instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: g_token_size(gss_OID_const mech, unsigned int body_size)
{
int hdrsize;
/*
* Initialize the header size to the
* MECH_OID byte + the bytes needed to indicate the
* length of the OID + the OID itself.
*
* 0x06 [MECHLENFIELD] MECHDATA
*/
hdrsize = 1 + gssint_der_length_size(mech->length) + mech->length;
/*
* Now add the bytes needed for the initial header
* token bytes:
* 0x60 + [DER_LEN] + HDRSIZE
*/
hdrsize += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(body_size + hdrsize);
return (hdrsize + body_size);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkitWebViewBaseDraw(GtkWidget* widget, cairo_t* cr)
{
DrawingAreaProxy* drawingArea = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget)->priv->pageProxy->drawingArea();
if (!drawingArea)
return FALSE;
GdkRectangle clipRect;
if (!gdk_cairo_get_clip_rectangle(cr, &clipRect))
return FALSE;
WebCore::Region unpaintedRegion; // This is simply unused.
static_cast<DrawingAreaProxyImpl*>(drawingArea)->paint(cr, clipRect, unpaintedRegion);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::NotifyRegistrationStored(int64_t registration_id,
const GURL& scope) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnRegistrationStored,
registration_id, scope);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(openssl)
{
char * config_filename;
le_key = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_pkey_free, NULL, "OpenSSL key", module_number);
le_x509 = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_x509_free, NULL, "OpenSSL X.509", module_number);
le_csr = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_csr_free, NULL, "OpenSSL X.509 CSR", module_number);
SSL_library_init();
OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_AES) && defined(EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x100020000
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_ccm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_ccm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_ccm());
#endif
SSL_load_error_strings();
/* register a resource id number with OpenSSL so that we can map SSL -> stream structures in
* OpenSSL callbacks */
ssl_stream_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "PHP stream index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT", OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* purposes for cert purpose checking */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT", X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER", X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER", X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN", X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT", X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN", X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#ifdef X509_PURPOSE_ANY
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("X509_PURPOSE_ANY", X509_PURPOSE_ANY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* signature algorithm constants */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1", OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_MD5", OPENSSL_ALGO_MD5, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_MD4", OPENSSL_ALGO_MD4, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_MD2_H
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_MD2", OPENSSL_ALGO_MD2, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_DSS1", OPENSSL_ALGO_DSS1, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA224", OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA224, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA256", OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA256, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA384", OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA384, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA512", OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA512, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ALGO_RMD160", OPENSSL_ALGO_RMD160, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* flags for S/MIME */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_DETACHED", PKCS7_DETACHED, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_TEXT", PKCS7_TEXT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_NOINTERN", PKCS7_NOINTERN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_NOVERIFY", PKCS7_NOVERIFY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_NOCHAIN", PKCS7_NOCHAIN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_NOCERTS", PKCS7_NOCERTS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_NOATTR", PKCS7_NOATTR, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_BINARY", PKCS7_BINARY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("PKCS7_NOSIGS", PKCS7_NOSIGS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_PKCS1_PADDING", RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_SSLV23_PADDING", RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_NO_PADDING", RSA_NO_PADDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING", RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* Informational stream wrapper constants */
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_DEFAULT_STREAM_CIPHERS", OPENSSL_DEFAULT_STREAM_CIPHERS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* Ciphers */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_40", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_40, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_128", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_128, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_64", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_RC2_64, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_DES", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_DES, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_3DES", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_3DES, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC", PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Values for key types */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA", OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#ifndef NO_DSA
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA", OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH", OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC", OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_RAW_DATA", OPENSSL_RAW_DATA, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_ZERO_PADDING", OPENSSL_ZERO_PADDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* SNI support included */
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("OPENSSL_TLSEXT_SERVER_NAME", 1, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
/* Determine default SSL configuration file */
config_filename = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF");
if (config_filename == NULL) {
config_filename = getenv("SSLEAY_CONF");
}
/* default to 'openssl.cnf' if no environment variable is set */
if (config_filename == NULL) {
snprintf(default_ssl_conf_filename, sizeof(default_ssl_conf_filename), "%s/%s",
X509_get_default_cert_area(),
"openssl.cnf");
} else {
strlcpy(default_ssl_conf_filename, config_filename, sizeof(default_ssl_conf_filename));
}
php_stream_xport_register("ssl", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
php_stream_xport_register("sslv3", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
#endif
php_stream_xport_register("tls", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
php_stream_xport_register("tlsv1.0", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
php_stream_xport_register("tlsv1.1", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
php_stream_xport_register("tlsv1.2", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
/* override the default tcp socket provider */
php_stream_xport_register("tcp", php_openssl_ssl_socket_factory);
php_register_url_stream_wrapper("https", &php_stream_http_wrapper);
php_register_url_stream_wrapper("ftps", &php_stream_ftp_wrapper);
REGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 18,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_domain_debug_one(struct sched_domain *sd, int cpu, int level,
struct cpumask *groupmask)
{
struct sched_group *group = sd->groups;
char str[256];
cpulist_scnprintf(str, sizeof(str), sched_domain_span(sd));
cpumask_clear(groupmask);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%*s domain %d: ", level, "", level);
if (!(sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE)) {
printk("does not load-balance\n");
if (sd->parent)
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: !SD_LOAD_BALANCE domain"
" has parent");
return -1;
}
printk(KERN_CONT "span %s level %s\n", str, sd->name);
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, sched_domain_span(sd))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: domain->span does not contain "
"CPU%d\n", cpu);
}
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, sched_group_cpus(group))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: domain->groups does not contain"
" CPU%d\n", cpu);
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%*s groups:", level + 1, "");
do {
if (!group) {
printk("\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: group is NULL\n");
break;
}
/*
* Even though we initialize ->power to something semi-sane,
* we leave power_orig unset. This allows us to detect if
* domain iteration is still funny without causing /0 traps.
*/
if (!group->sgp->power_orig) {
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: domain->cpu_power not "
"set\n");
break;
}
if (!cpumask_weight(sched_group_cpus(group))) {
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: empty group\n");
break;
}
if (!(sd->flags & SD_OVERLAP) &&
cpumask_intersects(groupmask, sched_group_cpus(group))) {
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: repeated CPUs\n");
break;
}
cpumask_or(groupmask, groupmask, sched_group_cpus(group));
cpulist_scnprintf(str, sizeof(str), sched_group_cpus(group));
printk(KERN_CONT " %s", str);
if (group->sgp->power != SCHED_POWER_SCALE) {
printk(KERN_CONT " (cpu_power = %d)",
group->sgp->power);
}
group = group->next;
} while (group != sd->groups);
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
if (!cpumask_equal(sched_domain_span(sd), groupmask))
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: groups don't span domain->span\n");
if (sd->parent &&
!cpumask_subset(groupmask, sched_domain_span(sd->parent)))
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: parent span is not a superset "
"of domain->span\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: usage_long()
{
fprintf(stderr, usage_longstr, UDP_RATE / (1024*1024), DURATION, DEFAULT_TCP_BLKSIZE / 1024, DEFAULT_UDP_BLKSIZE / 1024);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __aio_put_req(struct kioctx *ctx, struct kiocb *req)
{
dprintk(KERN_DEBUG "aio_put(%p): f_count=%ld\n",
req, atomic_long_read(&req->ki_filp->f_count));
assert_spin_locked(&ctx->ctx_lock);
req->ki_users--;
BUG_ON(req->ki_users < 0);
if (likely(req->ki_users))
return 0;
list_del(&req->ki_list); /* remove from active_reqs */
req->ki_cancel = NULL;
req->ki_retry = NULL;
/*
* Try to optimize the aio and eventfd file* puts, by avoiding to
* schedule work in case it is not final fput() time. In normal cases,
* we would not be holding the last reference to the file*, so
* this function will be executed w/out any aio kthread wakeup.
*/
if (unlikely(!fput_atomic(req->ki_filp))) {
get_ioctx(ctx);
spin_lock(&fput_lock);
list_add(&req->ki_list, &fput_head);
spin_unlock(&fput_lock);
schedule_work(&fput_work);
} else {
req->ki_filp = NULL;
really_put_req(ctx, req);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PasswordAutofillAgent::PasswordAutofillAgent(
content::RenderFrame* render_frame,
blink::AssociatedInterfaceRegistry* registry)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(render_frame),
last_supplied_password_info_iter_(web_input_to_password_info_.end()),
logging_state_active_(false),
username_autofill_state_(WebAutofillState::kNotFilled),
password_autofill_state_(WebAutofillState::kNotFilled),
sent_request_to_store_(false),
checked_safe_browsing_reputation_(false),
focus_state_notifier_(this),
password_generation_agent_(nullptr) {
registry->AddInterface(base::Bind(&PasswordAutofillAgent::BindPendingReceiver,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool JSTestInterfaceOwner::isReachableFromOpaqueRoots(JSC::Handle<JSC::Unknown> handle, void*, SlotVisitor& visitor)
{
JSTestInterface* jsTestInterface = jsCast<JSTestInterface*>(handle.get().asCell());
if (jsTestInterface->impl()->hasPendingActivity())
return true;
if (!isObservable(jsTestInterface))
return false;
UNUSED_PARAM(visitor);
return false;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *iname, struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
struct scatterlist sg;
int padding = 4 << (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
unsigned int lim;
unsigned int cryptlen;
lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
return -EIO;
/*
* Copy the filename to the output buffer for encrypting in-place and
* pad it with the needed number of NUL bytes.
*/
cryptlen = max_t(unsigned int, iname->len, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
cryptlen = round_up(cryptlen, padding);
cryptlen = min(cryptlen, lim);
memcpy(oname->name, iname->name, iname->len);
memset(oname->name + iname->len, 0, cryptlen - iname->len);
/* Initialize the IV */
memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Set up the encryption request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: skcipher_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
sg_init_one(&sg, oname->name, cryptlen);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, cryptlen, iv);
/* Do the encryption */
res = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
/* Request is being completed asynchronously; wait for it */
wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
res = ecr.res;
}
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
oname->len = cryptlen;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,937
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ppp_do_recv(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb, struct channel *pch)
{
ppp_recv_lock(ppp);
if (!ppp->closing)
ppp_receive_frame(ppp, skb, pch);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
ppp_recv_unlock(ppp);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSC::JSValue toJS(JSC::ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* impl)
{
return wrap<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface>(exec, globalObject, impl);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<FilePath> GDataCache::GetCachePaths(
const FilePath& cache_root_path) {
std::vector<FilePath> cache_paths;
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheMetaDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCachePinnedDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheOutgoingDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCachePersistentDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDownloadsDir));
cache_paths.push_back(cache_root_path.Append(kGDataCacheTmpDocumentsDir));
return cache_paths;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 8,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isHeading() const {
return roleValue() == HeadingRole;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 21,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OutdatedPluginInfoBarDelegate::Cancel() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("OutdatedPluginInfobar.AllowThisTime"));
return PluginInfoBarDelegate::Cancel();
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_acl_from_disk(
const struct xfs_acl *aclp,
int len,
int max_entries)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
const struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
unsigned int count, i;
if (len < sizeof(*aclp))
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > max_entries || XFS_ACL_SIZE(count) != len)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
acl_e->e_uid = xfs_uid_to_kuid(be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_gid = xfs_gid_to_kgid(be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id));
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 10,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_date(time_t time)
{
int lpc = 0;
char date_str[26];
asctime_r(localtime(&time), date_str);
for (; lpc < 26; lpc++) {
if (date_str[lpc] == '\n') {
date_str[lpc] = 0;
}
}
print_as("'%s'", date_str);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sg_get_reserved_size(struct request_queue *q, int __user *p)
{
unsigned val = min(q->sg_reserved_size, queue_max_sectors(q) << 9);
return put_user(val, p);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_get_group(
struct net_bridge *br, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int hash)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct hlist_node *p;
unsigned count = 0;
unsigned max;
int elasticity;
int err;
mdb = rcu_dereference_protected(br->mdb, 1);
hlist_for_each_entry(mp, p, &mdb->mhash[hash], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
count++;
if (unlikely(br_ip_equal(group, &mp->addr)))
return mp;
}
elasticity = 0;
max = mdb->max;
if (unlikely(count > br->hash_elasticity && count)) {
if (net_ratelimit())
br_info(br, "Multicast hash table "
"chain limit reached: %s\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name);
elasticity = br->hash_elasticity;
}
if (mdb->size >= max) {
max *= 2;
if (unlikely(max >= br->hash_max)) {
br_warn(br, "Multicast hash table maximum "
"reached, disabling snooping: %s, %d\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name, max);
err = -E2BIG;
disable:
br->multicast_disabled = 1;
goto err;
}
}
if (max > mdb->max || elasticity) {
if (mdb->old) {
if (net_ratelimit())
br_info(br, "Multicast hash table "
"on fire: %s\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name);
err = -EEXIST;
goto err;
}
err = br_mdb_rehash(&br->mdb, max, elasticity);
if (err) {
br_warn(br, "Cannot rehash multicast "
"hash table, disabling snooping: %s, %d, %d\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name,
mdb->size, err);
goto disable;
}
err = -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
return NULL;
err:
mp = ERR_PTR(err);
return mp;
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InlineIterator RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak(InlineBidiResolver& resolver, LineInfo& lineInfo, RenderTextInfo& renderTextInfo, FloatingObject* lastFloatFromPreviousLine, unsigned consecutiveHyphenatedLines, WordMeasurements& wordMeasurements)
{
ShapeInsideInfo* shapeInsideInfo = m_block->layoutShapeInsideInfo();
if (!shapeInsideInfo || !shapeInsideInfo->lineOverlapsShapeBounds())
return nextSegmentBreak(resolver, lineInfo, renderTextInfo, lastFloatFromPreviousLine, consecutiveHyphenatedLines, wordMeasurements);
InlineIterator end = resolver.position();
InlineIterator oldEnd = end;
if (!shapeInsideInfo->hasSegments()) {
end = nextSegmentBreak(resolver, lineInfo, renderTextInfo, lastFloatFromPreviousLine, consecutiveHyphenatedLines, wordMeasurements);
resolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(oldEnd);
return oldEnd;
}
const SegmentList& segments = shapeInsideInfo->segments();
SegmentRangeList& segmentRanges = shapeInsideInfo->segmentRanges();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < segments.size() && !end.atEnd(); i++) {
InlineIterator segmentStart = resolver.position();
end = nextSegmentBreak(resolver, lineInfo, renderTextInfo, lastFloatFromPreviousLine, consecutiveHyphenatedLines, wordMeasurements);
ASSERT(segmentRanges.size() == i);
if (resolver.position().atEnd()) {
segmentRanges.append(LineSegmentRange(segmentStart, end));
break;
}
if (resolver.position() == end) {
end = segmentStart;
segmentRanges.append(LineSegmentRange(segmentStart, segmentStart));
resolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(segmentStart);
} else {
LineSegmentRange range(resolver.position(), end);
segmentRanges.append(range);
resolver.setPosition(end, numberOfIsolateAncestors(end));
if (lineInfo.previousLineBrokeCleanly()) {
break;
}
}
}
resolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(oldEnd);
return end;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = NULL;
c->detach_close = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRA16F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing,
float,
uint16_t>(const float* source,
uint16_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[0]);
destination[1] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[3]);
source += 4;
destination += 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnInterestingUsage(int usage_pattern) {
client_->DidNoteInterestingUsage(usage_pattern);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> PaintArtifactCompositor::LayersAsJSON(
LayerTreeFlags flags) const {
ContentLayerClientImpl::LayerAsJSONContext context(flags);
std::unique_ptr<JSONArray> layers_json = JSONArray::Create();
for (const auto& client : content_layer_clients_) {
layers_json->PushObject(client->LayerAsJSON(context));
}
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> json = JSONObject::Create();
json->SetArray("layers", std::move(layers_json));
if (context.transforms_json)
json->SetArray("transforms", std::move(context.transforms_json));
return json;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_read_rx_descr(E1000ECore *core, uint8_t *desc,
hwaddr (*buff_addr)[MAX_PS_BUFFERS])
{
if (e1000e_rx_use_legacy_descriptor(core)) {
e1000e_read_lgcy_rx_descr(core, desc, &(*buff_addr)[0]);
(*buff_addr)[1] = (*buff_addr)[2] = (*buff_addr)[3] = 0;
} else {
if (core->mac[RCTL] & E1000_RCTL_DTYP_PS) {
e1000e_read_ps_rx_descr(core, desc, buff_addr);
} else {
e1000e_read_ext_rx_descr(core, desc, &(*buff_addr)[0]);
(*buff_addr)[1] = (*buff_addr)[2] = (*buff_addr)[3] = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 11,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void date_period_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
date_period_it *iterator = (date_period_it *)iter;
iterator->current_index++;
date_period_it_invalidate_current(iter TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSTestNamedConstructor::~JSTestNamedConstructor()
{
releaseImplIfNotNull();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dvb_usbv2_adapter_exit(struct dvb_usb_device *d)
{
int i;
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s:\n", __func__);
for (i = MAX_NO_OF_ADAPTER_PER_DEVICE - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (d->adapter[i].props) {
dvb_usbv2_adapter_dvb_exit(&d->adapter[i]);
dvb_usbv2_adapter_stream_exit(&d->adapter[i]);
dvb_usbv2_adapter_frontend_exit(&d->adapter[i]);
dvb_usbv2_media_device_unregister(&d->adapter[i]);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void window_overflow_fault(void)
{
unsigned long sp;
sp = current_thread_info()->rwbuf_stkptrs[0];
if(((sp + 0x38) & PAGE_MASK) != (sp & PAGE_MASK))
force_user_fault(sp + 0x38, 1);
force_user_fault(sp, 1);
check_stack_aligned(sp);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation(
const StatusCallback& callback,
base::PlatformFileError rv) {
if (!cancel_callback_.is_null()) {
DCHECK_EQ(kOperationTruncate, pending_operation_);
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_ABORT);
cancel_callback_.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK);
cancel_callback_.Reset();
} else {
callback.Run(rv);
}
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLBodyElement* Document::FirstBodyElement() const {
if (!documentElement() || !IsHTMLHtmlElement(documentElement()))
return nullptr;
for (HTMLElement* child =
Traversal<HTMLElement>::FirstChild(*documentElement());
child; child = Traversal<HTMLElement>::NextSibling(*child)) {
if (auto* body = ToHTMLBodyElementOrNull(*child))
return body;
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int opfnstcw(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xd9;
data[l++] = 0x38 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int system_errno_to_nbd_errno(int err)
{
switch (err) {
case 0:
return NBD_SUCCESS;
case EPERM:
case EROFS:
return NBD_EPERM;
case EIO:
return NBD_EIO;
case ENOMEM:
return NBD_ENOMEM;
#ifdef EDQUOT
case EDQUOT:
#endif
case EFBIG:
case ENOSPC:
return NBD_ENOSPC;
case ESHUTDOWN:
return NBD_ESHUTDOWN;
case EINVAL:
default:
return NBD_EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewHostImplTestHarness::~RenderViewHostImplTestHarness() {
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 28,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftrace_pid_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
int ret = 0;
if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
(file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
ftrace_pid_reset();
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_open(file, &ftrace_pid_sops);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int getliteralsize(const char *p, int c,
unsigned *size, int *binary, const char **parseerr)
{
int isnowait = 0;
uint32_t num;
/* Check for literal8 */
if (*p == '~') {
p++;
*binary = 1;
}
/* check for start of literal */
if (*p != '{') {
*parseerr = "Missing required argument to Append command";
return IMAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
/* Read size from literal */
if (parseuint32(p+1, &p, &num)) {
*parseerr = "Literal size not a number";
return IMAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (*p == '+') {
isnowait++;
p++;
}
if (c == '\r') {
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
}
if (*p != '}' || p[1] || c != '\n') {
*parseerr = "Invalid literal in Append command";
return IMAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (!isnowait) {
/* Tell client to send the message */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "+ go ahead\r\n");
prot_flush(imapd_out);
}
*size = num;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TracingControllerImpl::StopTracing(
const scoped_refptr<TraceDataEndpoint>& trace_data_endpoint) {
return StopTracing(std::move(trace_data_endpoint), "");
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Connect to service on startup
Temporary workaround for flaky tests introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1439082
TBR=eseckler@chromium.org
Bug: 928410, 928363
Change-Id: I0dcf20cbdf91a7beea167a220ba9ef7e0604c1ab
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452767
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Seckler <eseckler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Gable <agable@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#631052}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 25,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void appendfieldlist(struct fieldlist **l, char *section,
strarray_t *fields, char *trail,
void *d, size_t size)
{
struct fieldlist **tail = l;
while (*tail) tail = &(*tail)->next;
*tail = (struct fieldlist *)xmalloc(sizeof(struct fieldlist));
(*tail)->section = xstrdup(section);
(*tail)->fields = fields;
(*tail)->trail = xstrdup(trail);
if(d && size) {
(*tail)->rock = xmalloc(size);
memcpy((*tail)->rock, d, size);
} else {
(*tail)->rock = NULL;
}
(*tail)->next = 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_setup_session_slot_tables(struct nfs4_session *ses)
{
struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl;
int status;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
/* Fore channel */
tbl = &ses->fc_slot_table;
if (tbl->slots == NULL) {
status = nfs4_init_slot_table(tbl, ses->fc_attrs.max_reqs, 1);
if (status) /* -ENOMEM */
return status;
} else {
status = nfs4_reset_slot_table(tbl, ses->fc_attrs.max_reqs, 1);
if (status)
return status;
}
/* Back channel */
tbl = &ses->bc_slot_table;
if (tbl->slots == NULL) {
status = nfs4_init_slot_table(tbl, ses->bc_attrs.max_reqs, 0);
if (status)
/* Fore and back channel share a connection so get
* both slot tables or neither */
nfs4_destroy_slot_tables(ses);
} else
status = nfs4_reset_slot_table(tbl, ses->bc_attrs.max_reqs, 0);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 13,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int mpeg4_decode_dc(MpegEncContext *s, int n, int *dir_ptr)
{
int level, code;
if (n < 4)
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, dc_lum.table, DC_VLC_BITS, 1);
else
code = get_vlc2(&s->gb, dc_chrom.table, DC_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (code < 0 || code > 9 /* && s->nbit < 9 */) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "illegal dc vlc\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (code == 0) {
level = 0;
} else {
if (IS_3IV1) {
if (code == 1)
level = 2 * get_bits1(&s->gb) - 1;
else {
if (get_bits1(&s->gb))
level = get_bits(&s->gb, code - 1) + (1 << (code - 1));
else
level = -get_bits(&s->gb, code - 1) - (1 << (code - 1));
}
} else {
level = get_xbits(&s->gb, code);
}
if (code > 8) {
if (get_bits1(&s->gb) == 0) { /* marker */
if (s->avctx->err_recognition & (AV_EF_BITSTREAM|AV_EF_COMPLIANT)) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dc marker bit missing\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
}
return ff_mpeg4_pred_dc(s, n, level, dir_ptr, 0);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 12,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
do {
/*
* We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
*/
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&octx->ksenc.ks);
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&octx->ksdec.ks);
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
(block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt,
(block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt,
NULL))
return 0;
}
while (0);
/*
* If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
*/
if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
iv = octx->iv;
if (iv) {
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
!= 1)
return 0;
octx->iv_set = 1;
}
octx->key_set = 1;
} else {
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
if (octx->key_set)
CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
else
memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
octx->iv_set = 1;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 19,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons)
{
int i;
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
return 0;
} else {
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
return 0;
}
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
return 1;
}
}
}
if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
&& (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 24,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ManifestManager::RequestManifestImpl(
InternalRequestManifestCallback callback) {
if (!may_have_manifest_) {
std::move(callback).Run(GURL(), Manifest(), nullptr);
return;
}
if (!manifest_dirty_) {
std::move(callback).Run(manifest_url_, manifest_,
manifest_debug_info_.get());
return;
}
pending_callbacks_.push_back(std::move(callback));
if (pending_callbacks_.size() > 1)
return;
FetchManifest();
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::reset() {
LocalFrame* frame = GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (is_in_reset_function_ || !frame)
return;
is_in_reset_function_ = true;
if (DispatchEvent(Event::CreateCancelableBubble(EventTypeNames::reset)) !=
DispatchEventResult::kNotCanceled) {
is_in_reset_function_ = false;
return;
}
ListedElement::List elements(ListedElements());
for (const auto& element : elements) {
if (element->IsFormControlElement())
ToHTMLFormControlElement(element)->Reset();
}
is_in_reset_function_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 5,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *parse_hostspec(char *str, char **path_start_ptr, int *port_ptr)
{
char *s, *host_start = str;
int hostlen = 0, userlen = 0;
char *ret;
for (s = str; ; s++) {
if (!*s) {
/* It is only OK if we run out of string with rsync:// */
if (!port_ptr)
return NULL;
if (!hostlen)
hostlen = s - host_start;
break;
}
if (*s == ':' || *s == '/') {
if (!hostlen)
hostlen = s - host_start;
if (*s++ == '/') {
if (!port_ptr)
return NULL;
} else if (port_ptr) {
*port_ptr = atoi(s);
while (isDigit(s)) s++;
if (*s && *s++ != '/')
return NULL;
}
break;
}
if (*s == '@') {
userlen = s - str + 1;
host_start = s + 1;
} else if (*s == '[') {
if (s != host_start++)
return NULL;
while (*s && *s != ']' && *s != '/') s++; /*SHARED ITERATOR*/
hostlen = s - host_start;
if (*s != ']' || (s[1] && s[1] != '/' && s[1] != ':') || !hostlen)
return NULL;
}
}
*path_start_ptr = s;
ret = new_array(char, userlen + hostlen + 1);
if (userlen)
strlcpy(ret, str, userlen + 1);
strlcpy(ret + userlen, host_start, hostlen + 1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long macvtap_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
return macvtap_ioctl(file, cmd, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Range::setStartBefore(Node* refNode, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!m_start.container()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return;
}
if (!refNode) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return;
}
if (refNode->document() != m_ownerDocument) {
ec = WRONG_DOCUMENT_ERR;
return;
}
ec = 0;
checkNodeBA(refNode, ec);
if (ec)
return;
setStart(refNode->parentNode(), refNode->nodeIndex(), ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LRESULT OmniboxViewWin::OnGetObject(UINT message,
WPARAM wparam,
LPARAM lparam) {
if (lparam == OBJID_CLIENT) {
return LresultFromObject(IID_IAccessible, wparam,
native_view_host_->GetNativeViewAccessible());
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void instruction_breakpoint_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (notify_die(DIE_IABR_MATCH, "iabr_match", regs, 5,
5, SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
if (debugger_iabr_match(regs))
return;
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, TRAP_BRKPT, regs->nip);
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MediaMetadataRetriever::setDataSource(
const sp<IMediaHTTPService> &httpService,
const char *srcUrl,
const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource");
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mRetriever == 0) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (srcUrl == NULL) {
ALOGE("data source is a null pointer");
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
ALOGV("data source (%s)", srcUrl);
return mRetriever->setDataSource(httpService, srcUrl, headers);
}
Commit Message: Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLDeleteRenderbuffers(GLsizei n, const GLuint* renderbuffers) {
glDeleteRenderbuffersEXT(n, renderbuffers);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setRangeText(const String& replacement, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!m_inputType->supportsSelectionAPI()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return;
}
HTMLTextFormControlElement::setRangeText(replacement, ec);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_dm_proc_loc_oob(BOOLEAN valid, BT_OCTET16 c, BT_OCTET16 r)
{
FILE *fp;
char *path_a = "/data/misc/bluedroid/LOCAL/a.key";
char *path_b = "/data/misc/bluedroid/LOCAL/b.key";
char *path = NULL;
char prop_oob[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_proc_loc_oob: valid=%d", valid);
if (oob_cb.sp_c[0] == 0 && oob_cb.sp_c[1] == 0 &&
oob_cb.sp_c[2] == 0 && oob_cb.sp_c[3] == 0 &&
valid)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("save local OOB data in memory");
memcpy(oob_cb.sp_c, c, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
memcpy(oob_cb.sp_r, r, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
property_get("service.brcm.bt.oob", prop_oob, "3");
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_proc_loc_oob prop_oob = %s",prop_oob);
if (prop_oob[0] == '1')
path = path_a;
else if (prop_oob[0] == '2')
path = path_b;
if (path)
{
fp = fopen(path, "wb+");
if (fp == NULL)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_proc_loc_oob: failed to save local OOB data to %s", path);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_dm_proc_loc_oob: save local OOB data into file %s",path);
fwrite (c , 1 , BT_OCTET16_LEN , fp );
fwrite (r , 1 , BT_OCTET16_LEN , fp );
fclose(fp);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 23,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string FidoCableHandshakeHandler::GetEncryptionKeyAfterSuccessfulHandshake(
base::span<const uint8_t, 16> authenticator_random_nonce) const {
std::vector<uint8_t> nonce_message;
fido_parsing_utils::Append(&nonce_message, nonce_);
fido_parsing_utils::Append(&nonce_message, client_session_random_);
fido_parsing_utils::Append(&nonce_message, authenticator_random_nonce);
return GenerateKey(
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(session_pre_key_),
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(
fido_parsing_utils::CreateSHA256Hash(
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(nonce_message))),
kCableDeviceEncryptionKeyInfo);
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 28,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: qtdemux_parse_segments (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, QtDemuxStream * stream,
GNode * trak)
{
GNode *edts;
/* parse and prepare segment info from the edit list */
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "looking for edit list container");
stream->n_segments = 0;
stream->segments = NULL;
if ((edts = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (trak, FOURCC_edts))) {
GNode *elst;
gint n_segments;
gint i, count;
guint64 time, stime;
guint8 *buffer;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "looking for edit list");
if (!(elst = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (edts, FOURCC_elst)))
goto done;
buffer = elst->data;
n_segments = QT_UINT32 (buffer + 12);
/* we might allocate a bit too much, at least allocate 1 segment */
stream->segments = g_new (QtDemuxSegment, MAX (n_segments, 1));
/* segments always start from 0 */
time = 0;
stime = 0;
count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_segments; i++) {
guint64 duration;
guint64 media_time;
QtDemuxSegment *segment;
guint32 rate_int;
media_time = QT_UINT32 (buffer + 20 + i * 12);
/* -1 media time is an empty segment, just ignore it */
if (media_time == G_MAXUINT32)
continue;
duration = QT_UINT32 (buffer + 16 + i * 12);
segment = &stream->segments[count++];
/* time and duration expressed in global timescale */
segment->time = stime;
/* add non scaled values so we don't cause roundoff errors */
time += duration;
stime = gst_util_uint64_scale (time, GST_SECOND, qtdemux->timescale);
segment->stop_time = stime;
segment->duration = stime - segment->time;
/* media_time expressed in stream timescale */
segment->media_start =
gst_util_uint64_scale (media_time, GST_SECOND, stream->timescale);
segment->media_stop = segment->media_start + segment->duration;
rate_int = GST_READ_UINT32_BE (buffer + 24 + i * 12);
if (rate_int <= 1) {
/* 0 is not allowed, some programs write 1 instead of the floating point
* value */
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (qtdemux, "found suspicious rate %" G_GUINT32_FORMAT,
rate_int);
segment->rate = 1;
} else {
segment->rate = rate_int / 65536.0;
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "created segment %d time %" GST_TIME_FORMAT
", duration %" GST_TIME_FORMAT ", media_time %" GST_TIME_FORMAT
", rate %g, (%d)", i, GST_TIME_ARGS (segment->time),
GST_TIME_ARGS (segment->duration),
GST_TIME_ARGS (segment->media_start), segment->rate, rate_int);
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "found %d non-empty segments", count);
stream->n_segments = count;
}
done:
/* no segments, create one to play the complete trak */
if (stream->n_segments == 0) {
if (stream->segments == NULL)
stream->segments = g_new (QtDemuxSegment, 1);
stream->segments[0].time = 0;
stream->segments[0].stop_time = qtdemux->segment.duration;
stream->segments[0].duration = qtdemux->segment.duration;
stream->segments[0].media_start = 0;
stream->segments[0].media_stop = qtdemux->segment.duration;
stream->segments[0].rate = 1.0;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "created dummy segment");
stream->n_segments = 1;
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "using %d segments", stream->n_segments);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForZoomState() {
WebContents* contents =
browser_->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents)
return;
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ZOOM_PLUS,
CanZoomIn(contents));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL,
CanResetZoom(contents));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ZOOM_MINUS,
CanZoomOut(contents));
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::serviceOnAnimationFrame(Document& document, double monotonicAnimationStartTime)
{
if (!document.svgExtensions())
return;
document.accessSVGExtensions().serviceAnimations(monotonicAnimationStartTime);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_gsave(fz_context *ctx, pdf_run_processor *pr)
{
if (pr->gtop == pr->gcap-1)
{
pr->gstate = fz_resize_array(ctx, pr->gstate, pr->gcap*2, sizeof(pdf_gstate));
pr->gcap *= 2;
}
memcpy(&pr->gstate[pr->gtop + 1], &pr->gstate[pr->gtop], sizeof(pdf_gstate));
pr->gtop++;
pdf_keep_gstate(ctx, &pr->gstate[pr->gtop]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline zend_long parse_iv(const unsigned char *p)
{
return parse_iv2(p, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72663 - destroy broken object when unserializing
(cherry picked from commit 448c9be157f4147e121f1a2a524536c75c9c6059)
CWE ID: CWE-502
| 0
| 21,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __attribute__((weak)) kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 29,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String AudioNode::channelInterpretation() const {
return Handler().ChannelInterpretation();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserRenderProcessHost::FastShutdownIfPossible() {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return false; // Single process mode can't do fast shutdown.
if (!content::GetContentClient()->browser()->IsFastShutdownPossible())
return false;
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() ||
child_process_launcher_->IsStarting() ||
!GetHandle())
return false; // Render process hasn't started or is probably crashed.
if (!sudden_termination_allowed())
return false;
child_process_launcher_.reset();
fast_shutdown_started_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType DrawPolygonPrimitive(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
fill,
status;
double
mid;
PolygonInfo
**magick_restrict polygon_info;
register EdgeInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
ssize_t
start_y,
stop_y,
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(primitive_info != (PrimitiveInfo *) NULL);
if (primitive_info->coordinates <= 1)
return(MagickTrue);
/*
Compute bounding box.
*/
polygon_info=AcquirePolygonThreadSet(primitive_info);
if (polygon_info == (PolygonInfo **) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0)
{
status=DrawBoundingRectangles(image,draw_info,polygon_info[0],exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
polygon_info=DestroyPolygonThreadSet(polygon_info);
return(status);
}
}
RestoreMSCWarning
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," begin draw-polygon");
fill=(primitive_info->method == FillToBorderMethod) ||
(primitive_info->method == FloodfillMethod) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
mid=ExpandAffine(&draw_info->affine)*SaneStrokeWidth(image,draw_info)/2.0;
bounds=polygon_info[0]->edges[0].bounds;
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info[0]->number_edges; i++)
{
p=polygon_info[0]->edges+i;
if (p->bounds.x1 < bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=p->bounds.x1;
if (p->bounds.y1 < bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=p->bounds.y1;
if (p->bounds.x2 > bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=p->bounds.x2;
if (p->bounds.y2 > bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=p->bounds.y2;
}
bounds.x1-=(mid+1.0);
bounds.y1-=(mid+1.0);
bounds.x2+=(mid+1.0);
bounds.y2+=(mid+1.0);
if ((bounds.x1 >= (double) image->columns) ||
(bounds.y1 >= (double) image->rows) ||
(bounds.x2 <= 0.0) || (bounds.y2 <= 0.0))
{
polygon_info=DestroyPolygonThreadSet(polygon_info);
return(MagickTrue); /* virtual polygon */
}
bounds.x1=bounds.x1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x1 >= (double) image->columns-1.0 ?
(double) image->columns-1.0 : bounds.x1;
bounds.y1=bounds.y1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y1 >= (double) image->rows-1.0 ?
(double) image->rows-1.0 : bounds.y1;
bounds.x2=bounds.x2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x2 >= (double) image->columns-1.0 ?
(double) image->columns-1.0 : bounds.x2;
bounds.y2=bounds.y2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y2 >= (double) image->rows-1.0 ?
(double) image->rows-1.0 : bounds.y2;
status=MagickTrue;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
if ((primitive_info->coordinates == 1) ||
(polygon_info[0]->number_edges == 0))
{
/*
Draw point.
*/
start_y=(ssize_t) ceil(bounds.y1-0.5);
stop_y=(ssize_t) floor(bounds.y2+0.5);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status) \
magick_number_threads(image,image,stop_y-start_y+1,1)
#endif
for (y=start_y; y <= stop_y; y++)
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
ssize_t
start_x,
stop_x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
start_x=(ssize_t) ceil(bounds.x1-0.5);
stop_x=(ssize_t) floor(bounds.x2+0.5);
x=start_x;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,x,y,(size_t) (stop_x-x+1),1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
GetPixelInfo(image,&pixel);
for ( ; x <= stop_x; x++)
{
if ((x == (ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.x-0.5)) &&
(y == (ssize_t) ceil(primitive_info->point.y-0.5)))
{
GetFillColor(draw_info,x-start_x,y-start_y,&pixel,exception);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,&pixel,q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
polygon_info=DestroyPolygonThreadSet(polygon_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" end draw-polygon");
return(status);
}
/*
Draw polygon or line.
*/
start_y=(ssize_t) ceil(bounds.y1-0.5);
stop_y=(ssize_t) floor(bounds.y2+0.5);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(status) \
magick_number_threads(image,image,stop_y-start_y+1,1)
#endif
for (y=start_y; y <= stop_y; y++)
{
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
start_x,
stop_x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
start_x=(ssize_t) ceil(bounds.x1-0.5);
stop_x=(ssize_t) floor(bounds.x2+0.5);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,start_x,y,(size_t) (stop_x-start_x+
1),1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=start_x; x <= stop_x; x++)
{
double
fill_alpha,
stroke_alpha;
PixelInfo
fill_color,
stroke_color;
/*
Fill and/or stroke.
*/
fill_alpha=GetFillAlpha(polygon_info[id],mid,fill,draw_info->fill_rule,
x,y,&stroke_alpha);
if (draw_info->stroke_antialias == MagickFalse)
{
fill_alpha=fill_alpha > 0.25 ? 1.0 : 0.0;
stroke_alpha=stroke_alpha > 0.25 ? 1.0 : 0.0;
}
GetFillColor(draw_info,x-start_x,y-start_y,&fill_color,exception);
CompositePixelOver(image,&fill_color,fill_alpha*fill_color.alpha,q,
(double) GetPixelAlpha(image,q),q);
GetStrokeColor(draw_info,x-start_x,y-start_y,&stroke_color,exception);
CompositePixelOver(image,&stroke_color,stroke_alpha*stroke_color.alpha,q,
(double) GetPixelAlpha(image,q),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
polygon_info=DestroyPolygonThreadSet(polygon_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," end draw-polygon");
return(status);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: indexed_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *color, float *rgb)
{
float alt[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
struct indexed *idx = cs->data;
indexed_to_alt(ctx, cs, color, alt);
idx->base->to_ccs(ctx, idx->base, alt, rgb);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bitmap_writer_build(struct packing_data *to_pack)
{
static const double REUSE_BITMAP_THRESHOLD = 0.2;
int i, reuse_after, need_reset;
struct bitmap *base = bitmap_new();
struct rev_info revs;
writer.bitmaps = kh_init_sha1();
writer.to_pack = to_pack;
if (writer.show_progress)
writer.progress = start_progress("Building bitmaps", writer.selected_nr);
init_revisions(&revs, NULL);
revs.tag_objects = 1;
revs.tree_objects = 1;
revs.blob_objects = 1;
revs.no_walk = 0;
revs.include_check = should_include;
reset_revision_walk();
reuse_after = writer.selected_nr * REUSE_BITMAP_THRESHOLD;
need_reset = 0;
for (i = writer.selected_nr - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
struct bitmapped_commit *stored;
struct object *object;
khiter_t hash_pos;
int hash_ret;
stored = &writer.selected[i];
object = (struct object *)stored->commit;
if (stored->bitmap == NULL) {
if (i < writer.selected_nr - 1 &&
(need_reset ||
!in_merge_bases(writer.selected[i + 1].commit,
stored->commit))) {
bitmap_reset(base);
reset_all_seen();
}
add_pending_object(&revs, object, "");
revs.include_check_data = base;
if (prepare_revision_walk(&revs))
die("revision walk setup failed");
traverse_commit_list(&revs, show_commit, show_object, base);
revs.pending.nr = 0;
revs.pending.alloc = 0;
revs.pending.objects = NULL;
stored->bitmap = bitmap_to_ewah(base);
need_reset = 0;
} else
need_reset = 1;
if (i >= reuse_after)
stored->flags |= BITMAP_FLAG_REUSE;
hash_pos = kh_put_sha1(writer.bitmaps, object->oid.hash, &hash_ret);
if (hash_ret == 0)
die("Duplicate entry when writing index: %s",
oid_to_hex(&object->oid));
kh_value(writer.bitmaps, hash_pos) = stored;
display_progress(writer.progress, writer.selected_nr - i);
}
bitmap_free(base);
stop_progress(&writer.progress);
compute_xor_offsets();
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_adapter_properties_evt(bt_status_t status, uint32_t num_props,
bt_property_t *p_props)
{
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, adapter_properties_cb,
status, num_props, p_props);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 15,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LayerTreeHostImpl::PrepareTiles() {
if (!tile_priorities_dirty_)
return false;
client_->WillPrepareTiles();
bool did_prepare_tiles = tile_manager_.PrepareTiles(global_tile_state_);
if (did_prepare_tiles)
tile_priorities_dirty_ = false;
client_->DidPrepareTiles();
return did_prepare_tiles;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ber_out_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int length)
{
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
out_uint16_be(s, tagval);
}
else
{
out_uint8(s, tagval);
}
if (length >= 0x80)
{
out_uint8(s, 0x82);
out_uint16_be(s, length);
}
else
out_uint8(s, length);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_stream_idx(const unsigned *d)
{
if (d[0] >= '0' && d[0] <= '9' &&
d[1] >= '0' && d[1] <= '9') {
return (d[0] - '0') * 10 + (d[1] - '0');
} else {
return 100; // invalid stream ID
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/avidec: Limit formats in gab2 to srt and ass/ssa
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 12,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void convert_32s_P4C4(OPJ_INT32 const* const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32* pDst,
OPJ_SIZE_T length, OPJ_INT32 adjust)
{
OPJ_SIZE_T i;
const OPJ_INT32* pSrc0 = pSrc[0];
const OPJ_INT32* pSrc1 = pSrc[1];
const OPJ_INT32* pSrc2 = pSrc[2];
const OPJ_INT32* pSrc3 = pSrc[3];
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
pDst[4 * i + 0] = pSrc0[i] + adjust;
pDst[4 * i + 1] = pSrc1[i] + adjust;
pDst[4 * i + 2] = pSrc2[i] + adjust;
pDst[4 * i + 3] = pSrc3[i] + adjust;
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 2,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_KillTimer(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param, int timer_id) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
engine->formfill_timers_.erase(timer_id);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(strripos)
{
zval *zneedle;
zend_string *needle;
zend_string *haystack;
zend_long offset = 0;
char *p, *e;
char *found;
zend_string *needle_dup, *haystack_dup, *ord_needle = NULL;
ALLOCA_FLAG(use_heap);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "Sz|l", &haystack, &zneedle, &offset) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZSTR_ALLOCA_ALLOC(ord_needle, 1, use_heap);
if (Z_TYPE_P(zneedle) == IS_STRING) {
needle = Z_STR_P(zneedle);
} else {
if (php_needle_char(zneedle, ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle)) != SUCCESS) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle)[1] = '\0';
needle = ord_needle;
}
if ((ZSTR_LEN(haystack) == 0) || (ZSTR_LEN(needle) == 0)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(needle) == 1) {
/* Single character search can shortcut memcmps
Can also avoid tolower emallocs */
if (offset >= 0) {
if ((size_t)offset > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + (size_t)offset;
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack) - 1;
} else {
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack);
if (offset < -INT_MAX || (size_t)(-offset) > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack) + (size_t)offset;
}
/* Borrow that ord_needle buffer to avoid repeatedly tolower()ing needle */
*ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle) = tolower(*ZSTR_VAL(needle));
while (e >= p) {
if (tolower(*e) == *ZSTR_VAL(ord_needle)) {
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_LONG(e - p + (offset > 0 ? offset : 0));
}
e--;
}
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
haystack_dup = php_string_tolower(haystack);
if (offset >= 0) {
if ((size_t)offset > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + offset;
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack);
} else {
if (offset < -INT_MAX || (size_t)(-offset) > ZSTR_LEN(haystack)) {
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Offset is greater than the length of haystack string");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup);
if (-offset < ZSTR_LEN(needle)) {
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack);
} else {
e = ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup) + ZSTR_LEN(haystack) + offset + ZSTR_LEN(needle);
}
}
needle_dup = php_string_tolower(needle);
if ((found = (char *)zend_memnrstr(p, ZSTR_VAL(needle_dup), ZSTR_LEN(needle_dup), e))) {
RETVAL_LONG(found - ZSTR_VAL(haystack_dup));
zend_string_release(needle_dup);
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
} else {
zend_string_release(needle_dup);
zend_string_release(haystack_dup);
ZSTR_ALLOCA_FREE(ord_needle, use_heap);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 7,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigatorImpl::StartHistoryNavigationInNewSubframe(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& default_url) {
return controller_->StartHistoryNavigationInNewSubframe(render_frame_host,
default_url);
}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_mappedv4(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int val;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = sp->v4mapped;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType(HTMLInputElement* element)
: BaseDateAndTimeInputType(element)
, m_dateTimeEditElement(0)
, m_spinButtonElement(0)
, m_clearButton(0)
, m_pickerIndicatorElement(0)
, m_pickerIndicatorIsVisible(false)
, m_pickerIndicatorIsAlwaysVisible(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
{
if (uid_eq(current_euid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
mode >>= 6;
else if (in_egroup_p(GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
mode >>= 3;
if ((op & ~mode & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC)) == 0)
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::SetMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_set");
test_object_v8_internal::SetMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint StubGLCreateShader(GLenum type) {
return glCreateShader(type);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cexit(JF, enum js_AstType T, js_Ast *node, js_Ast *target)
{
js_Ast *prev;
do {
prev = node, node = node->parent;
switch (node->type) {
default: /* impossible */ break;
case STM_WITH:
emit(J, F, OP_ENDWITH);
break;
case STM_FOR_IN:
case STM_FOR_IN_VAR:
/* pop the iterator if leaving the loop */
if (F->script) {
if (T == STM_RETURN || T == STM_BREAK || (T == STM_CONTINUE && target != node)) {
/* pop the iterator, save the return or exp value */
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
if (T == STM_CONTINUE)
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2); /* put the iterator back on top */
} else {
if (T == STM_RETURN) {
/* pop the iterator, save the return value */
emit(J, F, OP_ROT2);
emit(J, F, OP_POP);
}
if (T == STM_BREAK || (T == STM_CONTINUE && target != node))
emit(J, F, OP_POP); /* pop the iterator */
}
break;
case STM_TRY:
/* came from try block */
if (prev == node->a) {
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
if (node->d) cstm(J, F, node->d); /* finally */
}
/* came from catch block */
if (prev == node->c) {
/* ... with finally */
if (node->d) {
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
cstm(J, F, node->d); /* finally */
} else {
emit(J, F, OP_ENDCATCH);
}
}
break;
}
} while (node != target);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *key,
const void *buf, size_t buflen,
int flags, int type)
{
if (strcmp(key, "") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return nfs4_proc_set_acl(d_inode(dentry), buf, buflen);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ft_add_renderer( FT_Module module )
{
FT_Library library = module->library;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_ListNode node;
if ( FT_NEW( node ) )
goto Exit;
{
FT_Renderer render = FT_RENDERER( module );
FT_Renderer_Class* clazz = (FT_Renderer_Class*)module->clazz;
render->clazz = clazz;
render->glyph_format = clazz->glyph_format;
/* allocate raster object if needed */
if ( clazz->glyph_format == FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_OUTLINE &&
clazz->raster_class->raster_new )
{
error = clazz->raster_class->raster_new( memory, &render->raster );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
render->raster_render = clazz->raster_class->raster_render;
render->render = clazz->render_glyph;
}
/* add to list */
node->data = module;
FT_List_Add( &library->renderers, node );
ft_set_current_renderer( library );
}
Fail:
if ( error )
FT_FREE( node );
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdio_generic_unimplemented_eject_media (void *p_user_data) {
/* Sort of a stub here. Perhaps log a message? */
return DRIVER_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 11,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void on_failed_event(const char *event_name)
{
/* Don't show the 'on failure' button if the processed event
* was started by that button. (avoid infinite loop)
*/
if (strcmp(event_name, EMERGENCY_ANALYSIS_EVENT_NAME) == 0)
return;
add_warning(
_("Processing of the problem failed. This can have many reasons but there are three most common:\n"\
"\t▫ <b>network connection problems</b>\n"\
"\t▫ <b>corrupted problem data</b>\n"\
"\t▫ <b>invalid configuration</b>"
));
if (!g_expert_mode)
{
add_warning(
_("If you want to update the configuration and try to report again, please open <b>Preferences</b> item\n"
"in the application menu and after applying the configuration changes click <b>Repeat</b> button."));
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_repeat);
}
add_warning(
_("If you are sure that this problem is not caused by network problems neither by invalid configuration\n"
"and want to help us, please click on the upload button and provide all problem data for a deep analysis.\n"\
"<i>Before you do that, please consider the security risks. Problem data may contain sensitive information like\n"\
"passwords. The uploaded data are stored in a protected storage and only a limited number of persons can read them.</i>"));
show_warnings();
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_onfail);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSoundFile::AdjustSampleLoop(MODINSTRUMENT *pIns)
{
if (!pIns->pSample) return;
if (pIns->nLoopEnd > pIns->nLength) pIns->nLoopEnd = pIns->nLength;
if (pIns->nLoopStart+2 >= pIns->nLoopEnd)
{
pIns->nLoopStart = pIns->nLoopEnd = 0;
pIns->uFlags &= ~CHN_LOOP;
}
UINT len = pIns->nLength;
if (pIns->uFlags & CHN_16BIT)
{
short int *pSample = (short int *)pIns->pSample;
if (pIns->uFlags & CHN_STEREO)
{
pSample[len*2+6] = pSample[len*2+4] = pSample[len*2+2] = pSample[len*2] = pSample[len*2-2];
pSample[len*2+7] = pSample[len*2+5] = pSample[len*2+3] = pSample[len*2+1] = pSample[len*2-1];
} else
{
pSample[len+4] = pSample[len+3] = pSample[len+2] = pSample[len+1] = pSample[len] = pSample[len-1];
}
if ((pIns->uFlags & (CHN_LOOP|CHN_PINGPONGLOOP|CHN_STEREO)) == CHN_LOOP)
{
if ((pIns->nLoopEnd+3 >= pIns->nLength) || (m_nType & MOD_TYPE_S3M))
{
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+1] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+1];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+2] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+2];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+3] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+3];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+4] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+4];
}
}
} else
{
signed char *pSample = pIns->pSample;
#ifndef FASTSOUNDLIB
if ((pIns->nLength > 0x100) && (m_nType & (MOD_TYPE_MOD|MOD_TYPE_S3M))
&& (!(pIns->uFlags & CHN_STEREO)))
{
int smpend = pSample[pIns->nLength-1], smpfix = 0, kscan;
for (kscan=pIns->nLength-1; kscan>0; kscan--)
{
smpfix = pSample[kscan-1];
if (smpfix != smpend) break;
}
int delta = smpfix - smpend;
if (((!(pIns->uFlags & CHN_LOOP)) || (kscan > (int)pIns->nLoopEnd))
&& ((delta < -8) || (delta > 8)))
{
while (kscan<(int)pIns->nLength)
{
if (!(kscan & 7))
{
if (smpfix > 0) smpfix--;
if (smpfix < 0) smpfix++;
}
pSample[kscan] = (signed char)smpfix;
kscan++;
}
}
}
#endif
if (pIns->uFlags & CHN_STEREO)
{
pSample[len*2+6] = pSample[len*2+4] = pSample[len*2+2] = pSample[len*2] = pSample[len*2-2];
pSample[len*2+7] = pSample[len*2+5] = pSample[len*2+3] = pSample[len*2+1] = pSample[len*2-1];
} else
{
pSample[len+4] = pSample[len+3] = pSample[len+2] = pSample[len+1] = pSample[len] = pSample[len-1];
}
if ((pIns->uFlags & (CHN_LOOP|CHN_PINGPONGLOOP|CHN_STEREO)) == CHN_LOOP)
{
if ((pIns->nLoopEnd+3 >= pIns->nLength) || (m_nType & (MOD_TYPE_MOD|MOD_TYPE_S3M)))
{
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+1] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+1];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+2] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+2];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+3] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+3];
pSample[pIns->nLoopEnd+4] = pSample[pIns->nLoopStart+4];
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum transmit_result transmit(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->msgcurr < c->msgused &&
c->msglist[c->msgcurr].msg_iovlen == 0) {
/* Finished writing the current msg; advance to the next. */
c->msgcurr++;
}
if (c->msgcurr < c->msgused) {
ssize_t res;
struct msghdr *m = &c->msglist[c->msgcurr];
res = sendmsg(c->sfd, m, 0);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_written += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
/* We've written some of the data. Remove the completed
iovec entries from the list of pending writes. */
while (m->msg_iovlen > 0 && res >= m->msg_iov->iov_len) {
res -= m->msg_iov->iov_len;
m->msg_iovlen--;
m->msg_iov++;
}
/* Might have written just part of the last iovec entry;
adjust it so the next write will do the rest. */
if (res > 0) {
m->msg_iov->iov_base = (caddr_t)m->msg_iov->iov_base + res;
m->msg_iov->iov_len -= res;
}
return TRANSMIT_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (res == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
if (!update_event(c, EV_WRITE | EV_PERSIST)) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't update event\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return TRANSMIT_HARD_ERROR;
}
return TRANSMIT_SOFT_ERROR;
}
/* if res == 0 or res == -1 and error is not EAGAIN or EWOULDBLOCK,
we have a real error, on which we close the connection */
if (settings.verbose > 0)
perror("Failed to write, and not due to blocking");
if (IS_UDP(c->transport))
conn_set_state(c, conn_read);
else
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return TRANSMIT_HARD_ERROR;
} else {
return TRANSMIT_COMPLETE;
}
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sys_rt_sigreturn(unsigned long r3, unsigned long r4, unsigned long r5,
unsigned long r6, unsigned long r7, unsigned long r8,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct ucontext __user *uc = (struct ucontext __user *)regs->gpr[1];
sigset_t set;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
unsigned long msr;
#endif
/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uc, sizeof(*uc)))
goto badframe;
if (__copy_from_user(&set, &uc->uc_sigmask, sizeof(set)))
goto badframe;
set_current_blocked(&set);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (__get_user(msr, &uc->uc_mcontext.gp_regs[PT_MSR]))
goto badframe;
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr)) {
/* We recheckpoint on return. */
struct ucontext __user *uc_transact;
if (__get_user(uc_transact, &uc->uc_link))
goto badframe;
if (restore_tm_sigcontexts(regs, &uc->uc_mcontext,
&uc_transact->uc_mcontext))
goto badframe;
}
else
/* Fall through, for non-TM restore */
#endif
if (restore_sigcontext(regs, NULL, 1, &uc->uc_mcontext))
goto badframe;
if (restore_altstack(&uc->uc_stack))
goto badframe;
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTOREALL);
return 0;
badframe:
if (show_unhandled_signals)
printk_ratelimited(regs->msr & MSR_64BIT ? fmt64 : fmt32,
current->comm, current->pid, "rt_sigreturn",
(long)uc, regs->nip, regs->link);
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_discoverable(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc != 1) {
printf("Discoverable mode not specified.\n");
return 1;
}
if (strcmp(argv[0], "true") && strcmp(argv[0], "false")) {
printf("Invalid discoverable mode '%s'.\n", argv[0]);
return 2;
}
uint8_t packet[] = { 0x1A, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x00 };
if (argv[0][0] == 't')
packet[ARRAY_SIZE(packet) - 1] = 0x03;
return !write_hci_command(HCI_PACKET_COMMAND, packet, ARRAY_SIZE(packet));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 19,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MetricsWebContentsObserver::TestingObserver::TestingObserver(
content::WebContents* web_contents)
: observer_(page_load_metrics::MetricsWebContentsObserver::FromWebContents(
web_contents)) {
observer_->AddTestingObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 5,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int michael_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct michael_mic_desc_ctx *mctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
struct michael_mic_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
mctx->pending_len = 0;
mctx->l = ctx->l;
mctx->r = ctx->r;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::applyStretchAlignmentToChild(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit lineCrossAxisExtent)
{
if (!isColumnFlow() && child->style()->logicalHeight().isAuto()) {
if (!hasOrthogonalFlow(child)) {
LayoutUnit heightBeforeStretching = needToStretchChildLogicalHeight(child) ? constrainedChildIntrinsicContentLogicalHeight(child) : child->logicalHeight();
LayoutUnit stretchedLogicalHeight = heightBeforeStretching + availableAlignmentSpaceForChildBeforeStretching(lineCrossAxisExtent, child);
ASSERT(!child->needsLayout());
LayoutUnit desiredLogicalHeight = child->constrainLogicalHeightByMinMax(stretchedLogicalHeight, heightBeforeStretching - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
if (desiredLogicalHeight != child->logicalHeight()) {
child->setOverrideLogicalContentHeight(desiredLogicalHeight - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
child->setLogicalHeight(0);
child->forceChildLayout();
}
}
} else if (isColumnFlow() && child->style()->logicalWidth().isAuto()) {
if (hasOrthogonalFlow(child)) {
LayoutUnit childWidth = std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, lineCrossAxisExtent - crossAxisMarginExtentForChild(child));
childWidth = child->constrainLogicalWidthByMinMax(childWidth, childWidth, this);
if (childWidth != child->logicalWidth()) {
child->setOverrideLogicalContentWidth(childWidth - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth());
child->forceChildLayout();
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_MuxInfo *gf_sm_get_mux_info(GF_ESD *src)
{
u32 i;
GF_MuxInfo *mux;
i=0;
while ((mux = (GF_MuxInfo *)gf_list_enum(src->extensionDescriptors, &i))) {
if (mux->tag == GF_ODF_MUXINFO_TAG) return mux;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::InitWithNode(
const blink::WebNode& web_node) {
DCHECK(!web_node.isNull());
DCHECK(web_node.document().frame());
DCHECK(!IsRendering());
state_ = INITIALIZED;
source_frame_.Reset(web_node.document().frame());
source_node_ = web_node;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ahash_mcryptd_final(struct ahash_request *desc)
{
/* alignment is to be done by multi-buffer crypto algorithm if needed */
return crypto_ahash_final(desc);
}
Commit Message: crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 16,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::MaybeInterceptAsStream(
net::URLRequest* request,
network::ResourceResponse* response,
std::string* payload) {
payload->clear();
const std::string& mime_type = response->head.mime_type;
GURL origin;
if (!delegate_ || !delegate_->ShouldInterceptResourceAsStream(
request, mime_type, &origin, payload)) {
return nullptr;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
StreamContext* stream_context =
GetStreamContextForResourceContext(info->GetContext());
auto handler = std::make_unique<StreamResourceHandler>(
request, stream_context->registry(), origin, false);
info->set_is_stream(true);
auto stream_info = std::make_unique<StreamInfo>();
stream_info->handle = handler->stream()->CreateHandle();
stream_info->original_url = request->url();
stream_info->mime_type = mime_type;
if (response->head.headers.get()) {
stream_info->response_headers =
base::MakeRefCounted<net::HttpResponseHeaders>(
response->head.headers->raw_headers());
}
delegate_->OnStreamCreated(request, std::move(stream_info));
return std::move(handler);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 22,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::NotifyUserActivation() {
Send(new FrameMsg_NotifyUserActivation(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init ion_reserve(struct ion_platform_data *data)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < data->nr; i++) {
if (data->heaps[i].size == 0)
continue;
if (data->heaps[i].base == 0) {
phys_addr_t paddr;
paddr = memblock_alloc_base(data->heaps[i].size,
data->heaps[i].align,
MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_ANYWHERE);
if (!paddr) {
pr_err("%s: error allocating memblock for heap %d\n",
__func__, i);
continue;
}
data->heaps[i].base = paddr;
} else {
int ret = memblock_reserve(data->heaps[i].base,
data->heaps[i].size);
if (ret)
pr_err("memblock reserve of %zx@%lx failed\n",
data->heaps[i].size,
data->heaps[i].base);
}
pr_info("%s: %s reserved base %lx size %zu\n", __func__,
data->heaps[i].name,
data->heaps[i].base,
data->heaps[i].size);
}
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(MultipleIterator, __construct)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern;
zend_long flags = MIT_NEED_ALL|MIT_KEYS_NUMERIC;
if (zend_parse_parameters_throw(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|l", &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
intern->flags = flags;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SaveResultAndQuit(bool success,
const history::URLRow&,
const history::VisitVector&) {
query_url_success_ = success;
quit_closure_.Run();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 28,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct request_queue *blk_alloc_queue(gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
return blk_alloc_queue_node(gfp_mask, NUMA_NO_NODE, NULL);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebEventListenerProperties ChromeClientImpl::EventListenerProperties(
LocalFrame* frame,
WebEventListenerClass event_class) const {
if (!frame)
return WebEventListenerProperties::kNothing;
WebFrameWidgetBase* widget =
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame)->LocalRoot()->FrameWidget();
if (!widget || !widget->GetLayerTreeView())
return WebEventListenerProperties::kNothing;
return widget->GetLayerTreeView()->EventListenerProperties(event_class);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,584
|
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