inx < BTA_AV_NUM_STRS) {
p_scb = p_cb->p_scb[inx];
}
if (p_scb) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: coll_mask = 0x%02X", __func__, p_scb->coll_mask);
if (p_scb->coll_mask & BTA_AV_COLL_INC_TMR) {
p_scb->coll_mask &= ~BTA_AV_COLL_INC_TMR;
if (bta_av_is_scb_opening(p_scb)) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: stream state opening: SDP started = %d", __func__,
p_scb->sdp_discovery_started);
if (p_scb->sdp_discovery_started) {
/* We are still doing SDP. Run the timer again. */
p_scb->coll_mask |= BTA_AV_COLL_INC_TMR;
alarm_set_on_mloop(p_cb->accept_signalling_timer,
BTA_AV_ACCEPT_SIGNALLING_TIMEOUT_MS,
bta_av_accept_signalling_timer_cback,
UINT_TO_PTR(inx));
} else {
/* SNK did not start signalling, resume signalling process. */
bta_av_discover_req(p_scb, NULL);
}
} else if (bta_av_is_scb_incoming(p_scb)) {
/* Stay in incoming state if SNK does not start signalling */
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: stream state incoming", __func__);
/* API open was called right after SNK opened L2C connection. */
if (p_scb->coll_mask & BTA_AV_COLL_API_CALLED) {
p_scb->coll_mask &= ~BTA_AV_COLL_API_CALLED;
/* BTA_AV_API_OPEN_EVT */
tBTA_AV_API_OPEN* p_buf =
(tBTA_AV_API_OPEN*)osi_malloc(sizeof(tBTA_AV_API_OPEN));
memcpy(p_buf, &(p_scb->open_api), sizeof(tBTA_AV_API_OPEN));
bta_sys_sendmsg(p_buf);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsHidden() {
return capturer_count_ == 0 && !should_normally_be_visible_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StyledMarkupAccumulator::wrapWithNode(Node* node, bool convertBlocksToInlines, RangeFullySelectsNode rangeFullySelectsNode)
{
StringBuilder markup;
if (node->isElementNode())
appendElement(markup, static_cast<Element*>(node), convertBlocksToInlines && isBlock(const_cast<Node*>(node)), rangeFullySelectsNode);
else
appendStartMarkup(markup, node, 0);
m_reversedPrecedingMarkup.append(markup.toString());
appendEndTag(node);
if (m_nodes)
m_nodes->append(node);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PermissionsData::SetPermissions(
std::unique_ptr<const PermissionSet> active,
std::unique_ptr<const PermissionSet> withheld) const {
AutoLockOnValidThread lock(runtime_lock_, thread_checker_.get());
active_permissions_unsafe_ = std::move(active);
withheld_permissions_unsafe_ = std::move(withheld);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __printf(2,3) void svc_printk(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, const char *fmt, ...) {}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 23,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser* BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::ProcessSpecifiedURLs(
const std::vector<GURL>& urls_to_open) {
SessionStartupPref pref = GetSessionStartupPref(command_line_, profile_);
std::vector<Tab> tabs;
if (!IncognitoModePrefs::ShouldLaunchIncognito(command_line_,
profile_->GetPrefs())) {
tabs = PinnedTabCodec::ReadPinnedTabs(profile_);
}
RecordAppLaunches(profile_, urls_to_open, tabs);
if (!urls_to_open.empty()) {
UrlsToTabs(urls_to_open, &tabs);
} else if (pref.type == SessionStartupPref::URLS && !pref.urls.empty()) {
AddUniqueURLs(pref.urls, &tabs);
} else if (pref.type == SessionStartupPref::DEFAULT && !tabs.empty()) {
std::vector<GURL> urls;
AddStartupURLs(&urls);
UrlsToTabs(urls, &tabs);
}
if (tabs.empty())
return NULL;
Browser* browser = OpenTabsInBrowser(NULL, true, tabs);
return browser;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qboolean FS_ConditionalRestart(int checksumFeed, qboolean disconnect)
{
if(fs_gamedirvar->modified)
{
if(FS_FilenameCompare(lastValidGame, fs_gamedirvar->string) &&
(*lastValidGame || FS_FilenameCompare(fs_gamedirvar->string, com_basegame->string)) &&
(*fs_gamedirvar->string || FS_FilenameCompare(lastValidGame, com_basegame->string)))
{
Com_GameRestart(checksumFeed, disconnect);
return qtrue;
}
else
fs_gamedirvar->modified = qfalse;
}
if(checksumFeed != fs_checksumFeed)
FS_Restart(checksumFeed);
else if(fs_numServerPaks && !fs_reordered)
FS_ReorderPurePaks();
return qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 1,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::SetTabContentBlocked(TabContents* contents, bool blocked) {
int index = tabstrip_model()->GetWrapperIndex(contents);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
tabstrip_model()->SetTabBlocked(index, blocked);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dw2102_rc_query(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
u8 key[2];
struct i2c_msg msg = {
.addr = DW2102_RC_QUERY,
.flags = I2C_M_RD,
.buf = key,
.len = 2
};
if (d->props.i2c_algo->master_xfer(&d->i2c_adap, &msg, 1) == 1) {
if (msg.buf[0] != 0xff) {
deb_rc("%s: rc code: %x, %x\n",
__func__, key[0], key[1]);
rc_keydown(d->rc_dev, RC_TYPE_UNKNOWN, key[0], 0);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::DecrementSharedWorkerRefCount() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!is_worker_ref_count_disabled_);
DCHECK_GT(GetWorkerRefCount(), 0U);
--shared_worker_ref_count_;
if (GetWorkerRefCount() == 0)
Cleanup();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbRequestAccessFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::RequestAccess::Params> parameters =
RequestAccess::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
return RespondNow(OneArgument(new base::FundamentalValue(true)));
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
{
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void destroy_tap_read_thread(void)
{
if (pan_pth >= 0)
{
btsock_thread_exit(pan_pth);
pan_pth = -1;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 22,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document& FrameSelection::GetDocument() const {
DCHECK(LifecycleContext());
return *LifecycleContext();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_asn1_write_element(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int tag,
const u8 * data, size_t datalen, u8 ** out, size_t * outlen)
{
return asn1_write_element(ctx, tag, data, datalen, out, outlen);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 27,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_dc_pattern_write(
const gx_device_color * pdevc,
const gx_device_color_saved * psdc,
const gx_device * dev,
int64_t offset,
byte * data,
uint * psize )
{
gx_color_tile *ptile = pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile;
int size_b, size_c;
byte *dp = data;
int left = *psize;
int64_t offset1 = offset;
int code, l;
if (ptile == NULL)
return 0;
if (psdc->type == pdevc->type) {
if (psdc->colors.pattern.id == ptile->id) {
/* fixme : Do we need to check phase ? How ? */
return 1; /* Same as saved one, don't write. */
}
}
if (offset1 == 0 && left == sizeof(gs_id)) {
/* A special case for writing a known pattern :
Just write the tile id. */
gs_id id = ptile->id; /* Ensure sizeof(gs_id). */
if_debug2m('v', dev->memory,
"[v*] Writing trans tile ID into clist, uid = %ld id = %ld \n",
ptile->uid.id, ptile->id);
memcpy(dp, &ptile->id, sizeof(id));
*psize = sizeof(gs_id);
return 0;
}
/* Check if pattern has transparency object
If so then that is what we will stuff in
the clist */
if (ptile->ttrans != NULL) {
if_debug2m('v', dev->memory,
"[v*] Writing trans tile into clist, uid = %ld id = %ld \n",
ptile->uid.id, ptile->id);
return gx_dc_pattern_trans_write_raster(ptile, offset, data, psize);
}
if (ptile->cdev == NULL)
return gx_dc_pattern_write_raster(ptile, offset, data, psize, dev);
/* Here is where we write pattern-clist data */
size_b = clist_data_size(ptile->cdev, 0);
if (size_b < 0)
return_error(gs_error_unregistered);
size_c = clist_data_size(ptile->cdev, 1);
if (size_c < 0)
return_error(gs_error_unregistered);
if (data == NULL) {
*psize = sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b + size_c;
return 0;
}
if (offset1 == 0) { /* Serialize tile parameters: */
gx_dc_serialized_tile_t buf;
buf.id = ptile->id;
buf.size.x = ptile->cdev->common.width;
buf.size.y = ptile->cdev->common.height;
buf.size_b = size_b;
buf.size_c = size_c;
buf.step_matrix = ptile->step_matrix;
buf.bbox = ptile->bbox;
buf.flags = ptile->depth
| TILE_IS_CLIST
| (ptile->tiling_type<<TILE_TYPE_SHIFT)
| (ptile->is_simple ? TILE_IS_SIMPLE : 0)
| (ptile->has_overlap ? TILE_HAS_OVERLAP : 0)
| (ptile->cdev->common.page_uses_transparency ? TILE_USES_TRANSP : 0);
buf.blending_mode = ptile->blending_mode; /* in case tile has transparency */
if (sizeof(buf) > left) {
/* For a while we require the client to provide enough buffer size. */
return_error(gs_error_unregistered); /* Must not happen. */
}
memcpy(dp, &buf, sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t));
left -= sizeof(buf);
dp += sizeof(buf);
offset1 += sizeof(buf);
}
if (offset1 <= sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b) {
l = min(left, size_b - (offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t)));
code = clist_get_data(ptile->cdev, 0, offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t), dp, l);
if (code < 0)
return code;
left -= l;
offset1 += l;
dp += l;
}
if (left > 0) {
l = min(left, size_c - (offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) - size_b));
code = clist_get_data(ptile->cdev, 1, offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) - size_b, dp, l);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 21,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LaunchTestingApp(const std::string& extension_dirname) {
base::FilePath data_dir;
ASSERT_TRUE(PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_GEN_TEST_DATA, &data_dir));
base::FilePath app_dir = data_dir.AppendASCII("ppapi")
.AppendASCII("tests")
.AppendASCII("extensions")
.AppendASCII(extension_dirname)
.AppendASCII(toolchain_);
const extensions::Extension* extension = LoadExtension(app_dir);
ASSERT_TRUE(extension);
AppLaunchParams params(browser()->profile(), extension,
extensions::LAUNCH_CONTAINER_NONE, NEW_WINDOW,
extensions::SOURCE_TEST);
params.command_line = *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
OpenApplication(params);
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_seal)
{
zval *pubkeys, *pubkey, *sealdata, *ekeys, *iv = NULL;
HashTable *pubkeysht;
EVP_PKEY **pkeys;
zend_resource ** key_resources; /* so we know what to cleanup */
int i, len1, len2, *eksl, nkeys, iv_len;
unsigned char iv_buf[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1], *buf = NULL, **eks;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
char *method =NULL;
size_t method_len = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z/a/|sz/", &data, &data_len,
&sealdata, &ekeys, &pubkeys, &method, &method_len, &iv) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pubkeysht = Z_ARRVAL_P(pubkeys);
nkeys = pubkeysht ? zend_hash_num_elements(pubkeysht) : 0;
if (!nkeys) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Fourth argument to openssl_seal() must be a non-empty array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_SIZE_T_TO_INT(data_len, data);
if (method) {
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
cipher = EVP_rc4();
}
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (!iv && iv_len > 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING,
"Cipher algorithm requires an IV to be supplied as a sixth parameter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pkeys = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*pkeys), 0);
eksl = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*eksl), 0);
eks = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(*eks), 0);
memset(eks, 0, sizeof(*eks) * nkeys);
key_resources = safe_emalloc(nkeys, sizeof(zend_resource*), 0);
memset(key_resources, 0, sizeof(zend_resource*) * nkeys);
memset(pkeys, 0, sizeof(*pkeys) * nkeys);
/* get the public keys we are using to seal this data */
i = 0;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(pubkeysht, pubkey) {
pkeys[i] = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(pubkey, 1, NULL, 0, 0, &key_resources[i]);
if (pkeys[i] == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "not a public key (%dth member of pubkeys)", i+1);
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
eks[i] = emalloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkeys[i]) + 1);
i++;
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_EncryptInit(ctx,cipher,NULL,NULL)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
php_openssl_store_errors();
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
/* allocate one byte extra to make room for \0 */
buf = emalloc(data_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
if (!EVP_SealInit(ctx, cipher, eks, eksl, &iv_buf[0], pkeys, nkeys) ||
!EVP_SealUpdate(ctx, buf, &len1, (unsigned char *)data, (int)data_len) ||
!EVP_SealFinal(ctx, buf + len1, &len2)) {
efree(buf);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
php_openssl_store_errors();
RETVAL_FALSE;
goto clean_exit;
}
if (len1 + len2 > 0) {
zval_dtor(sealdata);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(sealdata, zend_string_init((char*)buf, len1 + len2, 0));
efree(buf);
zval_dtor(ekeys);
array_init(ekeys);
for (i=0; i<nkeys; i++) {
eks[i][eksl[i]] = '\0';
add_next_index_stringl(ekeys, (const char*)eks[i], eksl[i]);
efree(eks[i]);
eks[i] = NULL;
}
if (iv) {
zval_dtor(iv);
iv_buf[iv_len] = '\0';
ZVAL_NEW_STR(iv, zend_string_init((char*)iv_buf, iv_len, 0));
}
} else {
efree(buf);
}
RETVAL_LONG(len1 + len2);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
clean_exit:
for (i=0; i<nkeys; i++) {
if (key_resources[i] == NULL && pkeys[i] != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkeys[i]);
}
if (eks[i]) {
efree(eks[i]);
}
}
efree(eks);
efree(eksl);
efree(pkeys);
efree(key_resources);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 1
| 7,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *CompositeOperatorToPSDBlendMode(CompositeOperator op)
{
const char
*blend_mode;
switch (op)
{
case ColorBurnCompositeOp: blend_mode = "idiv"; break;
case ColorDodgeCompositeOp: blend_mode = "div "; break;
case ColorizeCompositeOp: blend_mode = "colr"; break;
case DarkenCompositeOp: blend_mode = "dark"; break;
case DifferenceCompositeOp: blend_mode = "diff"; break;
case DissolveCompositeOp: blend_mode = "diss"; break;
case ExclusionCompositeOp: blend_mode = "smud"; break;
case HardLightCompositeOp: blend_mode = "hLit"; break;
case HardMixCompositeOp: blend_mode = "hMix"; break;
case HueCompositeOp: blend_mode = "hue "; break;
case LightenCompositeOp: blend_mode = "lite"; break;
case LinearBurnCompositeOp: blend_mode = "lbrn"; break;
case LinearDodgeCompositeOp:blend_mode = "lddg"; break;
case LinearLightCompositeOp:blend_mode = "lLit"; break;
case LuminizeCompositeOp: blend_mode = "lum "; break;
case MultiplyCompositeOp: blend_mode = "mul "; break;
case OverCompositeOp: blend_mode = "norm"; break;
case OverlayCompositeOp: blend_mode = "over"; break;
case PinLightCompositeOp: blend_mode = "pLit"; break;
case SaturateCompositeOp: blend_mode = "sat "; break;
case ScreenCompositeOp: blend_mode = "scrn"; break;
case SoftLightCompositeOp: blend_mode = "sLit"; break;
case VividLightCompositeOp: blend_mode = "vLit"; break;
default: blend_mode = "norm";
}
return(blend_mode);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncWithAudioThread() {
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
base::RunLoop run_loop;
audio_manager_->GetTaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, media::BindToCurrentLoop(run_loop.QuitClosure()));
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void proto_unregister(struct proto *prot)
{
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
release_proto_idx(prot);
list_del(&prot->node);
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
kmem_cache_destroy(prot->slab);
prot->slab = NULL;
req_prot_cleanup(prot->rsk_prot);
if (prot->twsk_prot != NULL && prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab != NULL) {
kmem_cache_destroy(prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab);
kfree(prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab_name);
prot->twsk_prot->twsk_slab = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct o2nm_cluster *to_o2nm_cluster(struct config_item *item)
{
return item ?
container_of(to_config_group(item), struct o2nm_cluster,
cl_group)
: NULL;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 16,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMovePageDown(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
unsigned distance = VerticalScrollDistance(frame);
if (!distance)
return false;
return ModifySelectionyWithPageGranularity(
frame, SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove, distance,
SelectionModifyVerticalDirection::kDown);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response IOHandler::Close(const std::string& handle) {
return io_context_->Close(handle) ? Response::OK()
: Response::InvalidParams("Invalid stream handle");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpu::gles2::GLES2Util* GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetGLES2Util() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_help(void)
{
printf(_("Usage: %s [OPTION]...\n"), program_name);
puts(_("psensor-server is an HTTP server for monitoring hardware "
"sensors remotely."));
puts("");
puts("Options:");
puts(_(" -h, --help display this help and exit\n"
" -v, --version display version information and exit"));
puts("");
puts(_(" -p,--port=PORT webserver port\n"
" -w,--wdir=DIR directory containing webserver pages"));
puts("");
puts(_(" -d, --debug=LEVEL "
"set the debug level, integer between 0 and 3"));
puts(_(" -l, --log-file=PATH set the log file to PATH"));
puts(_(" --sensor-log-file=PATH set the sensor log file to PATH"));
puts(_(" --sensor-log-interval=S "
"set the sensor log interval to S (seconds)"));
puts("");
printf(_("Report bugs to: %s\n"), PACKAGE_BUGREPORT);
puts("");
printf(_("%s home page: <%s>\n"), PACKAGE_NAME, PACKAGE_URL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 22,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::readStrongBinder(sp<IBinder>* val) const
{
return unflatten_binder(ProcessState::self(), *this, val);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_GotoPage(IPDF_JSPLATFORM* param,
int page_number) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
engine->ScrollToPage(page_number);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_h264_alloc_tables(H264Context *h)
{
const int big_mb_num = h->mb_stride * (h->mb_height + 1);
const int row_mb_num = 2*h->mb_stride*FFMAX(h->avctx->thread_count, 1);
int x, y, i;
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->intra4x4_pred_mode,
row_mb_num * 8 * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->non_zero_count,
big_mb_num * 48 * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->slice_table_base,
(big_mb_num + h->mb_stride) * sizeof(*h->slice_table_base), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->cbp_table,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint16_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->chroma_pred_mode_table,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mvd_table[0],
16 * row_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mvd_table[1],
16 * row_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->direct_table,
4 * big_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->list_counts,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint8_t), fail)
memset(h->slice_table_base, -1,
(big_mb_num + h->mb_stride) * sizeof(*h->slice_table_base));
h->slice_table = h->slice_table_base + h->mb_stride * 2 + 1;
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mb2b_xy,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint32_t), fail);
FF_ALLOCZ_OR_GOTO(h->avctx, h->mb2br_xy,
big_mb_num * sizeof(uint32_t), fail);
for (y = 0; y < h->mb_height; y++)
for (x = 0; x < h->mb_width; x++) {
const int mb_xy = x + y * h->mb_stride;
const int b_xy = 4 * x + 4 * y * h->b_stride;
h->mb2b_xy[mb_xy] = b_xy;
h->mb2br_xy[mb_xy] = 8 * (FMO ? mb_xy : (mb_xy % (2 * h->mb_stride)));
}
if (!h->dequant4_coeff[0])
init_dequant_tables(h);
if (!h->DPB) {
h->DPB = av_mallocz_array(MAX_PICTURE_COUNT, sizeof(*h->DPB));
if (!h->DPB)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
avcodec_get_frame_defaults(&h->DPB[i].f);
avcodec_get_frame_defaults(&h->cur_pic.f);
}
return 0;
fail:
free_tables(h, 1);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mxf_read_close(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MXFContext *mxf = s->priv_data;
int i;
av_freep(&mxf->packages_refs);
av_freep(&mxf->essence_container_data_refs);
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_streams; i++)
s->streams[i]->priv_data = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < mxf->metadata_sets_count; i++) {
mxf_free_metadataset(mxf->metadata_sets + i, 1);
}
av_freep(&mxf->partitions);
av_freep(&mxf->metadata_sets);
av_freep(&mxf->aesc);
av_freep(&mxf->local_tags);
if (mxf->index_tables) {
for (i = 0; i < mxf->nb_index_tables; i++) {
av_freep(&mxf->index_tables[i].segments);
av_freep(&mxf->index_tables[i].ptses);
av_freep(&mxf->index_tables[i].fake_index);
av_freep(&mxf->index_tables[i].offsets);
}
}
av_freep(&mxf->index_tables);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::DoGetNetworkList(int routing_id) {
net::NetworkInterfaceList list;
net::GetNetworkList(&list);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod(
this, &P2PSocketDispatcherHost::SendNetworkList, routing_id, list));
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void H264SwDecTrace(char *string)
{
FILE *fp;
fp = fopen("dec_api.trc", "at");
if (!fp)
return;
fwrite(string, 1, strlen(string), fp);
fwrite("\n", 1,1, fp);
fclose(fp);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int megasas_task_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
int ret;
struct megasas_instance *instance;
instance = (struct megasas_instance *)scmd->device->host->hostdata;
if (instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES)
ret = megasas_task_abort_fusion(scmd);
else {
sdev_printk(KERN_NOTICE, scmd->device, "TASK ABORT not supported\n");
ret = FAILED;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RenderProcessWillLaunch(
content::RenderProcessHost* host,
service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest* service_request) {
int id = host->GetID();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(host->GetBrowserContext());
host->AddFilter(new ChromeRenderMessageFilter(id, profile));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
host->AddFilter(new cast::CastTransportHostFilter());
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
host->AddFilter(new printing::PrintingMessageFilter(id, profile));
#endif
host->AddFilter(new prerender::PrerenderMessageFilter(id, profile));
host->AddFilter(new TtsMessageFilter(host->GetBrowserContext()));
WebRtcLoggingHandlerHost* webrtc_logging_handler_host =
new WebRtcLoggingHandlerHost(id, profile,
g_browser_process->webrtc_log_uploader());
host->AddFilter(webrtc_logging_handler_host);
host->SetUserData(
WebRtcLoggingHandlerHost::kWebRtcLoggingHandlerHostKey,
std::make_unique<base::UserDataAdapter<WebRtcLoggingHandlerHost>>(
webrtc_logging_handler_host));
AudioDebugRecordingsHandler* audio_debug_recordings_handler =
new AudioDebugRecordingsHandler(profile);
host->SetUserData(
AudioDebugRecordingsHandler::kAudioDebugRecordingsHandlerKey,
std::make_unique<base::UserDataAdapter<AudioDebugRecordingsHandler>>(
audio_debug_recordings_handler));
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_NACL)
host->AddFilter(new nacl::NaClHostMessageFilter(id, profile->IsOffTheRecord(),
profile->GetPath()));
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
host->AddFilter(
new cdm::CdmMessageFilterAndroid(!profile->IsOffTheRecord(), false));
host->SetUserData(
CrashMemoryMetricsCollector::kCrashMemoryMetricsCollectorKey,
std::make_unique<CrashMemoryMetricsCollector>(host));
#endif
Profile* original_profile = profile->GetOriginalProfile();
RendererUpdaterFactory::GetForProfile(original_profile)
->InitializeRenderer(host);
for (size_t i = 0; i < extra_parts_.size(); ++i)
extra_parts_[i]->RenderProcessWillLaunch(host);
service_manager::mojom::ServicePtr service;
*service_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&service);
service_manager::mojom::PIDReceiverPtr pid_receiver;
service_manager::Identity renderer_identity = host->GetChildIdentity();
ChromeService::GetInstance()->connector()->RegisterServiceInstance(
service_manager::Identity(chrome::mojom::kRendererServiceName,
renderer_identity.instance_group(),
renderer_identity.instance_id(),
base::Token::CreateRandom()),
std::move(service), mojo::MakeRequest(&pid_receiver));
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Vector<AtomicString>* createRoleNameVector() {
Vector<AtomicString>* roleNameVector = new Vector<AtomicString>(NumRoles);
for (int i = 0; i < NumRoles; i++)
(*roleNameVector)[i] = nullAtom;
for (size_t i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(roles); ++i)
(*roleNameVector)[roles[i].webcoreRole] = AtomicString(roles[i].ariaRole);
for (size_t i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(reverseRoles); ++i)
(*roleNameVector)[reverseRoles[i].webcoreRole] =
AtomicString(reverseRoles[i].ariaRole);
return roleNameVector;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 18,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShellSurface::OnMouseEvent(ui::MouseEvent* event) {
if (!resizer_) {
views::View::OnMouseEvent(event);
return;
}
if (event->handled())
return;
if ((event->flags() &
(ui::EF_MIDDLE_MOUSE_BUTTON | ui::EF_RIGHT_MOUSE_BUTTON)) != 0)
return;
if (event->type() == ui::ET_MOUSE_CAPTURE_CHANGED) {
EndDrag(false /* revert */);
return;
}
switch (event->type()) {
case ui::ET_MOUSE_DRAGGED: {
gfx::Point location(event->location());
aura::Window::ConvertPointToTarget(widget_->GetNativeWindow(),
widget_->GetNativeWindow()->parent(),
&location);
ScopedConfigure scoped_configure(this, false);
resizer_->Drag(location, event->flags());
event->StopPropagation();
break;
}
case ui::ET_MOUSE_RELEASED: {
ScopedConfigure scoped_configure(this, false);
EndDrag(false /* revert */);
break;
}
case ui::ET_MOUSE_MOVED:
case ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED:
case ui::ET_MOUSE_ENTERED:
case ui::ET_MOUSE_EXITED:
case ui::ET_MOUSEWHEEL:
case ui::ET_MOUSE_CAPTURE_CHANGED:
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 21,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal code churn */
struct tpacket_req *req = &req_u->req;
/* Opening a Tx-ring is NOT supported in TPACKET_V3 */
if (!closing && tx_ring && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Tx-ring is not supported.\n");
goto out;
}
rb = tx_ring ? &po->tx_ring : &po->rx_ring;
rb_queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
err = -EBUSY;
if (!closing) {
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
goto out;
if (packet_read_pending(rb))
goto out;
}
if (req->tp_block_nr) {
/* Sanity tests and some calculations */
err = -EBUSY;
if (unlikely(rb->pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET2_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET3_HDRLEN;
break;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely((int)req->tp_block_size <= 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->tp_block_size)))
goto out;
if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
(int)(req->tp_block_size -
BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
po->tp_reserve))
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size & (TPACKET_ALIGNMENT - 1)))
goto out;
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
order = get_order(req->tp_block_size);
pg_vec = alloc_pg_vec(req, order);
if (unlikely(!pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
/* Transmit path is not supported. We checked
* it above but just being paranoid
*/
if (!tx_ring)
init_prb_bdqc(po, rb, pg_vec, req_u);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Done */
else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
}
lock_sock(sk);
/* Detach socket from network */
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
was_running = po->running;
num = po->num;
if (was_running) {
po->num = 0;
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
synchronize_net();
err = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
if (closing || atomic_read(&po->mapped) == 0) {
err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec, pg_vec);
rb->frame_max = (req->tp_frame_nr - 1);
rb->head = 0;
rb->frame_size = req->tp_frame_size;
spin_unlock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec_order, order);
swap(rb->pg_vec_len, req->tp_block_nr);
rb->pg_vec_pages = req->tp_block_size/PAGE_SIZE;
po->prot_hook.func = (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) ?
tpacket_rcv : packet_rcv;
skb_queue_purge(rb_queue);
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
pr_err("packet_mmap: vma is busy: %d\n",
atomic_read(&po->mapped));
}
mutex_unlock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
if (was_running) {
po->num = num;
register_prot_hook(sk);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
if (closing && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
if (!tx_ring)
prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(po, rb_queue);
}
release_sock(sk);
if (pg_vec)
free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 18,624
|
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